Findings Of Fact Respondent Jimmy D. Napier is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license No. 0063347. His license has been inactive since March 31, 1981. In early May of 1980, respondent entered into a two-year lease of real property owned by Rosemary Drake, with an option to purchase it. The property was encumbered at the time by a mortgage in favor of Farmers Home Administration (FHA), and Ms. Drake was in arrears on her mortgage payments. Respondent went to FHA's DeFuniak Springs office to inquire as to the precise amount of the arrearage before executing the lease with option to purchase. Mack Baker, who had charge of the FHA office in DeFuniak Springs, had knowledge of the transaction at the time and discussed it with respondent. On May 17, 1980, respondent entered into a two-year lease of real property in Walton County, Florida, owned by Bobby Joe and Hilda Turner, with an option to purchase it. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. One provision of this agreement purported to allow respondent to sublease. The Turners were not delinquent on the FHA mortgage that encumbered the property at the time. Mrs. Turner telephoned FHA's Mack Baker and told him that they planned to rent their home and give an option to purchase. Only after this conversation did she and her husband execute the lease and option. Respondent gave the Turners a check for $3,075 on May 17, 1980, and other consideration subsequently. No commission was paid by any party. Respondent told them that he was a real estate broker buying for his own account, before the lease was executed. Respondent said he would let Mr. Baker know about the transaction and did in fact do so. Since the lease was executed, various people have lived on the property. On June 14, 1980, respondent entered into a two-year lease of real property in Walton County, Florida, owned by Doris A. Stocker, now Wilson, with an option to purchase it. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. At the time, the property was encumbered with a mortgage in favor of FHA, and Mrs. Wilson was sometimes in arrears on her mortgage payments. Jack Webster, a licensed real estate broker, had not succeeded in finding a purchaser for Mrs. Wilson's property when he worked as a salesman in the office of another broker with whom Mrs. Wilson had listed the property. After he went out on his own, he introduced Mr. Napier to Mrs. Wilson (then Stocker) and he was present when Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 was executed. He had told Mrs. Wilson that respondent was a real estate broker buying for his own account. Respondent paid Mrs. Wilson $1,750 on June 14, 1980. No commission was paid by any party. Mrs. Wilson asked respondent whether she should contact Mr. Baker, but respondent said he would handle it. Eventually, Mrs. Wilson deeded the property to respondent. One provision of the lease and option purported to allow respondent to sublease. Somebody else is now living on the property. Fred Thurmond Wakefield II, and his wife, Marie, bought some property in Walton County with money they borrowed from FHA. Eventually they listed the property, encumbered with an FHA mortgage, for sale with Joseph G. Lamerche, Jr., a licensed real estate broker in DeFuniak Springs. Mr. Lamerche read the FHA mortgage, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, a form used by FHA in all Florida transactions for the last few years. Paragraph (12) states: Neither the property nor any portion thereof or interest therein shall be leased, assigned, sold, transferred, or encumbered, voluntarily or otherwise, without the writ- ten consent of the Government. The Govern- ment shall have the sole and exclusive rights as beneficiary hereunder, including but not limited to the power to grant consents, par- tial releases, subordinations, and satisfac- tion, and no insured holder shall have any right, title or interest in or to the lien or any benefits hereof. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Mr. Lamerche telephoned Mr. Baker and brought the matter up without, however, mentioning the Wakefield property specifically. Mr. Baker told Mr. Lamerche he was glad respondent had bought the Drake property because of problems with Ms. Drake before the sale. Five or six days later, on February 3, 1981, respondent entered into a two-year lease of the Wakefield property with an option to purchase it. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Mr. Lamerche represented the Wakefields when the agreement was executed. Before they signed, respondent told them he was a real estate broker buying for his own account. Mr. Wakefield asked respondent if the transaction was legal and respondent answered that he had done three or four the same way. In all, respondent leased six separate parcels encumbered by FHA mortgages with options to purchase each, and without the written consent of FHA. Typically, the leases called for respondent to make the lessors' FHA mortgage payments. As a result of conversations going back to 1967 with Jerry Ausley, an FHA employee, respondent was under the impression that real estate encumbered by an FHA mortgage could be leased for two years before refinancing was necessary. He did not know that the consent FHA required for a mortgagor to sell property had to be in writing. FHA's Mr. Baker was aware of each of the six transactions. The office which Mr. Baker headed was the appropriate office at which to approach FHA for permission to lease or encumber property mortgaged to the FHA. FHA accepted mortgage payments from respondent for each of the six mortgages. At some point, however, FHA mailed warning letters threatening everyone leasing to respondent with foreclosure. Under FHA rules, Napier was ineligible for FHA loans because his income was too high, his assets were too great, and because he did not reside on any of the six parcels. Nevertheless, FHA eventually permitted respondent to assume the Turner, Wilson, and Wakefield mortgages. Respondents' Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, and 4. Respondent's proposed recommended order has been considered in preparation of the foregoing findings of fact, and respondent's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint filed against respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Russell A. Cole, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 155 Bonifay, Florida 32425 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint dated January 19, 1989; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the prehearing stipulation filed by the parties, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and disciplining real estate licensees. The Respondent, Charles P. Grimes, is, and has been at all times material to the allegations of the administrative complaint, licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, license number 0034301. In November, 1980, a contract for sale and purchase of real estate was drafted between Dorothy Langham Scott, seller, and Phillip Crawford, buyer. The contract, which was subsequently executed by both parties, provided that a deposit in the amount of $18,500 was to be held in escrow by Respondent. A separate brokerage agreement between Respondent and the seller, executed November 30, 1980, provided that Respondent would receive a brokerage fee of ten percent of the total gross sales price. The brokerage agreement specified that "should the buyer default and not close the transaction in accordance with the Contract, the Broker shall not be entitled to any commission." The agreement further provided that Respondent would "use reasonable diligence and his best efforts to see that the transaction is closed in accordance with the executed Contract." The contract described in paragraph 3 did not close. Subsequently, the seller sued Respondent in the Circuit Court in Palm Beach County, Case no. 82-1974 CA (L) 01 B. On August 13, 1985, an amended final judgment was entered which provided, in part: The facts adduced at trial indicate that Crawford and Scott entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of certain real property, located in Putnam County and that for no apparent reason Crawford defaulted on the contract. The evidence is clear and convincing and unrefuted. Crawford has admitted several letters which he says were communicated to the attorney for Scott. However, the substantial weight of the evidence will not support his repudiation of the contract. Accordingly, it is clear that as between Scott and Grimes, the real estate agent who was allegedly holding the deposit under the provisions of the deposit receipt contract, Scott is entitled to a judgment for $18,500.00, plus its costs and attorney's fees. John L. Burns, an attorney who represented the seller, Scott, during the contract negotiations in November, 1980- January, 1981, received a letter from Respondent on December 12, 1980. That letter, dated December 5, 1980, provided: "I have enclosed the signed contract and have received the deposit check from Dr. Crawford." On or about January 29, 1981, Mr. Burns received a letter from Respondent which indicated that the contract would close in March, 1981. Respondent did not advise the seller that the deposit on the Crawford/Scott contract was not in escrow. Respondent erroneously assumed that a deposit from the buyer (which had been deposited on another contract for sale and purchase) could be applied to the contract. That deposit, in the amount of $20,000.00, was not transferred and was not used to satisfy the amended judgment entered in Scott's favor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of the violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1000.00, suspending his license for a period of 60 days, and placing the Respondent on probation for a period of two years. It is recommended that the Respondent be found not guilty of the other alleged violations. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 89-2517 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 5, it is accepted that on or about November 30, 1980, Respondent was attempting to procure the contract described; however, the exact date the parties executed the contract is not known. The contract was ultimately executed by both parties but did not close. Consequently, the proposed fact, as written, is not supported by the record. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 8, it is accepted that the contract did not close and that a court of competent jurisdiction determined that the deposit should be awarded the seller; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as outside the scope of this record. Paragraph 9 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraph 11 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 12 is accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Glenn M. Blake Blake & Torres, P.A. 200 South Indian River Drive Suite 101 Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Richard D. Reichman is a registered real estate salesman holding license number 0072680. In February, 1975 he was employed by The Berg Agency, Inc., a registered real estate broker. Exhibits 2 and 2a, photocopies of registered letters with return receipts showing complaint and notice of hearing were mailed to Respondent's last address listed with the Real Estate Commission, were admitted into evidence. Accordingly proper service was obtained upon the Respondent. Some two years ago in May, 1974 Mr. and Mrs. Schutte listed their home for sale through Respondent, Reichman, when he was working for Anaconda Realty. That listing expired; and when Respondent asked them to renew the listing in September, 1974, they declined and had no further contact with the Respondent until February, 1975. Shortly after February 10, 1975 the Schuttes received a form letter from the Berg Agency, Inc. dated February 10, 1975 thanking them for listing their property with Berg. A copy of this letter with the listing agreement attached was submitted into evidence as Exhibit 5. The original listing agreement was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 4. Realizing that they had not listed their property with anyone and that the signatures on the listing agreement were not theirs, Mrs. Schutte called the Chamber of Commerce, Better Business Bureau, Margate Police, and the Florida Real Estate Commission before being called by Berg. A man who identified himself as a member of the ethics committee advised Berg of the Schuttes complaint and Berg called Mrs. Schutte. Berg called back the following day to advise the Schuttes that Reichman had been fired. Reichman visited the Schuttes a few days later to ask if they would sign an agreement not to prosecute him, which they declined. At this time Respondent told them that his quota had not been met so he "forged a few" agreements. At this time the Berg Agency had its salesman on a draw against future commissions, depending upon the man's performance. Reichman acknowledged to the office manager at Berg after his forgery had been discovered that he was afraid he would be taken off the draw if he didn't bring in a lot of listings and acknowledged that he had prepared Exhibit 4 and forged the signatures thereon.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Cindy Realty of Hernando, Inc., and William Colello as real estate brokers. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Stephen C. Booth, Esquire 1604 U.S. Highway 19, North New Port Richey, Florida 33552
The Issue Whether Weston Professional Title Group, Inc. (Respondent) committed the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times, Petitioner has been the entity of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to regulate title insurance agencies. At all times relevant to this proceeding Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a title insurance agent in the State of Florida. As of the formal hearing, Respondent had ceased its operations due to the lack of business. Petitioner's investigation of Respondent was initiated by a complaint from a man named Robert Anderson. Mr. Anderson represented to Petitioner that he discovered that his name and address had been used as the buyer of the two residences discussed above. Respondent was the title and settlement agent for both transactions. The Collonade Drive transaction settled on November 14, 2006, with disbursement of the funds on November 16, 2006. The Vignon Place transaction settled and the funds were disbursed on December 15, 2006. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner his belief that his identity had been stolen by a person named Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner that he had not participated in either transaction, and asserted that he did not sign any of the documents that purport to contain his signature as the buyer. Respondent was required to comply with the provisions of RESPA in completing the HUD-1 for the Collonade Drive closing and the Vignon Place closing. RESPA required that disbursements at closing be consistent with the HUD-1 as approved by the parties to the transaction and by the lender. COLLONADE DRIVE CLOSING On September 15, 2006, Robert Anderson (or someone impersonating Mr. Anderson) signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" (Collonade contract), agreeing to buy the Collonade Drive property from Mark Mariani and Kathy Mariani, for the purchase price of $1,375,000.00. The Collonade contract reflected that a deposit had been made to "FLORIDA TITLE & ESC." in the amount of $5,000 with an additional deposit of $5,000 to be made within ten days. Two loans with separate mortgages constituted the financing for the purchase of the Collonade Drive property. The first mortgage was $962,500.00. The second mortgage, as reflected on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement with the disbursement date of November 14, 2006, was $263,430.08.3/ First Magnus Financial Corporation, an Arizona corporation, was the lender for both loans. Agents of America Mortgage Corp. served as the mortgage broker for the transaction. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, an employee of Agents of America Mortgages, signed Mr. Anderson's loan application as the "interviewer." The following was a special clause of the Collonade contract: "BUYER AGREES TO PAY FOR TITLE INSUANCE [sic] FEE ONLY (LINE 1108 OF SELLERS' SETTLEMENT STATEMENT), ONLY [SIC] IF SELLERS AGREE TO USE BUYER'S TITLE COMPANY OF CHOICE. BUYER IS A LICENSED FLORIDA REAL ESTATE AGENT." Petitioner established that Robert Anderson was not a licensed Florida real estate agent. The Collonade contract represented that there were no real estate brokers representing either party. On or about November 1, 2006, Respondent received a "Request for Title Commitment" from Claudit Casanova, a mortgage broker with Agents of America Mortgage Corp., for the Collonade Drive transaction. This was a revised request. The first request had been sent to Respondent on or about October 3, 2006. A copy of the Collonade contract had been forwarded to Respondent with the first request. In connection with the Collonade Drive transaction, Respondent prepared two HUD-1s,4/ each of which was approved by the parties and the lender.5/ The first HUD-1 had an anticipated closing date of November 14, 2006. That HUD-1 was revised in response to the lender's instruction to move the disbursement date from November 14, 2006, to November 16, 2006. The revision of the HUD-1 slightly reduced the amount of cash the buyer needed to close as a result of interest beginning to run on the loans as of November 16 instead of November 14. This was a mail-away closing, in that a packet of the documents the buyer was to sign was sent to someone named Laurie Martin at a title agency in Glendale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified she mailed the packet pursuant to instructions without specifying who gave her those instructions. The packet of documents was returned to Respondent, with signatures purporting to be Mr. Anderson's. Laurie Martin appears to have served as the notary public when the documents were signed. The transaction closed pursuant to the revised HUD-1 with the disbursement date of November 16, 2006, which, as approved by the parties and the lender, reflected that the sellers were to receive $477,884.93 upon closing. Upon closing, Respondent drafted a check in the amount of $477,884.93 made payable to the sellers. The sellers voided the check and based on instructions from the sellers, Ms. Marrero redistributed the sellers' proceeds by wire transfer as follows: $116,112.85 to sellers; $170,250.00 to Pamela Higgins; and $191,508.08 to Unlimited Advertising USA. Fourteen dollars were spent on wire transfer charges. The actual disbursement of the seller's proceeds was inconsistent with the HUD-1 and unknown to the buyer and the lender. Respondent violated the provisions of RESPA by disbursing the proceeds of the sale in a manner that was inconsistent with the HUD-1. $195,000 DEPOSIT The Collonade contract reflected that a $5,000 deposit had been made to "Fla. Title & Esc." required for the buyer to pay an additional deposit of $5,000 within ten days. There was no evidence establishing any relationship between Respondent and "Fla. Title & Esc." Both HUD-1s for the Collonade Drive transaction reflected that the buyer had provided to the sellers a deposit in the amount of $195,000. These HUD-1s, reflecting that the sellers were holding a deposit in the amount of $195,000, were approved by the parties and the lender. Ms. Marrero testified that she was instructed to include the $195,000 deposit on the HUD-1s without specifying who gave her those instructions. Ms. Marrero did not attempt to verify that the $195,000 deposit was actually being held by the sellers. FRAUD Petitioner alleged that the Collonade Drive transaction was fraudulent. Mr. Wenger's testimony, based in part on reports of mortgage fraud prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, supported that allegation. Other evidence supporting that allegation included the following facts The first mortgage quickly went into foreclosure; A mailing address given for Robert Anderson did not (as of April 19, 2011) exist. The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Claudia Rodriguez, a former Florida title agent whose license had been suspended by Petitioner for failing to disburse in accordance with HUD statements and disbursing on uncollected funds; The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Juan Carlos Rodriguez (the person who supposedly took the credit application from Robert Anderson); The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Agents of America Mortgage Corporation (the mortgage broker for the Collonade closing. Juan Carlos Rodriguez supposedly notarized the document authorizing disbursement of part of the sellers' proceeds to Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson's purported signatures on different documents are inconsistent. The address for Mr. Anderson as it appears on the HUD- 1 Settlement Statements is 14233 W. Jenan Drive, Surprise, Arizona. Prior to the closing Ms. Marrero sent by Federal Express a copy of the unexecuted closing documents to "Pam Higgins c/o Robert S. Anderson" 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Following the closing, Ms. Marrero sent a copy of the closing documents by Federal Express to Robert S. Anderson, at the address 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified that she acted on instructions in sending the two packages, without identifying who gave her those instructions. There was no evidence that anyone employed by Respondent knew anyone connected to this transaction prior to being asked to provide a title commitment. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent had anything to do with the buy-sell agreement between the buyer and the sellers or the efforts by Mr. Anderson (or the person or persons impersonating Mr. Anderson) to obtain financing for the purchase. While there was significant evidence that the Colonnade Closing was a fraudulent transaction, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent was complicit in that fraud. VIGNON COURT CLOSING On a date prior to November 6, 2006, Maribel and Timothy Graves signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" offering to sell their Vignon Court residence to Robert Anderson for the purchase price of $1,975,000.00. Mr. and Mrs. Graves were represented by counsel during this transaction. The copy of the contract admitted into evidence had not been signed by Mr. Anderson and did not bear a legible date. The contract provided an acceptance date of November 6, 2006. The fully executed contract was not admitted into evidence. On October 4, 2006, Claudit Casanova of Agents of America Mortgage requested Respondent to provide a title commitment for the Vignon Court transaction. In that request, the sales price was stated as being $1,975,000; the loan amount was $1,481,250 and the mortgagee was American Brokers Conduit. Preferred Properties, Int., Inc., was listed as being the real estate broker for the transaction. Respondent prepared a HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction that reflected a closing and disbursement date of December 15, 2006. DEPOSIT The unexecuted (by the buyer) and undated copy Purchase Agreement required a deposit of $100,000 at the time of acceptance with an additional $50,000 being due within ten days thereafter. There was no evidence as to the terms of the completely executed Purchase Agreement. Line 201 of the HUD-1 reflected a deposit of $250,000 paid on behalf of the buyer. Respondent did not verify that deposit had been made. The HUD-1 specified that the deposit was being held by the sellers. The buyer, sellers, and lender approved the HUD-1, which reflected the existence of a deposit of $250,000, prior to closing. GASPARE VALENTINO On December 6, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Graves entered into a "Joint Venture and Property Resale Agreement" (Resale Agreement) pertaining to the sale of the Vignon Court residence with Gaspare Valentino. On February 5, 2002, Gaspare Rino Valentino was issued a license by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation of the type "Real Estate Broker or Sales" and of the rank "Sales Associate." That license was valid at the times relevant to this proceeding. Paragraph 2 of the Resale Agreement provides as follows: (2) SALE EFFORTS: CONTRACT PROCEEDS. Valentino agrees to use reasonable efforts to obtain a third party purchaser (a "Purchaser") for the Property. Valentino is not required to advertise the Property or list the Property for sale, but shall have such right to do so. Valentino does not guaranty [sic] the procurement of a Purchaser. The parties agree that the intention is for Valentino to secure a Purchaser who will pay a purchase price sufficient in order to (i) satisfy the existing debt upon the Property, (ii) pay ordinary and reasonable closing costs of the transaction, (iii) generate a net proceeds [illegible] to Owner not less than ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000); and (iv) generate such further sums beyond the foregoing in order to pay Valentino a fee for services rendered as set forth in this Agreement. In accordance with such understanding, Owner agrees to enter into and fully execute a Contract for Purchase and Sale with a Purchaser procured by Valentino which is consistent with the terms set forth in this Agreement, including without limitation, a designated sales price which enables Owner to receive at closing a net proceeds sum equal to ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) (the "Owner's Sale Proceeds") after payment of the Property Sale Expenses, hereinafter defined as set forth in Paragraph 3. Owner agrees that any net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner's Sale Proceeds shall be payable to Valentino (the "Excess Proceeds Fee), as Valentino's fee for the efforts of Valentino as set forth herein. Paragraph 3 (i) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" as follows: Owner shall receive the Owner Sale Proceeds consisting of exactly ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) from the net sales proceeds . . . Paragraph 3 (ii) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" and the "Owner Sale Proceeds": Valentino shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fees, constituting all remaining net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner Sale Proceeds, as a fee for services rendered by Valentino pursuant to this Agreement. Paragraph 7 of the Resale Agreement is as follows: 7. Licensed Agent: Valentino represents and discloses that Valentino is a licensed real estate agent in the State of Florida. Notwithstanding such, Valentino is individually entering into this Agreement using his own resources to assist Owner in the improvement and sale of the Property, and as such is a principal in this transaction earning the Excess Proceeds Fee. The parties acknowledge that Valentino is an investor in this transaction and as such at closing is entitled to and shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fee as set forth in Section [Paragraph] 3(ii) of this Agreement. Under RESPA, Section 700 of a HUD-1 is appropriately used for reporting the payments for commissions to real estate salesmen and/or brokers as part of the "Settlement Charges." Such payments can also be reported under Section 1300 ("Additional Settlement Charges"), if the payments are appropriately labeled. Respondent reflected the payment of $527,656.92 as "Payoff" to Gaspare Valentino at line 1307 of Section 1300." Prior to closing the buyer, sellers, and lender had approved the HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction. The lender was aware of the Resale Agreement. Mr. Marrero is an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida. Mr. Marrero construed the payments to Mr. Valentino to be other than a real estate commission. Although it is clear that Petitioner considers that payment to Mr. Valentino to be a real estate commission, the terms of the Resale Agreement entitled Mr. Marrero to treat that payment as being to an investor. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent erroneously stated the payment to Mr. Valentino on the HUD-1. SURETY BOND As a condition of licensure, a title agency is required to provide to Petitioner a $35,000 security deposit or a $35,000 surety bond. In connection with its application for licensure on August 29, 2002, Respondent filed the required surety bond with Petitioner. The bond was issued by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland with bond number 133046577. On July 14, 2004, Petitioner received from Respondent a surety bond issued by Western Surety Company in the amount of $35,000, effective as of August 29, 2004. The bond number was 69728435. On May 28, 2010, Petitioner received a letter from his surety dated May 24, 2010, which advised that bond number 69728435 would be voided or cancelled as of August 29, 2010. That letter of cancellation showed a copy being furnished to Respondent at the address "1820 North. Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida 33326." On June 11, 2010, Petitioner advised Respondent by letter sent to "1820 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite. 105, Weston, Florida 33326" that it had received the cancellation letter. The letter stated, in part, as follows: If we do not receive a replacement bond within 30 days of the dated letter, we will forward your file to the appropriate division for disciplinary action. If you do not plan to continue transacting business and wish to terminate your license, you must submit a request to us immediately. Prior to May 24, 2010, Respondent moved its offices from 1802 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida, to Suite 304 of the same building. Mr. Marrero testified that he had no recollection of receiving the letters cancelling the surety bond or the letter from Petitioner dated June 11, 2010. Respondent was without a surety bond between August 29, 2010, and November 18, 2010. Petitioner did not establish that Respondent's failure to maintain it surety bond during that period was willful within the meaning of section 626.8437(9). No prior disciplinary action has been brought against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of subsections 626.8473(2) and (4) as alleged in Count I of the Amended AC; and guilty of failing to maintain a surety bond as required by section 626.8418(2) in violation of section 626.8437(1), as alleged in Count III of the Amended AC. It is further recommended that the final order find Respondent not guilty of all other violations alleged in the Amended AC. For the violations found as to Count I, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of six months. For the violations found in Count III, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of three months. It is further recommended that the periods of suspension run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2012
The Issue The issue is whether respondent acted as a mortgage lender within the meaning of Section 494.001(3), Florida Statutes, and thus is subject to Division licensure requirements.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division), is a state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the Florida Mortgage Brokerage and Lending Act which is codified in Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Among other things, the Division regulates mortgage lenders and requires such persons or entities to secure a license. Respondent, White Pine Resouces, Inc. (WPR), is a Florida corporation formed in March 1986. Its sole shareholder is John R. Grass, a Pensacola attorney. Although the corporation was originally formed for a number of purposes, its primary activity is the real estate investment business. It holds no licenses issued by, or registrations with, the Division. WPR's current business address is 358-C West Nine Mile Road, Pensacola, Florida. WPR's principal source of money is Grass, or his professional association, who loan money to the corporation. In some cases, the money is used to acquire parcels of property for resale, make necessary repairs or improvements, and then provide owner financing to the buyer. In other cases, WPR loans money to persons needing to make improvements to their homes or rental property and takes back a second mortgage from the borrower. These types of transactions, which occurred during the years 1992-95, are found in documents offered in evidence as petitioner's exhibits 1-5. Respondent has also stipulated that several other transactions of this nature occurred during that same period of time. In every case, WPR was investing its own money or that of its principal. In 1992, a Division examiner analyst noted the following listing in the Yellow Pages section of the Pensacola telephone directory under the heading of "Mortgages": White Pine Resources Having Trouble With Financing Residential & Land Fast Service on 1st Mortgages The advertisement also contained respondent's street address and telephone number. In the 1993-94 telephone directory, WPR carried the following advertisement under the "Mortgages" section of the Yellow Pages: White Pine Resources Specialists! Bad Credit - We Can Help Vacant Land Loans In the 1995-96 telephone directory, WPR placed the following advertisement in the "Mortgages" section of the Yellow Pages: White Pines Resources A Private Investor Not a Mortgage Broker Specialists! We Can Help Vacant Land Loans Although the Division first noted one of WPR's Yellow Page advertisements in 1992, for some reason it did not conduct a formal investigation of respondent's activities until February 28, 1994. On that day, an examiner analyst made an unannounced visit to respondent's office for the purpose of inspecting its records to determine if WPR was acting as a mortgage lender. However, WPR's principal, John R. Grass, was not in the office, and the analyst simply left his business card and a message for Grass to contact him. The next morning, Grass telephoned the analyst's supervisor and advised him that since WPR was merely a private investor, and not a mortgage lender, it was not subject to the Division's regulation, and hence it would not provide copies of its records. A subpoena duces tecum was then issued by the Division, records were produced pursuant to the subpoena, and this controversy ensued. The parties agree, however, that this action was not prompted by complaints from consumers or other persons having dealings with WPR. The record indicates that a mortgage lender differs from a private investor in several material respects. An important distinction is that a private investor uses its own funds rather than those of another party. Also, a private investor does not buy or sell paper, does not escrow taxes, does not split or broker commissions, and does not close its own loans. In all of these respects, WPR had the attributes of a private investor. When mortgage brokerage firms are involved in transactions with private investors, they must supply the private investor with certain documents that are not provided to an institutional investor. Among others, they include a disclosure agreement, receipt of recorded instruments, an appraisal or waiver of the same, and title insurance. In addition, Division rules require that a mortgage brokerage firm record its transactions with private investors in a log journal known as DBF-MB-888. The evidence shows that for transactions between WPR and at least two mortgage brokerage firms during the years in question, the two firms recorded those transactions on DBF-MB-888. They also provided WPR with documents typically given to private investors. The Division has adopted Rule 3D-40.290(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides that a person is deemed to be holding himself out to the public as being in the mortgage lending business if he advertises in a manner "which would lead the reader to believe the person was in the business of buying, making or selling mortgage loans." The rule has not been challenged and, for purposes of resolving this controversy, is presumed to be valid. In view of the representations that WPR provided "Fast Service on 1st Mortgages" and "Vacant Land Loans," it is fair to infer that the Yellow Page advertisements made by WPR would reasonably lead the reader to believe that WPR was in the business of buying, making or selling mortgage loans. Therefore, by virtue of advertising in the Yellow Pages, WPR is deemed to be holding itself out to the public as being in the mortgage lending business. During the years 1993-95, the Division routinely sent WPR questionnaires regarding various WPR transactions with licensed lenders. The transmittal letter accompanying the questionnaire noted that the Division was conducting "a routine examination" of the licensed lender (and not WPR), and WPR's comments would "be of material assistance to (the Division) in determining compliance with the Florida Mortgage Brokerage Act." By way of an estoppel defense, WPR has essentially contended that the questionnaires constituted a representation by the Division that WPR was merely a private lender. It further contends that, to its detriment, it relied upon that representation. But there is nothing in the documents that states that the Division considered WPR to be a private lender. Nor is there any evidence that the Division made any other oral or written representations to WPR that it did not need to secure a license. Finally, assuming arguendo that such a representation occurred, there was no showing that WPR relied to its detriment on such an alleged "misstatement of fact." WPR also raises the defense of laches arguing that it was severely prejudiced by the Division's delay in prosecuting this action. Except for testimony that respondent was forced to secure the services of an attorney to defend against this action, and its principal was required to attend a hearing, there was no showing of prejudice on the part of WPR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order requiring respondent to cease and desist from engaging in the mortgage lending business without a license. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-0290 Petitioner: Because petitioner's post-hearing filing is more in the nature of a memorandum of law containing argument rather than proposed findings of fact, specific rulings have not been made. Respondent: Because respondent's post-hearing filing is more in the nature of a memorandum of law containing argument rather than proposed findings of fact, specific rulings have not been made. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry L. Hooper, III, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Clyde C. Caillouet, Jr., Esquire 4900 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 103 Pensacola, Florida 32503 John T. Reading, Jr., Esquire 358-C West Nine Mile Road Pensacola, Florida 32534-1818
Findings Of Fact Glen H. Miller is a registered real estate broker holding license #0060204 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Miller was the registered real estate broker in a transaction between David and Marsha Ewan, and Roy and Marilyn Cutrell. Miller prepared a contract for sale and purchase of real estate, Exhibit #5, for Roy and Marilyn Cutrell as buyers and presented it to Marsha and David Ewan, as sellers. The terms regarding the mortgage to be assumed in Paragraph B in Section 2 were based upon information given Miller by the Ewans when the property was listed. It is uncontroverted that as of the date the contract was prepared Miller had no knowledge that Ewan had refinanced the house and the mortgage terms had changed. This contract was presented in the presence of the Cutrells to the Ewans on January 20 or 21, 1977. There is a controversy as to when the Cutrells became aware the mortgage terms were different from those stated in the contract. The Ewans testified that they told the Cutrells the terms were different after the contract had been signed by both parties but not in Miller's presence. The Cutrells stated that they learned the mortgage terms were different when they inquired about the mortgage to Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan, holders of the mortgage. This occurred on January 24, 1977. In either event, both parties agree that Miller had no knowledge of the change in the terms of the mortgage until January 24. Miller prepared and presented a new contract to the Ewans and Cutrells which correctly reflected the mortgage data. The Cutrells represented to Miller and the Ewans that they did not consider the mortgage terms important and did not desire to sign the revised contract. The Ewans did not insist upon the revised contract. Subsequently, the Cutrells failed to deliver the additional deposit of $14,000 on February 1, 1977. Their reasons for failure to do so had nothing to do with the amount of the mortgage or the terms thereof. The Cutrells were advised by Miller's wife, a real estate salesman, that they would be in default if they did not deliver the $14,000 additional deposit and if they defaulted they would lose their initial $1,000 deposit. The Cutrells did not contest the forfeiture of their initial deposit and advised that they did not wish to complete the transaction. On February 4, 1977, a check was prepared by the broker to the Ewans in the amount of $700. The Ewans picked this check up on February 7, 1977. The remaining $300 was retained in the escrow account at all times. The Cutrells first demanded the return of the deposit orally on February The subsequently made written demands on February 23, 1977. Between the oral demand and the written demand, the broker reported the controversy existing with the Cutrells to the Florida Real Estate Commission, which eventually resulted in these charges being brought.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Glen H. Miller as a registered real estate broker. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 ADDENDUM The Hearing Officer has read and considered the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission. The facts presented in the Recommended Order are based on Substantial and competent evidence contained in the record. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings COPIES FURNISHED: Mark A. Grimes, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Harvey R. Klein, Esquire 333 NW 3rd Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670
Findings Of Fact Based on the admissions of the Respondent, on the testimony of the witnesses, and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact: Respondent Larry L. Toney is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0089521 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker, t/a Larry L. Toney Realty, Inc., 4629 Moncrief Road West, Jacksonville, Florida 32209. At the time of the events described below, Ernest W. Mabrey was the owner of a house located at 3926 Perry Street, Jacksonville, Florida. On or about March 3, 1986, the Respondent met with Josephine Watkins, who is the daughter of Ernest W. Mabrey, at her home in Lake Butler, Florida, and advised her and Mr. Mabrey that the property described above, then owned by Mr. Mabrey, was in foreclosure. Ernestine Byrd, another daughter of Mr. Mabrey, was also present. An action to foreclose the mortgage on the subject property had in fact been filed at the time the Respondent met with Ernest W. Mabrey and members of his family. The Respondent requested that Ernest W. Mabrey sign a warranty deed to evidence the fact that he, Ernest W. Mabrey, had no interest in saving the subject property from the then pending mortgage foreclosure action. Josephine Watkins and Ernestine Byrd discussed the proposed transaction before any papers were signed. Ernest W. Mabrey did not object to transferring the subject property. On or about March 3, 1986, Ernest W. Mabrey, as grantor, signed a warranty deed which conveyed the subject property to Emory Robinson, Jr. Mr. Mabrey willingly signed his name to the warranty deed with the understanding that he was releasing his interest in the subject property because he was sick and neither he nor his daughters had the funds necessary to redeem the property. Josephine Watkins helped her father, Mr. Mabrey, write his name on the warranty deed and Ernestine Byrd signed the warranty deed as a witness to her father's signature. At the time the warranty deed was signed, no payments had been made on the mortgage for approximately five years. The Respondent did not promise to pay any money to Mr. Mabrey or his daughters in connection with the transfer of the subject property, nor did they expect to receive any money. The Respondent did not forge any signatures on the warranty deed described above. All of the signatures on that warranty deed are genuine. The grantee in the subject transaction, Emory Robinson, Jr., paid the holder of the first mortgage the sum of $6,787.11 in order to bring the payments to a current status and he assumed the mortgage. The mortgage foreclosure action was then voluntarily dismissed.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order in this case dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Findings Proposed by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: First two lines accepted. Last line rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 5: First sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence is rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 6: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 7: Accepted in substance, with additional findings for clarity and completeness. Paragraph 8: It is accepted that the house was conveyed to Mr. Robinson. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence or as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Findings Proposed by Respondent: All of the findings proposed by the Respondent have been accepted in whole or in substance, except as specifically set forth below. In making my findings of fact, I have omitted a number of unnecessary details proposed by the Respondent. Paragraph 8: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 18: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 19: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details and as legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: JAMES H. GILLIS, ESQUIRE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 HENRY E. DAVIS, ESQUIRE ROBERTS & DAVIS 816 BROAD STREET JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 32202 DARLENE F. KELLER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 WILLIAM O'NEIL, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
