The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, Melvin Stewart, t/a Depar Motel, has engaged in acts and/or conduct, as more particularly set forth in the Notice to Show Cause filed herein, which warrants the Petitioner's proposed sanctions of suspending or revoking the Respondent's license to operate a motel or the assessment of a civil penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witness and his demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Melvin Stewart, trading as the Depar Motel, is licensed by the Petitioner and holds license control No. 23-13405H. The Depar Motel is situated at 301 Northwest 62nd Street, Miami, Florida, and is of concrete block and stucco construction. The motel has approximately sixty-three (63) rooms plus a bar and lounge. Rogers Brown is an inspector employed by the Petitioner since approximately 1976. During his tenure, there has been a brief hiatus in his employment during which time he was on leave with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida. During the course of his employment, Inspector Brown made a routine inspection of the Depar Hotel on February 7, 1979, and noted that the Depar Motel was not being properly maintained, for reasons set forth hereinafter for which the Respondent, Melvin Stewart, was cited as violating Chapter 509, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapters 7C-1 and 7C- 3, Florida Administrative Code. Without reciting herein the numerous alleged violations set forth in the Notice to Show Cause /1 or reciting in toto inspector Brown's testimony, the following is a brief summary of the conditions he found at the Depar Motel during his inspection on February 7, 1979. Inspector Brown found that the fire extinguishers at the Depar Motel were located at travel distances of more than seventy-five (75) feet apart. He found inadequate electrical wiring in several rooms, in that electrical wires were burned and exposed, air conditioning wires were exposed in several apartments, electrical shaving receptacles were exposed, electrical wall sockets did not have adequate cover plates and several rooms had no sockets in the bedrooms and bathrooms. (Apartments 33, 51, 10 and 19.) Inspector Brown found several apartment doors with improper locking devices; were poorly sealed; had loose door frames and broken jalousies in the doors and windows. (Apartments 13, 7, 15, 17, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40, 52 and 55.) He also found several rooms which had holes in the bathrooms and living room walls. (Apartments 7, 8, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 33, 39, 49, 52, 55, 57 and 59.) Inspector Brown also found several apartments which had inoperable jalousie windows and doors. (Apartments 4, 5, 11, 15, 24, 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 52, 57 and 60.) Inspector Brown found several rooms with clogged plumbing drains and he observed standing water in several plumbing fixtures, (Apartments 7 and 4.) He also found leaking faucets and hot water handles missing in several apartments. (Apartments 4, 16, 40, 52, 55 and 59.) Inspector Brown also found that several apartments lacked screen windows and that the screen windows in several apartments were torn. (Apartments 1, 4, 8, 10, 12, 15, 28, 29, 32, 34, 40, 51 and 60,) He also observed rodent droppings and roaches in several apartments. (TR. 70-73.) Inspector Brown found weeds, trash and debris outside the building. He noted that several apartments had soiled mattresses and in others the mattresses had no covers. (Apartments 4, 6, 30, 32 and 33.) Finally, Inspector Brown testified that the Respondent did not have on file with the Division a form No. 208, which is required of all licensees. 2/ Chapter 7C-3.02, Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent did not offer any witnesses to refute the charges set forth herein in the Notice to Show Cause or to counter the credited testimony of Inspector Rogers Brown.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: Upon issuance of the Division of Hotels and Restaurants' Final Order herein, the Respondent's license be suspended for a period of one (1) year with the suspension held in abeyance for a period of thirty (30) days, during which time the Respondent be allowed an opportunity to correct the deficiencies cited in the Notice to Show Cause filed herein. In the event that Respondent fails to correct the deficiencies as set forth in the referenced notice during the allowable period, Petitioner shall be authorized to immediately suspend Respondent's license for a period of one (1) year without the necessity for further hearing. Section 509.261(3)(a), Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice when it failed to hire Petitioner as a shift supervisor at the Conserv I wastewater treatment facility.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Parties Petitioner is a white male. At the time of the events giving rise to this proceeding, Petitioner was 52 years old. Petitioner holds a Class “A” wastewater treatment plant operator license from the State of Florida. Petitioner has worked for the City as a wastewater treatment plant operator since 1991. All of Petitioner’s experience with the City has been at the City's Iron Bridge facility. Respondent is a municipality of the State of Florida. Respondent operates at least three wastewater treatment facilities -– known as Conserv I, Conserv II (not directly implicated in this case), and Iron Bridge -– through its Wastewater Process and Operations Bureau (Wastewater Bureau). Each facility is slightly different. The Conserv I facility has a capacity of 7.5 million gallons per day (mgd) and is designed to service approximately 75,000 people. The facility uses a unique, technologically complex process to treat wastewater. The treated wastewater from the Conserv I facility is used for irrigation, and is referred to as “reuse” or reclaimed water. The Iron Bridge Facility is larger than the Conserv I facility. It has a capacity of 40 mgd and is designed to service approximately 400,000 people. The facility uses a more traditional process to treat the wastewater. The treated wastewater from the Iron Bridge Facility is discharged into wetlands and rivers; it is not used as reclaimed water. Hiring Process for the Conserv I Shift Supervisor In early 2001, a shift supervisor position came open at the Iron Bridge facility. Petitioner applied for that position, but he was not interviewed. The Iron Bridge shift supervisor position was filled by Don Proscia, a 64 year old white male. Mr. Proscia was a shift supervisor at the Conserv I facility, and his hiring at the Iron Bridge facility was considered to be a “lateral transfer” by the City. Apparently, the City does not interview other candidates where an existing employee requests a lateral transfer, which explains why Petitioner was not interviewed for the Iron Bridge shift supervisor position. As a result of Mr. Proscia’s lateral transfer, a shift supervisor position came open at the Conserv I facility. The minimum qualifications for the Conserv I shift supervisor position, as reflected on the job posting (Joint Exhibit 12), were graduation from high school, two years of experience in the operation of a wastewater treatment facility, and a valid Florida driver's license. The position also required a current Class "B" wastewater treatment operator license, and required a Class "A" license to be obtained within two years of employment. Experience in advance wastewater treatment and prior supervisory experience were preferred. Petitioner applied for the Conserv I shift supervisor position. Terry White and Klaus Blixer also applied for that position. Mr. White is an African-American male, and he was 29 years old at the time. He has worked for the City as a wastewater treatment plant operator since 1994. All of Mr. White’s experience with the City has been at the Conserv I facility. At the time of his application, Mr. White held a Class “B” wastewater treatment plant operator license. Subsequently, he obtained a Class "A" license. Mr. Blixer is a white male. The record does not reflect his age. Mr. Blixer has worked for the City as a wastewater treatment plant operator since approximately 1995. All of his experience with the City has been at the Iron Bridge facility. At the time of his application, Mr. Blixer held a Class “A” wastewater treatment plant operator license. The three applicants for the Conserv I shift supervisor position were interviewed by a committee composed of Ernie Cox, Charlie McComas, and Paul Deuel, all of whom are members of management with the Wastewater Bureau. Mr. Cox is an African-American male; Mr. McComas and Mr. Deuel are both white males. All of the committee members are 40 years of age or older. The committee interviewed each applicant and asked them the same set of interview questions. The interviews were all conducted on the same day. After all of the interviews were complete, the committee discussed their general impressions of each applicant. The committee did not make the hiring decision on that day. However, each of the committee members testified at the hearing that they ranked Mr. White the top candidate at that point, and two of the three committee members testified that they considered Mr. Blixer (not Petitioner) to be the second-best candidate. In an effort to obtain additional input on the applicants, Mr. Cox contacted Charles Thompson, the plant manager at the Iron Bridge facility where Petitioner and Mr. Blixer worked. Mr. Cox is the plant manager at the Conserv I facility where Mr. White worked, so he was generally familiar with him and his qualifications; however, he also obtained feedback on Mr. White from Mr. McComas, who was a chief operator at Conserv I and was more familiar with Mr. White's attendance and on-the-job performance. Mr. Thompson did not strongly recommend either Petitioner or Mr. Blixer. He characterized Petitioner as an "average" employee who did what was asked of him but nothing more. Mr. Cox relayed this information to the other members of the committee. Based upon the interviews and the additional information acquired by Mr. Cox, the committee unanimously agreed to recommend that Mr. White be hired for the Conserv I shift supervisor position. Mr. Cox forwarded the committee’s recommendation to David Sloan, the chief of the Wastewater Bureau. Mr. Sloan accepted the committee’s recommendation and forwarded it to Tom Lothrop, the director of the Environmental Services Department, for final approval. Mr. Lothrop gave final approval to the recommendation, and Mr. White formally assumed the shift supervisor position in June 2001. There is no credible evidence that either race or age were considered at any point during the interview process or that the committee was given a mandate by anyone in the City's management to hire a particular person or a person of a particular race or age for the Conserv I shift supervisor position. Indeed, at the hearing, each member of the interview committee adamantly (and credibly) denied consideration of race or age in connection with their recommendation to hire Mr. White. The committee members based their recommendation to hire Mr. White on his qualifications, work ethic, and experience at the Conserv I facility. As discussed below, Mr. White was more qualified for the Conserv I shift supervisor position than was Petitioner. The only direct evidence of discrimination cited by Petitioner in support of his claim allegedly occurred during the course of the internal grievance process initiated by Petitioner after he was not hired for the shift supervisor position. That process and the alleged evidence of discrimination are discussed below. City’s Internal Grievance Process After Petitioner learned that he had not been hired for the shift supervisor position, he filed a grievance with the City. The grievance was denied at each step in the process as described below. The City’s grievance process includes four steps. Step One is a hearing before Petitioner's plant manager, i.e., Charles Thompson. Step Two is a hearing before the chief of the Wastewater Bureau, i.e., David Sloan. Step Three is a hearing before the director of the Environmental Services Department, i.e., Tom Lothrop. Step Four is a hearing before a three-member grievance committee composed of two persons selected by the City and one person selected by Petitioner. The first three steps are relatively informal and are not recorded. They are meetings and/or discussions to address the concerns of the person who filed the grievance. Step Four is a more formal hearing, and it is tape recorded. Petitioner waived his Step One hearing, and the record does not include any credible evidence regarding Petitioner's Step Three hearing. Indeed, the focus of Petitioner's discrimination claim is on events which allegedly occurred at the Step Two and Step Four hearings. Petitioner's Step Two hearing was conducted on September 14, 2001. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Sloan (or anyone else) made a statement at that hearing regarding a need or requirement to hire a minority for the Conserv I shift supervisor position. Petitioner's Step Four hearing was conducted on November 10, 2001. That portion of the tape recording of the Step Four hearing introduced by the parties in this proceeding does not include any direct evidence of discrimination. Mr. Sloan did state that given two equal candidates, he would favor the minority in an effort to increase the diversity in the Wastewater Bureau. However, he further stated (consistent with his testimony at the hearing) that race did not factor into the decision to select Mr. White for the Conserv I shift supervisor position because Mr. White and Petitioner were not equal candidates. One of the exhibits discussed by Mr. Sloan at the Step Four hearing compared the percentage of black and white managerial employees in the Wastewater Bureau as a result of Mr. White's promotion with the percentage which would have existed if Petitioner had received the shift supervisor position. That exhibit, which was received in this proceeding as Joint Exhibit 7, was prepared by Mr. Sloan solely for use at the Step Four hearing to rebut Petitioner's discrimination claim and to show that the City does not discriminate based upon race or age. The exhibit was not used in connection with the decision to select Mr. White for the Conserv I shift supervisor position. Indeed, there is no credible evidence that the document existed prior to the Step Four hearing. In any event, Joint Exhibit 7 shows that there is not a pattern of discrimination in the Wastewater Bureau against persons in Petitioner's class (i.e., white males over age 45). The exhibit shows that more than 67 percent of the managers and supervisors in the Wastewater Bureau are white, and 35 percent of the managers and supervisors were promoted to those positions after the age of 46. The other exhibit discussed by Mr. Sloan at the Step Four hearing compared the qualifications of Mr. White and Petitioner. That exhibit, which was received in this proceeding as Joint Exhibit 6, presents an incomplete view of Petitioner's education and training because Mr. Sloan obtained the information on Petitioner (and Mr. White) from the personnel files maintained at the Wastewater Bureau, not the files maintained in the City's Personnel Office. The omissions in Joint Exhibit 6 are immaterial in this proceeding, however, because the record includes the Personnel Office files for Petitioner (Joint Exhibit 1) and Mr. White (Joint Exhibit 2), and those exhibits rather than Joint Exhibit 6 were relied upon in evaluating the relative qualifications of Petitioner and Mr. White. Relative Qualifications of Petitioner and Mr. White Both Petitioner and Mr. White met the minimum qualifications for the Conserv I shift supervisor position as reflected on the job posting. Neither Petitioner nor Mr. White has a college degree, but both have taken college courses. Mr. White has taken courses towards a business administration degree at Valencia Community College. Petitioner completed a correspondence course from Michigan State University on supervisory management in the water and wastewater field.2 Both Petitioner and Mr. White have attended numerous seminars and continuing education courses on wastewater. Petitioner has held a Class "A" wastewater treatment plant operator license since at least 1995. Mr. White held only a Class "B" license at the time of his application; however, he obtained his Class "A" license in April 2002, which is well within the time specified in the job posting for the shift supervisor position. Mr. White has a reclaimed water field inspector certification, which is important for Conserv I because the facility produces reclaimed water. Petitioner does not have this certification. Both Petitioner and Mr. White had worked "out of class" as shift supervisors at their respective plants. Both performed well in those positions. Petitioner had slightly more experience than Mr. White as a wastewater treatment plant operator with the City, i.e., 10 years compared to seven years. However, all of Mr. White's experience was at the Conserv I facility, whereas all of Petitioner's experience was at the Iron Bridge facility. The location of the experience was one of the most significant factors in the hiring decision. Mr. White's experience at the Conserv I facility meant that he would not have a significant learning curve in the shift supervisor position. By contrast, it would take Petitioner at least three to six months to adapt to the operational differences at the Conserv I facility. The other significant factors in the hiring decision were Mr. White's work ethic, his demonstrated communication and leadership skills, and his familiarity with the City's policies and procedures. Mr. White demonstrated his communication and leadership skills as a union representative and as a member of the City's pension advisory board. Mr. White's familiarity with the City's policies and procedures was important because he would be responsible for interpreting and applying those policies and procedures to the employees that he supervised. Mr. White was characterized by his supervisors as an exemplary employee who was highly motivated and takes pride in performing his job well. He willingly took on additional tasks, and he worked well without direction. By contrast, Petitioner was characterized by his supervisors as an "average" employee who did what was asked of him but nothing more.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2002.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the application filed by Thomas Edwards Dalton (Petitioner) to take the examination for certification as a plumbing plans examiner should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is seeking to become a state-certified plumbing plans examiner. The Respondent is the state agency charged with responsibility for certification of plumbing plans inspectors. On December 12, 2013, the Petitioner submitted to the Respondent his application to take the examination for the certification sought. As required by rule, the Petitioner also submitted an “Affidavit of Work Experience” setting forth a statement of work experience presumably relevant to his application. The affidavit form requires that it be “completed by an architect, engineer, contractor or building code administrator, who has personal knowledge of the application’s experience” for the relevant period. The Petitioner wrote the narrative of his experience contained within the affidavit dated December 8, 2013. The affidavit was signed by a person identified as Anthony Applebeck, a building code administrator in Altamonte Springs, Florida. Generally, an “Application Review Committee” (ARC) comprised of three building code enforcement specialists reviews applications and affidavits submitted to the Respondent. In this case, two members of the ARC independently reviewed the Petitioner’s submission and determined that additional information related to the Petitioner’s work experience was required. In an email dated December 17, 2013, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that additional information was required. The letter stated as follows: The Affidavit of Work Experience that was submitted with your application is missing detailed hands-on plumbing experience. Please complete the enclosed Affidavit of Work Experience and submit it to the department. The person completing the work affidavit should be specific when explaining your duties and actual hands-on experience. The ARC’s determination that the Petitioner’s Affidavit of Work Experience was insufficient was correct. The affidavit lacked a detailed explanation of the Petitioner’s work experience, specifically as to “hands-on” plumbing involvement. The Petitioner failed to submit the supplemental work experience affidavit requested by the Respondent. In an email dated December 18, 2013, the Petitioner requested that the ARC reconsider his original submitted affidavit. On February 18, 2014, the Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the Petitioner’s application based on the failure to submit sufficient information to establish that the Petitioner has the experience required for the certification sought. By letter dated February 28, 2014, the Petitioner challenged the proposed denial of his application and requested an administrative hearing. The evidence presented at the hearing by the Petitioner was insufficient to establish that the Petitioner meets the requirements to take the examination for certification as a plumbing plans examiner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application to take the examination for certification as a plumbing plans examiner be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Edward Dalton 906 Delta Court Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714 (eServed) Robert Antonie Milne, Esquire Office of The Attorney General Plaza Level 01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) J. Layne Smith, General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Robin Barineau, Executive Director Division of Professions Building Code Administrators and Inspectors Board Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing finding of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Harold D. Biggs, be found guilty of violating Subsections 409.129(1)(j), 489.113 (2)and (3), and 489.117(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, and be given a public reprimand and pay a $500 fine; all other charges should be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1982.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner violated the provisions of Chapter 381, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-6, Florida Administrative Code, referenced herein, by allegedly illegally connecting a second dwelling to an existing, approved septic system.
Findings Of Fact On January 17, 2002, the Petitioner was given a written Notice of Violation and advised that an illegal sewer connection from a new or second mobile home on her property to her existing sewer system, serving her primary residence would have to be disconnected. It was an illegal second connection on a single, permitted sanitary sewer system. The second home was not occupied and could not be legally occupied until the proper sewer connection and relevant permitting was obtained. On January 30, 2002, the inspector again visited the premises and determined the illegal connection to still exist and the Petitioner was then advised that the illegal connection would have to be disconnected. On February 28, 2002, the inspector returned and found that the illegal connection had been restored to the existing system. He observed a person hurriedly disconnect the system as he approached. The relevant pipe joint had been left un-glued so that it could be readily connected or disconnected. He again notified the Petitioner, in person, that the illegal connection would have to be disconnected. The Respondent cited the Petitioner for the illegally connected sewer system and seeks to impose a $500.00 fine. The Petitioner elected to formally dispute the position of the Respondent agency and pursued a formal hearing to contest the allegations. The Petitioner failed to actually appear at hearing and contest the evidence adduced by the Respondent agency. That evidence is credible and is accepted as unrefuted and supportive of the above Findings of Fact.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the State of Florida Department of Health denying the Petition of Shirley Davis in its entirety and that a final order be entered imposing a $500.00, fine for the violations described in the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Davis 140 West Putnam Grove Road Oak Hill, Florida 32759 John D. Lacko, Esquire Department of Health 420 Fentress Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The basic issue in this case concerns whether the Petitioners are entitled to reimbursement from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 5, 1994, the Petitioners entered into a contract with an entity named James Plumbing, Inc., pursuant to which James Plumbing, Inc., agreed to perform specified plumbing work for a two-story duplex the Petitioners were building. The total contract price for the plumbing work was $10,000.00. Article 4 of the contract, titled "Progress Payments," contained the following language: On completion of rough-in plumbing $4,000.00 is due, at top out of all riser pipes and runs for plumbing an additional $4,000.00. The final payment of $2,000.00 to be paid upon final completion and hookup of all plumbing items and approval of same by City of Delray Building Department. A lien release will be required upon final payment by James Plumbing, Inc. Owner's (sic) will furnish lien release to James Plumbing, Inc., for execution. The contract described above also included language to the effect that the work to be performed under the contract would be commenced "as per owner/builder schedule," and the work would be substantially completed in the spring or summer of 1995 "as per schedule of owners." At the time of the signing of the contract described above, and at all other times material to this case, James Plumbing, Inc., was a Florida corporation that had been administratively dissolved by the Florida Department of State. At the time of the signing of the contract described above, and at all other times material to this case, an individual named James West was licensed by the CILB as a "Certified Plumbing Contractor." At the time of the signing of the contract described above, and at all other times material to this case, James West purported to be the "qualifier" for the entity known as James Plumbing, Inc. James West was the original incorporator of the corporation named James Plumbing, Inc. At all times material to this case, James West was the only person who had any ownership interest in, or had any control over the affairs of, the corporation named James Plumbing, Inc. James West, doing business under the name of the defunct corporation named James Plumbing, Inc., finished the "rough-in" in June of 1995 and finished the "top out" in March of 1996. Consistent with the terms of the contract, he was paid $4,000.00 in June of 1995 and he was paid $4,000.00 in March of 1996.1 For several reasons not material to the issues in this case, progress on other aspects of the construction project took longer than expected and in was not until the spring of 1999 that the Petitioners contacted James West to schedule the completion of the plumbing work under the contract signed in December of 1994. As a result of disagreements regarding the scheduling of the plumbing work, by letter dated April 12, 1999, the Petitioners advised James West that they had elected to terminate the plumbing contract dated December 5, 1994. Neither James Plumbing, Inc., nor James West individually ever performed the work that remained to be performed under the contract dated December 5, 1994, after the "top out" that was completed in March of 1996. In order to finish the plumbing work that remained to be done under the contract dated December 5, 1994, the Petitioners hired another plumbing contractor, Lee Wilder Plumbing, Inc. ("Wilder"). During the course of finishing the plumbing work, Wilder discovered that some of the work done by James West was incomplete and that some of the work done by James West had been done improperly and had to be redone. Wilder finished the work that remained to be done under the contract dated December 5, 1994, and also corrected the mistakes in the work that James West had done. For these services the Petitioners paid Wilder a total of $2,967.50. In order to correct the mistakes made by James West, it was also necessary to remove portions of existing interior walls and to then rebuild and paint those portions of the interior walls. This work on the interior walls cost the Petitioners an additional $1,000.00. As a result of the matters described in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, above, the completion of the Petitioners' building was delayed. By reason of the delay, the Petitioners lost rental income in the amount of $4,350.00. The Petitioners filed a civil action in the County Court in Palm Beach County, Florida, against James West seeking to recover compensation for the harm caused by the failure of James West to properly perform his obligations under the contract of December 5, 1994. On September 3, 2002, the Petitioners obtained a final judgment against James West, individually. The judgment was in the total amount of $8,082.35, comprised of the following elements: Plumbing completion and repairs $2,967.50 Demolition and repair of walls $1,000.00 Cost of water heaters2 $400.00 Loss of rental income $4,350.00 Subtotal $8,717.50 Less $2,000.00 set off ($2,000.00) Plus prejudgment interest $1,364.85 Total Judgment $8,082.35 The final judgment includes the following language: Under the contract, work was to be completed by spring or summer, 1995. The Defendant actually finished the top-out installation in 1996 but the project was delayed due to a dispute the Plaintiffs had with the city in regard to paving an alley. The Plaintiffs contacted the Defendant in 1999 to finish the work, however, the Defendant requested additional money which he wanted up front. The Plaintiffs did not mind the additional money but objected to paying up front. They terminated the 1994 contract and hired Lee Wilder Plumbing, Inc., to complete the job of installing the fixtures. In May, 2000, the Plaintiffs discovered there was no hot water. The Defendant refused to come out and check on the problem so Lee Wilder Plumbing, Inc., was called. The evidence showed that cuts had to be made in the walls and floor to find the problem. While the Defendant asserts that the problem was crossed pipes which was easy to correct, he never came out to look at the job site. Instead, the evidence showed that there was a hot water pipe missing, that the two cold water pipes were not connected to anything and a new pipe had to be installed getting hot water to the second floor. The evidence further showed that the Defendant did all of the rough plumbing under the slab and top- out plumbing inside of the walls. Pursuant to F.S. 95.11(3)(c), the Court finds the plumbing defect to be a latent defect. Further, the Court finds that the Defendant is responsible for that latent defect. In addition to damages to correct the latent defect, the Plaintiffs seek damages for the cost of hot water heaters and loss of rent/loss of use for three months delay to correct the plumbing problem. It is well settled that the purpose of damages are (sic) to place the injured party in the position it would have been. Tucker v. John Galt Ins. Agency Corp., 743 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to [re]cover the cost of repairing the latent defect in the amount of $2,967.50 and $1,000.00 for the cost of repairing the walls and floor. Further, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for the cost of the water heaters of $400.00 and loss of rental income for one unit at $4,350.00. In addition, the Defendant is entitled to a set off of $2,000.00, as the Plaintiffs agreed to pay the Defendant $10,000.00 for the plumbing work in which they actually paid the Defendant $8,000.00. The measure of damages is the cost to complete contract price because parties already agreed to pay contract price for completed work. American Structural Systems, Inc. v. R. B. Gay Const. Co., Inc., 619 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Measure of damages is contract price diminished only by damages suffered. Fleming v. Urdl's Waterfall Creations, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). In addition to the final judgment described above, the Petitioners also received a judgment for costs against James West in the amount of $972.27. The amounts of the final judgment ($8,082.35) and the judgment for costs ($972.27) total $9,054.62. Following the entry of the judgments against James West, the Petitioners made numerous unsuccessful efforts to satisfy the judgment. Despite diligent search and inquiry, the Petitioners were never able to locate any property of James West that could be applied to the satisfaction of the judgments against James West. On or about November 27, 2002, the Petitioners signed a claim form seeking restitution from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. Their claim was received by the CILB on or about December 3, 2002. Following consideration of the Petitioners' claim, the CILB voted to deny the claim. An order to that effect was issued and filed on January 28, 2004. In that order the CILB gave the following reasons for its denial of the claim: Upon consideration of the documentation and testimony submitted, it is ORDERED: Claimants filed to satisfy all requirements for payment from the Recovery Fund. There is no evidence in the file to support the amount of actual damages suffered. Section 489.141(2)(c), states that a person is not qualified to make a claim for recovery from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund, if such person has suffered damages as the result of making improper payments to a contractor as defined in part I of chapter 713. There is no evidence in the file that the liens filed by subcontractors were valid liens under Chapter 713, Florida Statutes. At the beginning of the final hearing the Respondent stated on the record that it was still relying on the reason set forth in subparagraph a, above, but that it was abandoning the reasons for denial set forth in subparagraphs b and c, above. The Respondent also stated on the record that it was of the view that there were two additional reasons for denying the subject claim. The two additional reasons were described as follows: That the underlying court judgment on which the Petitioners' claim is based is not a judgment based on an act that constitutes a violation of subsections (g), (j), or (k) of Section 489.129, Florida Statutes, and That the corporation for which the individual contractor purported to be the qualifier was not licensed at the time of the violations that caused financial harm to the Petitioners. The Petitioners' first notice of the CILB's change in position appears to have been when these two new reasons were stated during the opening moments of the final hearing. In its proposed recommended order the Respondent raises for the first time a third new reason for denying the subject claim. This third new reason is set forth in the underscored portion of the following language from paragraph 28 of the Respondent's proposed recommended order: 29. An asset search indicates that there are no assets from which the judgment can be satisfied. However, James West held at the time of the judgment, and still holds today, an active license. There is no proof that Petitioners exhausted all efforts and demonstrated an inability to collect the judgment as required by Rule 61G4-21.003(2), Florida administrative Code.
Recommendation In view of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case concluding that the Petitioners are entitled to reimbursement from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund in the amount of their final judgment and their cost judgment, for a total reimbursement amount of $9,054.62. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2004.
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are: Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued by the Petitioner; and Whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondent if Petitioner proves one or more of the violations charged in its Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Brian Vincent Burns ("Burns"), at all times material to this matter, was a certified general contractor subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Petitioner. Burns was first licensed on October 26, 1981. Petitioner issued Burns license number CGO 020464. Burns' license expires on August 31, 2012. Action Restoration Inc. ("Action"), is and was, at all times material in this matter, the company where Burns is qualified. On October 24, 2007, Brian Burns-Action Restoration entered a Contractor Agreement ("Contract") with owner, Donnell Bryant, to construct a bathroom addition at Bryant's residence located at 3314 NW 23rd Court, Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33311. Burns admitted at the hearing that the Contract failed to include any written disclosure statement explaining consumer's rights under the Florida Homeowner's Construction Recovery Fund. The Contract provided a draw schedule detailing the amount of the payment and at which points during the project payments were to be made to Action. The total contract price was $36,000. Per Bryant's Contract, Bryant paid the first draw of $6000.00 down at contract signing and Action started the job. During the job, Burns followed the critical path method. The method consisted of each step of the job being completed before the next could take place because each built upon the other. Action applied for a permit to build the bathroom addition on the house under Burns' contractor's license and became the contractor of record for the project. Action began the job in November 2007. It included excavating, obtaining the soil test, forming up the plywood to form the concrete, putting the rebar in, and pouring. On November 26, 2007, Bryant paid Action $7,250 as draw two when the footing was completed. The next step of the project was the block. Burns hired three workers to pour the concrete block. On or about December 20, 2007, Action put the truss anchors in the wet concrete. On or about December 21, 2007, Action completed the tie beams and was paid $8000.00 for draw three of the contract. At some point, Burns and Bryant agreed to change the trusses to make them more energy efficient and structurally sound for windstorms. The design change delayed the job being finished by the deadline. During December 2007, there was a period when Burns did not return Bryant's phone calls. Bryant was very anxious for the bathroom addition project to be completed and became angry at Burns when he couldn't reach him. Bryant thought Burns had abandoned his job when he didn't see Burns from around the Christmas holiday until after the new year. After the new year, in January 2008, Bryant met with Burns and a third party, Walsh. At the meeting, Bryant determined that Walsh was the foreman for Action who oversaw the work. Walsh never worked for Burns or Action and has never been paid by either. Burns had only met Walsh in 2007 and worked on one previous project with him. Burns knew Walsh to be a mason. From the meeting, Bryant understood that the initial contract work had been transferred to Walsh to complete the bathroom addition project Action had contracted for originally. As a result, Bryant stopped paying Burns and agreed to pay Walsh the remaining sum of $14,000.00 on the contract. After the meeting, Burns continued to work on the Bryant contract off site. He worked to get the new trusses design approved so that the work could move forward at the residential site. Around January 17, 2008, Burns took the new trusses design to the truss shop professional engineers to do the drawings. After approval, Burns took the design to the architect, which was approved on February 1, 2008. Then, Burns processed the drawing though the City of Lauderdale, which approved them on February 18, 2008. After approval by the City of Lauderdale, Burns called Bryant several times, and Bryant never returned his call or responded. Burns never returned to the Bryant residence to work on the job because he thought a new contractor had been hired to complete the job in Action's place. Action had only completed 50% of the job on the contract at the time. Plumbing, electric, duct work, and stucco were left to be done for the bathroom addition to be completed. During the period when Burns was getting the new trusses design approved, Bryant paid Walsh $4000.00, with check number 5761 as a draw, on February 15, 2008. The Contract was amended and stated, "$Total owe $14,000-$4000.00 2/15/08>New Balance $10,000" Walsh's signature was by the total with "pd 5761 2/15"1 Burns admitted at hearing that Action was still the contractor of record because the permit remained open for the project in his name. Burns said, "I made an error in judgment in not going to see to it that it was closed out." Walsh continued to work on Bryant's bathroom addition and got paid monies until June 2008. As Walsh completed portions of the job, Bryant paid him the following: $800 on April 18, 2008, for the wall and tile; $3,500 on June 3, 2008, for the construction of the bathroom; and $325 on June 9, 2008, for the stucco for the bathroom. Walsh also was paid for other construction work beside the bathroom addition for Bryant. Bryant never heard from Walsh again after paying him $325.00 with the June 9, 2008, check. He contacted him numerous times to no avail. The job was not completed. On December 30, 2008, Bryant signed a contract with Complete Property Repair to complete the bathroom addition Action had started. The contract amount was for $36,800. The contract included redoing some of the previous work completed by Action and some upgrades including a two-person Jacuzzi and travertine rock instead of tile. The Charges: In Count I, Petitioner charges Respondent with abandoning a construction project in which the contractor is engaged or under contract as a contractor in violation of section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes. In Count II, Petitioner charges Respondent with failing to include a written statement explaining the consumer's right's under the Florida Homeowners' Construction Recovery Fund in the contract with Donnell Bryant in violation of Section 489.1425(1)(d)1.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order that: (a) finds Respondent guilty as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, imposing as a fine of $2,500, and placing Burns' license on probation for a period of one year; (b) finds Respondent guilty as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, imposing a fine of $250.00; and (c) not imposing any restitution since it was not proven in this matter at hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2011.
The Issue Respondent was charged in a November 19, 1998, Administrative Complaint, filed December 7, 1998, with ten counts of professional violations. The statutory violations alleged are: Count I: Section 489.129(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), obtaining a certificate or registration as a Certified Roofing Contractor by fraud or misrepresentation; Count II: Section 489.129(1)(h)2, Florida Statutes (1995), by committing mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that caused financial harm to a customer; Count III: Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes (1995), by abandoning a construction project in which the contractor is engaged or under contract as a contractor; Count IV: Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1995), by committing fraud or deceit in the practice of contracting; Count V: Section 489.129(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1995), by committing incompetency or misconduct in the practice of contracting; Count VI: Section 489.129(1)(p), Florida Statutes (1995), by proceeding on a job without obtaining the applicable local building department plumbing permits and inspection; Count VII: Section 489.129(1)(p), Florida Statutes (1995), by proceeding on a job without obtaining the applicable local building department electrical permits and inspection; Count VIII: Section 489.129(1)(p), Florida Statutes (1995), by proceeding on a job without obtaining the applicable local building department framing, insulation, and/or final inspections; Count IX: Section 489.129(1)(o), Florida Statutes (1995), by committing gross negligence, repeated negligence, or negligence resulting in a significant danger to life or property; and Count X: Section 389.129(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), by violating any provision of Chapter 455, to wit, Section 455.227(1)(o), practicing beyond the scope permitted by law and performing professional responsibilities the licensee knows, or has reason to know, he is not competent to perform.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was a Certified Residential Contractor, having been issued license number CR C057235, by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. At the time of hearing, Respondent's license had been suspended. Since January 27, 1998, Respondent also has been a Certified Roofing Contractor, having been issued license number CC C057649, by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. At no time material was Respondent licensed, registered, or certified to perform electrical work. At no time material was Respondent licensed, registered, or certified to perform plumbing work. On or about February 27, 1997, Respondent entered into a $39,050.40, contract with Reuben M. Adams to restore and repair the Adamses' home at 7037 Mark Street in Jacksonville, Florida, which had been destroyed by fire on February 1, 1997. The work contracted-for included complete restoration of the living room, kitchen, two hallways, two bathrooms, four bedrooms, a laundry room, and a dining room; restoration of heat and air conditioning; and a virtually new roof. Among the electrical and plumbing restoration involved, Respondent specifically agreed to install a ceiling fan and a light kit in the living room; install a sink and faucet for the sink and a ceiling light fixture and vented range hood in the kitchen; install a ceiling light fixture in a hallway; remove floor mounted with tank commode and reinstall a floor mounted with tank commode; replace commode sink, remove and reinstall sink, install new faucet for the sink, install shower head and faucet set for bathtub, install bathroom exhaust fan and light kit for ceiling fan in the bathroom; install ceiling fan and light kit in bedrooms; replace faucet for sink and provide a shower head, faucet set and install a ceiling light fixture in the second bathroom; install a ceiling fan and light kit in the third and fourth bedrooms and dining room and hallway; install 960 square foot electrical and provide temporary utilities for dimensions of 40 feet by 24 feet by eight feet. These types of activities require electrical and plumbing licensure. On or about April 15, 1997, Respondent received and endorsed the first draw check of $22,245.23 from the Adamses. In May 1997, Respondent's site supervisor, Aaron Mitchell, requested that Mr. Adams give him $1500.00, cash to buy materials because Respondent was out of town and Mitchell could not perform the work without the materials. Mr. Adams paid this amount in cash to Mr. Mitchell but was never reimbursed by either Mr. Mitchell or Respondent. In early June 1997, the Adamses became concerned because little work had been completed on the restoration of their home. The house had been cleaned out and gutted and the slab for the room addition had been poured. Mr. Adams contacted Respondent several times about the lack of work being performed on the home. Between mid-June and early July 1997, Respondent completed the framing and installed the roof. On or about July 24, 1997, the Adamses released the second draw of $11,122.62 to Respondent, and Respondent deposited the money into his bank account. In approximately August 1997, Respondent ran electrical wire in the roof, installed electrical outlets in the walls, and completed the electrical work, including installing electrical outlets in the walls. Mr. Adams personally observed Respondent and his workers performing electrical wiring. The electrical work performed by Respondent required licensure as an electrical contractor, that a permit be obtained prior to the electrical work being performed, and that inspections of the electrical work be made before the walls were sealed up over the electrical work. Respondent failed to obtain a permit or to have an electrical inspection performed. Respondent completed the electrical work and covered up the electrical work with the walls without an inspection being performed. Respondent performed plumbing work on the Adamses' home, although he held no plumbing license. Respondent failed to pull a permit for the plumbing work and failed to call for the required inspections. Ultimately, he covered up the plumbing work with the walls without an inspection having been performed. The City of Jacksonville "red-tagged" the home for this reason. The effect of "red-tagging" was to prevent occupancy until compliance with the building code was assured. Such assurance required inspection, which in turn, ultimately required that at least the interior walls be taken down. Respondent also never obtained a framing, insulation or final inspection on the project. In October 1997, the Adamses filed complaints against the Respondent with the State Attorney's Office and the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Case No. 97-18544). On or about October 31, 1997, Respondent signed a Letter of Intent with Mr. and Mrs. Adams agreeing to have their home ready for occupancy no later than December 1, 1997, and promising that Respondent would be responsible for all permits and inspections necessary for the project to be considered complete. At that time, Respondent apologized for all of the delays, the decline in their relationship, and the stress he had caused. Respondent and Mrs. Adams prayed together, and Respondent promised that from that day forward, the Adamses would see progress on their home every day until it was finished. Respondent did not abide by the requirements set forth in the Letter of Intent. Specifically, he never obtained the required permits and inspections. Mr. Adams confronted Respondent about the permits and the inspections, and the Respondent indicated that he had the permits at his office. He assured Mr. Adams that he was taking care of the electrical permit. In December 1997, Respondent requested that Mr. and Mrs. Adams drop their complaint with Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation because he had applied for his roofing license and the complaint was holding up that roofing license being granted. Respondent told the Adamses that if they would drop their complaint, he could obtain his roofing license, which would allow him to generate money to complete their project. Around mid-January 1998, Respondent requested that the Adamses release the final construction draw and drop their complaints with Petitioner and the State Attorney. Respondent stated that if they paid him the final draw of $5,682.55, he would work every day on their project and have it ready for them to move in no later than February 4, 1998. The Adamses paid Respondent the remaining construction draw of $5,682.55, and withdrew their complaint with Petitioner. Respondent accepted the final draw on or about January 27, 1998. Respondent obtained his roofing license after the Adamses withdrew their complaint with Petitioner. After receiving the final construction draw, Respondent did minimal work on the project in January. On or about February 23, 1998, the Adamses reinstated their complaint with Petitioner against Respondent, resulting in the instant case. Respondent has not returned to work on the Adamses' project since March 1998. As of March 1998, Respondent had been paid the full contract price, but the home remained uninhabitable. The workmanship was substandard and the project was less than 100 percent complete. As a result of Respondent's unlicensed electrical and plumbing work on the Adamses' home and his covering-up his work with the walls, the Adamses were unable to obtain an inspection without the walls being taken down. This in turn, required that the walls be rebuilt. In addition to the money paid to Respondent for work improperly done or not done at all, the Adamses had to pay another builder $14,900.00, to remove the walls, re-install the electrical wiring and plumbing which had been completed or partially completed by the Respondent, and complete the renovation. Testimony of Roy Brand, Raymond Smith, and Douglas Arnold supports a finding that Respondent committed repeated negligence and created a dangerous condition when he performed electrical and plumbing work which he was not licensed to do and which he did not have the knowledge to perform. Particularly upon the testimony of Mr. Brand, it is clear that three types of very serious electrical installation errors or omissions had been performed once or more than once by Respondent. At least one of these would have been sufficient, under certain circumstances, to burn down the entire house. By installing electrical universal polyethylene boxes and using them as junction boxes, a purpose for which they were not designed, Respondent created what Mr. Brand described as "short of a 'Molotov Cocktail' that would burn your house down just about as quick." Likewise, one serious error occurred in the type of glue Respondent used on plumbing pipe throughout the home. Mr. Brand gave credible expert evidence that the construction undertaken by Respondent was undertaken for a reasonable amount of $39,050.40, and that a reasonable time to construct the entire contract would have been two and one half to three months after permitting. In addition to the money Mr. and Mrs. Adams paid to Respondent and the substitute contractor, Douglas Arnold, they incurred additional expenses and spent additional time out of their home as a result of Respondent's shoddy workmanship and unlicensed electrical and plumbing work. The Adamses also had to take out a second mortgage of $18,800.00 at 16.3 percent interest for 15 years in order to finance the repairs necessitated by Respondent's substandard and incompetent work, so that they could move back into their home. Mr. and Mrs. Adams and their child had to live somewhere during construction. Their insurance company paid them $750.00, for each of three months. However, they were unable to move back into their home from August 1997 until November 1998, as a direct result of Respondent's incompetence and misconduct.3 During this fifteen-month period, the Adamses paid $300.00 rent per month to Mrs. Adams' mother, plus an additional $100.00 per month for water and utilities, and storage fees of $119.00 per month to a storage facility for keeping their items which had not been destroyed by the fire The Adamses also incurred an additional expense of $1,500.00, for an air conditioning unit which Respondent was to have purchased under their contract with him.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order that: Finds Respondent guilty of one violation of each of the following: Sections 489.129(1)(h)(2); (1)(k); (1)(m); (1)(n); (1)(p); (1)(o); and (1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995); Revokes Respondent's General Contractor's and Roofing Contractor's licenses; Imposes a total fine for all violations, in the amount of $30,000.00; and Requires Respondent to pay restitution to Mr. and Mrs. Adams in the amount of $49,835.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent in November 1983. He was assigned to the Water and Sewer Department as a laborer. In 1986, Petitioner was transferred by the Respondent to the Water and Sewer Department water meter shop to be a water meter repairman. Petitioner continued his employment in that section until the spring of 1993. At that time, Petitioner accepted status under the Respondent's Disability Income Replacement policy. This arrangement is for an employee who is absent due to disability for more than 60 days. He then becomes eligible to receive payment of 60 percent of the employee's regular earnings. From the years 1986 into 1990, Petitioner enjoyed good health. During that period his employee work evaluations ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory. In 1990, Petitioner developed psoriasis. In the beginning, the condition was controlled through medical treatment. However, in 1991, Petitioner was diagnosed with bladder cancer. As a result, while being treated for the bladder cancer in 1991 and 1992, to include two surgeries, Petitioner was unable to receive medical treatment for his psoriasis. Consequently the psoriasis became more severe. There was a change in supervisory personnel on April 4, 1991, which affected Petitioner's employment status together with that of other employees within the Water and Sewer Department. The change came about when Richard Davis, who headed the Water and Sewer Department was replaced by Henry Hicks. Respondent had found it necessary to replace Davis, because in Respondent's view Davis was not satisfactorily addressing the personnel issues within the Water and Sewer Department. When hired, one of the issues which Hicks felt he needed to address was a morale problem caused by employee perceptions that the Department of Water and Sewer employee rules were not being enforced in a consistent manner. Hicks was of the opinion that this perception existed, in part, because supervisors maintained a casual approach to employee counseling and discipline. Hicks, in his tenure, reminded the supervisors to formalize their procedures in dealing with employee counseling and disciplining. He required the supervisor provide documentation of any disciplinary action whether verbally given or by a written reprimand. This change in direction tended to increase the number of documented incidences of imposition of employee discipline within the Water and Sewer Department. The first employee evaluation which Petitioner received after Hicks' assumption of his position of director of the Water and Sewer Department was in 1991. The 1991 evaluation which Petitioner was given contained positive and negative remarks about Petitioner's work performance. In the spring of 1991, the Water and Sewer Department held a picnic, an activity in which the employees were encouraged to participate. As in prior years the Petitioner volunteered to be a member of the food committee for the picnic and was appointed to that committee. Members of the food committee would serve food at the picnic. At that time, the Petitioner's psoriasis was such that he was noticeably peeling and flaking. Howard Johnson, a supervisor with Respondent approached Hicks and told Hicks that several employees had stated that they, the employees, would not go to the picnic if Petitioner served food because they were afraid that Petitioner's skin would flake into the food. Having been apprised of this situation, upon a date prior to the picnic, Hicks met with Petitioner and told Petitioner what had been reported to Hicks and asked Petitioner to serve the needs of the picnic activity in some other manner than food service. Specifically, the Petitioner was offered the opportunity to help "set up" the picnic area. Petitioner did not accept the alternative offer to assist in the outing. Instead, Petitioner was offended and felt that he was unreasonably singled out due to his psoriasis. Nonetheless, the reaction by other employees to having Petitioner serve food and the response by Hicks to offer an alternative opportunity to assist in the activity did not constitute harassment or unreasonable conduct toward Petitioner. In association with the picnic for the spring of 1991, Bobby Thigpen, a supervisor with Respondent, made a comment to Petitioner about Petitioner's psoriasis and Petitioner's participation on the food committee at the picnic. Although Petitioner was mindful of Thigpen's candor about the subject, Thigpen's remarks contributed to Petitioner's hurt feelings concerning other employees not wishing Petitioner to serve food at the picnic. The remarks by Thigpen were not designed to harass Petitioner based upon Petitioner's physical condition. In addition, Petitioner did not report Thigpen's remarks to his supervisor pursuant to Respondent's "No times relevant to the inquiry, prohibited harassment on the basis of handicap status as well as other protected categories. The policy instructed the employee who believed that he had been harassed to bring the matter to the supervisor or to the Human Resource Department within the organization if the employee did not feel that he could discuss the matter with his supervisor. Respondent's employees are required to attend an annual meeting to review this policy. Petitioner did not complain to the Human Resource Department that he had been harassed by Thigpen through Thigpen's remarks regarding Petitioner's service on the food committee. No other competent proof was offered to the effect that Respondent's employees had made derogatory comments about Petitioner's physical disabilities. Because Petitioner's psoriasis was in a more severe condition, Petitioner would leave flakes of skin on chairs in the Water and Sewer Department break-room. When the Petitioner's co residue they would switch chairs rather than sit in the chair on which Petitioner had left flakes of skin. Although Petitioner found out that the other employees were switching chairs due to the flakes of Petitioner's skin being found on the initial chair, there is no competent proof that any employee ever commented to the Petitioner that the employee would be opposed to the Petitioner eating in the break-room due to his physical condition. Petitioner, together with other employees who were supervised by Dan Miller, had been harassed by Miller at times relevant to the inquiry. In Petitioner's instance, Miller's harassment was not directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. Some of the remarks made by Miller to Petitioner were that Petitioner was short and fat and further derogatory comments about Petitioner's haircut and clothes. Miller had also called the Petitioner dumb or stupid because Petitioner asked Miller to repeat instructions over the radio that was used for communicating between the supervisor and his respective employees. Notwithstanding Petitioner's contention that he had told Miller that he was having trouble hearing because of psoriasis that had spread to Petitioner's ears, Miller denies that Petitioner had told Miller that psoriasis was affecting Petitioner's hearing, and Miller's testimony is credited. On the contrary, without knowledge of any physical disability concerning hearing which Petitioner had, and without regard for the reaction any other employees which Miller supervised might have, Miller made insulting comments to employees which he supervised when talking to them on the radio. Employees other than Petitioner to whom the insulting comments were directed had no known physical disabilities. James Scarberry, a co-employee who worked for Miller, overheard Miller yell at Petitioner on occasion having to do with Petitioner's job performance, not Petitioner's physical disability related to hearing. Petitioner asked Miller and a co-worker not to smoke in his presence because he had recently had bladder cancer surgery. Petitioner contends that this request was met with laughter and jokes. Miller testified that the request was not met with jokes or laughter. Instead, Miller recalls, and his testimony is credited, that Petitioner complained that Al Nichols, a co-worker, had smoked excessively in Petitioner's presence. The subject of Nichols' and Miller's smoking in Petitioner's presence was discussed among Miller, Nichols and Respondent, and it was agreed that Nichols and Miller would try not to smoke excessively in Petitioner's presence. No medical evidence was presented which tended to identify the necessity for Petitioner to be afforded a smoke environment due to his medical condition or that Petitioner had ever made requests other than that directed to Miller and Nichols regarding not smoking in his presence at work. Petitioner had made requests that he be provided light duty because of the problems he experienced with his knees due to psoriasis. These requests were directed to Miller, Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The requests were not always granted. When Petitioner was turned down for light duty it was based upon the fact that light duty was generally not available in the Water and Sewer Department for any employee. Moreover, at that time, employees in Petitioner's work assignment usually worked alone and it would adversely affect the production of the unit if two repairmen were dispatched to do a job which would ordinarily take only one repairman to complete. Petitioner presented no proof concerning denial of light duty at a time when a physician may have specifically recommended light duty for Petitioner. Concerning discipline directed to the Petitioner, on March 18, 1982, Petitioner stopped at a job site to which he had not been assigned. There he engaged David Lipps, an employee of Respondent, in a conversation. Lipps was a supervisor at the site and the conversation had to do with the meal policy which had been applied at the site. Eventually the conversation became an argument, at which point Lipps told Petitioner that he did not belong at the job site and asked him to leave. Lipps then reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson and the matter eventually came to the attention of Hicks. Hicks discussed the matter with the Petitioner and Lipps and concluded that Petitioner had no business purpose for being at the Lipps' job site and that Petitioner was responsible for causing the argument with Lipps. Petitioner was issued a written warning on March 26, 1992. The disciplinary reprimand was not related to Petitioner's physical disabilities. On May 18, 1992, Petitioner received a written reprimand. The reprimand was based upon the Petitioner's conduct while on weekend standby duty. This assignment was in keeping with the periodic requirement to serve on weekend standby. On May 16, 1992, Petitioner was on a standby status with Lipps. Lipps was referred to as the "A" worker and Petitioner was the "B" worker. The "A" worker was in charge of the work team. Petitioner arrived at the first job site 34 minutes before Lipps. When Lipps arrived, Petitioner complained that Lipps was an hour late. Petitioner then told Lipps that he had somewhere else to go that day. Lipps and Petitioner went to a second job and by that time Lipps told Petitioner that he was tired of Petitioner's complaining about having to work that day and concluded that Lipps did not have Petitioner's full cooperation. As a result, Lipps determined to leave the completion of the second job until the following Monday. Lipps reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson. Petitioner had been previously counseled about his attitude concerning standby duty. Hicks reviewed the facts surrounding Lipps' complaint and decided to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner for making negative verbal remarks about Petitioner's duties and for failing to cooperate with his supervisor on standby duty. The disciplinary action was not for purposes of discriminating against Petitioner because of Petitioner's physical disabilities. Moreover, Hicks had reprimanded two other employees, Ed Swift and Bob Buckley for making negative verbal comments about job duties. Hicks did not know these other individuals to be suffering from any form of physical disability. In June of 1992, Petitioner applied for and was granted a leave of absence for an unspecified period. By June 2, 1992, Petitioner knew that he would need to go on extended leave beginning June 8, 1992. He failed to inform any of his supervisors that he was going on this medical leave. He did not show up for work on June 8, 1992. Hicks inquired of Petitioner on June 8, 1992, about not telling his supervisor that he was going to be on medical leave. Petitioner responded to the inquiry by indicating that he had told Scarberry, Petitioner's co-worker, of his intention to go on medical leave and that he had told a city clinic nurse that he was going on leave of absence. Hicks pointed out, correctly, that telling the nurse and Scarberry of Petitioner's intentions to take medical leave did not relieve Petitioner of the duty to directly inform a supervisor of that intention. Moreover, Scarberry had told the Petitioner that he, Scarberry, would not be at work the first day of Petitioner's medical leave, making it questionable that Scarberry would have advised a supervisor that Petitioner was hoping to be absent from work that day. Scarberry made Hicks aware that Scarberry had pointed out to Petitioner that he would not be at work on June 8, 1992. Petitioner's assertion that he wrote a note to his immediate supervisor, Miller, regarding the plan to be out on June 8, 1992, if true, is of no utility because the note was not given directly to Miller and was never indirectly received by Miller. Miller had not been at work June 5, 1992, the friday before Petitioner was missing from his job duty on June 8, 1992. Petitioner knew that Miller was not at work on June 5, 1992. As a consequence of not informing a supervisor that he was going to be on extended medical leave, Petitioner was disciplined. The action by Respondent on which Petitioner was given a written reprimand for failure to inform a supervisor that Petitioner was going to take extended medical leave did not constitute discrimination against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Petitioner was allowed to take the extended medical leave. Noel Werner, a secretary in the Water and Sewer Department had also been reprimanded by Hicks for failing to follow proper procedures for obtaining authorization to take medical leave. Hicks is unaware of any physical disability that Ms. Werner may have. When Petitioner took leave in June of 1992, he believed that he would be eligible for Disability Income Replacement. However, in August 1992, Petitioner was informed that the Respondent's Risk Management Department had determined that he was ineligible because he was under the care of a licensed health counselor as opposed to an M.D. or a Ph.D. Carol Ingham, Respondent's Human Resource Director, learned of this circumstance and contacted the Assistant City Manager, Dick Lewis, and requested that Petitioner be granted an exception to the policy of not being eligible for Disability Income Replacement when using a licensed health counselor. As a result, Petitioner's request was reevaluated and he was ruled eligible for Disability Income Replacement through the policy pertaining to that status for the period August 4 through 30, 1992. Concerning his physical condition, in the spring of 1992, Petitioner was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his knees. This meant he was disabled to do any persistent bending or kneeling, which was a requirement of his employment in the Water and Sewer Department. His condition also disabled him from doing his assigned work because his work as a water meter repairman involved walking distances of a 100 feet or more on a persistent basis and standing all day. Concerning the medical leave of absence which Petitioner took in the summer of 1992, this subject was discussed by Ingham in conversation with the city clinic nurse, Holly McLaughlin. They talked about the stress which Petitioner seemed to be experiencing and the failure to follow the policy of informing his supervisor of his intention to take medical leave. On June 15, 1992, Ms. Ingham met with Petitioner and his wife to discuss Petitioner's stress. At that time, Petitioner reported to Ms. Ingham that Petitioner's supervisor Miller had treated him badly and that Miller had also treated other employees badly. Petitioner told Ingham that Miller had called Petitioner stupid and had been abusive in conversation over the radio. No claim was made by Petitioner that Miller had made comments directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. As a follow Ingham discussed Petitioner's remarks about Miller's conduct with a number of the Petitioner's co-workers. Ingham decided that Miller had, in fact, yelled and cursed at a number of employees he supervised, to include Petitioner. No other employee reported to Ingham that Miller had made derogatory comments in their presence concerning Petitioner's physical disabilities. Based upon Ingham's findings, Hicks determined to discipline Miller for his conduct directed toward employees whom Miller supervised. Miller received a written reprimand and was given the option of being demoted or seeking counseling through an employee assistance program. Miller opted to go to the employee assistance program. Moreover, Miller was told that if conduct toward subordinates continued that he would be subject to more severe discipline to include discharge. Miller's treatment of the employees he supervises has improved since the imposition of discipline. Petitioner returned to work in August 1992, following his leave of absence for medical purposes. At that time, he was issued a service truck which another employee had been using. Petitioner felt that he should have been issued a new truck which the Water and Sewer Department operated. The truck that Petitioner had been issued was dirty and smelly. Miller told Petitioner that the newer truck was assigned to an employee who needed the larger truck because that employee would be performing heavier work than Petitioner would be called upon to perform. Miller offered to have the truck which Petitioner had been issued cleaned up or detailed. Petitioner declined that offer. Petitioner complained about the truck that he had been assigned to a co-worker, Fred Sauls. He told Sauls that he was going to take the truck he was issued and drive it to city hall to show Ingham, the Human Resource Director. In fact, Petitioner reported the incident to Ms. Ingham. The Petitioner received a letter of reprimand on September 4, 1992, for complaining to a co-worker and Ms. Ingham about an everyday work related problem rather than following the chain of command. Prior to receiving that written reprimand, Petitioner had been specifically counseled by Hicks concerning handling everyday work related problems through Petitioner's supervisor. Those specific instructions on everyday work related problems were not countermanded by the general opportunity which Hicks had described for employees to go outside the chain of command when they did not feel that they would get satisfaction from an immediate supervisor, and the open door opportunity to consult with the Human Resource Director. In this instance, the response from Miller was adequate to meet Petitioner's needs in confronting an everyday work related problem and Petitioner had no reason to complain to Sauls or to complain to Ingham. The written reprimand given to Petitioner was not designed to discriminate against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Hicks and Ingham became aware of the Petitioner's inability to perform his assigned job duties due to his physical disabilities and they looked for other duties that the Respondent might be able to perform in view of his physical disabilities. The only positions that were found for which Petitioner was otherwise qualified and physically able to perform were part-time positions that did not offer medical benefits. Upon further reflection, Ingham and Hicks offered to combine these two positions in the Respondent's Recreation Department into a single job which would allow Petitioner to continue working and to receive benefits. The combined position was at a lesser pay than the present position which he held. Petitioner decided that he would prefer to be placed in the status of Disability Income Replacement in lieu of the combined jobs. In April 1993, Petitioner accepted the status of Disability Income Replacement and has not returned to work.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations which dismisses the Petitioner's claims. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the Proposed Findings of Fact of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 7 through 14 are contrary to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Ramputi, Esquire Scott, Gleason & Pope, P.A. 409 Southeast Fourteenth Street Ocala, Florida 34471 David H. Spalter, Esquire Fisher & Phillips 2310 One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
