Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Hillside Sod Farms, Inc., is a producer of agricultural products, grass sod. Respondent, S. J . Harper Landscaping Enterprises, Inc., is a dealer of such products in the normal course of its landscaping business activity. Petitioner generally deals on a cash basis with customers, unless the customer is licensed by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services for the sale of agricultural products. Customers who are licensed may maintain an open account status with Petitioner. Respondent is licensed by the Department. The Respondent has maintained an open account with Petitioner since 1986. Petitioner sold Respondent grass sod by the truck load for various projects, and was given an invoice therefor. Under the terms of the account, payment was due in full the week following receipt of the sod. On November 21, 1988, including invoice number 12284, Respondent's account balance was $2,098.80. On November 25, 1988, the account balance was $3,129.12. On December 12, 1988, Respondent paid on the account the sum of $2,594.88, leaving a balance due, owing and unpaid of $534.24. Respondent's alleged that in early November, 1988 several trucks loads that were accepted by Respondent were short of sod by approximately eight pallets (each pallet contains 400 square feet of sod) Simon J. Harper, Respondent'S president, reported this fact to Petitioner's foreman, Larry Poole, at night after the work day. He did not reject the trucks with the lesser amount of sod on them, but accepted them. Respondent did not file a complaint or objection to the billing, verbally or in writing, to an officer in the Petitioner's company, although he had dealt with the company for years. Respondent estimated the amount of sod it believed they had been shorted and sent a check for the unpaid balance, less the charges for shorted sod. The amount withheld was the sum of $534.24.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Respondent to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $534.24. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Avery P. Wisdom Vice President Hillside Sod Farms, Inc. 1620 East State Road 46 Geneva, FL 32732 Simon J. Harper President S. J. Harper Landscaping Enterprises, Inc. 205 Zenith Point Geneva, FL 32732 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Ben H. Pridgeon, Jr. Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Mallory Horne General Counsel 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents owe Petitioner $13,512.09 for watermelons, as alleged in the Amended Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Cook Brown Farms is a melon farm in Punta Gorda, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Cook Brown Farms was a "producer" as defined in Subsection 604.15(5), Florida Statutes, of agricultural products in the State of Florida. Melons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. J.G.L. Produce is a Florida Corporation, owned by John W. Johnson, Jr., and located in Pompano Beach, Florida. At times pertinent to this proceeding, J.G.L. Produce was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Andrew J. Cook, a principal owner of Cook Brown Farms, and Mr. Johnson of J.G.L. Produce entered into an oral agreement regarding the sale of watermelons grown at Cook Brown Farms. The core of this case is a dispute concerning the nature of this agreement. Mr. Cook testified that, under the agreement, J.G.L. Produce would purchase the melons at the farm at their daily market price, plus 1/2 cent to cover Cook Brown Farms' cost of picking, sorting, and placing the melons in special bins and in special pallets required by the ultimate purchaser, Kroger Supermarkets. J.G.L. Produce would provide the bins and pallets and would provide the trucks to ship the melons. Mr. Johnson testified that the agreement was not for purchase but for brokerage of the melons. J.G.L. Produce would act as broker of Cook Brown Farms' watermelons, use its best efforts to sell the melons at the highest price available, and pay Cook Brown Farms the proceeds of the sale, minus expenses and a brokerage fee of one cent per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that J.G.L. Produce never took title to or purchased the melons, and that the risk of loss always remained on Cook Brown Farms. Mr. Johnson testified that he approached Mr. Cook about the melons because he had a ready buyer in another local dealer, Delk Produce, which had a longstanding arrangement to provide melons to Kroger. Mr. Johnson agreed with Mr. Cook that the arrangement included the provision of bins and pallets by J.G.L. Produce, though Mr. Johnson stated that the arrangement also called for J.G.L. Produce to retain $0.015 per pound from the amount paid to Cook Brown Farms to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. J.G.L. Produce took approximately 24 truck loads of watermelons from Cook Brown Farms. J.G.L. Produce deducted a one cent per pound brokerage fee from each load of melons it took, except for certain loads noted below, without contemporaneous objection from Cook Brown Farms. The Amended Complaint claims that J.G.L. Produce owes money to Cook Brown Farms for five of the loads taken by J.G.L. Produce. In sum, the Amended Complaint states that J.G.L. Produce owes Cook Brown Farms $19,991.74 for the five loads, less $6,479.65 already paid, for a total owing of $13,512.09. Item One of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,438.54 for a load of 38,596 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 20, 2000. Item Two of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,625.30 for a load of 40,220 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 21, 2000. The Amended Complaint alleges that the melons on these two loads were inspected and approved for shipment during loading by Delk Produce employee Freddie Ellis. The Amended Complaint states that Cook Brown Farms was paid in full for the loads on May 3, 2000, but that the contested amounts were deducted from subsequent settlements by J.G.L. Produce. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item One were initially sold to Delk Produce for delivery to Kroger. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $4,438.54, which constituted the price for 38,596 pounds of melons at $0.125 per pound, less $385.96 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Jay Delk, the principal of Delk Produce, testified that this load was rejected by Kroger's buyer in Virginia due to "freshness," meaning that the melons were unsuitably green. Mr. Delk stated that the melons were taken to North Carolina to ripen and eventually sold at $0.06 per pound. The final return on this load, less the brokerage fee, was $1,543.84. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $4,438.54 and the final payment of $1,543.84. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Two were initially sold to Delk Produce. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $5,809.80, which constituted the price for 50,520 pounds of watermelons at $0.125 per pound, less $505.20 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Seminole Produce purchased 10,300 pounds of this load at $0.145 per pound, or $1,493.50. The remainder of the load was rejected by Kroger due to freshness and had to be resold at a lesser price of $0.0346 per pound, or $1,391.00. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $5,809.80 and the final payment (after deduction of the brokerage fee) of $2,576.11. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Three were sold to Delk Produce. On May 9, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $2,731.30, which constituted the price for 42,020 pounds of watermelons at $0.0675 per pound, less $105.05 for the brokerage fee, reduced to $0.0025 per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that he decided to forego the full brokerage fee to save money for Mr. Cook and his farm, because it was "hurting" due to the rapidly plummeting price for watermelons. Mr. Johnson discovered at this time that Delk Produce had not been retaining the agreed- upon $0.015 per pound to cover the cost of bins and pallets and decided not to lose any more money on that item. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $2,731.30 and $2,206.05, deducting $525.25 from the original payment to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Items Four and Five were originally shipped to Wal-Mart in Kentucky on April 29, 2000, and were rejected on the ground that the melons were not packed to specifications. The melons were trucked back to Florida at J.G.L. Produce's expense. The melons claimed under Item Four totaled 41,100 pounds. J.G.L. Produce divided the melons into four loads and sold them to four local dealers at an average price of $0.775 per pound, totaling $3,185.41. J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets, reducing the total to $2,671.51. J.G.L. Produce then deducted $1,750.00 from the total as reimbursement for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $921.51 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The melons claimed under Item Five totaled 45,600 pounds. J.G.L. Produce sold 2,426 pounds to Seminole Produce at $0.10 per pound, or $242.60. J.G.L. Produce sold the remaining 43,174 pounds to Belle Glade Produce at $0.065 per pound, or $2,800. From the total for Item Five, J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets and $1,950.00 for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee on this load of melons. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $416.64 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The weight of the credible evidence, excluding the hearsay that was not supported by the direct testimony of Mr. Johnson, leads to the finding that there was a brokerage arrangement between the parties. J.G.L. Produce routinely deducted brokerage fees from its payments, without objection by Cook Brown Farms. This course of dealing strongly indicates a brokerage arrangement. Mr. Cook testified as to prior dealings with J.G.L. Produce, which also involved a brokerage arrangement. The evidence indicated that J.G.L. Produce fully accounted for the five loads of melons at issue, and paid Cook Brown Farms the full amounts due and owing for those loads.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the Amended Complaint filed by Gin Brown Matthews, d/b/a Cook Brown Farms. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Redland Insurance Company 222 South 15th Street, Suite 600, North Omaha, Nebraska 65102 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 John W. Johnson, President Post Office Box 1123 Pompano Beach, Florida 33061 Harold M. Stevens, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1440 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Edward L. Myrick, Jr., Esquire Beighley & Myrick, P.A. 1255 West Atlantic Boulevard Suite F-2 Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Terry L. Rhodes Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Respondent, Debruyn Produce Co. owes Petitioner, Florida Farm Management Inc. the sum of $4,846.00 for watermelons shipped by Petitioner and handled by Respondent as Petitioner's agent during the period from May 30, 1989 through July 5, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant fact are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, Florida Farm Management, Inc. was a "producer" of agricultural products in the state of Florida as that term is defined in Section 605.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Debruyn Produce Co. was a licensed "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued license number 596 by the Department, and bonded by Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless) for the sum of $47,000.00, bond number R2-27-13, with an effective date of November 13, 1988 and a termination date of November 13, 1989. At all times material to this proceeding, Debruyn was authorized to do business in the state of Florida. Around the last week of April, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent orally agreed, among other things, for Petitioner to produce certain quantities of Mickey Lee Watermelons and for Respondent to market those watermelons. This oral agreement was reduced to writing, executed by the Respondent and sent to Petitioner to execute. Petitioner, after making certain changes in the agreement and initialing those changes, executed the agreement and returned it to the Respondent. It is not clear if Respondent agreed to the change since they were not initialed by Respondent. However, the parties appeared to operate under this agreement as modified by Petitioner. Under the agreement, Respondent was to advance monies for harvesting and packing, furnish containers and labels for packing and agreed to pay certain chemical bills. Petitioner was to reimburse any monies advanced by the Respondent for (a) harvesting or packing; (b) containers and labels and; (c) chemicals, from the proceeds of the sale of watermelons. Any balance owed Petitioner for watermelons was to be paid within 30 days. Additionally, Respondent was to receive a commission of 8% of net FOB, except 30 cent maximum on sales of less than $6.25 per carton and 40 cents per carton for melons delivered on contract to National Grocers Co. The relationship of the parties was to be that of producer and sales agent. Before entering into the agreement with Respondent, Petitioner had agreed to furnish National Grocers Co. four shipments of melons totalling 8,000 cartons. Respondent agreed to service that agreement. Although Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger shows a credit of $6,007.13 for chemicals paid for by Respondent, the parties agreed that only $3,684.68 was expended by Respondent for chemicals and that Respondent should receive credit for that amount. The parties agree that Respondent advanced a total of $18,960.00 for harvesting and packing and the Respondent should be given credit for this amount. The parties agree that Respondent paid to Petitioner the sum of $12,439.32 and the Respondent should be given credit for this amount. Cartons and pads for packing the melons were shipped on two occasions and the total sum paid by Respondent for those cartons and pads was $17,225.00. The cartons were printed with the logo of Respondent on one side and the logo of Petitioner on the other side. Petitioner agrees that the number of cartons and pads used by him came to $12,463.78 and the Respondent should be given credit for that amount. All cartons and pads in the sum of $17,255.00 were delivered to Petitioner's farm. The amount in dispute for the remainder of the carton is $4,762.22. The Respondent was responsible under the agreement to furnish cartons and pads (containers). Respondent ordered the cartons and pads after determining from Petitioner the number needed. There were two orders for cartons and pads placed and delivered. There was an over supply of cartons and pads delivered to Petitioner. This over supply was the result of a miscommunication between Petitioner and Respondent as to the amount of cartons and pads needed. Petitioner agrees that all of the cartons and pads were delivered to his farm but that he was unable to protect these cartons and pads from the weather. However, Petitioner advised Respondent that the remainder of the carton and pads could be picked up at his farm. Respondent contended that he was denied access to the farm and was unable to pick up the remainder of the cartons and pads and, therefore, they were ruined by exposure to the weather. While there may have been times when Respondent attempted to retrieve the carton and Petitioner was unavailable, there is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent was intentionally denied access to Petitioner's farm to retrieve the cartons. Clearly, the ordering, purchasing and storing of the cartons and pads was a joint effort and both Petitioner and Respondent bear that responsibility. Therefore, the Petitioner is responsible for one-half of the difference between the total cost of the cartons ($17,225.00) and the amount used by Petitioner ($12,462.78) which is $2,381.11 and Respondent should be given credit for this amount. Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger shows that Petitioner shipped melons to Respondent in the amount of $54,715.63, after adjustments for complaints and commission. Respondent's accounts payable ledger shows receiving melons from Petitioner in the amount of $51,483.00, after adjustments for complaints and commission. The difference in the two ledgers in the amount of is accounted for as follows: Invoice No. 210066 - Customer paid $2.00 per carton less on 93 cartons, Petitioner agreed to the reduction. However, Petitioner's account is in error by 9 cents which reduces total amount to $54,715.54. Invoice No. 210067 - Respondent paid for more melons than Petitioner shows were shipped - $39.60. Invoice No. 210068 - difference in calculation of commission $13.32 Invoice No. 2100105 - difference due to Petitioner not agreeing to adjustment in price taken by customer. $2,886.00 Invoice No. 2100239 - difference of $108.04 due to Respondent allowing customer adjustment which Petitioner did not agree to. Invoice No. 2100267 - difference of $210.00 for same reason stated in (e) above. Petitioner should be allowed the difference due to miscalculation of commission in invoice Nos. 210068, 2100134 and 2100160 in the sum of $68.10 since Petitioner's calculation was in accordance with the agreement. There was no dispute as to the condition of melons being as contracted for upon receipt. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the melons shipped under invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 by Petitioner were not of the size and number contracted for by the customer. As to invoice Nos. 2100239 and 2100267, the adjustments were made after the fact without contacting Petitioner. As to invoice No. 2100105, the Petitioner shipped the melons to Russo Farms, Inc., Vineland, N.J., as per Respondent's order who then unloaded the melons and reloaded on Russo's truck and shipped to another buyer. It was this buyer's complaint that resulted in Russo demanding an adjustment. Respondent granted such adjustment without approval of the Petitioner. Although Respondent did contact Petitioner in regard to this complaint, Petitioner would not authorize a federal inspection, which he could have, but instead, requested that Respondent obtain an independent verification of the basis of the complaint. Instead of an independent verification of the complaint, Respondent had Russo evaluate the load as to size of melons and number of boxes. No complaint was made as to condition of the melons. Petitioner would not accept Russo's evaluation because based on the total weight of the melons shipped, as indicated by the freight invoice, Russo's evaluation could not have been correct. The only evidence presented by Respondent as to size and number of melon in regard to invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 was hearsay unsupported by any substantial competent evidence. Petitioner should be allowed the difference in invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 for a sum total of $3,204.00. No adjustment should be made for the differences in invoice No. 210067 other than the 9 cent error made by Petitioner because this amount is not used in Petitioner's calculation of the gross amount due for melons shipped. Therefore, the sum total of all melons sold and shipped is $54,715.63 - 0.09 = $54,715.54. The amount due Petitioner is calculated as follows: Sum total of melons shipped with proper adjustments $54,715.54 Subtract from that the following: Chemicals 3,684.68 Advances 18,960.00 Cost of Cartons $12,462.78 + 2,381.11 14,773.89 Payment 12,439.32 Subtotal of Deductions 49,857.89 Difference and amount owed $4,857.65
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent Debruyn Produce Company, Inc. be ordered to pay the Petitioner Florida Farm Management, Inc. the sum of $4,857.65. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Debruyn Produce Company, Inc. fails to timely pay Petitioner, Florida Farm Management, Inc. as ordered, the Respondent, Peerless Insurance Company be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner. 1. Not a finding of fact but the issue in this case. 2.-3. Adopted in findings of fact 2 and 4. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Adopted in finding of fact 4. First sentence adopted in finding of fact 7. The balance is not material but see findings of fact 16-23. Not material but see findings of fact 16-23. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record but see findings of fact 9-14. Adopted but modified in findings of fact 21 and 22. 10(A), 10(C)(1), 10(E), and 10(F) adopted in finding of fact 24. 10(C)(2)(3), 10(d) rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. See findings of fact 5, ,7, 9 - 15. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent. 1.-7. Adopted in findings of fact 2, 1, 4, 4, 4, 6, and 7 respectively as modified. Not material. This involved invoice Nos. 210066 and 210067 and adjustment were agreed to be Petitioner and is not part of this dispute. See Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger, Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Adopted in finding of fact 21 as modified. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Not material. This involved invoice No. 2100160 and adjustments were granted by Petitioner and is not part of this dispute. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1. 12.-13.Adopted in finding of fact 21 as modified. Adopted in finding of fact 5, and 9-15 as clarified. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record but see findings of fact 9-15. Adopted in finding of fact 13 as clarified. Adopted in finding of fact 23 as clarified but see findings of fact 9-22.
The Issue Petitioner claims that Respondent owes approximately $6,000.00 for the purchase of grass sod. Respondent argues that the funds claimed by Petitioner are for repairs on equipment, not sod, and that its only indebtedness to Petitioner is $6.00, mistakenly omitted from a payment. The issue is whether Petitioner's claim is proper and cognizable under section 604.31, F.S., related to complaints of breach of agreement by a licensed dealer in agricultural products.
Findings Of Fact Hillside Sod Farms, Inc. (Hillside) produces grass sod for sale to landscaping firms and similar customers. Its business address is 1620 East State Road 46, Geneva, Florida. Bill Hatfield Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Bill's Landscaping (Hatfield) is a licensed dealer in agricultural products, bonded by Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, as surety. Hatfield's business address is 1116 State Road 434, Winter Springs, Florida. Sometime around April 1989, Hatfield began purchasing sod from Hillside. Hatfield uses a lot of sod in his landscaping business. The arrangement between the parties was that Hillside would charge an extra 1/2 cent a square foot on his price for the sod for the use of heavy equipment (forklifts). Hillside owns twenty-seven such machines and loaned three out to Hatfield. The equipment stayed at Hatfield's job sites and was operated by Hatfield's crew. When the equipment broke down, Hatfield notified Hillside, who had it repaired. At least some of the repair bills were sent to Hatfield, who paid them. Sometime around the end of September 1989, Avery Wisdom complained to Bill Hatfield about what he thought was an excessive amount of repairs on his equipment. He felt Hatfield's workers were rough on the machines. He suggested several alternatives, including pulling the machines off the jobs and letting Hatfield provide his own machines. He also suggested that he could purchase new equipment and let Hatfield pay all its expenses over a period of time, ultimately buying the equipment, in a lease-purchase type of arrangement. Another suggestion was that he would get the equipment overhauled and let Hatfield pay all the repair bills. Suggestions one and two were apparently rejected, and it is not clear that suggestion three was formally accepted. Nothing was put in writing. Hatfield claims now that he offered to pay an additional 1/2 cent per square foot of sod for the use of the equipment. Avery Wisdom claims that he did raise the price of his sod, but that it was an across-the-board price increase for all of his customers due to increased costs of production, and not related to rental. The October 9, 1989 invoice #13290 from Hillside to Bill's Nursery reflects an increase of $2.00 per pallet of Bahia sod and $2.50 per pallet of Floratam sod, or 1/2 cent per square foot increase. Debra Ludewig, the bookkeeper and general office manager for Hatfield, asked Hatfield why the price" went up, and he told her it was for the equipment. Hillside continued to bill Hatfield for repairs on the equipment after October 1989. These repair costs are reflected on invoices to Bill's Landscaping and are backed up by separate special "repair order" forms itemizing each repair bill. The "special repair order" forms were also furnished to Bill's Landscaping. The repairs are listed on the invoices with a date, reference to the "special repair order" (SRO number), and a total cost which is calculated into the purchaser's running total at the bottom of the invoice. Payments were made on a continuing basis by Hatfield in varying amounts, and rarely in an exact amount to correspond to the total on an invoice. That is, Bill's Nursery maintained a running balance of its account with Hillside, sometimes totalling as much as $20,000.00. Each time she made a payment to Hillside, Debra Ludewig wrote the invoice number on the check. Sometimes more than one check would reflect a single invoice number. After October 1989, Debra Ludewig started deducting the repair bill portion of the invoices when she computed her payments to Hillside. She did this on her own initiative, without direction from Hatfield, because she understood that the 1/2 cent price increase was to cover the repairs. She did not question why the repair bills were being sent and were still being included on the invoices; she just deducted them without any notice to Hillside. In the meantime, the invoices kept coming from Hillside, showing the running balance on Hatfield's account. The top of the invoices reflected the prior outstanding balance, then payments since the last invoice, then additional charges for sod, then repair orders (if any), and then the total amount outstanding. It is clear from the invoices maintained by Hillside and provided to Hatfield, that Hillside was applying Hatfield's checks to the total outstanding balance, which balance included any repair bills, as well as sod delivered. On the other hand, the invoice numbers referenced on Hatfield's checks to Hillside substantiate that Ms. Ludewig was unilaterally deducting sums from certain invoices, which sums corresponded to the amounts being charged for repairs. It is not clear that Hillside was aware of the bookkeeping discrepancy, as nothing was said about deducting the repair bills until the parties' relationship came to an end in June 1990. Hatfield found a new sod producer, claiming that a customer complained about the quality of Hillside's sod. The total amount of repairs charged by Hillside to Hatfield between October 1, 1989, and June 1990, was $7150.25, compared to approximately $300,000.00 for sod,. The final invoice from Hillside to Bill's Landscaping reflected a total balance due of $13,872.59. This invoice #14070 is dated June 18, 1990. On June 21, 1990 and June 29, 1990, payments were made by Hatfield in the amounts of $3,000.70 and $4,641.00 respectively. This left a balance due of $6,230.89. Avery Wisdom concedes that this total should be adjusted: an invoice #13256 (9/22/89) charged $4.50 sales tax in error, and invoice #13406 (11/13/89) included a math error in the amount of $206.70. The proper adjusted total is $6,019.69. The last invoice to include repairs to equipment is dated April 16, 1990. After that date, according to invoices dated from April 23, 1990 to June 18, 1990, Hatfield purchased $39,943.98 in sod from Hillside. The most recent $6,019.69, therefore, is not attributable to repairs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter its final order finding Respondent indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $6,019.69 and requiring payment within fifteen (15) days after the order becomes final as provided in Section 604.21(7), F.S. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Avery P. Wisdom, President Hillside Sod Farms, Inc. 1620 E. State Road 46 Geneva, FL 32732 Bill Hatfield, President Bill Hatfield Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Bills Landscaping 1116 State Road 434 Winter Springs, FL 32708 Ohio Casualty Insurance Company 136 North Third Street Hamilton, OH 45025 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Senior Counsel Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
The Issue The issue is whether Boyer Produce, Inc. and its surety, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, owe petitioner $1,751.80 as alleged in the complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In July 1993, petitioner, Patricia Thomas, was given authority by her brother to sell all remaining watermelons on his farm located in Citra, Florida. This amounted to approximately one truckload. She eventually sold them to respondent, Boyer Produce, Inc., a dealer (broker) in agricultural products located in Williston, Florida. Its owner and president is Kennedy Boyer (Boyer), who represented his firm in this proceeding. As an agricultural dealer, respondent is required to obtain a license from and post a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). In this case, the bond has been posted by respondent, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, and is in the amount of $75,000.00. Although the parties had never had business dealings before this transaction, through a mutual acquaintance, Randy Rowe, respondent learned that petitioner was interested in selling her watermelons. After Boyer visited the field and examined three watermelons which he described as "good," Boyer offered to purchase a truckload for 4 per pound if all melons were of the same quality. Thomas declined and counteroffered with a price of 5 per pound. The parties then agreed to split the difference and arrived at a sales price of 4 per pound. During the negotiations, Rowe acted as an intermediary between the parties and observed the formation of the contract as well as the loading of the goods onto the truck. Although the matter is in dispute, it is found that both parties agreed that Thomas would be paid 4 per pound for "good" watermelons delivered. This meant that petitioner would not be paid unless and until the watermelons were delivered to their final destination in "good" condition. In the trade, being in "good condition" meant that the watermelons would meet U. S. Grade No. 1 standards. Respondent also agreed to provide a truck and driver at petitioner's field and to transport the produce to Brooklyn, New York, the final destination. At the same time, petitioner was given the responsibility of loading the watermelons on the truck. To assist petitioner in meeting her up- front labor costs, respondent advanced $500.00 as partial payment for the shipment. Winston Smith was hired by respondent to transport the melons to New York. He arrived at petitioner's field on Saturday, July 16, 1993, and remained there while approximately 46,000 pounds of melons were loaded on an open top flat bed trailer. One of the loaders said the melons were "packed real tight," and four bales of straw were used in packing. According to Rowe, who observed the loading, the watermelons packed that day were in "good" condition, and any nonconforming watermelons were "kicked" off the truck. Also, by way of admission, the driver, as agent for Boyer, acknowledged to Rowe that the melons loaded were in "good" condition. Late that afternoon, a thunderstorm came through the area and, due to lightening, no further loading could be performed. Since around 46,000 pounds had already been loaded, petitioner desired for the truck to be sent on its way north. Smith, however, told petitioner he wanted 50,000 pounds in order to make his trip to New York worthwhile and he would not go with anything less. Acceding to his wishes, petitioner agreed to meet Smith the next morning and load an additional two hundred watermelons, or 4,000 pounds, on the truck. Smith then drove the loaded truck to a nearby motel where he spent the night. That evening it rained, and this resulted in the uncovered watermelons and straw getting wet. The next morning, Smith telephoned petitioner and advised her to meet him at 9:00 a. m. at a local Starvin' Marvin store, which had a weight scale that could certify the weight of the shipment. Petitioner carried two hundred watermelons to the store at 9:00 a. m., but Smith did not arrive. Around noon, she received a call from Smith advising that his truck was broken down at the motel and would not start. The watermelons were then taken to the motel and loaded onto the trailer. In all, 50,040 pounds were loaded. Smith's truck would still not start after the watermelons were loaded, and Smith refused to spend any money out of his own pocket to repair the truck. Not wanting to delay the shipment any longer, petitioner gave Smith $35.00 to have someone assist him in starting the vehicle. In order for the repairs to be made, the loaded trailer had to be jacked up and the truck unhooked from and later rehooked to the trailer. This was accomplished only with great difficulty, and Smith was forced to "jostle" the trailer with the power unit for some two hours altogether. According to Rowe, he warned Smith that such jostling could bruise the melons and "mess them up." Smith was also cautioned early on that he should make the necessary repairs as soon as possible so that the load of watermelons would not continue to sit uncovered in the sun. The truck eventually departed around 9:00 p. m., Sunday evening after the uncovered trailer had sat in the sun all day. The shipment was delivered to Brooklyn on the following Tuesday afternoon or evening, and it was inspected by a government inspector on Wednesday morning. According to the inspection report, which has been received in evidence, the load was split evenly between crimson and jubilee melons, and 23 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the two types of melons failed to meet grade. No greater than a 12 percent "margin" is allowed on government inspections. Almost all of the defects cited in the report were attributable to the melons being "over-ripe." The buyer in New York rejected the entire shipment as not meeting standards. Respondent then sold the shipment for only $1350.00 resulting in a loss of $350.00 on the transaction. In addition, respondent says the driver (Smith) accepted $1200.00 instead of the $2,000.00 he would have normally charged to transport a load to New York. When petitioner asked for her money a few weeks later, respondent declined, saying the goods had not met specification when delivered to their destination, and if she had any remedy at all, it was against Smith, the driver. If petitioner had been paid 4 per pound for the entire shipment, she would have been entitled to an additional $1,751.80, or a total of $2,251.80. Petitioner contends that the melons failed to meet grade because of the negligence of the driver. More specifically, she says the loaded melons sat in the sun for almost two days, including all day Sunday after being soaked from the Saturday evening rain. If wet melons are exposed to the hot sun for any length of time, they run the risk of "wet burning," which causes decay. But even if this occurred, only 1 percent of the shipment was found to have "decay" by the government inspector. Petitioner also says that by being jostled for two hours on Sunday, the melons were bruised. Again, however, the melons were rejected primarily because they were over-ripe, not bruised. Therefore, and consistent with the findings in the inspection report, it is found that the jostling and wet burning did not have a material impact on the quality of the melons. Respondent contended the melons were close to being fully ripened when they were picked and loaded. In this regard, Charles Strange, Sr. agreed that if the melons sat in the field for another four or five days, they would have started "going bad." By this, it may be reasonably inferred that, unless the melons were loaded and delivered in a timely manner, they would have become over-ripe and would not meet grade within a matter of days. Therefore, a timely delivery of the melons was extremely important, and to the extent respondent's agent, Smith, experienced at least a twenty-four hour delay in delivering the melons through no fault of petitioner, this contributed in part to their failure to meet grade. Petitioner is accordingly entitled to some additional compensation, a fair allocation of which is one-half of the value of the shipment, or $1125.90, less the $500.00 already paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring respondent to pay petitioner $625.90 within thirty days from date of the agency's final order. In the event such payment is not timely made, the surety should be liable for such payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard A. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company Post Office Box 1985 Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1985 Patricia Thomas Post Office Box 522 Archer, Florida 32618 Kennedy Boyer 15A South West 2nd Avenue Williston, Florida 32696
Findings Of Fact On August 6, 1986, an indemnity bond was executed between RAINMAKER as principal and FIDELITY as surety. The effective dates of the bond were from October 21, 1986, to October 20, 1987. The bond was required under Sections 604.15-604.30, Florida Statutes, in order for RAINMAKER to become licensed as a dealer in agricultural products in Florida. The purpose of the bond is to secure the faithful accounting for a payment to producers or their agents or representatives of the proceeds of all agricultural products handled or purchased by RAINMAKER. The Petitioner, SHAN-RON, is a corporation whose address is 276 Cypress Street, La Belle, Florida. Its purpose is to conduct business by finding buyers for sod located on acreage owned by various cattle ranchers in Lee County, Florida. This practice is commonly known as "bird dogging" in the agricultural trade. The way the business is conducted is as follows: SHAN-RON is contracted by sod installers to whom it sells sod in specific quantities for a fixed price. Once the oral agreement is made, SHAN-RON tells the sod installer where a sod field is located. At this point in the business transaction, the sod installer sends independent truck drivers to the designated sod field. If the sod installer is unable to locate truckers, he telephones a SHAN-RON field foreman. The foreman, as a courtesy, will check to see if any of the independent truckers currently as the sod field can haul a load for the sod installer. Once a trucker is located, employees from SHAN-RON mow the grass, cut the sod, and load it onto pallets owned by SHAN-RON. The truck is loaded with pallets by SHAN-RON employees and the driver is given two copies of the load ticket, one for him and one for the sod installer. The driver delivers the sod and pallets to the address placed upon the load tickets. Upon delivery, the driver has the responsibility to deliver the load ticket to the business office of the sod installer. If he does not deliver the ticket, he does not get paid for hauling the sod. Employees of the sod installer are usually at the delivery site. The sod is laid and the empty pallets are returned to the sod field by the truckers. Every Friday, a representative of SHAN-RON personally delivers a weekly bill to the sod installer in order to collect is owed. When the money is collected, the funds are divided between the rancher whose sod was sold and SHAN-RON. The accountability system used within the sod industry leaves room for a high margin of error at various stages. The SHAN-RON employees occasionally short pallet loads or two layers of sod. The truck drivers occasionally misnamed the sod installer to whom the sod is to be delivered. The truck drivers also occasionally do not take empty pallets under their control back to SHAN-RON. They sell the pallets and pocket the money. The sod installer is financially responsible for the pallet costs. RAINMAKER is a corporation whose address is Post Office Box 7385, Ft. Myers, Florida. The company is primarily in the business of installing sod. It transacted business with SHAN-RON between November 11, 1986, and January 8, 1987. At the time of these transactions, RAINMAKER was licensed as a dealer in agricultural products supported by surety bond number 974 52 23 in the amount of $13,500.00. SHAN-RON, through testimony and the introduction of its business records, proved a prima facie case that RAINMAKER owes $12,964.00 for the purchase of sod between November 11, 1986, and January 8, 1987. Both parties Stipulated that $4,000.00 has been paid on the balance of the account which should be deducted from the balance owed SHAN-RON. In rebuttal to SHAN-RON's presentation, RAINMAKER presented testimony and a business record summary which revealed that six invoices were improperly charged, against its account in the amount of $1,260.00. The record summary was based upon a comparison of load tickets against production records during the time period involved. In addition, RAINMAKER's records reveal that the two drivers, Stormy and Fred Bower, were not paid for delivering the sod to RAINMAKER under the load ticket presentation to the sod installer which was previously described as an accounting method within the business. Because RAINMAKER set forth the issue of delivery discrepancies in its answer to the complaint and competent evidence was presented, $1,260.00 should be deducted from the `balance owed. SHAN-RON presented testimony that it is customary for the company to spray the sod for pest control. RAINMAKER received defective sod from SHAN-RON which contained "Creeping Charlie" weeds during the time of the deliveries in dispute. SHAN-RON was timely notified of the problem, and toad RAINMAKER to have the sod sprayed. A copy of the invoice for $300.00 was sent to SHAN-RON and has not been paid. Although the issue was not raised in RAINMAKER's answer to the complaint, it is properly before the Hearing Officer because of RAINMAKER's timely notification and cure of the defect in the product. The $300.00 should be deducted from the amount owed. Testimony relating to possible sod shortages was rejected as no evidence was presented that shortages occurred in the orders for which SHAN-RON seeks payment. The customary procedure In the sod business for handling credits for shortages requires the buyer to notify the seller within a responsible length of time of the shortages. Such notification did not take place as to the orders in dispute. The amount owed to SHAN-RON by RAINMAKER is $7,404.00. It is officially noticed that SHAN-RON's complaint was originally filed with the department on June 19, 1987, within nine months from the date of sale.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture enter a final order requiring the Respondent RAINMAKER to make payment to the petitioner SHAN-RON in the amount of $7,404.00. In the event that RAINMAKER does not comply with the department's order within fifteen days from the date it final, FIDELITY should be ordered to provide payment and the conditions and provisions of the bond furnished to RAINMAKER. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Clinton H. Coutler, JR., Esquire Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture Lab Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650 Shan Ron Sod, Inc. 276 Cypress Street LaBELLE, FLORIDA 33935 Rainmaker Sod, Inc. 2290 Bruner Lane, South East Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 1227 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Robert Chastain General Counsel Department of Agriculture Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Robert J. Walsh and Company, Inc. has been in the business of selling agricultural products since 1962. It is a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in s. 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1985). It is not a "producer" as defined in s. 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985). Walsh's modus operandi which it has used for many years is to have its salesmen call on landscapers, nurseries and other customers for trees, plants and other agricultural products to determine their needs. These salesmen have the prices of products and their availability from producers and the salesmen take orders from these purchasers. This order is sent to the producer who delivers the product to the purchaser and sends Walsh a copy of the delivery ticket. Walsh bills the customer for the product delivered and the producer bills Walsh for the consumer-cost of the product less a 20-25 percent discount from which Walsh derives its profit from the sale. The producer relies solely on Walsh for payment for the product it produces and delivers to the customer. Walsh has no authority to sell the product at a price other than that set by the producer. In any event, the producer bills Walsh for the product delivered at the producer's established price less the discount it gives Walsh for acting as intermediary in the sale. If products are damaged in transit, the producer's driver will make any necessary adjustment with the customer or return the damaged plant for replacement by the producer. Walsh does not represent the grower if such a situation develops. Similarly, if the product is rejected by the purchaser for not meeting quality standards, that issue is resolved between the grower and the customer without input from Walsh. Whatever agreement is reached between the grower and the customer is reflected on the invoice signed by the customer and forwarded to Walsh who has the responsibility of collecting from the customer. The grower bills Walsh for the cost of the product less Walsh's commission. The sales forming the bases for the complaints filed by Walsh with Respondent involve sales to Paul Pent, d/b/a Paul Pent Landscape Company, Dean Pent and J & W Landscape. On January 31, 1985, Walsh sold Pent three laurel oaks grown by Stewart Tree Service for a total price of $467.46 including sales tax (Ex. 2). On March 27, 1985, Walsh sold various trees and plants grown by Goochland Nurseries to J & W Landscape for a total price of $403.98 (Ex. 3). On April 22, 1985, Walsh sold two live oaks grown by Stewart Tree Service to Pent Landscape Company for a total price of $336.00 (Ex. 4). On July 3, 1985, Walsh sold various plants grown by Goochland Nurseries to J & W Landscape for a total price of $564.96 (Ex. 5). On all of these sales the producers billed Walsh for the product and were paid by Walsh. Walsh billed the customers who did not pay and Walsh filed the complaints (Ex. 8, 9 and 10), denied by Respondent on grounds Walsh was not an agent or representative of the producers. In 1976, Petitioner filed a complaint against the bond of the Ernest Corporation, a licensed dealer in agricultural products and received $5,589.20 from Respondent who recovered from the bonding company. In the complaint Walsh alleged that it was agent for Southeast Growers, Inc., selling their nursery stock throughout Florida. Respondent's witnesses could not recall what additional evidence they saw to conclude that Walsh was, in fact, an agent for the producer. However, these witnesses all testified that had they then believed Walsh was solely responsible to the producer for payment for the products sold they would not have concluded Walsh was the agent or representative of the producer. The bond on which Petitioner is attempting to recover provides that if the principal "shall faithfully and truly account for and make payment to producers, their agents or representatives, as required by Sections 604.15 - 604.30, Florida Statutes, that this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect." (Ex. 11 and 12)
Conclusions The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of these proceedings. Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1985) provides in pertinent part: Any person claiming himself to be damaged by any breach of the conditions of a bond or certificate of deposit, assignment or agreement given by a licensed dealer in agricultural products as herein before provided may enter complaints thereof against the dealer and against the surety, if any, to the department, which complaint shall be a written statement of the facts constituting the complaint. Section 604.15(1) , Florida Statutes (1985) provides: "Dealers in agricultural products" means any person, whether itinerant or domiciled within this state, engaged within this state in the business of purchasing, receiving, or soliciting agricultural products from the producer or his agent or representative for resale or processing for sale; acting as an agent for such producer in the sale of agricultural products for the account of the producer on a net return basis; or acting as a negotiating broker between the producer or his agent or representative and the buyer. (emphasis supplied) One of the complexities of this case which leads to some confusion is the fact that both Pent and Walsh were dealers in agricultural products as above defined. Walsh fits into the category of a person claiming himself to be damaged by a breach of any condition of the bond of Pent. However, he has the burden of showing that he is a person covered by the bond. According to the terms of the bond, coverage is provided only for "producers, their agents or representatives." Walsh is clearly not a producer in this case but claims coverage as an agent or representative. In construing "agent" or "representative" the legislative intent should be considered. The purpose of these provisions of the statute requiring licensing and bonding of dealers in agricultural products, as expressed in Section 604.151, Florida Statutes, is to protect producers from economic harm. Economic harm sustained by an agent or representative is imputed back to the principals, which in this case are the producers. An agency may be defined as a contract either expressed or implied upon a consideration, or a gratuitous undertaking, by which one of the parties confides to the other the management of some business to be transacted in the former's name or on his account, and by which the latter assumes to do the business and render an account of it. 2 Fl. Jur. 2d "Agency," Section 1. Here, Walsh was selling agricultural products on its own account, which products it was purchasing from the producers. The producer sold its product to Walsh and delivered it to the address Walsh indicated. The customer receipted for the product and the producer billed Walsh for the total cost, including transportation, to the ultimate buyer, less the 20-25 percent commission Walsh received. Walsh paid the producer and billed the customer. Whether or not Walsh collected from the customer had no bearing on the debt Walsh owed the producer for the product. It could be said that the producer was the agent for Walsh in delivering the product to the user. Even though Walsh never had actual possession of the product the sale to Walsh was complete when the producer delivered the product to the user. The entire transaction clearly is a buy-and-sell operation by Walsh and not Walsh acting as an agent for the producer. The fact that Walsh sells the producer's product does not make Walsh the agent or representative of the producer, when the producer holds only Walsh responsible to pay for the product. Nor was Walsh a representative of the producers. Representative is defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977 Ed.) as: "standing or acting for another esp. through delegated authority." Walsh had no delegation of authority to act for the producer. Walsh had no authority to modify the price, settle disputes, or any other function normally performed by a representative. The above interpretation of those having standing to file a complaint against a dealer in agricultural products is the same interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions that is made by Respondent. As stated in Natelson v. Dept. of Insurance, 454 So.2d 31 (Fl 1st DCA 1984): Agencies are afforded a wide discretion in the interpretation of a statute which it [sic] administers and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous. The reviewing court will defer to any interpretation within the range of possible interpretations. (citations omitted). This interpretation limiting recovery on an agricultural bond to producers and their agents or representatives is certainly within the range of possible interpretations, especially considering the purpose of these statutory provisions to be the protection of the economic well being of the producer. From the foregoing, it is concluded that Robert J. Walsh & Company, Inc. was not the agent or representative of Goochland Nurseries and Stewart Tree Service and does not have standing to file a complaint against Dean Pent, d/b/a Pent Landscape Company, and Paul Pent, d/b/a Paul Pent Landscape Company, and their surety, Transamerica Insurance Company.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the petition as contained in Petitioner's letter dated March 24, 1986. ENTERED this 14th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas M. Egan, Esquire Phillip Kuhn, Esquire Post Office Box 7323 Winter Haven, Florida 33883 Ronnie H. Weaver, Esquire Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joe W. Right Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent contracted for the employment of farm workers with a farm labor contractor before the contractor displayed a current certificate of registration in violation of Section 450.35, Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of relevant facts are determined: Respondent, David Torres, is a farm labor contractor licensed in Florida. On January 31, 1991 Larry Coker, during a routine grove inspection, observed a crew of farm workers picking fruit in the Happy Acres Grove, in Hardee County, under the supervision of Respondent. Respondent utilized Billy Handford and Antonio Torres to transport the farm workers to the grove. Mr. Handford was employed to recruit and transport farm workers for a fee to be paid by Respondent. Billy Handford did not have a Florida FLC license which authorized him to engage in this occupation. On January 31, 1991, Billy Handford recruited and transported six farm workers from the Bartow area to the Happy Acres grove in Hardee County. Respondent was cited for three violations of Chapter 450, on January 31, 1991.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent has violated Section 450.35, Florida Statutes (1989). It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent be fined $500 (dollars) and such fine to paid within thirty days from date of the final order entered by the Division. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED TO: FRANCISCO R. RIVERA, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 2012 CAPITAL CIRCLE, S.E. SUITE 307, HARTMAN BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0658 DAVID TORRES, POST OFFICE BOX 842 HAINES CITY, FL 33844 FRANK SCRUGGS, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 303 HARTMAN BUILDING 2012 CAPITAL CIRCLE, S.E. TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-2152 STEPHEN BARRON, GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 307 HARTMAN BUILDING 2012 CAPITAL CIRCLE S.E. TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-2152
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Raysbrook Sod, Inc. (Respondent), is indebted to Florida Sod, Inc. (Petitioner), related to the sale and purchase of sod, and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of harvesting sod. Petitioner is located in LaBelle, Florida. Respondent is a corporation located in Riverview, Florida, and is also engaged in the sod business. In September 2007, Respondent was interested in purchasing some sod in order to satisfy a customer's needs. Respondent's regional supervisor, Gabriel Monsivais, approached a gentleman by the name of Trampis Dowdle about purchasing sod. Monsivais had never met Dowdle and, in fact, knew him only as "Mr. Trampis." Dowdle represented that he could obtain sod from Petitioner, and a deal was struck. There was no written contract between Monsivais and Dowdle, nor--quite interestingly- -between Petitioner and Respondent. Nonetheless, Respondent had its drivers go to Petitioner's sod field and begin loading sod for Respondent's use. In all, approximately 1,700 pallets of sod were acquired from Petitioner's field by Respondent. Each time a load of pallets was taken, a Load Sheet was created to show the number of pallets, the location of the field, and the name of the person taking the sod. The driver of the truck was expected to sign the Load Sheet, indicating that the sod had indeed been received. There is no dispute between the parties about the number of pallets taken by Respondent's drivers.1 As sod was taken by Respondent, Petitioner would issue an invoice reflecting the amount of sod and the price to be paid. The invoices were sent to Respondent via U.S. Mail. The total amount billed for the sod was $42,559.16. Respondent issued a check (No. 8899) in the amount of $1,271.16, made payable to Petitioner on November 30, 2007, in payment of the first invoice from Petitioner. No further checks from Respondent were received by Petitioner, leaving a balance due of $41,288.00.2 Respondent, however, did attempt to make payments for the sod it purchased. Respondent wrote checks to Dowdle based on Dowdle's representations that he either owned Petitioner's company or was working for Petitioner. In fact, Dowdle neither owned nor was in any way affiliated with Petitioner. Dowdle was apparently defrauding Respondent (and possibly Petitioner as well). Respondent's representative, Joseph Bushong, and Petitioner's representative, Jake Alderman, had never met prior to the day of the final hearing in this matter. There was no written contract between the parties. The entire business relationship between the parties was done orally, based on conversations between Monsivais and Dowdle. Nonetheless, Respondent did obtain over $42,000.00 worth of sod from Petitioner. Respondent does not contest this fact. Respondent's actions indicate acknowledgement of the presumed relationship between the parties. Respondent submitted a credit application to Petitioner with references and credit information to be used by Petitioner in extending credit to Respondent for the sod it was purchasing. Respondent issued at least one check directly to Petitioner for payment of the sod in response to an invoice issued by Petitioner. The check was made payable to "Florida Sod" in the amount of $1,271.16. That check directly corresponds to the amount in Invoice No. 1697 from Petitioner dated October 8, 2007. Respondent did receive additional invoices from Petitioner for the sod Respondent had purchased and received. Clearly, there was an understanding between the two companies that a business relationship existed. After making its first payment to Petitioner, Respondent's subsequent payments for the sod were made directly to Dowdle and his companies. One such payment, made by way of a credit card, was actually applied to a restaurant with which Dowdle apparently had some business connection. Other payments were made via checks made payable to other Dowdle interests. Respondent made payments to Dowdle in the mistaken belief that Dowdle was the agent of or employed by Petitioner. In fact, Dowdle has never been affiliated with Petitioner. Petitioner did not receive any of the payments made by Respondent to Dowdle. Petitioner and Dowdle are not related or affiliated in any fashion (other than a prior arm's-length sod purchase between the two). It is clear that Dowdle received the payments intended for Petitioner in payment for the sod purchased by Respondent. Dowdle, whose whereabouts are unknown by the parties, did not provide Petitioner with the payments. Rather, from the evidence, it appears that Dowdle kept the payments, thereby committing a fraud on both Petitioner and Respondent. Though both parties are somewhat at fault in this matter for failure to utilize normal and acceptable business practices, one or the other party must necessarily bear the burden of payment. The evidence supports Petitioner in this regard because it best followed normal business procedures. Had Respondent made its remittance checks payable to Petitioner (who had issued the invoices), Dowdle would not have been able to abscond with the money. Had Respondent obtained some affirmative proof that Dowdle was an agent of Petitioner, Respondent would have known better than to provide money to Dowdle. Had Respondent contacted Petitioner directly instead of relying on third parties (its foreman and Dowdle), the deception would have been uncovered. However, the facts of this case support the proposition that Petitioner made a valid sale of sod to Respondent, and Respondent did not pay Petitioner for the sod.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $41,288.00 within 30 days of entry of a final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2008.
