The Issue The issues are whether the City of Jacksonville's (City's) Ordinance No. 2008-628-E adopted on September 9, 2008, which remediates Ordinance No. 2007-383-E, is in compliance, and whether Chapter 2009-96, Laws of Florida, renders this proceeding moot, as alleged by Petitioner, Dunn Creek, LLC (Dunn or Petitioner).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties Petitioner is the owner of a vacant 89.52-acre parcel of property in Council District 11, which is located in the northern reaches of the City. More specifically, the property lies around four or five miles east of the airport and Interstate 95, just south of Starratt Road between Dunn Creek Road and Saddlewood Parkway, and within a "couple of miles of Main Street," a major north-south State roadway. Dunn submitted oral and written comments to the City during the plan amendment process. As such, it is an affected person and has standing to participate in this proceeding. The City is a local government that is subject to the requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. It adopted the amendments being challenged by Dunn. Except for the challenged plan amendment, the City's current Plan is in compliance. Intervenor Britt owns property and resides within the City. The parties have stipulated to the facts necessary to establish that she is an affected person and therefore has standing to participate in this matter. The Department is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility for reviewing plan amendments of local governments, including the City. Background On May 14, 2007, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2007- 383-E, which amended the FLUM by changing the land use category on Dunn's property from LDR to RPI, which would allow an increase in the density and intensity of use on the property. (The LDR land use allows up to seven dwelling units per acre, while RPI is a mixed-use category that allows up to twenty dwelling units per acre if built to the maximum development potential.) On July 9, 2007, the Department issued its Notice and Statement of Intent finding that the Ordinance was not in compliance on the ground the map change was not supported by adequate data and analysis to demonstrate that the City would achieve and maintain the adopted LOS standards for the roadways within its jurisdiction. The Department further determined that the traffic study submitted by the City was not based on the maximum development allowed under the RPI category. On August 1, 2007, the Department initiated this case by filing a Petition, which tracked the objections described in its Notice and Statement of Intent. The City, Dunn, Department, and Britt later entered into settlement discussions. As part of the settlement discussions, Dunn submitted a revised traffic study and coordinated with other applicants for map changes to perform cumulative traffic impact studies. The parties eventually entered into a proposed settlement agreement which would limit development of the property to 672 condominiums/townhomes and 128,000 square feet of non-residential uses through an asterisk to the Plan. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 25. Also, the proposed settlement agreement noted that the data and analysis confirmed that certain future road improvements in the Capital Improvement Element (CIE) of the Plan would offset the traffic impacts of the new RPI land use. These were improvements to the East-West Connector (U.S. Highway 17 to New Berlin Road) and Starratt Road. Id. Finally, Dunn agreed to pay $4.3 million in "fair share money" to the City to offset the proportionate share of the development's traffic impacts. See Petitioner's Exhibit 6. The proportionate share agreement was intended to match the trip count anticipated from the RPI development. On September 3, 2008, the proposed settlement agreement and remedial amendment were presented to the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee (Committee) for approval as Ordinance Nos. 2008-627 and 2008-628, respectively.3 At that meeting, the Committee heard comments from several members of the public who opposed the amendment, a Dunn attorney, and the City's Director of Planning and Development, William B. Killingsworth. The City Council member who represents District 11 and is a member of the Committee also spoke in opposition to the proposal. Based primarily upon data in a new traffic study prepared on August 28, 2008, by a member of Mr. Killingsworth's staff, and the opposition of the District 11 Council member, the Committee voted unanimously to revise the proposed settlement agreement and remedial amendment by changing the land use designation on the property back to LDR, its original classification. The revised settlement agreement was approved by Ordinance No. 2008- 627-E, while the remedial amendment changing the land use was approved by Ordinance No. 2008-628-E. The two Ordinances were then forwarded to the full City Council, which approved them on September 9, 2008. The revised settlement agreement was later executed by the City, Department, and Britt, but not by Dunn, and is known as the Sixteenth Partial Stipulated Settlement Agreement. See Petitioner's Exhibit 2. The essence of the revised agreement was that by changing the land use back to its original designation, the potential adverse impacts to transportation facilities would be resolved. Id. The remedial amendment package was transmitted by the City to the Department for its review. On December 18, 2008, the Department issued a Cumulative Notice of Intent to Find Ordinance Nos. 2007-383-E and 2008-628-E in compliance. On January 8, 2009, Dunn filed a Motion to Amend Petition to Intervene pursuant to Section 163.3184(16)(f)1., Florida Statutes. Because Dunn objected to the revised settlement agreement and challenged the remedial amendment, the parties were realigned, as reflected in the style of this case. On June 1, 2009, Senate Bill 360, engrossed as Chapter 2009-96, Laws of Florida, became effective. That legislation amends Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, in several respects. Among other things, it designates the City as a Transportation Concurrency Exception Area (TCEA).4 See § 163.3180(5), Fla. Stat. The new law also provides that plan amendments for land uses of a local government with a TCEA are deemed to meet the LOS standards for transportation. See § 163.3177(3)(f), Fla. Stat. Therefore, after a TCEA becomes effective, the Department no longer has the authority to review FLUM amendments in the TCEA for compliance with state-mandated transportation concurrency requirements. However, Senate Bill 360 contains a savings clause, which provides that "this subsection does not affect any contract or agreement entered into or development order rendered before the creation of the [TCEA] except as provided in s. 380.06(29)(e)." See § 163.3180(5)(f), Fla. Stat. The City, Department, and Britt contend that this provision "saves" the Sixteenth Partial Stipulated Settlement Agreement executed by them in November 2008, and that the Department still retains jurisdiction to consider the remedial amendment. Conversely, Dunn contends that the savings clause does not apply to the revised agreement, that the Department no longer has jurisdiction to review the challenged amendment, that the remedial amendment was not authorized, and that because the remedial amendment never became effective, the Department's Petition should be dismissed as moot. Objections to the Remedial Amendment Besides the contention that the proceeding is moot, Dunn raises three issues in its challenge to the amendment. First, it contends that the amendment is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis related to traffic impacts and therefore is not in compliance. Second, Dunn contends that the amendment does not address the concerns raised in the Department's original Notice and Statement of Intent regarding the City's achieving and maintaining the adopted LOS of affected roadways. See § 163.3184(16)(f)2., Fla. Stat. Third, Dunn contends that due to procedural errors in the amendment adoption process, it was unduly prejudiced. Data and analysis Because almost all of the unresolved FLUM amendments in this case involved "traffic issues," on September 4, 2007, a Department employee, Melissa Hall, sent an email to counsel for a number of applicants, including Dunn, describing "what the department would be looking for in terms of traffic analysis." See Petitioner's Exhibit 12, p. 1. The email required those applicants to submit revised traffic studies. Id. Among other things, the applicants were advised that the revised traffic impact analysis for each amendment had to use "a professionally acceptable traffic impact methodology." Id. Dunn followed the requirements of the email in preparing its revised traffic study. At the time Ordinance No. 2007-383-E was adopted, based on total background traffic, which includes existing traffic plus reserve trips for approved but not-yet-built developments, eight road segments in the study area already failed to meet LOS standards. (LOS E is the adopted passing standard on those roadways.) The study area includes affected roadways within a two-mile radius of the boundaries of the proposed project site where project traffic consumes more than one percent of the service volume. If the Dunn project is built, six segments impacted by the development will continue to fail. According to the City's expert, as a general rule, an applicant for a land use amendment is not required to bring a failing segment back up to its adopted LOS. Rather, it is only required to pay its proportionate share of the improvements for bringing it up to compliance. The unique aspect of this case is that the City has simply reclassified the property back to what it was, LDR, when Ordinance No. 2007-383-E was adopted. At that time, the Plan was in compliance. In response to Dunn's contention that Ordinance No. 2008-628-E is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis, the City, joined by the Department and Britt, first contends that, given the unique circumstances presented here, no data and analysis were required. Alternatively, it contends that there are sufficient relevant and appropriate data and analysis to support maintaining the LDR land use designation. The data and analysis include the traffic study prepared by Dunn's consultant in October 2007, the additional traffic analysis performed by the City staff just before the Committee meeting, and the testimony provided at the Committee meeting on September 3, 2008. At hearing, the City first pointed out that the RPI designation was never determined to be in compliance, Ordinance No. 2007-383-E never became effective, and the property has remained LDR throughout this proceeding. See § 163.3189(2)(a), Fla. Stat. ("[p]lan amendments shall not become effective until the [Department] issues a final order determining the adopted amendment to be in compliance in accordance with s. 163.3184(9), or until the Administration Commission issues a final order determining the adopted amendment to be in compliance"). Therefore, the City takes the position that Ordinance No. 2008- 628-E did not need to be supported by data and analysis because the LDR category was the land use designation on the property at the time of the adoption of Ordinance No. 2008-628-E. In the same vein, it argues that the remedial amendment is the equivalent of a repeal of the prior ordinance (2007-383-E), which would not require any data and analysis support. While at first blush these arguments appear to be plausible, the City could not cite any provision in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, or Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 9J-55 that relieves a local government from the requirement that a plan amendment be supported by data and analysis. The City also argues that even if Ordinance No. 2008- 628-E is deemed to be a change in the land use (from LDR to LDR), the net impact of the change would be zero. This argument is based on the accepted testimony of Mr. Killingsworth, who stated that the City, Department, and Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) agreed upon a methodology which entitled the City to give "credit" for uses permitted under the existing land use category.6 Under that methodology, the City subtracts the number of trips that the existing land use (LDR) generates from the additional trips generated by the proposed land use (LDR). Therefore, the net transportation impact of a change from LDR to LDR, in effect, would be zero. The methodology is described in Petitioner's Exhibit 15, a memorandum authored by Mr. Killingsworth and sent on October 4, 2007, to Dunn and other parties seeking map changes in this case. The memorandum stated that the methodology described therein was "developed in coordination [with] FDOT District 2" and "is the suggested methodology for use in determining traffic impacts of proposed land uses for the City." See Petitioner's Exhibit 15, p. 1. Mr. Killingsworth could not cite any provision in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, or Chapter 9J-5 allowing for such a credit for traffic generated by a prior permitted land use in the data and analysis required for a FLUM amendment. At the same time, however, Petitioner could not cite any rule or statute that prohibits the Department from allowing this type of methodology when deemed to be appropriate. Even though it differed from the methodology described in Ms. Hall's earlier email by allowing credit for the existing land use, it was nonetheless "a professionally acceptable traffic impact methodology" approved by the Department and FDOT and could be used as data and analysis to support a change back to the property's original land use classification. Therefore, it constitutes relevant and appropriate data and analysis to demonstrate that the net traffic impact of the change in land use from LDR to LDR is zero. The City further argues that if it was required to provide other data and analysis, the traffic impacts of the new ordinance are offset by the two roadway improvements negotiated with the Department in the proposed settlement agreement for Ordinance No. 2008-627. See Finding 7, supra. Based upon the City staff's analysis, which is found in City Exhibit 3, the LDR land use generates less trips than the RPI land use. (This study was prepared a few days before the Committee meeting in response to an inquiry from a Committee member.) More specifically, page 3 of that exhibit reflects that there are 169 less afternoon peak hour trips for LDR than RPI with the development cap of 672 dwelling units and 128,000 square feet of non-residential uses. It is fair to infer, then, that if the proposed mitigation in the original settlement agreement offsets the impacts of the more intense RPI land use, the mitigation also offsets the impacts of the less intense LDR land use. City Exhibit 3 is a comparative calculation of the difference in vehicle trips generated by development of the property under the LDR category approved by Ordinance No. 2008- 628-E and the development of the property under the RPI category approved by Ordinance No. 2007-383-E. Dunn points out, however, that the exhibit does not show how the trips generated are distributed on affected roadways or how those trips, as they may be distributed, affect LOS of any roadways. Despite the fact that the data in Exhibit 3 are limited to trip generation data, and establish no facts relating to the LOS of affected roadways, they support a finding that more trips will be generated under the RPI designation than the existing LDR designation. Also, they provide further support for a finding that if the proposed road improvements offset the impacts of the RPI use, the mitigation will offset the impacts, if any, of the original LDR use. For data and analysis relating to the LOS of affected roadways, the City, joined by the Department and Britt, rely upon a traffic study performed by Dunn's traffic consultant, King Engineering Associates, Inc. (King). That firm prepared a transportation analysis dated November 19, 2007, for the purpose of supporting a mixed-use development on the property under the RPI category. See Petitioner's Exhibit 8. This study, however, does not apply to development of the property under the LDR category because it was based upon a mixed-use project which would allow for credit based upon the internal capture of some trips. (In other words, a portion of the new trips will be internal to the site, that is, trips between the residential and commercial land uses on the property.) Because of this, any reference to the King study and proposed mitigation therein was deleted from the revised settlement agreement. In this respect, the study does not support the amendment. The King study addresses impacted roadway segments, existing and background traffic, proposed traffic generated by the development, and LOS for the impacted roadways, as suggested by Ms. Hall in her email. Dunn's traffic engineer established that in the impacted study area, six out of eight roadway links will continue to fall below adopted LOS standards based upon existing traffic and that generated by the RPI development (segments 174, 372, 373, 374, 377, and 543). See Table 4, Petitioner's Exhibit 8. The study also identifies proposed roadway improvements in the vicinity of the project site that are intended to help cure or mitigate the failing standards. See Petitioner's Exhibit 8, p. 12. These improvements are listed in the CIE and will cost around $85 million. A "fair share" agreement has also been executed by the City and Dunn, which requires Dunn to pay more than $4.3 million to offset impacts of the RPI development. Those monies would be applied to improvements in Sector 6.1 (the North Planning District), which includes Starratt Road and the East-West Connector. The agreement notes that this contribution would offset the proportionate share of traffic impacts of the proposed RPI development. Notably, the City has already funded both the widening of Starratt Road and the improvements to the East-West Connector, U.S. Highway 17 to Berlin Road, through the Better Jacksonville Plan. Therefore, even if the Dunn fair share agreement is not implemented, the two improvements will still be made. According to Dunn's engineer, the completion of the four projects listed on page 12 of his traffic study, which are labeled as "mitigation," will not restore or cure any of the LOS failures that now exist on the six impacted segments in Table 4 of the study. However, two of the failing segments (373 and 543) may be "helped" by the projects listed on that page. Dunn's engineer also analyzed City Exhibit 3 and concluded that if the Dunn property is developed as LDR, rather than RPI, there would be potentially one less roadway segment (374) impacted by development, while five other segments would continue to fail. When the proposed mitigation in the King study is factored in, he opined that the East-West Connector may help two other failing segments. He further opined that if LDR development on the property occurs, probably three of the six impacted segments will continue to fail adopted LOS standards. Even so, the improvements identified in the CIE, including those already funded by the Better Jacksonville Plan, should offset the proportionate share of traffic impacts associated with any future LDR development.7 The foregoing data and analysis establish that the LDR land use category generates less traffic impacts than the originally-proposed RPI use; that a change from LDR to LDR should have zero effect in terms of traffic impacts; that even if there are impacts caused by a change back to LDR, the proposed mitigation in the CIE will offset the proportionate share of the impacts associated with any LDR use; that while it differed from other studies, a professionally acceptable traffic impact analysis was used by the City to support the remedial amendment; and that the proposed road improvements are fully funded without having to implement the fair share agreement. Finally, in adopting the amendment, the City has reacted to the data and analysis in an appropriate manner. Does the Remedial Amendment Resolve All Issues? Dunn also asserts that the amendment does not resolve the issues raised by the Department in its Notice and Statement of Intent dated July 9, 2007. Under Section 163.3184(16)(f)2., Florida Statutes, an affected party may assert that a compliance agreement does not resolve all issues raised by the Department in its original notice of intent. The statute allows an affected party to then address those unresolved issues in the realigned proceeding. In this case, Petitioner asserts that the Department's original objection that the change in land use would result in a lowering of the LOS in the study area was not addressed by the remedial amendment. In its Notice and Statement of Intent to find the amendment not in compliance, the Department cited the following rules and statutes as being contravened: Sections 163.3164(32) and 163.3177(3)(b),(6)(a), (8), and (10), Florida Statutes, and Rules 9J-5.005(2)(a) and (c), 9J-5.006(2)(a), (3)(b)1. and 3., 9J-5.016(4)(a)1. and 2., and 9J-5.019(3)(a) through (h) and (4)(b)2. Although these sources of authority were cited in a single generic notice of intent as a basis for objecting to all seventeen map changes, it is assumed that they have equal application to this proceeding. The cited statutes relate to funding of transportation projects and concurrency issues, while the rules relate to data and analysis requirements, concurrency issues, the capital improvement element, and required transportation analyses, all subjects addressed by Dunn at the final hearing. Assuming arguendo that the remedial amendment does not address all of the issues raised in the original notice of intent, Dunn was given the opportunity to fully litigate those matters in the realigned proceeding. Procedural Irregularities Rule 9J-5.004 requires that the City "adopt procedures to provide for and encourage public participation in the planning process." See also § 163.3181(1), Fla. Stat. ("it is the intent of the Legislature that the public participate in the comprehensive planning process to the fullest extent possible"). Dunn does not contend that the City failed to adopt the required procedures. Rather, it contends that the City did not follow those procedures during the adoption of the remedial amendment. More specifically, prior to the Committee meeting, Dunn says it spent "hundreds of thousands of dollars on top of the millions that [it] had spent previously, working for fourteen months in conjunction with the City and [Department]" so that the parties could resolve the Department's objections. Dunn argues that it was unduly prejudiced by the last-minute revisions made by the Committee and City Council, and that it did not have an adequate opportunity to respond. Dunn points out that a City Planning Commission meeting was conducted before the Committee meeting, and that body unanimously recommended that Ordinance Nos. 2008-627 and 628 be approved. It further points out that when the Committee met on September 3, 2008, the proposed revisions to the settlement agreement, the accompanying remedial amendment, and the new traffic data were not discussed until after the public comment portion of the meeting was closed. (The transcript of that meeting reflects, however, that after the new revisions and traffic study were raised, Dunn's counsel was briefly questioned about Dunn's traffic study and the density/intensity of the project. Also, according to Mr. Coe, a copy of the City's newly-prepared traffic study was given to a Dunn representative just before the Committee meeting.) For both public meetings, the City's published notices indicated that the purpose of the meetings was to consider the proposed revised settlement agreement and remedial amendment allowing a cap on the development of the RPI property through the use of an asterisk, as reflected in Ordinance Nos. 2008-627 and 2008-628. See Petitioner's Exhibits 16 and 17. Dunn contends that it had insufficient time between the Committee meeting on September 3, 2008, and the final City Council meeting on September 9, 2008, in which to review and evaluate the new traffic information and respond to the comments of the Committee member who supported the revisions. It also points out that, like other members of the public, Dunn's attorney was only given three minutes to present comments in opposition to the revised agreement at the City Council meeting on September 9, 2009. Notwithstanding any procedural errors that may have occurred during the City's adoption process, Dunn received notice and attended both the Committee and City Council meetings, it presented written and oral objections to the revised plan amendment prior to and at the City Council meeting on September 9, 2008, and it was given the opportunity to file a petition to challenge the City's decision and present evidence on the revisions at the hearing in this case. Savings Clause in Senate Bill 360 In support of its position that the matter is now moot, and that the savings clause in Senate Bill 360 does not "save" the revised settlement agreement executed by the City, Department, and Britt, on November 10, 2008, Dunn submitted extrinsic evidence to show the Legislature's intent in crafting a savings clause, which include four separate analyses by the Legislative staff (Appendices A-D); an article authored by the Bill's Senate sponsor (Senator Bennett) and published in the St. Petersburg Times on May 23, 2009 (Appendix E); a similar article authored by the same Senator and published in the Sarasota Harold-Tribune on June 11, 2009 (Appendix F); a seven-page letter from Secretary Pelham to Senator Bennett and Representative Murzin dated July 23, 2009, concerning the new law and a two and one-half page summary of the bill prepared by the Department (Appendix G); a power point presentation for the Senate Community Affairs Committee on October 6, 2009 (Appendix H); and an article published in the October 2009 edition of The Florida Bar Journal (Appendix I). The Florida Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact contained in Appendix A was prepared on February 17, 2009, and does not reference the relevant savings clause. A second Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact contained in Appendix B and prepared on March 19, 2009, merely acknowledges that the legislation includes a savings clause but provides no further explication. See App. B, p. 9. Appendix C is the Florida House of Representatives 2009 Session Summary prepared in May 2009, while Appendix D is a Summary of Passed Legislation prepared by the House of Representatives Economic Development and Community Affairs Policy Council on an undisclosed date. Neither document addresses the issue of what types of agreements were intended to be saved. Appendices E through I are guest newspaper columns, correspondence, a power point presentation, and an article in a professional journal. None are authoritative sources of legislative intent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2008-628-E, which remediates Ordinance No. 2007- 383-E, is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2009.
The Issue The issues in this case are (1) whether the City of Panama City's (the City) Small Scale Comprehensive Plan Amendment No. 04-20S adopted by Ordinance No. 1985 (the Plan Amendment) is "in compliance," as that term is defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and (2) whether the petition challenging the Plan Amendment should be dismissed as untimely.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Robert E. Moore owns a home and resides at 1310 Kristanna Drive, Panama City, Florida. The northwestern property line of Mr. Moore's home is adjacent to the northeastern corner of the Property. JE 7; PE 98-B at RM.2 There is an approximate 100-foot-wide Bay County maintained canal or drainage ditch (canal) that forms the northern boundary of the Property, see Endnote 1 and PE 50 at 7, which runs in an east-to-west direction at the northern portion of his home. This canal eventually leads to North Bay to the west.3 Goose Bayou is located south of the Property. Mr. Moore taught respiratory care at Gulf Coast Community College for approximately 23 years and is retired. His residence was affected by a hurricane which passed through the area in September 2004. He noticed water appearing half-way up his driveway, which is not on the canal. He is concerned with the placement of additional homes in this area in light of his experience with the water level after the recent storm event. (Generally, Mr. Moore stated that there is a two- foot difference between low and high tide in this area. T 133, 137.) Mr. Moore, as well as the other Petitioners, made oral and written comments to the City Commission during the Plan Amendment adoption hearings. See City's Unilateral Pre-Hearing Stipulation at 5, paragraph E.4.; T 213. The St. Andrews Bay Resource Management Association (RMA) was established in 1986 and is a citizen's organization devoted to the preservation of the quality of St. Andrews Bay and its surrounding ecosystems. T 194. (St. Andrews Bay is a larger body of water which includes North and West Bay and Goose Bayou. See generally JE 12, Map 1.) The RMA has approximately 100 members. The RMA uses, but does not own, an office on the Panama City Marine Institute campus located within the City. The RMA occasionally conducts seminars or conferences and offers several programs for citizens, e.g., sea turtle nest watch, a water sampling program (Baywatch), and a sea grass watch program. The RMA meets every month except during the summer. T 195-196. The RMA opposes the Plan Amendment, in part, because of concerns with the effect of development on what Ms. Shaffer characterized as the "pine islands." Linda Anne Yori owns and resides in a house at 908 Ashwood Circle, Panama City, Florida, which is "just off Kristanna" Drive and to the east. See PE 98-C at the blue X. She teaches middle school science at a local public school. She has observed the Property, and generally described the Property, and vacant property to the north, as "upland hammock with salt marsh." T 209. In general, Ms. Yori opposes the Plan Amendment because she "believe[d] the environmental impact would be too great." Mary Rose Smith owns and resides in a house on Ashwood Circle, Panama City, Florida, two houses away from Ms. Yori's residence. Ms. Smith regularly jogs throughout the neighborhood. She believed that there are approximately 400 homes in Candlewick Acres and six vacant lots remaining. T 214- 215. As a result of recent hurricanes in the area, she observed flooding approximately half-a-mile upland along Kristanna Drive from the west-end to the east (half a mile to the turn off to Ashwood). PE 98-D at the blue 1/2 designation and blue line. While she cannot say for certain where the water came from, she believed the water "came from the bay or the bayou." T 220. The Bay County Audubon Society (BCAS) conducts membership and board meetings within the City limits and also owns a piece of property in the City. BCAS has approximately 400 members. Members live within the City. BCAS is concerned with the environment and with "the density of the proposed development" and "access to the pine islands." T 409-411. The City is the local government unit responsible for approving the Plan Amendment at issue in this proceeding. § 163.3187(1)(c), Fla. Stat. The Application, Review, and Adoption of the Plan Amendment On or about May 11, 2004, James H. Slonina, P.E., the president of Panhandle Engineering, Inc., filed an application on behalf of Robert H. and Barbara B. Hansman, requesting the City to annex "approximately 9.9 acres including lots, paved roadways and bridged drives" and further requested a land use designation to allow proposed residential development." The Property, see Endnote 1, is designated on a Bay County parcel map. A flood zone map is also included, but lacks clarity. The Property is vacant. JE 13. The purpose of the annexation and request for land use designation "is to accommodate the development of a 13+/- lot single-family residential waterfront development adjacent to North Shore Subdivisions." The application also stated: To support the residential home sites, there are adequate adjacent public roadways and utilities. Due to the unique physical configuration of the property, traditional RLD lot standards may not [sic] applicable. While we would prefer to pursue an RLD-1 designation, the application is submitted contingent upon confirmation of an appropriate land use designation and an approval of the proposed project. If another course of action is available, which would allow for the development of 13+/- single-family residential lots on 9.9 acres, please advise. JE 13. (It is represented throughout this record that the land use designation is requested for approximately 6.8 acres rather that approximately 9.9 acres. See, e.g., JE 7 at 1; JE 11 at 12-13.) The application was reviewed, in part, by Mr. Thomasson. JE 7. The staff report4 dated July 30, 2004, stated that the request is to amend the City's FLUM from Conservation (as previously designated by Bay County) to RLD with a Zoning District classification of RLD-1. (The staff report referred to several permitted uses under RLD-1. JE 7 at 2. The permitted uses for RLD-1 are those contained in the City's "Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Code (LDRC)" at section 4-6.1.2.a. JE 4 at IV:8-9. However, the propriety of the RLD-1 Zoning District classification for the Property is not at issue in this proceeding. T 266.) The staff report also stated that the Property "is currently zoned conservation, abuts property to the North that is designated conservation Land Use category in the County and is just North of an existing Special Conservation Treatment Zone," which is indicated on a map on page 1 of the staff report. JE 7 at 1. The staff report stated that "[w]ater and sewer infrastructure and other urban services are available to this property." See T 286-287, 301-303, 307-308; JE 7 at 1. Under the background section, it is stated that "[t]he property has been seen as environmentally significant and has been the object of an effort to purchase for perpetual protection by a local land trust organization. It is adjacent to an existing development to the East." Id. The Plan provides that an RLD land use district "is intended to provide areas for the preservation of development of low-density neighborhoods consisting of single-family dwelling units on individual lots" with a density of "[n]o more than five dwelling units per acre." The allowed intensity is "[n]o more than 40% lot coverage as determined by dividing the impervious areas by the gross area of the site or lot." JE 3 at 1-2. The staff report contained findings of fact with citations to the Plan, including the Future Land Use Element, the Coastal Management Element, and the Conservation Element. References to the LDRC are also provided. See also T 285-311, 315-317, 320-321; JE 7 at 2-3. Thereafter, specific findings are made: Staff finds that this property, as a part of the St. Andrews estuary, serves as a breeding, nursery, feeding and refuge are for numerous marine creatures, birds and upland wildlife. The three pine and oak hammacks [sic] are a few of a rare estuarian resource. The marsh throughout the area serves as home for seagrass and other marine organisms that are integral with the biodiversity of the estuary. There also exists a [sic] archaeological sites [sic] consisting of an ancient Indian midden that has already been classified by the Director of the Florida State Division of Historical Resources as deservant [sic] of mitigation and potentially eligible for the National Historic Registry (see attached documentation). The site overall has a biotic community of nearly 90% of it [sic] total area. Staff findings are that this proposed Land Use Amendment is inconsistent with the above listed mandates of the Comp Plan. Staff also finds that the proposed Land Use is inconsistent with the LDR Code, in that it is not in harmony with the Comp Plan (Subsection 2-5.5.6.e. above), as well as the requirements of the environmental protection standards of Section 5-5. This decision hinges on the whether the City intends to enforce it's [sic] environmental protection standards of the Comp Plan and the LDR Code and if the site is seen as environmentally significant. JE 7 at 4 (italics in original). Ultimately, staff recommended approval only with the following conditions: 1.) that the fullness of the subject property be designated as a Conservation Special Treatment Zone [CSTZ][5] and that the pine and oak hammacks [sic](as referred to as "Pine Islands" in the Bay County Comp Plan) are prohibited from being developed; and 2.) that the area of the subject property that is beyond the mean high tide of the mainland portion, which specifically means the marshes/wetlands and the oak and pine hammacks [sic], shall be placed in a conservation easement and dedicated to either the City, or a third-party land trust or conservancy. JE 7 at 4. (Mr. Hammons, the City Manager, disagreed with the staff report, in part, because there was no data to support several findings. T 119-124.) On August 9, 2004, the Planning Board of Panama City met in regular session to consider the application. The request was to approve a small scale land use amendment to the FLUM of the Plan from Conservation (under the Bay County Comprehensive Plan) to RLD with a zoning classification of RLD-1 for the Property. JE 11 at 2. But see Finding of Fact 15. Mr. Fred Webb and Dr. Frasier Bingham were present on behalf of the applicant. Mr. Webb advised that the Bingham's and the Webb's owned the property which consisted of approximately 6.5 acres of uplands. But see Finding of Fact 29 regarding the ownership of the Property. In part, Mr. Webb stated that the grass beds would not be impacted and that there was no legitimate environmental complaint. Dr. Bingham stated that he is an ecologist, specializing in shallow water ecology. JE 11 at 3. He said his family had purchased the upland property in 1948 and the submerged land in the 1960s. Beginning in 1991, Dr. Bingham stated he tried to get the government to purchase the property, but to no avail. He also recounted attempts to obtain permits from DEP and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). See, e.g., PE 60, 63-64.6 He believed that the bridge problem, identified by the Corps had been solved. JE 11 at 3 and 13. (There is no persuasive evidence in this record that the Corps has approved any permits for development of the Property.) Mr. Webb stated that all maintenance to the bridges and other utilities would be the responsibility of the association (for the developed Property) and not the City and that the City would only be responsible for police and fire. Id. at 4. Mr. Thomasson addressed the Planning Board. JE 11 at The staff report previously mentioned is incorporated in the minutes. Staff felt that the CSTZ designation would be the most appropriate designation due to the environmental issues and that the RLD-1 designation would be the least intense land use available under the Plan. Board member Pritchard inquired whether the application was incomplete "as it doesn't address the environmental issues." Mr. Thomasson stated the applicant did not believe there would be any environmental impact, while staff believed the property to be environmentally significant. JE 11 at 8. Dr. Bingham again addressed the Planning Board to refute the staff's findings of fact. Dr. Bingham said that "the wetlands would not be impacted, the grass beds would not be impacted, and the stormwater runoff already goes into the grass beds, which are, in his opinion, fine grass beds" and that "that 13 houses would not have any significant impact." He indicated that soils were not at issue and that the "property is sandy, not special." Id. at 9. Mr. Webb indicated that "they had evaluated the environmental aspects and added the raised bridges, swales, etc." JE 11 at 9. Numerous individuals spoke in opposition to the request. Apparently, by a show of hands "a large majority of those present were in opposition to the request." JE 11 at 12. It appears that two persons spoke in favor of the request. Id. at 9-11. Mr. Webb confirmed that the application requested approval of the land use designation and annexation for 6.8 acres. JE 11 at 12. He also advised that a limited liability corporation owned the 6.8 acres, while there are different owners of other parcels. Mr. Webb indicated that "only the uplands on the islands were being annexed," although "he was not sure the properties were 'islands' in legal terms." Id. at 13. Mr. Webb indicated that he was willing to indemnify the City against any legal expenses arising from this request. Id. The requested land use change was approved by a vote of three to two. Id. at 14. On September 28, 2004, the City Commission considered Ordinance No. 1985 pertaining to the requested land use designation change and Ordinance No. 1995 pertaining to the annexation of the Property. These Ordinances were read by title only as a first reading. JE 10 at 293-294. During this meeting, the minutes (JE 10) reflect that Mr. Webb stated that they would only be developing the upland islands and proposed to use bridges, which he says "the environmental regulatory community has considered to have almost no environmental impact. He said that the addition of thirteen single family residential homes to an area that has seven hundred homes will not materially affect level of service." JE 10 at 289. Several of the people who appeared before the Planning Board also appeared opposing the application for annexation and land use designation change. JE 10 at 290. Mr. Martin Jacobson, Planning and Zoning Manager for Bay County filed a formal letter of objection to the annexation. Id. Mr. Fred Beauchemin opposed the annexation and responded to eleven items which were discussed by Mr. Webb and Dr. Bingham during the Planning Board meeting, including representations of impacts to grass beds, wildlife resources, and soils. JE 10 at 290-292. Mr. Webb continued to feel that there would not be any destruction of the marshes. Id. at 292. Dr. Bingham again noted that he is a shallow water marine ecologist and felt that he was informed about the environmental situation on the Property. Id. at 293. After brief discussion by some of the Commissioners, Ordinance Nos. 1985 and 1995 were approved by a vote of three to two. JE 10 at 293-294. By a letter dated November 9, 2004, Daniel Shaw, A.I.C.P., memorialized the October 5, 2004, Bay County Commission's unanimous decision to contest the potential annexation of and land use change to the Property, referring to several provisions of the Bay County Comprehensive Plan. T 228; PE 69. Mr. Shaw opined that "[c]learly, development proposed for the annexed Pine Islands violates the County's Comprehensive Plan." PE 69 at 2. He further stated: What's more the proposed annexation also violates the City's Comprehensive Plan. City Policy 5-5.2, 5-5.3 related to preservation of Environmentally Significant Resources would prohibit the proposed development. The property is a part of the St. Andrews estuary, and serves as a breeding/refuge area for numerous marine creatures, birds and wildlife. The three pine and oak hammocks are a truly rare estuarine resource for Bay County and for the State of Florida. The marshlands contain valuable sea grass beds and are home to numerous marine creatures, which are integral to the biodiversity of the estuary. Finally, the property contains valuable archeological sites, consisting of ancient Indian middens that are classified by the State Division of Historical resources, and potentially eligible for the National Historic Register. I would concur with staff's memorandum of August 9, 2004, which cites numerous other examples of where the development would violate the City's plan. PE 69 at 2 (emphasis in original). Mr. Shaw also stated that the Property is located in the coastal high hazard area, within a "V" zone for flood regulations.7 He stated that "[t]hese designations argue for prohibiting development for public safety and infrastructure investment purposes." Again, Mr. Shaw stated that Bay County opposed the potential annexation and subsequent land use reclassification. PE 69 at 3. Mr. Shaw also testified during the final hearing and reaffirmed his prior position. T 232-245. Mr. Shaw stated that the Property, prior to annexation by the City, was designated Conservation under the Bay County Comprehensive Plan, which allows for limited residential use and the preservation of pine islands (an outright prohibition).8 He was not qualified, however, to make a determination whether any portion of the Property is a pine island. T 247. Mr. Shaw thinks that Bay County allows up to 15 units per acre in the coastal high hazard area. T 254. On November 9, 2004, the City Commission met and considered a final reading of Ordinance Nos. 1985 and 1995. Several people appeared opposing both ordinances including Mr. Moore, Ms. Smith, Ms. Yori, and others. JE 8 at 3-14; JE 9 at 3-5. Mr. Webb again addressed the City Commission and stated, in part, that "nothing in the marsh would be touched." He also indicated that he would fully indemnify the City in the event of a lawsuit. JE 8 at 14-21; JE 9 at 5. Dr. Bingham also addressed the Commission. JE 8 at He stated that he has designed an environmentally friendly community of 13 home sites. He indicated that he had a Ph.D. in shallow water marine ecology and attended Florida State University and the University of Miami. He said that he was thoroughly familiar with the Panama City area and had worked with a large list of groups as an ecologist. He reiterated that the homes sites will take up 6.8 acres and will be entirely uplands and no marshes or swamps. He said that he is trying to use one fifth of the property that he owns and "there are no wetlands involved in this particular operation that will be damaged." JE 8 at 23. He also indicated that there will be raised bridges constructed on the Property, and according to him, were suggested by the Corps. Id. After brief comments by several Commissioners, the Commission approved the annexation and land use designation change by a vote of three to two. JE 8 at 26-27, 30-31. Toward the end of the November 9, 2004, hearing, the City Attorney, Rowlett Bryant, advised that the minutes of the September 28, 2004, Commission meeting would be included with the minutes of the November 9, 2004, public hearing. In other words, the November 9, 2004, Commission meeting was the public hearing held on the application for the annexation and the land use designation change. JE 8 at 27-30. Mr. Bryant also noted that the Ordinance No. 1985, related to the land use designation, would be RLD-1 and that the prior reference to Special Treatment Conservation Zone in the title of Ordinance No. 1985, considered on September 28, 2004, was a recommendation of staff and was deleted from Ordinance No. 1985, which was approved by the City Commission on November 9, 2004. JE 8 at 31-32. Ordinance No. 1985, in fact, changed the land use designation of the Property (approximately 6.8 acres) "from Conservation (a Bay County Land Use designation) to Residential- Low Density-1 as described in Small Scale Amendment 04-S20." JE 1 at 2. However, Petitioners and the City agree that "[t]he city assigned a future land use map designation to the parcel of Residential Low Density in Ordinance No. 1985." See T 11, lines 10-23; Petitioners' Prehearing Stipulation at 2, IV.2. Data and Analysis As more fully discussed in the Conclusions of Law, "[t]he future land use plan shall be based upon surveys, studies, and data regarding the area, including the amount of land required to accommodate anticipated growth; the projected population of the area; the character of undeveloped land; the availability of public services; the need for redevelopment, including the renewal of blighted areas and the elimination of non-conforming uses which are inconsistent with the character of the community; the capability of uses on lands adjacent to or closely approximate to military installations; and, in rural communities, the need for job creation, capital investment, and economic development that will strengthen and diversify the community's economy." § 163.3177(6)(a), Fla. Stat. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(2) provides for "land use analysis requirements" and requires, in part, that the future land use element "be based upon the following analyses which support the comprehensive plan pursuant to subsection 9J-5.005(2) F.A.C." Subsection 9J-5.006(2)(b) requires "[a]n analysis of the character and magnitude of existing vacant or undeveloped land in order to determine its suitability for use, including where available: 1. Gross vacant or undeveloped land area, as indicated in paragraph (1)(b); 2. Soils; 3. Topography; 4. Natural resources; and 5. Historic resources." Further, "all goals, objectives, policies, standards, finding and conclusions within the comprehensive plan and its support documents, and within plan amendments and their support documents, shall be based upon relevant and appropriate data and the analyses applicable to each element. To be based on data means to react to it in an appropriate way and to the extent necessary indicated by the data available on that particular subject at the time of adoption of the plan or plan amendment at issue." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.005(2)(a)(emphasis added). "Data are to be taken from professionally accepted existing sources, such as the United States Census, State Data Center, State University System of Florida, regional planning councils, water management districts, or existing technical studies. The data shall be the best available existing data, unless the local government desires original data or special studies." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.005(2)(c). Petitioners question whether the record contains relevant and appropriate data, which was existing and available on or before November 9, 2004, to support the Plan Amendment. Petitioners further question whether the analysis of that data is adequate. The application, JE 13, requested approval of annexation of and a change in the land use designation for, as amended, approximately 6.8 acres. Aside from identifying the parcel in question, in relation to Goose Bayou and the subdivision to the east, the application does not contain adequate data and analysis to support the Plan Amendment. Mr. Slonina, a professional engineer and expert in civil engineering, testified during the final hearing as to the due diligence he and his firm performed in support of filing the application with the City. T 424. Mr. Slonina has been on the Property many times. T 456. As part of the due diligence, Mr. Slonina analyzed the area proposed for development on the Property, which are the upland areas, and, in part, stated that these areas are primarily free draining sands and have fairly high percolation rates. T 425, 453. He also characterized upland areas as fairly clean sands and satisfactory for development in this area based on his experience. He also examined the upland and wetland soils to determine suitability for a "post and beam timbered bridge system" that would be pile supported over the wetlands bridging upland areas. He opined that the soils on the uplands were nothing unique and were suitable for low density residential and suitable to support the bridge system he described. T 428, 442, 458-459. See also P 50, Attachment A. Regarding utilities which might be available to the Property, during the due diligence phase, he identified, from utility maps, the location of the closest water and sewer which could serve the Property, adjacent to the Property to the east. He also analyzed the ability of fire protection to be provided to the Property and concluded that it was feasible. T 428-432, 460-461. See also JE 7 at 1 regarding "utility and other urban services availability" and P 50 at 14-16 for a discussion of "utilities." Mr. Slonina also opined that a stormwater system could reasonably be designed for the Property and that it was feasible to design a stormwater system that would capture stormwater runoff before it went into the bayou. T 432-435. Mr. Slonina examined flood zone information and determined that the Property was "very typical" and that the flood zone information available would not preclude residential development on the Property. T 434-435, 450. But see Endnote 7. From a traffic concurrency standpoint, he examined traffic engineering data on trip generation for 13 single-family homes and determined that there was adequate capacity for that additional loading on "the only roadway that connects to the [P]roperty." His traffic impact analysis was limited "through the residential streets." T 435-436, 439-441. Mark O. Friedemann, is the executive vice-president at the Phoenix Environmental Group, Inc., an environmental consulting firm. T 466. Mr. Friedemann was retained on or about January 7, 2005, by the City's counsel for the purpose of "doing a basic assessment of the property and whether it was suitable for some type of development, residential in particular." T 474-475. Prior to conducting a survey of the Property, aerial photographs, data from the Florida Natural Areas Inventory, and various maps were reviewed. Id. Mr. Friedemann and an assistant conducted a field survey of the Property on January 12, 2005. They collected basic water quality data, observed wildlife, conducted several soil observations pits, looked for scat, and examined the vegetative community on the Property. T 476. For the purpose of the survey, the Property was divided into areas 1 through 4, which are labeled on CE 5, Figure 2. T 478. These upland areas were the major focus of the assessment along with the interior (wetland/marsh) areas. T 478, 565. CE 5 at 2, Figure 2. Mr. Friedemann and his assistant arrived on the Property at approximately 9:00 am on January 12, 2005, during low tide. They left the Property as the tide was starting to return. T 517, 532, 548. Area one is a rectangular portion of the Property, which runs north to south and forms most of the eastern boundary of the Property and is adjacent to Candlewick Acres. Area two is another upland area which is in the northwest portion of the Property and west of area one. Area three is in the southwest portion of the Property and southwest of area two. Area four is a small upland portion, which is almost due south of area one in the southeastern portion of the Property. CE 5 at 2, Figure 2; see also Endnote 6. Mr. Friedemann accessed area two from area one by walking along a path/spoil pile, which runs east to west and forms part of the northern boundary of the Property (the approximately 100 foot canal is north of and adjacent to the path/spoil pile). He walked to area three by stepping across a small rivulet of no more than a foot in width. He walked to area four from area three, stepping over another small tidal- influenced rivulet that passed between areas three and four. He approached area one from area four walking across "a rather high area." Mr. Friedemann "did not get the impression that area two was surrounded" by wetlands, salt marsh, or tidal mud flats. T 479-481, 500, 517, 556-557. He stated that area three would be surrounded, but was unsure about area four. T 556-559. Some of the areas photographed would be potentially inundated during high tide. T 521-525. Mr. Friedemann's report also contained, in part: water quality data taken on January 12, 2005; and a list of species seen on the same date; a recent undated aerial of the Property and surrounding area, downloaded from the DEP website, which was also magnified; and several aerials (dated 1953, 1962, 1967, 1974, 1978, and 1986) of the Property including the surrounding areas. Mr. Friedemann opined, based on his review of aerials, that there may have been a timber operation ongoing on the Property in the past although he would not hazard a guess. T 540. The report also included several photographs taken of the four areas, during the site visit on January 12, 2005. CE 5 at x-xxii. Although he did not "review any set of plans," or have any opinion regarding any specific development proposal, Mr. Friedemann opined that based on his observations in the field, "there is a viable project that could be built on this parcel."9 T 482, 501-502, 511, 520. Mr. Friedemann provided an analysis of the Property by and through his testimony regarding photographs taken of the Property during his site visit. From a biological or ecological perspective, he did not observe anything on the Property which would preclude residential development. He further opined that what he observed was not unique in the panhandle of Florida. T 501-502. Mr. Friedemann did not conduct a wetland delineation of the Property. T 556. However, the record contains an infrared Conceptual Site Plan dated October 22, 2002, indicating vacant land to the north of the Property, and residential areas to the east of the Property and east of the vacant parcels to the north. This particular site plan provided for the approximate wetland boundaries of the Property identified as south parcel (4). PE 98-D and PE 50 at Exhibit 1. Mr. Friedemann indicated that he had not observed the Property during a hurricane, during periods of high wind, or during periods of a combination of high wind and high tide. He agreed that the tides in the United States can be lower during the winter than they are during the spring and that the highest tides may be experienced during the spring called neap tides. T 532-533. Mr. Friedemann was also referred to a December 30, 2004, document apparently prepared by Panhandle Engineering, Inc., sheet number 2 of 4, CE 16, which delineated 13 lots. T 533. See Endnote 6. (City Exhibit 16 was admitted into evidence as an authentic document; however, there was no testimony regarding the preparation of this document. T 535-537.) Comparing sheet 2 of 4 with Figure two of CE 5, area two is depicted as being surrounded by rush marsh and connected to area one and area three by drawn-in bridges. Compare PE 50, Attachment E, Sheet 1 of 2, dated July 31, 1998, depicting the Property with 13 lots configured, interspersed with a "conservation area" designation and Attachment A, Figure 4., Project Base Map, depicting upland areas on the Property, interspersed with a "marsh" designation with PE 98-D south parcel (4) and "approximate wetland boundary. See also Endnote Mr. Friedemann stated that the indication of rush marsh on sheet number 2 of 4 did not comport with his observations of the Property during his site visit. He was unaware of this drawing. T 534-538. Gail Easley, A.I.C.P., an expert in urban and regional planning, opined that the Plan Amendment was consistent with various provisions of the City's Plan, the State Comprehensive Plan, and the West Florida Regional Strategic Policy Plan. She also opined the Plan Amendment was supported by data and analysis regarding the suitability of the Property for the RLD land use designation. In support, Ms. Easley stated in part: Understanding that the amendment is not really permitting the use, but understanding that the amendment establishes the uses that are allowed as I testified earlier, the suitability data that is available in addition to the data and analysis here in the Comprehensive Plan includes the information from Panhandle Engineering about, more specifically about the availability of facilities and services and the suitability of soils for use of residential low density, as well as the analysis contained in Mr. Friedemann's report regarding environmental issues and the suitability of this site for residential low density. So I found plenty of evaluation of suitability. T 586. See also T 610-611. Ms. Easley also opined that the Plan Amendment does not threaten coastal and natural resources in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rules 9J-5.006, 9J-5.012, and 9J- 5.013, and Sections 163.3177 and 163.3178, Florida Statutes, because she considered the data and analysis in the Plan, "as well as the suitability and capability [sic] analysis that were submitted by Panhandle Engineering and Mr. Friedemann demonstrated that there was not a violation of these provisions." T 617. Ms. Easley also stated that there was adequate data to support a need for residential (RLD) development on the Property. See, e.g., T 584-585, 621-622, 629-630, 632-634. See also JE 3 at Future Land Use Data, 1-1 - 1-10. During cross-examination, Ms. Easley was asked to identify the particular Panhandle Engineering report which she reviewed to support her opinion. The report is not in evidence. However, Ms. Easley stated: "It was a report that they prepared that addressed issues of suitability of the site with regard to the availability of water, the availability of sewer, the capacity for water and sewer, soil conditions on the site, and traffic situations on the site. I'm sorry, I do not recall the date of that particular suitability analysis, but it was prepared by Panhandle Engineering, and I reviewed it as a part of my analysis." T 626. Ms. Easley was also asked to provide the source of her data and analysis about environmental conditions on the site and she replied: "Two places, there is information in the City's data and analysis with regard to the vacant land analysis, as well as general environmental conditions in or around the City, I reviewed that data and analysis that I mentioned earlier. I also saw information specific to this parcel from Mr. Friedemann's report." T 627. Ms. Easley indicated that there was no specific data and analysis contained in the City's Plan about the Property, although the Plan referenced areas adjacent to the City. T 628. Ms. Easley reiterated that natural resources are considered during the plan amendment process. It also occurs during permitting. T 642. She again stated: "The suitability analysis was contained in two different reports. As I testified earlier, Mr. Slonina's report from Panhandle Engineering addressed soils and soil suitability. And Mr. Friedemann's report looked at other kinds of environmental issues. I reviewed both of those reports and determined that suitability analysis had been preformed to support the plan amendment." T 643. According to Ms. Easley, if there were environmental reasons creating an inconsistency with Rule 9J-5, then such reasons could serve as a basis for denial. T 643. (Ms. Easley also opined that a land use change to the FLUM "is an assignment of a land use category and the associated density and intensity, it is not a development activity." See T 587, 651.) Mark Llewellyn, P.E., is the president of Genesis Group. In October 2002, Genesis Group completed a planning and engineering analysis (Genesis Report)10 for Chandler and Associates, who, in turn, had a contract with the DEP to prepare an appraisal report for the Goose Bayou Marsh Property.11 The Goose Bayou Marsh Property included four parcels, including the south parcel (4), which is the Property in question, two north parcels (2 and 3), and the middle parcel (1), which is north and northeast of and adjacent (the west one- third) to the Property. All the parcels are vacant. See PE 98- D, which also appears at PE 50, Exhibit 1. Mr. Llewellyn identified three peninsular islands on the Property (south parcel 4)(PE 98-D at the blue X's), which roughly correspond with areas one and two in Mr. Friedemann's report at CE 5 at 2, Figure 2. T 160-161. See also Endnote 6. The two eastern peninsular islands (area one) are connected to the upland to the east, Candlewick Acres. The third peninsular island, located in the northwest corner of the Property, can be accessed, according to Mr. Llewellyn, by a berm or other geographical feature to the north of the Property and south of the drainage canal. Id. See also T 397. There is one larger upland island and a smaller upland island toward the southwest and southern portions of the Property, which appear to be surrounded by wetlands, waters of the state, salt marsh, or tidal mud flats. T 160-164. Each peninsular island and upland island is less than 20 acres. Mr. Llewellyn's analysis is consistent with the approximate wetland boundaries identified in the Conceptual Site Plan, PE 98-D. Mr. Llewellyn opined that the Property could be developed as a single-family development without having an impact on the Property if it is designed and maintained properly. T 157, 172. See also Endnote 6. The Genesis Report provided an analysis of the four parcels. Apparently the south parcel (4), the Property, contained approximately 16.2 acres as follows: wetlands 9.8+/- acres; upland islands 3.5+/- acres; peninsula uplands 2.9+/- acres; or 6.4+/- acres of total uplands. T 163; PE 50 at 12. Parcels 1-4 are analyzed in light of several factors, including but not limited, to the Bay County Future Land Use and Comprehensive Plan. The following is an analysis of the Bay County Future Land Use and Comprehensive Plan as applied to the north parcels (2 and 3): The Bay County Comprehensive Management Plan identifies the North Parcel's Future Land Use Designation as Conservation. The purpose of this land use is to identify public and private lands held for conservation of natural features. Allowable uses for this designation are natural resource protection, flood control, wildlife habitat protection, passive of recreation, silviculture and residential densities up to 2DU/acre. Commercial development is prohibited for properties with this land use designation. Additionally, the upland islands located on these parcels fit the definition for "Pine Islands" as defined in the Bay County Comprehensive Plan. A Pine Island is defined as a small upland area generally 20 acres or less, usually characterized by typical pine flatwood vegetation, which are surrounded by waters of the State, wetlands, salt marsh, or tidal mud flats. The Bay County Comprehensive Plan prohibits development on any "Pine Island". This means that it will be extremely difficult to develop the upland areas located on this parcel. PE 50 at 2. See also PE 50 at 2 (II.B.) and 13 (IV.B.) regarding the Panama City Future Land Use. (The Genesis Report was prepared approximately two years prior to the City's annexation of the Property. The City did not annex the vacant land to the north (parcels 1-3), which is part of the subject of the Genesis Report.) Regarding the analysis of parcels 1, and 4, the Property, and referring to the Bay County Future Land Use and Comprehensive Plan, it is noted that "[t]he same issues apply to this parcel." PE 50 at 7 and 13. The Genesis Report discussed wetlands on the Property: The wetlands within the property consist of estuarine salt marshes, which are connected to Goose Bayou and West Bay. According to an environmental assessment prepared by Biological Research Associates (BRA) the marshes are tidally influenced and dominated by black rush. Other species include seaside goldenrod, seashore dropseed grass, sea purslane, glasswort, salt grass, marsh hay cord grass, sea lavender, Chinese tallow, saw grass, cork wood, and saltbrush. Additionally, the salt marsh is habitat for two listed bird species; the snowy egret and the little blue heron (see Attachment A). As previously stated, a wetland delineation has been completed for this parcel and accepted by FDEP and ACOE. PE 50 at 13. The Genesis Report also provided a brief discussion of flood plain and cultural resource considerations, and also provided an analysis of site planning and engineering, including access, utilities, owner site plan/lot lay out, and probable development costs. PE 50 at 13-15. Regarding south parcel 4, the Property, the Genesis Report concluded, in part, that "[t]his parcel has limited development potential." A cost estimate is provided. It is also concluded that water and sewer could be provided without incurring significant increases in development costs. "Development of the upland islands would require bridges, which significantly increases the development cost. There is no guarantee that the development within the wetlands would be permitted at this time." PE 50 at 16. The Genesis Report also included a report prepared by Biological Research Associates, which appears as Attachment A to PE 50. Mark Andrew Barth, vice president/senior ecologist for Biological Research Associates, was one of the two signatories to a section of the Genesis Report and also testified during the final hearing. T 175; PE 50, Attachment A. He reiterated that they prepared a preliminary environmental assessment for a proposed acquisition by a State agency. T 176, 180. (While unclear, it appears that his study area included the approximate western one-third of the Property, see, e.g., T 189; PE 50, Attachment A, Figures 1, 3-4, although other portions of the Property were studied. See, e.g., Finding of Fact 93.) Referring to PE 98-C and the Property (outlined in black) and the vacant land to the north outlined in red, Mr. Barth testified that they are "mainly comprised of salt marsh and scattered pine dominated islands." According to Mr. Barth, the term "pine islands," "describes isolated upland patches within the salt marsh." T 177. The salt marshes consist of vegetation that extends beyond the water level usually in very shallow water. T 178. The Property is part of an estuary system, Goose Bayou, for example. Id. See also T 381; JE 12 at IV-14-16 and Map 1. The salt marsh is inundated by saline or marine water as opposed to fresh water. T 178. One of the most significant features of an estuary system "is providing nursery grounds and habitat for marine and estuarine fish and wildlife." T 179. Mr. Barth considered the Property, south parcel 4, PE 98-D, to be environmentally sensitive in light of the combination of estuarine and upland areas which are undisturbed. T 185-186. Mr. Barth did not have enough information to assess specific impacts to the surrounding salt marsh and water in light of a proposed development on the Property. He felt it depended on the type of development. T 182. "Middens" have been found on the south side of the Property, in and around area 3 (CE 5 at 2, Figure 2). See, e.g., T 558-559; PE 50, Genesis Report at 13 and Attachment A at 6-7 and Attachment E, Figure 4, Project Base Map and Figure 5, PBY139 Base Map. Ultimate Findings of Fact Regarding Adequacy of Data and Analysis Ultimately, whether the Plan Amendment is based upon relevant and appropriate data and analysis is a close question. This is particularly true here where critical portions of Mr. Friedemann's analysis are based on information, e.g., Mr. Friedemann's photographs, collection of water quality samples, and observations of the Property (species seen and terrain), which post-dated the City's adoption of the Plan Amendment on November 9, 2004. As a result, his analysis of this information has been disregarded, notwithstanding the lack of an objection to the admissibility of his report, CE 5. See Conclusions of Law 110-114. (Mr. Friedemann also provided several aerials of the Property and surrounding area which pre-date the date of adoption of the Plan Amendment and have been considered along with his analysis of this data.) Also, to the extent that Ms. Easley relied on Mr. Friedemann's report (CE 5) and the post- adoption information collected by Mr. Friedemann and his analysis of that information, her opinions have also been disregarded. Nevertheless, Petitioners have the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plan Amendment is not based upon relevant and appropriate data and analysis, which Petitioners have not done. Accordingly, based on a review of the entire record in this proceeding, it is ultimately concluded that the Plan Amendment is based on relevant and appropriate data and analysis, except as otherwise stated herein. See § 163.3177(6)(a), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.005(2), 9J-5.006(2), and 9J-5.012-.013. Consistency with the City's Plan, the West Florida Strategic Regional Policy Plan, the State Comprehensive Plan, and the City's Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Code Petitioners contend that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with several provisions of the City's Plan: Future Land Use Element Policy 1.1.1.10; Coastal Management Element Goal 1, Objective 5.1, and Policies 5.1.1 and 5.1.3.3, and Goal 3; and Conservation Element Goal 1, Policies 6.6.2, 6.6.2.3, and 6.6.2.4. Petitioners contend that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with several provisions of the LDRC: subsections 2- 5.5.6, 5-5.1, 5-5.2, 5-5.3, and 5-5.6.3.e. Petitioners also contend that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Section 187.201, Florida Statutes, and the West Florida Strategic Regional Policy Plan. The Plan Amendment changes the land use designation on the Property to RLD. The Plan Amendment is not a development order. See Strand v. Escambia County, Case No. 03-2980GM, 2003 WL 23012209, at *4 (DOAH Dec. 23, 2003; DCA Jan. 28, 2004), aff'd, 894 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). It does not authorize any development to occur on the Property. Further, a special treatment zone, as used in the City's Plan, is not a FLUM land use district. Based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the various Plan provisions at issue, the Plan Amendment does not alter or interfere with the City's ability to maintain the quality of coastal resources; restrict the City's ability to maintain regulatory or management techniques intended to protect coastal wetlands, water quality, wildlife habitat, and living marine resources, for example, or prohibit the construction of docks, piers, wharves, or similar structures; interfere with the City's ability to provide for or have available adequate areas for public waterfront access or to provide the circumstances necessary for the conservation, protection, and use of natural resources; or interfere with the City's ability to enforce guidelines in its LDRCs related to, for example, the protection and conservation of the natural functions of existing soils, wetlands, marine resources, estuarine shoreline, stormwater management, wildlife habitat, or flood zones. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with cited portions of the City's Plan, the State Comprehensive Plan, and the West Florida Strategic Regional Policy Plan. Further, the Plan Amendment need not be consistent with the City's LDRCs because it is not the subject of "in compliance" review.12
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order concluding that the Plan Amendment, adopted by the City of Panama City in Ordinance No. 1985, is "in compliance" as defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether a text amendment to the general description of the Commercial land use designations of the Comprehensive Plan (Plan) of Respondent, City of Jacksonville (City), adopted by Ordinance No. 2010-401-E on June 22, 2010, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties The City is a municipal entity and is responsible for enacting and amending its Plan. Since 2007, the City has participated in the Pilot Program for adoption of comprehensive plan amendments. Except for amendments based on the Evaluation and Appraisal Report or amendments based on new statutory requirements that specifically require that they be adopted under the "traditional" procedure described in section 163.3184, and small-scale amendments, all other amendments must be adopted under that process. Under the Pilot Program, municipalities have "reduced state oversight of local comprehensive planning," and plan amendments may be enacted in "an alternative, expedited plan amendment adoption and review process." § 163.32465, Fla. Stat. Although the City must send a transmittal package to the Department of Community Affairs (Department) and other designated agencies for their preliminary review, the Department does not issue an Objections, Recommendations, and Comments Report or a notice of intent. Instead, the Department "may provide comments regarding the amendment or amendments to the local government." Id. It may also initiate an administrative proceeding to challenge whether an amendment is in compliance. Id. In this case, the Department did not file adverse comments or initiate a challenge to the City's amendment. Clifton Curtis Horton owns real property located at 7175 Blanding Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. Horton Enterprises, Inc., is a Florida corporation that owns and operates a "strip club" known as "New Solid Gold" located on Mr. Horton's property. The club is an "adult entertainment establishment" as defined by the Jacksonville Municipal Code (JMC). See §§ 150.103(c) and 656.1101, JMC. History Preceding the Amendment In order to operate an adult entertainment facility within the City, the facility must have both a correct land use and zoning classification. The location must also satisfy certain distance limitations from schools (2,500 feet), other adult entertainment businesses (1,000 feet), churches (1,000 feet), residences (500 feet), and businesses selling alcohol (500 feet). See § 656.1103(a)(1)-(4), JMC; § 847.0134, Fla. Stat. Prior to 2005, adult entertainment facilities were an authorized use in the Heavy Industrial (HI) land use category. In 2005, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2005-1240-E, which approved a text amendment to the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) of the City's 2010 Plan adding the following language to the Community/General Commercial (C/GC) land use category: "Adult entertainment facilities are allowed by right only in Zoning District CCG-2." See Respondent's Exhibit D. That classification is the primary zoning district within the C/GC land use category. The Ordinance also deleted the following language from the HI land use category: "Adult entertainment facilities are allowed by right." Id. The purpose of the amendment was to change the permissible land use designation for adult entertainment facilities from HI to C/GC with a further condition that the property must also have a CCG-2 zoning classification. At the same time, the City enacted Ordinance No. 2005-743-E, which adopted a new zoning requirement that any adult entertainment facility whose location was not in conformity with the revised land use/zoning scheme must close or relocate within five years, or no later than November 10, 2010. See § 656.725(k), JMC. Because New Solid Gold did not conform to these new requirements, it would have to close or relocate within the five-year timeframe. On an undisclosed date, Horton Enterprises, Inc., and two other plaintiffs (one who operated another adult entertainment facility in the City and one who wished to open a new facility) filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the City's adult zoning scheme and seeking to enjoin the five-year amortization requirement, as applied to them. See Jacksonville Property Rights Ass'n v. City of Jacksonville, Case No. 3:05-cv-1267-J-34JRK (U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D. Fla.). On September 30, 2009, the United States District Court entered a 33-page Order generally determining that, with one exception not relevant here, the City's zoning and land use scheme was permissible. See Petitioners' Exhibit V. On November 3, 2009, that Order was appealed by Petitioners to the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit where the case remains pending at this time. The parties' Stipulation indicates that oral argument before that Court was scheduled during the week of December 13, 2010. An Order of the lower court memorialized an agreement by the parties that the five- year time period for complying with the new requirements are stayed until the federal litigation is concluded. See Petitioners' Exhibit JJ. The Court's Order also noted that an "ambiguity" in the Plan arose because the City failed to "remove the language in the general description of the Commercial land use designations acknowledging its intention to locate adult entertainment facilities in the HI category." Id. at 19. This occurred because when adopting the new amendments, the City overlooked conflicting language in the general description of the Commercial land use designations in the FLUE. However, the Court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the City on the theory that the conflicting language was contrary to the City's overall legislative intent in adopting the new land use/zoning scheme and could be disregarded. Id. Thereafter, a new amendment process was begun by the City to delete the conflicting language. This culminated in the present dispute. The Transmittal Amendment - 2010-35-E To eliminate the ambiguity, the City proposed to amend the FLUE by deleting the following language from the general description of the Commercial land use designations: "Adult entertainment facilities are allowed by right in the heavy industrial land use category, but not in commercial." This amendment was numbered as Ordinance No. 2010-35-E. A public workshop was conducted by the City's Planning and Development Department on December 14, 2009. Thereafter, public hearings were conducted by the City Planning Commission on February 11, 2010; by the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee on February 17, 2010; and by the full City Council on February 9 and 23, 2010. It became effective upon the Mayor signing the Ordinance on February 26, 2010. Although the Ordinance inadvertently referenced section 163.3184 as the statutory authority for its adoption, it also stated that the amendment was being transmitted for review "through the State's Pilot Program." See Petitioners' Exhibit E. As required by the Pilot Program, copies of the amendment were then transmitted to the Department and seven other agencies. No adverse comments were received from any agency. It is undisputed that Petitioners did not attend the the workshop or any hearing, and they did not submit written or oral comments concerning the proposed amendment. When the process for adopting Ordinance No. 2010-35-E began, the City's 2030 Plan was still being reviewed by the Department and had not yet become effective. Consequently, at the Department's direction, the Ordinance referenced the City's then-effective 2010 Plan as the Plan being amended. On February 3, 2010, the City's 2030 Comprehensive Plan became effective, replacing the 2010 Plan. However, the 2030 Plan contained the same conflicting language. Notice of the public hearings for Ordinance No. 2010- 35-E (and other plan amendments adopted at the same time) was published in the Daily Record on January 29, 2010, a local newspaper that the City has used for advertising plan amendments since at least 2003. The parties agree that the legal advertisements complied with the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. Besides the above notice, an additional notice regarding Ordinance No. 2010-35-E was published in the Florida Times Union on January 31, 2010. The parties agree that this advertisement did not meet the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. but was published by the City for the purpose of providing additional public notice and to broaden the coverage of the plan amendment. The Adoption Amendment - 2010-401-E Because the 2030 Plan contained the same conflicting language in the Commercial land use descriptions, on May 25, 2010, a draft of Ordinance No. 2010-401-E was introduced at City Council for the purpose of deleting this language. Except for referencing the latest Plan, the language in Ordinance Nos. 2010-35-E and 2010-401-E was identical. While somewhat unusual, this procedure was authorized by the Department because the 2030 Plan became effective during the middle of the amendment process. A copy of the draft Ordinance and schedule for the upcoming hearings on that Ordinance was emailed by the City's counsel to Petitioners' counsel on June 4, 2010. See Petitioners' Exhibit FF. Public hearings on Ordinance No. 2010-401-E were conducted by the Planning Commission on June 10, 2010; by the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee on June 15, 2010; and by the full City Council on June 8 and 22, 2010. All of the meetings occurred after Petitioners' counsel was given a schedule of the hearings. The amendment became effective upon the Mayor signing the Ordinance on June 24, 2010. Notice of the public hearings for Ordinance No. 2010- 401-E was published in the Daily Record on May 28, 2010. The parties agree that the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. were met. An additional notice of the public hearings was published in the Florida Times Union on May 30, 2010. The parties agree that this legal advertisement did not meet the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b., but was published by the City for the purpose of providing additional public notice and to broaden the coverage of the plan amendment. Ordinance No. 2010-401-E, as originally proposed, incorrectly referenced section 163.3184, rather than the Pilot Program, as the statutory authority for adopting the amendment. During the hearing conducted by the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee on June 15, 2010, an amendment to Ordinance No. 2010-401-E was proposed changing the statutory authority to section 163.32465. The City proposed the same amendment for 19 other plan amendments being considered at the same hearing. The amendment was minor in nature and had no effect on the substance of the Ordinance. It is undisputed that Petitioners did not appear or submit written or oral comments at any public hearing regarding Ordinance No. 2010-401-E. On July 21, 2010, Petitioners timely filed their Petition with DOAH challenging Ordinance No. 2010-401-E. Their objections, as later refined in the Stipulation, are both procedural and substantive in nature and are discussed separately below. Petitioners' Objections Substantive Objections As stated in the Stipulation, Petitioners contend that the amendment is not in compliance because it "is inconsistent with the balance of the 2030 Comprehensive Plan, and underlying municipal policies, since it forces adult uses into zones which permit residential and educational uses." To support this claim, Petitioners point out that the C/GC land use category permits a wide range of uses, including commercial uses in close proximity to sensitive uses, such as schools, churches, and residential areas. Petitioners characterize the current range of uses in C/GC as "an excellent planning approach to downtown Jacksonville" and one that promotes a well-reasoned, mixed-use development in the urban area. Because Ordinance No. 2010-401-E "forces" adult uses into the C/GC category where, despite the distance limitations, they will have to co-exist with sensitive uses, Petitioners contend the amendment is inconsistent with Policy (15)(b)3. and Goal (16) of the State Comprehensive Plan, which generally encourage orderly, efficient, and functional development in the urban areas of the City. Further, they assert it would contradict the City's "policy" of separating adult uses from residences, businesses, and schools. Petitioners' primary fear is that if they are required to relocate from HI to C/GC where sensitive uses are allowed, this will generate more complaints from schools, churches, and residents, and result in further zoning changes by the City and more forced relocations. As explained by Mr. Killingsworth, Director of the City's Planning and Development Department, Ordinance No. 2010- 401-E does not change the permitted uses in the Commercial or HI land use categories. Those changes in permitted uses were made by Ordinance No. 2005-1240-E in 2005 and are now being litigated in federal court. The purpose of the new amendment is simply "to clear up an inconsistency [noted by the federal court but told that it could be disregarded] that existed in the comprehensive plan." Mr. Killingsworth added that even if the language remained in the Plan, it would have no regulatory weight since the actual language in the C/GC and HI categories, and not the "header" or general description that precedes the category, governs the uses allowed in those designations. Assuming arguendo that the new amendment constitutes a change in permitted uses, the City established that from a use standpoint, adult entertainment facilities (like businesses selling alcohol) are more consistent with the C/GC land use category with the appropriate distance limitations from schools, churches, and residential areas. Further, the placement of adult entertainment facilities on property with a C/GC designation will not necessarily result in their being closer to residential property, as the City currently has a "great deal" of HI land directly adjacent to residential properties, as well as grandfathered enclaves of residential areas within the HI category. The City also established that the HI category is set aside for uses that generate physical or environmental impacts, which are significantly different from the "impacts" of a strip club. Finally, while a plan amendment compliance determination does not turn on zoning issues, it is noteworthy that the CCG-2 zoning district is the City's most intensive commercial district, and that very few schools (all grandfathered) remain within that zoning classification. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the amendment is consistent with the State Comprehensive Plan and internally consistent with the "balance of the 2030 Comprehensive Plan." Procedural Objections Petitioners' principal argument is that the City did not publish a notice for either Ordinance in a newspaper of general circulation, as described in section 166.041(3)(c)2.b., or in the proper location of the newspaper; that these deficiencies violate both state law and a Department rule regarding notice for the adoption of this type of plan amendment; and that these procedural errors require a determination that the amendment is not in compliance. They also contend that because the legal notice did not strictly comply with sections 163.3184(15)(e) and 166.041(3)(c)2.b., both Ordinances are void ab initio.2 As noted above, the City has published legal notices for plan amendments in the Daily Record since at least 2003. The newspaper is published daily Monday through Friday; it has been published continuously for 98 years; it is published wholly in English; it is mailed to 37 zip codes throughout the City and around 20 zip codes outside the City; most of its revenue is derived from classified and legal advertisements; it is considered by the United States Postal Service to be a general circulation newspaper; it is available in newsstands throughout the City; and although much of the newspaper is directed to the business, legal, and financial communities, the newspaper also routinely contains articles and editorial content regarding special events, sporting news, political news, educational programs, and other matters of general interest pertaining to the City that would be of interest to the general public and not just one professional or occupational group. Its publisher acknowledges that the newspaper is a "Chapter 50 periodical," referring to chapter 50 and specifically section 50.031, which describes the minimum standards for newspapers that can be utilized for publishing certain legal notices. Also, its website states that it covers political, business, and legal news and developments in the greater Jacksonville area with an emphasis on downtown. Although Petitioners contend that the legal notice was published in a portion of the Daily Record where other legal notices and classified advertisements appear, as proscribed by section 166.041(3)(c)2.b., and is thus defective, this allegation was not raised in the Petition or specifically in the parties' Stipulation. Therefore, the issue has been waived. Both proposed recommended orders are largely devoted to the issue of whether the Daily Record is a newspaper of general paid circulation as defined in section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. For the reasons expressed in the Conclusions of Law, it is unnecessary to decide that question in order to resolve the notice issue. Petitioners received written notice that the City intended to adopt Ordinance No. 2010-401-E prior to the public hearings, along with a copy of the draft Ordinance and "everything" in the City's file. They also received a copy of all scheduled hearings during the adoption process. See Petitioners' Exhibits EE and FF. Therefore, notwithstanding any alleged deficiency in the published legal notice, they were on notice that the City intended to adopt the plan amendment; they were aware of the dates on which public hearings would be conducted; and they had an opportunity to submit oral or written comments in opposition to the amendment and to otherwise participate in the adoption process. Given these facts, even assuming arguendo that the publication of the legal notice in the Daily Record constitutes a procedural error, there is no evidence that Petitioners were substantially prejudiced in any way. Petitioners also contend that reference by the City to section 163.3184, rather than the Pilot Program, in the draft ordinance during the preliminary stages of the amendment process is a procedural error that rises to the level of requiring a determination that the amendment is not in compliance. This argument is rejected as the error was minor in nature, it was corrected shortly after Ordinance No. 2010-401-E was introduced, it did not affect the substance of the amendment, and it would not confuse a member of the public who was tracking the amendment as to the timing and forum in which to file a challenge. In Petitioners' case, they cannot claim to be confused since they timely filed a Petition with DOAH, as required by section 163.32465(6)(a). Finally, intertwined with the procedural arguments is the issue of whether Petitioners are affected persons and thus have standing to challenge the plan amendment. The parties have stipulated that Petitioners (or their representative) did not attend any meeting regarding the adoption of either Ordinance. Petitioners argue, however, that emails between the parties in May and June 2010, and a telephone conference call on June 3, 2010, involving Petitioners' counsel and the City's then Deputy General Counsel, equate to the submission of written and oral comments regarding the amendment. The parties have stipulated that the following written communications between Petitioners and the City occurred in May and June 2010: Petitioners made a public records request regarding the amendment on May 21, 2010, to Cheryl Brown, Council Secretary/Director, seeking various public documents relating to Ordinance No. 2010-35-E, transmitted by electronic mail and facsimile. On May 27, 2010, counsel for Petitioners exchanged emails with Assistant General Counsel Dylan Reingold regarding pending document requests relating to Ordinance No. 2010-35-E, and Mr. Reingold provided a number of responsive documents. On June 3, 2010, Cindy A. Laquidara, then Deputy General Counsel (but now General Counsel), sent an email to Petitioners' counsel stating: "Below please find the schedule for the passage of the comp plan changes. Call me with questions or to discuss. Take care." On June 4, 2010, counsel for Petitioners exchanged a series of emails with Assistant General Counsel Reingold regarding the status of Ordinance Nos. 2010-35-E and 2010-401-E, as well as the review of the proposed plan amendment by the Department of Community Affairs. On June 4, 2010, Jessica Aponte, a legal assistant with counsel for Petitioners' office, exchanged emails with Jessica Stephens, legislative assistant, regarding the proofs of publication for the legal advertisements relating to Ordinance No. 2010- 35-E. The affidavits of Petitioners' counsel (Petitioners' Exhibits KK and LL) regarding a conversation with the City's then Deputy General Counsel would normally be treated as hearsay and could not, by themselves, be used as a basis for a finding of fact. See § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. However, the parties have stipulated that they may be used in lieu of live testimony by Petitioners' counsel. See Stipulation, p. 17. The affidavits indicate that the reason for the conference call was "that [Petitioners] were trying to reach a mutually acceptable approach with the City by which enforcement of the City of Jacksonville's amortization ordinance against [them] . . . would be deferred pending the outcome of the appeal to the Eleventh Circuit." Petitioners' Exhibits KK and LL. During that call, counsel also advised the City's counsel that "there were [procedural] problems with the enactment of the subject Comprehensive Plan Amendment and that they would likely be filing challenges to its enactment." Id.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2010-401-E is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Polk County's small scale development amendment (CPA2003S-02) adopted by Ordinance No. 03-03 on January 22, 2003, as later amended by Ordinance No. 03-19 on March 15, 2003, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Berry is the owner of a tract of land located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Eagle Lake Loop Road (County Road 540-A) and Pollard Road in Section 16, Township 29, Range 26 in the eastern part of unincorporated Polk County, Florida. The property lies south of the City of Winter Haven, east-southeast of the City of Eagle Lake, less than a mile south of Lake Eloise (on which Cypress Gardens is located), and west of U.S. Highway 27. Because Berry owns property within the County, and submitted oral and written comments to the County prior to the adoption of the challenged amendment, it has standing to participate in this action. On July 19, 2002, Berry filed an application with the County Planning Department seeking to change the land use on 9.99 acres (or just below the threshold of 10.0 acres for a small scale amendment) from RL-1 to Neighborhood Activity Center (NAC) to include approximately 4.95 acres of various neighborhood specialty shops such as a grocery store, drug store, convenience store, and dry cleaners, with the remaining acreage used as a mini-warehouse self-storage facility. In September 2002, Berry amended its application by seeking to change 3.93 acres from RL-1 to CC and 6.06 acres from RL-1 to BPC-1. The application was assigned Case File No. CPA2003S- 02. Under the County's review process, the application is first reviewed by the County Development Review Committee (Committee), then by the County Planning Commission (CPC), which either accepts or rejects the Committee's recommendation, and finally by the Board of County Commissioners (Board), which either adopts the amendment, adopts the amendment as amended by the Board, or rejects the amendment. After conducting a preliminary review of the application, on September 16, 2002, the Committee conducted a public hearing and voted to recommend approval. The matter was then transmitted to the CPC, which conducted a meeting on October 9, 2002, and recommended that the Board approve the amendment. On January 22, 2003, by a 3-2 vote, the Board adopted CPA2003S-02 changing the designation on the FLUM of the County Comprehensive Plan (Plan) as proposed by Berry. This was confirmed by the County's adoption of Ordinance No. 03-03. On February 21, 2003, Petitioners filed their Petition challenging the Berry amendment. The matter was again placed on the Board's agenda on March 19, 2003, after the County discovered that Ordinance No. 03-03 had inadvertently changed the land use on the entire parcel to CC rather a mix of CC and BPC-1. In addition, there were minor errors in the legal description of both the 3.93 and 6.06-acre parcels. Accordingly, Ordinance No. 03-19 was enacted to correct those errors. A second Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings (with essentially the same allegations, but also adding an allegation that the same property had been improperly subject to two small scale amendments within a 12- month period) was filed by Petitioners on March 19, 2003, challenging the action taken in Ordinance No. 03-19. At the outset of the final hearing, Petitioners voluntarily dismissed two allegations contained in their Petition. In their Proposed Recommended Order, Petitioners have further narrowed the issues by addressing only the following allegations: that the property which is the subject of this proceeding exceeds 10.0 acres in size and therefore cannot qualify as a small scale amendment; and that the amendment violates Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Policies 2.102-A1, 2.113-B-3, 2.113-B-4, 2.110-C3, and 2.113-B-1 and is thus internally inconsistent with the Plan. These issues will be discussed separately below. All other allegations contained in the second Petition and the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation are deemed to have been withdrawn or abandoned. Because the change in the FLUM was filed and approved as a small scale plan amendment under Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003),1 a compliance review of the amendment was not made by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). See § 163.3187(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Standing of Petitioners Durham is a realtor/developer who owns property within 250 feet of Berry's property and resides at 10 Lake Eloise Lane, Southeast, Winter Haven, Florida. He made oral and written comments to the County prior to the adoption of the amendment. As such, he qualifies as an affected person under Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and has standing to bring this action. CPPI began as an association in November 2002 and was later incorporated in February 2003. Presently, it has around 100 members, all of whom reside in the County. According to its chairperson, its purpose is to "help educate and inform residents of Polk County . . . towards growth matters that may affect their daily lives." The organization "encourages donations" from its members; it was scheduled to have conducted its first annual meeting on January 10, 2004; and members prepared and circulated petitions opposing the amendment to residents of the area in December 2002 and January 2003. At least one member of CPPI made written and oral comments on its behalf to the County prior to the adoption of the amendment in March 2003. There is no evidence, however, that CPPI (as opposed to its individual members) owns property or owns or operates a business within the County. Therefore, it lacks standing to file a petition. The land and surrounding uses Berry owns a triangle-shaped parcel of land (the parent parcel) totaling around 14 acres which fronts on Eagle Lake Loop Road (a 24-foot wide urban collector road) to the north, Pollard Road (a local road) to the east, and a CSX railroad track, with right-of-way, on its western side. (Pollard Road dead ends at Eagle Lake Loop Road, and another collector road, Eloise Loop Road, continues to the north from the intersection). Pollard Road provides access to eight nearby single-family homes, which lie south of the Berry property and front on Pollard Road, and eventually terminates at the City of Winter Haven's Sewage Treatment Plant (an institutional use), which lies slightly more than a mile south of the site. To the west of the site directly across the railroad tracks and fronting on Eagle Lake Loop Road is additional property owned by Berry and on which were once located the original Berry corporate offices. The Berry office buildings are now used, at least partially, by other tenants. Although the land across the railroad tracks is classified as Residential Suburban (RS), the property can be used for offices since the buildings were constructed, and office use began, prior to the adoption of the Plan. Directly across Pollard Road to the east is a vacant 10-acre tract of land owned by the Baptist Ridge Association, which intends to construct a church on the property. Berry's property is now classified as RL-1, a land use classification which "is characterized by single-family dwelling units, duplex units, and small-scale multi-family units." Since at least the 1950s, however, or long before the County adopted its Plan, the property has been used primarily for agriculture purposes (citrus groves); therefore, Berry is grandfathered to continue this non-conforming use on its property. Presently, the entire tract of land is undeveloped and largely covered by an orange grove, which Berry describes as "past maturation and is declining." Citrus trucks and trailers have been parked on the extreme northwestern corner of the parent parcel and are used in conjunction with the citrus operation. Except for the former Berry offices, a nearby beauty salon operating out of a house, and a convenience store about three-quarters of a mile away, which all began operation before the Plan was adopted and are grandfathered as non- conforming uses, and the City of Winter Haven's large tract of institutional land to the south, all of the property within slightly less than a one-mile radius of the Berry property is classified in various residential land use categories with only residential uses. The Amendment As noted above, Berry has owned the subject property for many years. In 1987, Berry (then under the name of Jack M. Berry, Sr.) made application with the County for a zoning change on the property from Rural Conservation (RC) to Commercial (C-3) to allow typical commercial uses. The application was ultimately denied by the County on the ground, among others, that the zoning district being proposed was inconsistent with the Plan, "given the residential development pattern in the area." At least partly on the theory that the area has changed substantially in the last 15 years, Berry has filed (and the County has approved) an application seeking to change the land use on the property to commercial uses. Berry has carved out of the parent parcel two smaller parcels totaling 9.99 acres in size and seeks to change the land use on the northern parcel (3.93 acres) to CC and the land use on the southern parcel (6.06 acres) to BPC-1. The remaining land in the parent parcel, which consists of a 0.43-acre triangle-shaped parcel on the northwestern corner of the parent parcel and now used by citrus trucks, and a vacant 2.74-acre triangle-shaped parcel on the southern end, will remain R-1. (However, all parties agree that if the amendment is approved, these remaining parcels will be unsuitable for residential development.) In addition, strips of land ranging from 22 to 28 feet in width which front on Eagle Lake Loop Road and Pollard Road will be dedicated to the County for right-of-way and have not been included in the 9.99-acre amendment. Presumably, the proposed change is being done in this manner so that the total acreage is less than 10.0 acres, which qualifies the application to be processed as a small scale development amendment rather than a regular plan amendment and subject to DCA review and approval. If the change is approved, the northern part of the parcel (3.93 acres) will be changed to CC to develop convenience commercial uses. Under the Plan, the most typical tenant in this category is a convenience store, while other typical tenants include laundry, dry cleaning, barber, restaurant, gas station, and office uses. The southern (and larger) portion of the tract will be changed to BPC-1. The most typical tenant in this category is "[o]ne or more light- assembly plants, or warehouse facilities," which include a mini-warehouse storage facility. Other typical tenants described in the Plan are offices, distribution centers, research and development firms, and high-density residential, with proper buffering. (Berry says it intends to build a mini-warehouse facility on the southern parcel; however, any of the above described uses could be placed on the property if the change is approved.) Petitioners' Objections In broad terms, Petitioners have contended that the small scale amendment actually involves a use of more than 10 acres since the strips of land being dedicated as right-of-way to the County must be counted as a part of the land being amended. They also contend that the plan amendment violates five FLUE policies and is therefore internally inconsistent with the Plan. A small scale development amendment can only be adopted if "[t]he proposed amendment involves a use of 10 acres or fewer." See § 163.3187(1)(c)1., Fla. Stat. The parties have agreed that the legal description of the parcel subject to the change includes only 9.99 acres, or less than the 10-acre threshold. However, prior to the development of the site, Berry intends to dedicate to the County two strips of land, one fronting on Eagle Lake Loop Road (28 feet wide), and the other on Pollard Road (22 feet wide), for future right-of-way for some public purpose. Petitioners contend that the right-of-way constitutes essential infrastructure for the development and must be included as a part of the amendment. If this land is added to the amendment, the total acreage would obviously exceed 10.0 acres. The dedicated land is not "essential infrastructure" needed for the development activities on the land, since two roadways (Eagle Lake Loop Road and Pollard Road) already exist on the northern and eastern boundaries of the property, and they are sufficient in size to provide ingress to, and egress from, the property. Instead, the County will "bank" the land in the event some form of right-of-way activity is needed in the future. It is noted that Eagle Lake Loop Road was recently widened to 24 feet, and it is not anticipated that a further widening will occur for a number of years. There is nothing in the Plan which requires an applicant for an amendment to include all of its property in a proposed amendment, or prevents an applicant from leaving a residual piece of property out of the application. Therefore, Berry was not required to include in the amendment the right- of-way or the two smaller residual pieces of property that will remain R-1. Finally, assuming arguendo that Petitioners' contention is correct, that is, that an applicant must include right-of-way land dedicated to the local government in the total acreage calculation, Berry could still lawfully comply with the 10-acre threshold by simply reducing the other acreage being changed to CC or BPC by the amount of land being dedicated to the local government for right-of-way. Therefore, it is found that Berry has not improperly excluded from the amendment land necessary for essential infrastructure so as to violate Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes, as alleged by Petitioners. Policy 2.102-A1 requires compatibility between adjacent uses. More specifically, it provides that: Land shall be developed so that adjacent uses are compatible with each other, pursuant to the requirements of other Policies in this Future Land Use Element, so that one or more of the following provisions are accomplished: there have been provisions made which buffer incompatible uses from dissimilar uses; incompatible uses are made to be more compatible to each other through limiting the intensity and scale of the more intense use; uses are transitioned through a gradual scaling of different land use activities through the use of innovative development techniques such as a Planned Unit Development. Therefore, as the Plan is now written, so long as Berry develops the land in a manner which accomplishes at least one of the three "provisions" in paragraphs a - c of the policy, so as to make the adjacent uses compatible, the proposed land use change is permissible. As noted above, except for a few non-conforming uses adjacent to, or near the property, virtually all of the area around the Berry property is designated for residential use. The area to the north and northeast is developed with up-scale (with some homes ranging to as high as $1 million in value), low density, large lot, single-family residential subdivisions, including Harbour Estates, Cedar Cove, Cypress Cove, Gaines Cove, and Valhalla. To the east of the site are more subdivisions, including Eloise Place, Skidmore, Cypress Point, Lake Eloise Estates, Eloise Pointe Estates, a mobile home park, and Little Lake Estates. The lands to the south are primarily agriculture and in active citrus groves, with eight single-family homes on Pollard Road. Finally, a church will be built on the property directly across the street from the Berry property at the southeast corner of the intersection of Eagle Lake Loop Road and Pollard Road. The County Planning Director agrees that a convenience store (which is an authorized use on CC land), standing alone, is incompatible with adjacent single-family residences. Given this acknowledgement, and the fact that a non-binding, proposed site plan submitted by Berry with its application does not provide for any buffering between the commercial uses and the residential areas, Petitioners contend that none of the conditions required for compatibility in paragraphs a through c have been met, and thus the policy has been violated. The County has made clear, however, that when a final site plan is submitted, there must be "provisions [in the site plan] . . . which buffer incompatible uses from dissimilar uses," as required by the policy. Assuming that this is done at the site plan stage, at least one of the three provisions will be accomplished, thereby satisfying the compatibility requirement. This being so, the plan amendment does not violate the policy and in this respect is not internally inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioners next contend that the amendment is inconsistent with Policy 2.110-C3, which contains locational criteria for CC property. One such criterion requires that "Convenience Centers shall be located at the intersections of arterial and/or collector roads." Because the property is at a T-shaped intersection (as opposed to a traditional cross intersection with four directions for traffic to move off the site), Petitioners assert that the property is not located at an "intersection" within the meaning of the policy. Eagle Lake Loop Road, on which the northern boundary of the property fronts, is designated as an urban collector road. That road forms an intersection with Pollard Road (a local road) and Eloise Loop Road (also an urban collector road), which meets Eagle Lake Loop Road from the north at the intersection, and then makes a 90 degree turn to the east. (When Eagle Lake Loop Road continues to the east beyond the intersection, it turns into Eloise Loop Road, and later into Thompson Nursery Road, until it eventually intersects with U.S. Highway 17.) There is no dispute that the two collector roads (Eagle Loop Lake Road and Eloise Loop Road) form a T intersection, rather than a traditional cross intersection. For many years, however, the County has considered a T intersection and a cross intersection to be the same in terms of satisfying Plan requirements. Indeed, at the present time, at least four other CC designated properties within the County are located at T intersections. The County's interpretation of the policy is consistent with sound planning principles, is reasonable and logical, and is more persuasive than the contrary view offered by Petitioners. Accordingly, it is found that the amendment does not conflict with Policy 2.110- C3. Petitioners also contend that the amendment is inconsistent with Policy 2.113-B-3, which provides that "Business-Park Centers shall be located with consideration being given to regional transportation issues, and should be located at the intersections of arterial roads, and preferably on a fixed-route mass-transit line." (Emphasis added.) The use of the word "should" (rather than "shall") is intended to state a preference, but not an absolute requirement, that BPC lands be located at the intersections of arterial roads. According to the County's Planning Director, this is because "most cases that come [before the County] don't meet the ideal situation" of satisfying every requirement, and the County has used this permissive language to give itself some degree of flexibility in handling cases that do not meet every Plan requirement. Therefore, even though it is preferable that BPC land be located at the intersection of arterial roads, this requirement is not mandatory, and the County has the flexibility to approve a BPC land use change at property not sited at the intersection of arterial roads. In contrast to the permissive language described above, Policy 2.113-B-4 provides that development within a Business-Park Center shall conform to certain development criteria, including one that Business-Park Centers shall have frontage on, or direct access to, an arterial roadway, or a frontage road or service drive which directly serves an arterial roadway. Business-Park Centers shall incorporate the use of frontage roads or shared ingress/egress facilities wherever practical. In this case, the closest arterial roadway to Berry's property is State Road 17 to the west, which is four miles away, while State Road 60, another arterial roadway, is approximately six miles to the south. These arterial roads must be accessed, at least at the beginning of the trip, by Eagle Lake Loop Road, a two-lane, 24-foot wide urban collector that runs through predominately residential neighborhoods with some homes having fences within a foot or two from the road. The County interprets the requirement that BPC land have "direct access to an arterial road" to be satisfied if the property fronts on a collector road, which then provides access to an arterial road. Under the County's interpretation, the requirement is met since Eagle Lake Loop Road provides access (albeit 4 to 6 miles away) to State Roads 17 and 60. The County says it has consistently interpreted this provision in this manner for at least ten years, and has approved other applications for changes to BPC when those parcels were located on urban collector roads. (The distance between these other BPC parcels and the arterial roads is not of record, however.) While Policy 2.113-B-1 provides that Business-Park Centers are "not intended to accommodate major commercial or other high-traffic producing facilities," they "are intended to promote employment opportunities within the region by allowing for the establishment of office parks, research and development parks, areas for light-industrial facilities, distribution centers, and mixed-use employment parks." The same policy provides that they must have a usable area of 10 acres or more, have a service-area radius of 20 miles or more, be supported by a population of 150,000 or more people, and have a gross leasable area of 500,000 to 2,000,000 square feet. Given this description of their purpose and characteristics, and the wide range of commercial activities that are allowed on Business-Park Center lands, it is not surprising that Policy 2.113-B-3 provides that BPC lands should be located "at the intersections of arterial roads, and preferably on a fixed-route mass-transit line," while Policy 2.113-B-4 requires that they "have direct frontage on, or direct access to, an arterial roadway, or a frontage road or service drive which directly serves on an arterial roadway." When reading these provisions as a whole, it is unreasonable to conclude, as the County does, that "direct access" contemplates a drive of over 4 miles, partly on a narrow two- lane road, in order to reach an arterial road. Accordingly, on this issue, Petitioners' evidence is the most persuasive, and it is found that the plan amendment conflicts with Policy 2.113-B-4 and in this respect is internally inconsistent with the Plan. Policy 2.110-C3 sets forth the following location criteria for Convenience Centers: LOCATION CRITERIA Convenience Centers shall be located at the intersections of arterial and/or collector roads. There shall be the following traveling distance, on public roads, between the center of Convenience Center and the center of any other Convenience Center, or other higher- level Activity Center, Linear Commercial Corridor, or Commercial Enclave providing for the same convenience shopping needs: One (1) mile within the UDA and UGA Two (2) miles within the SDA and UEA This required separation may be reduced if: The higher-level Activity Center, Linear Commercial Corridor or Commercial Enclave within the required distance separation is over 80 percent developed; or the proposed Convenience Center market- area radius, minimum population support is over 5,000 people. Petitioners contend that this policy has been violated in two respects: the Berry property is not located at the intersection of arterial roads; and there is an existing convenience center located within 0.8 mile of the Barry property, and Berry cannot qualify for a reduction in the required separation, as described in paragraphs a and b. For the reasons stated in Findings of Fact 30-32, it is found that the Berry property is located at the intersection of two collector roads (Eagle Lake Loop Road and Eloise Loop Road) and that a T intersection satisfies the requirements of the policy. As to the second contention, the Berry property is located within an UGA (Urban Growth Area), and an existing convenience store is located at the intersection of Rifle Range Road and Eagle Lake Loop Road, or less than a mile west of Berry's property. The land use on the property on which the store sits was recently changed (in December 2003) to BPC, which does not allow a convenience store. However, the store is a non-conforming use, having been located at that site before the Plan was adopted. The locational requirement in Policy 2.110-C-3 that CC lands within the UGA be located at least a mile apart is not the least bit vague or ambiguous: CC designated lands (and not individual convenience stores, as Petitioners suggest) must be separated by at least a mile, unless one of the two criteria for reducing this separation is met. Because there is no CC land within a one-mile radius of the Berry land, the policy has not been violated. Policy 2.113-B-1 sets forth the following relevant characteristic for Business-Park Centers: General characteristics of Business-Park Centers are: Usable Area 10 acres or more There is no dispute that the useable area for the BPC land is only 6.06 acres, or approximately 60 percent of the required acreage. Petitioners contend that the amendment violates the foregoing policy because the useable area on Barry's property is much less than "10 acres or more." While the former County Planning Director conceded that the 10-acre usable area requirement is "mandatory," he justified the amendment on the ground that the 6.06 acres "approximates" 10 acres, and thus satisfies the policy. In the same vein, the current County Planning Director asserted that if Berry was proposing a stand-alone BPC, it would have been required to have 10 usable acres. In this case, though, he pointed out that the Berry property will be used for a nonresidential mixed use (BPC and CC) totaling almost 10 acres, and therefore Berry has satisfied the requirement. The Planning Director admitted, however, that nothing in the Plan specifically allows this type of exception. He justified the County's action on the theory that the Plan "doesn't anticipate every situation that comes in," and "interpretations have to be made of the comprehensive plan and how it's applied." The requirement that Business-Park Centers have a usable area of 10 or more acres is clear and unambiguous, was characterized as being "mandatory," and is not subject to any exceptions in the Plan. This being so, the County's interpretation is found to be unreasonable and contrary to the plain language in the policy, and in this respect the plan amendment is internally inconsistent with the Plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the small scale development amendment (CPA2003S-02) adopted by Polk County by Ordinance No. 03-03, as amended by Ordinance No. 03-19, is not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2004.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Environmental Regulation published notices of this land hearing on January 25, 1990, in the Miami Herald and on January 26, 1990, in the Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel and the Ft. Lauderdale News. Notice of this hearing was also published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 2, 1990. The DER mailed notice of this hearing to the chief executives of the local and regional authorities with responsibility for zoning and land use planning whose jurisdiction includes the site. The Applicant, FPL, posted notices of this hearing at the proposed site. The Lauderdale Repowering Project FPL submitted an application for site certification for the Lauderdale Repowering Project which was filed with DER on November 29, 1989. The application was determined complete by DER on December 13, 1989. The project will involve the "repowering' of existing Units 4 and 5 at FPL's Lauderdale Plant Site, resulting in the replacement of the unit's steam generators with new combustion turbines and heat recovery steam generators. The project will increase the net generating capacity at the site by approximately 680 megawatts. The existing 24 gas turbines at the Lauderdale Site will be unaffected by the Repowering Project. In addition, new water and wastewater treatment facilities and stormwater runoff ponds will be constructed as part of the project. The tallest structures on site will be the 150 foot tall stacks associated with the new hear recovery steam generators. No principal structure will be constructed closer than 25 feet from the site's south boundary along the Dania Cutoff Canal. The Site The site for the proposed Lauderdale Repowering Project is a previously-developed, 392-acre parcel of land in southeastern Broward County. An adjacent ten-acre parcel will be utilized temporarily during construction for parking and equipment laydown. The site lies about 1 mile east of the Florida Turnpike and 1 mile west of Interstate 95. State Road 84 and Interstate 595 are north of the site. Griffin Road is about one-half mile south off the site. The site is bounded on the north and west by the South New River Canal and on the south by the Dania Cutoff Canal. The site has been utilized for the generation of electricity since the 1920's. Current use of the site consists of two fossil-fuel-fired steam generating units (which will be repowered) and 24 gas turbine units. The total net generating capacity of the existing Lauderdale Plant is 1,248 megawatts. Consistency of the Site with Local Land Use Plans and Zoning Ordinances The site was located entirely within the unincorporated area of Broward County on the dates the application was filed and determined complete. A small portion of the southeast corner of the site was annexed into the City of Hollywood, Florida in December, 1989 but subsequent to the submittal of the Site Certification Application. The applicable land use plans and zoning ordinances are those adopted by Broward County in effect as of the date of the application. Since the annexation occurred after the application was filed and determined complete, the land use plans and zoning ordinances for the City of Hollywood cannot be considered as part of this land use hearing. The City of Hollywood does not have land use designations or zoning classifications assigned to the portion of the site that has been annexed into the City of Hollywood. The land use plan that governs the Lauderdale Site for purposed of this hearing is the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element of the Broward County Board of County Commissioners on March 1, 1989, and its accompanying map. The applicable zoning regulations are Broward County's Zoning Ordinance as codified in Chapter 39 of the Code of Broward County. The entire proposed site for the project is designated as either Utility or as Industrial under the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element and its accompanying map. Electrical power plants, such as that proposed by FPL, are uses permitted in both the Utility and Industrial designations under the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element. The site is also consistent with location-oriented objectives and policies of the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element concerning Utility and Industrial designations. The site is similarly designated for utility and industrial uses under the Broward County Land Use Plan. The Broward County Land Use Plan was prepared as a guide in the preparation of the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element. The Broward County Planning Council has certified the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element as the effective land use plan for the unincorporated areas of Broward County. The site is zoned M-3 under the Broward County Zoning Ordinance, which is the general industrial zoning district permitting a variety of industrial uses. Electrical power plants are a permitted use within the M-3 zoning district as electrical power plants are not prohibited by Section 39-1073 of the Broward County Zoning Code; are not otherwise prohibited by other resolutions or by law; and are not listed as permissible only in an M-4 or an M-5 zoning district. The DER, the DCA, and Broward County concur that the location of the Lauderdale Repowering Project at the Lauderdale Site is consistent and in compliance with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Siting Board, enter a Final Order finding that the proposed Lauderdale Repowering Project Site is consistent and in compliance with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of April 1990. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April 1990. * NOTE: THE APENDIX TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER IS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW IN THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING'S CLERK'S OFFICE. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter C. Cunningham, Esquire Douglas S. Roberts, Esquire Hopping Boyd Green & Sams Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Hamilton S. Oven, Jr., P.E. Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Steven Pfeiffer, General Counsel Kathryn Funchess, Senior Attorney Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Sarah Nail, Esquire South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680 Suzanne S. Brownless, Esquire Division of Legal Services Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Room 212 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 Gary Smallridge Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Noel M. Pfeffer, Esquire Deputy County Attorney Governmental Center, Suite 423 115 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Thomas R. Henderson Broward County Resource Recovery 115 South Andrews Avenue, Room 521 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Patricia Woodworth, Director Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Planning and Budgeting Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the pleadings and evidence, including the stipulation by counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Marion County (County), is a local governmental unit subject to the land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive growth management plans and amendments thereto. In this case, the County has adopted an amendment to its comprehensive plan, which is the subject of the dispute. Petitioners, Henry and Betty Prominski, are residents of Marion County and own a 16.5 acre tract of land on the southeast bank of Lake Weir in the southeastern portion of the County. The property is more commonly known as Orangewood Shores Subdivision. Until April 1994, the land was classified in the urban expansion category, which allows up to four residential units per acre. The County adopted its comprehensive plan in January 1992. After the plan was determined by the DCA to be not in compliance, the County eventually adopted certain remedial amendments on April 7, 1994, one of which changed the land use designation on petitioners' property from urban expansion to urban reserve. Under the new classification, only one residential unit per ten acres is allowed. A cumulative notice of intent to find the plan and remedial amendments in compliance was issued by the DCA on May 30, 1994. During the foregoing process, petitioners timely submitted oral or written objections to the County concerning the plan amendment, and thus they are affected persons within the meaning of the law. On September 14, 1994, the County, through its Staff Vesting Committee, issued Vesting Order No. 94-14, which granted petitioners' application for vesting determination on Orangewood Shores Subdivision. Among other things, the order determined that "the applicant has vested rights to complete the development (known as Orangewood Shores Subdivision) without aggregation of lots providing the applicant continues development activity in good faith." In this regard, petitioners have represented that they intend to "continue development activity in good faith," and they do not intend to vacate their plat. They also recognize that their land is vested from the plan amendment. Despite the lack of any viable issues regarding the development of their property, for the sake of "principle" only, they still wish to contest the de facto reclassification of their property. The foregoing language in the Vesting Order means that petitioners have vested rights to complete the development of their land notwithstanding the change of land use designation from urban expansion to urban reserve. The parties also agree that the effect of the Vesting Order is to vest the property from the comprehensive plan and the restrictions of the urban reserve area. Therefore, within the narrow context of the petition, the thrust of which is that the plan amendment prevents the subdivision's development, the issues raised therein are no longer viable, and petitioners do not have a cognizable interest in the outcome of this proceeding. The controversy is accordingly deemed to be moot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the petition in this case on the ground the issues raised therein are moot. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry J. Prominski, Esquire Post Office Box 540 Weirsdale, Florida 32195-0540 Sherry A. Spiers, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 315 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Thomas D. MacNamara, Esquire 601 Southeast 25th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34471-2690 James F. Murley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Stephanie M. Gehres, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue The issue is whether the City of Panama City's small scale development amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2055.1 on February 8, 2005, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Creekstone is a limited liability corporation and presumed to be the owner of a 3.212-acre tract of land at 305 East Beach Drive, Panama City.3 (The record does not show when or if Creekstone actually purchased the property; when the application for a land use change on the property was filed with the City, Creekstone was a contract purchaser. In its Proposed Recommended Order, however, the City states that Creekstone "recently acquired" the property.) The property lies at the northwest edge of a residential area known as The Cove and is just south of the central business district of the City. The Cove is separated from the business district by a small waterbody known as Massalina Bayou (Bayou), which is spanned by the Tarpon Bridge (Bridge) at one of the Bayou's most narrow points. The 225-foot Bridge provides the most direct and easiest access between the two areas of the City. For many years, and beginning before the City adopted its Plan, Tibbetts Boat Works, Inc. (Tibbets) occupied the site and was engaged in the boat repair business, consisting of hull repair, engine maintenance, other mechanical services, and boat bottom painting, a legal but nonconforming use under the City's land development code. Photographs of the area suggest that the business is no longer active, presumably because the property has been sold. On or about December 8, 2004, SFB Investment Company, LLLP (SFB), who then owned the property but had a contract to sell it to Creekstone, filed an application with the City Planning Board seeking a change in the land use and zoning on the property. At the Planning Board meeting on January 10, 2005, the staff noted that the proposed change would "allow an encroachment of commercial into a predominately residential area" and recommended denial of the application on the ground that the change "is inconsistent with the LDR and the Comp Plan."4 By a 3-1 vote, the City Planning Board rejected the staff recommendation and recommended that the application be approved. On February 8, 2005, by a 4-1 vote, the City accepted the recommendation of the City Planning Board and adopted Ordinance No. 2055.1, which amended the FLUM by reclassifying the land use designation on the property from MU to GC for the purpose of allowing the owner to "develop [a] multi-family project on [the] property." (Simultaneously with that change, the City also changed the zoning on the property from Mixed Use- 3 to General Commercial-2, which allows a wide range of activities, including residential, professional office and services, low-intensity commercial, public/institutional/ utilities, and high-intensity commercial.) The MU land use classification "is intended to provide areas for medium to high density residential development and low intensity commercial development," allows a density of "not more than twenty (20) dwelling units per acre," and an intensity of "[n]o more than 75% lot coverage as determined by the size of the lot compared to the amount of impervious roof and driveway/ parking lot surface." On the other hand, the GC district is "intended to provide areas for high intensity commercial development, including retail sales and services, wholesale sales, shopping centers, office complexes, and other similar land uses." There are no density restrictions, but intensity is limited to "[n]o more than 90% lot coverage." Thus, while the two land uses are similar in some respects, the highest and best use on the property will now be "high intensity commercial development," such as shopping centers and office complexes, a much more intensive use than is presently permitted under the MU land use category. To address this concern, witness Harper indicated that SFB has filed a restrictive covenant on the property which includes a shoreline buffer, as well as use, height, and setback restrictions. At the Planning Board meeting on January 10, 2005, however, the staff stated "that a covenant would not be enforceable." Under the existing land use (MU), the owner can construct up to 64 residential units on the property. That number is derived by multiplying the size of the property (3.212 acres) times the allowed density (20 units per acre). However, the current zoning on the property (which is apparently tied to the MU land use category) prohibits the construction of buildings which exceed 65 feet in height. Because of this height restriction, which limits the number of residential units that can be constructed on the property, the owner has requested a change in the land use (and zoning) so that it can develop a multi-family residential condominium project (nine stories in height) with approximately 77 units. On March 10, 2005, Mr. Cooper filed his Petition challenging the small-scale amendment. He later filed an Amended Petition on April 21, 2005. Mr. Cooper resides and owns property one-half block south of the subject property (in an area designated as a special historical zone of the City) and submitted objections to the amendment during the adoption process. As such, he is an affected person and has standing to file this challenge. Joint Exhibit 9 reflects that Creekstone is a "contract purchaser" of the subject property. It also reflects that it appeared through counsel at the adoption hearing on February 8, 2005, and offered comments in support of the plan amendment. As such, Creekstone is an affected person and has standing to participate in this case. In the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation, Mr. Cooper (through his former counsel) identified numerous issues, many of which were not raised in his Amended Petition. At hearing, however, he contended only that the GC land use is incompatible with the character of the surrounding area, and that the amendment is internally inconsistent with Objectives 1.1 and 1.4 and Policies 1.1.1, 1.2.1, and 1.4.1 of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) of the Plan. All of the objectives and policies relate to the compatibility issue. In all other respects, Petitioner agrees that the plan amendment is in compliance. Because the City's action involves a small scale (as opposed to a large scale) development plan amendment, the Department of Community Affairs did not formally review the plan amendment for compliance. See § 163.3187(3)(a), Fla. Stat. The Subject Property West Beach Drive runs in a northwest-southeast direction through the downtown business portion of the City until a few blocks north of the Bridge, where it changes to East Beach Drive. The roadway continues south across the Bridge and in a southerly direction along the eastern edge of St. Andrews Bay, a much larger waterbody which lies between the City and Panama City Beach. Approximately one-half mile south of the Bridge, East Beach Drive takes a 90-degree turn to the east. Most, if not all, of the peninsula south of the Bayou and Bridge and continuing until East Beach Drive turns to the east is known as The Cove, a part of which has been designated by the City as a historic special treatment zone because of its historical significance. The predominate character of The Cove is older, single-family homes. As noted above, the Bayou separates The Cove from the central business district and serves as a natural barrier between the two areas. The property is an odd-shaped parcel which sits just east of the southern terminus of the Bridge and fronts on the Bayou. (The central business district lies directly across the Bayou to the north and northwest, is classified as General Commercial or Public/Institutional, and includes a wide array of offices, government buildings, restaurants, and other commercial and public uses.) The western side of the property faces East Beach Drive. Immediately across East Beach Drive to the west (and facing St. Andrews Bay) is the Cove Harbor Condominium, a nine-story, multi-family residential condominium which was apparently constructed under MU standards, which apply to that parcel. Immediately to the east of the property is a single- family residence and then a two-story townhouse complex. The southern boundary of the property (which appears to run approximately 325 feet or so) faces East Second Court, a local road which begins on East Beach Drive and runs eastward until Watson Bayou (perhaps a mile or so away). Although a map of the historical district was not introduced into evidence by the parties, the northern and western reaches of the special treatment zone appear to begin just east of the intersection of East Second Court and East Beach Drive since the homes at 114 and 122 East Second Court are designated as having historical significance. See Respondent's Exhibit 4. These two homes appear to lie directly across the street from the southern boundary of Creekstone's property. Except for a two-story, multi-family structure (Cedar Cove Townhouses) which sits across East Second Court facing the southwest corner of the subject property, the remainder of the southern boundary of Creekstone's property faces four single-family homes. Several other multi-family structures are scattered throughout the area to the south and east, while the remainder of the neighborhood extending for at least one-half mile to the south and all the way to Watson Bayou on the east is predominately single-family residences. Finally, a condominium is located about one-half mile south of the property on the waterfront where East Beach Drive makes a 90-degree turn to the east. Except for Tibbets' activities, there is no commercial encroachment (by non-conforming use or land use classification) in the immediate area south of the Bridge and Bayou. The current FLUM shows that, with three exceptions, the entire area south of the Bridge and the Bayou to the end of the peninsula, and extending east at least a mile to Watson Bayou, is either classified as Mixed Use or Residential Low Density. (Perhaps a mile or so to the southeast there is one parcel classified as Recreation, another as Public/Institutional (which is probably a school), and a smaller adjoining parcel classified as General Commercial.) Thus, if the change is approved, the subject property will be the only parcel south of the Bridge and Bayou (except for the above exceptions which lie around a mile away) which is classified as commercial; the remainder is either mixed use or residential. Over the years, Tibbets has been the subject of City code enforcement actions, investigations by City code enforcement personnel, and investigations by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). It has also caused chronic environmental problems in the area. On August 27, 2002, DEP and Tibbets executed a Consent Order to resolve certain violations. Also, on April 10, 2001, Mr. Paul L. Benfield, who apparently either owned Tibbets or was associated with it in some manner, entered into a Consent Order with DEP because of his unlawful filling of 0.114 acres of jurisdictional wetlands on the site. It is fair to describe the subject property as blighted, unsightly, and in disrepair. Photographs received in evidence suggest that the business is no longer active. The parcel is fenced on three sides, and, besides an older structure which apparently housed Tibbets' office, the property contains a mixture of empty storage crates, pilings, and various pieces of equipment that were once used in the boat repair business. There are also several docks or small piers extending into the Bayou from the northwestern corner of the site. Finally, it appears that much of the eastern half of the parcel contains wetlands and is largely undeveloped. Although the staff report dated December 31, 2004, recommended denial of the application, noting that it would allow "an encroachment of commercial into a predominately residential area," it acknowledged that "[a]llowing this request can make a case for helping to rid this area of a problematic non- conforming use." See Joint Exhibit 6, page 2. Petitioner's Objections As narrowed at hearing, Mr. Cooper contends only that the plan amendment is not compatible with the character of the adjoining land in The Cove and is thus internally inconsistent with Objectives 1.1 and 1.4 and Policies 1.1.1, 1.2.1, and 1.4.1 of the FLUE. He also relies upon Policy 2.5.5(6)(e) of the City's Land Development Code. However, plan amendments do not have to be consistent with land development regulations in order to be in compliance. See § 163.3184(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Objective 1.1 requires that the City maintain a FLUM "which coordinates future land uses with . . . [compatibility]5 of adjacent land uses." Policy 1.1.1, which furthers that objective, provides in part that the City will regulate land uses through the designation of land use districts on a FLUM, and that the "location and extent of development within the City" should be "consistent with . . . compatibility of adjacent land uses." Under this objective and policy, then, land use districts on the FLUM should be located in a manner which assures compatibility with adjacent land uses. Objective 1.4 provides that the City shall "maintain procedures for the elimination or reduction of land uses inconsistent with the character of the City and the future land uses designated in the Plan." In furtherance of that objective, Policy 1.4.1 requires that the City "restrict proposed development which is inconsistent with the character of the community." Taken literally, the objective encourages the City to reduce or eliminate land uses that are inconsistent with the character of the surrounding area or other land use districts. In the same fashion, the policy requires that the City prohibit development that is not consistent with the character of the adjoining area. Finally, among other things, Policy 1.2.1 requires that the City "administer land development regulations for implementation of the Comprehensive Plan" in such a manner as to "ensure the compatibility of adjacent land uses." (The City has adopted such regulations for this purpose.) Because the implementation of land development regulations is not in issue, the provision does not appear to be relevant. According to the City's Director of Public Works, The Cove, or at least that part which lies in the area around Creekstone's property, is considered to be a part of the central business district since the two areas are "contiguous," and therefore the extension of the commercial land use district across the Bayou would be consistent with the character of the immediate area. The same view was also expressed by witness Grey. However, the two areas are physically separated by a waterbody (the Bayou) and are connected only by a 225-foot bridge which spans the Bayou at one of its most narrow points. At the same time, the land uses in the two areas are distinctly different: the business district contains a wide array of commercial and public/institutional uses while the predominate character of The Cove is single-family residential, with a scattering of multi-family residential dwellings such as townhouses and a condominium. The fact that the City interprets its GC district (presumably through its zoning regulations) as allowing certain residential uses does not change this dichotomy in character. Therefore, it is inappropriate to consider The Cove and the central business district as being contiguous, or to base a finding of compatibility on the fact that commercial uses are now found across the Bayou in the business district. The commercial land use classification has never been extended into the residential neighborhood south of the Bayou. If the change becomes effective, the new land use would be incompatible with the Residential Low Density and Mixed Use land uses which now make up the entire neighborhood. It would also be incompatible with the historic special treatment zone, which lies directly across the street from Creekstone's property. Finally, the creation of a commercial district in this area of The Cove would change the character of the neighborhood, and it is fair to infer that, even if SFB's covenant is enforceable, it would still lead to, and justify, the reclassification of other nearby parcels into commercial uses. Given these considerations, the proposed land use is internally inconsistent with the City's objective and policy that there be "[compatibility] of adjacent land uses," see Objective 1.1 and Policy 1.1.1, and Plan provisions encouraging the elimination of land uses and associated development which are inconsistent with the "character of the community." See Objective 1.4 and Policy 1.4.1. The minutes of the two meetings which culminated in the adoption of Ordinance No. 2055.1 reflect that the City's (and Planning Board's) principal rationale for the reclassification of the property was to eliminate an unsightly nonconforming use (boat repair business) which occupied the site. While it is true that the City's Plan encourages the revitalization and redevelopment of blighted areas, and provides that developers should be given "flexibility" when seeking to revitalize blighted areas, see Objectives 1.3 and 1.15 of the FLUE, there is no evidence that these objectives are intended to override (and trump) the provisions of the Plan which require that adjacent land uses be compatible with one another and preserve the character of the neighborhood.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2055.1 is not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 2005.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Environmental Coalition of Broward County, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Coalition"), is a Florida corporation. The Coalition has offices located in Broward County. The Coalition has approximately 500 members, most of whom reside in Broward County. A substantial number of the Coalition's members own property in Broward County and/or operate businesses within Broward County. The Coalition is a not-for-profit corporation, chartered for educational and scientific purposes. The primary purpose of the Coalition is to present objections and recommendations to local governments concerning planning issues on behalf of its membership. The Coalition is authorized to participate in actions of this type and to represent its membership in administrative proceedings. The Coalition presented oral and written objections to Broward County during the review and adoption process concerning the plan amendment at issue in this proceeding. Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of implementing the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Among other things, the Department is required to review local government comprehensive plans and amendments thereto for compliance with the Act. Respondent, Broward County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is the local government with the authority pursuant to the Act and the Broward County Charter to adopt and amend a comprehensive plan. The County has adopted the 1989 Broward County Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"). The Broward County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commission"), is the local planning agency for the County. The County Commission is advised on land use planning issues by the Broward County Planning Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Planning Council"). The Planning Council was created by the County Charter. Intervenors, Miramar Lakes, Inc., d/b/a Miramar Rock, Robert A. Whitcombe, Trustee, and the South Broward Trust own or have under contract virtually all of the property affected by the Plan amendment which is the subject of this proceeding. These Intervenors have entered into a joint venture agreement with Intervenor Atlantic Gulf Communities Corporation to develop the subject property. Intervenors applied for the amendment that is the subject of this proceeding and presented oral or written comments, recommendations and objections during the period of time between the transmittal hearing and adoption of the subject Plan amendment. The County's Plan. The County adopted a comprehensive plan as required by the Act in 1989. The planning horizon of the plan is 2010. The Plan includes two volumes of text, two volumes of support documents and associated maps. See Petitioner's exhibit 8. Volume One is text and is effective countywide. Volume Three contains support documents for the Plan. The Plan also includes the 1989 Broward County Future Land Use Plan Map (Series) (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"). The FLUM depicts the proposed distribution, extent and location of categories of land uses allowed under the Plan. Among others, those land uses include "residential" at various densities and "agricultural". Pursuant to the Plan, the eastern approximately one-third of the County may be developed. The developable area consists of approximately 400 square miles of land area. The western approximately two-thirds of the County are designated as water conservation areas and are separated by a levee from the developable one- third. Future land use elements of municipal comprehensive plans in the County must be in substantial conformity to the Plan. The Subject Property. The property which is the subject of the Plan amendment at issue in this case consists of 1,280 acres of a total of 1,965 acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). The Property is located in the City of Miramar, in southwest Broward County, Florida, Sections 25, 26, 27 and 36, Township 51 South, Range 39 East. The Property is located in the southwestern portion of the developable one-third of the County. See Map 1 of Broward County exhibit 1. The Property is bounded on the east by S.W. 184th Avenue and on the north by Honey Hill Road. It is east of U.S. Highway 27. Part of the Property is vacant. Part of the Property is being used as cattle pasture and for a rock mining, batching, mixing and crushing operation. Existing land uses in the vicinity of the Property include vacant land, rock mining and some development to the north, single-family residential development to the east, rock mining and vacant land to the south, in Dade County, Florida. Residential development immediately to the east in a development known as "Silverlakes" is being developed at a density of three dwelling units per acre. Further to the west of the Property is the eastern boundary of the water conservation areas of the Everglades. These areas are separated from the rest of Broward County by a levee. The land use designation of the Property and other property in the surrounding area is "agricultural". Under the Plan, the land use designation allows agricultural uses and residential development of one dwelling per 2.5 acres. Under its current land use designation, a total of 786 dwelling units may be developed on the Property. The First Amendment Requested by the Intervenors. In early 1994 Intervenors filed an application with the County seeking an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Low (2) Residential". "Low (2) Residential" allows the development of two dwelling units per acre. The Planning Council conducted a review of the proposed amendment. The Broward County Department of Natural Resource Protection raised objections to the proposed amendment because the Property is located in an area of water recharge and wetlands. The area is identified as within a general wetlands area on the "Southwestern Generalized Wetlands Map" of the Plan. 30 Based upon the objections of the County Department of Natural Resource Protection, the staff of the Planning Council recommended denial of the proposed amendment. The South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter referred to as the "SFWMD"), an agency with broad regional responsibility for water management in southeast Florida, raised objections with the Planning Council concerning the location of the property in an area which was being considered for use as part of a project to restore the Everglades. The SFWMD was concerned that the Property is located within an area which has come to be known as the "East Coast Buffer". In early 1994, at the time of the initial review of the proposed amendment, the East Coast Buffer was a study area abutting the eastern water conservation areas of southeast Florida. The SFWMD was studying the East Coast Buffer for use in water conservation efforts in southeast Florida. At the time of the first review of the proposed amendment, the portion of the East Coast Buffer in which the Property is located was being considered for preservation as a reservoir site. The Planning Council transmitted the proposed amendment to the County Commission without recommendation. The County Commission decided not to transmit the proposed amendment to the Department for its review, ending review of the initial application. The Initial Review of the Subject Amendment. A second application on the Property was resubmitted by the Intervenors in March of 1994. The application was designated Application PC 94- 15. Application PC 94-15 sought an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". "Irregular 1.5 Residential" allows 1.5 dwelling units per acre. The amendment sought by Intervenors would have allowed an increase from 786 dwelling units to 2,947 dwelling units on the Property. An increase of 2,161 units. Application PC 94-15 was again reviewed. The same comments about, and objections to, the proposed amendment were raised concerning groundwater and aquifer recharge. The staff of the Planning Council again recommended denial of the proposed amendment. 41 The Planning Council recommended transmittal of the application, subject to the Intervenors satisfying the concerns raised by the SFWMD. On August 17, 1994, the County Commission transmitted Application PC 94-15 to the Department, conditioned upon the Intervenors satisfying the concerns of the SFWMD. The SFWMD objected to Application PC 94-15 because of its conclusion that the proposed future land use designation was not compatible with the East Coast Buffer then under evaluation by the SFWMD. SFWMD had developed data and conducted computer modeling concerning the utilization of a buffer for a variety of purposes, including reducing seepage of water from the Everglades, increasing groundwater recharge into aquifers and creating a natural buffer to protect the Everglades from the impacts of development. The SFWMD had commissioned a worldwide engineering firm, CH2M Hill to prepare a report on the East Coast Buffer. The SFWMD recommended that Application PC 94-15 not be approved until it had completed its study of the East Coast Buffer because the land use designation being sought might be incompatible with the conclusions reached from the SFWMD's and CH2M Hill's evaluation. The Department reviewed Application PC 94-15 and, based upon comments from the SFWMD similar to those raised before the County Commission, issued an Objections, Recommendations and Comments report concerning Application PC 94-15. The Department raised objections consistent with the adverse comments from the SFWMD. Modification of the Proposed Amendment. Parts of southwestern Broward County and northwestern Dade County were designated "Management Unit 5" by the SFWMD. Management Unit 5 was being considered, as recommended by CH2M Hill, as a reservoir area. Development of the Property was, therefore, not considered to be a use comparable with the concept of the East Coast Buffer being considered by the SFWMD at the time of the County's and Department's decision to reject Application PC 94-15. Intervenors worked with the SFWMD in an effort to find a way of modifying Application PC 94-15 to satisfy the SFWMD's concerns. SFWMD utilized computer modeling to simulate groundwater and surface water flows in Management Unit 5 to determine the impact of allowing development of the Property. The SFWMD concluded that Management Unit 5 was more suitable as a recharge area rather than as a reservoir. This conclusion was based, in part, of the transmissibility of the soil and other site conditions which were not conducive to storing water above ground for long periods of time. Use of Management Unit 5 as a recharge area and not a reservoir requires less surface area. Therefore, it was concluded that development in the area might be compatible with the SFWMD's East Coast Buffer concept. The SFWMD modeled four development alternatives for Management Unit 5 and analyzed the impact of each alternative on the efforts to retard seepage, provide groundwater recharge and enhance wetland benefits: (a) retaining the Property as a recharge area and allowing no development; (b) retaining the entire western two-thirds as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern one-third; (c) retaining the western one-third as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern two-thirds; and (d) allowing development of the entire management unit. Alternatives (b) and (c) assumed that a berm would be constructed between the recharge area and the developed area. After meeting with Intervenors and discussing the results of the modeling, Intervenors indicated willingness to remove the western portion of the Property from the proposed development. The SFWMD then conducted a more detailed, computer analysis of the following alternatives: (a) continuing existing conditions; (b) constructing a berm around Management Unit 5 and utilizing the entire area as a recharge area; (c) constructing a berm between the eastern and western sections of the Management Unit 5 and utilizing the western section for recharge with no development in the eastern section; and (d) alternative "(c)" with development of the eastern section. As a result of computer modeling of the alternatives, it was concluded that alternatives (b), (c) and (d) could significantly reduce seepage from the Everglades and increase groundwater recharge in to the aquifers when compared to development under the agricultural land use designation of alternative (a). As a result of the more detailed analysis, the SFWMD concluded that essentially all of its goals could be achieved for Management Unit 5 if the western section of Management Unit 5 is preserved even if development is allowed in the eastern section. The SFWMD concluded that the eastern two-thirds of the Property, consisting of approximately 1,280 acres, could be developed as "Irregular 1.5 Residential" if the western one-third, consisting of approximately 685 acres, was utilized as a recharge area. Intervenors agreed to preserve the western third of the Property (685 acres) and grant the SFWMD a flowage easement, consistent with the East Coast Buffer and at a savings of $43 million. On December 14, 1994, the staff of the SFWMD presented the results of the computer modeling to the SFWMD. On December 15, 1994, the SFWMD withdrew its objection to Application PC 94-15, conditioned upon the deletion of the 685 acres from the application and the granting of a flowage easement. The County and the Department were informed of the decision of the SFWMD. Approval of Application 94-15. On December 20, 1994, the County Commission adopted by Ordinance 94-55 an amendment to the Plan, Amendment PC 94-15 (hereinafter referred to as the "Amendment"), subject to the conditions suggested by the SFWMD, which resolved the SFWMD's objections. The Amendment included modifications to the FLUM and text amendments. The Amendment, in relevant part, modifies the future land use designation of approximately 1,280 acres of the Property from "Agricultural" to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". This will allow the construction of a total of 1,920 dwelling units on the Property, or an increase of 1,408 dwelling units over the number of dwelling that may be constructed under the current future land use designation for the Property. In light of Intervenor's modifications of the application, the removal of the SFWMD's objections and the approval of the application by the County, the Department found the Amendment to be in compliance with the Act. On February 14, 1995, the Department issued a notice of intent to find the Amendment in compliance. The County and the Department accepted and relied upon the data and methodology employed by the SFWMD and the conditions for removal of the SFWMD's objections. Petitioner's Challenge. On or about March 8, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department challenging the Amendment. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on April 25, 1995. At the commencement of the final hearing, Petitioner withdrew all issues it had raised in the Amended Petition except the issues of: (a) whether the data and analysis available supports a conclusion that there is a need for additional residential development; and (b) whether the Amendment is supported by data and analysis in light of an ongoing study of the East Coast Buffer. Residential Housing Need. The Plan includes the following Goal and Objective concerning the provision of adequate areas for residential use: Goal 01.00.00 Provide residential areas with a variety of housing types and densities offering convenient and affordable housing opportunities to all segments of Broward County's population while maintaining a desired quality of life and adequate public services and facilities. Objective 01.01.00 Accommodate the projected population of Broward County by providing adequate areas on the Future Broward County Land Use Plan Map (Series) intended primarily for residential development, but which also permit those non-residential uses that are compatible with and necessary to support residential neighborhoods. The Plan, including the methodology utilized to determine residential need, was found to be in compliance by the Department. The residential need methodology of the Plan utilized the Broward County Population Forecasting Model to project the population of southwest Broward County in 1994 to be 225,489 people. This projected population formed the basis for the allocation of residential housing units for Subregion 5 under the Plan. The Property is located in an area of southwest Broward County designated as Subregion 5 in the Plan. In reviewing the Amendment, the County conducted an analysis of the need for additional residential development in southwest Broward County. This analysis utilized, and was consistent with, the residential need methodology of the Plan. A summary of the data and analysis utilized by the County was provided to the Department. The County's analysis indicated that the population of Subregion 5 has exceeded the population projections for the Subregion of the Plan. By 1994, there were 284,361 people living in Subregion 5 or 17,872 more than projected in the Plan. The increased population rate of growth in Subregion 5 was projected to represent an increase in projected demand for approximately 6,847 residential units in excess of the projected demand expected under the Plan. The analysis also took into account amendments to the Plan which have resulted in a reduction of 1,087 residential units for Subregion 5. When combined with the increased population, the data and analysis supports a conclusion that there is a need for 7,934 additional residential units in Subregion 5. The Amendment increases residential housing in Subregion 5 by 1,134 dwelling units (1,920 units allowed under the Amendment, less 786 dwelling units allowed under the current agriculture classification), well below the projected need for additional residential units for Subregion 5. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and submitted to the Department supports the conclusion of the County that there is need for the proposed additional residential development approved by the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was professionally acceptable and adequate to support the Amendment. The evidence presented by Petitioner failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was not professionally acceptable and adequate. Rather than attempting to prove that the County's methodology was not professionally acceptable or was flawed, Petitioner utilized a methodology based upon an annualized population growth rate for Subregion 5. Petitioner offered evidence that there is sufficient residential housing approved under the Plan to meet the projected population for 15.6 years, beyond the remaining life of the Plan. The methodology utilized by Petitioner was, by the admission of the Petitioner's own witness, not a professionally acceptable methodology. The evidence failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County does not support its conclusion that there is sufficient need for the additional residential housing authorized for the County by the Amendment. The East Coast Buffer Zone. Efforts to restore the Everglades have been initiated and are ongoing. As a part of these efforts a group of technical and scientific staff members of various federal agencies involved in the restoration efforts were formed as the "Science Sub Group." The Science Sub Group was formed as an advisory group to provide guidance towards ecosystem restoration efforts. The Science Sub Group had no implementing authority. It issued at least one report in late 1993 which included an East Coast Buffer concept. The East Coast Buffer identified by the Science Sub Group included the area in which the Property is located. The Science Sub Group relied upon data obtained from the SFWMD and various computer models developed by the SFWMD, and SFWMD personnel contributed to the preparation of the report. The East Coast Buffer concept generally includes a series of interconnected water flow-ways along the eastern edge of the water conservation areas necessary to restore the Everglades. The federal government has also instituted a study known as the "Central & South Florida Project: Comprehensive Review Study" (hereinafter referred to as the "Restudy"). The United States Corps of Engineers is the lead agency of the Restudy. The first phase of the Restudy's efforts has resulted in a "Reconnaissance Report", also known as the "Recon Study". The second phase of the Restudy's efforts will be the feasibility phase. The feasibility phase will begin in the summer of 1995 and will be completed several years later. The purpose of the Restudy is to bring together the interested federal agencies to review the current management of the Everglades and identify strategies for altering management practices and systems to improve the Everglades. The Recon Study was completed in late 1994. It describes various conceptual strategies for restoring the Everglades. The determination of the feasibility of the strategies has not, however, been started, much less completed. Therefore, although the East Coast Buffer concept is considered in the Recon Study, the actual identification of the area which will constitute the Buffer has not been identified. Nor has the area which should constitute the East Coast Buffer been recommended in the Recon Study. The Recon Study identifies problems and opportunities, formulates alternative plans, evaluates conceptual alternative plans and recommends further study. The Recon Study is advisory. It does not identify, recommend or implement a plan of action. The Coalition presented evidence concerning the ongoing analysis of Everglades restoration efforts. That evidence proved that the Property is located within a very large area, which completely surrounds the Everglades, which is being considered as part of the Everglades restoration effort because of the impact of this large area on restoration efforts. The evidence presented by the Coalition, however, failed to prove that the Property has been, or will be, determined to be essential or even necessary for future Everglades restoration efforts. At the time of the approval of the Amendment and, even at the time of the final hearing of this case, no such determination had been made. Nor had any determination been made as to what will be necessary for the restoration of the Everglades or whether decisions will be made to carry out the necessary restoration efforts. As recognized by the Coalition in its proposed order: 52. The study necessary to make [a determination of the water levels needed] for the areas which are implicated by this amendment will be done in the next two years or three years. * * * 55. There is no way of telling, based on the data and analysis available at this point, how much water will be necessary in order to fully restore the Everglades. . . . Coalition proposed findings of fact 52 and 55. The Coalition also recognized the following: The Reconnaissance study has not reached the point where conclusions can be drawn about parcel specific uses. The next step is the feasibility planning phase, which is a much more detailed phase which will run for several years. . . . Coalition proposed finding of fact 107. Instead of attempting to prove that the data and analysis at the time of adoption of the Amendment indicated that development of the Property authorized by the Amendment would be detrimental to restoration efforts, the Coalition attempted to prove that development of the Property should be delayed until data and analysis is available indicating conclusively what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts. The Act does not require such delay. In addition to failing to prove what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts, the evidence presented by the Coalition also failed to prove that the conclusions reached by the Science Sub Group and the Restudy will even be implemented. The evidence presented by the Coalition failed to prove that the conclusions of the SFWMD with regard to the impact of the Amendment are not supported by data and analysis or were not arrived at by professionally acceptable methods. While the evidence proved that there will be some reduction in the amount of groundwater recharge function and seepage control function as a result of the Amendment, the evidence failed to prove what ultimate impact the reductions in recharge and seepage control will be or that the SFWMD's conclusions are not reasonable. While the Coalition proved that the SFWMD's conclusions were not based upon a consideration of what should be done to restore the Everglades, the evidence failed to prove that the information available was sufficiently conclusive that the SFWMD should have objected to the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County in approving the Amendment was collected and applied in a professionally acceptable manner. None of those agencies charged with responsibility to review the Amendment raised objections to its approval. The evidence failed to prove that the state of the data and analysis available to the County from the Science Sub Group and the Restudy or any other source concerning the area referred to as the East Coast Buffer and the Property is such that it proved that the data that was relied by the County upon was inadequate.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department dismissing finding the Amendment "in compliance" and dismissing the petition in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Coalition's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1-2. Accepted in 2. 3-4 Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5 Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5. Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 5-6. Accepted in 6. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12 14-15 Not relevant. 16-18 Not relevant. See 81-84. 19-25 Not relevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 81-84. Accepted in 29. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 26 and hereby accepted. 30-31 See 24. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 36 and 62. Accepted in 62. 35-41 Hereby accepted. 42-48 These proposed findings are generally correct. They are not, however, relevant to the ultimate determination in this case. 49-50 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. See 96. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted in 96. The last sentence is not relevant. Hereby accepted. 57-63 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 64-65 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 89 and 91 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90 and 92. See 86 and 92. Hereby accepted. Although generally true, the evidence failed to prove that this finding specifically applies to the Property. Except for the first sentence, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31-33. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 76-87 Although generally correct, these findings were too broad and the evidence failed to prove that they specifically apply to the Property. 88-90 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 94-97 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 98 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 99-100 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 104-105 Not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 97. Accepted in 90. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 111-114 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The County's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 Accepted in 1. 2 Accepted in 7. 3 Accepted in 8. 4 Accepted in 11. 5 Hereby accepted. 6 Accepted in 12. 7 Accepted in 13. 8 Accepted in 14. 9 Accepted in 15. 10 Accepted in 9-10. 11 Accepted in 18. 12 Accepted in 16. 13 Accepted in 17. 14 Accepted in 61. 15 Accepted in 60. 16 Accepted in 19-20, 26 and 62. 17 Accepted in 23. 18 Accepted in 21-22 19-20 Accepted in 24. 21 Hereby accepted. 22 Accepted in 37. 23-24 Hereby accepted. 25 Accepted in 68. 26 Accepted in 65-67. 27-28 Accepted in 67. 29-30 Hereby accepted. 31-32 Accepted in 28. 33 Accepted in 29. 34 Accepted in 30. 35 Accepted in 34. 36 Accepted in 31 and hereby accepted. 37 Accepted in 32-33. 38 Accepted in 31. 39 Accepted in 33. 40 Accepted in 35. 41 Accepted in 316. 42 Accepted in 37. 43 Accepted in 39. 44 Accepted in 40. 45 Accepted in 41. 46 Accepted in 42. 47 Accepted in 72. 48-49 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 73-77 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 76-77. Accepted in 38. Accepted in 79-80 Accepted 58 and 62. 55-57 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 82. Hereby accepted. 60-61 Accepted in 81-84. 62 Hereby accepted. 63-65 Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 43 and 45. Accepted in 88. Accepted in 89-90. 69-70 Accepted in 85-86. 71 Accepted in 90 and 92-93. 72-77 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 32 and 44. Hereby accepted. None proposed. Accepted in 33. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 49 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. 87-88 Accepted in 52. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 53 and 58 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 54. Accepted in 56. Accepted in 58. 95-96 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 60. Accepted in 61. The Department's and Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 8. Accepted in 11. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 14. Accepted in 15. Accepted in 9-10. Accepted in 18. Accepted in 16. Accepted in 17. Accepted in 61. Accepted in 11 and 19-20. Accepted in 20. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 24-25. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 27. Accepted in 36-38. 22-37 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 43. Accepted in 88. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31. 42-43 Accepted in 44. Accepted in 43 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 42. Accepted in 42 and 46. Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 46. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 46. 52-53 Accepted in 48. Accepted 49. Accepted in 49, 52 and 54. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 54 and 57. 59-60 Accepted 54. 61-63 Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 55. Accepted in 56-57. 66-67 Accepted in 58. 68-70 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 64. Accepted in 58 and 62. Accepted in 60 and 62. Accepted in 63. Accepted in 67. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 67 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 37 and hereby accepted. Not relevant. Accepted in 86. Hereby accepted. 82-83 Accepted in 86. Accepted in 87. Accepted in 89 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90. Accepted in 90 and 92-93. Accepted in 93. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 72-78. Accepted in 69-71. Accepted in 70. Accepted in 73-74 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 75. Accepted in 76. Accepted in 77. Accepted in 78. Accepted in 79-80. 101-102 Accepted in 82. Accepted in 83. Accepted in 83-84. Accepted in 81 and 84. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brion Blackwelder, Esquire Jack Milbery, Esquire 8751 West Broward Boulevard, #206 Plantation, Florida 33324 Sherry A. Spiers Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Tracy Lautenschlager, Esquire Broward County Attorney's Office 115 South Andrews Avenue Suite 423 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Glenn Smith, Esquire Michael A. Cohn, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. 200 East Broward Boulevard Post Office Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Honorable Gerald F. Thompson Chairman, Broward County Board of County Commissioners Governmental Center 115 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Carla Brice, has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to a vested rights certificate to develop certain real property located in Alachua County, Florida without complying with the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding (hereinafter referred to as "Lot 111"), consists of approximately 6 acres of real property located in Alachua County, Florida. Lot 111 is currently owned by the Petitioner, Carla Brice. Ms. Brice acquired Lot 111 through inheritance from her father, Carl L. Brice. Ms. Brice acquired the property in approximately January of 1993. Early History of the Development of Arredonda Estates. During the 1950s Mr. Brice acquired a platted subdivision in Alachua County known as Arredonda Estates Unit 1 (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 1"). Approximately 100 acres of property located adjacent to Unit 1 were also acquired by Mr. Brice. Unit 1 met the existing plat law of Alachua County. Mr. Brice proceeded with the development of Unit 1 and the sale of lots therein. Part of the 100 acres acquired by Mr. Brice was subsequently platted and developed for sale as residential lots as Arredonda Estates Unit 2A (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 2A"). Arredonda Estates Unit 2B (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 2B") was to be located to the north of Unit 2A. Because of the lack of access out of Unit 2B, the then County engineer of the Alachua County, Roy J. Miller, informed Mr. Brice that he would not allow Mr. Brice to proceed with Unit 2B until Mr. Brice completed development of approximately 33 acres of real property located to the east of Unit 1. Mr. Miller believed that there would be better access from the various phases of Arredonda Estates if the 33 acres were developed first because there would be access out of the 33 acres onto County Road 24 and onto Broken Arrow Road to the east of the 33 acres. Mr. Miller, as the County engineer, wielded a great deal of influence in the development of property in Alachua County at the time Mr. Brice developed Units 1 and 2A and at the time he was beginning development of the 33 acres. Although the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Miller could have legally required Mr. Brice to develop the 33 acres before developing Unit 2B, the uncontroverted evidence proved that it was believed that Mr. Miller's approval was necessary in order to complete a development. The 33 acres surround Lot 111 on the east, west and north. The south boundary of Lot 111 is County Road 24, Archer Road. One of the two access roads to County Road 24 from the 33 acre development was located to the immediate east of Lot 111 and the other was located to the immediate west of Lot 111. Lot 111 is bounded on the south by County Road 24. The 33 acres were to be developed as Arredonda Estates (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 4"). The Development of Unit 4. Mr. Brice informed Mr. Miller that he was concerned about developing Unit 4 before developing Unit 2B because Mr. Brice planned to develop Lot 111 as a shopping center. He did not plan to build the shopping center until all phases of Arredonda Estates were completed, including Unit 2B. In agreeing to develop Unit 4 before Unit 2B, Mr. Brice was concerned about making expenditures for larger drainage facilities and obtaining additional easements necessary for the development of Lot 111 before he planned to begin actual development of the shopping center. Mr. Brice informed Mr. Miller of these concerns. The shopping center Mr. Brice planned to develop was to consist of 296,000 square feet of paved surface and 50,000 square feet of roof area. These plans required a redesign of the drainage for Unit 4. In particular, the following modifications were necessary: In conclusion I find it necessary to change the diameter of pipe #7 from an 18 inch diameter to a 21 inch diameter, placed at a 0.15 percent slope pipe grade. Some necessary amendments are required at this point. The larger size pipe in place will cost $9.20 per linear foot. Some sixty-two feet are needed, therefore the total cost will be $570.40. Brice exhibit 9. Despite Mr. Brice's concerns, Mr. Miller continued to insist on the development of Unit 4 before Unit 2B and Mr. Brice proceeded with the development of Unit 4. Unit 4 was platted on July 19, 1970. The plat was recorded in Plat Book H, Page 30, Official Records of Alachua County. The initial design of Unit 4 provided for one point of ingress and egress on to State Road 24 from Unit 4. Mr. Miller required that two points of ingress and egress be provided and Mr. Brice agreed. The evidence failed to prove that this requirement was agreed to in exchange for any representation from Alachua County that Mr. Brice would be allowed to develop the shopping center. The final plat provided two means of ingress and egress to State Road 24 and one means of ingress and egress to County Road Number Southwest 24-C (Broken Arrow Road). Lot 111 is contained on the plat. No intended use for Lot 111 was designated on the plat of Unit 4. The plat simply identifies the lot. See Brice exhibit 5. The plat identifies the development of residential lots only. The 33 acres was initially zoned as "A" (agriculture). In order to develop Unit 4 it was necessary to obtain approval of re-zoning of the property as R1C, residential use. The re-zoning of the 33 acres was sought and approved. Lot 111 was also zoned for agricultural use when acquired. On February 11, 1969, 4.27 acres of Lot 111 were re-zoned from "A" (agriculture) to "BR" (retail sales and service). On July 1, 1969, a special use permit allowing a mobile home trailer sales agency was issued for use of 1.1 acres contiguous to the 4.27 acre parcel of Lot 111 by Alachua County. On July 7, 1975, the 1.1 acres, which the special use permit had been issued for, was zoned from "A" to "BR." Construction plans for site improvements for Unit 4 were subsequently prepared, filed with Alachua County and were approved. See Brice exhibit 10. Included on the plans is a rectangular shape identified as "Proposed Shopping Center" containing indications of measurements representing 50,000 square feet of building space. The "Proposed Shopping Center" designation is located on Lot 111. Mr. Brice was subsequently informed that the site improvements for Unit 4 were approved by Alachua County. The evidence failed to prove, however, that Alachua County specifically considered or approved the construction of a shopping center on Lot 111 in approving the site improvement plans for Unit 4. The approved site improvements for Unit 4 were ultimately made and accepted by Alachua County in September of 1970. Government Action Relied Upon. Mr. Miller intended to allow Mr. Brice to develop Lot 111 as a shopping center "as he had planned." Mr. Miller's approval was conditioned on the completion of development of Units 2B and 4 and the sale of lots thereon. The shopping center to be approved was to be limited to what Mr. Brice "had originally proposed" which was a shopping center of 50,000 square feet. Mr. Brice complied with Mr. Miller's condition that he complete development of Unit 4 before developing Unit 2B. The evidence failed to prove that it was reasonable for Mr. Brice to believe that Mr. Miller's representations concerning the approval of Mr. Brice's intended development of a shopping center on Lot 111 would last indefinitely. It was also unreasonable for Mr. Brice to believe that the representations of Mr. Miller would survive indefinitely beyond the time that Mr. Brice completed development of Arredonda Estates. In July of 1970, Alachua County Zoning Regulations contained the following site plan approval requirement for shopping centers: No permit shall be issued for construction of a shopping center until the plans and specifications, including the design of ingress and egress roads, parking facilities, and such other items as may be found of importance have been approved by the zoning commission. Based upon this provision, Mr. Miller did not have the authority to approve the construction of a shopping center on Lot 111 in July of 1970. If the representations made by Mr. Miller to Mr. Brice concerning construction of the shopping center had been made in July, 1970, it would be unreasonable for Mr. Brice to rely upon Mr. Miller's representation because of the Alachua County Zoning Regulations quoted in finding of fact 31. If the representations were made before July, 1970, it would be reasonable for Mr. Brice to rely on Mr. Miller's approval of the shopping center because the evidence failed to prove that Alachua County Zoning Regulation quoted above was in effect before July, 1970. The weight of the evidence proved that Mr. Miller's representations were made before July, 1970. Detrimental Reliance. Mr. Brice proceeded with the development of Unit 4. Roads and drainage facilities associated with Unit 4 were constructed by 1971. The cost of these improvements was approximately $68,989.54. The total cost of improvements associated with Unit 4 was $121,947.54. Mr. Brice also had to obtain a drainage easement but the evidence failed to prove the cost of doing so. The exact amount expended on Unit 4 attributable to work performed just for Lot 111 and the shopping center was not proved by Ms. Brice. One method of allocating costs associated with the development of Unit 4 to Lot 111 suggested by Ms. Brice is to determine the percentage of acreage Lot 111 represents of the whole of Unit 4: approximately 17.9 percent. Applying this percentage to the total costs equals $21,828.61. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that $21,828.61 was actually incurred in association with Lot 111. The evidence failed to prove that it would be reasonable to attribute any part of the expenditures listed in paragraphs 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11 or 12 of Brice exhibit 30 as attributable to Lot 111. Based upon evidence presented by Alachua County, the total expenditures made by Mr. Brice associated with Lot 111 and the shopping center were approximately $1,005.50. Subsequent Events. Mr. Brice caused preliminary plans for a shopping center for Lot 111 to be developed. Brice exhibit 14. Those plans were never submitted for approval and no building permit was issued approving the construction of a shopping center for Lot 111. The preliminary plans for the shopping center indicate a substantially different configuration for the shopping center than indicated on the site improvement plans for Unit 4. Brice exhibit 14. No final development plan or plat approving a shopping center on Lot 111 was issued by Alachua County. Efforts were made during the 1970s to market Lot 111 for development as a shopping center. These efforts were not successful. As a part of this effort, Mr. Brice incurred $7,000.00 for the construction of a three dimensional model of the proposed shopping center evidenced on the preliminary plans. It has been suggested that Mr. Brice did not proceed with the development of the shopping center during the 1970's and into the 1980's for a number of reasons: A dispute between Mr. Brice and Alachua County arose in 1976 concerning the road in Unit 2A; A dispute also arose concerning the water system in the area of Arredonda Estates; The state of the economy was not conducive to development. The evidence, however, failed to prove why the shopping center was not developed. In 1973, Alachua County created a development review committee. Final site plans for commercial sites were required to be approved by the committee. Mr. Brice did not obtain approval for the proposed shopping center or seek assurances from Alachua County that Mr. Miller's representations concerning the shopping center on Lot 111 were still valid. During 1982 and 1983, Mr. Brice became aware of proposed revisions to the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Brice met with Alachua County officials concerning the revisions and followed the progress of the revisions. In 1984 Alachua County adopted a comprehensive plan. Under this plan commercial use of Lot 111 was not allowed except for a neighborhood convenience store with square footage of 10,000 square feet. In 1985, during a meeting with Alachua County personnel, Mr. Brice and his attorney were informed that Lot 111 could not be developed as a shopping center without a comprehensive plan amendment. No amendment was applied for. In 1989, offers to purchase Lot 111 were received. Those offers were continent upon the property being developed consistent with the BR zoning. Ms. Brice's name, then known as Carla B. Sutton, first appears in connection with Lot 111 in 1989 when offers to purchase Lot 111 were received. The evidence, however, failed to prove that she was owner of Lot 111 at that time. In 1989 or 1990, a conceptual site plan review was applied for by David Miller, Mr. Brice's representative, concerning Lot 111. Brice exhibit 21. The application was considered at an Alachua County Development Review Committee meeting on March 22, 1990. Consideration of the application was deferred for two weeks. The development Review Committee met on April 19, 1990 and considered the application for conceptual site plan review for Lot 111. The Committee was concerned about how the fact that Lot 111 had been zoned BR before the comprehensive plan had been adopted impacted the fact that development of Lot 111 as a shopping center was prohibited by the comprehensive plan. A decision was delayed for a month and staff was asked to prepare a report dealing with similarly situated parcels. By January 1991, proposed language providing for vesting of certain zoning had been drafted by Alachua County. Brice exhibit 24. By letter dated January 30, 1991, Kurt Larsen, Director of the Office of Planning and Development of Alachua County, informed all affected property owners that Alachua County was "considering" allowing a period of time during which existing zoning would be honored. Brice exhibit 25 Comments were invited. By letter dated February 15, 1991, counsel for Ms. Brice responded to Mr. Larsen's January 30, 1991 letter. Brice exhibit 26. A Transmittal Draft of the Future Land Use Element of the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan dated April 1991 was sent to the Florida Department of Community Affairs for review. See Brice exhibit 27. The Draft provided a two- year period during which undeveloped parcels zoned for a use that was otherwise inconsistent with the Comprehensive Land Use Plan would be allowed to be developed essentially in accordance with existing zoning. This policy was ultimately rejected by the Department of Community Affairs. Alachua County informed Ms. Brice of the action of the Department of Community Affairs by letter dated September 18, 1991. Brice exhibit 28. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. Alachua County adopted a Comprehensive Land Use Plan in 1991. The following policy was agreed to in a compromise between Alachua County and the Department of Community Affairs concerning commercial enclaves: Policy 3.4.3. Commercial Enclaves are designed within the Urban Cluster on the Future Land Use Map. These sites shall be subject to the following location and compatibility standards: Development of Commercial Enclaves shall be required to meet all concurrency requirements. Development shall be required to minimize access from arterials and collectors. Whenever possible, driveways shall use common access points to reduce potential turn movements. A maximum of 20,000 square feet of gross leasable area shall be permitted within each enclave. Uses may include neighborhood convenience centers consistent with Policy 3.8., offices consistent with Policy 3.9.1. and sit-down restaurants. The land development regulations for this land use category shall specify performance standards required to mitigate any adverse impact of such development on adjacent land uses and affected public facilities. Such performance standards shall include buffering and landscaping provisions, site design measures to locate such uses away from less intensive adjacent land uses, signage and parking restrictions, and intensity provisions (e.g. height and bulk restrictions). In the interim, until land development regulations consistent with these policies are adopted, the standards and criteria governing Commercial Enclaves shall be implemented through the County's Development Review Committee process. This policy shall be reviewed by 1993 to determine the effectiveness of the land use category. Mr. Brice was informed, after contacting the Alachua County Growth Management Department, that his development of Lot 111 was limited by the commercial enclave policy. Pursuant to the commercial enclave policy, development of Lot 111 is limited to a size of 20,000 square feet and the uses to which Lot 111 may be put are less than would be allowed under BR zoning. Carla Brice's Reliance and Detriment. The evidence in this case failed to prove that Ms. Brice, the current owner of Lot 111 and the applicant in this case, was aware of any representations made by Mr. Miller. More importantly, the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Brice in any way reasonably relied upon the representations made to her father. The evidence also failed to prove that Alachua County made any representations to Ms. Brice that she would be allowed to develop Lot 111 as a shopping center. In fact, Alachua County has indicated just the opposite to Ms. Brice since she became the owner of Lot 111. In light of the amount of time that passed after Mr. Miller's representations were made to Mr. Brice and the intervening events concerning development in Alachua County before Ms. Brice acquired Lot 111, any reliance by Ms. Brice on Mr. Miller's representations would not be reasonable. Finally, the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Brice detrimentally relied upon any representation of Alachua County concerning the development of Lot 111. Only Mr. Brice, Ms. Brice's father, made expenditures related to the development of Lot 111 as a shopping center. I. Procedural Requirements. On June 9, 1993 Ms. Brice filed her Application seeking an equitable vested rights certificate or a statutory vested rights certificate. On September 22, 1993 Kurt Larsen, Director, Department of Growth Management, Alachua County, informed Ms. Brice that the Application was denied. Ms. Brice appealed the decision to deny the Application by letter dated September 28, 1993. The Division of Administrative Hearings was requested by letter dated January 18, 1994, from Alachua County to assign a hearing officer to conduct a formal administrative hearing. The formal administrative hearing of this matter was conducted on March 14, 1994.
