The Issue Whether the second and third sentences of Rule 59C-1.033(7)(c), Florida Administrative Code, are invalid? If so, whether they may be severed from the remainder of the Rule?
Findings Of Fact Subparagraph (7)(c) of the Rule states: Regardless of whether need for a new adult open heart surgery program is shown in paragraph (b) above, a new adult open heart surgery program will not normally be approved for a district if the approval would reduce the 12 month total at an existing adult open heart surgery program in the district below 350 open heart surgery operations. In determining whether this condition applies, the Agency will calculate (Uc x Px)(OP + 1). If the result is less than 350, no additional open heart surgery program shall normally be approved. (Emphasis supplied to indicate the challenged portion of the Rule.) The first sentence sets forth the objective and intent of subparagraph (7)(c) of the Rule: unless there are "not normal circumstances," a new open heart surgery program will not be approved in a district if the approval would reduce the volume below 350 procedures annually at any existing OHS provider in the district. This is the intent and objective of the sentence despite the use of the word "an" to modify the term "existing adult open heart surgery program in the district" used toward the end of the sentence. As was testified by the Agency representative: [T]he entire notion of the rule, the entire intent of the rule is that existing providers maintain the 350 level. I mean, [there's] no question about that, so that has to be considered. (Tr. 3287). Indeed, intent that it is desirable for individual existing OHS providers to perform 350 procedures in 12-month periods is expressed elsewhere in the Rule. And that goal is so desirable, in fact, that new programs in a district are not under normal circumstances to be approved if the 350 level has not been met recently by an existing provider in the district: (7) Adult Open Heart Surgery Program Need Determination. (a) A new adult open heart surgery program shall not normally be approved in the district if any of the following conditions exist: * * * One or more of the operational adult open heart surgery programs in the district that were operational for at least 12 months as of 3 months prior to the beginning date of the quarter of the publication of the fixed need pool performed less than 350 adult open heart surgery operations during the 12 months ending 3 months prior to the beginning date of the quarter of the publication of the fixed need pool; . . . Rule 59C-1.033, F.A.C., (e.s.). Given the clear intent of the Rule as a whole and of the first sentence of subparagraph (7)(c), the formula in the challenged portion of the Rule (the "formula"), should be used to measure and determine whether the approval of a new OHS program would reduce the annual volume of OHS procedures at any existing OHS provider below 350. Under the formula, adult open heart surgeries are projected for each service district. The resulting number is divided by the number of existing OHS programs plus one new OHS program. If calculation results in a number less than 350, the third sentence of the subparagraph purports to carry out the intent of the first sentence of subparagraph (7)(c), that is, "no additional open heart surgery program shall normally be approved." For example, assume 3000 OHS are projected for a service district with five existing programs. Under the formula, 3000 would be divided by six (the existing five plus the proposed program). The result is 500, and the operation of the subparagraph does not prohibit a new OHS program. If, on the other hand, a volume for the district of 3000 were projected and there were eight existing providers, the addition of a ninth program would bring the average below 350 and, by operation of the third sentence, prohibit the approval of a new program. The challenged portion of the Rule, however, does not necessarily implement the objective of the first sentence of subparagraph (7)(c). The calculations in the challenged portion do not determine whether the volume at any specific provider would fall below 350 as the result of a new program. Instead, the calculations measure only the "average" volumes at existing programs plus one new one. A program operating slightly above 350 (such as CRMC), with the addition of a new program (such as the one proposed by Venice) in close enough proximity that their primary service areas significantly overlap, could drop below 350, even though the number of OHS procedures in the district is calculated district-wide to increase and even though the average calculated by the formula exceeds 350. Such a result increases in likelihood when one of the providers in the district (such as Memorial) is projected to have volume significantly above 350. Illustrations of the ineffectiveness of the challenged portion for achieving the clear objective set forth in the first sentence of subpararaph (7)(c) are in CRMC Exhibit no. 58. For example, in 1997, existing OHS providers in District 8 had an average volume of 716. That year CRMC performed only 369 OHS procedures. Had Venice commenced an OHS program in 1997, adverse impact analysis and service area overlap as used by Mr. Baehr in this proceeding show that CRMC would have dropped below 350 procedures in 1997, while the district average would have remained well above 350 despite the addition of a new program.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's name and address are North Broward Hospital District d/b/a North Broward Medical Center, 201 E Sample Road, Pompano Beach, Florida 33604. The North Broward Hospital District is a Special Taxing District created by the Florida Legislature. It currently owns and operates three public, nonprofit hospitals in Broward County including Broward General Medical Center ("BGMC") and North Broward Medical Center Respondent, Department of Heath and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS"), is responsible for the administration of Section 381.493 through 381.499, Fla. Stat. ("the CON statute"), and Fla. Administrative Code Ch. 10-5 ("the CON rules"). Under the foregoing, authorities, HRS reviews applications for CONs to construct, purchase or otherwise implement certain new health care facilities and new institutional health care services, as defined by the CON statute. One of these new institutional health care services subject to HRS' review under the CON statute and CON rules is open-heart surgery service, as defined in Fla. Admin. Code Rule 10-5.11(16)(a). By formal application under the CON statute and CON rules which was deemed complete by HRS effective October 16, 1985, NBMC applied for a certificate of need ("CON") to institute an open-heart surgery service at 201 E. Sample Road, Pompano Beach, Florida 33604. Exhibit "A" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of NBMC's application for certificate of need for open-heart surgery. NBMC's application was denied by HRS by letter dated February 28, 1986, received by NBMC open March 10, 1986. Exhibit "B" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of said letter. Publication of the denial appears at Vol. 12; No. 11, Florida Administrative Weekly (March 14, 1986). HRS' basis for denying the application is contained in the "State Agency Action Report". Exhibit "C" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of HRS' State Agency Action Report pertaining to NBMC's application. NBMC has petitioned HRS for formal Section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., administrative proceedings challenging the denial of its application for open- heart surgery. Exhibit "D" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of that petition. In its application, NBMC stated that one of its sister hospitals, BGMC, currently provided open-heart surgical services. NBMC proposed in its application to utilize the same open-heart surgical team at NBMC as was then practicing at BGMC. Applicants for CONs for open-heart surgery services must satisfy certain regulatory standards prescribed in CON Rule 10-5.11(16). These standards include: (k)1. There shall be no additional open- heart surgery programs established unless: The service volume of each existing and approved open-heart surgery program within the service area is operating at and is and expected to continue to operate at a minimum of 350 adult open-heart surgery cases per year or 130 pediatric heart cases per year; and The conditions specified in (e)4., above will be met by the proposed program. (E.S.) Rule 10-5.11(16)(e)4. provides in pertinent part as follows: There shall be a minimum of 200 adult open- heart procedures performed annually, within three years after initiation of service, an any institution in which open-heart surgery is performed for adults. (E.S.) Exhibit "E" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of CON Rule 10-5.11(16). 10. In 43 Fed. Reg. 13040, 13048 (March 28, 1978) (42 C.F.R. 121.207), the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") set forth the federal CON standards for open-heart surgery, as part of the National Guidelines for Health Planning. The National Guidelines for Health Planning are referenced in HRS's State Agency Action Report. Exhibit "F" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of that portion of the Nation Guidelines for Health Planning which pertain to the implementation of open-heart surgery services. The National Guidelines for Health Planning also provide that approval of new open-heart surgery services should be contingent upon existing units operating and continuing to operate at a level of at least 350 procedures per year. The National Guidelines for Health Planning further provide as follows: In some areas, open-heart surgical teams, including surgeons and specialized technologists, are utilizing more than one institution. For these institutions, the guidelines may be applied to the combined number of open-heart procedures performed by the surgical team where an adjustment is justifiable in line with Section 121.6(B) and promotes more cost effective use of available facilities and support personnel. In such cases, in order to maintain quality care a minimum of 75 open-heart procedures in any institution is advisable, which is consistent with recommendations of the American College of Surgeons. (E.S.) HRS' CON Rule 10-5.11(16); which contains the "350" standard, does not contain any comparable exception for institutions sharing open-heart surgical teams. NBMC's application for CON projects 200 open-heart surgeries by the end of the third year of operations and, when combined with BGMC's open-heart procedures satisfies the exception contained in the National Guidelines for Health Planning, as described above. There are no disputed issues of material fact that will require an evidentiary hearing in this matter. The parties therefore agree that the matter shall be submitted pursuant to legal memoranda and oral argument. The parties' legal memoranda will be due on June 17, 1986, and oral argument will be held on the scheduled hearing date of June 19, 1986. The parties agree to allow responses to the legal memoranda, which responses shall be submitted no later than June 26; 1986.
Findings Of Fact Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Northside Hospital ("Northside") and NME Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Palms of Pasadena Hospital ("Palms") were litigants in administrative proceedings concerning the Agency For Health Care Administration's ("AHCA's") preliminary action on certificate of need applications. Northside moved to dismiss Palms' application based on defects in the corporate resolution. The resolution is as follows: RESOLVED, that the Corporation be and hereby is authorized to file a Letter of Intent and Certificate of Need Application for an adult open heart surgery program and the designation of three medical/surgical beds as a Coronary Intensive Care Unit as more specifically described by the proposed Letter of Intent attached hereto. RESOLVED, that the Corporation is hereby authorized to incur the expenditures necessary to accomplish the aforesaid proposed project. RESOLVED, that if the aforedescribed Certificate of Need is issued to the Corporation by the Agency for Health Care Administration, the Corporation shall accomplish the proposed project within the time allowed by law, and at or below the costs contained in the aforesaid Certificate of Need Application. RESOLVED, that the Corporation certifies that it shall appropriately license and immediately there- after operate the open heart surgery program. In its Motion, Northside claimed that the third and fourth clauses in the Resolution are defective, the third clause because it does not "certify" that the time and cost conditions will be met and the fourth for omitting "adult" to describe the proposed open heart surgery program. Northside relies on the language of the statute requiring that a resolution shall contain statements . . .authorizing the filing of the application described in the letter of intent; authorizing the applicant to incur the expenditures necessary to accomplish the proposed project; certifying that if issued a certificate, the applicant shall accomplish the proposed project within the time allowed by law and at or below the costs contained in the application; and certifying that the applicant shall license and operate the facility. Subsection 408.039(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Northside also relies on Rule 59C-1.008(1)(d), which is as follows: The resolution shall contain, verbatim, the requirements specified in paragraph 408.039 (2)(c), F.S., . . . Palms' filed the Motion For Sanctions against Northside on November 15, 1993, pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1)(b)5 for filing a frivolous motion for an improper purpose, needlessly increasing the cost of the litigation, with no legal basis. Northside's claims that the Resolution was defective were rejected in the Recommended Order of Dismissal of January 11, 1994, amended and corrected on January 26, 1994, and not discussed in AHCA's Final Order of March 15, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The decedent, James C. Daniels, was employed as a fire fighter with the Village of Miami Shores, Florida, in April of 1972. The Miami Shores Fire Department was subsequently assimilated by Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, and at the time of the decedent's death on July 20, 1976, he was employed by Dade County as a fire fighter/emergency medical technician. On November 4, 1975, the decedent received a physical examination which showed no evidence of heart disease, and an electrocardiogram, the results of which were within "normal" limits. The decedent had no history of heart disease or circulatory problems, did not drink, and began smoking only in 1974 or 975. At the time of his death, the decedent's customary work routine involved 24 hours on duty, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m., followed by 48 hours off duty. The decedent's duties included answering emergency calls along with his partner in a rescue vehicle. These calls included such incidences as automobile accidents, fires, violent crimes involving injuries to persons, and various and sundry other emergency situations. Upon answering an emergency call, the decedent was required by his job to carry heavy equipment, sometimes weighing as much as 80 pounds, to the place where the injured person was located. On occasion, the decedent would transport injured persons from the scene to local hospitals. At the time of his death, the decedent appeared outwardly to be in good physical condition. In fact, he engaged in a regular program of physical exercise. During the approximately two months prior to his death, the decedent participated in a busy work schedule which often included numerous rescues, in addition to false alarms and other drills required of his unit. In fact, only four days prior to his death, the decedent and his partner during one twenty- four hour shift, were involved in 13 rescues and one building fire. During that day, the decedent worked for 24 straight hours, apparently without sleep. On July 19, 1976, at 7:00 a.m., the decedent began his last work shift prior to his death. During that day, the decedent's unit participated in two rescues and two drills. That evening, several of decedent's fellow workers noticed that he looked "bad", "tired" or "drawn out". During the night, decedent was observed getting out of bed from three to five times, and holding his left arm, left side or armpit. At 7:00 a.m. on July 20, 1976, the decedent went off duty and returned home. Upon returning home, he ate breakfast, and later washed down a new brick fireplace at his home. After showering, resting and eating a lunch, he joined several other men near his home whom he had agreed to help in pouring cement for some new construction. The decedent mentioned pains in his neck and shoulder to these men before the truck carrying the cement arrived. The decedent mentioned that he had been under a lot of tension and pressure as a result of the busy work schedule at the fire station. When the cement truck arrived, cement was poured into several wheelbarrows and several of the men, including the decedent, pushed the wheelbarrows to the rear of the structure on which they were working. It appears that the decedent pushed approximately four wheelbarrow loads of cement weighing about 75 pounds each to the rear of the structure. Approximately one-half hour elapsed during the time that the decedent was engaged in this activity. Soon thereafter, the decedent was observed to collapse and fall to the ground. He was given emergency medical treatment and transported to Palmetto General Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 5:24 p.m. on July 20, 1976. An autopsy was performed on the deceased on July 21, 1976 by Dr. Peter L. Lardizabal, the Assistant Medical Examiner for Dade County, Florida. In pertinent part, the autopsy showed moderate arteriosclerosis of the aorta, and severe occlusive arteriosclerosis of the proximal third of the anterior descending coronary artery in which the lumen, or opening, through which the blood passes through the artery was hardly discernible. The remaining coronary arteries appeared unaffected by the arteriosclerosis. The decedent's certificate of death, which was also signed by Dr. Lardizabal, listed the immediate cause of death as acute myocardial infarction due to severe occlusive arteriosclerosis of the left coronary artery. Dr. Lardizabal performed the autopsy examination of the decedent by "gross" observation, that is, without the benefit of microscopic analysis. However, microscopic slides were made during the course of the autopsy which were subsequently examined by other physicians whose testimony is contained in the record of this proceeding. Findings contained in the autopsy report, together with an evaluation of the aforementioned microscopic slides, establish that the myocardial infarction suffered by the decedent occurred at least 24 hours, and possible as many as 48 hours, prior to the decedent's death. This conclusion is based upon the existence of heart muscle necrosis, or tissue death, which would not have been discernible had the decedent died immediately following a coronary occlusion. In fact, for a myocardial infarction to he "grossly" observable at autopsy, that is, without the benefit of microscopic examination, it appears from the record that such an infarction would have to occur a substantial period of time prior to the death of the remainder of the body. Otherwise, the actual necrosis of heart muscle tissue would not be susceptible to observation with the naked eye. Although it appears probable from the evidence that the decedent went into a type of cardiac arrhythmia called ventricular fibrillation which led to his death, the actual proximate cause of his death was the underlying myocardial infarction, which in turn was a result of arteriosclerosis which had virtually shut off the supply of blood to the affected area of his heart. Although the causes of arteriosclerosis are not presently known to A medical science, it appears clear from the record that acute myocardial infarctions can be caused by emotional or physical stress, and that the decedent's myocardial infarction was, in fact, caused by the stress and strain of his job as a fire fighter and emergency medical technician. In fact, it appears from the medical testimony in this proceeding that the decedent was having a heart attack which led to the myocardial infarction on the night of July 19, 1976, or in the early morning hours of July 20, 1976, while he was still on duty. It further appears that, although physical exertion, such as the pushing of the wheelbarrow loads of cement by the decedent, might act as a "triggering mechanism" for ventricular fibrillation, the decedent's activities on the afternoon of July 20, 1976, had very little to do with his death. The type of lesion present in the decedent's heart, which had occurred as much as 48 hours prior to his death, was of such magnitude that he would likely have died regardless of the type of physical activity in which he engaged on July 20, 1976. Petitioner, Dolores A. Daniels, is the surviving spouse of James C. Daniels.
The Issue Petitioner, St. Mary's, and Intervenor, BRCH contend that Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority for the reasons more specifically set forth in St. Mary's Amended Petition for Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of a Rule. Respondent, HRS, and Intervenors, JFK, PBGMC, and Florida Hospital, contend that Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE Petitioner, St. Mary's, presented the oral testimony of Philip Rond, W. Eugene Nelson-Michael L. Schwartz, and James McElreath. Petitioner submitted 9 exhibits at formal hearing, 8 of which were admitted in evidence. Pursuant to a stipulation among the parties, St. Mary's subsequently had admitted an after- filed deposition of Frank R. Sloan. Intervenor BRCH had admitted in evidence 1 exhibit but called no witnesses. Respondent HRS presented the oral testimony of Elfie Stamm and Reid Jaffe. Respondent HRS had 4 exhibits admitted in evidence. At formal hearing, Intervenors JFK and PBGMC presented the oral testimony of Mark Richardson which was also adopted by HRS as its own. Pursuant to a stipulation among the parties, JFK and PBGMC subsequently had admitted an after- filed deposition of Harold B. Luft which was also adopted by HRS. Official recognition of JFK's Petition in DOAH Case No. 86-4368 was granted. PBGMC had 1 exhibit admitted in evidence at formal hearing. Intervenor Florida Hospital, submitted no exhibits and adopted the testimony of HRS' witnesses. The Hearing Officer received two documents into evidence as Hearing Officer Exhibits, the Prehearing Stipulation between the parties in this proceeding and a copy of Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code. Official recognition was taken of the Final Order dated July 27, 1987, in St. Francis Careunit v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., DOAH Case No. 84-2918. Subsequent to the filing of the transcript herein, and pursuant to time waivers and stipulations among the parties, St. Mary's and BRCH filed their joint proposed final order; JFK and PBGMC filed their joint proposed final order; and HRS and Florida Hospital filed individual respective proposed final orders. The parties' respective proposed findings of fact are ruled upon in the Appendix to this Final Order, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Additionally HRS' Motion to Strike Portions of the Joint Proposed Findings of Fact of St. Mary's and Intervenor BRCH, and JFK's Motion to Strike are ruled upon within this Final Order and its Appendix.
Findings Of Fact St. Mary's is an existing general acute care hospital in HRS Service District 9, West Palm Beach, Florida. St. Mary's has pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings DOAH Case No. 86-4368 concerning its certificate of need (CON) application for an open heart surgery program at St. Mary's which was preliminarily denied by HRS (CON Action No. 4551). Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, was utilized by HRS in evaluating St. Mary's CON application and was relied upon by HRS in its decision to deny CON Action No. 4551. Pursuant to that HRS review, there is no numerical need for the St. Mary's proposed program, based upon HRS' application of the quantitative need methodology contained in the Rule. St. Mary's is substantially affected by Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, and consequently has standing to seek administrative determination of the validity of said rule through this present cause. BRCH is an existing general acute care hospital in HRS Service District 9, Boca Raton Florida. BRCH has pending before HRS a CON application for an open heart surgery program at BRCH (CON Application No. 5194) which is currently being reviewed by HRS in accordance with Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code. BRCH is substantially affected by Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, and consequently has standing to seek administrative determination of the validity of said rule through this present cause. JFK is an existing general acute care hospital in HRS Service District 9, Lake Worth, Florida, which has in place its open heart surgery program. JFK's open heart surgery program opened and closed in 1986. On the date of formal hearing, JFK had scheduled to reopen its open heart surgery program in August, 1987. The program is subject to regulation pursuant to Sections 381.493-499, Florida Statutes, (1985), and regulations promulgated thereunder, including Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code. JFK is an Intervenor in opposition to St. Mary's application in DOAH Case No. 86-4368 alleging that due to the service area and medical staff overlaps between St. Mary's and JFK, there will be adverse staffing, economic, availability, and quality impacts upon JFK. PBGMC is an existing general acute care hospital in HRS Service District 9, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, which has in place an open heart surgery program. Its program is likewise subject to regulation pursuant to Sections 381.493-499, Florida Statutes (1985), and regulations promulgated thereunder, including Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code. PBGMC is an Intervenor in opposition to St. Mary's application in DOAH Case No. 86- 4368 alleging that due to the service area and medical staff overlaps between St. Mary's and PBGMC, there will be adverse staffing, economic, availability and quality impacts upon PBGMC. Florida Hospital is an existing general acute care hospital in Service District 7, Orlando Florida, which has in place an open heart surgery program. It is subject to regulation pursuant to Sections 381.493-499, Florida Statutes (1985), and regulations promulgated thereunder, including Section 10- 5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code. It may be inferred that a determination of invalidity of the Rule wall impact upon Florida Hospital if, as a result thereof CONs are granted for other open heart surgery programs in that District, but there is no direct evidence to that effect. No direct threat of revocation of Florida Hospital's existing CON or of economic or other impact of this rule challenge upon Florida Hospital was demonstrated by Florida Hospital at formal hearing. Respondent, HRS, is responsible for the administration of Sections 381.493-499, Florida Statutes, (the CON statute) and Chapter 10-5, Florida Administrative Code, (the CON rules). The initial development of the Rule was undertaken in 1982 and 1983 in a manner consistent with HRS internal policy. HRS reviewed the relevant literature relating to open heart surgery programs and services. Included among the literature reviewed were the National Guidelines for Health Planning (National Guidelines or Guidelines) and the standards for review of applications for certificates of need (CON) for open heart surgery services proposed by several Health Systems Agencies. At the time those standards were developed, the Health Systems Agencies were responsible for the first level of review in the state certificate of need process. Originally, the companion to the open-heart surgery rule, was Rule 10- 5.011(15), now codified as Rule 10-5.011(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code, which rule sets forth criteria for cardiac catheterization lab CON applications. Considerably more emphasis was accorded the development of the companion rule initially, but even expert witnesses for Petitioner's view acknowledge that the rule promulgation process relative to the adoption of the open heart surgery rule was thorough, rational, and essentially non-remarkable in the scope of promulgation of numerous CON rules drafted and implemented for the first time during a period in which HRS was also developing other rules dealing with a broad range of services and facilities to comply with new legislation eliminating Health Systems Agencies and requiring HRS to adopt uniform methodologies to be used in the CON program. Subsequent to its review of the literature, HRS formed a work group to assist in the development of the Rule. HRS prepared a draft of the proposed Ruled which was sent to over fifty experts in the field of cardiology. HRS received extensive comments on the draft rule. The final proposed Rule was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. A public hearing on the proposed Rule was held in December, 1982, during which extensive public comment was received. The public comments were reviewed by and discussed among the HRS' health planning staff and administration. Upon consideration of all the input received, the final draft of the initial rule abandoned a proposal to rely on 1979 utilization data and substituted 1981 data. Additionally, provision was made to allow for consideration within the Rule's need formula of approved, but not yet operational, open heart surgery programs. The Rule was then filed for adoption and went into effect February 14, 1983. Because it was deemed prudent, and because the National Guidelines provided for it, HRS intended, at the time the initial open heart surgery rule was promulgated, to revisit the components of the Rule every 2-3 years. The Rule was next amended in 1986. At that time, in response to public comment, "Uc" of Subparagraph 8 of the Rule, which prescribes the base period to be used in the calculation of a service area use rate, was substantially revised. In its initial form, element "Uc" was based on the 1981 service area actual use rate. As amended, "Uc" measures the actual use rate in the service area for a 12 month period beginning 14 months prior to the letter of intent deadline for the batching cycle at issue, or the most recent use rate available to HRS. There have been no other substantial amendments which impinge upon the instant Rule challenge. Among other allegations, Petitioner asserts that because the Rule is silent as to which or however many exceptional circumstances would have to exist in order to justify approval of a CON application for an open heart surgery program in the absence of numerical needs the Rule is arbitrary and capricious. The evidence and applicable case law do not support such a premise. The Rule provides that HRS will consider applications in the context of applicable statutory and rule criteria. See 10-5.011(1)(f)2. The Rule further provides that HRS will "not normally" approve applications for new open heart surgery programs unless the conditions of subparagraphs 8 and 11 of the Rule are met. Also 10-5.011(1)(f)2. The very nature of "not normal" circumstances is that all possible "not normal" circumstances cannot be enumerated within a rule because in the attempt, some exceptionalities would inevitably be excluded. Of the four applications proposing new open heart surgery programs which have been approved in the recent past, three were approved under "not normal" circumstances, that is, where one or both provisions of Subparagraphs 8 and 11 were not met. The applicable state agency action reports (SAARS) which reflect HRS' preliminary position on CON applications, demonstrate that HRS routinely considers all relevant statutory and regulatory criteria in its review of open heart surgery program CON applications. There is no competent substantial evidence to show that HRS' evaluation of applications proposing new open heart surgery programs are prohibited by the Rule from entailing a balanced consideration of the statutory and regulatory criteria relevant to CON review. As a corollary of the foregoing allegation, it is alleged that because the Rule does not specifically address what has come to be known in CON practice as "the in-migration/out-migration" phenomenon, while at least one other CON rule does specifically address this phenomenon, a balanced consideration of all statutory criteria is frustrated, thereby resulting in understating the need for open heart surgery programs in one District/service area while enabling unnecessary, costly duplication of programs within other Districts/service areas. The use rate (discussed infra) purports to capture that in- and out- migration which can be standardized within the 12 month base period. At hearing, it was tenuously demonstrated that an unmeasured in-/out-migration phenomenon may exist within 2 out of 11 HRS Districts, but the degree to which it exists, if at all, is purely speculative. Even if these two Districts clearly possessed extraordinary timeframe, geographical, or transportation uniqueness, these access abnormalities would not justify declaring the Rule invalid. Rather, in the event the use rate for some reason does not measure them, these exceptionalities would be just the sort of "not normal" aberration for which it would be appropriate to resort to balancing of all statutory and rule criteria. Petitioner also contends that because this Rule does not define "service area" as the respective HRS Service District, it leaves each applicant free to designate, virtually at will, its own service area. Apparently, the initial Rule drafters intended that the service area be defined in the open heart surgery Rule as the HRS Service District. In finalizing Section (1)(e)(its companion cardiac catheterization lab rate rule), this definition was indeed included. However, in the open heart surgery rule, it was omitted. No witness recommended or even seriously considered that any service area less than the relevant HRS District should be designated, and the evidence is unrefuted and substantial that District lines have always been uniformly applied by HRS in interpreting the open heart surgery Rule. This interpretation is consistent with the agency's application of similarly silent rules. Petitioner alleges that because there is no Rule requirement or uniform manner for hospitals to report their open heart surgery utilization data to Local Health Councils or to HRS, the Rule is arbitrary and capricious. Authorized HRS representatives and others testified that data for the most current 12-month period, with a 2 month lag time are the most appropriate data to use. Testimony by St. Mary's experts that the data necessary to derive the rule methodology is not available, was directly refuted by evidence from authorized HRS representatives and others that HRS is able to collect all necessary data even though some councils report at different intervals from each other, and even though some hospitals report in "cases," others in "procedures" and one in "minutes." Because of these procedures of reporting, it may be necessary to make certain mathematical conversions or interpretations in preparing an agency SAAR or in presenting evidentiary proof in a Section 120.57 hearing, but even if one accepts that it is difficult to collect and interpret the necessary data, that concept does not support the conclusion that the Rule itself is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise fatally flawed. Subparagraph 8 of the Rule defines Year X as the year in which the proposed open heart surgery program would initiate service but no more than two years into the future. St. Mary's contentions with regard to this provision are that the triggerpoint cannot be determined and that by allowing applicants in the same batching cycle to elect varying dates of initiating service, similarly batched applicants may select different horizons within the two year outside limit and therefore those two applicants could not be comparatively reviewed. It was shown that in the last batching cycle all applications were reviewed from the same trigger date and that HRS' implementation of the CON rules is guided by legal precedent. HRS' shifting of trigger dates in past batches is accounted for by shifting legal precedents. Therefore, assuming applicants in the same batch may unilaterally select different planning horizons within the traditional two year range permissible under the Rule, that is not sufficient to invalidate the Rule as arbitrary and capricious. The Rule establishes a need formula. Entitlement of applicants to "comparative review" is set forth in other statutory, ruled and case law authority. Applicants in the same batching cycle who elect significantly different horizon dates under the Rule probably ought not to be comparatively reviewed, but that problem is to be addressed within the context of "all statutory and rule criteria" both at the agency level in the case of initial review, and, when necessary, in the case of litigation before the Division of Administrative Hearings, by appropriate motion. The remainder of Petitioner's challenge addresses, in one form or another, the Rule's numerical need formula. The Rule establishes three thresholds which apply to utilization of open heart surgery programs. Subsection 3.d. requires that each program shall be able to provide 500 open heart operations per year." Each program is required to provide a minimum of 200 adult open heart procedures annually within 3 years of the initiation of service, with no additional programs to be approved in a service area until each existing program is operating at a minimum of 350 adult open heart cases. Subparagraphs 8 and 11 are the cornerstones of the numerical need formula provided in the Rule. Specifically, Subparagraph 11 of the Rule provides: There shall be no additional open heart surgery programs established unless; The service volume of each existing and approved open heart surgery program within the service area is operating at and is expected to continue to operate at a minimum of 350 adult open heart surgery cases per year or 130 pediatric heart cases per year; and, The conditions specified in Sub- subparagraph 5.d., above, will be met by the proposed program. b. No additional open heart surgery programs shall be approved which would reduce the volume of existing open heart surgery facilities below 350 open heart procedures annually for adults and 130 pediatric heart procedures annually, 75 of which are open heart. The standard found at Subparagraph 11 of the Ruled which provides that there should be no additional open heart surgery units initiated in a service area unless each existing and approved unit is operating at and is expected to continue to operate at 350 adult open heart surgery cases per year or 130 pediatric open heart cases per year, is based upon a substantially similar standard enunciated in the National Guidelines published in 1978 and in effect at the time the Rule was initially promulgated. The National Guidelines were developed by the Federal Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) pursuant to an extensive process of public consultation, including receipt of recommendations and comments for Health Systems Agencies (HSAs), State Health Planning and Development Agencies (SHPDAs) Statewide Health Coordinating Councils, associations representing various health care providers, and the National Council on Health Planning and Development. The federal process of promulgation encompassed over two years of consultation, public notices, public meetings, and related activities. There were strong incentives to SHPDAs to develop local standards consistent with the National Guidelines and the National Guidelines contain a provision which permitted HSAs and SHPDAs pursuant to detailed local analyses, to deviate from the standards contained in the National Guidelines. The Florida Rule deviates from the National Guidelines in that it does not require facilities which offer cardiac catheterization services to also offer open heart surgery service. Florida's rationale supporting the 350 standard in its Rule is that of the National Guidelines which assumes that each facility can provide an average of seven operations a weeks a schedule HEW judged to be feasible in most institutions which provide open heart surgery services. As a matter of health planning policy, HEW established the 350 standard in an effort to prevent duplication of costly services which are not fully utilized, both as to facility resources and manpower. This goal is reiterated in the 1985 Florida State Health Plan. Reasonableness of the 350 case requirement is supported by testimony regarding the purposes behind the hours of operation standards portion of the Rule. See 10-5.011(1)(f)4.b. That subparagraph mandates that open heart surgery programs be available for procedures 8 hours per days 5 days per weeks for a total of 40 available hours of surgery per week, and capable of rapid mobilization of the surgical and medical support team for emergencies 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. Since it is estimated that each open heart procedure requires an average of 4 hours of operating room time, including cleanup, and operations go forward 50 weeks per year, then each program can, over time, attain the goal of 500 annual open heart operations which is set in Subsection 3.b. Considering both elective and unscheduled services, HRS arrived at a 75 percent of maximum as a reasonable utilization figure, and Petitioner has in no way refuted the reasonableness of these hours of operation requirements or of HRS' 75 percent figure for reasonable utilization. The 350 threshold figure is primarily intended to ensure an appropriate utilization level of every open heart surgery unit. In fact, the minimum quality standard is set forth in Subparagraph 5 of the Rule as "200" and is supported in reason and logic upon the facts set forth, infra. The 350 figure here is intended to result in greater efficiency which results in economic benefits to the hospital which may ultimately be passed on to patients. I accept Dr. Luft's expert opinion and analysis that the economic benefits of a 350 threshold are derived primarily from clinical economies of scale which result from improved proficiencies in the provision of service rather than solely in the classic economy of scale of a greater division of fixed costs. One clinical economy of scale demonstrated by Dr. Luft is that shorter average lengths of hospital stay result from high volume facilities. The shorter lengths of stay translate into patient or third party payor dollars saved. Admittedly, the 350 standard also secondarily encompasses consideration of the relationship of the volume of open heart surgery services and patient mortality, thus peripherally impinging on the volume of a 200 minimum threshold for quality of care purposes. Except for one study by Dr. Sloan, the evidence consistently supports existence of a negative relationship between volume and outcome, e.g., facilities performing higher volumes of open heart surgery have lower mortality rates. Obvious empirical problems inherent in Dr. Sloan's study impair its credibility. In light of his deposition testimony concerning how his several studies were conducted and how empirical data was converted by him for use in those studies, and due to his superior education, training, and experience, I find more credible Dr. Luft's determination that hospitals which perform low volumes of open heart surgery, particularly with respect to coronary artery bypass graft surgery, have substantially higher mortality rates than hospitals performing higher volumes of such surgery. Moreover, those areas of analysis in which the opinions of these two health care economic experts, Dr. Luft and Dr. Sloan, are consistent with one another and with the other literature and experts in the field whom they each cite as accepted and relied upon by them, strongly suggest that Dr. Sloan's unusual conclusion that low volume hospitals more often fit his unique categorization of "low mortality" should not be relied upon for purposes of formulating, drafting, and promulgating standard rules. The 350 standard does not appear to have impeded either competition or quality of care. There is also no competent substantial evidence to establish that there are too few open heart surgery programs in Florida at this time. At present, no District/Service Area has fewer than two open heart surgery programs, and 8 of the 11 Districts have 3 or more programs. Although many individual programs fall below the 350 thresholds on average, open heart surgery programs in operation in Florida perform close to 350 cases per year apiece. Between 1985 and 1986 the percentage of Florida programs performing 350 or more cases annually climbed from 24 percent to 35 percent. Petitioner never directly attacked the 200 procedure standard for quality, however, some evidence was presented to show that a lesser figure could still uphold quality considerations. This evidence was neither substantial nor credible. In lieu of the 350 utilization threshold, a variety of possible optimal threshold numbers were suggested by Petitioner's expert witnesses, among them 130 (the same utilization figure as for pediatric cases), 150, and 200 (the same figure as presently used to insure adult quality of care). Even if the highest of these suggested figures were selected as a utilization standard, that is, 200 cases per year substituted for the 350 utilization standards a minimum additional 31 open heart surgery programs would be "needed" on a statewide basis. This would nearly double the current number. Assuming there would emerge therefrom a normal distribution of programs around the substituted 200 standard, there could be the result that half the State's programs would then be operating below 200 and half above 200, so that half the programs would operate below the 200 quality of care standard now in effect. Even assuming arguendo that Petitioner's expert, Mr. Schwartz, is correct that 72 percent of current programs meet or exceed the 200 procedure levels and that that 72 percent would remain constant, more than one quarter of the state's programs would be below the 200 quality of care level. This is clearly not a desirable health planning goal. Such a proliferation of straight numbers of programs would doubtless impact adversely on all existing approved providers' utilization, concomitantly forcing up individual consumer costs. The testimony is more credible that the improvement curve "flattens out" anywhere from 333 to 350, but even if one were to accept St. Mary's witnesses position that the improvement curve "bottoms out" (that is, utilization and quality optimums meet) at 200 open heart surgeries, there is evidence that there is still some minimal improvement in outcome (quality) in operations performed in hospitals exceeding the 200 figure. The 350 standard reduces the number of institutions over which a given number of procedures is spread and in general will result in higher volume per hospital, reducing the likelihood that outcomes would be worse than they might be otherwise. To the extent that witnesses support the position that the 350 figure is not reasonably or rationally related to the CON statutes, is arbitrary, or is unduly restrictive of the initiation of new open heart surgery programs, their testimony is unpersuasive in light of the foregoing determinations with regard to the hours of operation standards, the National Guidelines, and the statutory goal to avoid proliferation of such programs at the expense of efficiency, economy, and quality. Subsection 8 of the Rule provides as follows: Need Determination. The need for open heart surgery programs in a service area shall be determined by computing the projected number of open heart surgical procedures in the service area. The following formula shall be used in this determination: Where: N = Number of open heart procedures projected for Year X; U = Actual use rate (number of procedures per hundred thousand population) in the service area for the 12 month period beginning 14 months prior to the Letter of Intent deadline for the batching cycle. P = Projected population in the service area in Year X; and, Year X = The year in which the proposed open heart surgery program would initiate service, but not more than two years into the future. Subparagraph 8 of the Rule provides a formula by which numerical need for open heart surgery programs within a service area may be calculated. The use rate therein is based upon the number of procedures per 100,000 population in the District/Service Area for the 12 month period beginning 14 months prior to the letter of intent deadline for the applicant. If a District does not have 12 months' experience, the statewide use rate is used. This use rate is based upon the most recent utilization data available to HRS. The data necessary to calculate the use rate is accessible and available to HRS as set out supra. The base period employed in the calculation of the use rate is appropriate for use in the numerical need methodology. It provides the most current picture of utilization of open heart surgery services within each District/Service Area which the agency has been able to devise. The Rule's base period essentially provides what health planners describe as a "realistic" or "rolling" use rate. Such a component permits consideration of facility number increases and volume fluctuations within facilities within the District/Service Area. Increased number of facilities and volume increases and decreases within specific facilities are quickly reflected by such a use rate and may be quickly considered in projecting need for the future. Such reality based use rates are customarily employed by health planners in projecting need for new open heart surgery services. The use rate minimally approaches the differences in population utilization of open heart surgery facilities occurring across age differential groupings. Although there is some evidence that the use rate formula contained in the Rule is not optimal in providing accessibility where there occasionally is clustering of "aged aged" population centers or clustering of heart surgery optimal age groups, the evidence in favor of such a rolling use rate establishes that as a statewide rule component, it is reasonable, not arbitrary, and not capricious. No witness offered a more reasonable substitute base period and the agency is not required to promulgate an optimal one, merely a reasonable one. St. Mary's and BRCH's witnesses suggestion that the Rule is ambiguous for a discernible number need methodology is not substantiated by credible competent evidence, and is generally rejected. Ms. Stamm, testifying for Respondent, had trouble with applying basic arithmetic under stress but not with the methodology. Mr. Schwartz, on behalf of the Rule's opponents, had some difficulty in determining whether the 200 or 350 standard was the appropriate figure for need determination. No other witness experienced Mr. Schwartz' confusion. When called to work Subparagraph 8 calculations, all witnesses were in agreement as to the mechanics of the Rule. No witness, including those who attacked the Rule as facially inconsistent due to the Rule's use of undefined terms of "programs," "procedures," and "cases" and/or those who complained about difficulty of obtaining raw data for the base time period had any difficulty in applying the Rule's numerical need formula, and indeed, Mr. Rond testified that HRS' interpretation of the numerical need formula was the most straightforward interpretation (TR-115) and the way he would logically do it. (TR-98-100) Each witness who was asked to use the Rule's formula in order to determine numerical need, consistently offered the following approach: First Derive Nx, as provided in Subparagraph 8. (Nx is the number of open heart procedures projected for year X). Second: Divide Nx by 350 (from Subparagraph 11) to obtain the gross projected need. Third, subtract from the gross projected needs the numbers of existing and approved programs within the applicable district so as to obtain the net need. The Rule's provision for subtraction of approved as well as for subtraction of operating programs from gross need so as to determine net need was investigated and adopted in the rational approach to rule promulgation. This is an accepted health planning component utilized in numerous CON rules. For these reasons and for all of the foregoing reasons related to the value of retaining 350 utilization and 200 quality thresholds, this provision for subtracting approved facilities from the gross need is found neither arbitrary nor capricious. The evidence presented by St. Mary's and BRCH is insufficient to demonstrate that HRS has not, subject to evolving legal precedent, consistently used the formula's interpretation set forth in Finding of Fact 33, at least as modulated by universally accepted common mathematical principles such as rounding results to the nearest whole number and considering "not normal" circumstances in light of all statutory and rule criteria on a case by case basis. In any case, if the agency misapplies its own Rule, applicants have recourse to a Section 120.57 proceeding and misapplication is not cause to invalidate the rule applied. I also reject as speculative and not credible St. Mary's allegation that a "sinister" conspiracy among existing and authorized providers within a given District may unnaturally reduce a single facility below the 350 threshold in order to thwart new program applications. Mr. Rond and Mr. Schwartz also promoted the premise that this result might occur unintentionally as well. HRS has not interpreted the Rule in such a peculiar manner and has approved new programs in districts where individual existing programs were not performing at the 350 level. I specifically reject as not credible the testimony of the St. Mary's and BRCH's witnesses professing concern that persons applying the Rule may be confused about how to work the formula and whether or not the pediatric population within a service area or the 130 pediatric procedures are to be subtracted at some point. Px is defined in the Rule to mean "the projected population in the service area in Year X." The Rule's language is plain and unambiguous. Nothing in the language of the Rule suggests the "projected population in the service area" is intended to exclude the pediatric population. Petitioner offered evidence that in certain instances HRS has applied Px to include the pediatric population. This, on its face, is an erroneous application of the Rule but without more, will not invalidate the Rule itself. Should HRS fail to implement the Rule according to the plain meaning of its languages an affected party may contest that agency action in a Section 120.57 hearing. In the case of former HRS employees concerned with drafting, promulgating amending and/or applying the Rule over a period of several years, their credibility is impaired by their never attempting to correct the alleged flaws and by their expressed perception of the necessity for a rule challenge as a strategic litigation move in anticipation of St. Mary's contested CON action.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, the surviving spouse of Ralph Timmerman, is entitled to receive "in line of duty" death benefits?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Ralph Timmerman, who died on January 23, 1998, at 48 years of age. Petitioner and Mr. Timmerman had been married since September 5, 1981. They had two daughters, who are now four and thirteen years of age. Mr. Timmerman was a member of the Florida Retirement System. At the time of his death, Mr. Timmerman was employed by Martin County as the Assistant Building Maintenance Superintendent. Mr. Timmerman had been Martin County's Building Maintenance Superintendent until December of 1990, when he suffered a heart attack and had five-vessel by-pass surgery. Following his return to work, he was reassigned to the position of Assistant Building Maintenance Superintendent. This was a new supervisory position that had been specifically created for him. By design, it was less demanding than the Building Maintenance Superintendent position he had formerly held. One of Mr. Timmerman's former subordinates, Harold Markey, was tapped to succeed Mr. Timmerman as the Building Maintenance Superintendent, a decision that Mr. Timmerman supported. As the Assistant Building Maintenance Superintendent, Mr. Timmerman worked under Mr. Markey's supervision. Mr. Markey made an effort to avoid assigning Mr. Timmerman any tasks that, given Mr. Timmerman's history of heart problems, might jeopardize Mr. Timmerman's health. Mr. Timmerman's primary duties were to directly supervise the building maintenance staff and to deal with contractors hired by Martin County to perform building maintenance and repair work. Mr. Markey did not ask Mr. Timmerman to attend or make presentations at Martin County Board of County Commissioners meetings because he knew that Mr. Timmerman would feel uncomfortable performing these duties. Neither did Mr. Markey require Mr. Timmerman to do any physically demanding work. In fact, whenever, he saw Mr. Timmerman engaged in such physical labor, he would intervene and instruct Mr. Timmerman to stop. Whenever Mr. Timmerman indicated during the course of the work day that he was tired or not feeling well, Mr. Markey allowed Mr. Timmerman to leave work and go home.7 Notwithstanding these accommodations made for him, Mr. Timmerman, on a number of occasions, complained to Mr. Markey about (what Mr. Timmerman perceived to be) Mr. Markey's lack of understanding and compassion as a supervisor. He expressed these views in a loud and argumentative manner.8 As a general rule, following these outbursts, Mr. Timmerman apologized to Mr. Markey for the manner in which he had acted. It was during such an outburst on January 23, 1998, at his work site and during his normal working hours, that Mr. Timmerman suffered cardiac arrest and subsequently died. The day before, Mr. Timmerman and members of his staff had attended a meeting with Mr. Markey. Among the subjects discussed at the meeting was the response of Mr. Timmerman and his staff to a water main break that had occurred at the Martin County-operated library in Hobe Sound on January 20, 1998. The discussion concerning this subject lasted approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Mr. Markey was not at work on January 20, 1998, and therefore it was Mr. Timmerman's responsibility to coordinate the efforts to repair the break and remedy any water damage that had occurred at the library. Mr. Timmerman was notified of the water main break by Teresa Van Cardo, a Martin County employee occupying the position of Administrator Coordinator II for General Services. After some time had passed, Ms. Van Cardo became concerned that Mr. Timmerman had not yet arrived at the library. She therefore telephoned Mr. Markey at home to express her concerns about Mr. Timmerman's delay in responding to the scene. (Huey Cummings, Martin County's lead plumber, however, was on the scene and assessing the situation.) After speaking with Ms. Van Cardo, Mr. Markey telephoned Mr. Timmerman and told him that "he needed to get to the site and he needed to make an assessment of it." Mr. Timmerman replied that Huey Cummings was already at the library. When Mr. Timmerman came home from work that day he told Petitioner about what had happened at the library and that he was "very pleased at the way the whole situation was handled" by his staff. At the January 22, 1998, staff meeting (which was a regularly scheduled meeting), Mr. Markey voiced his criticism of the manner in which the staff had responded to the water main break at the library two days before,9 and he indicated what improvements the staff needed to make in responding to similar incidents in the future. It should not be necessary, he told his subordinates at the meeting, for anyone to have to bother him at home for guidance in dealing with a situation such as the one that arose at the library. At least one of the employees at the meeting (Patti Smith) could sense (based upon her observations of Mr. Timmerman's body movements as Mr. Markey spoke) that Mr. Markey's comments upset Mr. Timmerman. Indeed, Mr. Timmerman was upset. He felt that Mr. Markey's criticism was unwarranted, and, after Mr. Markey had voiced his criticism, Mr. Timmerman told Mr. Markey and the others at the meeting that, in his opinion, "everybody responded exceptionally." That evening, when he arrived home from work, Mr. Timmerman was still upset about the negative comments that Mr. Markey had made at the staff meeting earlier that day. Mr. Timmerman shared with Petitioner what Mr. Markey had said at the meeting and expressed his disappointment that Mr. Markey had criticized, rather than praised, his subordinates. The following morning (January 23, 1998), Mr. Timmerman woke up at 5:30 a.m. He ate a small breakfast and, after spending time with his youngest daughter, left for work at 6:30 a.m. He appeared to be "very calm" when he left. Mr. Timmerman arrived at work at or about 7:00 a.m. At around 7:30 a.m., Mr. Markey, at the request of another employee, went to Mr. Timmerman's office (which was located in a different building than Mr. Markey's office) and requested that Mr. Timmerman not park his assigned Martin County- vehicle in the staff parking lot (which was reserved for personal vehicles). Mr. Timmerman reacted with displeasure to the request. He told Mr. Markey, "This is bull crap," or at least used words to that effect. Mr. Markey repeated his request and then left Mr. Timmerman's office. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Markey discovered that two expensive vacuum cleaners were missing from the storage area where they were supposed to be kept. A few months earlier, Mr. Markey had instructed Mr. Timmerman to put up a "sign-out" sheet outside the storage area for employees to sign whenever they removed an item from the storage area. After discovering that the vacuum cleaners were missing from the storage area, Mr. Markey looked for, but did not find, such a "sign-out" sheet. When he returned to the building where Mr. Timmerman's office was located, Mr. Markey confronted Mr. Timmerman and asked him where the vacuum cleaners were. Mr. Timmerman told Mr. Markey that it was not his (Mr. Timmerman's) day to watch the vacuum cleaners and that he did not know where they were. Mr. Markey then said to Mr. Timmerman, "We need to get them located today," to which Mr. Timmerman responded, "Well, later on today, I will get somebody on it and we'll try to find them." Mr. Markey was not satisfied with Mr. Timmerman's response. He advised Mr. Timmerman that he wanted Mr. Timmerman, not someone else, to look for the vacuum cleaners and that he wanted Mr. Timmerman to look for them that morning, not later in the day. He also told Mr. Timmerman that he expected Mr. Timmerman to place a "sign-out" sheet outside the storage area before the morning was over. Mr. Markey then walked away and left the building. When Mr. Markey was approximately 30 feet away, Mr. Timmerman yelled out to him, "What do you have up your ass today?" Mr. Markey stopped and replied, "Obviously you." Mr. Markey then continued walking and returned to his office. Approximately four or five minutes later, an obviously very upset Mr. Timmerman stormed into Mr. Markey's office, yelling and screaming that Mr. Markey mistreated his staff and lacked understanding and compassion. Mr. Markey told Mr. Timmerman to calm down so that they could discuss what was bothering Mr. Timmerman. Mr. Timmerman, however, continued to yell and scream. In fact, if anything, he became louder. Mr. Markey made further attempts to persuade Mr. Timmerman to sit down and talk calmly about his grievances, but these efforts were to no avail. During his exchange with Mr. Timmerman, Mr. Markey, like Mr. Timmerman, raised his voice. Mr. Timmerman left Mr. Markey's office in a huff. As he was walking down the hallway, he shouted back to Mr. Markey, "I take-up for you all of the time with the guys," and then added, "I treat you like a F-en prince, and this is what I get." Mr. Timmerman then went into another employee's (Sharon Barnes') office and started pacing back and forth. His face was red and he was visibly agitated. Ms. Barnes told Mr. Timmerman to calm down. He replied to her that it was "too late." Mr. Timmerman thereupon returned to Mr. Markey's office and continued his ranting. Mr. Markey shouted back at Mr. Timmerman. When Mr. Markey told Mr. Timmerman to "sit down," Mr. Timmerman said that he "couldn't" and then turned to leave. Mr. Markey asked where Mr. Timmerman was going. Mr. Timmerman responded that he was going to take a ride in his truck. As Mr. Timmerman exited Mr. Markey's office and walked toward his truck, Mr. Markey followed behind him. Mr. Markey believed that, given Mr. Timmerman's agitated emotional state, Mr. Timmerman was in no condition to drive. He urged Mr. Timmerman not to go to his truck. Mr. Markey was ultimately able to convince Mr. Timmerman to sit down on a bench outside the building where Mr. Markey's office was located. Mr. Timmerman remained on the bench, however, for just a couple of seconds before getting up and walking away. As Mr. Timmerman walked away, he continued to yell and scream at Mr. Markey. Mr. Markey shouted back at Mr. Timmerman, repeating his plea that Mr. Timmerman not drive off in his truck. When Mr. Timmerman was approximately 20 feet from the bench, he started breathing heavily and leaned against a wall for support. Mr. Markey ran over to Mr. Timmerman to make sure that he did not fall. Mr. Markey again exhorted Mr. Timmerman to calm down. Mr. Timmerman, as he had done previously, told Mr. Markey that he "couldn't." Mr. Timmerman then collapsed in Mr. Markey's arms. After gently lowering Mr. Timmerman to the ground, Mr. Markey ran to Ms. Barnes' office window, which was approximately ten or 15 feet away. When he got Ms. Barnes' attention, he instructed her to "call 911." Paramedics subsequently arrived on the scene. They were unable to revive Mr. Timmerman. He was pronounced dead at 8:35 a.m. on January 23, 1998. An autopsy was performed the following day by Frederick Hobin, M.D., the Medical Examiner for the 19th Medical Examiner District of Florida. Dr. Hobin is a Florida-licensed physician, who is board-certified in anatomic, clinical, and forensic pathology. Following the completion of the autopsy, Dr. Hobin prepared an autopsy report, which contained the following findings and observations, among others (which the undersigned accepts as accurate): PATHOLOGIST'S OPINION MECHANISM OF DEATH: SUDDEN CARDIAC DEATH DUE TO ISCHEMIC CARDIOMYOPATHY CAUSE OF DEATH: OCCLUSIVE CORONARY ARTERIOSCLEROSIS MANNER OF DEATH: NATURAL . . . GROSS AUTOPSY PROTOCOL EXTERNAL EXAMINATION . . . INTERNAL EXAMINATION . . . CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM The heart weighs 680 grams. The increase in weight is attributed to biventricular hypertrophy. All of the chambers are markedly dilated. There is a dense gray scar throughout the posteroseptal myocardium. There are some focal areas of hyperemia in the inferior septum. The cardiac valves appear functionally intact. The coronary arteries have diffuse calcific occlusive arteriosclerosis. There is indication of a double remote bypass coronary graft procedure. There is some sclerosis of both of the grafts and one of the grafts appears to have been occluded by thrombus material throughout its entire length. The thrombus material appears remote in age and it is gray and friable. There is moderate arteriosclerosis of the aorta with some reduced elasticity. . . . FINDINGS AT GROSS AUTOPSY Arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease. Occlusive coronary artery disease. Remote coronary artery bypass graft. Remote thrombosis of coronary artery graft. Ischemic cardiomyopathy. Healed posteroseptal myocardial infarction. . . . MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION HEART There is marked hypertrophy of the myocardium as well as very extensive scarring. This is associated with sclerosis of the coronary artery bypass grafts and they are occluded by degenerated thrombus material. There appears to be minimal fibrosis of the mitral valve. Appended to Dr. Hobin's autopsy report were the written results of laboratory tests that had been conducted in conjunction with the autopsy. Such testing, according to the written results, revealed the presence of cannabinoids (cannabis metabolites) in Mr. Timmerman's blood.10 Although at the time of his death, Mr. Timmerman (as the autopsy reflected) was suffering from a chronic, degenerative, life-threatening cardiovascular disease that had evolved over a prolonged period of time, he was able to, and did in fact, lead a relatively normal life notwithstanding his disease. He was still able to work, and he continued his employment with Martin County11 until his death. Mr. Timmerman, however, because of his disease, was vulnerable to sudden cardiac death. Sudden cardiac death is a term the medical profession uses to indicate that a person has undergone a rapid, fatal deterioration as a result of an adverse cardiac event. In most, but not all, instances, the adverse cardiac event is an arrhythmia (as was the situation in Mr. Timmerman's death). Emotional stress and excitement can produce physiological changes that increase cardiac demand and consequently may precipitate an arrhythmia that leads to sudden cardiac death. Whether a particular incident or situation will produce such a result depends, not only on the individual's physical health, but on his or her emotional makeup as well. In the instant case, it appears, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, that work-related emotional distress (which manifested itself during the confrontations Mr. Timmerman had with Mr. Markey immediately preceding Mr. Timmerman's death) aggravated Mr. Timmerman's preexisting cardiovascular disease and thereby precipitated his demise.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement issue a final order finding that Petitioner is qualified to receive "in line of duty" death benefits from the account of her late husband, Ralph Timmerman. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Lakeland Regional Medical Center (LRMC), is a 897-bed private, not-for-profit, general acute care hospital located at 1324 Lakeland Hills Boulevard, Lakeland, Florida. It is considered a major regional referral hospital and provides a wide range of tertiary services, including open heart surgery. The facility is located in District 6 and is one of six facilities in the district having an existing open heart surgery program. Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Health Facility and Services Development Act, also known as the Certificate of Need (CON) law. On September 26, 1988 intervenor, Winter Haven Hospital, Inc. (WHH), filed with HRS an application for a CON seeking authority to establish an open heart surgery program at its facility in Winter Haven, Florida. After reviewing the application, on February 3, 1989, HRS published notice of its intent to issue the requested CON. If approved, this program would be in competition with similar programs operated by LRMC and intervenor, Hillsborough County Hospital Authority d/b/a Tampa General Hospital (TGH). Those two parties have initiated formal proceedings in Case Nos. 89-1286 and 89-1287 to contest the proposed grant of authority. Intervenor, Venice Hospital, Inc. (Venice), has a pending application for authority to establish an open heart surgery program in a separate administrative proceeding and has intervened in opposition to LRMC's rule challenge. It is noted that LRMC, WHH and TGH are located in District 6 while Venice is located in an adjoining, but separate, district. All parties have standing in this proceeding. In order for HRS to grant a certificate of need, it is necessary for an applicant to satisfy all relevant rule and statutory criteria. In this vein, the agency has promulgated Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code (1987), which contains certain criteria pertaining to open heart surgery programs. That rule provides in relevant part as follows: (f)2. Departmental Goal. The Department will consider applications for open heart surgery programs in context with applicable statutory and rule criteria. The Department will not normally approve applications for new open heart surgery programs in any service area unless the conditions of Sub-paragraphs 8. and 11., below, are met. * * * 11.a. There shall be no additional open heart surgery programs established unless: (1) the service volume of each existing and approved open heart surgery program within the service area is operating at and is expected to continue to operate at a minimum of 350 adult open heart surgery cases per year or 130 pediatric heart cases per year, (Emphasis added) * * * The requirements of this rule, which are unambiguous, and other pertinent statutory and rule criteria, are to be applied by HRS to all applicants, including WHH, during the CON review process. Although the rule itself is not being challenged by LRMC, subparagraph 11.a. of the rule is at the heart of this controversy. Petitioner and TGH contend that the clear language of the rule requires that, absent the existence of not normal circumstances, HRS may not award a CON unless each existing and approved open heart surgery program in the service area is operating at and is expected to continue to operate at 350 procedures per year. Because there are now six approved and existing open heart surgery programs in the district, petitioner argues that the rule mandates that, before a new program can be authorized, each of the six programs must meet the required level of 350 procedures per year. They contend further that the particular policy applied by HRS to WHH's application is not apparent on the face of rule 10-5.011(1)(f)2. and thus it constitutes an unpromulgated rule. In preliminarily approving WHH's application, HRS admits that it used a so-called averaging policy which it agrees may be described in the following manner: HRS has formulated and is applying in reviews of Certificate of Need ("CON") applications for new open heart surgery services a policy of general applicability that is uniformly and consistently applied, which calls for the averaging of the utilization of existing and approved adult open heart surgery programs in the applicable service area, and which deems subparagraph 11.a.(I) of Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Fla. Admin. Code, to be met if the average utilization of all such existing and approved programs in that service area is at least 350 cases (the "Averaging Policy"). Pursuant to its Averaging Policy, HRS will approve a CON application for a new adult open heart surgery program under Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f), Fla. Admin. Code, even if each existing and approved program in the proposed service area is not operating at a minimum of 350 adult cases per year, and even if no "not normal" circumstances are presented in the application or found to exist in the State agency Action Report. Stated another way, HRS deemed subparagraph 11.a. to have been met in WHH's case because, after dividing the total number of procedures performed district wide by the number of existing and approved programs, there were an average number of procedures in excess of 350 for each program in the district. It used this averaging process even though two programs were not operational at the time the review process took place, and only two (LRMC and TGH) of the six programs had actually performed more than 350 procedures during the specified time period being measured. 1/ Thus, the averaging policy used by HRS allows approval of a CON application for open heart surgery even if only some programs in a district, rather than each, have the required 350 case volume. The averaging technique has not been reduced to writing in a memorandum, manual or agency policy directive, and it has not been formally adopted as a rule. In this regard, HRS, but not WHH and Venice, has admitted that the policy is indeed a rule. The results of applying that "rule" are contained in the state agency action report issued by HRS and made a part of this record. HRS has consistently and uniformly applied this averaging technique in every open heart surgery case except one since the rule was adopted in substantially its present form on February 14, 1983. 2/ It has been applied without discretion by those HRS personnel who have the responsibility of administering the CON law and regulations. The proponents of the averaging policy argued first that the language in subparagraph 11.a. authorized its use. However, nothing in the language of the existing rule expressly refers to an averaging process. They also contended that when other provisions within the rule are read, the use of the policy becomes apparent. More particularly, they pointed to subsection (7) of the rule which requires that the provision of open heart surgery be consistent with the state health plan. That plan provides in part that one of its objectives is to maintain an average volume of 350 procedures at all programs in the state. However, the state health plan is not mentioned in subparagraph 11.a., subsection (7) does not track or mirror the averaging technique, and the same subsection does not alert the user of the rule to the fact that an averaging process will be applied.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether an agency statement, and criteria used in support of the statement, constitute a rule under Subsection 120.52(16), Florida Statutes (1993), whether the statement and criteria have been adopted as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1993), and whether the statement and criteria violate Subsection 120.535(1), Florida Statutes (1993).
Findings Of Fact Sacred Heart initiated this proceeding by filing a Petition alleging that, in reviewing the Baptist application, AHCA developed a statement which violates the provisions of Section 120.535(1), Florida Statutes, because the statement should have been promulgated as a rule. The statement, as described by Sacred Heart, is as follows: The Agency may, in its discretion, approve a CON application to establish an adult open heart surgery program notwithstanding findings by it that: 1) Need is not indicated pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.033(7)(c), i.e., approval of a new program will reduce the 12 month total to an existing adult open heart surgery program in the district below 350 open heart surgery operations; (2) the applicable fixed need pool for adult open heart surgery programs in the District is zero; and, (3) the application failed to demonstrate "not normal" circumstances justifying the approval of its application. By contrast, Rule 59C-1.033(7)(c) establishes the formula for determining numeric need and also provides: (c) Regardless of whether need for a new adult open heart surgery program is shown in paragraph (b) above, a new adult open heart surgery program will not normally be approved for a district if the approval would reduce the 12 month total at an existing adult open heart surgery program in the district below 350 open heart surgery opera- tions. . . . In reaching the preliminary decision to approve the Baptist application, various AHCA staff considered and discussed the facts presented, and the merits of the Baptist application. Dr. James T. Howell, the AHCA Division Director for Health Policy and Cost Containment, made the decision to approve the Baptist open heart surgery CON, because of Baptist's substantial, active, sophisticated cardiology program, its status as a high disproportionate share provider, its size, and because the results of the numeric need calculation and the formula for determining the reduced volume at existing providers were close to that required by rule. In February, 1993, after the numeric need publication and prior to the filing of the application at issue in this case, Dr. Howell, Albert Granger, and Robert Sharpe of AHCA met with the Mayor of Pensacola who is also Senior Vice President of Baptist Health Care and President of Baptist Health Care Foundation, and Baptist's Vice President for Planning who expressed frustration over the denials of its prior open heart surgery CON applications. Baptist submitted CON applications for open heart surgery in 1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, and 1993. Among the issues of concern was the status of Sacred Heart and West Florida Regional as grandfathered providers resulting in their having "a permanent franchise." Baptist representatives expressed concern about their ability ever to secure an open heart surgery program under the current rules. After that meeting, the rule amendment process was initiated to allow consideration of data reported up to 3 months, rather than 6 months prior to the publication of the fixed need pool. At the time the Baptist application for CON 7184 was reviewed, the amendment had not been adopted. No other change in the open heart surgery rule has been made subsequent to the review of the prior Baptist CON application. When the Baptist application for CON 7184 was filed initially, Laura MacLafferty was assigned as AHCA's primary reviewer. The state agency action report ("SAAR") represents her factual analysis of the application, although she did not and, routinely, does not make recommendations to issue or deny CONs. Ms. MacLafferty and her supervisor, Alberta Granger, are not aware of any AHCA non-rule policy to determine if a calculation of minimum volume is "close" enough to the 350 standard of the rule, nor any agency guidelines to determine when a hospital is "large" or "operates a large cardiology program" which should include open heart surgery. Subsequent to reviewing the Baptist application, in December 1993, Ms. MacLafferty reviewed another open heart surgery application from District 1, filed on behalf of Fort Walton Beach Medical Center. In her review of both the Baptist and Fort Walton applications, Ms. MacLafferty found no documentation that patients in District 1 experienced problems with access to open heart surgery services. Ms. MacLafferty submitted the draft SAAR to a supervisor, Alberta Granger. The draft SAAR was retrieved from her desk, prior to Ms. Granger's reviewing it. It was removed by Elizabeth Dudek, who heads AHCA's CON and health care board sections. Ms. Granger did not review the SAAR, which was prepared by Ms. MacLafferty. The final draft was returned to Ms. Granger for her to sign on July 7, 1993. This was the only time since Ms. Granger became supervisor in the CON office, that she has not reviewed and discussed with Ms. Dudek SAARs prepared by her staff. Ms. Granger had been the primary reviewer of Baptist's 1989 CON application. Ms. Granger and her supervisor, Ms. Dudek, are aware that in this case and in one or more of its prior CON open heart surgery applications, Baptist argued that its size, scope of cardiology services, and proposed fixed rate structure were reasons to approve its proposal. Ms. Granger stated, and Ms. Dudek confirmed, that the usual procedure was not followed in the review of this and one other application in this batching cycle. In this batching cycle, Dr. Howell requested that Mr. Sharpe, head of AHCA's planning section, also review those two open heart surgery applications. Ms. Dudek recalls, that prior to 1987, there were two batches of approximately 12 total applications in which agency personnel other than the CON staff was involved in the review of CON applications. In making his decision on the Baptist application, Dr. Howell consulted Ms. Dudek and Mr. Sharpe. Ms. Dudek, who heads the CON and health care board section, was not initially in favor of the approval of the Baptist application. Mr. Sharpe, head of the planning section, prepared a 9 page analysis of the pros and cons of the Baptist proposal. The Sharpe analysis demonstrates that an increase of 9 additional open heart surgeries during the 12 month reporting period, and the use of the more current data under the pending rule revision would have resulted in the need for one additional open heart surgery program in District 1. The memorandum also demonstrated that a lower future volume of open heart surgeries is projected by using the actual use rate, as required by Rule 59C-1.033(7)(6)2, rather than a trended use rate. If these adjustments to the data are made to achieve numeric need, then Baptist's application could be approved without a showing of not normal circumstances. The memorandum also reported the October 1991-September 1992 volumes of cardiac cath admissions at Baptist as 2677, at Sacred Heart as 2053, and at HCA West Florida as 1915, with the conclusion that Baptist "had the largest number of cardiac catheterization admissions of the three hospitals." The evidence in this proceeding is that the memorandum was in error. Actual volumes for October 1991-September 1992 were 912 at Baptist, not 2677. Dr. Howell found Baptist's proposal consistent with health care reform trends towards eliminating the need for CON regulation by enhancing market competitive forces, as a part of Florida's managed competition model, as explained in the Sharpe analysis. Similarly, Dr. Luke described the 1980's use of the CON process to control costs by limiting duplication and the rejection of institution specific planning as outdated. Dr. Luke also favors a model of competition for cost controls. At this time, however, these positions have not been adopted in Florida Statutes and rules. The 1994 Florida Health Security Plan recommends the continuation of CON review of all tertiary services, including open heart surgery. That plan was submitted as a part of AHCA's 1994 legislative proposals. Ms. Dudek described traditional "not normal" circumstances as issues related to financial, geographic, or programmatic access to the proposed service by potential patients, and not facility specific concerns. Facility specific concerns, in this case, include Baptist's attempt to retain cardiologists who wish to perform procedures not approved at Baptist and to improve its position to compete for managed care contracts. Baptist and AHCA contend that the intent to approve the application is predicated upon the exercise of AHCA's discretion to determine whether the circumstances justify a departure from the "normal" operation of the rule methodologies. As stated by Baptist and AHCA, this position is not inconsistent with the wording of the rule, but reflects a disagreement with Sacred Heart over what constitutes not normal circumstances. AHCA interprets Rule 59C-1.033 as giving the agency flexibility, in the exercise of its professional judgment, to approve open heart surgery applications when the rule methodology does not result in a numeric need for a new program, and/or the calculation intended to assure the 350 minimum procedures for established providers yields a lower number. Both sections of the open heart surgery rule have been upheld with the not normal circumstances provisions included. St. Mary's Hospital v. HRS, 13 FALR 2096 (F.O. 5/1/91). In the review of certificate of need applications, the weight to be accorded a particular statutory or rule criterion varies based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If an earlier application is denied, and a new one submitted, the weight to be afforded certain criterion in the review of the more recent application may be different if the facts and circumstances are different. It is not consistent, however, for AHCA to treat the same facts differently, or to reach different conclusions of law on the same facts. In 1987, the agency responsible for CON regulation, denied a Baptist application, in the absence of numeric need, for the express purpose of protecting the 350 volumes at existing providers. In the preceding 12 months, there were 45 emergency angioplasties performed at Baptist, Sacred Heart's open heart surgery volume was 291, and West Florida Regional's was 344. The Baptist application was denied in a SAAR, which is replete with the references to the relationship of volume to quality, and which concludes: There is insufficient need for a third open heart surgery program in District One. It would lower the average number of procedures below the 350 recommended in the Rule and it would have a negative impact on existing providers. SAAR, CON Action No. 5120 at p.17. In early 1990, another Baptist application for an open heart surgery CON was denied. Using the preferences from the 1989 state health plan, the agency found that Baptist was (1) in a large county with a higher than average elderly population, (2) a disproportionate share provider, which would serve patients regardless of their ability to pay, (3) large enough to propose a fixed price structure for 3 years, and (4) capable of providing all the supplementary procedures for a complete cardiac program. Baptist was also found to have met the quality of care standard and to have the resources to implement the program. In addition, the fixed rate proposal was viewed as enhancing competition. The agency recommended denial, after finding no need for the project, no enhanced access or quality of care benefits and that existing providers volumes would fall below 350. The 1989 state health plan is also applicable to the review of CON 7184. Using the same 1989 preferences, the findings on the preferences in this case are essentially the same, except that the elderly population in Escambia is now below the state-wide average. See, DOAH Cases Nos. 93-4886 and 93-4887, Findings of Fact 53-60 (R.O. 11/18/94). By 1992, the use rate indicated a need for 2.48 open heart surgery programs in District One. Baptist asserted as "not normal" circumstances: (1) scheduling difficulties at Sacred Heart, (2) its status as a Level II trauma center, and (3) a fixed price structure at 85 percent of the average rate per DRG for the two existing providers. In its analysis of Baptist's asserted "nor normal" circumstances, the agency noted that "[a]pparently, Baptist has made no attempt to refer cases to West Florida Regional." The agency rejected the assumption that a trauma center has a need for open heart surgery services. The agency treated the proposed pricing structure as one reason for concluding that Baptist's proposed open heart program would reduce patient volumes at Sacred Heart and West Florida Regional. See, SAAR CON Action No. 6774, pp. 3-5. In this case, AHCA made a mistake of fact and failed to follow its precedents in determining not normal circumstances. See, Finding of Facts 16 and 17, supra. Due to the regulatory scheme which establishes the certificate of need review process and the criteria in statutes and rules which have be weighed and balanced, it is impossible to have a rule which would describe every set of circumstances which would justify departure from the "normal" operation of a rule methodology. The agency has, however, described the conditions which should be alleviated by the approval of a CON under not normal circumstances. In the 1987 CON 5120 SAAR, the agency found: There is no accessibility problem, geographic, programmatic or financial, noted by the applicant or the Local Health Council, for patients in District One for open heart surgery. SAAR, CON Action No. 5120 at p.6. The "not normal" circumstance claimed by Baptist do not involve access problems for District 1 residents and have been rejected as such by the agency in the past.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated August 30, 2000, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Health, Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in Florida. Section 20.43 and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes (1997). Dr. O'Rourke is, and was at the times material to this proceeding, a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida, having been issued license number ME 0044786. He has been in private practice in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, since 1985 and was board-certified by the American Board of Surgery in 1987 and re-certified in 1997. Dr. O'Rourke has been the Chief of Surgery at Broward General Medical Center since 1997. In early 1996, R.F., a 65-year-old woman, was referred to Dr. O'Rourke by Dr. Rajendra P. Gupta, a physician who had treated R.F. at the Broward General Medical Center Clinic ("Clinic") in 1995 and early 1996. The purpose of the referral was for a surgical consultation regarding a mass on R.F.'s liver. 1/ Dr. O'Rourke first saw R.F. at the Clinic on February 14, 1996, and on February 21, 1996, R.F. returned to see Dr. O'Rourke for preoperative testing. Dr. O'Rourke examined R.F., took a patient history, and ordered several preoperative tests. Dr. O'Rourke also reviewed R.F.'s medical records from the Clinic and her hospital chart from Broward General Medical Center ("Broward General"). These documents included, among other things, the record of prior consultations with physicians at Broward General, the films from a recent M.R.I. and a recent CT scan, and the results of a CT-guided biopsy, x-rays, sonograms, blood tests, and an esophageal endoscopy. The CT-guided biopsy did not confirm or rule out the possibility that the mass on R.F.'s liver was cancerous. However, because tests showed that R.F.'s alpha-fetoprotein levels 2/ were abnormal, Dr. O'Rourke considered the mass to be a cancerous tumor and, therefore, lethal. Based on the results of the tests ordered by Dr. Gupta and by Dr. O'Rourke and on the information in R.F.'s medical records and hospital chart, Dr. O'Rourke decided that it would be appropriate to perform an exploratory laparotomy on R.F. to evaluate the mass and, if indicated, perform a right hepatic segmentectomy, or resection, to remove the mass. Dr. O'Rourke explained the gravity of the situation to R.F. and told her that he wanted to perform exploratory surgery to determine if the mass on the liver could be removed and to remove it, if possible. R.F. discussed the proposed surgery with her family and notified Dr. O'Rourke that she would have the surgery. In deciding that an exploratory laparotomy was appropriate for R.F., Dr. O'Rourke considered and evaluated the risk that R.F. would have excessive bleeding during the procedure. The presence of significant cirrhosis of the liver is one indication that a patient might bleed excessively during a hepatic resection. 3/ The results of the esophageal endoscopy performed on R.F. in October 1995 did not show the presence of esophageal varices, nor did the results of R.F.'s CT scan show the presence of ascites. Both of these conditions are indicative of portal hypertension, which is increased blood pressure in the portal triad that provides blood to the liver. 4/ Portal hypertension is caused by a slowing of the blood flow through the liver, which is, in turn, caused by cirrhosis of the liver. Because there was no evidence of portal hypertension in R.F.'s test results, there was no conclusive preoperative evidence that R.F.'s liver was cirrhotic. 5/ Nonetheless, based on other indications in R.F.'s medical records and test results, Dr. O'Rourke considered it highly probable that R.F.'s liver was cirrhotic. R.F. was at high risk of cirrhosis because she had a positive hepatitis profile for Hepatitis B and C, because she had a probable primary cellular carcinoma in the liver, and because her outpatient medical records revealed a persistent elevation of cellular enzymes in her liver. However, the extent of R.F.'s cirrhosis could not be precisely determined through preoperative testing; it could only be conclusively determined intraoperatively. The more important consideration in Dr. O'Rourke's evaluation of R.F. as a candidate for an exploratory laparotomy and possible hepatic resection was the functional ability of R.F.'s liver. There was no preoperative evidence that R.F.'s liver function was abnormal; her PT levels and her bilirubin levels, both important indicators of liver function, consistently tested within the normal range. Dr. O'Rourke also considered the possibility that R.F.'s tumor was particularly vascular, 6/ which would also indicate that R.F. would bleed excessively during surgery. It is not possible to determine conclusively before surgery if a tumor is vascular; that determination can only be made once the tumor is visible and can be manipulated. However, there was no preoperative evidence that R.F.'s tumor was particularly vascular. R.F. tolerated a CT-guided biopsy of the liver prior to surgery; there was nothing in the biopsied tissue that indicated the tumor was particularly vascular, nor was there any significant bleeding as a result of the biopsy. This would indicate that R.F.'s tumor was not particularly vascular. Dr. O'Rourke did not request a preoperative cardiology consultation for R.F. because there were no indications of a cardiac risk in her medical records or in her test results. Although R.F. had diagnoses of systemic hypertension and of atrial fibrillation, both of which are very common, the hypertension was controlled by Accupril and a diuretic, and neither the hypertension nor the atrial fibrillation would indicate the need for a cardiology consultation. R.F.'s EKG was interpreted as borderline; and there were no indications in her medical records that R.F. had ischemic heart disease. In addition, the anesthesiologist who was to administer anesthesia to R.F. during the surgery did not request a cardiology consultation. 7/ Had the anesthesiologist been concerned about R.F.'s cardiac fitness to tolerate general anesthesia, he or she would likely have cancelled or deferred the surgery. The only documentation of the location of the hepatic mass that Dr. O'Rourke included in R.F.'s medical records was a notation that the indicated procedure was a right hepatic segmentectomy. However, even though Dr. O'Rourke did not more precisely set forth the location of the mass in the documentation, he knew the exact location of the mass from having examined the film of the CT scan and of the M.R.I. performed on January 3, 1996, which showed an "ovoid solitary mass along the dome of the right lobe of the liver." In addition, the report of the sonogram performed on November 21, 1995, which was available to and reviewed by Dr. O'Rourke, showed a "focal mass on the diaphragmatic surface of the right lobe of the liver." On February 27, 1996, Dr. O'Rourke performed exploratory surgery on R.F. to determine the resectability of the liver tumor. Ultimately, Dr. O'Rourke performed a non- anatomic hepatic resection to remove the tumor. Dr. O'Rourke prepared adequately for the possibility that R.F. would experience blood loss during the exploratory laparotomy. As noted above, however, there were no preoperative indicators that R.F. would experience excessive blood loss. Dr. O'Rourke requested that a cell saver be available in the operating room during R.F.'s surgery, 8/ and the anesthesiologist ordered R.F.'s blood to be typed and screened to identify the correct blood type. Dr. O'Rourke did not order R.F.'s blood to be typed and cross-matched, which provides the most specific information about the particular type of blood required by the patient. Although the better practice is to have the patient's blood typed and cross-matched prior to surgery, it takes only ten minutes to obtain typed and cross- matched blood from the blood bank should the patient lose more blood than can be replaced by the cell saver. 9/ R.F.'s blood pressure was monitored during the surgery by an arterial line, and good access was provided for the introduction of fluids into R.F. through two intravenous lines placed by the anesthesiologist, one 16-gauge line and one 18-gauge line. Dr. O'Rourke did not place a "central line," or central venous pressure ("CVP") line, 10/ into R.F. preoperatively. The anesthesiologist usually makes the decision to insert a CVP line preoperatively, and, in R.F.'s case, Dr. O'Rourke agreed with the anesthesiologist that it was not necessary. Some surgeons routinely insert CVP lines preoperatively when performing an exploratory procedure such as Dr. O'Rourke was performing on R.F.; other surgeons prefer to wait until they are sure that they will perform the hepatic resection because there are a multitude of risks attendant to the insertion of a CVP line, a bleeding pneumothorax being the most common. 11/ Dr. O'Rourke began the exploratory laparotomy by opening R.F.'s belly and removing scar tissue that resulted from prior surgery. He dissected into the abdomen, down to the fascia, and again removed scar tissue that resulted from prior surgery. He divided the falciform ligament and removed it at the point where it attaches to the liver, a procedure that is necessary before the liver can be mobilized. Dr. O'Rourke moved the falciform ligament further up to its diaphragmatic attachment so that he could have full access to the dome of the liver, where R.F.'s tumor was located. Once the falciform ligament was separated from the liver, Dr. O'Rourke palpated the tumor and determined that it was very fragile and tended to crumble. Dr. O'Rourke then mobilized R.F.'s liver. 12/ When he did so, the tumor ruptured, and R.F. started to bleed from the posterior of the liver. R.F.'s blood pressure fell dramatically, a condition known as hypotension, and she became unstable. Dr. O'Rourke's first priority was to stop the bleeding and stabilize R.F.'s blood pressure, and he decided to pack the liver, the most extreme technique used to stop bleeding in or around the liver. Unfortunately, once a patient undergoing hepatic surgery begins to bleed, it is very difficult to stop the bleeding. 13/ The Pringle maneuver is one technique that can be used to control bleeding in and around the liver. This technique requires dissecting around the portal triad and clamping the hepatic artery and the portal vein in order to stop temporarily the blood flow from the portal triad into the liver. Dr. O'Rourke's decision to pack R.F.'s liver rather than attempt the Pringle maneuver was based on several factors. First, R.F. had a significant amount of scar tissue on her anterior abdominal wall, and Dr. O'Rourke anticipated that, given her rapidly deteriorating condition, it would take too much time to dissect through the scar tissue to expose the portal triad. Second, the Pringle maneuver provides only a temporary solution because the portal triad can be clamped and the blood flow into the liver stopped for no more than 15 minutes at a time; the maneuver can be repeated if necessary when working with a healthy liver but it is very risky to do so when working with a cirrhotic liver such as R.F.'s. Third, although it can be helpful to a surgeon trying to find the source of bleeding to temporarily stop the blood flow from the portal triad, Dr. O'Rourke already knew that the bleeding originated in the posterior of the liver, behind the tumor. At the same time that Dr. O'Rourke was packing the liver, the anesthesiologist was resuscitating R.F. with fluids and calling the blood bank to order cross-matched blood. After packing the liver, Dr. O'Rourke observed the site of the bleeding for 15 to 20 minutes, during which time the bleeding decreased slightly but not significantly. R.F.'s parameters did not improve, and Dr. O'Rourke decided to close the abdomen. After closing the abdomen, Dr. O'Rourke inserted a CVP line; the CVP line was inserted primarily for the purpose of more quickly introducing fluids and blood products into R.F. Once he had placed the CVP line, Dr. O'Rourke assisted the anesthesiologist in attempting to resuscitate R.F. by the rapid infusion of fluid and blood. At this point, Dr. O'Rourke anticipated that R.F. would stabilize, and, once she had stabilized, Dr. O'Rourke intended to wait 24-to-48 hours, reopen the abdomen, remove or replace the lap packing, and close the abdomen without removing the tumor. He decided that, when he re-opened the abdomen, it would be too risky to proceed with the tumor resection because of the likelihood that R.F. would again begin bleeding. Dr. O'Rourke's plans changed because R.F.'s blood pressure did not significantly improve after approximately 20 minutes, and the degree of her hypotension was out of proportion to her actual blood loss, which Dr. O'Rourke estimated as 300- to-400 cubic centimeters. Under these circumstances, Dr. O'Rourke felt that he had two alternatives: to do nothing and let R.F. die or to re-explore the liver. He, therefore, re- opened the incision, removed the packing, and confirmed that the packing had not controlled the bleeding. When packing fails to control the bleeding, the surgeon has a serious problem and a limited number of options: The surgeon can temporarily stop the flow of blood into the liver by using the Pringle maneuver; the surgeon can extend the incisions under the ribs or into the side and fully mobilize the liver 14/ to expose its posterior and possibly locate the source of the bleeding; or, the surgeon can remove the tumor to try to gain access to the vessels that are bleeding so that they can be suture-ligated. Dr. O'Rourke had already rejected the Pringle maneuver as too time-consuming and unlikely to be successful in stopping the bleeding. He decided not to fully mobilize the liver because R.F.'s liver was cirrhotic, and therefore somewhat brittle, so that, had he attempted to mobilize the liver fully, he risked exacerbating the bleeding. In any event, the tumor was completely accessible to Dr. O'Rourke without fully mobilizing the liver. Dr. O'Rourke decided that, under the circumstances, the best chance of saving R.F. was to remove the tumor, thereby gaining access to the posterior of the liver and to the hepatic veins, which he suspected were the source of the bleeding. Once the tumor was removed, he could suture-ligate the blood vessels from which the bleeding originated. Accordingly, Dr. O'Rourke performed a non-anatomic hepatic resection. He found that the tumor resection itself was easy and presented no problems. He individually suture-ligated the vessels that provided the tumor's blood supply and brought the bleeding down to a low level. Dr. O'Rourke felt that he had controlled the bleeding, and R.F.'s hepatocrit level was brought back to a low-normal, but acceptable, level. Nonetheless, R.F.'s blood pressure did not improve and actually deteriorated. Despite the successful efforts to control the bleeding and the efforts to resuscitate R.F. by transfusing blood and fluids, her condition continued to deteriorate, and she was pronounced dead at 6:23 p.m. on February 27, 1996. Dr. O'Rourke spoke with R.F.'s family and told the family members that the amount of R.F.'s blood loss did not explain why her blood pressure fell so low or why her condition continued to deteriorate in spite of his having controlled the bleeding and in spite of the efforts to resuscitate her with blood and fluids. He asked the family for permission to do an autopsy to determine what had happened. The family refused, although they later had a private autopsy done at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida. The cause of death stated in the autopsy report was "[e]xsanguination post subtotal hepatic resection." The evidence submitted by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. O'Rourke failed to keep adequate medical records to justify the course of his treatment of R.F. Because R.F. was a Clinic patient, Dr. O'Rourke had access to the medical records kept since her first consultation with Dr. Gupta in October 1995, as well as access to all of the results of the tests performed on her from October 1995 through the date of surgery. In the record of his examination of R.F., Dr. O'Rourke included her surgical history, her medical history, a list of the medications R.F. was taking, and the results of his physical examination of R.F. His proposed treatment of R.F. was identified in the documentation as a right hepatic resection. Taken altogether, the documentation in this case adequately justifies Dr. O'Rourke's decision to do an exploratory laparotomy and a right hepatic resection, if indicated, and there is no evidence that additional documentation was required. 15/ The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. O'Rourke's preoperative examinations, testing, or planning fell below that level of care, skill, and treatment that is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. R.F.'s medical records and chart establish that she was given a battery of pre-operative tests, and the Department's expert witness could not identify any additional pre-operative test that should have been given. Dr. O'Rourke examined the patient and noted the results of his examination, as well as the medications she was taking, on the Outpatient/Short Stay Record. Dr. O'Rourke knew the exact location of the mass on R.F.'s liver, he adequately noted the location of the tumor as the right posterior lobe of the liver, and he knew that, although R.F.'s liver was most likely cirrhotic, her liver function was normal, albeit low normal. A pre-operative cardiology consult was not indicated by R.F.'s medical records or test results. It is uncontroverted that Dr. O'Rourke's decision to do an exploratory laparotomy on R.F. was not inappropriate. Dr. O'Rourke anticipated that R.F. would suffer blood loss during the surgery, and he planned for the anticipated blood loss by ordering a cell saver for the operating room. Although Dr. O'Rourke perhaps should have had R.F.'s blood typed and cross-matched prior to the surgery, his failure to do so did not appreciably delay the delivery of additional blood to R.F. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. O'Rourke's intraoperative efforts to control R.F.'s bleeding fell below that level of care, skill, and treatment that is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Dr. O'Rourke's decisions to pack the liver to control the bleeding and then, when that failed, to remove the tumor in an effort to expose the vessels that were bleeding were not inappropriate under the circumstances. Although there were options other than packing available to help control the bleeding, Dr. O'Rourke rejected these options as too time- consuming, as temporary solutions, as unnecessary, or as unlikely to be successful. Dr. O'Rourke's decision to remove the tumor to gain access to the vessels that were the source of the bleeding and to attempt to stop the bleeding by suture- ligating these vessels was a decision that could only have been made intraoperatively, based on all of the information available to Dr. O'Rourke at the time. Although R.F. was very unstable, the cell-saver was recycling the blood she was losing and re- infusing it, and R.F. was receiving other blood products and fluids. Given the available options, Dr. O'Rourke's decision was not inappropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Aiden Matthew O'Rourke, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2001.
