The Issue Whether Respondent, a medical doctor, in his treatment of Patient M.A., failed to keep legible medical records in violation of section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2007); prescribed or administered inappropriate or excessive quantities of controlled substances in violation of section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes (2007); committed medical malpractice by practicing below the standard of care in violation of section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2007); failed to perform a statutory or legal obligation placed upon a licensed physician in violation of section 458.331(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2007); and violated any provision of chapter 458 or chapter 456, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto in violation of section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2007), as Petitioner alleges in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint; if so, whether (and what) disciplinary measures should be imposed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Paul M. Goldberg, M.D., violated sections 458.331(1)(g) and (nn), Florida Statutes, as charged in Counts IV and V of the Complaint; Dismissing Counts I-III of the Complaint; Imposing $20,000 in administrative fines; issuing a reprimand against Dr. Goldberg's medical license; requiring Dr. Goldberg to complete the "Laws and Rules" Course; suspending Dr. Goldberg's medical license until such time as Dr. Goldberg undergoes a "UF CARES" evaluation; and placing Dr. Goldberg's license on probation for three years under indirect supervision with 100 percent chart review of cosmetic surgery patients and 25 percent chart review of all other patients. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2015.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 13, 1984, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a CON for an ambulatory surgical center (ASC). Respondent assigned CON number 3677 to Petitioner's application. Petitioner seeks to construct a two operating room, free standing ASC at 1710 West Colonial Drive in Orlando, Orange County, Florida. The primary area to be served by this application is Orange County, and the facility as proposed is reasonably accessible to Orange County residents. Orange County is located within Respondent's District VII, which is also comprised of Osceola, Brevard and Seminole Counties. Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz are owners of Y and S Management and are partners in the application here at issue. Y and S Management will provide medical management services at this facility, as it provides at nine other facilities throughout the country which performed approximately 17,500 outpatient surgical procedures in 1985, primarily gynecological. Two of the facilities managed by Y and S Management are licensed as ASCs under the laws of the states in which they are located. The chief operating officer of Y and S Management, Susan Hill, prepared the CON application which is here at issue. Financing for this project will be provided from the personal funds of Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz. No funds will be borrowed for this purpose. They have sufficient liquid personal funds to fully finance the project cost of $473,000, as well as operating costs. Petitioner will lease 6,500 square feet on the first floor of a professional building to be constructed at 1710 West Colonial Drive in Orlando from West Colonial Properties, Ltd., at $12 per square foot. This property is owned by Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz. An abortion clinic known as Orlando Women's Health Center, which they also own, is located next door at 1700 West Colonial Drive. The facility as proposed can reasonably be expected to meet licensure requirements for an ASC. Ambulatory surgical procedures to be performed at Petitioner's facility will include, but not be limited to abortions, tubal ligations, hernia repairs, diagnostic laproscopies, eye surgery for cataracts, hand surgery, plastic surgery, tonsillectomies, and dilatation and curettage. Equipment cost estimates for this project of $161,158 are realistic and complete. Staffing requirement estimates of 11.54 F.T.E., and salary requirements of approximately $182,000 annually are also realistic and complete. Petitioner estimates that for 1987 and 1988, 20% of all cases will be paid by Medicaid, 5% by Medicare, and 75% will be insurance and private pay, with 4% of this figure ultimately being bad debt or indigent care. With total cases estimated for 1987 and 1988 to be 1700 and 2100, respectively, total net revenues for 1987 and 1988 are estimated to be $732,000 and $903,000, respectively. Providing services to Medicaid patients in 20% of its cases would be beneficial to the community since this is a high level of service to patients who are typically underserved. Assuming that 20% of the cases handled at Petitioner's facility have multiple procedures, the projected charge rates for 1987 are $326 per case for Medicare and Medicaid, and $489 per case for private pay and insurance. These are reasonable and competitive charges. The projected charge rate for private pay and insurance is simply 150% of the Medicare and Medicaid rate, which in turn is based on the projected case mix considering the various levels of reimbursement. Petitioner will pay Y and S Management a fee of $50 per case for management services. The financial pro forma prepared for Petitioner demonstrates that using a conservative approach that somewhat overestimates expenses, Petitioner will reach the break-even point at 1400 cases, after allowing for management fees, depreciation and amortization. Using a less conservative, but more typical approach to estimating expenses, Petitioner will break-even at 1100 cases. Need in the service area exceeds the conservative break-even point and Petitioner estimates it will handle 1700 cases in its first year of operation and 2100 in its second. These are reasonable estimates. Respondent has not promulgated a rule setting forth a methodology for determining need for an ASC. However, Respondent has utilized an evolving non-rule policy in evaluating the need for such facilities. Reid Jaffe, Respondent's expert in health care planning, explained the methodology used in this case which resulted in his determining that in July, 1987, there will be a need for additional ambulatory surgical facilities in Orange County sufficient to recommend approval of Petitioner's CON application. Specifically, Jaffe's methodology is as follows: Acquire data from the local health council regarding the number of inpatient and outpatient procedures performed by existing providers, as reported for the current calendar year (1985) by hospitals in the appropriate service district (District VII). Acquire data from the Governor's Office of the population estimate for the appropriate service area (Orange County) for the current and planning horizon years. Using this data, calculate the current overall surgical and outpatient surgical use rates per 1000 population for hospitals in the service area. Using the projected population for the planning horizon year (1987) and the current use rates calculated in (c) above, calculate the projection of overall surgical procedures in the planning horizon year. Multiply projected overall surgeries by 40% to establish total number of out-patient surgeries to be performed in the planning horizon year. Subtract from (e) all outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in hospitals, other ASCs in the service area, as well as the financial break-evens of all CON approved free-standing outpatient surgery centers in the service area. After performing these calculations and subtractions, the number of outpatient surgical procedures remaining are compared to the break-even of the CON applicant at issue. If the remaining number is larger than the applicant's break even, a quantitative need is demonstrated. Applying Jaffe's methodology to this case and applying data he obtained from the Local Health Council of East Central Florida, as reported to it by hospitals in District VII for calendar year 1985, as well as population data for Orange County he obtained from the Governor's Office, it appears that a total of 83,054 surgical procedures were performed in District VII in 1985, with 21,084 of these being outpatient procedures performed in a hospital. Using a July, 1985, population estimate for Orange County of 556,384, the overall surgical use rate for Orange County is 83,054 divided by 556,384 over 1000, or 149.27 surgical procedures per 1000 population; the use rate for outpatient procedures performed in hospitals is 21,084 divided by 556,384 over 1000, or 37.89 outpatient procedures performed in hospitals per 1000 population. Multiplying the overall surgical use rate of 149.27 by 574,599 (projected Orange County population for July 1987) over 1000 and applying a factor of 40% yields a projection of 34,308 outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in 1987. The use rate of 37.89 for outpatient services performed in a hospital is then multiplied by 574,599 over 1000 to obtain 21,722 which is the projected number of outpatient procedures which will be performed in a hospital in 1987. By subtracting this number (21,722) from the projection of total outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in 1987 (34,308) you identify 12,536 procedures which could be performed in ASCs in 1987. The reported number of outpatient procedures being performed in existing ASCs and the break-evens of CON approved facilities are calculated to be 5,488 (Surgical Services 2,693; MediVision 903; AMI Single Day Surgery 1,832; Surgical Associates 60) which is then subtracted from 12,536 to leave a need of 7,048 outpatient procedures which could be performed in ASCs which are not now approved for this service area. Since Petitioner has a conservative break-even point of 1400 cases, and a more typical break-even point of 1100 cases, a quantitative need has been identified which far exceeds Petitioner's break-even point. Jaffe testified that in his experience this is the largest margin between break-even and available procedures he has seen in reviewing CON applications. A need analysis conducted by Howard E. Fagin, Ph.D., who was accepted as an expert in health care planning, facility planning and operations analysis, also confirms that there is a quantitative need for the ASC proposed by Petitioner. The methodology used by Dr. Fagin starts by calculating a target utilization for ambulatory surgical operating rooms. Assuming that a facility operates 250 days/year, 6 hours/day, it takes 1.25 hours/case and that there are 1.2 procedures/case with a utilization rate of 75%, a target utilization of 1,080 procedures/year for an ambulatory surgical room is thereby determined. In 1985 there were 10 approved hospital "dedicated" ambulatory surgical rooms in Orange County, and 9 approved rooms in free-standing ASCs (Surgical Services-5, AMI Single Day Surgery-2, MediVision-2) not counting the 2 rooms approved in CON 3313 for Surgical Associates which are used for no more than 60 cases per year. Multiplying these 19 rooms by the target utilization of 1,080 procedures/year results in a calculation of 20,520 total utilization in available dedicated and free-standing ASC rooms. Data from the Local Health Council of East Central Florida for 1985 indicates that 11,413 outpatient procedures were performed in hospital, non-dedicated, operating rooms. Therefore if we take Jaffe's projection of 34,308 outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in 1987, and subtract 20,520 (total utilization in available dedicated and free-standing ASC rooms) and also subtract 11,413 (outpatient procedures performed in hospital, non-dedicated, rooms), we arrive at a need of 2,375 procedures in 1987 and 3,770 procedures in 1989. Since Petitioner's break-even is conservatively 1400 cases, and again assuming 1.2 procedures per case, Petitioner's conservative break-even is 1680 procedures, which is within the need which will exist in 1987, and well within the need in 1989. The need methodology and opinion of Intervenor's expert, Dr. Deborah Kolb, is rejected because she incorrectly: (a) considered Orange and Seminole Counties as comprising a two county service area; (b) included all existing inpatient hospital based operating rooms, regardless of whether they are dedicated to outpatient surgery, in arriving at her conclusion that there is excess capacity; and (c) assumed all hospital operating rooms are available for outpatient surgery without modification. Ambulatory surgery is typically performed in three types of facilities: hospitals which utilize their operating rooms for both inpatient and outpatient surgery; hospitals which maintain separate "dedicated" outpatient operating rooms, sometimes even in separate facilities adjacent to the main hospital; and free-standing ASCs which are not associated with a hospital. There are definite disadvantages to serving outpatients in hospitals without "dedicated" outpatient operating rooms, including the "bumping" of outpatients in emergencies and increased costs to the patient for services. On the other hand there are advantages and disadvantages to the other two modes of delivering ambulatory surgical services. Hospital based "dedicated" rooms are obviously closer to a hospital in case an emergency develops, and some patients may prefer this proximity to additional equipment and emergency medical staff. On the other hand, costs at a free-standing ASC are generally lower, and some patients prefer to avoid a hospital atmosphere altogether. Surgical procedures performed at ASCs have grown from 10% of all procedures in the early 1970s to 40% currently, and are projected to grow to 50% in the near future. This growth is somewhat the result of a change in Medicaid/Medicare reimbursement policies which now pay 80% for procedures performed in a hospital and require a 20% co-payment by the patient, but which pay 100% for procedures performed in an ASC and require no patient co-payment. The decision to have outpatient surgery performed at one or the other of these types of facilities is primarily the result of patient preference. However, it is clear that the increasing utilization of ASCs is a market force that is driving the cost of hospital outpatient services down. Respondent issued its original notice of intent to deny Petitioner's application on or about May 17, 1985, and on June 14, 1985, Petitioner filed its Petition for Formal Hearing. Thereafter, Respondent reconsidered its position and on March 6, 1986, notified the parties that it intended to grant Petitioner's application. The reason for this reconsideration was that when the initial denial was made, Respondent's projections of procedures were premised on the use of a 30% outpatient surgical factor. Subsequently, the Respondent began using 40% in its projection of the total volume of surgical procedures which might be performed on an outpatient basis. Given the fact that the reason Petitioner was initially denied was due to insufficient procedures, and utilization of the new projection of outpatient volume indicated there would be sufficient volume to support the facility, Respondent determined to support Petitioner's application. The notice of change of position was prepared by Reid Jaffe, who based his testimony at hearing on the 40% factor, and was approved by Robert E. Maryanski, Administrator of Community Medical Facilities, and Marta V. Hardy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Planning and Development. Since Respondent has not adopted a need methodology rule for ambulatory surgical centers, the increase in the factor used to calculate outpatient surgeries from overall surgeries performed was not accomplished through rule-making proceedings. In 1985 Respondent used a factor of 30%, but in early 1986 increased this to the 40% applied in this case.. Intervenor provides services similar to those which Petitioner will perform, and has four free-standing, "dedicated" operating rooms which are used for ambulatory surgery. It also has 17 operating rooms that are used for both in and out-patient surgery. The Intervenor opposes Petitioner's application. In 1985, Intervenor made a profit of $10.9 million on total revenues collected of $184 million; it had an actual total of $37.4 million in uncompensated care which includes partial or no payments, charity, bad debt, and contractual patients. For 1986, it projects an $18.9 million profit on collected revenues of $211 million, with projections of actual uncompensated care of approximately $52 million. In 1985, 2% of Intervenor's costs were for providing indigent care, and this totaled approximately $6 million. Petitioner projects net revenues of approximately $900,000, and it has not been established if this will have any impact on Intervenor's revenues. According to Billie June, Assistant Director of Operating Rooms at Florida Hospital who was accepted as an expert in surgical nursing, and the management and operation of surgical units from a nursing standpoint, Intervenor has had considerable difficulty attracting qualified nursing staff for its operating rooms, and has had to develop its own qualified staff through an internship program. However, Petitioner's facility will not contribute to this difficulty or result in higher salaries. Susan Hill testified based on her experience since 1973 of managing and hiring staff in the Orlando area of the type needed to operate an ASC, that she has had no difficulty obtaining the cooperation of physicians in the area and in attracting fully qualified staff. Based on Hill's experience with other ASCs managed by Y and S Management throughout the country as well as her experience in Orange County, it is found that the staffing needs of Petitioner's proposed facility can be met with nursing and medical staff available in the area. It is found as a matter of fact that there is a need in Orange County for the two operating room ASC proposed by Petitioner, that Petitioner has the ability and will provide quality care, the project is financially feasible, Petitioner will work with and help to meet the needs of health maintenance organizations and will promote cost effectiveness in Orange County. Petitioner's proposal is consistent with the goals, objectives and recommended actions in the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan and the local health plan. The State Plan encourages the existence of ASCs and the removal of obstacles to the use of outpatient surgery; the local plan provides that applicants for an ASC must demonstrate a willingness to provide services to underserved patient groups and considers the provision of ambulatory surgery to the underserved population to be a desirable objective. In this case Petitioner intends to provide 20% of its cases to Medicaid patients, and another 4% to indigents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for CON number 3677. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chris H. Bentley, Esquire Post Office Box 1739 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Douglas Mannheimer, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 E. G. Boone, Esquire Jeffrey Boone, Esquire Gregory Roberts, Esquire Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. 2,3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 14. 12,13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 15 but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. 23-25. Rejected in Finding of Fact 18 and otherwise rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12-14. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12, 13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13, 14. 31-35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 36,37. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. 39,40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. 41. Rejected as a Finding of Fact since this is a request for further ruling on Petitioner's Motion to Limine which was granted at hearing. Petitioner filed a Motion in Limine on June 11, 1986 to exclude depositions taken of John Hutchens on April 23, 1986 and June 5, 1986. This is the motion dealt with at the prehearing conference on June 23, 1986. The only deposition of John Hutchens offered by Intervenor and admitted was one taken on June 20, 1986 (I-2). Therefore, Petitioner's motion and the prior ruling is moot since the depositions to which the motion was directed were not offered at hearing. 42-45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Rulings on Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact, as set forth beginning on page 3: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 2-16. Rejected in Finding of Fact 15, and otherwise irrelevant and cumulative. 17,18. Rejected in Findings of Fact 12-14, 22. 19-26. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 14, but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. 27,28. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 12, 13, but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. 29. Rejected in Findings of Fact 12-15 and otherwise as argument rather than proposed findings of fact. 30-34. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 16 and otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 19, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13, 14. 37,38. Rejected as irrelevant. 39,40. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 2, 3 but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 43,44. Rejected in Finding of Fact 22. 45-47. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected in Findings of Fact 3, 5, 7 and 22. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. 53,54. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 11, 22 but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 57-59. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony, irrelevant and contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 13, 14 and 16 but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. 62,63. Rejected in Finding of Fact 21 and otherwise irrelevant and contrary to competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 4, 7. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected in Findings of Fact 11, 22. Rejected in Finding of Fact 22 and otherwise irrelevant and contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 20, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16; rejected in Finding of Fact 21 and otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 4, 5 and otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 72-75. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 19-21, but otherwise rejected in Findings of Fact 21, 22 and as irrelevant. 76-79. Rejected as irrelevant, cumulative argument which does not provide citations to the record contrary to Rule 221-6.31(3), Florida Administrative Code.
Conclusions Having reviewed the administrative complaint dated July 16, 2008, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration ("Agency") has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 2) with the other party to these proceedings, and being otherwise well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: The. att ached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Filed June 30, 2009 1:59 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. Respondent shall pay an administrative fine in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1000.00). The administrative fine is due and payable within thirty (30) days of the date of rendition of this Order. Checks should be made payable to the "Agency for Health Care Administration." The check, along with a reference to these case numbers, should be sent directly to: Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Unpaid amounts pursuant to this Order will be subject to statutory interest and may be collected by all methods legally available. Respondent's petition for formal administrative proceedings is hereby dismissed. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's fees. The above-styled case is hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this du, day of- =---' 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Holly Ben on, Secretary Agency fo Health Care Administration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: David C. Ashburn Attorney for the Respondent Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (U. S. Mail) Mary Daley Jacobs Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2295 Victoria Avenue, Room 346C Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (Interoffice Mail) Finance & Accounting Agency for Health Care Admin. Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Daniel Manry Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (U.S. Mail) Jan Mills Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the <?s = method designated, on this the Z f C J , 2009. Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 922-5873 STATE OF FLORIDA
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Petitioner is liable to the Agency for Health Care Administration ("Agency") for Medicaid reimbursement overpayments and related fines, costs, and interest.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the single state agency charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida under Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner provides physician services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to a contract with the Agency under provider number 037381800. The Agency sent the Petitioner a Preliminary Agency Audit report on June 30, 1998, notifying him of a preliminary determination of Medicaid overpayments in the total amount of $21,156.35. The Agency sent the Petitioner a Final Agency Audit Report on October 28, 1998, confirming the Agency's determination of Medicaid overpayments in the total amount of $21,156.35. The Agency's determination of overpayment was based upon findings that obstetrical echography services "were billed and paid in violation of Medicaid policy governing those services." The Agency performed an audit of the Petitioner for the period January 1, 1993, through October 31, 1996. According to the Agency audit report, the Petitioner's records contained violations of two billing policies outlined in the Medicaid Physician Provider Handbook. The first violation was that the Petitioner billed and received payment for more than one initial ultrasound procedure per pregnancy, and the second was that the Petitioner failed to submit documentation of medical necessity for additional procedures. During the years examined by the audit, Medicaid policy allowed providers to bill for more than one complete initial procedure per patient, so long as providers filed supporting documentation of medical necessity. However, the documentation submitted by the Petitioner indicated that the additional ultrasound procedures he conducted were mere follow-up procedures, instead of medically necessary complete procedures. According to the terms of the Medicaid Physician Provider Handbook, "[i]f more than two (or any combination of two) ultrasounds are performed during a pregnancy, they must be billed with modifier-22 and a report documenting the medical necessity for the procedure." The Petitioner submitted bills for more than two ultrasound treatments per recipient without explaining why the procedures were medically necessary. The Agency audit report established that the Petitioner has been overpaid as a result of the Petitioner's erroneous billings. The total overpayment to the Petitioner was calculated as "the difference between what he got paid for a complete procedure and the amount that he should have gotten paid for the follow-up." The Agency records received in evidence and the testimony of the Agency's witness establish that the amount overpaid to the Petitioner totaled $21,156.35. The Petitioner, as an authorized provider of Medicaid services, had signed a Medicaid Provider Agreement. That agreement states, among other things, that the "provider agrees to submit Medicaid claims in accordance with program policies." When the Petitioner became a certified Medicaid provider, he received a handbook outlining billing procedures for the performance of diagnostic ultrasounds. The Petitioner admitted that he knows "little about billing," that he "didn't involve [himself] in the billing at all," and that he has never read the Physicians' Current Procedural Terminology book, which sets forth the universally used billing codes.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency issue a final order requiring the Petitioner to reimburse the Agency for overpayments in the total amount of $21,156.35, plus such interest as may accrue as of the date on which payment is made. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2001.
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether Petitioners are entitled to the Medicaid payments which they received or whether the claims filed by Petitioners were improper. At hearing Petitioners presented the testimony of Gary Allen Kitos; Joseph Namey, D.O.: Herbert Moselli; Robert Grenitz, M.D.; Mary Bone; Herbert Topol, D.O.; Sylvan Goldin, D.O.; and Mildred Martin. Topol Exhibits 1-3 and 5 were admitted in evidence. Goldin Exhibits 1-4, 6 and 7 were admitted in evidence. Topol-Goldin General Practice (GP) Exhibits 1-7 and 35-37 were admitted in evidence. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) presented the testimony of Jules J. Cohen, D.O.; Morton T. Smith, D.O.; and Mildred Martin. HRS also presented the testimony by deposition of Lawrence E. Stivers and Michael W. Forsthoefel, M.D. HRS Exhibits 1-23 were admitted in evidence. Joint Exhibits 1-4 were also admitted, which include three inventory lists and four separate large boxes of patient records. The parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. All proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law have been considered. A ruling has been made on each proposed finding of fact in the Appendix hereto and made a part hereof.
Findings Of Fact During 1932, Petitioners Goldin, Topol, and the Topol- Goldin General Practice Clinic were all operating out of the same facility but each billed Medicaid under a separate physician provider number. Medicaid is a joint state and federal program that is completely voluntary. In entering into a provider agreement with Medicaid, Topol, Goldin and the General Practice Clinic agreed to abide by the provisions of the Florida Administrative Rules, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and federal laws and regulations. Under the Medicaid Program, a state may limit the services provided for under federal regulations. As part of the requirements for participation in Medicaid, the State of Florida has a peer review process to monitor all providers. Peer review is a recognized process utilized by third party payors (such as Medicaid, Medicare and insurance companies) to assure that they are getting the services for which they are paying. Florida's Medicaid peer review process is modeled after the federal Medicare Program's process. In Florida approximately 7,000 physicians are enrolled in the Medicaid program at any one time. In order to monitor all of these physicians' practices, the Medicaid Program reviews those physicians whose practice exceeds the parameters of the average Medicaid physician's practice. Reviews of physicians' practices number between 60 to 85 physicians per year. Approximately 40-50% of those physicians reviewed are referred for peer review. The Medicaid review for physicians consists of a Level I review of the physician's activity in the program compared to the physician's peers. If the physician exceeds the upper limits in the Level I review, a desk review is done by medical consultants who review a "claims detail" of all claims for payment made by the provider. If further review is needed, a disproportionate stratified random sample (DSRS) of the physician's claims is obtained and the physician's patient records for those claims are obtained. The physician's records are first reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant who determines if peer review is necessary. After a peer review is done, an in-house consultant does a line-by-line evaluation based on the peer review findings and medical necessity and makes a recommendation for denial of claims. Those claims denied are then converted into an amount of money for disallowance. The Medicaid program does not review physicians just because of the amount of money they make in the program. In September of 1981 the Medicaid Investigative Section requested updates on providers who had previously been investigated in 1977. Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic were among those providers. Cases for review were then opened for Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice-Clinic in 1982. A preliminary cursory review of the practices of Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic was prepared by a nursing consultant who recommended that the investigation go forward. During the same time period that the review of Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic was beginning, a separate review of a Medicaid recipient raised questions of pingponging (going from one doctor to another) between Drs. Topol and Goldin that would justify a further review of their practice. In February and March of 1983, Level II Review reports (desk analysis) were issued on Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic. These reports contained the Level I Reviews, documentation of the provider's 1982 Medicaid practice, complaints, conclusions, and recommendations. The Level I Review reports included in the Level II Review indicated those areas where the providers exceeded the upper limits of their peers. For example, Dr. Goldin averaged 1,998 Medicaid office visits per quarter compared to an average of 86 for other Medicaid physicians. Dr. Goldin's average exceeded two standard deviations above the average for his peers. The Level II Reviews concluded that the allegations of overutilization for Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic had been substantiated and it was recommended that they be referred to Peer Review. In March of 1983, a meeting was held to discuss these cases because of their complicated nature. At that meeting, Mildred Martin was instructed to proceed with Peer Review In preparing for Peer Review, disproportionate stratified random samples (DHRS) for Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic were obtained. A DSRS is the tabulation of the provider's activities or the amounts paid to him for each recipient during a specific period of time. It lists the recipients in ascending order of amounts paid to the provider. Total amounts of the payments made during the period are divided into five strata of the same or close to the same amounts of money. A DSRS is used to give an overall view of the physician's practice. On each DSRS the computer randomly picked 30 patients for a detailed review of their patient records. Because of the volume of practice of Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic, it would not have been fair to evaluate their entire practice using only 30 records. Therefore, HRS decided to review 7% of records of Topol and Goldin. The General Practice Clinic records were reviewed as randomly selected by the computer. In order to enlarge the sample to 7%, Ms. Martin utilized a random selection process employed by Medicare, which entailed selecting every third patient beginning from the bottom of each strata and working up until a 7% sample was achieved. This does mean that patients in the 7% samples represent the patients in each strata for whom the highest claims were made. When the same patient record appeared in two different samples, the next patient on the list was used to avoid duplication and disallowance of two of the providers for the same patient. The records selected for review were selected randomly and selected utilizing generally accepted statistical techniques. In June of 1983, Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic were requested to submit the records of those claims selected from the DSRS and the 7% sample process. When it was obvious that the records received were not complete, Ms. Martin contacted the offices of Goldin, Topol and the General Practice Clinic, requesting the missing records. Those records received from Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic were referred to the Florida Osteopathic Medical Association's (FOMA) Peer Review Committee along with information indicating the areas of concern and a letter of explanation from Dr. Goldin. The FOMA Peer Review Committee is an independent organization made up of approximately ten osteopathic physicians from various parts of the State of Florida. The FOMA contracts with third party carriers (Medicaid) to review peers. The cases supplied to the FOMA Peer Review Committee are reviewed and discussed and the committee issues its opinion on overutilization. The FOMA Peer Review Committee's findings are either no overutilization, minimal overutilization (5-20%) overutilization), moderate overutilization (20-50%) or excessive overutilization (over 50%). Upon receipt of the referral from HRS, the FOMA Peer Review Committee set up a meeting and invited Drs. Topol and Goldin. At that meeting held April 28, 1984, eight (8) physicians of the Peer Review Committee reviewed the charts and interviewed Drs. Topol and Goldin. The Peer Review Committee looked for a trend in the physicians' overall practice. The Peer Review Committee found that the records were poorly documented and difficult to read. The Peer Review Committee found that the patients were being seen more than medically necessary. It was a consensus of the members of the FOMA Peer Review Committee that there was moderate overutilization. By letters dated May 9, 1984, the FOMA Peer Review Committee notified Drs. Topol and Goldin and HRS of their findings. The medical records of Topo1 and Goldin were then sent to Dr. Michael Forsthoefel, M.D., for a line-by-line disallowance of services based upon the Medicaid rules and regulations and the Peer Review Committee's findings. Dr. Forsthoefel disallowed an amount of claims in the range of 30-35% which fell within the level of moderate overutilization (20-50%) determined by the Peer Review Committee, however, since Dr. Forsthoefel was an M.D. and not a D.O., HRS decided that in all fairness the determinations should be made by a D.O. who was a peer of the doctors being reviewed. The medical records of Topol and Goldin under review were-then sent to Dr. Morton T. Smith, D.O., for the line-by- line determination. In order to assure further fairness of the review, Dr. Smith was instructed not to review and disallow any claims by a physician that appeared on a record of the other physician being reviewed. As a result of the new review by Dr. Smith and the instructions given him, the total amount disallowed dropped to 16 or 17%. (The Transcript, p. 635, says 60-70%, but that is a typographical error and should read 16-17%). It is found that the peer review and the disallowances by Dr. Smith were reasonable and accurate. It was then necessary to apply the amount disallowed in the 7% sample to the overall Medicaid claims of Topol and Goldin. HRS performed this calculation by determining the average overpayment for the recipients in each strata sample and multiplying that average by the total number of recipients in each strata. However, because the samples were selected from those recipients in each strata with the highest claims (See Finding of Fact 32), the "average overpayment per recipient" method of extending the overpayments in each sample to the total population of claims is arbitrarily skewed. The result is that Topol and Goldin were exposed to liability greatly in excess of the total amount claimed. The more reasonable method for extending the overpayments in each sample to the total population of claims would be to determine the percentage of disallowed claims in each strata sample and to apply that percentage to the total paid in each strata. For example for Dr. Goldin in Strata I a total of $922 was paid and $30 was disallowed, or a 3.25% disallowance. Applied to the total paid in that strata of $21,600.28, a total overpayment for Strata I is shown to be $702.01. Using this method of calculation, it is determined that Dr. Goldin has been overpaid as follows: Strata I $702.01 (30/922 X 21,600.28) Strata II $2,957.64 (204/1490.92 X 21,620.18) Strata III $2,238.49 (274.24/2378.94 X 21,627.92) Strata IV $3,506.92 (617.95/3805.88 X 21,594.33) Strata V $5,886.05 (1841.36/6729.80 X 21,513.33) Total $15,291.11 Using this method of calculation, it is determined that Dr. Topol has been overpaid as follows: Strata I $1,417.87 (60.98/728.16 X 16,939.88) Strata II $2,263.31 (160.00/1199.63 X 16,966.34) Strata III $2,099.45 (225.74/1823.52 X 16,958.37) Strata IV $2,335.17 (402.96/2935.57 X 17,007.75) Strata V $4,195.75 (1358.14/5443.97 X 16,816.65) Total $12,311.55 The General Practice Clinic was treated differently because it was operated differently. The provider number issued to the General Practice Clinic was applied for and granted to Drs. Topol and Goldin as authorized agents. General Practice Clinic was actually operated and run by Mary Petruff Bone. At the General Practice Clinic, Ms. Bone prescribed and mixed antigens for allergy patients, determined what testings were to be done, and handled other medical problems of patients. Neither Dr. Topol nor Dr. Goldin had any expertise in the field of allergy treatment. The records of the General Practice Clinic were the responsibility and the product of Ms. Bone. At all times material hereto, Ms. Bone was a certified physician's assistant competent to provide services to allergy patients. A physician's assistant is not a physician. At all times material hereto, physicians' assistants could not receive a provider number from Medicaid under which they could bill the Medicaid Program. Ms. Bone billed Medicaid for her services under the General-Practice Clinic's physician provider number. Medicaid was billed for physician's services by the General Practice Clinic even though a physician did not see the patient. It is not usual and customary practice for physicians to bill for their services when they do not see the patients. The State of Florida's Medicaid Program does not authorize payment for services to a physician's assistant under the supervision of a physician. The Medicaid program paid $75,654.73 to the General Practice Clinic in 1982 under its physician provider number. Medicaid did not learn that the General Practice Clinic's billings were for non-physician's services until the Peer Review Committee met with Petitioners on April 28, 1984. For the General Practice Clinic, Dr. Goldin admitted that $40,642.85 should have been disallowed due to improper billing procedures. The $40,642.85 calculated by Dr. Goldin did not take into account any possible double billing or the fact that the clinic's services were performed by a physician's assistant. The records for the General Practice Clinic were not referred to a physician consultant because the payment denials were due strictly to noncompliance with Medicaid rules and regulations, not the overutilization findings of the Peer Review Committee. Medicaid claims for the General Practice Clinic were denied for four basic reasons: 1) No records provided to substantiate the claim; 2) improper billing for B-12 injections; 3) duplicate billing where the General Practice Clinic and Topo or Goldin billed on the same day; and 4) office visits not rendered by a physician. Antigen injections and allergy testing were not disallowed in the claims submitted by the General Practice Clinic because those services are commonly reimbursable when done by someone other than a physician under a physician's supervision. The amounts disallowed for the sample of claims for the General Practice Clinic was then applied to the overall clinic practice in the same manner that the Topol and Goldin amounts were applied to their practice in order to obtain an amount owed the HRS Medicaid Program for the disallowed services. However, again the method used by HRS to extend the overpayment amount determined from the sample to the total population of claims is unreasonable because it does not accurately project the total amount overpaid. For example, in Strata I for the General Practice Clinic, a total of $15,177.73 in Medicaid benefits were paid in 1982. Yet, using the HRS method, a total overpayment of $22,201.44 is determined for that strata, or $7,023.71 more than was ever paid in that strata. Such a result must be unreasonable. If instead the percentage method applied above is used, it is determined that the General Practice Clinic has been overpaid as follows: Strata I $12,659.76 (362/434 X 15,177.73) Strata II $12,784.78 (1447/1719 X 15,188.00) Strata III $12,578.68 (3284/4001 X 15,325.00) Strata IV $13,102.67 (4244/4969 X 15,341.00) Strata V $12,215.79 (5369/6427 X 14,623.00) Total S63,341.68 Some disallowances were made on all three provider numbers because no documentation was provided, even after Ms. Martin asked a second time. These disallowances are proper and correct because Medicaid will not pay for services where there is no documentation justifying the services. The fact that Petitioners now claim to have that documentation is irrelevant to the correctness of the disallowances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order which provides: That Dr. Herbert Topol, D.O., reimburse the Medicaid Program for $12,311.55 in Medicaid overpayments for 1982. That Dr. Sylvan Goldin, D.O., reimburse the Medicaid Program for $15,291.11 in Medicaid overpayments for 1982. That the Topol-Goldin General Practice reimburse the Medicaid Program for $63,341.68 in Medicaid overpayments for 1982. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Herbert Topol, D.O. 1111 W. Broward Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Sylvan Goldin, D.O. 1111 W. Broward Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Page, Jr., Secretary Dept. of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Petitioners' proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding of Fact 3 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 32. Proposed Finding of Fact 6 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 76. Proposed Finding of Fact 8 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 77. Proposed Finding of Fact 39 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 70. Proposed Finding of Fact 52 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 55. . 6. Proposed Findings of Fact 1, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 47 and 48 are rejected as constituting argument and as being conclusory. 7. Proposed Findings of Fact 2, 4, 16, 22, 23, 24, 30, 33, 35, 36, 40, 46, 49 and 50 are subordinate to the fact actually found. 8. Proposed Findings of Fact 7, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 34, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45 and 46 are irrelevant and/or unnecessary. 9. Proposed Findings of Fact 17, 25, 28, 32, 43 and 51 are not supported by the competent, substantiated evidence. Additionally, Proposed Findings of Fact 25, 28 and 32 are based on and refer to exhibits which were not admitted in evidence. The exhibits are attached to the proposed order and are rejected as an inappropriate attempt to supplement the record. Rulings on Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact. Each of the following proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance or as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the pro- posed Findings of Fact: 1(1); 2(58); 3(59); 4(60); 5(S1); 6(62); 7(63); 8(64); 9(65); 10(66); 11(67); 12(68); 13(69), 14(70) 15(71); 16(72); 17(60); 18(2); 19(3); 20(4); 21(5); 22(6); 24(7) 25(8); 26(9); 27(10); 28(11); 29(12); 30(13); 31(14); 32(15), 33(16); 34(17); 35(18); 36(19); 37(20); 38(21); 39(22); 40(23). 41(24); 42(25); 43(26); 44(27); 45(28); 46(29); 47(30); 48(31), 49(32); 50(33); 51(34); 52(35); 53(36) 54(37); 55(38); 56(39). 57(40); 58(41); 59(42); 60(43); 61(44); 62(45); 64(46); 65(47) 66(48). 67(49); 68(50); 69(51); 70(53); 74(73); 75(74); 76(76); 79(75); 81(78). Proposed Findings of Fact 23, 63, and 80 are irrelevant. Proposed Findings of Fact 71, 72, 73, 77 and 78 are subordinate to the facts found.
