The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and/or Class "G" Statewide Firearm License should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, set forth in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence introduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about June 7, 1989, Respondent filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License with the Department. The application form asked the applicant whether he had ever been arrested and to list any and all arrests. The application specifically provided that "falsification of this question may be grounds for denial of your license." Respondent answered affirmatively that he had been arrested. The only specific incident listed on the application was an arrest in 1979 for a charge of "asault [sic] with a deadly weapon intemp [sic] to kill Fay N.C. [sic]." The Application also required the applicant to set forth the outcome of all arrests. Respondent replied that the "charges was [sic] drop [sic]." On or about July 17, 1990, Respondent submitted an application with the Department for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. The application form for this license included an identical request regarding prior arrests. In response, Respondent checked the box indicating he had never been arrested and wrote "N/A" where he was supposed to indicate the date, charge and outcome of the arrests. Respondent has not provided any explanation for why his Class "D" Application disclosed an arrest in 1979, but his Class "G" Application did not reference this arrest. This discrepancy is not alleged in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner has submitted a certificate from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court which indicates that a criminal summons was issued for "Angelo Louis Lugo" on or about May 5, 1987, for a charge of "M Assault By Pointing A Gun." It is not clear whether this summons is directed at Respondent nor is it clear whether the Summons was ever served and/or the subject was arrested. The ultimate disposition of this criminal case is not clear. Respondent denies ever being served with the summons referenced in this court record. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Respondent was ever arrested in connection with this matter. Petitioner has submitted a second certified record from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court, which indicates that Respondent was issued a "Citation" on March 10, 1986, for the charge of "M Shoplifting Concealment Goods." No other evidence or explanation of this record has been provided. Respondent admits that he was issued a Notice to Appear in court after he was caught by store security personnel taking aspirin from a bottle. He testified that he did not list this matter on his applications because he was not "arrested." Instead, he claims that he was merely issued a citation to appear in court. The evidence presented in this case did not refute Respondent's version of the events surrounding this court record. In sum, the evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever formally "arrested" for this incident. The ultimate disposition of this criminal charge is not clear from the record in this proceeding. Counts III and IV of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint are based upon an incident that occurred on February 9, 1993 between Respondent and Jorge Ruiz. There is a good deal of conflicting evidence regarding this incident. Both Respondent and Ruiz have testified and/or given statements on several occasions about the incident including statements to the police, testimony in a related criminal proceeding against Respondent and depositions taken in connection with a civil lawsuit filed by Ruiz against Respondent, Respondent's employer and the Bank where Respondent worked. It is impossible and unnecessary to resolve all of the conflicts in the differing accounts of the incident as described by Respondent and Ruiz at various times. After considering all of the evidence presented, including the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, the findings in this Recommended Order are based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented. On February 9, 1993, Respondent was working as an armed security guard at a Barnett Bank in Plantation, Florida. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Respondent was working outside the bank in the vicinity of the drive-thru lanes. He was there to direct traffic and monitor the area. Around this time, Jorge Ruiz pulled into the paved area in front of the drive-thru booths. Ruiz had been to the Bank on numerous occasions in the past and he had often used the drive-thru windows. Ruiz has a very powerful radio in his pick-up truck and he admits that he tends to play music at a loud volume. On at least one prior occasion, Ruiz had proceeded to the drive-thru station with his radio blasting. The tellers had complained about the noise coming through the intercom system. During the week or so prior to February 9, 1993, Ruiz and Respondent had at least one minor confrontation. During this prior instance, Respondent advised Ruiz that he had to turn his radio down before he reached the drive-thru booth because the intercom system picked up the background noise and it interfered with the tellers' ability to communicate with the customers. Ruiz replied that he would turn down the radio when he got to the window. When Ruiz entered the Bank's parking lot on February 9, 1993, his radio was playing loudly. Respondent approached the driver's side window of Ruiz' vehicle and asked Ruiz to turn his radio down. Ruiz responded with a number of obscenities. Respondent told Ruiz that unless he turned his radio down, he could not use the drive-thru facility. Ruiz refused to comply. Respondent stood in front of Ruiz' vehicle and directed him away from the drive-thru lane. Ruiz' vehicle moved forward and bumped into Respondent. Respondent drew his gun and shouted at Ruiz to stop the car and get out. Respondent claims that he intended to hold Ruiz while he called the police. The parties exchanged words and Ruiz' truck again moved forward striking Respondent. Respondent was not knocked down or otherwise injured, however, his gun discharged. The bullet penetrated the windshield of Ruiz' truck and hit the steering wheel. A fragment from the steering wheel struck Ruiz in the neck or chest area, causing a minor wound. Respondent contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon and/or using deadly force "to prevent the escape from custody of a person who committed a felony in his presence." This contention is rejected because there is no evidence that Ruiz was attempting to escape. Furthermore, it is not clear that Ruiz in fact committed a felony, nor does it appear that the use of force was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case. Respondent also contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon in self-defense because he was being threatened by a deadly weapon, i.e. Ruiz' truck, and he had no reasonable means of escape. Respondent claims that he was boxed in by a vehicle in front of the truck and had no reasonable way to retreat from the "deadly force" that confronted him. Respondent's contention that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected as not credible. Contrary to Respondent's claim, the evidence was clear that Respondent had reasonable means of escape. Moreover, there were alternate ways to handle the situation which would have diffused rather than exacerbated the tension and danger. Respondent claims that the gun discharged accidently when the truck hit him. No persuasive evidence was presented to refute this contention. Indeed, in some of his statements, Ruiz admitted that the gun may have gone off by accident when his truck struck Respondent. In sum, it is clear that Ruiz was belligerent and abusive and that his car bumped into Respondent twice. Nonetheless, Respondent's contention that he was justified in drawing his weapon and that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected. While it can not be concluded from the evidence presented that Respondent deliberately shot at Ruiz, the evidence did establish that Respondent was guilty of negligence, misconduct and/or incompetency when he drew and pointed his loaded weapon at Ruiz. The circumstances did not justify Respondent pointing a loaded weapon at Ruiz. Without question, Respondent failed to demonstrate that level of discretion and caution that is expected of a person licensed to carry a firearm in the course of his employment. After the gun went off, Respondent immediately jumped into the truck and took Ruiz to a nearby hospital where Ruiz' minor injury was treated and he was released.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I, II, and III of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent and finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Count IV of that Third Amended Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violation, Respondent should be fined $1,500.00, his Class "G" Firearms License should be revoked and his Class "D" Security Guard License should be placed on probation for three years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2566 Petitioner has not submitted any proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's proposed recommended order included a section entitled Findings of Fact. However, that section does not include any individually numbered proposed findings of fact and the paragraphs contained in this section of Respondent's proposal include a mixture factual assertions, argument and legal conclusions. The proposal has been fully reviewed and considered. However, because proposed findings of fact have not been separately identified, no rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposal. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 James S. Benjamin, Esquire Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A. 100 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact Based on the exhibits received in evidence and the testimony of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact. The Respondent holds a Class "D", unarmed security guard license, No. GD-0106713, which was most recently renewed on July 3, 1983. The Respondent also holds a Class "G", statewide gun permit (armed security guard license) , No. GG-0025231, which was issued on July 3, 1983. The Division of Licensing of the Department of State did not approve or deny the Respondent's application for a Class "G" license within a 90-day period from the date of receipt of the application and, accordingly, by operation of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, the Division was required to, and in fact did, issue a Class "G" license to the Respondent. Except for the operation of the 90-day provision in Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, the Division of Licensing would not have issued the Respondent a statewide gun permit because of the Respondent's criminal record. For the same reason, it was a mistake for the Division of Licensing to renew the Respondent's Class "D" license in 1983. On February 28, 1977, the Respondent was arrested on the roof of a department-store and charged with burglary, to which he entered a plea of nolo contendre. Adjudication was withheld and the Respondent was placed on probation for 5 years. During the summer of 1980, the Respondent and two of his friends apprehended two thieves who had stolen some personal property from a vehicle. Later, the Respondent appeared in court to testify against the two thieves. On April 15, 1981, the Respondent was arrested for grand larceny. On November 9, 1981, the Respondent entered a plea of guilty to a larceny charge of failing to redeliver a hired motor vehicle. Adjudication was withheld and the Respondent was placed on probation for one year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing it is recommended that the De- partment of State issue a Final Order which (a) Would revoke Respondent's Class "D" and Class "G" licenses and (b) would order Respondent to forthwith return such licenses to the Department of State. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of September, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1984 COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State Department of State 1801 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James V. Antista, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Stuart Phillip Coon 12824 Southwest 114 Terrace Miami, Florida 33183
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, an employee of Vanguard Security and the holder of a Class "D" security guard license and a Class "G" statewide firearms license. Vanguard Security (hereinafter referred to as "Vanguard") is an agency which provides armed and unarmed security services to its clients. Vanguard has a written policy prohibiting the display and use of firearms by its security officers except where such conduct is reasonably necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm. Vanguard also has a written policy forbidding its security officers from leaving their assigned posts while they are on duty. These written policies are set forth in an employee handbook that all employees of the agency are given. On the evening of October 25, 1993, Respondent was assigned to provide armed security services in a warehouse area in Dade County, Florida. At approximately 10:00 p.m. that evening Andrea Ramsey was walking her friend's unleashed dog, a Doberman pinscher named "Chewy," in the vicinity of the warehouse area Respondent was responsible for guarding (hereinafter referred to as Respondent's "post" or "posted area"). Chewy's owner, Eileen Escardo, was working late in her photography studio which was located across the street from Respondent's post. Respondent saw Ramsey from afar. His suspicions aroused, he walked toward her to investigate. Respondent left his posted area and started to cross the street that separated the posted area from the warehouse in which Escardo's photography studio was located. When he was approximately 20 feet from Ramsey, he asked her if Chewy, who was by a tree to her left, was her dog. Ramsey responded in the affirmative. Chewy then, in a leisurely manner, headed toward Ramsey and Respondent. Although Chewy was moving in Respondent's direction, he did so in a manner that did not reasonably suggest that he was going to attack Respondent. Nonetheless, Respondent panicked. Contrary to his employer's written policies regarding the display and discharge of firearms, he drew his revolver and, when Chewy was approximately three or four feet away from him, fired the weapon, but without any intention of shooting the dog or Ramsey. The bullet hit and shattered the glass door of the business next to Escardo's photography studio. Fortunately, no one was hurt or injured. Ramsey screamed when Respondent fired his revolver. Escardo heard her friend's scream, as well as the shot that preceded it. She rushed out of her studio to see what had happened. Escardo saw Ramsey standing in the middle of the street, with Respondent nearby holding a revolver. After instructing Ramsey to call the police, Escardo walked toward Respondent. Pointing his revolver at Escardo, Respondent warned her to stay away from him. Despite the warning, Escardo, who was unarmed, continued to approach Respondent until she was close enough to push him and the revolver aside. She then turned around and walked toward her studio to wait for the police.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department enter a final order (1) finding the evidence sufficient to establish that Respondent committed the violations of Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, in alleged Counts I and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and (2) disciplining him for having committed these violations by revoking his Class "G" statewide firearms license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of July, 1994. _ STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Christopher Hargraves, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed on his Class "B" Security Agency License, Class "G" Statewide Firearm Permit, and Class "MB" Manager of Security Agency License.
Findings Of Fact At all timed pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Christopher W. Hargraves (Respondent/Mr.Hargraves), was the holder of Class "B" Security Agency License No. B87-00007, Class "MB" Security Agency Manager License No. MB 90-000019, and Class "G" Statewide Firearms License No. G91-00245. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Hargraves was president of Protection Unlimited Crime Prevention Associated, Inc. (Protection Unlimited), a company which provided security services in the Tampa Bay area. The address of record for Protection Unlimited is 1511 Clement Road, Lutz, Florida 33549. Mack Cummings began his employment as a security officer with Protection Unlimited in early 1996 and worked there until late 1996. At the time Mr. Cummings was employed to work as a security guard for Protection Unlimited, he was also employed by Providence Security. As a security officer for Providence Security, Mr. Cummings' assigned posts were three Checkers Restaurants located in Tampa, Florida. Mr. Cummings' shift at Checkers began at 8:00 p.m. and ended between 1:00 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. The variation in the time Mr. Cummings' shift ended was due to and coincided with the time the particular Checkers' manager completed the restaurant's closing. When Mr. Cummings was employed by Protection Unlimited, he was assigned to work at Channel 13, a television facility located in Tampa, Florida. When he was being considered for the position of security officer, Mr. Cummings told Respondent about his assignment with Providence Security and advised Respondent that he would be unable to report to Channel 13 until after midnight. Nonetheless, Mr. Cummings was scheduled to begin his shift at Channel 13 at midnight. As a result of his employment at Providence Security, Mr. Cummings usually did not report for duty at Channel 13 until after midnight. Respondent was aware that on many nights Mr. Cummings was not reporting to Channel 13 until much later than midnight. Steven Cox worked for Protection Unlimited as a security officer during most of 1995. As a security guard for Protection Unlimited, Mr. Cox' assigned posts were Channel 13 and a yacht, the Claire T. While working at Channel 13, Mr. Cox performed security duties in plain clothes. At the time Mr. Cox was employed by Protection Unlimited, no uniforms were issued to him. Mr. Hargraves issued uniforms to Mr. Cox approximately two months after Mr. Cox began working for Protection Unlimited. David Gilbert was hired as a security officer with Protection Unlimited on or about July 10, 1995. Mr. Gilbert often worked with Steven Cox while both were employed with Protection Unlimited. During this time, Mr. Cox often observed Gilbert performing security duties in civilian clothes, rather than in a uniform. Michael Munger began his employment as a security officer with Protection Unlimited in late 1994 and worked for that agency for approximately nine months. As an employee of Protection Unlimited, Mr. Munger was assigned to Channel 13. Although Mr. Munger performed security duties at Channel 13, he was never provided with a uniform and thus, performed these duties in plain clothes. Willie Lee began his employment as a security officer with Protection Unlimited in June 1995 and worked for the agency until January 1996. Mr. Lee's assigned post was Channel 13. When Mr. Lee was initially employed by Protection Unlimited, he was not issued an agency identification card. A month or two after Mr. Lee was employed by Protection Unlimited, Respondent gave him a card which Respondent referred to as an agency identification card. The only information contained on the card was "Protection Unlimited Crime Prevention, Inc.," the typewritten name "Willie Lee," and Mr. Lee's signature. Also, the "agency card" had spaces designated "photo" and "agency representative," although the card contained neither a photo of Mr. Lee nor the signature or name of the agency representative. Barbara Norman was employed as a security officer with Protection Unlimited for several weeks in 1995. Respondent never provided Ms. Norman with uniforms to wear while she was performing security duties. Moreover, Ms. Norman had only a Class "D" license and therefore was not authorized to work as an "armed guard." Consistent with this Class "D" license, Protection Unlimited did not provide Ms. Norman with a firearm while she worked at Channel 13. However, she was told to wear an empty holster. Glen Davis was employed as a security officer with Protection Unlimited in 1996. Mr. Davis was assigned to the Claire T yacht. Mr. Davis was not issued uniforms to wear while conducting security duties for Protection Unlimited. On April 8, 1996, Gary Floyd and Gene Blicth, investigator for the Department, performed a proactive inspection of the Claire T while Mr. Davis was on duty and observed that Mr. Davis was not wearing a uniform. William Scott was employed with Protection Unlimited in February 1996 and continued working for the agency until July 1996. While employed with Protection Unlimited, Mr. Scott worked as a both a security guard and as acting supervisor for the agency. During the time that Mr. Scott worked for Protection Unlimited, he usually relieved by Mack Cummings or Steve Pritchard, also employees of Protection Unlimited. One night Mr. Pritchard did not report to work and no guard was or came on duty when Mr. Scott's assigned shift ended. Several times during his employment with Protection Unlimited, Mr. Scott needed to leave Channel 13 before the end of his shift. In these instances, and before leaving his post early, Mr. Scott gave prior notice to Respondent. Upon being so informed, Respondent told Mr. Scott that he should not indicate on the log that he had left his post early. As acting supervisor with Protection Unlimited, Mr. Scott was aware that Respondent routinely generated scheduling documents, time sheets, and payment schedules related to the operations of Protection Unlimited. Mr. Scott observed Respondent throw away many of these documents. The documents that Respondent discarded were less than two years old. On or about March 8, 1996, Investigator Floyd performed a proactive inspection of the yacht, the Claire T. At the site, he spoke with a man who identified himself as Rocky Cocozza. Mr. Cocozza was working as a security guard on the vessel and produced an agency identification card from Protection Unlimited. During this inspection, Mr. Cocozza was wearing black trousers and a black jacket. Under the jacket, Mr. Cocozza was wearing a blue short-sleeve shirt which contained an emblem identifying the employing agency; the emblem was on the left side of the shirt, just above the pocket. However, the emblem on the shirt could not necessarily be seen when Mr. Cocozza was wearing the black jacket. On March 18, 1996, Investigator Floyd was on the premises of Channel 13. As he was leaving that facility, Investigator Floyd observed Respondent performing security duties in the reception area. Investigator Floyd then approached Respondent and asked to see his agency identification card. Respondent did not produce a current agency identification card. On or about May 3, 1996, Investigator Floyd went to Respondent's address of record to inquire about matters related to Protection Unlimited. After determining that no one was on the premises, Investigator Floyd left one of his business cards on the door of Respondent's address of record. On the card, Investigator Floyd wrote, "Chris, please call." The note on the card was directed to Respondent, whose first name is Christopher. Later that same day, Investigator Floyd went to Respondent's residence. After Respondent's wife told Investigator Floyd that Respondent was not at home, Investigator Floyd gave one of his business cards to Respondent's wife and requested that she give it to Respondent. On the card given to Respondent's wife, Investigator Floyd also wrote a note requesting that Respondent call him. After waiting two months and receiving no response from Respondent, Investigator Floyd left several telephone messages for Respondent between July 10 and July 29, 1996. The telephone messages were left with Respondent's answering service and requested that Respondent return Investigator Floyd's calls. Although Respondent's answering service confirmed to Investigator Floyd that all of his messages had been conveyed to Respondent, Respondent never returned Investigator Floyd's telephone calls. On August 20, 1996, Investigator Floyd reached Respondent by telephone and scheduled a meeting with Respondent for August 22, 1996. On the day of the scheduled meeting, Respondent called Investigator Floyd and canceled the meeting. The following day, August 23, 1996, Investigator Floyd called Respondent at the Channel 13 security desk and, again, attempted to schedule a meeting with Respondent. Respondent indicated that he would call Investigator Floyd the following Monday, August 26, 1996, to schedule a meeting. After he had not heard from Respondent by 4:00 p.m. on August 26, 1996, Investigator Floyd called Respondent to schedule a meeting. During the August 26, 1996 telephone conversation, Respondent refused to set a date to meet with Investigator Floyd, indicating that he was too busy. However, Respondent told Investigator Floyd that he would call him the next week to schedule a meeting. Because he previously had been unsuccessful in scheduling a meeting with Respondent, after speaking with Respondent by telephone on August 26, 1998, Investigator Floyd went to Channel 13 and served Respondent with a subpoena duces tecum. The subpoena required Respondent to produce and provide the Department with various records maintained and related to the business operations of Protection Unlimited. The documents requested by the subpoena included the following: weekly assignment schedules; daily guard logs; time sheets; payroll records; personnel records of specified employees; and Employee Action Reports from January 1995 through March 1995, December 1995 through February 1996, and January 1996 through August 1996. Respondent failed to provide all of the documents requested in the subpoena. Respondent provided several of the requested documents but many of them appeared to have some of the information on them obliterated with "white out." With regard to several of the requested documents, Mr. Hargraves noted on the subpoena that the records could not be located. On or about September 3, 1996, after receiving some of the documents Respondent had provided pursuant to the subpoena, Investigator Floyd went to Channel 13 to speak with Respondent about the documents that had been requested. Upon arrival at Channel 13, Investigator Floyd told Respondent that he had a tape recorder and was recording the conversation. Respondent then refused to speak with Investigator Floyd and ejected him from the Channel 13 premises. Once Respondent ejected Investigator Floyd, Respondent went inside the Channel 13 building and locked the door. Investigator Floyd met with Respondent and his attorney on September 6, 1996, at the address of record for Protection Unlimited. During the meeting, Investigator Floyd discussed several areas of concern with Protection Unlimited, including the following: (1) general record keeping and record retention procedures; (2) filing of hiring and termination notices with Petitioner; (3) occupational license; (4) branch offices; and (5) general liability insurance. During the September 6, 1996, meeting, with regard to record keeping, Respondent acknowledged that he was a poor record keeper and that he routinely threw away records that he believed were no longer of use to him. Moreover, during this meeting, Respondent stated that he did not always file hiring and termination notices with Petitioner. During the course of his investigation, Investigator Floyd determined that Channel 13 permitted Respondent to bill for security guard services two weeks in advance. Based on a review of invoices from mid-December 1995 to August 1996, to Channel 13 from Respondent, Investigator Floyd found that Respondent had billed Channel 13 for his agency's services two weeks in advance. However, Respondent failed to make adjustments on subsequent invoices, to reflect a reduction in the actual number of hours worked by some security officers. For example, in July 1996, Respondent's invoices do not reflect the approximately nineteen hours that Mark Cummings was not actually at Channel 13. An investigation by Petitioner substantiated Respondent's admission that he did not always file hiring and termination notices. Among employees hired by Protection Unlimited, but for whom notices of hiring were not filed, were Barbara Norman, Steven Cox, William Scott, and Willie Lee. Furthermore, the Department's investigation found that Respondent failed to file termination notices for several of his employees, including William Scott, Barbara Norman, Steven Cox, and Willie Lee. During the September 6, 1996, meeting, Respondent showed Investigator Floyd a Hillsborough County occupational license for Protection Unlimited. The license was dated September 5, 1996, and indicated that it was an initial issue, although Protection Unlimited had been in business since at least 1994. During the course of that meeting, Respondent acknowledged that his agency did not have an occupational license prior to the one dated September 5, 1996. Investigator Floyd discussed the issue of branch offices with Respondent during the September 6, 1996 meeting. At that time, Respondent acknowledged that he had no branch office license. This admission by Respondent is confirmed by Petitioner's records which revealed that Respondent had no branch office license for any location, including 3213 West Kennedy, Tampa, Florida, the location of Channel 13. Despite not having a branch office license which authorized him to carry on business activities such as interviewing potential employees at a location other than his address of record, Respondent routinely conducted such activities at Channel 13, located 3213 West Kennedy Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. Newspaper advertisements by Protection Unlimited, included a Channel 13 telephone number. When individuals called that number to inquire about available security officer positions, prospective job applicants were directed to come to Channel 13 for their job interview. During the time relevant to this proceeding, numerous job interviews to fill security officer positions for Protection Unlimited were routinely conducted at Channel 13. During the September 6, 1996, meeting with Respondent, Investigator Floyd asked Respondent whether he issued agency identification cards to each of his employees when they were hired. Respondent answered affirmatively and indicated that he issued agency identification cards to each of his employees before "they ever set foot" on their assigned post. The statement by Respondent that he always provided agency identification cards to employees upon hiring them is false in light of the credible testimony of Willie Lee that he performed his security duties for Protection Unlimited for at least a month before receiving his agency identification card. During the September 6, 1996, meeting between Investigator Floyd and Respondent, Investigator Floyd asked Respondent whether he either permitted or had knowledge of his employees working in plain clothes while performing security duties. In response to this inquiry, Respondent told Investigator Floyd that he neither permitted nor had knowledge that employees wore plain clothes while performing security duties for his company. The statement made by Respondent to Investigator Floyd was a false statement. The credible testimony of Barbara Norman and Glenn Davis, both employees of Protection Unlimited, was that Respondent never issued them uniforms in which to perform their security duties and, as a result thereof, they performed their duties in plain clothes. Furthermore, the credible testimony of Michael Munger and Steve Cox was that as employees of Protection Unlimited, they performed security duties in plain clothes. Despite his testimony to the contrary, Respondent was at the Channel 13 and observed that many times these employees were performing security duties while not in uniforms. Another issue addressed by Investigator Floyd during the September 6, 1996, meeting with Respondent concerned the required reporting of individuals who had been employed by Protection Unlimited. When asked by Investigator Floyd whether he had ever employed Barbara Norman and Michael Munger as security guards for Protection Unlimited, Respondent answered in the negative. This statement by Respondent is false in light of the credible testimony of Barabara Norman and Michael Munger. Ms. Norman and Mr. Munger were employed by and worked for Protection Unlimited in 1995. During the September 6, 1996, meeting, Investigator Floyd asked Respondent to provide proof of the required general liability insurance for Respondent's agency. Respondent implied that he had the required insurance coverage, but at that time had no proof of such coverage. However, Mr. Hargraves told Investigator Floyd that he would have his insurance company fax documentary evidence that Protection Unlimited had the required insurance. Although Mr. Hargraves indicated that he would request that the insurance company fax the information to Investigator Floyd that same day, no such proof of insurance was ever provided to Investigator Floyd. Respondent routinely performed duties as a security officer at Channel 13 during the period between March 1996 and August 1996, inclusive, although he did not have a Class "D" Security Officer License. Respondent routinely carried a concealed firearm while on duty as a security officer during the time period April 1995 to July 1996. Respondent told Glenn Davis that if investigators from the Department came to the Claire T, Mr. Davis was not to allow them on the post. Respondent indicated to Mr. Davis that he would be fired if he cooperated with the Department. Respondent also told Mr. Scott that he was not to speak with Department investigators and that if the investigators came to his assigned post, Mr. Scott was to have the police remove the investigators from the premises. Respondent told Mr. Pritchard not to speak with any investigators from the Department and to call the police if they came to Channel 13. Mr. Pritchard was told that he would be terminated if he spoke to any Department investigators. On July 13, 1996, at about 8:30 p.m. and while on duty at Channel 13, Mr. Scott locked his master key to the facility in an office he had just checked. Immediately thereafter Mr. Scott attempted to call Respondent. When Mr. Scott could not reach Respondent directly, he left several messages with Respondent's answering service. Respondent never turned the calls. When Mr. Scott left at midnight, he still had not heard from Respondent. The next day when Mr. Scott spoke with Respondent, about the "key" incident that has occurred on July 13, 1996. Respondent then directed Mr. Scott to indicate on the log that Respondent had returned Mr. Scott's call on July 13, 1998, shortly after 8:30 p.m., the time Mr. Scott had initially placed the call to Respondent. Mr. Scott told Respondent that he would not falsify the log. Later Mr. Scott observed that Mr. Hargraves had added an addendum to the daily log that falsely indicated that Respondent had responded to Mr. Scott's call the previous night.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent committed the violations alleged in Counts IV through XXIV and Counts XXVI through XXVIII; (2) dismissing Counts I, II, III, and XXV; and (3) revoking Respondent's Class "B" license, Class "G" license, and Class "MB" license. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Michele L. Guy, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station Four Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Christopher Hargraves 12515 Mondragon Tampa, Florida 33625 Laura Vaughn, Esquire 401 East Jackson Suite 2525 Tampa, Florida 33602
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Glen Thurlow (Thurlow), was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission) on June 15, 1982, and was issued Certificate Number 02-3128. Thurlow has been employed by the West Palm Beach Police Department (WPBPD) for the last eight years. On the evening of November 24, 1990, Thurlow was assigned as a police officer to the WPBPD Criminal Apprehension Team (CAT), which is a street crimes unit. That evening Thurlow was partnered for the first time with Lee Rollins (Rollins), a fellow police officer on CAT. Thurlow and Rollins were assigned as plain clothes officers in an unmarked police vehicle, an old, gold Cadillac. Thurlow had on a black T-shirt, combat pants, black combat boots, duty leather and underneath his shirt a bullet-proof vest with a trauma plate. Rollins was dressed in a black T-shirt and jeans. He was not wearing duty leather, but was wearing a utility belt fastened with velcro. Both officers wore their police badges on a chain underneath their shirts. Around 10:30 p.m., near the end of their duty shift, they were returning to the police station. Thurlow was driving south on South Dixie Highway headed toward the Belvedere Road intersection. As they approached the intersection, the officers saw a man, later identified as Robert Jewett (Jewett), dressed in cut-off jeans, a T-shirt, and a cap standing near the middle of the south bound lanes on South Dixie Highway past the Belvedere Road intersection, near the Palm Beach Post Building. The officers continued through the Belvedere Road intersection toward Jewett. As they approached Jewett, he stuck out his left hand in a "hitchhiking gesture." Thurlow pulled over to the side of the road near the parking lot of the Palm Beach Post Building. When Thurlow pulled over, Jewett ran up to the car and got in the back seat. Rollins showed Jewett his police badge, told Jewett that he was a police officer, and requested Jewett to step outside the car. Jewett complied. Rollins exited the Cadillac and Thurlow remained inside. Rollins asked Jewett for his driver's license, which Jewett gave him. Rollins radioed the police dispatcher with the information on the driver's license in order to determine whether there were any outstanding warrants on Jewett. Rollins advised Jewett that he was going to charge him with hitchhiking, but that if there were no warrants against Jewett that he would be given a Notice to Appear and released at the scene, rather than being taken down to the police station. Rollins told Jewett to place his hands on top of the car and spread his legs so that Rollins could search him for weapons. Jewett complied. Thurlow, still sitting in the driver's seat, was monitoring the conversation between Rollins and Jewett. Rollins began the weapons search at Jewett's shoulder and continued down to his left pocket. Finding nothing, he started to search the right pocket. At that time Jewett brought his right arm down from the top of the car. Rollins caught his arm, put it back on top of the car, and told him to keep his hands on the top of the car. As Rollins proceeded to search Jewett's right pocket, Jewett brought his right arm down and stuck it in his pocket. At the same time he came around with his left elbow and hit Rollins on the left side of his chest, knocking him around. Rollins pulled Jewett's hand out of his pocket and they began to struggle. Rollins pulled his flashlight from his back pocket and tried to hit Jewett on his left forearm. Jewett tried to kick Rollins in the groin and Rollins grabbed Jewett's T-shirt. Their feet tangled, the men went down and Rollins fell back toward the car, hitting his head on the back door. Rollins was stunned from the blow to his head. Thurlow felt the Cadillac rock as if someone had bumped against the car. Rollins called to Thurlow to give him some assistance. Thurlow exited the car and came around to the passenger side, where he saw Rollins sitting on the ground with his back to the car, and Jewett straddling and leaning over Rollins with his arms raised as if he were preparing to hit Rollins. Thurlow ran up behind Jewett and put his arm below Jewett's Adam's apple in Jewett's upper chest area in order to pull Jewett back from Rollins. Jewett began to fight and had Thurlow on the balls of his feet. They went towards the front of the car. Jewett went down on his knees with Thurlow's arm still around him. Jewett stood up with Thurlow on his back and they both went backwards, and as a result Thurlow's arm slipped up towards Jewett's chin. Rollins, seeing Jewett put his right hand in his pocket, ran over to Jewett and tried to grab his right hand. The three men fell to the ground and rolled backwards landing in a grassy area. Thurlow still had his arm around Jewett's neck. Thurlow was on the bottom, Jewett in the middle and Rollins on top. Thurlow released his hold on Jewett and slipped out from under Jewett. Thurlow was on Jewett's left side and Rollins was sitting to Jewett's right, about, waist-high facing away from Jewett. Jewett was grabbing at his right pocket. Rollins saw a metal object in the area of Jewett's right pocket. Rollins took his flashlight and swiped at the metal object, sending both the flashlight and the metal object flying off in an easterly direction. Rollins told Jewett to quit struggling. Jewett grabbed the butt of Rollins' gun. Rollins hollered to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun. Rollins hit Jewett in the groin three to four times. Thurlow got up and threw a punch at Jewett connecting at Jewett's left eye. At that point Jewett quit fighting. Thurlow held Jewett's arm over the curb and told Rollins to handcuff Jewett. Having lost his handcuffs in the struggle, Rollins used Thurlow's handcuffs and cuffed Jewett's hands behind his back. All three men were breathing hard and sweating. Rollins told Thurlow that he had lost his flashlight and that something had been thrown out of Jewett's hand during the struggle. Thurlow left Rollins with Jewett and went to look for the lost items. At the time Thurlow left Rollins and Jewett, Jewett was breathing. During the struggle, Rollins' handcuffs, radio, and ammo pouch came off his belt. Rollins found his radio and called the dispatcher at 22:35:52 hours to report the incident. He then went to look for the rest of his missing equipment and was gone approximately one to one and a half minutes. Rollins returned to Jewett and started to pick him up; however Jewett was limp. Rollins put him back on the ground and tried to take his pulse. Because Rollins was still in an excited state from the fight, he could not tell whether he was getting a pulse from Jewett. He tried to take Jewett's pulse again but still could not determine whether he was getting a pulse. Thurlow, having found the flashlight in the grass and an open pocketknife on the sidewalk, walked back over to Rollins and Jewett. Thurlow asked Rollins if something was wrong with Jewett, and Rollins replied that Jewett did not look well. At 22:39:54 hours Thurlow radioed for the paramedics. At 22:43:35 hours, Thurlow again radioed for the paramedics to hurry and get to the scene. Rollins again checked for a pulse but could not determine whether there was a pulse. A few minutes later firefighters, responding to a medical call, arrived on the scene. One of the firefighters checked Jewett's pulse and breathing and determined that Jewett was not breathing and did not have a pulse. Jewett was pale with some discoloration and swelling about the face. Within several seconds, the rescue team arrived. The rescue team got Jewett uncuffed and began to administer advanced life support. Jewett was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. Both Thurlow and Rollins were trained to administer CPR; however the unmarked police vehicle did not contain rubber gloves or a bag which are used in administering CPR to protect the person administering CPR from diseases such as AIDS which could be transmitted by bodily fluids. Additionally, Jewett appeared to be breathing, which would mean that he was not a candidate for CPR. At the time of the incident, Joseph Huffman and his girlfriend were traveling north on South Dixie Highway in a van. The van had windows on the rear doors and on the passenger and driver doors. As Mr. Huffman approached the Palm Beach Post parking lot, he saw two men scuffling on the hood of the gold Cadillac. He began to slow down to watch the fracas. He observed the fight for approximately 20 to 30 seconds, during which time he looked over to the El Cid Bar to see if anyone was watching. His girlfriend observed that Huffman tried to look at the fight through his side mirror but couldn't see so he stuck his head out the driver's window and glanced back once or twice, looking forward to check the approaching traffic. Huffman recalled seeing a third man strike Jewett at least 20 times in the groin with a flashlight; however the medical evidence does not support Mr. Huffman's assertion. Having judged the credibility of the witness, I find that Mr. Huffman's recollection is not credible. An autopsy was performed on Jewett by the Palm Beach County Medical Examiner, Dr. James Benz. The autopsy revealed that Jewett had a black eye, markings on the forehead and neck area, minor bruises and abrasions on the right forearm, abrasions on the knees, and abrasions on the right wrist. Jewett suffered fractured ribs and bruising of the left lung underlying the rib fractures. There was a "blow out" of the heart. There was hemorrhaging underneath the Adam's apple and an irregular fracture in the lamana below the Adam's apple. The hyoid bone, which sits above the voice box, was fractured. There were no injuries to the upper thighs, penis or lower abdomen. There was a mild bruise in the testicle area and hemorrhaging in the left testicle. The injuries to the testicles are not consistent with Jewett's being hit between 10 to 20 times with a flashlight in the groin. The "blow out" of Jewett's heart is called a cardiac tamponade. Most probably as a result of the impact to Jewett's chest when he, Rollins, and Thurlow fell to the ground, a thin area of Jewett's heart blew out forming a small hole in Jewett's heart. The heart pumped blood through the small hole into the pericardial sac. As a result of the blood flowing into the pericardial sac, the heart could not expand and death occurred. The cardiac tamponade did not occur after Jewett died nor did it occur in a peri-mortem, near-death state. The cardiac tamponade did occur while Jewett was alive and death occurred some time later. Based on the testimony of Dr. Charles Petty, an expert in forensic pathology, I find that the injuries to Jewett's neck occurred as a result of forceful application of force to the neck, which is consistent with a fall across a rounded object such as a forearm rather than police carotid holds and choke downs. The Use of Force Matrix from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is the state standard concerning the use of force by law enforcement officers. The matrix lists the resistance levels of a subject and indicates the appropriate level of force to be used by an officer in responding to the various levels of resistance. An aggressive physical resistance is defined as overt, hostile attacking movements which may cause injury, but are not likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. Aggravated physical resistance is when the subject makes overt, hostile, attacking movements with or without a weapon, with the intent and apparent ability to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. The resistance level of Jewett when he was straddled and leaning over Rollins as Rollins was up against the fender of the Cadillac and Jewett's actions at the front of the car with Thurlow constitutes aggressive physical resistance. The matrix guidelines indicate that an officer may use all levels of force with the exception of deadly force in dealing with aggressive physical resistance. When Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind to remove Jewett from his position of standing over Rollins, Thurlow was not using deadly force. His arm was not under Jewett's chin but was lower, nearer the upper chest area. The resistance level of Jewett when he was trying to get Rollins' gun constitutes aggravated physical resistance. The matrix guidelines for force to counter aggravated physical resistance include among other things, counter moves, incapacitation, and deadly force. Deadly force includes techniques that may result in imminent or serious injury, unconsciousness or permanent disfigurement, such as impact weapon strikes to the head or use of firearms. Thus, Thurlow's punch to Jewett's face was within the matrix guidelines.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Glen H. Thurlow. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2593 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly" which is rejected. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 10-12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance; however it should be noted that it appeared to Thurlow that Jewett was about to strike Rollins. Paragraph 17: The first and second sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The evidence established that Thurlow jumped across Jewett's back, placing his arm across Jewett below Jewett's Adam's apple. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Accepted that Thurlow and Jewett continued to struggle. Rejected that Thurlow continued to maintain a choke hold on Jewett. The greater weight of the evidence established that Thurlow's arm did not slip up under Jewett's chin until Jewett and Thurlow began to fall backward. Paragraph 19: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance with the exception of "continued to hold Mr. Jewett in a choke hold." The evidence established that Thurlow's did not have a choke hold on Jewett until they fell backwards and that the choke hold was not an intentional action but rather resulted from the struggle between Jewett and Thurlow and Rollins running into them. Paragraph 21-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 23: Accepted in substance except to the extent that such finding implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett at the time that Huffman saw them. Paragraphs 24-26: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Huffman's testimony concerning the repeated striking of Jewett in his groin not to be credible, particularly considering the medical evidence and the fact that Huffman was driving down the street while he was trying to look at the fight and keep track of traffic both in front of and behind him. Paragraph 27: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett the entire time that they were struggling. The evidence established that Thurlow did not start out with a choke hold but that during the struggle, Thurlow's arm slipped underneath Jewett's chin. Paragraphs 31-35: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: Accepted in substance to the extent that at one point in time while Jewett was supine on the ground his head was turned toward Thurlow and he grabbed Thurlow's shirt but rejected to the extent that it implies that during the entire time Jewett was on the ground he was looking at Thurlow and grabbing Thurlow's shirt. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow did hear Rollins shout that Jewett had grabbed his gun and to the extent that Thurlow did not see Jewett actually grab the gun. Rejected to the extent that the word "claiming" implies that Rollins may not have shouted to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun and rejected to the extent that the last part of the sentence could be construed to mean that Thurlow did not see Jewett's right arm reach in the direction of Rollins' holster. Paragraphs 39-40: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly." Paragraphs 42-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: The portion relating to rendering medical assistance is accepted in substance. The portion relating to never checking on the well being of Jewett is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Thurlow did inquire of Rollins concerning the condition of Thurlow before he called for the paramedics. Paragraph 47: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 48: Accepted in substance to the extent that Rollins did not render any first aid but rejected to the extent that Thurlow always had an unobscured view of Jewett. The evidence established that Thurlow was looking for the knife and the flashlight during a portion of the time . Paragraph 49: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 50-51: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 52-53: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 54: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 55: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 56: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 57-59: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 60-73: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 74: Accepted in substance to the extent that Jewett was lying on the ground, was bloody, and was not moving. In light of the testimony of Mr. Cook that Jewett's skin was pale and there was discoloration about his face, I do not find Mr. Bouchillion's testimony that Jewett was turning blue to be credible. Paragraph 75: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 76-77: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 78-86: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 87: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 88: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 89: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 90-96: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 97: Having considered the opinions of Dr. Benz and Dr. Petty, I reject the finding to the extent that it implies that the fractures resulted from a choke hold applied prior to Thurlow, Jewett, and Rollin falling down and rolling into the grassy area. Paragraph 98: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 99: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 100: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 101: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 102: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 103: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 104: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 105-109: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 110-111: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 112: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 113: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 114: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 115: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 116-117: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 118: Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 119: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett from the time there were at the rear of the Cadillac until they fell backwards. The evidence established that Thurlow did not have Jewett in a choke hold when Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind. Paragraph 120: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 121-125: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 2-3: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 4: The first and last sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The portion of the second sentence relating to Thurlow being able to hear is accepted but the portion that Thurlow could see everything is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The last sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow thought that he needed to monitor the traffic but the greater weight of the evidence established that the Cadillac was not in the lane of traffic while it was parked. Paragraphs 10-27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28-30: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 31: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 32: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn P. Whitehurst, Esquire Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Gene "Hal" Johnson, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Scott N. Richardson, Esquire Atterbury, Goldberger & Richardson One Clear Lake Center, Suite 1400 250 Australian Avenue, South West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5012 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for licensure should be granted.
Findings Of Fact l. Petitioner became a certified law enforcement officer and was employed by the Metro-Dade Police Department in 1981. He worked for that agency through 1994, and his employment was terminated in 1996. During his employment with the Metro-Dade Police Department, he was trained as an investigator and was specifically trained in traffic accident investigation and reconstruction. He subsequently became an instructor for the Department and trained other police officers. During his employment with that agency, he received 12 commendations for good deeds and heroism. Initially, he received above-satisfactory evaluations. During his last seven years, he was rated as an outstanding employee. Although no longer employed by the Police Department, he continues to be used by the Metro-Dade Police Department, by the County Attorney's Office, and by the State Attorney's Office as a consultant on a regular basis and testifies on behalf of those agencies as an expert in traffic accident reconstruction. In 1994 he was charged with several felonies in Broward County. The jury found him not guilty of those charges, but he was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior on June 10, 1995. The convictions were for five misdemeanors. Petitioner has engaged in no criminal activity either before or after his conviction and continues to maintain his innocence regarding the activity for which he was convicted. Petitioner was given six months' probation and has completed all conditions of that probation. None of the conditions of probation involved contact with people or restrictions on the employment in which he can engage. For the past three years, Petitioner has been employed in an administrative capacity by an investigative and security agency licensed by the Department. For a while he worked there under temporary licensing by the Department without incident. The agency which employs Petitioner performs a substantial amount of investigation and traffic accident reconstruction for insurance carriers. If licensed, Petitioner would perform that work in the field. Petitioner's ability to perform the duties of that employment is enhanced by his extensive educational background and experience. Petitioner even has a degree in photography, which further enhances his ability to perform surveillance, investigations, and traffic accident reconstruction. Petitioner's employers, who are both certified law enforcement officers, rely on Petitioner's "outstanding" investigative abilities and guidance. He is considered very knowledgeable in the requirements of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, the framework for investigative and security services administered by the Department. His skills are considered superior, and he is respectful to all with whom he comes in contact. He conducts himself with the utmost professionalism. Petitioner respects the law and asserts that he has never knowingly broken it. He further respects the rights of others as evidenced by his testimony, the testimony of other law enforcement officers, and the many awards, letters of praise from citizens, and commendations from his superiors admitted in evidence. There is no relationship between the misdemeanors for which Petitioner was convicted and the licenses for which he has made application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT a Final Order be entered granting Petitioner's application and issuing to him a Class "C" Private Investigator license, a Class "D" Security Officer license, and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm license. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Michael Cornely, Esquire Hartman and Cornely, P.A. 10680 Northwest 25 Street, Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33172 Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza 2 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
