The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to credit for answers, which the Respondent scored as incorrect, to three questions on the February 2003 General Contractor Construction Examination.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner took the General Contractor Construction Examination on February 11, 2003. After being notified that he did not pass the test, the Petitioner requested a review of the test and his responses. Following the informal review of his examination answers, the Respondent awarded no further credit and the Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. The Petitioner initially challenged the scoring of his answers to 12 examination questions. The challenged examination questions are identified as Business and Finance AM questions 6, 12, 33, and 40, Business and Finance PM questions 2 and 25, and General Contract Administration questions 21, 22, 30, 34, 48, and 59. At the hearing, the Petitioner withdrew his challenges to Business and Finance AM questions 6, 12, and 33, and maintained his challenge to Business and Finance AM question 40. Business and Finance AM question 40 requires an examination candidate to identify the proper response, according to a specified reference source, to the hypothetical discovery of hidden asbestos revealed during a demolition process. The correct answer to Business and Finance AM question 40 requires a contractor to stop working and notify the owner and architect in writing. The answer is directly referenced in the text of "General Conditions of Contract," a book that the Petitioner was permitted to use during the examination. The Petitioner's answer to Business and Finance AM question 40 was to stop work and notify the owner by telephone. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner's response to Business and Finance AM question 40 is correct or that the Petitioner is otherwise entitled to credit for his answer. At the hearing, the Petitioner withdrew his challenges to Business and Finance PM questions 2 and 25. The Petitioner also withdrew his challenges to General Contract Administration questions 30, 34, 48, and 59, and maintained his challenge to General Contract Administration questions 21 and 22. General Contract Administration question 21 requires an examination candidate to calculate the workday upon which concrete footers could be poured following completion and inspection of specified preparatory work. According to the question, no inspection or other work occurs on Saturdays or Sundays and an inspection would occur on the workday after the footing preparation was completed. The question provided that the specified preparatory work would begin on a Monday and would take seven days to complete. An inspection would occur on the eighth workday. The correct answer to General Contract Administration question 21 was that the footers could be poured on the ninth workday. The Petitioner's answer to General Contract Administration question 21 was that the footers could be poured on the eleventh day. The Petitioner incorrectly included the weekend in his calculation of workdays. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner's response to General Contract Administration question 21 is correct or that the Petitioner is otherwise entitled to credit for his answer. General Contract Administration question 22 requires an examination candidate to calculate the total linear feet of rebar needed to reinforce a footer of specified length and construction. The calculation of the total linear feet of rebar as performed at the hearing by the Respondent's witness, William H. Palm (qualified as an expert in General Contracting), is accepted as correct. Based on the specifications given in the question, Mr. Palm calculated that there would be eight 20-foot bars with the eight bars overlapping each other by 12.5 inches at each of seven overlaps. Multiplying the seven overlaps by 12.5 inches results in 7.29 feet of total overlap. Adding the total overlapping segments to the 160-foot total and multiplying the results by the four continuous bars results in an answer to General Contract Administration question 22 of 669.16 feet. The closest possible answer from the multiple choices listed in the examination question is 670 linear feet. The Petitioner's answer to General Contract Administration question 22 was that 666 linear feet of rebar would be required. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner's response to General Contract Administration question 22 is correct or that the Petitioner is otherwise entitled to credit for his answer. The Petitioner also challenges as inappropriate and unfair, the use of "general trade knowledge" as a reference to correct answers. The evidence presented by the Petitioner fails to establish that the use of "general trade knowledge" is inappropriate or unfair. General trade knowledge is general or common knowledge among professionals in the trade. The list of appropriate references available to all examination candidates states that some questions will "be based on field experience and knowledge of trade practices."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's challenge to the grading of the Petitioner's responses to the February 2003 General Contractor Construction Examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carl Malavenda 15811 Gulf Boulevard Redington Beach, Florida 33703-1733 Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Tim Vaccaro, Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding Respondent was a registered building contractor in the State of Florida having been issued license number RB 0009164. At no time material to this proceeding was Domingo Alonzo (a/k/a Domingo Alonzo) registered, certified or otherwise licensed by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. Respondent and Alonzo signed and submitted a proposal to Myron M. Gold and Roberta Fox for remodeling and additions to their residence located at 1550 Zuleta Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida in accordance with plans prepared by Frese - Camner Associates on file with the City of Coral Gables, Florida, File No. 2897 for a contract price of $65,940.00 with draw schedules attached. On December 6, 1982, Myron M. Gold and Roberta Fox (Homeowners) accepted the Proposal (Contract). On December 6, 1982, the Homeowners paid Respondent and Alonzo jointly $3,297.00 in accordance with the contract whereby they were to receive 5 percent of the contract amount as a down payment upon signing. The draw schedule provided for a 10 percent retainage from each draw which was to be paid to Respondent and Alonzo upon completion and the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. On December 21, 1982 the Homeowners paid Respondent and Alonzo jointly $2,025.00 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 3 for $1,350.00, Schedule II - Item 2 for $360.00 and Item 5 for $315.00. On December 17, 1982 the Homeowners and Respondent filed the affidavit required by ordinance with the City of Coral Gables for the purpose of having a building permit issued covering the work under the contract. 9. On January 19, 1983 Respondent using his building contractors license applied for building permit to cover the work anticipated under the contract and on the same day was issued building permit, No. 28214. Under the contract the Homeowners were to pay for the building permit and the bond required by the city. On January 26, 1983 the Homeowners paid Respondent and Alonzo jointly $3,000.00 which along with a payment on January 27, 1983 of $500.00 and January 31, 1983 of $544.60 represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 2 for $405.00, Item 5 for $1,260.00, Item 6 for $1,547.10 and Item 13 for $832.50. All payments from December 6, 1982 through January 31, 1983 under the contract by the Homeowners totaled $9,366.50 and were paid jointly to Respondent and Alonzo. On February 4, 1983 Respondent and Alonzo entered into an agreement, prepared by Myron Gold in the law office of Gold and Fox, whereby the Homeowners were to pay the balance of the funds remaining under the contract to Alonzo individually. After this date all payments were made to Alonzo. It was the Homeowners understanding after the February 3, 1983 agreement that Respondent would still be responsible for the supervision of the construction although they never saw Respondent again until October 1983. Edward Borysiewicz testified that he dealt with Respondent during March 1983 when he made the floor slab inspection on March 3, 1983 and the columns inspection on March 14, 1983. The record is clear that shortly after the agreement on February 3, 1983 Respondent no longer came to the construction site and supervised the work of Alonzo. On February 8, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $3,060.00 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 1 for $810.00, Item 5 for $1,417.50 and Item 13 for $832.50. On February 28, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $3,155.40 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 4 for $1,705.50 and $729.90 for extras apparently not covered by the contract but whether the balance of check No. 1161 (Pet. Ex. 13) of $720.00 was for payment under the contract or for extras is not shown in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15. On March 18, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $1,000 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 9 for $819.00. Again whether the balance of check No. 1206 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 13) of $181.00 is for payment under the contract or for extras is not shown in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15. On March 21, 1983, the Homeowners paid Alonzo $6,400.00 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Items 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15. On March 21, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $2,166.90 but Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15 does not list check No. 1210 as being a payment under the contract or for extras. On March 31, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $4,230.00 which represents a draw under Schedule I - Item 7 for $2,520.00 and a payment for extras not covered under the contract in the amount of $1,710.00. On April 21, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $5,207.40 which represented a draw Schedule I - Items 1, 5, 6, 9 and 14. On June 24, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $5,788.00 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 12 for $667.00, Item 14 for $3,024.00 and payment for extras not under contract for $2,097.00. After March 14, 1983 Respondent was not seen on the job site and there was no longer any apparent supervision of Alonzo by Respondent. After Respondent left the job site there was no licensed building contractor involved in the construction. After Respondent left the construction site the Homeowners soon realized that Alonzo did not know how to proceed with the work and experienced problems with the pace and manner in which the work was being accomplished. On July, 1983, Alonzo stopped working altogether. Although the Homeowners were aware of the problems that Alonzo was having with the construction and that Respondent was not on the job, the record does not reflect that they ever attempted to contact Respondent after the meeting on February 3, 1983. On August 1, 1983 the Homeowners notified Respondent and Alonzo that the contract had been terminated. The Homeowners paid Respondent and Alonzo $42,174.20 total under the contract (pages 1-5, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15) and paid Alonzo $10,766.37 for extras (Pages 6- 10, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15). On August 31, 1983 the Homeowners paid Edward Bryant, plastering contractor the sum of $3,100.00 for plastering performed by Edward Bryant. This was for work under the contract that had not been completed or work necessary to correct problems that were already completed. Roberta Fox testified that there were no extras on plaster, however, page 7, line 11 and page 9, line 21 of Petitioner's Exhibit 15 indicates that there was extra plastering. On August 29, 1983 and September 29, 1983 the Homeowners paid Southwest Plumbing Services, Inc. the total amount of $4,875.00 for work contemplated under the contract that had not been completed or needed correction. Homeowners had paid Alonzo $3,591.00 for plumbing under the contract. Both Alonzo and Southwest Plumbing, Inc. were paid for extra plumbing not covered by the contract in the amount of $567.00 and $391.50, respectively by the Homeowners. From September 13, 1983 through June 13, 1984 the Homeowners paid Charles Brueg, Jim Brueg, Charles Buffington and Dan, Inc. the total amount of $4,192.91 for electrical work contemplated under the contract that was not completed or required correction after Alonzo left the construction site. Page 6 lines 6 and 11 of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15 indicate that there were extras not covered by the contract. The total amount for electricity contemplated by the contract was $3,649.00. Alonzo was paid $2,627.10 under the contract and $1,710.00 for extras. The Homeowners were required to obtain the services of an air conditioning contractor to complete the work contemplated under the contract after Alonzo left the job site and as a result were required to pay Cameron, Inc., the air conditioning contract the amount of $5,181.60 between August 16, 1983 and January 24, 1984. The total amount contemplated under the contract was $3,600.00 of which $1,134.00 had been paid to Alonzo. Debris was dumped in the swimming pool requiring the Homeowners to pay $7,000 to refurbish the swimming pool. This amount included the repair contemplated under the contract and the extra work caused by Alonzo. The contract contemplated $2,300.00 for repairs of which none had been paid to Respondent or Alonzo. The Homeowners paid $1,150.00 to a painting contractor to finish the painting contemplated under the contract. Alonzo had been paid $1,125.00 for painting. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15) The contract provided $2,500.00 for all painting required under the contract. Respondent failed to notify the building department that he was no longer responsible for the construction. After the Homeowners terminated the contract due to Respondent's and Alonzo's nonperformance, the Homeowners had to expend a substantial amount of extra money to complete the construction. The evidence is insufficient to determine an exact or approximate amount. Roberta Fox's testimony was conflicting with regard to her understanding as to whether or not the Respondent would continue to supervise the construction after the meeting in the Homeowners' law office on February 3, 1983 when Respondent and Alonzo entered into this agreement. Myron Gold testified that it was his understanding that Respondent would continue to supervise Alonzo after the agreement. However, the Homeowners action in this regard subsequent to February 3, 1983, in making no effort to bring the matter to a "head" and requiring Respondent to supervise the work or terminate the contract and in continuing to deal with Alonzo although Homeowners were aware shortly after February 3, 1983 that Alonzo could not perform without Respondent's supervision and that they knew Respondent was not on the job, tends to show that they were aware or should have been aware that Respondent was no longer involved in the day to day supervision of the construction. Alonzo installed a fireplace pursuant to the contract that the building department determined to be a fire hazard and recommended against its use. The Homeowners applied for and were granted a "owner/builder" permit on September 1, 1983 and requested cancellation of the building permit issued to Respondent which was cancelled on September 6, 1983. They have not received a certificate of occupancy because the building department has not performed the following inspection: electrical final; plumbing final; air conditioning final; roofing final and public works final. The building department would have issued a "stop-work order" had it been aware that Respondent was not supervising the construction and would have required the Homeowners to obtain another licensed building contractor or proceed as a owner/builder. The plans prepared by Frese-Camner Associates that were made a part of the contract by reference were not introduced into evidence with the contract and thus the record is insufficient to determine what was required to meet the specifications of the plans and thereby determine if the specifications had been met. There was a permit issued for the septic tank and drain field which work was started in December, 1982. The construction of the house itself was started in January 1983. The first inspection (foundation) on the house was made by the building department of January 21, 1983.
Recommendation Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is Recommended that the Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(h)(k)(m), Florida Statutes (1981) and for such violations it is Recommended that the Board assess the Respondent with an administrative fine of $500.00 and suspend the Respondent's contracting license for a period of three (3) years, provided, however, that if Respondent submits to the Board competent and substantial evidence of restitution to Myron Gold and Roberta Fox within one (1) year from the date of the final order herein, then the suspension shall be stayed and Respondent placed on probation for the balance of the suspension. Respectfully submitted and entered this 6th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 84-2529 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. RULINGS ON PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 but clarified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12 except clarified as to the last date on construction site. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact24 but clarified to show correct amount paid under contract as indicated by Petitioner's Exhibit 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25 but clarified to show that extra plastering not under contract was required. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30 but clarified. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32 but clarified to show that the record does not support a figure that approximate $32,000.00. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence even though the Homeowners' testimony supported this fact because the Homeowners' actions with regard to Respondent after February 3, 1983, was to the contrary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. RULINGS ON PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT: No Findings of Fact was submitted by the Respondent. COPIES FURNISHED: James Linnan, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. Douglas Beason Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. George J. Soler, Pro Se 3315 S.W. 96th Avenue Miami, Florida 33165
Findings Of Fact In October, 1973, Petitioner Mike Anagnostakis began operating a Texaco service station on South State Road 7 in Broward County, Florida. At that station, gasoline was pumped, and automobiles were washed and repaired. In October, 1981, Petitioner purchased a Shell service station located on South State Road 7 in Broward County, Florida, approximately four miles south of his Texaco station. At the Shell station, gasoline was pumped, and automobiles were repaired. On April 1, 1982, Respondent contacted Petitioner in conjunction with a Relocation B Plan and completed a business survey questionnaire. A Relocation A Plan generally describes the businesses and residences that could possibly be displaced by a number of alternative highway alignments. After the Federal Highway Administration makes the final determination on which alignment a road will take, the Department of Transportation acquires the maps necessary for that particular alignment. Then the Relocation Section personnel go out and perform the Relocation B Plan survey identifying the persons who will be displaced based upon the final road alternative chosen. Business survey questionnaires are compiled and contracts are entered into for appraisals for the purchase of the property affected. Thereafter, the Department of Transportation commences the actual acquisition process. Years may elapse between the Relocation A Plan which includes all possible alternatives for the proposed road and the actual acquisition by the Department of Transportation of the specific properties finally affected. No notice to vacate or notice that a parcel is going to be acquired is given until the beginning of negotiations with the occupants of those properties. If a business relocates prior to the beginning of negotiations, that business is not eligible for moving costs. Under Department procedures, an offer must be made before an occupant is considered eligible for any relocation payments. On April 1, 1982, when Respondent made its first contact with Petitioner relative to the determination that Petitioner's business would be displaced in conjunction with the property acquisition for the proposed roadway, the business survey questionnaire involved only the Texaco service station since the Shell service station was not being acquired by the Department of Transportation. In September, 1983, Petitioner's gas lease with Texaco expired. Although a new lease was entered into between Petitioner and Texaco, that new lease authorized Petitioner to use the premises only as an automotive garage and no further gasoline was supplied by Texaco to Petitioner. At that time Petitioner ceased pumping gasoline at that site. At the Texaco site, Petitioner continued washing . and repairing automobiles. At some undisclosed time he also commenced selling used cars from that site. Follow up contact between Respondent and Petitioner occurred at the end of 1983, and an offer to the real estate owner may have been made at that time. When that contact occurred, Petitioner was physically working at the Shell station and not at the Texaco site. However, cars were being sold at both locations, and the same repairs were being performed at the Texaco and at the Shell sites. Since Petitioner did not own the real property on which the Texaco station was situated, on February 27, 1984, Respondent delivered to Petitioner an offer relative to the improvements on the real estate. At the same time other written materials were delivered to Petitioner advising him as to the procedures involved in the relocation program, including a letter advising Petitioner that he would be afforded no less than so days notice of the date on which he would be required to vacate the property. On February 27, 1984 automobiles were being sold and repaired at both the Texaco and the Shell service stations. Petitioner presented no evidence to compare the cars available for sale at the Texaco site compared to the Shell site or the rate of repairs being accomplished to the automobiles at either of those two sites. The initiation of negotiations between Petitioner and Respondent occurred on February 27, 1984.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered determining that Petitioner Mike Anagnostakis does not qualify for a fixed relocation payment in lieu of any other moving expense payments. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of August, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RI60T, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James R. Clodfelter, Esquire Suite 207 1701 West Hillsboro Boulevard Deerfield Beach, Florida 33442
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent negligently practiced engineering in the preparation of construction plans for a residential structure and airplane hanger.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these matters, Respondent has been a licensed engineer in the State of Florida, having been issued license number PE 37862. Respondent is the engineer of record for the residential and airplane hanger project (Rutman project). On Sheet 6 of 8 of the drawings prepared for the Rutman project, Respondent failed to reference sections or details found in the plan for the project. Specifically, Sheet 6 indicates the floor truss layout for the ground and second floors, but fails to indicate what the framing members are supported upon, a very significant fact, in that one who is reading the plan would not be instructed in how to construct that portion of the work. On Sheet 5 of 8, which indicates the layout of the framing members of the roof, no specific information is provided showing how to construct, support or connect the members and no reference is made to any other parts of the plans. Respondent's drawings fail to specify or indicate anywhere on the plans the proper reinforcing for the masonry column. On Sheet 2 of 2 - Hanger, and on Sheet 1 of 3 - Floor Plan, Respondent has called for a 24-inch by 24-inch reinforced masonry column that supports a W24 x 55 Steel I-beam that is 48 feet 8 inch long. There is no specification for column ties, which are reinforcing bar loops that are to be placed around the vertical steel within a column, as required by the American Concrete Institute's Code (ACI) provision 530. ACI 530 is used by all engineers in Florida that design masonry columns. These technical codes for concrete have been provided by ACI since 1904. ACI 530, Section 5.9.1.6(a), relating to lateral ties, provides that longitudinal reinforcement shall be enclosed by lateral ties at least 1/4 inch in diameter. Respondent's drawings fail to provide the required lateral ties. According to ACI 530, Section 5.9.1.4, vertical column reinforcement must not be less than .0025 times the nominal area of the column or approximately 1.44 square inches of steel. Respondent's drawing provides only 1.24 square inches of steel.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Professional Engineers enter a final order reprimanding Respondent for negligence in this matter, and placing him on probation for a period of two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: David P. Rankin, Esquire The Law Offices of David P. Rankin, P.A. 14502 North Dale Mabry Boulevard, Suite 300 Tampa, Florida 33618 Douglas Sunshine, Esquire Florida Engineers Management Corporation 2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulations Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Natalie A. Lowe, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulations 2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5267
Conclusions The record in this proceeding and the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer have been reviewed. Respondent, Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT), has filed exceptions to the Recommended Order and Petitioner has filed a response thereto. FDOT's exceptions are considered and addressed below.1 The Findings of Fact set forth in the Recommended Order are considered correct and are incorporated as part of this Final Order with the following exception. The Hearing Officer noted that FDOT's appeal of DOAH Case No. 87-0621R, is currently pending before the First District Court of Appeal. This is incorrect. The matter is pending before the Fifth District Court of Appeal. FDOT's exceptions to Findings of Fact numbered 4, 7, 8, 9, 16, 23, 26, 27, 28, and 34 are rejected as an impermissible attempt to supplement the Hearing Officer's findings. Inverness Conval. Ctr. v. Dept. of H.R.S., 512 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Cohn v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 477 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). FDOT takes exception to the Findings of Fact number 24, claiming , in paragraph 1, that there is a lack of substantial record evidence that material from Merritt Island mine No. 70-1 tested less that the minimum carbonate requirement. However, closer examination of the exception reveals that the foundation of the claim lies in the Hearing Officer's omission of certain language contained in the Gammage memo of September 30, 1969. As noted above, the Department cannot supplement the Hearing Officer's finding. Consequently, paragraph one of the exception must be rejected. Similarly paragraph two, going to omitted facts must be rejected as well. The Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact number 25 is essentially a summary of Blackhawk's Exhibit 13 and is supported by competent substantial evidence. Consequently, FDOT's exceptions thereto are rejected. FDOT also takes exception to Finding of Fact number 29, Claiming first that there is competent substantial record evidence to support the finding that FDOT has never conducted a study to document the necessity of the 50 per cent carbonate requirement. Respondent is mistaken. The record reflects that FDOT personnel and their expert gave testimony indicating that such specific research had never been conducted. (TI 348, 434, 435, 480; TII 24, 71) FDOT's second and third complaints being predicated upon the omission of facts, must also be rejected. FDOT's exception to Finding of Fact number 30 is rejected because the record reflects that Dr. Eades testified that as used in this state, LBR is the indicator of the ultimate strength of the material. (TI 412, 434) FDOT's exception to Finding of Fact number 31 amounts to a challenge t the Hearing Officer's weight and credibility determinations regarding Dr. Bromwell's testimony, and consequently must be rejected. Heifetz v. Dept. Of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). FDOT's first two paragraphs in its exception to Finding of Fact number 32 constitute challenges to the Hearing Officer's credibility determinations, the inferences she drew from the evidence, and her failure to rely upon or cite certain facts as opposed to others. As noted above, exceptions predicated on these types of grounds must be rejected. The third paragraph of this exception must also be rejected because record testimony clearly demonstrates that Bill Wisner testified that the Merritt Island mine was in existence for three to five months -- a very short period of time. (TI 52) FDOT's exception to Finding of Fact number 35 is rejected as being immaterial to the ultimate disposition of this matter. FDOT's exceptions to Findings of Fact numbers 36, 38, and 40, in the final analysis, represent challenges based upon the credibility and weight determinations of the Hearing Officer, and the inferences drawn from the record evidence. Since weight and credibility determinations cannot be disturbed, and since the inferences drawn, while not palatable, are nonetheless arguably reasonable, these exceptions must be rejected. Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, supra.
