The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent, KaShamba Miller-Anderson, violated section 112.3145(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), by willfully failing to file a 2015 CE Form 1, “Statement of Financial Interests”; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently a member of the Riviera Beach City Council. As a member of the Riviera Beach City Council, Respondent served as a “local officer” as defined in section 112.3145(1)(a), throughout the year 2015. Respondent was aware that she was required to file a CE Form 1 every year, including for the year 2015. Financial disclosures are filed in order to allow the public to monitor public officials and employees for any conflicts of interest that may arise. The requirement that financial disclosures be filed is intended to deter corruption and increase the public’s confidence in government. In 2016, Respondent received e-mails at the address kmiller@rivierabch.com. She received regular mail at the address 430 West 28th Street, Riviera Beach, Florida 33404. The CE Form 1, “Statement of Financial Interests,” for calendar year 2015 was required to be filed on or before July 1, 2016. There is a grace period for filing the form that expired on September 1, 2016. After the expiration of the grace period, an automatic fine of $25 per day was imposed for each day the form is late, up to a maximum fine of $1,500. The maximum fine accrued on October 31, 2016. The Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections (Palm Beach SOE) office sent Respondent the original blank 2015 financial disclosure form, along with the requirements for filing the form, before June 1, 2016. She was instructed to file her completed form no later than July 1, 2016. Respondent failed to file her 2015 CE Form 1 by either July 1, 2016, or September 1, 2016. Respondent received notice from the Commission regarding her failure to file her 2015 CE Form 1. On July 31, 2016, the Palm Beach SOE sent a delinquency memorandum to Respondent at 430 West 28th Street, Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 by certified mail. The mail was unclaimed. The July 31, 2016, memorandum included the following statement: Pursuant to State law, please be advised that although you are delinquent in filing Form 1, a grace period is in effect until September 1, 2016. If your form is not received by September 1, 2016, we will be required by law to notify the Commission on Ethics of the delinquency. A fine of $25 for each day late will be imposed, up to the maximum penalty of $1500. In addition, pursuant to enacted legislation, the Commission on Ethics must initiate investigations of delinquent filers in certain circumstances. This can result in you being removed from your public office or employment. Respondent took no action to file her form by September 1, 2016. If she had done so, it would have been considered timely. Commission staff sent Respondent a courtesy letter on September 7, 2016, and advised her that she was accruing a fine of $25 per day for failure to file her 2015 CE Form 1. The Commission also e-mailed Respondent on September 20, 2016, using the e-mail address kmiller@rivierabch.com. Respondent accrued the maximum fine of $1,500 as of October 31, 2016, as authorized by section 112.3145(7)(f), for failing to file her CE Form 1 for the year 2015. On November 4, 2016, the Commission again e-mailed Respondent at the same e-mail address, advising her that the maximum fine had accrued and she still needed to file her 2015 CE Form 1. The November 4, 2016, e-mail attached a blank 2015 CE Form 1 and a form to appeal her fine. Respondent did not avail herself of the opportunity to appeal the fine that had accrued. On February 21, 2017, the Commission sent Respondent a Notice of Assessment of Automatic Fine by certified mail, using the 430 West 28th Street address. Respondent acknowledged receipt of the February 2017 notice. This e-mail also provided the appeal process for contesting the maximum fine. Respondent did not pay the fine at that time because she did not have the funds to do so. She believed, in error, that she now could not file the 2015 CE Form 1 until she paid the fine. Her belief, however misplaced, was sincere. On June 16, 2017, the Commission mailed Respondent a Notification of Issuance of Default Final Order at the 430 West 28th Street address. The Notice was not returned to the Commission as undeliverable. On June 22, 2017, Respondent paid the $1,500 fine. On June 28, 2017, Respondent filed her CE Form 1 for calendar year 2015. Respondent did not have a particularly compelling reason for not timely filing her 2015 CE Form 1. Her position on the city council is a part-time position, for which she is not assigned an assistant. She admitted at hearing that the notice and the form simply got lost on her desk, and she did not make it a priority. However, Respondent claims that while filing her 2015 CE Form 1 was not the priority it should have been, she never intended not to file the form, and she never indicated to anyone that she would not do so. Respondent filed her 2015 CE Form 1 and paid the fine prior to the finding of probable cause in this case. There are some differences between the financial disclosure Respondent filed when she initially ran for office and the one filed for 2015. Those differences however, are not so great as to support an inference or finding that she was attempting to hide something by not filing timely. The term for which Respondent was elected expired on March 21, 2018. She was re-elected for another term which began March 21, 2018.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter a final order and public report finding that no violation of section 112.3145(8)(c) has been demonstrated. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Melody A. Hadley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A. 131 North Gadsden Street (32301) Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Glen Thurlow (Thurlow), was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission) on June 15, 1982, and was issued Certificate Number 02-3128. Thurlow has been employed by the West Palm Beach Police Department (WPBPD) for the last eight years. On the evening of November 24, 1990, Thurlow was assigned as a police officer to the WPBPD Criminal Apprehension Team (CAT), which is a street crimes unit. That evening Thurlow was partnered for the first time with Lee Rollins (Rollins), a fellow police officer on CAT. Thurlow and Rollins were assigned as plain clothes officers in an unmarked police vehicle, an old, gold Cadillac. Thurlow had on a black T-shirt, combat pants, black combat boots, duty leather and underneath his shirt a bullet-proof vest with a trauma plate. Rollins was dressed in a black T-shirt and jeans. He was not wearing duty leather, but was wearing a utility belt fastened with velcro. Both officers wore their police badges on a chain underneath their shirts. Around 10:30 p.m., near the end of their duty shift, they were returning to the police station. Thurlow was driving south on South Dixie Highway headed toward the Belvedere Road intersection. As they approached the intersection, the officers saw a man, later identified as Robert Jewett (Jewett), dressed in cut-off jeans, a T-shirt, and a cap standing near the middle of the south bound lanes on South Dixie Highway past the Belvedere Road intersection, near the Palm Beach Post Building. The officers continued through the Belvedere Road intersection toward Jewett. As they approached Jewett, he stuck out his left hand in a "hitchhiking gesture." Thurlow pulled over to the side of the road near the parking lot of the Palm Beach Post Building. When Thurlow pulled over, Jewett ran up to the car and got in the back seat. Rollins showed Jewett his police badge, told Jewett that he was a police officer, and requested Jewett to step outside the car. Jewett complied. Rollins exited the Cadillac and Thurlow remained inside. Rollins asked Jewett for his driver's license, which Jewett gave him. Rollins radioed the police dispatcher with the information on the driver's license in order to determine whether there were any outstanding warrants on Jewett. Rollins advised Jewett that he was going to charge him with hitchhiking, but that if there were no warrants against Jewett that he would be given a Notice to Appear and released at the scene, rather than being taken down to the police station. Rollins told Jewett to place his hands on top of the car and spread his legs so that Rollins could search him for weapons. Jewett complied. Thurlow, still sitting in the driver's seat, was monitoring the conversation between Rollins and Jewett. Rollins began the weapons search at Jewett's shoulder and continued down to his left pocket. Finding nothing, he started to search the right pocket. At that time Jewett brought his right arm down from the top of the car. Rollins caught his arm, put it back on top of the car, and told him to keep his hands on the top of the car. As Rollins proceeded to search Jewett's right pocket, Jewett brought his right arm down and stuck it in his pocket. At the same time he came around with his left elbow and hit Rollins on the left side of his chest, knocking him around. Rollins pulled Jewett's hand out of his pocket and they began to struggle. Rollins pulled his flashlight from his back pocket and tried to hit Jewett on his left forearm. Jewett tried to kick Rollins in the groin and Rollins grabbed Jewett's T-shirt. Their feet tangled, the men went down and Rollins fell back toward the car, hitting his head on the back door. Rollins was stunned from the blow to his head. Thurlow felt the Cadillac rock as if someone had bumped against the car. Rollins called to Thurlow to give him some assistance. Thurlow exited the car and came around to the passenger side, where he saw Rollins sitting on the ground with his back to the car, and Jewett straddling and leaning over Rollins with his arms raised as if he were preparing to hit Rollins. Thurlow ran up behind Jewett and put his arm below Jewett's Adam's apple in Jewett's upper chest area in order to pull Jewett back from Rollins. Jewett began to fight and had Thurlow on the balls of his feet. They went towards the front of the car. Jewett went down on his knees with Thurlow's arm still around him. Jewett stood up with Thurlow on his back and they both went backwards, and as a result Thurlow's arm slipped up towards Jewett's chin. Rollins, seeing Jewett put his right hand in his pocket, ran over to Jewett and tried to grab his right hand. The three men fell to the ground and rolled backwards landing in a grassy area. Thurlow still had his arm around Jewett's neck. Thurlow was on the bottom, Jewett in the middle and Rollins on top. Thurlow released his hold on Jewett and slipped out from under Jewett. Thurlow was on Jewett's left side and Rollins was sitting to Jewett's right, about, waist-high facing away from Jewett. Jewett was grabbing at his right pocket. Rollins saw a metal object in the area of Jewett's right pocket. Rollins took his flashlight and swiped at the metal object, sending both the flashlight and the metal object flying off in an easterly direction. Rollins told Jewett to quit struggling. Jewett grabbed the butt of Rollins' gun. Rollins hollered to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun. Rollins hit Jewett in the groin three to four times. Thurlow got up and threw a punch at Jewett connecting at Jewett's left eye. At that point Jewett quit fighting. Thurlow held Jewett's arm over the curb and told Rollins to handcuff Jewett. Having lost his handcuffs in the struggle, Rollins used Thurlow's handcuffs and cuffed Jewett's hands behind his back. All three men were breathing hard and sweating. Rollins told Thurlow that he had lost his flashlight and that something had been thrown out of Jewett's hand during the struggle. Thurlow left Rollins with Jewett and went to look for the lost items. At the time Thurlow left Rollins and Jewett, Jewett was breathing. During the struggle, Rollins' handcuffs, radio, and ammo pouch came off his belt. Rollins found his radio and called the dispatcher at 22:35:52 hours to report the incident. He then went to look for the rest of his missing equipment and was gone approximately one to one and a half minutes. Rollins returned to Jewett and started to pick him up; however Jewett was limp. Rollins put him back on the ground and tried to take his pulse. Because Rollins was still in an excited state from the fight, he could not tell whether he was getting a pulse from Jewett. He tried to take Jewett's pulse again but still could not determine whether he was getting a pulse. Thurlow, having found the flashlight in the grass and an open pocketknife on the sidewalk, walked back over to Rollins and Jewett. Thurlow asked Rollins if something was wrong with Jewett, and Rollins replied that Jewett did not look well. At 22:39:54 hours Thurlow radioed for the paramedics. At 22:43:35 hours, Thurlow again radioed for the paramedics to hurry and get to the scene. Rollins again checked for a pulse but could not determine whether there was a pulse. A few minutes later firefighters, responding to a medical call, arrived on the scene. One of the firefighters checked Jewett's pulse and breathing and determined that Jewett was not breathing and did not have a pulse. Jewett was pale with some discoloration and swelling about the face. Within several seconds, the rescue team arrived. The rescue team got Jewett uncuffed and began to administer advanced life support. Jewett was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. Both Thurlow and Rollins were trained to administer CPR; however the unmarked police vehicle did not contain rubber gloves or a bag which are used in administering CPR to protect the person administering CPR from diseases such as AIDS which could be transmitted by bodily fluids. Additionally, Jewett appeared to be breathing, which would mean that he was not a candidate for CPR. At the time of the incident, Joseph Huffman and his girlfriend were traveling north on South Dixie Highway in a van. The van had windows on the rear doors and on the passenger and driver doors. As Mr. Huffman approached the Palm Beach Post parking lot, he saw two men scuffling on the hood of the gold Cadillac. He began to slow down to watch the fracas. He observed the fight for approximately 20 to 30 seconds, during which time he looked over to the El Cid Bar to see if anyone was watching. His girlfriend observed that Huffman tried to look at the fight through his side mirror but couldn't see so he stuck his head out the driver's window and glanced back once or twice, looking forward to check the approaching traffic. Huffman recalled seeing a third man strike Jewett at least 20 times in the groin with a flashlight; however the medical evidence does not support Mr. Huffman's assertion. Having judged the credibility of the witness, I find that Mr. Huffman's recollection is not credible. An autopsy was performed on Jewett by the Palm Beach County Medical Examiner, Dr. James Benz. The autopsy revealed that Jewett had a black eye, markings on the forehead and neck area, minor bruises and abrasions on the right forearm, abrasions on the knees, and abrasions on the right wrist. Jewett suffered fractured ribs and bruising of the left lung underlying the rib fractures. There was a "blow out" of the heart. There was hemorrhaging underneath the Adam's apple and an irregular fracture in the lamana below the Adam's apple. The hyoid bone, which sits above the voice box, was fractured. There were no injuries to the upper thighs, penis or lower abdomen. There was a mild bruise in the testicle area and hemorrhaging in the left testicle. The injuries to the testicles are not consistent with Jewett's being hit between 10 to 20 times with a flashlight in the groin. The "blow out" of Jewett's heart is called a cardiac tamponade. Most probably as a result of the impact to Jewett's chest when he, Rollins, and Thurlow fell to the ground, a thin area of Jewett's heart blew out forming a small hole in Jewett's heart. The heart pumped blood through the small hole into the pericardial sac. As a result of the blood flowing into the pericardial sac, the heart could not expand and death occurred. The cardiac tamponade did not occur after Jewett died nor did it occur in a peri-mortem, near-death state. The cardiac tamponade did occur while Jewett was alive and death occurred some time later. Based on the testimony of Dr. Charles Petty, an expert in forensic pathology, I find that the injuries to Jewett's neck occurred as a result of forceful application of force to the neck, which is consistent with a fall across a rounded object such as a forearm rather than police carotid holds and choke downs. The Use of Force Matrix from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is the state standard concerning the use of force by law enforcement officers. The matrix lists the resistance levels of a subject and indicates the appropriate level of force to be used by an officer in responding to the various levels of resistance. An aggressive physical resistance is defined as overt, hostile attacking movements which may cause injury, but are not likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. Aggravated physical resistance is when the subject makes overt, hostile, attacking movements with or without a weapon, with the intent and apparent ability to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. The resistance level of Jewett when he was straddled and leaning over Rollins as Rollins was up against the fender of the Cadillac and Jewett's actions at the front of the car with Thurlow constitutes aggressive physical resistance. The matrix guidelines indicate that an officer may use all levels of force with the exception of deadly force in dealing with aggressive physical resistance. When Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind to remove Jewett from his position of standing over Rollins, Thurlow was not using deadly force. His arm was not under Jewett's chin but was lower, nearer the upper chest area. The resistance level of Jewett when he was trying to get Rollins' gun constitutes aggravated physical resistance. The matrix guidelines for force to counter aggravated physical resistance include among other things, counter moves, incapacitation, and deadly force. Deadly force includes techniques that may result in imminent or serious injury, unconsciousness or permanent disfigurement, such as impact weapon strikes to the head or use of firearms. Thus, Thurlow's punch to Jewett's face was within the matrix guidelines.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Glen H. Thurlow. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2593 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly" which is rejected. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 10-12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance; however it should be noted that it appeared to Thurlow that Jewett was about to strike Rollins. Paragraph 17: The first and second sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The evidence established that Thurlow jumped across Jewett's back, placing his arm across Jewett below Jewett's Adam's apple. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Accepted that Thurlow and Jewett continued to struggle. Rejected that Thurlow continued to maintain a choke hold on Jewett. The greater weight of the evidence established that Thurlow's arm did not slip up under Jewett's chin until Jewett and Thurlow began to fall backward. Paragraph 19: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance with the exception of "continued to hold Mr. Jewett in a choke hold." The evidence established that Thurlow's did not have a choke hold on Jewett until they fell backwards and that the choke hold was not an intentional action but rather resulted from the struggle between Jewett and Thurlow and Rollins running into them. Paragraph 21-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 23: Accepted in substance except to the extent that such finding implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett at the time that Huffman saw them. Paragraphs 24-26: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Huffman's testimony concerning the repeated striking of Jewett in his groin not to be credible, particularly considering the medical evidence and the fact that Huffman was driving down the street while he was trying to look at the fight and keep track of traffic both in front of and behind him. Paragraph 27: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett the entire time that they were struggling. The evidence established that Thurlow did not start out with a choke hold but that during the struggle, Thurlow's arm slipped underneath Jewett's chin. Paragraphs 31-35: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: Accepted in substance to the extent that at one point in time while Jewett was supine on the ground his head was turned toward Thurlow and he grabbed Thurlow's shirt but rejected to the extent that it implies that during the entire time Jewett was on the ground he was looking at Thurlow and grabbing Thurlow's shirt. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow did hear Rollins shout that Jewett had grabbed his gun and to the extent that Thurlow did not see Jewett actually grab the gun. Rejected to the extent that the word "claiming" implies that Rollins may not have shouted to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun and rejected to the extent that the last part of the sentence could be construed to mean that Thurlow did not see Jewett's right arm reach in the direction of Rollins' holster. Paragraphs 39-40: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly." Paragraphs 42-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: The portion relating to rendering medical assistance is accepted in substance. The portion relating to never checking on the well being of Jewett is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Thurlow did inquire of Rollins concerning the condition of Thurlow before he called for the paramedics. Paragraph 47: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 48: Accepted in substance to the extent that Rollins did not render any first aid but rejected to the extent that Thurlow always had an unobscured view of Jewett. The evidence established that Thurlow was looking for the knife and the flashlight during a portion of the time . Paragraph 49: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 50-51: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 52-53: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 54: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 55: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 56: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 57-59: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 60-73: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 74: Accepted in substance to the extent that Jewett was lying on the ground, was bloody, and was not moving. In light of the testimony of Mr. Cook that Jewett's skin was pale and there was discoloration about his face, I do not find Mr. Bouchillion's testimony that Jewett was turning blue to be credible. Paragraph 75: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 76-77: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 78-86: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 87: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 88: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 89: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 90-96: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 97: Having considered the opinions of Dr. Benz and Dr. Petty, I reject the finding to the extent that it implies that the fractures resulted from a choke hold applied prior to Thurlow, Jewett, and Rollin falling down and rolling into the grassy area. Paragraph 98: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 99: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 100: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 101: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 102: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 103: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 104: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 105-109: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 110-111: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 112: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 113: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 114: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 115: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 116-117: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 118: Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 119: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett from the time there were at the rear of the Cadillac until they fell backwards. The evidence established that Thurlow did not have Jewett in a choke hold when Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind. Paragraph 120: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 121-125: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 2-3: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 4: The first and last sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The portion of the second sentence relating to Thurlow being able to hear is accepted but the portion that Thurlow could see everything is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The last sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow thought that he needed to monitor the traffic but the greater weight of the evidence established that the Cadillac was not in the lane of traffic while it was parked. Paragraphs 10-27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28-30: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 31: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 32: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn P. Whitehurst, Esquire Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Gene "Hal" Johnson, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Scott N. Richardson, Esquire Atterbury, Goldberger & Richardson One Clear Lake Center, Suite 1400 250 Australian Avenue, South West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5012 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent, Larry A. Moore, was certified as a law enforcement officer and corrections officer in Florida. The Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, (Commission), is the state agency responsible for the certification of law enforcement and corrections officer in Florida. During the months of November and December, 1987, Respondent was employed as a police officer by the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. In December, 1987, Officer Chris Hamori was a traffic officer with the same department. He had been issued certain equipment for his personal use on duty in which he had placed his personal identification mark. The equipment, primarily a windbreaker, a raincoat, a flashlight and other items necessary for traffic accident investigation, was kept in the trunk of the patrol car signed out to him. He was the only operator of that vehicle, though numerous department cars, all of the same make and model, were identically keyed. Therefor, any key for any of the vehicles would open and operate any of the other identical vehicles. On December 8, 1987, Officer Hamori was assigned to teach a class at a junior college in the next county to the south. When he got there, it was raining and he went to the trunk to get his raincoat but found it missing. He had to get to class and so did not search the trunk at that time. During the mid-class break, however, he again went to the car to make a more thorough search and discovered that his trunk had been rifled and not only his raincoat but his windbreaker as well were missing. There was no evidence of breaking into the trunk. Officer Hamori reported the theft the next morning and went to the Department's property custodian to let them know as well. At that time he was issued another raincoat and windbreaker which, according to the property custodian, Ms. Bell, had just been turned in by the Respondent who was leaving employment with the Department. Officer Hamori noted, from the lack of patches on the windbreaker, that it was much like his and upon further checking, noted that his name appeared on the underside of the right sleeve where he had placed it when the garment was initially issued to him. He also noted that the raincoat had his name written on the inside of the placket where he had placed it when the coat was initially issued to him. From this, he determined that these two garments were the ones taken from his car, without his knowledge or permission, the previous day. Ms. Bell was quite certain that the items in issue here had been turned in to her that same day by the Respondent. When he brought them in, she cleared his property account and placed the items off to the side. She had not had time to place them back into stock. Notwithstanding Respondent's urging that other individuals than Ms. Bell had access to the property storage area, she indicated that no one else turned in any items of that nature that day. Respondent was the only one to turn in equipment that day and, as was stated, she had not put it back into stock when Hamori came in to ask for a reissue. It is found, therefore, that the property turned in by Respondent was the property issued to Officer Hamori and was the same property which had been taken from him without permission. Respondent urges that numerous people could have gotten into Respondent's patrol car and taken his property because of the large number of keys out that would fit it. This is true, but the evidence is uncontrovertible that the property turned in by the Respondent was the property taken from Officer Hamori's car the day before and there is some evidence in fact, that Respondent indicated to Sergeant Lobeck, his immediate supervisor, that he needed some equipment, including a raincoat, to turn in when he left the Department's employ. It is found, therefore, that Respondent is the individual who took the property in question from Officer Hamori's car. Had this not been discovered, the Department would have been out the cost of the equipment since, because it had been stolen from Hamori, Hamori would have been released from liability for it. Only the property initially issued to Respondent was not returned, and though he ultimately paid for it, at the time in issue, he took it from Hamori without authority. Toward the end of 1988, Assistant Chief of the West Palm Beach Department, attempted to locate the Respondent, then a patrolman with that agency, due to a schedule change. At that time, Respondent was not where he was supposed to be and had not advised the Department of his whereabouts. He was finally located at the Mt. Vernon Motor Lodge in West Palm Beach. Discussions with the manager of that facility indicated that the Respondent had moved out without paying the full amount of the room rent owed and had left his room in a messy and unclean condition. Abel Menendez was the manager of the Mount Vernon Motor Lodge during the period September through November, 1988. During that time, Respondent, who represented himself incorrectly as an employee of the Sheriff's office, rented a room at the motel, paying a rate therefor of $135.00 per week. Respondent was to pay his rent in advance and at first did so, but after a while, he began to get behind in his payments and Mr. Menendez had trouble finding him. When it became clear that Respondent could not bring his arrears current, Mr. Menendez agreed that he could make partial payments to catch up, but he never did so. Finally, in November, along with Mr. Fishbein, the motel owner, Mr. Menendez told Respondent he would have to pay up or move out. When Respondent first began to fall behind in his rent, Mr. Menendez contacted representatives of the West Palm Beach Police Department and gave them a summary of the charges owed by Respondent. The last payment made by Respondent was $135.00 on November 11, 1988, which left a balance due of $500.00 which was never paid. Respondent is alleged to have left the motel during the night of November 11, 1988. According to Mr. Menendez, Respondent "destroyed" the room before his departure. Some of his clothes and things were left in the room. The room was examined the following day by Sgt. Chappell, also of the Department, who had gone there to look for the Respondent at the direction of Captain Griffin. This officer observed holes punched in the walls, and trash and dirty diapers in the room. He never located Respondent. Chief Bradshaw subsequently spoke with the Respondent about this situation and based on the facts as he determined them, terminated Respondent's probationary status with the Department and discharged him. In their discussion, Respondent indicated he had an arrangement with the motel manager, but this was only partially true. The arrangement was to pay in installments but Respondent abandoned the room without doing so. He was locked out by the management the following day. Even though Respondent agreed with Chief Bradshaw to make payments of the amounts owed, he may not have done so. As a result, criminal charges were filed against him. The criminal charges were subsequently disposed of by a Deferred Prosecution Agreement entered into by the Respondent and the State in June, 1989. By the terms of that agreement, Respondent agreed to pay off the obligation at a rate no less than $100.00 per month. However, Mr. Moore never paid any money to the motel because, due to a total mixup in the motel's paperwork, they were never able to establish to whom the money was to be paid. As a result, the matter was ultimately disposed of by the State entering a nolle prosequi in the case. Respondent's public defender, Ms. Kretchmer, remembers Respondent's repeatedly indicating he wanted to pay off the obligation, however. Respondent's wife, with whom he was living in the motel prior to their marriage, recalls having offered Mr. Menendez $300.00 the day before the Moores moved out. Mr. Menendez would not take it, however, indicating he wanted to receive it from Respondent. When Respondent came by, she gave him the money and they went to Menendez to pay him but he would accept only $150.00 and told Moore to keep the rest and not worry about it because, due to the fact he was a policeman, they "needed him around there." Shortly thereafter, however, Mrs. Moore heard Mr. Menendez complaining to the police about the amount owed. She claims Moore tried to make payments several times and whenever he would do so, Menendez would get upset. It was her understanding that Menendez was getting pressure from his boss to collect what was due and get the records straight. He mentioned to her that the motel cash account was short and he was being accused of taking the money. There is some evidence that Moore was not the only one having trouble with rent payments at the motel at that time. When he found that out, he decided to move but Mr. Menendez begged him not to go because his presence as a policeman helped in curbing drugs, gambling and prostitution there. Mrs. Moore absolutely denies that she and Respondent ever hid from Mr. Menendez nor did they sneak out during the night. They checked out in broad daylight at 11:45 in the morning with Mr. Menendez standing by. At that time, Menendez threatened to call the police but, according to Respondent, he, Moore did so instead, but could get no one in authority to listen or help him. Even after they left, Moore called and spoke with Menendez several times but was still subsequently arrested on the defraud charge. According to Mrs. Moore, they at no time damaged the room. At the time they left, the motel was fixing the air conditioner which caused some damage, but that's the only damage in the room when they left. Before they left, she cleaned the room so that it was in the same condition when they left as it was when they moved in. Respondent claims that when he began work with the West Palm Beach Police Department he discussed his rent problems with police officials and told them he had an arrangement with the motel to pay off the arrears. He admits he then got behind and when he tried to pay, the figures kept changing because of the absence of rental records. When he left, his disagreement with the motel was over the amount owed. He called the police to get a witness to his request for a firm bill, but by that time, he had already been terminated and the police would not come out. He had already had his discussion with Chief Bradshaw who, he claims, had told him to take care of the bill whatever the amount. He felt this was unfair, however, because he was told to pay whatever was asked regardless of whether he owed it or not. Respondent was ordained and licensed as a minister by the Church of God, 629 5th Street, West Palm Beach, on January 3, 1992. His minister the Reverend Preston Williams has found him to be a nice person and a well mannered person dedicated to his work, who has served with him in the local ministry since 1985.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore; RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case, dismissing the allegation of defrauding an innkeeper as alleged in the original Administrative Complaint, finding Respondent guilty of unlawfully taking the property issued to officer Hamori as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and revoking his certification as a correctional officer and as a law enforcement officer. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 24th day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Gina Cassidy, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Larry A. Moore 5100 45th Street, Apt. 1-A West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues to be determined is whether the City of Destin (“City”) has demonstrated its entitlement to place dredged material from the maintenance dredging of the East Pass (“East Pass” or “inlet”) entrance channel conducted pursuant to the Consolidated Joint Coastal Permit and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization, Permit Number: 0288799-003-JC (“Permit”), in the swash zone east of East Pass in accordance with the Notice to Proceed (“NTP”); and whether the Inlet Management Plan referenced in the NTP is an unadopted rule as described in section 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the stipulations of the parties, and the evidentiary record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties Petitioners, David H. Sherry and Rebecca R. Sherry, own Unit 511 at the Surf Dweller Condominium, 554 Coral Court, Fort Walton Beach, Florida. The Surf Dweller Condominium, which is on Santa Rosa Island in the unincorporated community of Okaloosa Island,1/ fronts the Gulf of Mexico, and straddles DEP Reference Monument R-7, which is between three and four miles west of DEP Virtual Monument V-611, and is between five and six miles west of the west side of East Pass. The Sherrys use the beach at their condominium on a daily basis for fishing, crabbing, swimming, walking, running, and general recreation. They also walk or run from Monument R-7 along the beaches to East Pass, and occasionally drive to and use the beaches on the east side of East Pass. Petitioner, John S. Donovan, owns Units 131 and 132 at the El Matador Condominium, 909 Santa Rosa Boulevard, Fort Walton Beach, Florida. The El Matador Condominium is on Okaloosa Island, fronts the Gulf of Mexico, and is approximately five miles west of Monument V-611, and is more than six miles west of the west side of East Pass. Mr. Donovan generally walks the beaches west of his condominium, but does occasionally walk along the beach to Monument V-607, which is the location of a seawall constructed by the Air Force on sovereign submerged lands to protect an Air Force tracking facility. Intervenor, Thomas Wilson, resides at 856 Edgewood Drive, Charleston, West Virginia, and owns a secondary residence at 1530 Miracle Strip Parkway, No. 101-B, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, in the vicinity of Monument R-14. Mr. Wilson uses and enjoys the gulf-front beaches between his property on Okaloosa Island and East Pass. Petitioners’ stated injuries are related to the allegation that the lateral movement of sand from the East Pass areas of influence is from east to west. Placing dredged material in the eastern disposal site would allegedly deprive the beaches in front of their property -- beaches that are miles from the nearest area of influence or spoil disposal site -- of their natural sand supply by cutting off what they allege to be the natural sand flow, causing the beaches in front of their properties to eventually erode. Petitioners alleged no immediate environmental injuries associated with the NTP. Petitioners’ stated objective in this case is to have any sand dredged from East Past to be placed on the western disposal areas at all times. The City is the applicant for the Permit and the NTP, and abuts the east side of East Pass. DEP is an agency of the State of Florida pursuant to section 20.255, Florida Statutes. DEP is the permitting authority in this proceeding and issued the NTP at issue in this proceeding to the City. The NTP was issued on February 2, 2018, without notice of rights language regarding the right to request a hearing or time limits for doing so. Petitioners received a copy of the NTP on October 1, 2018, and filed a challenge more than 14 days later, on November 30, 2018. East Pass Prior to 1928, the connection from Choctawhatchee Bay to the Gulf of Mexico flowed through what is now Old Pass Lagoon. After a storm in 1928, a high-tide breach of the shoreline near the current location of East Pass was formed. In 1929, a record rain event caused waters to rise in Choctawhatchee Bay. Residents of the area dug a relief channel at roughly the present location of East Pass. The waters releasing through the more hydraulically efficient flow path from Choctawhatchee Bay established a channel, which quickly enlarged to become the prominent inlet to the Gulf of Mexico. The permanent channel, now known as East Pass, is the only navigable passage from Choctawhatchee Bay and the Intercoastal Waterway to the Gulf of Mexico between Panama City, Florida, and Pensacola, Florida. East Pass separates the gulf-fronting beaches of the City to its east from the beaches owned by the United States as part of Eglin Air Force Base to the west. The entrance to East Pass is protected by two boulder-mount jetties: a 3,860 foot- long jetty on the west side of the inlet and a 1,210 foot-long jetty on the east side of the inlet. East Pass is an ebb tide dominated inlet, with a sizable amount of sediment moving in and out. When outgoing tidal flow moves though the constriction formed by the jetties, flow velocities are accelerated. When the water, and any entrained sediment, passes the jetties, flow tends to spread out to the east, west, and south, and naturally loses velocity. When the outgoing tidal waters reach a critical velocity where they can no longer carry the sand, the sand drops out of suspension, which forms the ebb shoal. Essentially, the ebb shoal is a large, semi-circular sandbar extending from the mouth of East Pass that was created by the ebb tide carrying sediments south. East Pass is a highly dynamic inlet system. There are processes spurred by the configuration and location of East Pass, tides, waves, and storms that have resulted in currents running to the east and west that change on a frequent basis. The Physical Monitoring Plan (“PMP”), which is part of the Permit, and thus, not subject to challenge in this case, established, for the period of 1996 through 2007, “a trend of west to east longshore transport, resulting in net gain immediately west of [East Pass] and a significant loss of sand along Holiday Isle east of [East Pass].” The PMP further established that a “drift nodal point” existed at East Pass. Longshore transport at uniform coastal locations is generally in one direction. However, when there are wave events coming from varying angles, and where beach contours are not parallel and uniform, or even linear, it is common for transport reversals to occur. The point at which those reversals occur is referred to as a nodal point. That point can be where east and west transport converges, or where it diverges. The shoreline in the vicinity of East Pass has exhibited “quite a few” nodal points over the past decade, resulting in frequent drift reversals and sand transport to the east and the west. The evidence as to the existence and effect of the East Pass drift nodal point, and its affect on the lateral transport of sand in the area, including the East Pass areas of influence, was substantiated by testimony and other evidence introduced at the final hearing. The testimony and evidence that there is no consistent direction of lateral sand transport in the vicinity of East Pass, and no predominant lateral current transporting sand in a westerly direction, is accepted. Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive. East Pass includes a federal navigation channel. The federal navigation channel requires routine maintenance to prevent it from shoaling. On an average, East Pass is dredged in two-year intervals. The last time that East Pass was dredged was in December of 2013. It has now shoaled with sand and become very hazardous for marine traffic. In December of 2018, the City declared a state of emergency relating to the navigational hazards caused by the accumulation of sand in the navigation channel. The Permit On February 26, 2015, DEP issued the Permit, which authorized the City to perform “periodic maintenance dredging of the federally authorized East Pass and Destin Harbor and navigation channels.” The Permit will expire on February 26, 2030. Notice of the issuance of this Permit was published in the Destin Log, a newspaper of general circulation, on December 24, 2014. No challenge to the issuance of the Permit was filed. As it pertains to the issues in this proceeding, the Permit provides that “Dredged material from . . . maintenance dredging activities will be placed in the swash zones of the beaches east and west of East Pass, as specified in the East Pass Inlet Management Plan.” The specific beach spoil placement sites are, as relevant to this proceeding, located “west of East Pass . . . between [DEP] reference monuments V-611 and V-622; and on 2 beach sites situated east of East Pass . . . from R-17 to R-20.5 and from R-23.5 to R-25.5.” Those areas correspond to what have been identified as the “areas of influence,” which are the beach areas east and west of East Pass that are affected by tidal forces generated by the inlet. The specified beach spoil placement sites, being conditions of the unchallenged Permit, are not subject to challenge in this case. The Permit establishes the criteria by which specific work is to be authorized. Specific Condition 5 provides, in pertinent part, that: 5. No work shall be conducted under this permit until the Permittee has received a written notice to proceed from the Department for each event. At least 30 days prior to the requested date of issuance of the notice to proceed, the Permittee shall submit a written request for a Notice to Proceed along with the following items for review and approval by the Department: * * * Prior to the second dredging event authorized under this permit, and each subsequent event, the Physical Monitoring Data, as specified in Specific Condition 9, shall be submitted to select the appropriate placement locations. Specific Condition 9 provides that: Following the initial placement of material on Norriego Point, fill site selection shall be supported by the latest physical monitoring data over a minimum of five years in accordance with the adopted East Pass Inlet Management Implementation Plan (July 24, 2013). All physical monitoring shall be conducted in accordance to the Approved physical monitoring plan dated August, 2014. A notice to proceed for specific projects shall be withheld pending concurrence by the Department that the data support the proposed placement location. The purpose of Specific Condition 9 is to identify, using supporting monitoring data from the eastern and western areas of influence, the “adjacent eroding beach” most in need of sand from the inlet. The requirement that physical monitoring data be used to determine which of the beach spoil placement sites identified in the Permit’s Project Description will receive the spoil from any particular periodic dredging event was to implement section 161.142, Florida Statutes. That section mandates that “maintenance dredgings of beach-quality sand are placed on the adjacent eroding beaches,” and establishes the overriding policy of the state regarding disposition of sand from navigational channel maintenance dredging. East Pass Inlet Management Implementation Plan The East Pass Inlet Management Implementation Plan (“East Pass IMP”) was adopted by Final Order of DEP on July 30, 2013.2/ The East Pass IMP was not adopted through the rulemaking procedures proscribed by chapter 120, Florida Statutes, or DEP rules. Despite a comprehensive Notice of Rights advising persons whose substantial interests could be affected of the means by which the East Pass IMP could be challenged, it was not. There are 44 maintained inlets in Florida. About half have individual inlet management plans. The East Pass IMP is not applicable to any inlet other than East Pass. The East Pass IMP does not require that any quantity of dredged material from the dredging of East Pass be placed at any particular location other than as established in the Permit. Rather, the disposal site is to be determined on a case-by-case basis based on the best monitoring data available for the beaches in the area of influence of East Pass. The critical element of the IMP, and that in keeping with the statutory requirement that sand be placed on “adjacent eroding beaches” is the “strategy” that “the recent erosion of adjacent beaches observed over a minimum of five years shall define the placement need in terms of location and volume.” The East Pass IMP, being applicable only to East Pass, is not of “general applicability.” Furthermore, the East Pass IMP does not implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. The Notice to Proceed On January 30, 2018, the City filed its Request for Notice to Proceed (“Request”). The Request addressed the criteria in Specific Conditions 5 and 9 of the Permit. Upon review, DEP determined the conditions of the Permit were satisfied and issued the NTP on February 2, 2018. The analysis of data submitted as part of the Request was designed to show areas of erosion and accretion within the eastern and western areas of influence in order to identify “critically eroded beaches.” The shoreline of Santa Rosa Island to the west of East Pass has historically been stable. To be sure, as is the case with any shoreline, there will be some areas of erosion and some areas of accretion. After Hurricanes Ivan and Opal, areas of Santa Rosa Island experienced erosion. DEP declared the shoreline to be critically eroded after the 2004-2005 hurricane seasons, which prompted Okaloosa County to commission a study to monitor the health of the Monuments R-1 through R-16 beach segment, a segment that includes Petitioners’ residences. Despite the fact that no post-storm beach restoration occurred in the area, the beach recovered naturally and gained sand following the post-storm recovery. In addition, Santa Rosa Island is known for “beach cusps,” which are crenulate3/ shapes along the shoreline. Depending on the season and storm conditions, those beach cusps can have a localized erosive effect on the beach, but those tend to be seasonal. They do not negate what the evidence shows to be the overall stable to accretional conditions of the beaches west of East Pass from Monument V-622 to Petitioners’ residences. Mr. Trammell offered testimony, including a discussion of photographic evidence, demonstrating the beaches west of East Pass have large dunes; multiple dune lines; tall, and thick vegetated dunes indicating established dune growth; pioneering vegetation indicating active, healthy dune growth and accretion; partially buried signs indicating dune advance; and broad and expansive beaches. Those features are indicative of a stable and accretional shoreline. Mr. Trammell’s testimony as to the western spoil disposal site was convincing and is accepted. At present, the Santa Rosa Island shoreline is not deemed by DEP to be “critically eroded.” The photographic evidence supports the data collected over time for the beaches west of East Pass, and the testimony offered at the final hearing, which collectively establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the beaches to the west of East Pass are stable and accretional, are not subject to erosion caused by East Pass, and are not “adjacent eroding beaches” as that term is used in section 161.142. The shoreline east of East Pass, including the eastern area of influence and the proposed dredge material disposal sites at Monuments R-17 to R-20.5 and R-23.5 to R-25, except for the area immediately abutting the eastern jetty, is highly erosional. Mr. Trammell offered testimony, including a discussion of photographic evidence, demonstrating the beaches east of East Pass exhibit the following signs of significant and ongoing erosion: extensive dune erosion; exposed sea oat roots; reduced beach elevation; reduced beach width; crenulate bays; newly built dune walkovers that replaced old walkovers claimed by erosion; dune walkovers in close proximity to the shoreline indicating that the shoreline had receded to the walkover; and beach scarping at the shoreline indicating active erosion. Mr. Trammell’s testimony as to the eastern spoil disposal sites was convincing and is accepted. The eastern areas of influence are currently designated to be “critically eroded” by DEP, a designation maintained for more than 10 years. The photographic evidence supports the data collected over time for the beaches east of East Pass, and the testimony offered at the final hearing, which collectively establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the beaches to the east of East Pass are critically eroded, a condition that is influenced by East Pass and or its navigational channel, and are “adjacent eroding beaches” as that term is used in section 161.142. Data in Support of the NTP The data submitted by the City to DEP in support of the Request included monitoring data for the eastern beach placement areas from the West Destin Four-Year Post-construction Monitoring Report and earlier annual post-construction reports covering the period from October 2012 to July 2017, and additional data from the Holiday Isle Emergency Beach Fill Two-Year Post-construction Report. DEP was also provided with historical monitoring data for the area west of East Pass, including the Western Beach Monitoring Report, which covered 2006 to 2017, and the Potential Borrow Area Impact Report, which included data from 1996 through 2012. DEP has also received recent profile data from April 2019. These reports, and the data contained within them, cumulatively provide more than 20 years of survey date, and demonstrate convincingly that the shoreline to the west of East Pass has been stable or accreting, and the areas to the east are eroded. The data submitted in support of the Request was sufficient to meet Specific Condition 9 that fill site selection be supported by the latest physical monitoring data over a minimum of five years in accordance with the East Pass IMP. Petitioners argue that the City failed to comply with the PMP, which requires, among other things, that the analysis of the dredged material disposal area include “preconstruction survey data and the most recent survey conducted at least five years prior.” The PMP establishes that “[p]reconstruction surveys shall be conducted no more than 90 days before construction commences. A prior beach monitoring survey of the beach and offshore may be submitted for the pre-construction survey if consistent with the other requirements” of the PMP. The City submitted a prior beach monitoring survey of the beach and offshore that is consistent with the PMP. Petitioners argue that the City violated a temporal limitation which provides that the City “may submit a prior beach restoration monitoring report for the west or east beach areas (Walton-Destin or Western Destin Beach Restoration Project) if the monitoring data is collected within 1 year of the proposed maintenance dredging event and if consistent with the other requirements of this condition.” Petitioners acknowledge in their PRO that the beach restoration monitoring report was timely when the Request for NTP was submitted. The information contained therein was sufficient to support the notice of proposed action on the NTP. The otherwise compliant data is no longer within one year of the proposed dredge. In that regard, the litigation in this case, initiated by Petitioners, has been ongoing for almost one year. Work authorized by the NTP cannot go forward when subject to challenge. If the PMP, which is not a rule, is unreasonably read so as not to account for delay caused by litigation, such delay becomes a tool for use by, and a reward for, a person dissatisfied with DEP’s outcome. In this case, the NTP was lawfully issued pursuant to compliant data, surveys, and analysis. As with any permit or license subject to a third- party challenge, the terms of the NTP are tolled pending Petitioners’ litigation, and do not become a ground for denial of the otherwise compliant Request. See § 120.60(1), Fla. Stat. (“An application for a license must be approved or denied within 90 days after receipt of a completed application unless a shorter period of time for agency action is provided by law. The 90-day time period is tolled by the initiation of a proceeding under ss. 120.569 and 120.57. Any application for a license which is not approved or denied . . . within 45 days after a recommended order is submitted to the agency and the parties, . . . is considered approved unless the recommended order recommends that the agency deny the license.”).4/ Furthermore, DEP has now received recent profile data from April 2019. The evidence establishes that the data provided to DEP as part of the Request includes the latest physical monitoring data over a period of greater than five years, and that the data collection met the standards for conducting physical monitoring. Fill Site Selection The NTP authorized “placement of dredged material in the swash zone east of East Pass.” In accordance with the Permit, that authorized area extends eastward from R-17 to R-20.5 and from R-23.5 to R-25.5, in Holiday Isle. The evidence is persuasive that placing dredged material on the eastern side of East Pass would not result in erosion on the western side of East Pass. Dredged material placed in the western beach placement area, and in the “shadow” of the western jetty, will tend to remain in that area. It would take a very long time, if at all, for that material to migrate further to the west. However, dredged material placed to the east of East Pass would, if the lateral shoreline drift is east to west as asserted by Petitioners (though not supported by a preponderance of the evidence as set forth in paragraphs 11 through 13), be introduced into the ebb shoal and likely move faster to the west as opposed to it being placed directly at the base of the west jetty. As such, placement of the dredged material on the eastern beach placement areas would, more likely than not, accomplish the beach effect objectives set forth in the Petition. The Eglin AFB Beach Restoration Project Petitioners relied heavily on photographs taken in 2010 and 2019 from roughly the same location in the vicinity of Monuments V-607 to V-608 to demonstrate that the beaches of Santa Rosa Island are eroding. The area depicted is outside of the area of influence of East Pass, and outside of the western beach placement area under the Permit. Those photographs depict a wide expanse of beach in 2010, with a seawall well upland from the shore in 2010. Then, in 2019, a photograph depicting the same stretch was offered that showed the same seawall, now at or below the water line. The photographs were, ostensibly, designed to depict naturally occurring erosion in the area. Mr. Clark testified that the seawall and boulder mound structure depicted in both photographs protect an Air Force mission-critical tracking facility. The seawall was originally constructed in 1979 after Hurricane Frederick, was constructed at that time to extend into the water, and was maintained in that configuration through the 1990s. One could not walk around the original seawall. Rather, for most of its history, passage around the seaward side of the seawall could only be accomplished by swimming or wading. The original seawall was damaged by Hurricane Opal, and destroyed by Hurricanes Ivan and Dennis in 2004 and 2005. The Air Force, needing to reconstruct the wall, applied for and received a joint coastal construction permit, allowing the structure to be constructed on sovereign submerged land below the line of mean high water. The seawall was rebuilt and, as stated by Mr. Clark, “it was in the water.” In 2010, the Air Force performed the small Eglin Air Force Base Beach Restoration Project, which placed artificial fill in front of the seawall, thereby creating a temporary beach. That beach fill project was “a one-shot deal,” did not involve any subsequent maintenance, and is now essentially gone, as was expected. Mr. Clark was neither surprised nor concerned with the fact that the area returned to what he described as its natural state, with the seawall below mean high water. The 2019 photograph was presented as evidence of erosion caused by East Pass. That was not the case. Rather, the 2010 photograph was evidence of an artificial and singular event, and the 2019 photograph depicts the natural state of the shoreline. Rather than depicting erosion, the 2019 photograph depicts a return to the stable shoreline that exists all along Santa Rosa Island to the west of East Pass. The photographs of the site of the 2010 Eglin Air Force Base Beach Restoration Project do not support a finding that the beaches of Santa Rosa Island are anything but stable, if not accretional, nor do they support a finding that the beaches of Santa Rosa Island are eroding. Ultimate Factual Conclusion Specific Condition 9 of the Permit requires the location of the spoil disposal be supported by the latest physical monitoring data over a minimum of five years in accordance with the East Pass IMP and the PMP. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that the City submitted physical monitoring data consistent with the requirements of Specific Condition 9. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that the eastern areas of influence of East Pass, including the beach disposal areas at R-17 to R-20.5 and R-23.5 to R-25.5, are critically eroded, a condition influenced if not caused by the East Pass, and constitute East Pass’s “adjacent eroding beaches.” Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that the western areas of influence of East Pass, including the beach disposal areas at Monuments V-611 to V-622, are stable, if not accreting, and are not East Pass’s “adjacent eroding beaches.” Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that the City met the standards for the NTP as proposed for issuance by DEP on February 2, 2018. Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive. Thus, the NTP should be issued.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order: Approving the February 2, 2018, Notice to Proceed for the maintenance dredging of East Pass as authorized pursuant to Consolidated Environmental Resource Permit and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization No. 50-0126380-005-EI and State- owned Lease No. 0288799-003-JC, subject to the general and specific conditions set forth therein; and Denying the City of Destin’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Expenses and Costs pursuant to section 120.595(1). DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 2019.
The Issue Should the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (the Commission) impose discipline on Respondent in association with his law enforcement certificate?
Findings Of Fact The Commission has the power to certify and revoke the certification of law enforcement officers. § 943.12(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). Respondent is a certified law enforcement officer. At times relevant to the inquiry he served in that capacity in New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Based upon the record, it is inferred that his employment was in association with what has been identified as the Volusia County Beach Patrol (Beach Patrol). That organization was constituted of law enforcement officers and other employees, to include an ocean rescue life guard and EMT. The latter employment position was referred to in the organization as a Beach Safety Specialist. The accusations against Respondent in this case involve conduct seen by and directed to two females, Captain Tamara Marris, a law enforcement officer and Beach Patrol Specialist Christine Dobmeier. Both worked for the Beach Patrol at times relevant to the inquiry. The incidents that form the basis for this complaint took place in a building (the station) utilized by the Beach Patrol. The basic design of the building is set out in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered one, admitted. The drawing or diagram is not to scale. It does reflect the location of a locker room, the door to that locker room, a bathroom and an office in the building. It also shows the location of Respondent's locker within the locker room. The door into the locker room is kept shut. It has a combination lock on it that must be unlocked to gain access to the locker room. In the summer 2004, Respondent and Captain Marris finished their duty shift at the beach and returned to the station. They were the only employees in the station at the time. Respondent was in the locker room, which was not intended to be a dressing room. The bathroom is the place where people change their clothes from the duty clothing into other attire. Respondent was facing his locker wearing only a towel when Captain Marris entered the locker room. While in the locker room Respondent's genitals were exposed to her view. On this first occasion Captain Marris thought that the exposure was just an accident. On a second occasion when the two officers, Captain Marris and Respondent were closing the shift, Captain Marris walked into the locker room and Respondent dropped the towel he was wearing exposing himself, that is exposing his genitals. The second incident took place in approximately August 2004. There was a third incident at the station between Respondent and Captain Marris. This time before Captain Marris entered the locker room, she said some words to the effect, "Hey, are you decent," to which Respondent replied, "Yeah, come on in." When she entered the room, Respondent dropped his towel to pull up his shorts and she saw his genitals again. In her mind, with the third incident having transpired, she concluded that Respondent's actions were deliberate. As a consequence beyond that point, when Captain Marris needed to put her work gear away in the locker room, she would wait until Respondent left the station. On the third occasion which occurred sometime around September 2004, Respondent and Captain Marris were alone as they had been on the prior two occasions. When Captain Marris determined in her mind that the Respondent was acting intentionally in exposing his genitals, she considered this to be vulgar or indecent. She did not believe that anything in the conduct was legitimate. Certainly by the third occasion, if not before, Respondent's conduct could be seen as intentional and without legitimate purpose. Christine Dobmeier was subject to Respondent's inappropriate conduct. She was a full-time ocean life guard and EMT in the position Beach Safety Specialist. She had similar experiences with Respondent to those between Respondent and Captain Marris. As Ms. Dobmeier recalls, ordinarily the male personnel would wear "life guard baggies" at work. At times the male employees would wrap a towel around the life guard baggies. This reference is understood to mean some form of pants or shorts worn by the male personnel which they would cover with a towel. In July or August 2004 around closing time, Ms. Dobmeier entered the locker room where Respondent was located. He was wearing a towel when she entered the room. At that moment his towel fell exposing his genitals. She stated, "I am so sorry" and walked out. On that occasion the door to the locker room had been open when she entered. A couple of weeks later Ms. Dobmeier entered the locker room. This time the locker room door had been closed. She did not bother to knock because most people in her experience would change their clothes in the bathroom. She pushed the lock mechanism which made a loud noise. She entered the room and saw Respondent, who was wearing only a T-shirt. Respondent was facing his locker. When Ms. Dobmeier entered the room he turned toward her, exposing his genitals. Ms. Dobmeier apologized for seeing Respondent in his undressed state and immediately left the room. There was a third incident involving Respondent and Ms. Dobmeier, a few weeks after the second incident. This time Ms. Dobmeier knocked on the locker room door and Respondent told her to enter the room. When she did he was standing naked and she walked right back out. Later, Ms. Dobmeier asked Respondent about the third incident and said, "Why did you tell me to come in," and Respondent in reply, as Ms. Dobmeier explains, "Just kind of laughed." After the third incident Ms. Dobmeier felt that the Respondent intended the conduct in exposing himself. There was a fourth incident in the locker room. This time Ms. Dobmeier knocked on the locker room door and did not hear anything in response. She activated the locking mechanism and Respondent was found in the room with his penis erect facing her. He asked Ms. Dobmeier whether he, as Ms. Dobmeier states, indicating Respondent, "Was as large as my boyfriend." This is understood to mean a comparison between Respondent and Ms. Dobmeier's boyfriend as to their genitals. No other persons were in the station when this encounter took place. Ms. Dobmeier considered the Respondent's exposure of his genitals as vulgar. As a result of the last encounter Ms. Dobmeier decided not to enter the locker room while Respondent was at the station. At the beginning of 2005 there was another incident. This time Respondent grabbed Ms. Dobmeier's breast after a swim drill. The incident took place in the locker room with the door open and 10 to 12 lifeguards in the main area outside of the room. Only Respondent and Ms. Dobmeier were in the locker room when he performed this act. His action was not invited or acquiesced to. Ms. Dobmeier responded by telling Respondent, "Don't ever touch me again" and walked away.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding violations of the statutes and rule referred to and revoking Respondent's law enforcement certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2006.
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, is entitled to relocate its employee, Perry Kirkland, from an assignment in Jacksonville, Florida, to an assignment in West Palm Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Perry Kirkland, the Respondent, is employed as a beverage sergeant with the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. He has been employed with that division for sixteen years. Within that employment period, he has worked for one year in Orlando, two years in Miami, a period of time in Daytona Beach and then was assigned to Jacksonville, Florida, where he has remained as an employee with the exception of a period of time of 28 days beginning on September 19, 1977, when he was working for the same division in West Palm Beach, Florida. His service in the present type of classification began in 1968 when he was made an enforcement supervisor. His category was later changed to beverage sergeant in 1975. He is a permanent status employee. The underlying nature of the dispute between the Petitioner and Respondent concerns the Petitioner's effort to have the Respondent moved from Jacksonville, Florida, to West Palm Beach, Florida, on a permanent basis, as a condition of the Respondent's employment. The propriety or impropriety of such a requirement may be best understood by discussing the background facts which led to his proposed relocation. In the late fall or early winter of 1976, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Charles A. Nuzum, in conjunction with his subordinates, determined that it was necessary to transfer certain personnel from the Marianna office to the Panama City office. The purpose of such transfer was to promote more comprehensive enforcement in the Panama City area which was thought to be necessary, and had as its correlative purpose the removal of employees from the Marianna office, where the workload was not as substantial as that in Panama City. In essence, it has been decided that a full-fledged office would he opened in Panama City, in contrast to a sort of impromptu office that was in existence at the time. To make this change in personnel, it was necessary for the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco to get the approval of the Department of Administration, Division of Budget. Mr. Nuzum and his chief of law enforcement met with representatives of the Department of Administration, Division of Budget, to include Elton Revell, a senior budget analyst. The purpose of this meeting was to present the request for changes in the Marianna and Panama City Offices. Revell advised the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco that the Division of Budget could not go along with the "piecemeal" resolution of the problem of a disparity in the efforts of fulfilling the mission of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. It was Revell's position that it would be necessary to consider the entire state in evaluating such realignment, before any approval could be granted. As an example of his position, Revell specifically mentioned that he thought that Live Oak and Jacksonville were offices that were overstaffed. At the insistence of the Division of Budget, and in keeping with his own analysis of the needs of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Mr. Nuzum undertook the task of analyzing the assignment status of the manpower of the division statewide, in an effort to achieve the mandate of his division's function more uniformly. The director had the benefit of certain weekly and monthly reports filed by the field agents in the categories of the division's overall mission. He also had the benefit of an overview of the conditions in the district offices, having made personal visits to the offices around the state. However, it was determined that a more specific study was necessary to get a true picture of the conditions in the district and sub-district offices for purposes of presenting the proposed realignment of personnel to the Department of Administration, Division of Budget. The principal task of doing the study was assigned to John Berry, an auditor with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Berry performed a workload study for a period in 1976, which was designed to determine the time that the agents within the district offices were spending in the primary agency functions, which are licensing and enforcement. The result of this study may he found in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Berry in compiling his study, examined the various functions being performed in the Jacksonville District Office and the West Palm Peach District Office, which are Districts III and X respectively. It was determined, per his workload study, that although Jacksonville and West Palm Beach had a comparable number of licenses in their district, the number of manhours being spent in the performance of the licensing and enforcement functions of the division were significantly disproportionate. This is borne out by an examination of the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which shows 2,067 licenses in Jacksonville and 2,015 licenses in West Palm Beach, for the various counties in the districts. Although this number is relatively close, manhours in the licensing function in Jacksonville was some 9,907 hours and the licensing manhours in West Palm Beach were 6,683. Likewise, the enforcement manhours in Jacksonville were 10,250, an even greater gap existed for enforcement in West Palm Beach in comparison to Jacksonville, in that the total manhours spent for that function in West Palm Beach was 3,355. These statistics were derived from an examination of the weekly and monthly reports from the personnel within the Jacksonville and Palm Beach offices. The statistics were also borne out by the testimony of the lieutenant in charge of the West Palm Beach office, who indicated that due to a shortage of manpower, the enforcement function in the West Palm Beach area was woefully inadequate. This discussion of the Jacksonville and West Palm Beach district offices leads to further consideration of the efforts made by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco to have their personnel realigned. After Director Nuzum had received the workload study, he had a further discussion of the authenticity of that study, with members of the staff, to include the district supervisors. His communication with the district supervisors had been by sending them a copy of the workload study to solicit their remarks. This study was forwarded to the district supervisors some time in March, 1977. After this discussion, the study was accepted. On June 7, 1977, the director forwarded the reorganization proposal to Mr. J. Jackson Walter, the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation, of which the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco is a part. This reorganization proposal was forwarded in conjunction with a request made by Mr. Walter. Again, the contents of this proposal are found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which includes the workload study and a specific indication of how many persons would be reassigned to the various offices. It also includes a copy of the then present manning chart and a copy of the proposed manning chart after the changes. At that point in time, the exact persons who would be moved had not been determined. Moreover, the criteria for moving individuals from one location to another was still under discussion. Finally, it was determined that the basis for movement would be on the grounds of seniority, should there be two possible candidates for relocation and a decision become necessary for selecting one of those two persons. Sergeant Kirkland was in that category, because within the Jacksonville district there were two beverage sergeants and the other beverage sergeant was a more senior member of the division. Therefore, Kirkland was chosen to be relocated from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach. The purpose of this relocation was primarily to promote a more consistent enforcement pattern in terms of hours spent in that function statewide and between Jacksonville and West Palm Beach. A related reason was to allow some assistance to the lieutenant in charge of the West Palm Beach office, in terms of supervision of the field beverage officers of basic rank. A letter was forwarded to the district supervisors and district auditors from Mr. Nuzum, indicating that the realignment of personnel assignments would be on the basis of seniority. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 submitted into evidence is a copy of that notification. After determining that seniority would be the criterion for the relocation of personnel involved, the Division Director submitted his proposals through the Department of Business Regulation for transmittal to the Department of Administration for their approval. The Department of Administration approved the reorganization and J. Revell of the Department of Administration informed Floyd L. Dorn of the Department of Business Regulation's personnel office, that this approval had been granted. This approval came about in August, 1977. After receiving the notification of approval, Director Nuzum then began to advise the personnel who were affected by the reorganization in terms of any relocation. As stated before, Sergeant Kirkland was a person involved in the relocation question. Assistant Chief of Enforcement, Ken Ball, on the basis of the seniority standard, determined that Sergeant Kirkland should be transferred from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach. This was approved by Director Nuzum and this particular change was indicated on the reorganization position chart, which was Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 submitted into evidence. His position number is 00092. The Respondent had filled the 00092 position while working in Jacksonville. His primary function was as supervisor of the enforcement section of the district, with the exception of the period of time in which he was acting in the dual capacity of enforcement supervisor and acting district supervisor. His duties during that latter period are described in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. This duty description was made by Sergeant Kirkland. When the present district supervisor, Captain Oganowski, took over the permanent job of district supervisor in Jacksonville, Sergeant Kirkland went back to filling the duties of enforcement supervisor. This function entailed the supervision of the enforcement division, as opposed to enforcement and licensing or licensing. Sergeant Kirkland continued to hold this position except for a short period of time in 1975 when he changed positions with the licensing supervisor. This is reflected in Respondent's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6 shows the reassignment of Kirkland back to the job 00092, (enforcement supervisor) in Jacksonville. During his tenure with the division, Sergeant Kirkland has maintained a high standard of performance in his various assignments. The current description of duties and responsibilities which the Respondent is expected to assume in the West Palm Beach office may be found as a part of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. This function includes the supervision of both enforcement and licensing personnel. When it was determined that Sergeant Kirkland would be sent to West Palm Beach, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco telephonically communicated the notice of this transfer. It was followed by a letter indicating the transfer, a copy of which is Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. The date of the written notification is August 25, 1977. The official report of personnel action setting the effective date of the relocation was dated September 15, 1977, and made the effective date September 19, 1977. A copy of this report of personnel action is Respondent's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. The type of action indicated on this form is original appointment, with the additional statement entered as "Continued." In fact, the relocation of Sergeant Kirkland is a reassignment within the meaning of Rule 22A-7.08, F.A.C. It is a reassignment because the appointment involved a move from one position in one class to a different position in the same class. The position move, is a move from the 00092 position in Jacksonville, which involves the supervision of enforcement personnel in Jacksonville, to the 00092 position in West Palm Beach, which involves the supervision of both enforcement and licensing personnel. Under the terms of Rule 22A-7.08, F.A.C., Kirkland may not appeal that reassignment. However, since it involves a geographic transfer of more than fifty miles the Respondent is entitled to appeal this decision to the Career Service Commission, in keeping with the authority of Rule 22A-7.09, F.A.C. The Respondent has challenged this relocation by his Career Service Appeal. That appeal has two principal contentions. The first contention concerns the assertion that the transfer does not fall within any of the types of enumerated appointments found in Rule 22A-7, F.A.C. As already shown, this position has been rejected, because the appointment has been determined to be a reassignment appointment. The second contention of the appeal is that any transfer from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach would cause irreparable financial harm and hardship on the Respondent and his wife. In connection with this assertion, Sergeant Kirkland produced evidence that the housing in the West Palm Beach area is more expensive than that in Jacksonville, and that, not withstanding the amount of equity which he might realize from the sale of his Jacksonville property, he still would incur approximately $15,000 additional cost for housing. This housing would not be comparable to his Jacksonville housing, due to the difference in the available amount of property and size of the home itself being smaller in West Palm Beach. The house that he is purchasing in Jacksonville is a four-bedroom, two-bath, two-carport home. The house being contemplated for purchase in West Palm Beach is a three-bedroom, two-bath home. Furthermore, the cost of the mortgage in Jacksonville is $165 and this cost would be exceeded in West Palm Beach even if the equity realized in the sale of Jacksonville home were put toward the down payment. It was also established that the restaurant cost in the West Palm Beach area is greater than that cost in Jacksonville. Sergeant Kirkland's wife testified that she is a hospital operating room nurse who has established a certain amount of seniority in her present employment. She is also only one year away from being able to retire with retirement benefits. If she is required to move, she would lose those benefits and also have to start at the bottom of the seniority list in any new employment in a hospital operating room in West Palm Beach. Finally, the Respondent demonstrated that to move from the Jacksonville community to West Palm Beach would cause him to lose church membership and other community activities in which he is involved. In spite of the degree of hardship which has been demonstrated by the Respondent in his presentation, a review of all the facts and circumstances would justify the Petitioner's action in its reassignment transfer of the Respondent. The action was not a punishment, it was a circumstance where the needs of the Petitioner in this instance, are more compelling than the hardship which will be caused Sergeant Kirkland and his family.
Recommendation It is recommended that the proposed reassignment appointment transfer of the Respondent from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach in the position 00092 he approved and that the appeal by the Respondent challenging this action by the Petitioner be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 30 day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Glickstein, Jr., Esquire 1205 Universal Marion Building Post Office Box 1086 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Francis Bailey, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32201 Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Division of Personnel and Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
