Findings Of Fact Respondent, Philip Lee Sullivan (Sullivan), has served as Chief of Police for the City of Panama City Beach, Florida since August 10, 1977. Sullivan's salary as Police Chief was $62,326.12 in 1994, and will total $63,211.20 in 1995. As Police Chief, Sullivan's duties include planning, organizing, and directing all activities of the Panama City Beach Police Department. He is also charged with supervision of all members of the police force, with particular attention to personnel at the administrative and supervisory level, and with the investigation and disposition of complaints against police officers. In his official capacity, Sullivan is also required to cooperate with state and federal officers in the apprehension and detention of wanted persons and with other agencies where activities of the police department are involved. Sullivan has the authority to take disciplinary action against an employee of the police department up to and including suspension without pay for 30 days, and can recommend termination to the City Manager. He also completes written performance evaluations on members of his command staff, which is comprised of the Patrol Division Commander, the Investigative Division Commander, the Assistant to the Chief, and the Reserve Division Commander. In 1987, Sullivan began a business as a loss prevention and security consultant, operating as a sole proprietorship. Sullivan's first client was Hilton, Inc. Charles Hilton is the Chief Executive Officer of Hilton, Inc. It was Mr. Hilton who made the initial decision to hire Sullivan. He considered one other person for the work, but rejected that individual based on the fee sought. Sullivan verbally sought approval from the City Manager to contract with Hilton, Inc. The City Manager verbally approved the arrangement. Hilton, Inc. owns and operates five hotels in Panama City Beach: The Holiday Inn Sun Spree, Ramada Inn, Days Inn, Best Western Del Coronado, and Best Western Casa Loma. All except Sun Spree, which was added in 1990, were owned by Hilton, Inc., when Sullivan began contracting with the corporation. Hilton, Inc. pays Sullivan $2,000 a month with an additional fee for background checks. Sullivan's next client was the Bay Point Improvement Association (Bay Point). Bay Point is outside the city limits of Panama City Beach. By letter dated February 2, 1989, Sullivan formally requested approval from the City Manager to accept the position of Director of Security for Bay Point. Approval was granted by letter dated February 15, 1989. Sullivan was initially hired in February, 1989, as Director of Security, but his employment status was subsequently changed to that of an independent contractor, similar to his position with his other private employers. Bay Point pays Sullivan $18,000 per year for his services. Sullivan's next client was the La Vela Beach Club ("La Vela") in March, 1993. He was hired by the club's owner, Alois Pfeffer. Sullivan no longer works for the La Vela Beach Club, but while he was working for the club he was paid $6,000 per year. Sullivan's next client was Boardwalk Beach Resorts, which hired him in September, 1993. Boardwalk Beach Resort is the fictitious name for a limited partnership, Resort Hospitality Enterprises, Ltd. ("Resort Hospitality"). The majority of the stock of Resort Hospitality is owned by People's First Properties, Inc. ("People's First"). Resort Hospitality owns and operates four hotel properties, totaling approximately 625 rooms, on Panama City Beach. Robert Henry, the chief financial officer for People's First, was the person who decided to contract with Sullivan after independently determining to the satisfaction of People's First that Sullivan did not have a conflict of interest. People's First pays Sullivan $18,000 per year with additional fees for background checks. In 1994 Sullivan was paid $6,450 for background checks and as of September 11, 1995, he was paid $4,720 for the background checks performed in 1995. Sullivan incorporated his business as Beach Security, Inc. on December 12, 1993. Sullivan's next client was the Miracle Strip Park/Shipwreck Island (Miracle Strip). He was hired in May, 1994 by the Miracle Strip's General Manager, Shelton Wilkes. Miracle Strip is located on Panama City Beach. Sullivan receives $7,200 per year from Miracle Strip. Sullivan's next client was Spinnakers, where he was hired in July, 1994, by W. B. Sparkman, III. Spinnakers paid Sullivan $6,000 per year. As of the date of the final hearing it was not known whether Spinnakers would continue its contract with Sullivan for the next season. Except for Bay Point, there are no written contracts between Sullivan and any of the businesses with which he contracts. Sullivan has no job description, no set work hours, and no regular meetings with his employers. As part of the services offered by Beach Security, Sullivan makes recommendations to his clients in developing their safety and security policies and procedures, particularly with respect to policies, procedures and training for the security staff. The ultimate decision whether to implement any of Sullivan's recommendations rests with Sullivan's clients. Sullivan is also expected to defend those policies and procedures in court as an expert witness in the event his employer adopts his recommendations and is sued. Sullivan neither sets nor manages security for his clients. He makes recommendations. Sullivan does not hire, fire, or make other employment decisions for the security personnel of his clients. He does not supervise or evaluate the performance of his clients' security staff on a daily basis, and does not evaluate the individual performance of any of his clients' employees. As part of Sullivan's services to Hilton, Inc., Boardwalk Beach Resort and La Vela, Sullivan did background checks for potential employees. Sullivan hired an employee of the police department to do the background checks for him. The background checks were performed at the Bay County Courthouse for local applicants. If the information needed was located in another county or state, Sullivan would contact the clerk of the court at the appropriate location for the information. Getting information from another county or state can be a slow process. The information which Sullivan uses in doing the background checks is information which is available to the general public. The Police Department of Panama City Beach (Police Department) has an agreement with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to allow the Police Department access to criminal history record information. Access to the information is limited to police department business. If a police department employee desires to access the information, the employee must log in on the computer, which creates a computer-generated log at FDLE. Sullivan personally does not know how to access the information. Sullivan could request a police department employee to access the information for him. Panama City Beach is a popular resort area, which experiences a large influx of teenagers and young adults during spring break. Problems associated with alcohol consumption, including traffic violations and accidents, assaults, and disorderly conduct, are commonplace police concerns, particularly during spring break. Spinnakers and La Vela are clubs located on Panama City Beach which cater to the spring break crowd and serve alcohol. The La Vela has a capacity for about 6,000 people and Spinnakers about 4,000. The Hilton, Inc. hotels, the Boardwalk Beach Resort, and the Miracle Strip also do heavy spring break business. The Miracle Strip deals with more than 600,000 visitors over the course of its season. The police department investigates crimes and responds to calls and complaints made by citizens. The department also investigates accidents and is routinely called any time an ambulance is called. In the past two years the police department has received more than five thousand calls for service at businesses which are located in Panama City Beach and which contract with Sullivan. No evidence was presented that Sullivan has ever disregarded public duty in favor of private interests, or misused confidential police information for the benefit of his private employers. In February 1993, Spinnakers was sued for the wrongful death of one of its patrons. The Complaint alleged that the deceased, Robert Gaither, was involved in an altercation with one or more of the club's other patrons. Spinnaker security became involved, and the other patrons were ejected. When Mr. Gaither left, security allegedly saw these individuals in Spinnakers' parking lot, but took no action. After leaving the club, Mr. Gaither was beaten to unconsciousness by these same people, and was either left or passed out in the street, where he was run over by a drunk driver. The Complaint alleges that Spinnakers' security staff was negligent in its handling of the incident. Although the incident took place before Spinnakers hired Sullivan, Sullivan has given a deposition in the case as a potential expert witness. The Panama City Beach Police Department investigated the death of Mr. Gaither. Part of Sullivan's services to Le Vela has been to instruct its staff on how to handle fights. The owner of the club has complained to Sullivan about reaction from Panama City Beach police officers when fights have occurred at the club. It is the club owner's observation that the police, in protection of their own physical safety, often leave the burden of breaking up a fight to the security officers, or wait until the participants wear themselves out. Since the club's insurance will not pay for damages if the club's security officers get involved in the fight, the owner wants the police officers to intervene at an earlier stage in the fight and has so complained to the police department. At the June 23, 1994 meeting of the Panama City Beach City Council, Sullivan's outside employment as a consultant was thoroughly discussed. Sullivan gave a detailed account of his operation. At that meeting the City Council voted to continue the City's policy of encouraging outside employment of its police officers and allowing police officers to use the police vehicles during off-duty hours as long as the police officer is on call. On October 12, 1995, the City Council of the City of Panama City Beach enacted Ordinance No. 455, which codified the rules governing secondary or off- duty employment by employees of the City of Panama City Beach. Section 2-46 of the ordinance deals specifically with law enforcement officers, including the Chief of Police. Section 2-46(d)(1) of Ordinance 455 provides: The following types of off-duty employment do not, on their face, constitute a conflict of interest for law enforcement officers: Security guard duty protecting premises or property. Security consultant within or without the City. Providing dignitary or official's protection. Conducting pre-employment checks into the applicant's previous criminal history provided that only public records are accessed. Performing accident investigations or providing technical services as otherwise per- mitted by the Department. Ordinance 455 requires that police officers who desire to have outside employment must submit an "Off-Duty Employment Request" form. The forms were made available to the police officers sometime during the early part of December, 1995. Shortly after Sullivan received the forms, he submitted authorization requests for off-duty employment with Bay Point Resort, Miracle Strip Amusement Park, Boardwalk Beach Resort, and Hilton, Inc.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Philip Lee Sullivan's employment with businesses within the jurisdiction of the Panama City Beach Police Department and his employment in doing pre-employment application background checks is in violation of Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and recommending that Philip Lee Sullivan be dismissed from his employment as Police Chief of the Panama City Beach Police Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4141EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted to the extent that the computer database can be accessed from the Police Department but rejected to the extent that it implies that Sullivan, himself, can physically access the information based on his testimony that he does not know how to operate the computer to get the information. Paragraph 6: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found Paragraph 7: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 8-12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: The first two sentences are accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 14-21: Accepted. Paragraph 22: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 23: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is accepted. Paragraphs 24-28: Accepted. Paragraphs 29-32: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 33-34: Accepted. Paragraph 35: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 36: The first sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that the information is available at the Police Department and can be accessed by Police Department staff pursuant to an agreement with FDLE. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance except for the employment outside the police department jurisdiction. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance that Sullivan requested approval for employment as Director of Security for Bay Point. Rejected to the extent that the request could be construed as a request for blanket approval for Sullivan to do security consulting services. It appears from Sullivan's letter that his employment at that time dealt with more than consulting services given that he had the authority to hire, fire, and direct the security force at Bay Point. Paragraph 3: Accepted to the extent that Beach Security Inc. was incorporated in December, 1993. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted to the extent that Sullivan has submitted the off-duty employment authorization requests. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 8: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found Paragraph 9: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 11-15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 17: The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence that such an arrangement could not tempt dishonor. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The first part of the second sentence is accepted in substance. The last part of the second sentence is rejected to the extent that although the businesses were anticipating that Sullivan would gather his information from public records, human nature being what it is, if Sullivan knew that an applicant was a suspect in a criminal investigation the employers would not want Sullivan to recommend that the applicant be hired. Paragraphs 19-22: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mary Ellen Davis, Esquire Hilton, Hilton, Kolk, Penson & Roesch Post Office Box 1327 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Glen Thurlow (Thurlow), was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission) on June 15, 1982, and was issued Certificate Number 02-3128. Thurlow has been employed by the West Palm Beach Police Department (WPBPD) for the last eight years. On the evening of November 24, 1990, Thurlow was assigned as a police officer to the WPBPD Criminal Apprehension Team (CAT), which is a street crimes unit. That evening Thurlow was partnered for the first time with Lee Rollins (Rollins), a fellow police officer on CAT. Thurlow and Rollins were assigned as plain clothes officers in an unmarked police vehicle, an old, gold Cadillac. Thurlow had on a black T-shirt, combat pants, black combat boots, duty leather and underneath his shirt a bullet-proof vest with a trauma plate. Rollins was dressed in a black T-shirt and jeans. He was not wearing duty leather, but was wearing a utility belt fastened with velcro. Both officers wore their police badges on a chain underneath their shirts. Around 10:30 p.m., near the end of their duty shift, they were returning to the police station. Thurlow was driving south on South Dixie Highway headed toward the Belvedere Road intersection. As they approached the intersection, the officers saw a man, later identified as Robert Jewett (Jewett), dressed in cut-off jeans, a T-shirt, and a cap standing near the middle of the south bound lanes on South Dixie Highway past the Belvedere Road intersection, near the Palm Beach Post Building. The officers continued through the Belvedere Road intersection toward Jewett. As they approached Jewett, he stuck out his left hand in a "hitchhiking gesture." Thurlow pulled over to the side of the road near the parking lot of the Palm Beach Post Building. When Thurlow pulled over, Jewett ran up to the car and got in the back seat. Rollins showed Jewett his police badge, told Jewett that he was a police officer, and requested Jewett to step outside the car. Jewett complied. Rollins exited the Cadillac and Thurlow remained inside. Rollins asked Jewett for his driver's license, which Jewett gave him. Rollins radioed the police dispatcher with the information on the driver's license in order to determine whether there were any outstanding warrants on Jewett. Rollins advised Jewett that he was going to charge him with hitchhiking, but that if there were no warrants against Jewett that he would be given a Notice to Appear and released at the scene, rather than being taken down to the police station. Rollins told Jewett to place his hands on top of the car and spread his legs so that Rollins could search him for weapons. Jewett complied. Thurlow, still sitting in the driver's seat, was monitoring the conversation between Rollins and Jewett. Rollins began the weapons search at Jewett's shoulder and continued down to his left pocket. Finding nothing, he started to search the right pocket. At that time Jewett brought his right arm down from the top of the car. Rollins caught his arm, put it back on top of the car, and told him to keep his hands on the top of the car. As Rollins proceeded to search Jewett's right pocket, Jewett brought his right arm down and stuck it in his pocket. At the same time he came around with his left elbow and hit Rollins on the left side of his chest, knocking him around. Rollins pulled Jewett's hand out of his pocket and they began to struggle. Rollins pulled his flashlight from his back pocket and tried to hit Jewett on his left forearm. Jewett tried to kick Rollins in the groin and Rollins grabbed Jewett's T-shirt. Their feet tangled, the men went down and Rollins fell back toward the car, hitting his head on the back door. Rollins was stunned from the blow to his head. Thurlow felt the Cadillac rock as if someone had bumped against the car. Rollins called to Thurlow to give him some assistance. Thurlow exited the car and came around to the passenger side, where he saw Rollins sitting on the ground with his back to the car, and Jewett straddling and leaning over Rollins with his arms raised as if he were preparing to hit Rollins. Thurlow ran up behind Jewett and put his arm below Jewett's Adam's apple in Jewett's upper chest area in order to pull Jewett back from Rollins. Jewett began to fight and had Thurlow on the balls of his feet. They went towards the front of the car. Jewett went down on his knees with Thurlow's arm still around him. Jewett stood up with Thurlow on his back and they both went backwards, and as a result Thurlow's arm slipped up towards Jewett's chin. Rollins, seeing Jewett put his right hand in his pocket, ran over to Jewett and tried to grab his right hand. The three men fell to the ground and rolled backwards landing in a grassy area. Thurlow still had his arm around Jewett's neck. Thurlow was on the bottom, Jewett in the middle and Rollins on top. Thurlow released his hold on Jewett and slipped out from under Jewett. Thurlow was on Jewett's left side and Rollins was sitting to Jewett's right, about, waist-high facing away from Jewett. Jewett was grabbing at his right pocket. Rollins saw a metal object in the area of Jewett's right pocket. Rollins took his flashlight and swiped at the metal object, sending both the flashlight and the metal object flying off in an easterly direction. Rollins told Jewett to quit struggling. Jewett grabbed the butt of Rollins' gun. Rollins hollered to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun. Rollins hit Jewett in the groin three to four times. Thurlow got up and threw a punch at Jewett connecting at Jewett's left eye. At that point Jewett quit fighting. Thurlow held Jewett's arm over the curb and told Rollins to handcuff Jewett. Having lost his handcuffs in the struggle, Rollins used Thurlow's handcuffs and cuffed Jewett's hands behind his back. All three men were breathing hard and sweating. Rollins told Thurlow that he had lost his flashlight and that something had been thrown out of Jewett's hand during the struggle. Thurlow left Rollins with Jewett and went to look for the lost items. At the time Thurlow left Rollins and Jewett, Jewett was breathing. During the struggle, Rollins' handcuffs, radio, and ammo pouch came off his belt. Rollins found his radio and called the dispatcher at 22:35:52 hours to report the incident. He then went to look for the rest of his missing equipment and was gone approximately one to one and a half minutes. Rollins returned to Jewett and started to pick him up; however Jewett was limp. Rollins put him back on the ground and tried to take his pulse. Because Rollins was still in an excited state from the fight, he could not tell whether he was getting a pulse from Jewett. He tried to take Jewett's pulse again but still could not determine whether he was getting a pulse. Thurlow, having found the flashlight in the grass and an open pocketknife on the sidewalk, walked back over to Rollins and Jewett. Thurlow asked Rollins if something was wrong with Jewett, and Rollins replied that Jewett did not look well. At 22:39:54 hours Thurlow radioed for the paramedics. At 22:43:35 hours, Thurlow again radioed for the paramedics to hurry and get to the scene. Rollins again checked for a pulse but could not determine whether there was a pulse. A few minutes later firefighters, responding to a medical call, arrived on the scene. One of the firefighters checked Jewett's pulse and breathing and determined that Jewett was not breathing and did not have a pulse. Jewett was pale with some discoloration and swelling about the face. Within several seconds, the rescue team arrived. The rescue team got Jewett uncuffed and began to administer advanced life support. Jewett was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. Both Thurlow and Rollins were trained to administer CPR; however the unmarked police vehicle did not contain rubber gloves or a bag which are used in administering CPR to protect the person administering CPR from diseases such as AIDS which could be transmitted by bodily fluids. Additionally, Jewett appeared to be breathing, which would mean that he was not a candidate for CPR. At the time of the incident, Joseph Huffman and his girlfriend were traveling north on South Dixie Highway in a van. The van had windows on the rear doors and on the passenger and driver doors. As Mr. Huffman approached the Palm Beach Post parking lot, he saw two men scuffling on the hood of the gold Cadillac. He began to slow down to watch the fracas. He observed the fight for approximately 20 to 30 seconds, during which time he looked over to the El Cid Bar to see if anyone was watching. His girlfriend observed that Huffman tried to look at the fight through his side mirror but couldn't see so he stuck his head out the driver's window and glanced back once or twice, looking forward to check the approaching traffic. Huffman recalled seeing a third man strike Jewett at least 20 times in the groin with a flashlight; however the medical evidence does not support Mr. Huffman's assertion. Having judged the credibility of the witness, I find that Mr. Huffman's recollection is not credible. An autopsy was performed on Jewett by the Palm Beach County Medical Examiner, Dr. James Benz. The autopsy revealed that Jewett had a black eye, markings on the forehead and neck area, minor bruises and abrasions on the right forearm, abrasions on the knees, and abrasions on the right wrist. Jewett suffered fractured ribs and bruising of the left lung underlying the rib fractures. There was a "blow out" of the heart. There was hemorrhaging underneath the Adam's apple and an irregular fracture in the lamana below the Adam's apple. The hyoid bone, which sits above the voice box, was fractured. There were no injuries to the upper thighs, penis or lower abdomen. There was a mild bruise in the testicle area and hemorrhaging in the left testicle. The injuries to the testicles are not consistent with Jewett's being hit between 10 to 20 times with a flashlight in the groin. The "blow out" of Jewett's heart is called a cardiac tamponade. Most probably as a result of the impact to Jewett's chest when he, Rollins, and Thurlow fell to the ground, a thin area of Jewett's heart blew out forming a small hole in Jewett's heart. The heart pumped blood through the small hole into the pericardial sac. As a result of the blood flowing into the pericardial sac, the heart could not expand and death occurred. The cardiac tamponade did not occur after Jewett died nor did it occur in a peri-mortem, near-death state. The cardiac tamponade did occur while Jewett was alive and death occurred some time later. Based on the testimony of Dr. Charles Petty, an expert in forensic pathology, I find that the injuries to Jewett's neck occurred as a result of forceful application of force to the neck, which is consistent with a fall across a rounded object such as a forearm rather than police carotid holds and choke downs. The Use of Force Matrix from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is the state standard concerning the use of force by law enforcement officers. The matrix lists the resistance levels of a subject and indicates the appropriate level of force to be used by an officer in responding to the various levels of resistance. An aggressive physical resistance is defined as overt, hostile attacking movements which may cause injury, but are not likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. Aggravated physical resistance is when the subject makes overt, hostile, attacking movements with or without a weapon, with the intent and apparent ability to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. The resistance level of Jewett when he was straddled and leaning over Rollins as Rollins was up against the fender of the Cadillac and Jewett's actions at the front of the car with Thurlow constitutes aggressive physical resistance. The matrix guidelines indicate that an officer may use all levels of force with the exception of deadly force in dealing with aggressive physical resistance. When Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind to remove Jewett from his position of standing over Rollins, Thurlow was not using deadly force. His arm was not under Jewett's chin but was lower, nearer the upper chest area. The resistance level of Jewett when he was trying to get Rollins' gun constitutes aggravated physical resistance. The matrix guidelines for force to counter aggravated physical resistance include among other things, counter moves, incapacitation, and deadly force. Deadly force includes techniques that may result in imminent or serious injury, unconsciousness or permanent disfigurement, such as impact weapon strikes to the head or use of firearms. Thus, Thurlow's punch to Jewett's face was within the matrix guidelines.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Glen H. Thurlow. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2593 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly" which is rejected. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 10-12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance; however it should be noted that it appeared to Thurlow that Jewett was about to strike Rollins. Paragraph 17: The first and second sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The evidence established that Thurlow jumped across Jewett's back, placing his arm across Jewett below Jewett's Adam's apple. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Accepted that Thurlow and Jewett continued to struggle. Rejected that Thurlow continued to maintain a choke hold on Jewett. The greater weight of the evidence established that Thurlow's arm did not slip up under Jewett's chin until Jewett and Thurlow began to fall backward. Paragraph 19: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance with the exception of "continued to hold Mr. Jewett in a choke hold." The evidence established that Thurlow's did not have a choke hold on Jewett until they fell backwards and that the choke hold was not an intentional action but rather resulted from the struggle between Jewett and Thurlow and Rollins running into them. Paragraph 21-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 23: Accepted in substance except to the extent that such finding implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett at the time that Huffman saw them. Paragraphs 24-26: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Huffman's testimony concerning the repeated striking of Jewett in his groin not to be credible, particularly considering the medical evidence and the fact that Huffman was driving down the street while he was trying to look at the fight and keep track of traffic both in front of and behind him. Paragraph 27: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett the entire time that they were struggling. The evidence established that Thurlow did not start out with a choke hold but that during the struggle, Thurlow's arm slipped underneath Jewett's chin. Paragraphs 31-35: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: Accepted in substance to the extent that at one point in time while Jewett was supine on the ground his head was turned toward Thurlow and he grabbed Thurlow's shirt but rejected to the extent that it implies that during the entire time Jewett was on the ground he was looking at Thurlow and grabbing Thurlow's shirt. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow did hear Rollins shout that Jewett had grabbed his gun and to the extent that Thurlow did not see Jewett actually grab the gun. Rejected to the extent that the word "claiming" implies that Rollins may not have shouted to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun and rejected to the extent that the last part of the sentence could be construed to mean that Thurlow did not see Jewett's right arm reach in the direction of Rollins' holster. Paragraphs 39-40: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly." Paragraphs 42-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: The portion relating to rendering medical assistance is accepted in substance. The portion relating to never checking on the well being of Jewett is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Thurlow did inquire of Rollins concerning the condition of Thurlow before he called for the paramedics. Paragraph 47: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 48: Accepted in substance to the extent that Rollins did not render any first aid but rejected to the extent that Thurlow always had an unobscured view of Jewett. The evidence established that Thurlow was looking for the knife and the flashlight during a portion of the time . Paragraph 49: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 50-51: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 52-53: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 54: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 55: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 56: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 57-59: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 60-73: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 74: Accepted in substance to the extent that Jewett was lying on the ground, was bloody, and was not moving. In light of the testimony of Mr. Cook that Jewett's skin was pale and there was discoloration about his face, I do not find Mr. Bouchillion's testimony that Jewett was turning blue to be credible. Paragraph 75: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 76-77: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 78-86: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 87: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 88: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 89: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 90-96: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 97: Having considered the opinions of Dr. Benz and Dr. Petty, I reject the finding to the extent that it implies that the fractures resulted from a choke hold applied prior to Thurlow, Jewett, and Rollin falling down and rolling into the grassy area. Paragraph 98: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 99: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 100: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 101: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 102: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 103: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 104: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 105-109: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 110-111: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 112: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 113: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 114: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 115: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 116-117: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 118: Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 119: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett from the time there were at the rear of the Cadillac until they fell backwards. The evidence established that Thurlow did not have Jewett in a choke hold when Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind. Paragraph 120: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 121-125: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 2-3: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 4: The first and last sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The portion of the second sentence relating to Thurlow being able to hear is accepted but the portion that Thurlow could see everything is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The last sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow thought that he needed to monitor the traffic but the greater weight of the evidence established that the Cadillac was not in the lane of traffic while it was parked. Paragraphs 10-27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28-30: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 31: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 32: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn P. Whitehurst, Esquire Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Gene "Hal" Johnson, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Scott N. Richardson, Esquire Atterbury, Goldberger & Richardson One Clear Lake Center, Suite 1400 250 Australian Avenue, South West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5012 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, committed the violations alleged in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint dated February 21, 1991, as further amended by order issued March 11, 1992, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that is responsible for the certification of law enforcement officers. The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 27, 1981, and was issued certificate number 02-27492. VERBAL THREATS TO OFFICER LINDQUIST ON JANUARY 15, 1986 In January 1986, Officer Barry Lindquist was working as a shift Lieutenant with the Pompano Beach Police Department (PBPD). Respondent was one of the police officers assigned to Officer Lindquist's shift. At the time he gave his deposition in this proceeding, Officer Stanley Tipton was the Chief of Police for Pompano Beach. In January 1986, Officer Tipton was a sergeant with the PBPD. On January 15, 1986, Respondent called in sick and did not report to work. Officer Lindquist asked Officer Tipton to go over to Respondent's house to check on his welfare. Officer Tipton called the Respondent's house before leaving the police station for the house and spoke to a man (someone other than Respondent) and then to a woman. He advised that he was coming to check on Respondent. Officer Tipton arrived at Respondent's house at approximately 7:45 p.m. Officer Tipton was greeted at the door by a young man who asked him to come in. He stepped inside the doorway and asked for the Respondent. The young man proceeded to the rear of the house, and the Respondent subsequently appeared in the hallway. Respondent had on a pair of pants, but no shirt, and he started walking toward Officer Tipton. Officer Tipton observed a firearm sticking out of Respondent's waistband and, because he had become apprehensive, stepped backwards. Respondent recognized Officer Tipton and said "It's a good thing it was you Tipton, 'cause if it was Lindquist, I would have shot him." After Respondent got closer to Officer Tipton, he repeated his threat two additional times and continued to express his anger toward Officer Lindquist. Officer Tipton was of the opinion that Respondent was serious about the threats he had made against Officer Lindquist and that he was angry that Officer Lindquist had sent Officer Tipton to check on him. Officer Tipton observed that Respondent's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and his balance impaired. Officer Tipton was of the opinion that Respondent had been drinking. Officer Tipton talked to Respondent, saying that the Respondent would not do what he had threatened, and kept his eye on Respondent's gun. Respondent calmed down and allowed Officer Tipton take the gun from him. Officer Tipton then placed the gun on a table in the hallway. After Respondent calmed down, Officer Tipton and Respondent shook hands and Officer Tipton left the house. As Officer Tipton was leaving, Respondent offered to let him take the gun with him, an offer that Officer Tipton declined. Officer Tipton told Respondent that he was not going to take the gun because Respondent was in his own house and because Officer Tipton did not believe Respondent was going to leave the house and do anything. Officer Tipton left the gun with Respondent. After Officer Tipton left Respondent's house, the Respondent called the Pompano Beach Police Department and spoke to Barbara Johnson, who is a police department telecommunicator. Respondent asked to speak to Officer Lindquist. Ms. Johnson could tell from Respondent's voice that he was very upset, and during the course of his conversation with Ms. Johnson, Respondent threatened to shoot Officer Lindquist. Ms. Johnson kept talking to Respondent and was able to calm him down. Ms. Johnson immediately thereafter called Officer Lindquist and told him what had happened and that Respondent wanted Officer Lindquist to call him. Officer Lindquist called Respondent, who was still upset and angry. Respondent told Officer Lindquist by telephone that "it was a good thing that you hadn't come over to my house because if you had, I probably would have shot you." Officer Lindquist continued to talk to Respondent and calmed him down. As a result of this incident, Respondent was investigated by PBPD internal affairs and given a thirty day suspension from work. INVESTIGATION OF THREE CAR ACCIDENT ON MAY 19, 1987 On May 19, 1987, Respondent responded to Atlantic Boulevard in Pompano Beach to investigate a traffic accident involving three cars. This incident occurred when car #2 rear-ended car #1 and car #3 thereafter rear-ended car #2. Katherine Danner was the driver of car #3. Respondent arrived at the scene and assumed that Ms. Danner had first rear-ended car #2 (driven by a Mr. Flowers) which had caused car #2 to rear-end car #1. Respondent's assumed that the accident was entirely Ms. Danner's fault without conducting a proper investigation. Respondent told Ms. Danner that the other drivers would probably blame her for the entire accident. Mr. Flowers thereafter told Respondent that he had rear-ended car #1 before Ms. Danner became involved in the accident. Respondent then told Mr. Flowers that he was going to give him a ticket if he stuck to that story. Ms. Danner felt that Respondent was giving Mr. Flowers the opportunity to avoid a ticket by changing his story, and filed a complaint against Respondent with the Pompano Beach Police Department. Following an investigation, it was determined that Respondent had improperly handled the investigation and had exhibited a poor attitude. Respondent received a letter of reprimand reflecting those findings. There were no findings and no allegations that Respondent had falsified his police report or that he had solicited a false statement. The evidence failed to establish that Respondent solicited a false statement from Mr. Flowers or that he made a false statement in his police report. ASSAULT ON FORT LAUDERDALE POLICE OFFICERS ON AUGUST 21, 1987 At the time pertinent to this proceeding, Joel Maney, Lee Spector, Russell H. Hanstein, Leon O. Walton, Edward N. Good and Captain Robinson, were police officers employed by the City of Fort Lauderdale Police Department. On August 21, 1987, Officer Maney was on regular patrol in the City of Fort Lauderdale on the midnight shift. He was patrolling the area of Northwest 6th Street and Northwest 9th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale. At approximately 2:45 a.m., Officer Maney observed a dark blue, four door car (which he later learned was Respondent's personal vehicle) traveling at a high rate of speed west on Northwest 6th Street. Officer Maney, who was driving a marked patrol car, got behind Respondent's car as quickly as he could and got close enough to read the license plate. Officer Maney observed a Fraternal Order of Police emblem on the license plate, but he could not read the entire tag. Officer Maney suspected that the car might have been stolen, and he tried to run the license number. While Officer Maney was still following Respondent's car, Officer Spector, who was also driving a marked patrol car, pulled up behind Officer Maney and followed both vehicles. While both officers followed the blue car, it ran two stop signs. Officer Maney decided to stop the car and put on his blue lights and siren. Respondent was the operator and sole occupant of his car. Respondent pulled over within two blocks after Officer Maney put on his blue lights. After he stopped, Officer Maney got out of his car and approached the driver's side of Respondent's vehicle. Officer Spector got out of his car and approached the passenger's side of Respondent's vehicle. Respondent was wearing his uniform pants and a white T-shirt. Officer Maney asked Respondent for his driver's license and registration. Respondent responded in an agitated voice, saying "I don't have my fucking license." Officer Maney noticed that the Respondent had a gun stuck in his waistband, and ordered him several times to put both hands on the steering wheel. Respondent was not cooperating with Officer Maney or Officer Spector and in a very agitated voice used profanity against the officers. Officer Maney was of the opinion that Respondent was not acting abusive towards him, but that he was acting in an unprofessional manner. Respondent eventually gave the gun to the officers and stepped out of the vehicle as instructed. Even after Respondent exited his car, he was uncooperative with the officers and refused to let them do a pat-down search. At this point, Officer Maney called for backup officers, and Officers Hanstein, Good, Captain Robinson, and other officers came to the scene. Respondent was still in an agitated state when the backup officers arrived, and was making comments to no one in particular in a loud voice. Respondent stated that he was a Pompano Beach Police Officer and that he had been trained by Joe Hess and Ed White, two well-known martial arts experts who trained officers at the Broward County Police Academy. Respondent said that he weighed 240 pounds and that he was a "mean mother fucker." He said that he would hurt some people before he went to jail. Respondent looked directly at Officer Hanstein, pointed his index finger at him, and said, "I'm going to kick your ass." Respondent then looked at Officer Spector, pointed his finger directly at him, and said, "Then, I'm going to kick your ass." Respondent was between eight and ten feet away from these officers at the time he made these statements, and there were several other officers in the general area. He was unrestrained at the time he made these statement, and he used a serious, angry tone of voice. Respondent had the apparent ability to carry out his threats, and he caused the officers to be concerned for their safety. At this point, Respondent was arrested and charged with two counts of assault on a law enforcement officer. Both charges were misdemeanors. Respondent subsequently entered a plea of no contest to the two charges. At no time during the course of the incident did Respondent attempt to swing at or kick at any of the Fort Lauderdale Police Officers. Respondent did not offer any resistance after he was placed under arrest. At the time of this incident, Officer Hanstein, Officer Spector, and the other Fort Lauderdale officers were in uniform with marked patrol units. Following his arrest, Respondent's employment with the Pompano Beach Police Department was terminated. His employment was subsequently restored. ALCOHOLIC REHABILITATION On the night he threatened Officer Lindquist and on the night of his arrest by the Fort Lauderdale Police Officers, Respondent had been drinking. Respondent is an alcoholic and was drinking to excess, which contributed to his misconduct. Respondent admitted to himself that he was an alcoholic after he was fired following his arrest. He subsequently admitted his problem to his family, to the City Manager of Pompano Beach, and to his police supervisors, and he asked for help. On New Years' Eve, December 31, 1987, Respondent voluntarily checked himself into a five day inpatient program for alcohol detoxification. After successfully completing that program, Respondent joined an outreach program and became active in AA. Respondent successfully completed a course of treatment and therapy with the Broward County Alcohol and Drug Abuse Services on August 8, 1988. With the exception of one relapse, Respondent has not had a drink in two years. Respondent appealed the termination of his employment to the Pompano Beach Civil Service Board, which determined that his misconduct was alcohol related and ordered his reinstatement pursuant to a "One Last Chance Agreement". This arrangement returned Respondent to work on a special one year probationary period. Under the terms of the agreement, Respondent's employment would be terminated without recourse if he violated any PBPD policy or procedure and if the violation was alcohol related. Respondent successfully completed that probationary period and has been reinstated to all rights and privileges of any other PBPD officer. For the last three and one half years, Respondent has worked as a police officer assigned to the city jail. He incurred a three day suspension when he did not report to work following the death of his godson, but his work record has otherwise been acceptable. His supervisor views him as an outstanding employee and his colleagues respect him and consider him to be a dependable, efficient police officer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which adopts the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein and which reprimands Respondent for his failure to maintain good moral character as found herein. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-1398 The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner are adopted in material part by the recommended order with the exception of the proposed finding in the second sentence of paragraph 45, which are rejected as being contrary to the findings made. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-24, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 25 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. While it is apparent that excessive drinking contributed to Respondent's problems, the proposed findings are an overstatement. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 26 and 27 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 31 and 32 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 40-46 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 47 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Pompey Whitehurst, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William E. Platlow, Esquire Panza, Maurer, Maynard, Platlow & Neel, P.A. 3801 East Commercial Boulevard Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact The Problem: A Seawall In Danger of Collapse Applicant is an incorporated condominium association which owns the Gulf front property of Bonita Beach Club, a residential condominium located on the northern portion of a barrier island known as Little Hickory Island. The island is south of Fort Myers and part of Lee County. (Testimony of Truitt, Tackney; R-1.) Applicant's Gulf front property is protected by a 600-foot seawall; that seawall, exposed to wave and storm attack, is now in the beginning stages of failure. Applicant seeks a permit to place a revetment along the entire seaward face of the seawall "to help strengthen the seawall and stop the erosion at [its] . . . base . . . ." (R-1.) (Testimony of Truitt, Tackney, Sharma; R-1) The seawall shows evidence of profile lowering; sand has been scoured from its face, exposing 6 to 7 feet of wall above the sand line. Its face shows abrasions from buffeting by sand and sediment; its joints have begun to separate, allowing sand from behind the wall to leak through the cracks. Under high tide conditions, the seaward portions of the seawall are under water; under other tidal conditions there is no more than 6 to 7 feet of wetsand area between the base of the wall and the waterline. (Testimony of Truitt.) The present condition of the seawall is mainly due to two processes: the long-term shoreline migration of Little Hickory Island, and (2) profile steepening, scouring, and accelerated sand loss in the immediate vicinity of Applicant's seawall. There is a south-to-north longshore or littoral sand transport in the area off Little Hickory Island, a northward flowing "river of sand." This phenomenon has caused sand loss to beaches in front of and south of Applicant's property and sand accretion to the undeveloped northern beaches north of the island. The localized profile steepening and accelerating sand loss at Applicant's seawall is caused by waves hitting the vertical seawall, then rebounding-- causing removal of sand at the foot of the wall and steepening of the offshore profile. This localized sand loss and erosion has been aggravated by the original placement and alignment of Applicant's seawall. 7/ The seawall protrudes further seaward than adjacent seawalls or bulkheads. 8/ This protrusion, together with the wall's irregular shape, disrupts the otherwise straight shoreline and acts as a headland: an abutment which concentrates wave energy and longshore currents and causes accelerated erosion and sand loss in the immediate area. The effects of the northerly longshore drift and the localized sand loss have been dramatic: between 1974 and 1980 the sandy beach in front of Applicant's seawall has receded landward 50-60 feet. (Testimony of Truitt, Tackney, Sharma; P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, 1-2, R-3, R-4, R-5, R-6, R-7.) In addition, the shoreline of Little Hickory Island is gradually and inexorably eroding. This is due to long-term backyard erosion, a natural )process by which barrier islands gradually migrate landward. (Testimony of Sharma, Tackney, Truitt.) II. Applicant's Solution: Place a Rock Revetment in Front of the Seawall In October, 1980, Applicant applied for a DNR permit to place a rock revetment along the existing seawall. By January, 1981, DNR's Bureau of Beaches and Shores determined that all of the documentation required by its rules 9/ had been submitted and the application was complete. Subsequently, the Applicant agreed to several design changes suggested by DNR and agreed to a permit condition requiring it to dedicate a travel easement to assure continued public access to beaches north of its property. As so modified, DNR proposes to issue the requested permit. (Testimony of Truitt; R-1, -R-11, R-12.) The proposed permit, with conditions, is contained in Respondent's Exhibits R-1, R-11, and R-12. 10/ The proposed shore protection structure is described as a rock toe-scour revetment to be placed along the seaward face of Applicant's existing seawall. The revetment extends 7 feet in the shore-normal direction and approximately 600 linear feet in the shore-parallel direction. It will consist of lime-rock boulders of various sizes stacked on top of each other. The top layer of rocks will be the largest, 75 percent of them weighing greater than 500 pounds. The rock revetment will rest on a layer of Filter-X mat to help stabilize the underlying sand. The revetment's elevation will range from 0.0 feet (NGVD) 11/ at the toe of the seawall to -0.5 feet (NGVD) at 7 feet seaward. Its slope will be no greater than 3 horizontal units to 1 vertical unit. The mean high waterline will intercept the revetment-seawall interface at a maximum elevation of approximately +1.5 feet (NGVD). (R-1, R-11, R-12.) III. The Effects of the Proposed Revetment The proposed revetment will fulfill its primary purpose: it will protect the Applicant's seawall by reducing the amount of sand that is scoured and removed from its face and it will add significant structural stability to the wall. It will provide these benefits because its sloping surface will intercept and dissipate waves which would otherwise hit and rebound off the vertical seawall. Because wave deflection energy will be lessened, steepening of the offshore profile will be reduced and accelerating longshore currents will be slowed. It will also protect the seawall against storm, but not hurricane, damage. (Testimony of Truitt, Tackney.) However, the proposed rock revetment will not stop the migration of sands from the southern to the northern reaches of Little Hickory Island; the northward flowing longshore currents will continue. Neither will the revetment protect Applicant's property against long-term background erosion; the entire island will continue its steady easterly retreat to the mainland. Scouring at the ends of the existing seawall will be reduced, but not eliminated. Eddy currents at the ends of the revetment will cause some localized scouring to take place. Wave and water action will take its toll on the revetment; it will require periodic repair and rebuilding in the years ahead. (Testimony of Sharma, Tackney, Truitt.) Although the testimony is conflicting, the weight of the evidence is that the proposed revetment will not adversely affect adjacent beaches and the offshore profile. 12/ While localized scouring will not be eliminated, the evidence indicates that the rates will be lessened--that the existing erosion problems will be mitigated, not aggravated. With reduced localized scouring, longshore currents will not accelerate, and the offshore profile will not deepen at increasing rates. The expert witnesses agreed that, at least for the short term, the proposed revetment will protect the existing seawall against at least three-year storm conditions. (Testimony of Tackney, Truitt, Sharma.) While the revetment will not accelerate or contribute to the erosion of adjacent lands, it will impair the public's use of the beaches in front of and to the north of the Applicant's seawall. Because the revetment will protrude 6 to 7 feet seaward from the seawall--intercepting the mean high waterline--the public will be precluded from traversing the beaches in front of Applicant's property. That narrow corridor of wet-sand beach now permits dry passage only during low tide. With placement of the rock revetment on that passageway, it will become impassable to most people who use the Little Hickory Island beaches. 13/ (Testimony of Sharma, Member of the Public.) Generally, rip-rap revetments, such as that proposed by Applicant, do not eliminate erosion or cause sand to accrete. Rather, they tend to increase erosion and escarping beyond that which would occur if a shoreline is left in its natural, unaltered condition. (Testimony of Sharma, Truitt, Tackney.) IV. DNR Coastal Construction Permits: Practice and Policy There may be alternatives to the proposed revetment which will not endanger the Applicant's upland structure or block the public's access to beaches in front of and north of Applicant's property. 14/ DNR does not require the consideration of shore protection alternatives when it processes coastal construction permit applications. Neither, in its view, is public access to adjacent beaches a matter of regulatory concern in this licensing process. 15/ At the staff level of DNR, the sole consideration is engineering design of the proposed structure: At the level of staff of the Bureau of Beaches and Shores there are no other con- siderations other than simply engineering judgments on the appropriateness or other considerations of the design. I have no idea what the governor and cabinet or exec- utive director may consider. (Tr. 170.) This view of the agency's duty helps explain why DNR has never denied an application to construct a shore protection revetment, although it has suggested design modifications, as was done in this case. (Testimony of Truitt.) V. Interests of Objectors to Proposed Revetment Project DNR requires applicants for coastal construction permits to provide a map showing the location of the proposed erosion control structure and the shoreline for at least 1,000 feet on each side. Applicants are also required to provide a list of the names and addresses from the latest county tax role of all riparian property owners within 1,000 feet. It is DNR practice, in accordance with its rule, Section 165-24.07, Florida Administrative Code, to mail notice of a proposed project to those riparian property owners. By rule, such interested persons or objectors to a proposed project have the right to appear and make their positions known to the Governor and Cabinet at the time the agency decision is made. Id. (Testimony of Truitt; R-1.) Petitioners, Casa Bonita I and II Condominium Associations, Inc., and Seascape Condominium I and II Associations, Inc., assert that the proposed revetment will adversely affect their rights as riparian owners, that it will cause erosion of their shorelines; they also allege that it will prejudice their recreational use of sovereignty lands--the public's beaches lying below the line of mean high water. Relative to the site of the proposed revetment, Casa Bonita I Condominium Association, Inc., lies 1,350 to 1,400 feet south; Casa Bonita II Condominium Association, Inc., 670 feet south; Seascape Condominium I and II Associations, Inc., lie immediately adjacent to the site. (Testimony of Tackney; R-1, R-14.) No evidence was presented to establish that intervenor Lee County is a riparian property owner within 1,000 feet of the proposed revetment. The Lee County Board of County Commissioners were, however, notified of the instant application and given an opportunity to object. The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact; to the extent such findings are incorporated in this Recommended order, they are adopted; otherwise they are rejected as irrelevant to the issues presented or unsupported by the preponderance of evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Bonita Beach Club Condominium Association, Inc., for a coastal construction permit be GRANTED, subject to the agreed-upon conditions described above, including the dedication of a travel easement allowing the public to circumvent the 600-foot rock revetment. 21/ DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 16th day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone: (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1981.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, John L. Eifert (Respondent) was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Petitioner). Respondent was certified on July 17, 1981, being issued Certificate Number 74043. On or about June 14, 1984, Officer Goodwin of the Miami Beach Police Department (Miami Beach P.D.) was involved in an automobile accident. Officer Goodwin was off-duty at the time. The officers dispatched to the accident scene found, among other things, on the driver's side of Officer Goodwin's vehicle, evidence bags from the Miami Beach P.D. and a clear plastic bag. The evidence bags were clearly marked as Miami Beach P.D. evidence bags. The clear bag and one of the evidence bags contained a white substance that the officers suspected was cocaine. Officer Goodwin was arrested for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages and/or narcotics. All the bags found in Officer Goodwin's vehicle at the accident scene were seized and placed into evidence. The white substance in the bags was subsequently tested. The tests revealed that the white substance was cocaine. The cocaine found in Officer Goodwin's vehicle was the same cocaine that he had seized in a narcotic's case. He had obtained the cocaine from the evidence room under false pretenses, indicating that he was going to testify in court and needed the cocaine for his testimony. There was no court hearing. Officer Goodwin obtained the cocaine for his own personal use; he intended to consume the cocaine himself. Officer Goodwin was Respondent's fellow officer with the Miami Beach P.D. and friend. They had gone through the police academy together in 1981, and they were motorcycle officers together. Prior to the accident, at approximately 9:30 a.m. on June 14, 1984, Officer Goodwin had visited Respondent at Respondent's off-duty job. Respondent was moonlighting as a security guard at a bank. Officer Goodwin had been ingesting cocaine prior to the visit, had not slept in approximately 24 hours, and was paranoid. Officer Goodwin wanted to use Respondent's residence to consume more cocaine. Because of his paranoid behavior and because he was a friend, Respondent agreed for Officer Goodwin to go to his residence and convinced Officer Goodwin to wait for him there. When Officer Goodwin arrived at Respondent's residence, he continued to ingest cocaine. Also, he placed some of the cocaine in individual plastic bags. Officer Goodwin hid the cocaine filled plastic bags in Respondent's residence. When Respondent came to his residence at approximately 4:45 p.m. that same day, he found Officer Goodwin more paranoid than before. Officer Goodwin refused to remain at Respondent's residence and left shortly before 5:00 p.m. Before leaving, Respondent agreed for Officer Goodwin to leave the cocaine filled plastic bags in his residence. Officer Goodwin informed Respondent where he had hid the bags. Respondent located the cocaine filled bags. Without getting any sleep, Respondent continued with his social activities planned for the remainder of the evening. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Respondent went to his second moonlighting job. On June 15, 1984, around 3:30 a.m., Officer Goodwin called Respondent at his second moonlighting job. Officer Goodwin informed Respondent that he had been arrested and requested that Respondent dispose of the cocaine and told him where to leave it. Unbeknownst to Respondent, Officer Goodwin was calling from police headquarters and was attempting to return the remaining cocaine to the Miami Beach P.D. Instead of following Officer Goodwin's instructions, Respondent went home around 3:50 a.m. and disposed of the cocaine by dumping it into the bay behind his residence. Respondent believed that he was helping Officer Goodwin, a friend. Subsequently, around 6:00 a.m., Respondent received another telephone call from Officer Goodwin. Respondent informed him what he had done with the cocaine. Officer Goodwin was upset about what Respondent had done. Goodwin admitted at hearing that, due to the quantity of cocaine that he had ingested, beginning June 13, 1984, and continuing into June 14, 1984, he had very little independent recollection of what happened that day. His information, as to what happened that day, is mostly from reading his statements that he had made regarding the incident, police reports, and transcripts of depositions. Further, Goodwin also admits that his recall prior to going to Respondent's residence is fair. Officer Goodwin entered into a plea agreement regarding the accident and the cocaine. The plea agreement provided, among other things, that he give testimony, regarding the incident, forever in whatever the forum may be and that he relinquish his certification from Petitioner. Presently, Goodwin is in charge of a drug treatment center for Metro- Dade County. He has been in this position for five years. In June 1984, Respondent resigned from the Miami Beach P.D. Consistent with the policy of the Miami Beach P.D. at that time, no investigation was instituted against Respondent by Internal Affairs of the Metro-Dade Police Department due to his resignation. Respondent does not deny that he permitted Goodwin to take the cocaine to his residence, that he permitted Goodwin to leave some of the cocaine at his residence, and that Goodwin left some of the cocaine at his residence. Furthermore, Respondent does not deny that the cocaine remained at his residence after Goodwin left and that he disposed of the cocaine by dumping it into the bay. At the time of his resignation, Respondent and the Miami Beach P.D. agreed that, whenever inquiries were made regarding Respondent, the Miami Beach P.D. would make neither negative nor positive comments about Respondent. The intent of this agreement was to allow Respondent to keep his record clean. However, the reverse occurred. He was effectively prevented from getting jobs in law enforcement. Subsequently, Respondent and the Miami Beach P.D. agreed to full disclosure regarding Respondent and the cocaine incident. In 1987, Respondent began to obtain employment in law enforcement. From September 1987 to January 1989, Respondent was employed as a police officer with the Indian Creek Village Police Department. From February 1989 to May 1989, he was employed as a police officer with the Florida City Police Department. Respondent resigned from both positions. In January 1990, Respondent was rehired by the Florida City Police Department (Florida City P.D.). At the time of hearing, he was still employed with the Florida City P.D. Respondent's personnel file reflects that, during his tenure as a police officer, Respondent has had one reprimand. The reprimand occurred after his resignation from the Miami Beach P.D. However, Respondent's personnel file also reflects that, during his tenure as a police officer, Respondent has had numerous commendations and letters commending his performance. He has been subjected to pressure and dangerous encounters and has performed in an exemplary manner. At hearing, several individuals, law enforcement and non-law enforcement, supported Respondent either through testimony or letters. Respondent's former pastor and the Mayor of the City of Florida City testified in support of him. Both regarded Respondent as having high moral character. Moreover, the Mayor's position was that the incident in June 1984 would have no effect on his opinion of Respondent. Additionally, the former Police Chief of the City of Miami Beach at the time of the incident in June 1984 did not find it odd or unusual for Respondent to still be in law enforcement. To him, Respondent had made a mistake, paid for the mistake, and had turned his life around. By letter, Respondent's immediate supervisor of five years with the Florida City P.D. supported him. Also, a special agent with the Florida East Coast Railway Police, who has known Respondent both personally and professionally for approximately nine years, supported Respondent. Petitioner filed the administrative complaint against Respondent on August 9, 1993. Respondent has no prior disciplinary action against him by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order Reprimanding Respondent; and Placing Respondent on probation for one (1) year under terms and conditions that the Commission deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED in this 2nd day of January, 1997 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Braverman, Esquire Braverman and Grossman, P.A. 2780 Douglas Road, Suite 300 Miami, Florida 33133-2749 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Glenda Parris (Respondent), while employed as a West Palm Beach Code Enforcement Officer, violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes,1/ by using her position to rent property and/or gain preferential treatment at a court proceeding and, if so, the appropriate penalty. Whether Respondent, while employed as a West Palm Beach Code Enforcement Officer, violated section 112.313(7), by having a contractual relationship that conflicted with her official responsibilities and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact At the times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a West Palm Beach Code Enforcement Officer. Respondent is subject to the requirements of part III, chapter 112, which consists of sections 112.311 - 112.326, and is known as the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. Respondent's assigned duties included inspecting, observing, reporting, and enforcing the City of West Palm Beach's code regulating zoning, housing, and the environment Respondent's was assigned a work zone in West Palm Beach that included 231 Lytton Court (the subject property). At the times relevant to this proceeding, Dr. Rhonda Nasser was the owner and/or principal of El Nasco II, a limited liability company. El Nasco II owned the house at 231 Lytton Court. In the summer of 2010, Respondent issued multiple notices of violation to Dr. Nasser relating to the subject property. In July 2010, Respondent and Dr. Nasser met at the subject property to discuss the notices of violation. At that meeting, Respondent asked Dr. Nasser if she could rent the subject property. Respondent was on duty and in her uniform when she negotiated the lease of the subject property. Dr. Nasser entered into an agreement with Respondent for Respondent to rent the subject property for $1,200.00 per month beginning in August 2010. As soon as she moved in to the subject property, Respondent began to complain to Dr. Nasser as to items that needed to be repaired or replaced. Respondent wrote a demand letter on August 31, 2010, that referenced code requirements. On November 3, 2010, wrote a second demand letter that also referenced code requirements. Dr. Nasser testified, credibly, that she believed that Respondent was threatening to use code violations to support her demand as to items that needed to be impaired or replaced. Dr. Nasser's belief was reasonable. Respondent began to withhold rent because Dr. Nasser would not make the improvements Respondent had demanded. At the end of January or the beginning of February 2011, Dr. Nasser initiated eviction proceedings against Respondent due to Respondent's failure to pay rent. John Frasca has been employed as a West Palm Beach Code Enforcement Officer for more than 11 years. Respondent asked Mr. Frasca on two separate occasions prior to May 26, 2011, to inspect the subject property. At the first inspection, Respondent deliberately withheld the fact that she lived at the subject property. At the time of the second inspection, Respondent pressured Mr. Frasca to complete the inspection and informed him that she needed the inspection report for her attorney. A rental license for a residence is the official authorization from the City of West Palm Beach that an owner may rent its residence and that the residence will be inspected. A rental license guarantees to a renter that the residence has been inspected and maintained, and is meeting all current codes. A rental license is required by the city code. Mr. Frasca discovered that the owner of the subject property had no rental license. Respondent should have known that the owner did not have a rental license, and she should have refused to rent the property until the owner obtained a rental license. The eviction proceedings initiated by Dr. Nasser progressed to a court hearing before a judge. At the eviction hearing, Respondent wore her work uniform, which consisted of dark colored pants, a code enforcement badge on her belt, and a shirt with "City of West Palm Beach, Code Enforcement" written on it. Dr. Nasser believed that Respondent wore the uniform in court to give the appearance that Respondent was an expert in code enforcement. Alleged code violations came up as an issue during the eviction hearing. Respondent argued that she withheld the payment of rent because Dr. Nasser would not correct perceived code violations. Following the eviction hearing, Dr. Nasser contacted John Alford, who was, at that time, the Director of Public Works for West Palm Beach. Mr. Alford supervised the West Palm Beach Code Enforcement Department, including the code enforcement officers. There existed an unwritten policy that code enforcement officers were not to wear their uniforms on unofficial business. Mr. Alford had admonished the code enforcement officers, including Respondent, to "take care while wearing the badge." The City of West Palm Beach investigated Respondent's actions and prepared a document titled "Timeline - 231 Lytton Ct., WPB." That document, which is in evidence as Exhibit 9, reflects Respondent's actions regarding the subject property. West Palm Beach uses a computer tracking system called Community Plus System that tracks all activities relating to a building code complaint and/or violation. A code officer puts in all information related to an inspection plus action taken for the property by its owner or a magistrate. The public can go to a website to view the status of a property in the City. The City prepared a report based on the Community Plus System for the subject property. Mr. Alford determined that Respondent had manipulated entries for the subject property in the Community Plus System by changing information relating to inspections. On June 7, 2011, Mr. Alford notified Respondent in writing that he was going to terminate her employment. On July 6, 2011, Respondents' employment was terminated for violations of the City's Employee Handbook and Code of Ethics. Mr. Alford determined that Respondent's actions of proposing and negotiating a lease agreement while on duty and in uniform violated subparagraph 6 of the City's Ethics Policy 4.4, which is as follows: "City representatives shall not engage in financial transactions using non-public information or allow the improper use of such information to further any private interest or gain." Mr. Alford also determined that Respondent violated the City's Code of Ethics provision 4.4 by wearing her City-issued uniform and badge to court for a personal matter giving the appearance that she was acting on behalf of the City.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public Report that finds that Respondent, Glenda Parris, violated section 112.313(6) and imposes against her a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public Report that finds that Respondent, Glenda Parris, violated section 112.313(7) and imposes against her a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00, for a total civil penalty of $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2013.
