The Issue The issues in this case are whether six outdoor advertising sign permits previously issued to Petitioner should be reinstated; or, if not, whether new permits should be issued for the six advertising facings (two on each of three sign structures) in Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact In June 1982, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.5 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 6868 issued by the City of Clearwater (the City), on October 22, 1981, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AF604 and AF605 issued by DOT on November 18, 1981. In January 1983, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.4 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 10406 issued by the City on October 15, 1982, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers A1288 and A1289 issued by DOT on December 20, 1982. On or about July 1, 1984, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.3 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number SN - 24060117 issued by the City on June 6, 1984, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AM631 and AM632 issued by DOT on January 12, 1984. National maintained the three outdoor advertising billboard structures, containing six advertising faces, as identified in Findings of Fact numbers 1, 2 and 3, above (the "subject sign structures"), in the same condition as they were when erected. Following the lawful erection of the subject sign structures, National paid DOT the required annual permit fees through the year 1995, which allowed National to maintain and operate the subject sign structures through December 31, 1995. In March of 1995, DOT notified National that it was dropping state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory because DOT had no jurisdiction over the segment of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, adjacent to which the subject sign structures were located. The evidence was that DOT did so by serving on National a "Notice of Violation," citing DOT's lack of jurisdiction. The "Notice of Violation" gave National the opportunity to request an administrative hearing to contest DOT's action. National had no reason to question DOT's position on the jurisdictional issue but rather relied upon DOT's determination that DOT did not have jurisdiction in March of 1995. National chose not to request a hearing. The evidence was not clear as to when the DOT lost, or believed it lost, jurisdiction; the evidence also was not clear whether the DOT ever had, or believed it ever had, jurisdiction. At the time DOT dropped state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory, DOT did not refund any permit fees to National, including the permit fees which National had paid for the 1995 calendar year. Consequently, permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 were fully paid through December 31, 1995. On November 2, 1995, the section of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, along which the subject sign structures are located became part of the National Highway System (NHS), and became jurisdictional for the purpose of permitting outdoor advertising billboard structures. On August 26, 1996, Kenneth M. Towcimak, as Director of DOT's Office of Right of Way, issued a memorandum to all District Outdoor Advertising Administrators addressing implementation of outdoor advertising control over roadways which were previously uncontrolled by DOT, and which became designated as part of the NHS on November 28, 1995. The Towcimak memorandum of August 26, 1996, required notification by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to all owners of such outdoor advertising billboard structures, that they must obtain state permits by January 1, 1997. There was no evidence as to whether DOT ever notified National by registered mail, with return receipt requested, that National was required to obtain state permits by January 1, 1997, for the subject sign structures. National filed six applications for the subject sign structures on or about December 29, 1997 (one for each of the two sign facings on each sign structure). On the part of the forms asking for the location of the sign, the six applications described the location of the signs, respectively, as: "Reinstated State Tag # AF 604-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AF 605-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 631-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 632-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AI 288-10"; and "Reinstated State Tag # AI 289-10." The applications contained copies of the permits previously issued by DOT for the operation and maintenance of the subject sign structures, copies of Landowner's permission and copies of City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures. Although the applications included copies of the City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures, DOT knew that the City no longer considered the sign structures to be legal under the City's code. In 1989, the City amended its code to place limitations on the size (height and area) and concentration (one per lot) of signs in the locations of the subject sign structures. The subject sign structures exceeded at least some of the new limitations; however, the code amendment provided for a seven-year "amortization" period, until January 19, 1996, during which the signs would be permitted as legal, non-conforming signs. At the end of the "amortization" period, the signs no longer were legal under the City code. Some of the information on National's six applications was incorrect or incomplete. But all of the incorrect or incomplete information could easily have been remedied, and "incorrect information" is not the real basis upon which DOT gave notice of intent to deny the applications. The real basis for the notice of intent was the illegality of the sign structures under the City code. On or about November 22, 1999, National filed with DOT a Petition for Reinstatement for each of the three signs (each petition seeking reinstatement of the two permits for the two advertising facings for each sign structure) under Section 479.07(8)(b)1-3, Florida Statutes (1999). On January 31, 2000, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Reinstatement as to each of the three such petitions filed by National.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Transportation enter a final order denying National's petitions for reinstatement and National's applications for new sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent?s Outdoor Advertising Permits should be revoked pursuant to section 479.08, Florida Statutes, because the associated sign has not remained substantially the same, has been disassembled and re-erected, or has been destroyed, as set forth in the Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation regulates outdoor advertising signs located in proximity to the State Highway System, the Interstate, and portions of the Federal-aid Primary System. Green?s Wrecker Service, begun in 1947, was one of the first wrecker services in Alachua County. Mr. Allen Green was the owner and operator. There was no precise testimony as to when Mr. Green first erected the advertising sign at issue here, but Mr. Green?s daughter, Pamela, vaguely remembered that happening: Well, I was seven or eight years old. I remember Daddy and Grandpa going down there after they opened up the road. It was woods there and we used to play on our bikes and I remember my Grandmother coming out and sitting beside the road because she was scared we was gonna get onto 301 because it was always woods back there before, and we could ride and we didn?t have her bothering us, you know. So when the woods got cleared out to 301, then, you know, Granny was sitting out there and daddy and grandpa went down there and done something, put that sign up, I guess. Based upon Pamela?s current age and her recollection, it can be roughly calculated that the sign was put up over 40 years ago. It is a small sign, about three feet by six feet, and has the words “Green?s Garage” in red letters and a smaller “Pennzoil” logo in yellow, along with a large arrow pointing toward the business. The sign sits at the intersection of US Highway 301 and 165th Avenue, the business being located about a hundred yards down 165th Avenue. The sign is important to the business because, due to the trees, one cannot see the actual building or cars at the business location from US Highway 301 until one is already at the 165th Avenue intersection, where one can finally see them through the area that has been cleared out for the road. Mr. Green turned the business over to Pamela before he died, and she has operated the business ever since. She subsequently married Mr. Gary Keen. Mrs. Pamela Green Keen incorporated the business as “Green?s Garage and Wrecking Service, Inc.” There was no evidence as to when the subsequent provision of state law or local ordinance with which the sign fails to comply was passed, but the parties stipulated that the sign is nonconforming, so it is clear that the sign was lawful when erected but could not be put up today. The sign was permitted as a wooden sign with a back-to- back configuration and two supports. That configuration has never changed. The sign was assigned tag numbers BE893 and BE894 by the Department. These tags look like small license plates that are posted on the sign and must be visible from the main travel-way. Mr. Tom Simmons is a senior outdoor advertising inspector for Cardno TBE Consultants (Cardno TBE), a contractor for the Department. Cardno TBE manages the outdoor advertising program for the State of Florida. Mr. Simmons has been employed with them for 12 years, and, before that, performed a similar job for four years with the Department. Mr. Simmons oversees 16 counties in northeast Florida, including Alachua County. Mr. Simmons was very credible in his testimony. Mr. Simmons testified that he was aware of the sign: In the due process of traveling from point A to point B on 301, I had seen it before. Like I stated earlier, after you have been out here a long time like I have, when structures disappear and go away, you pick up on it because it?s something that you are looking for constantly. On September 7, 2011, Mr. Simmons took a picture of the sign. It was down on the ground and was not erect. Mr. Keen testified that shortly before this, he had been having problems with vandals. The windshield of his tow truck had been shattered by a man whose car had been towed to Green?s Garage. That man was caught and ultimately paid restitution. A vehicle had also been stolen from Green?s Garage in June, and Mr. Keen or his wife had requested increased sheriff?s patrols at the business address in August, as evidenced by records from the Alachua County Sheriff?s Department. Mr. Keen testified that people often became upset when their cars were towed and that some were vindictive and would resort to vandalism. He said it was an unavoidable consequence of the business, since he towed cars for the Sheriff?s Department and the Florida Highway Patrol. Mr. Keen testified that he goes down 165th Avenue to US Highway 301, right past where the sign is located, almost every day. His testimony that the sign was not down for more than a day is accepted. Mr. Keen?s first action was to look for signs as to who had knocked it down, but he could not find any evidence such as cigarette butts, or cans, or footprints, so he decided it would do no good to call the police. Mr. Keen re-erected the sign. He did not have to reassemble or add to the materials on the sign in any way, since it was still intact. He just put it back up. The Department issued its original Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit for Violation, dated October 26, 2011, alleging that the sign had been abandoned. Respondent denied this in its response to the Department and requested an administrative hearing. The Department did not request an administrative law judge within 15 days of Respondent?s request. Green?s Garage and Wrecker Service is substantially affected by the Department?s intended action to revoke the permits for the sign. If the permit is lost, the sign must be taken down and no new sign can be erected. Almost a year later, on October 18, 2012, Mr. Simmons took a picture of the sign which showed that it was back up in its original location. He testified that it appeared to be the same sign, constructed of the same materials as before. On March 28, 2013, the Department issued Green?s Garage an Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit for Violation, alleging violations of three different provisions of the rules. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the sign remained substantially the same as it was on the date it became nonconforming. Even if it was determined that the sign did not remain substantially the same simply because it was down for a day or two, simply re-erecting the sign when no assembly or construction was required constituted reasonable repair and maintenance of the sign. The sign was never disassembled throughout the time relevant to this proceeding. Less than 60 percent of the upright supports of the sign were physically damaged at any time relevant to this proceeding. One pole was not damaged at all; the other had only very minor damage. The minor damage to one pole was not such that the normal repair practices of the industry would call for that pole?s replacement. Respondent never had an intention to abandon or discontinue the sign at any time relevant to this proceeding. The facts did not show that the sign structure ceased to exist. All the interrelated parts and material -- including the beams, poles, and stringers -- which were constructed for the purpose of supporting or displaying the message remained completely intact and never ceased to exist as an integrated structure.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit for Violation and allow the outdoor advertising permits to continue. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a permit for an outdoor advertising sign should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Poz), filed an application dated June 19, 1996, with the Department of Transportation (Department) for an outdoor advertising sign permit. The application stated that the sign was to be located at I-95 approximately 2500 feet north of Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. Additionally the application provided that the sign would not be located within city limits. The Department issued a Notice of Denied Application to Poz on July 16, 1996, stating the application was not approved because the “site is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade," citing Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. The Department uniformly interprets Rule 14- 10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. In the mid-80’s, the Department's central office sent out a diagram and instruction memo to all district staff explaining the measurement and distance requirements in Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5. Based on the methodology used by the Department for measuring compliance with Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, the site of the sign proposed by Poz is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. The area where I-95 crosses or intersects with Midway Road is called an interchange. Petitioner claims that the Department has approved other signs which are within 500 feet of a restricted interchange, namely, signs with permit numbers BM 097 and BM 096, located at the east side of I-95 and State Road 514; signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 516; and signs with permit numbers BM 825 and BM 826 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 514. The signs with permit numbers BM 096 and BM 097 are located within the city limits of Palm Bay according to the approved applications for those signs. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 825 AND BM 826 are located within city limits. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820, are located within city limits. Petitioner also claims that the sign located at the interchange of I-95 and State Road 60 was within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. This sign is located in an unincorporated area of Indian River County. A sign was erected in this location in 1973 and was replaced with another sign at the same location in 1991. The county building permit for the restructured sign was issued conditioned upon the applicant receiving approval from the “State of Florida Right of Way Administration.” No evidence was presented to show that such approval was sought from or given by the Department. No evidence was presented to establish that the Department was aware that the sign had been restructured. Richard Pozniak, the husband of one of the owners of Poz, testified that a former sign inspector for the Department, Vanna Kinchen, had showed him how to measure for proposed sign sites. Ms. Kinchen rode out with Mr. Pozniak to a location about five miles from the interchange at issue and taught Mr. Pozniak how to measure from the interchange. Ms. Kinchen was not involved with the site at issue and was no longer a sign inspector at the time that Poz made the application for a permit of the site at issue. All interchanges are not constructed alike. Richard Pozniak and his wife, Barbara, measured the site which is at issue. Mr. Pozniak computed the distance from the interchange to the site by measuring 500 feet from the safety zone or gore area on I-95. The gore area is located on the inside of an entrance or exit ramp rather than along the outside of the widening of the pavement. In determining whether the site is within 500 feet of the interchange, the Department measures 500 feet beyond the widening of the entrance ramp onto I-95. The site proposed by Poz was located in the area before the widening of the ramp ends. A sign cannot be placed in the area. The logo program is a federally funded program. The requirements for the issuance of an outdoor advertising permit is different from the requirements for a business to display its logo in the logo program. In the logo program, the business is limited to displaying its logo on a Department sign structure located on the interstate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc.’s application for a permit for an outdoor sign at I-95 and Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of May, 1997. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Pennington, Culpepper, Moore, Wilkinson Dunbar & Dunlap, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 34399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner’s applications for a State sign permit should be granted.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that DOT is the State agency responsible for regulating outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of the State Highway system, interstate, or federal-aid primary system in accordance with Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Mr. Monsalve wishes to place two advertising signs within 660 feet of Interstate 95 and visible to Interstate 95. The advertising signs require a permit. On or about June 16, 2008, Mr. Monsalve filed two applications, completing DOT’s forms titled “Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit” (Application), with DOT for outdoor advertising signs. The two applications indicated the same location for the outdoor advertising but with different height, width, and total square feet: one was a height of 4 feet, width of 60 feet, and 240 total square feet, and the other was a height of 12 feet, width of 12 feet, and 144 total square feet. The two Applications were assigned Application numbers 57196 and 57197, respectively. The location for the proposed outdoor advertising signs is 299 Southwest 17 Road in Miami, Florida, near Interstate 95, North of Southwest 3rd Avenue. Mr. Monsalve owns the property on which the advertising signs are to be located. The Application contained a section titled “Local Government Permission.” The section provided that it was to be completed by the appropriate local government official or that a “written statement indicating that the sign complies with all local government requirements” may be submitted or, “for a proposed sign location, a copy of the building permit issued by the local government may be submitted.” The section was neither completed by the local government official nor was a written statement submitted indicating that the signs comply with all local government requirements. However, Mr. Monsalve submitted a 1999 building permit from the local government. The local government was the City of Miami. The 1999 building permit was issued by the City of Miami on July 13, 1999, to Hampton Inn for a commercial painted wall sign, located at 299 Southwest 17 Road. The building permit was issued Permit Number SG 99-5011166. The Folio Number, i.e., Property ID Number, on the 1999 building permit is No. 01-4138-002-0020. Mr. Monsalve owns the property for which the 1999 building permit was issued for the advertising sign. The property is the same property identified on his Application, assigned Application number 57197. DOT requires that, in order for a building permit to constitute “local government permission,” the permit must have been issued within six months of the date of an application for an outdoor advertising sign. The 1999 building permit submitted by Mr. Monsalve was beyond the six-month time period of the date of Application number 57197. Furthermore, by letter dated June 25, 2008, the City of Miami notified DOT that the 1999 building permit no longer had legal status due to the City of Miami changing its laws regarding billboards and that Mr. Monsalve did not have local government permission.3 The evidence demonstrates that the 1999 building permit did not constitute local government permission. The evidence failed to demonstrate that Mr. Monsalve had obtained local government permission. In March 2004, DOT issued a permit to the Hampton Inn for an outdoor advertising sign on Mr. Monsalve’s property. The permit was issued Tag Number CA179, and the sign was built on August 19, 2004. The permit information provides, among other information, that the location of the outdoor advertising sign was located 0.040 miles North of Southwest 3rd Avenue and that the sign was 144 square feet. Hampton Inn and Mr. Monsalve entered into an agreement/contract for Hampton Inn to lease outdoor advertising space from Mr. Monsalve at 299 Southwest 17 Road, Miami, Florida. A Second Lease Agreement between Mr. Monsalve and the Hampton Inn indicates in provision numbered one that the lease agreement was extended until March 31, 2007. The evidence demonstrates that, subsequent to March 31, 2007, the lease of the space by the Hampton Inn continued on a month-to-month basis and that the last time that Mr. Monsalve received payment for the monthly lease was in March 2008. The location for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 is the same location of Mr. Monsalve’s proposed outdoor advertising sign in Application number 57197. In June 2008, the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was transferred from Hampton Inn to Outlook Media using DOT’s form titled “Outdoor Advertising Permit Transfer Request.” The permit is considered by DOT to be currently active. The location for Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 is currently permitted to Outlook Media due to the transfer of outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 to Outlook Media. The distance between the proposed sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57196 and the space in the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, is less than 1500 feet. The evidence demonstrates that the sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 conflicts with the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, in that the two are the same location. Mr. Monsalve believed that he, as the property owner, owned the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, as well. He did not agree for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve was not aware that the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, had been transferred by Hampton Inn to Outlook Media. The evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he owned or did not own the permit or that his permission was required for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve did not agree to lease the space for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. Mr. Monsalve notified DOT that a problem existed between him and the City of Miami regarding obtaining local government permission and requested DOT to put his Application on “Hold” in order to provide him with time to resolve the problem. He also notified DOT regarding his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. DOT is unable to place applications on hold but is required to act on applications within 30 days. Also, Mr. Monsalve notified the City of Miami, among other things, of his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media, and that he did not give Outlook Media permission to erect a sign on his property for which the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was issued. By Notice of Denial issued on July 3, 2008, DOT notified Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reason: Other: No statement from the appropriate local governmental official indicating that the agency or unit of local government will issue a permit to the applicant upon approval of the state permit application by the Department (Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes). On July 15, 2008, DOT issued an amended Notice of Denial, notifying Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reasons: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500’ for interstates . . .) s.479.07(9)(a)1.&2., FS In conflict with permitted sign(s), tag #(s) CA 179 held by Outlook Media of South Florida, LLC . . . Sign/location does not comply with all local government requirements . . . s.479.07(3)(b), FS Other: The building permit submitted with the application is not in compliance with local governmental requirements. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that a determination had been made as to what Mr. Monsalve’s legal rights are as the owner of the property regarding his lease agreement/contract with the Hampton Inn and the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179; and regarding the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Andres Monsalve’s application for an outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2008.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to sign permits for signs to be located 100 feet east of SR 29 on U.S. 41 in Collier County, Florid.a.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence presented at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Petitioner business is located off U.S. 41 in Collier County, Florida, and is a franchised boat tour company doing business within the Everglades National Park. Prior to May, 1990, the Petitioner utilized a sign site which was located 100 feet east of SR 29 on U.S. 41 to alert its customers of the turn to make to enter Petitioner's place of business. That sign (two sides, one facing either direction) was located on property owned by the Barron Collier Company. For a number of years prior to 1989, National Advertising Company (National) leased the sign location from Barron Collier and then contracted with Petitioner for the sign site. The ownership of the sign itself, as of December, 1989, has not been established. Originally, the Barron Collier Company had erected a wooden sign on telephone-type poles at the site in the 1950s. Whether that sign or its replacement was there in December, 1989, is unknown. The Barron Collier Company takes the position that they leased the sign and the site to National. No mention was made as to the sign's ownership within the lease document. In any event, for reasons unknown, Barron Collier and National had a falling out which resulted in the termination of their agreement in December, 1989. National's lease to the site was then deemed a holdover tenancy for the period of time ending in May, 1990. In May, 1990, the sign was removed from the site and National gave notice to the Department that it was abandoning the location. Barron Collier and Petitioner claim the removal of the sign was an act of vandalism or trespass. To date, no court of law, civil or criminal, has reached that legal conclusion. In October, 1990, Petitioner applied for a state sign permit for the same location. That location is currently zoned agricultural, environmentally sensitive. Additionally, that location is 288 feet from a permitted sign site. U.S. 41 at the proposed sign location is, a federal-aid primary highway. Permits for the two faces of the sign which had been at the location were previously held by National. Permits for both faces of the sign which had been there prior to May, 1990, were cancelled by National in an affidavit dated May 15,, 1990. The Department verified the removal of the sign by certificate of sign removal dated June 14, 1990. Subsequently, Petitioner received permission from the Collier County Board of County Commissioners to re-erect the sign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying the sign application for the location at 100 feet east of SR 29 on U.S. 41 in Collier County, Florida, as requested by the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-7189T RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: With regard to paragraph 1, it is accepted that the Barron Collier Company erected a sign on the subject site in the 1950s. Whether that sign was the one removed in May, 1990 by National or others is unknown. Representations to the contrary are not supported by the weight of the evidence. With regard to paragraph 2, it is accepted that the Petitioner entered into a lease with National for a sign at the site location which is the subject of this case and that that agreement was in effect from the 1960s until 1990. Paragraphs 3 and 4 are accepted. Note: there is no paragraph 5 proposed by the Petitioner. Paragraph 6 is rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. It is accepted, however, that the sign was removed in May, 1990, and that National cancelled its permits for the location. Paragraphs 7 through 9 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: George Vega, Jr. VEGA, BROWN, STANLEY & MARTIN, P.A. 2660 Airport Road South Naples, Florida 33962 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 ATT: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58
The Issue There are two separate issues in this case: (1) Whether Petitioner breached its contract with Respondent by not making payments for a sign lease, thereby resulting in the sign permit becoming invalid; and (2) Whether Petitioner constructed a roadside sign illegally, i.e., without a permit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SG Outdoor, is a company engaged in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida. Respondent is the State of Florida ("State") agency responsible for monitoring compliance with State and Federal laws relating to outdoor advertising. According to those laws, signs within 660 feet of primary or interstate roadways visible from those roadways are subject to advertising regulations. There is currently a 1,500-foot spacing requirement (up from 1,000 feet in 1984) between signs. Further, signs must be located on land zoned for commercial and industrial use. Petitioner owns two signs which are at issue in this proceeding. One of the signs is a single facing sign of wood construction with a seven-foot height above ground level. The sign is assigned Tag No. AU557. The sign is situated just off Interstate 4, .871 miles east of State Road 33 in Polk County, Florida. This sign will be referred to herein as the "Original Sign." The Original Sign was built in 1971 and was located, at all times relevant hereto, on land owned by Mrs. Ona Grimes until that land was purchased by the State in October 2002. Petitioner also constructed another sign at approximately the same location. This sign, referred to herein as the "New Sign," has a double-faced, single-metal pole and is considerably higher in height than the Original Sign. Both the Original Sign and the New Sign are located on property which DOT contends is zoned as "Pasture, with residence." However, Polk County did away with its zoning ordinance in March 2000 and replaced it with Land Use Districts. The current Land Use District designation for the site is Business Park Center (within the Green Swamp Area of Critical State Concern). There was no competent testimony at final hearing as to whether that designation constitutes commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of roadside signs. The Original Sign was purchased by Petitioner in 1991 and was located on the Grimes property. Petitioner entered into a Ground Lease with Grimes that had a term of 30 years at a payment of $1,500 per year. In 2002, DOT entered into negotiations with Grimes to purchase the property. When DOT purchases property on which a roadside sign already exists, DOT may take the sign by way of condemnation through eminent domain (sometimes referred to by DOT as a "Take"). In such cases, the State must reasonably compensate the sign owner for the taking of its sign. In the alternative, the State may assume the sign lease and become a lessor to the sign owner. In that case, the sign owner must make its lease payments directly to the State. On May 22, 2002, DOT sent a letter to Petitioner explaining that DOT was in the process of acquiring the right of way on which the Original Sign was located. DOT offered to purchase (or Take) the sign from Petitioner for $17,300. While that offer to Petitioner was pending, DOT went forward with the purchase of the Grimes property. The purchase agreement for the property was signed by Grimes on July 11, 2002. Four days later, a letter from DOT to Petitioner was issued which said: Subsequent to receiving agreement and signed ODA [out door advertising] disclaimer from the property owner, an offer has been made to SG Outdoor, Inc. for the purchase of the ODA structure. Negotiations are ongoing. However, the purchase of Grimes property did not occur immediately. Meanwhile, in August 2002, Grimes entered into an illegal lease with Lamar Advertising, giving Lamar the same rights it had already contracted away to Petitioner. Petitioner was unaware of the lease with Lamar at that time. Such a lease would have been in violation of the already-existing lease between Grimes and Petitioner. At almost the same time, a DOT memorandum indicated that DOT was still "involved in ongoing negotiations" with Petitioner concerning the sign. The Grimes property purchase (by DOT) finally closed on October 1, 2002, at which time DOT became the owner of the Grimes property. Because of this fact, Petitioner was supposed to make its annual lease payments to the State of Florida ("State") as the new owner. Stated differently, the State became Petitioner's new lessor. On October 14, 2002, Lamar Advertising filed a Sign Permit Application with the Polk County Building Division. The application was for approval of its sign on the Grimes property. The application included a copy of Lamar's lease with Grimes; the lease had a 10-year period and a payment of $4,000 per year.1 On July 8, 2003 (ten months after DOT purchased the property), Petitioner filed a permit application with Polk County for the New Sign. Petitioner did not, at that time, have permission from DOT to erect a new sign, but believed it could obtain that permission after the fact. Petitioner then went forward with the construction of the New Sign. Meanwhile, Petitioner sent Grimes a check in October 2003, for its lease payment for the period June 1, 2003, through May 30, 2004. By that time, the State already owned the Grimes property. A member of the Grimes family sent Petitioner's check back to Petitioner in January 2004, explaining that all payments should be made directly to the State. There is no evidence in the record as to whether Petitioner attempted to make a lease payment to the Department at that time or at any other time. In November 2003, DOT issued a certified letter to Petitioner addressing Sign Permit No. AU557 that said: On October 2, 2002, the above referenced parcel was purchased by the Florida Department of Transportation. Although the Department will honor an existing lease, it will not engage in any new lease agreements nor grant permission for the referenced sign to remain. Since any potential oral agreement with the previous owner has expired, the Department requests that the [Original] sign be removed. Clearly DOT was mistaken. Petitioner had a written, not oral, lease with the prior owner. In response, Petitioner sent DOT a copy of its Ground Lease with Grimes. At that time, Petitioner also asked for a meeting with DOT's acquisition director to continue negotiating a fair price for the Original Sign. Several months later (on July 9, 2004), DOT issued its Notice of Violation regarding the Original Sign. The notice said "that the outdoor advertising sign referenced above has been acquired by the Department" (rather than saying the Department had purchased the land). The notice directed Petitioner to immediately remove the sign from the premises. The notice was partially in error; DOT had actually acquired the land, not the sign. Petitioner was in breach of its lease with the State by failing to make lease payments as required by the lease which DOT had assumed. However, it is unclear as to whether, upon notice of receipt of the written lease, DOT had ever advised Petitioner to send its lease payments directly to the Department. The Notice of Administrative Hearing Rights attached to the DOT Notice of Violation indicates a deadline of 30 days from receipt of the Notice for filing such a request, i.e., on or about August 10, 2005. Petitioner responded to the Notice with another letter (dated July 14, 2009) explaining again that it had a valid lease with Grimes for the sign location. Petitioner's letter asked DOT to abate its violation notice and reinstate Petitioner's permit. It also stated that "[i]f the State decides not to acknowledge the Judicial process [the ongoing probate dispute with the Grimes family concerning the lease with Lamar] and still proceeds with the Notice of Violation, then upon receiving your next correspondence, we will exercise our privilege to request an administrative hearing." Petitioner contends that the quoted statement constituted its request for an administrative hearing. However, the plain reading of the statement indicates that it is a statement of future intent based upon future actions by DOT. DOT then issued a letter dated August 10, 2004, to Petitioner explaining that the permit for the Original Sign had been revoked. The letter directed Petitioner to remove the sign. The letter stated that if Petitioner does not do so, then DOT would have the right to remove the sign. (As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, the sign was still in place.) The August 10 letter, in response to Petitioner's July 14 letter, appears to be the "next correspondence" Petitioner had requested. The exercise of its right to an administrative hearing would, therefore, be due on or about September 11, 2004. On September 8, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to Holschuh declining DOT's offer to purchase the Original Sign for $17,000. That offer had been made in May 2002.2 This letter suggests a counter-offer of $82,500 as the purchase price. The letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to an administrative hearing. Holschuh responded that she was not involved in acquisitions, and Petitioner should contact the district office (with whom Petitioner had previously negotiated). Instead of heeding Holschuh's directions, Petitioner then sent her another letter asking her to send the correspondence on to someone in the acquisition division. The new letter also repeats the counter-offer of $82,500. This letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to a formal hearing, either. About one year later, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued another Notice of Violation, this one addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a (which Holschuh at final hearing said referred to the Original Sign, although there was no "a" nomenclature on the July 9, 2004, Notice of Violation). Also, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued a Notice of Violation addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, which Holschuh said referred to Petitioner's New Sign, even though no permit for the New Sign had ever been issued by DOT. The New Sign by this time had been completed and was being used for outdoor advertising. Petitioner understands the need for a permit to construct a new outdoor sign on the State road right-of-ways, but opined that it believed it could do so after the fact. Petitioner has only obtained approval from Polk County for erecting the sign, an event necessary for construction purposes, but irrelevant to DOT requirements. In the letter to DOT from Petitioner dated October 26, 2005 (and presumably accepted by DOT as Petitioner's request for a formal hearing), reference is made to Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, i.e., the New Sign. However, the letter addresses the Original Sign and its perceived value by Petitioner. It is patently unclear as to which sign is actually being addressed, but facts surrounding both signs were presented at final hearing and both have been addressed herein. Nonetheless, Petitioner's October 26, 2005, letter was submitted within 30 days of the latest Notice of Violation and was presumably intended to invoke Petitioner's right to a formal administrative hearing. This letter was then forwarded to DOAH by DOT in March 2009, for the purpose of conducting the hearing. (No evidence was presented as to why the DOT's cover letter and Petitioner's request for hearing were not submitted to DOAH until three-and-a-half years after the letter was written.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Transportation, reversing the revocation of Sign Permit No. AU557 and providing Petitioner, SG Outdoor, just compensation for that sign. Further, the final order should deem the newly constructed sign on the same site to be unauthorized and order its removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The outdoor advertising sign that is the subject of the instant proceeding (hereinafter referred to as the "Sign") is a billboard with steel "I" beams and iron stringers which sits perpendicular to U.S. Highway 1 approximately 1,800 feet south of Hypoluxo Road and approximately 1,000 feet north of Neptune Drive in Palm Beach County. Petitioner has owned the Sign since about 1978 or 1979, when it purchased the assets of the Sign's previous owner, Outdoor Media. The Sign was originally erected in 1963 by Ferrin Signs, Inc., pursuant to a permit issued by Palm Beach County. In 1967, Ferrin Signs, Inc., obtained a permit from Palm Beach County to perform further work on the sign. Shortly thereafter, Ferrin Signs, Inc., sold the Sign to Outdoor Media. Prior to March of 1970, the land on which the Sign is located was in the unincorporated area of Palm Beach County. In March of 1970, the land was annexed by the Town of Hypoluxo and has been within the Town's jurisdictional boundaries ever since. The Town of Hypoluxo has an ordinance currently in effect that regulates signs within the Town. The ordinance, like its predecessors dating back to 1961, prohibits "off premises signs." It also contains a section dealing with "nonconforming signs," which provides as follows: Signs or sign structures made nonconforming by this sign and signage code shall be governed by the following regulations: A sign existing within the town on or before November 30, 1992, which, because of its height, square foot area, location or other characteristics, does not conform to this article is hereby declared to be a nonconforming sign. A nonconforming sign under this subsection may be allowed to remain in existence, but if destroyed or allowed to deteriorate in excess of 50 percent of the depreciated value of the structure, it may not be replaced. The status afforded signs under this section shall not be applicable to any sign for which no sign permit was ever issued; such signs are deemed illegal signs and are subject to the provisions of this article governing illegal signs. No conforming sign or sign structure shall be permitted to be erected for the same property containing an existing nonconforming sign until the nonconforming sign has been removed or made conforming. An "off premises sign" that does not qualify for "nonconforming sign" status is subject to removal under the ordinance. The Town also has a building code. Under the code, a building permit is required before a sign within the Town may be altered or repaired. No building permit has ever been issued by the Town for any work to be performed on the Sign. On December 27, 1990, the Department issued a Notice of Violation alleging that Petitioner was maintaining the Sign without a state-issued outdoor advertising sign permit, as required by Section 497.07, Florida Statutes. In response to the Notice of Violation, Petitioner advised the Department that it would be filing an application for such a permit. Petitioner filed its application on January 12, 1993. The application was accompanied by, among other things, a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit referred to in Finding of Fact 3 above. The application package, however, contained neither a permit for the Sign issued by the Town of Hypoluxo, nor a statement from any Hypoluxo official indicating that the Sign was eligible for such a permit or was otherwise allowable under the Town's sign ordinance. Accordingly, after receiving the application package, the Department contacted the Mayor of the Town, the Honorable Al Merion, to ascertain the Town's position on the matter. In conjunction therewith, it provided Mayor Merion with a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit that had accompanied Petitioner's application. By letter dated January 25, 1993, Mayor Merion responded to the Department's inquiry. In his letter, he wrote: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of your fax transmittal containing a permit issued by Palm Beach County to the Ferrin Signs, Inc. on January 24, 1963. The permit issued by Palm Beach County is not valid because it is not within their [sic] jurisdiction to issue sign permits for property lying within the territorial boundaries of the Town of Hypoluxo. To the best of our knowledge, the Town of Hypoluxo has no record of a permit being issued to Ferrin Signs Inc. It should be noted that, in the past years, on numerous occasions, the billboard in question has been illegally constructionally altered by virtue of no permit having been obtained from the Town. On or about February 2, 1993, the Department returned Petitioner's application to Petitioner. In the Memorandum of Returned Application that it sent to Petitioner, the Department gave the following reason for denying the application: "local permit not provided for Town of Hypoluxo." Although the Town no longer contends that Palm Beach County was without authority to issue the 1963 pre-annexation permit for construction of the Sign, the Town still takes the position that, because of unpermitted post- annexation repairs and alterations, the Sign is prohibited and subject to removal under the Town's current sign ordinance. 1/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a state outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of January, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1994.
Findings Of Fact On November 4, 1982, the Petitioner, Enterprise Outdoor Advertising, Inc., submitted applications for permits for two signs facing Interstate No. 4 (hereafter I-4) near the intersection of I-4 and 50th Street in Tampa, Florida. The specific location of the proposed signs is described as: Sec. 205 E/B .02 F/W Interstate I-4 50th Street and I-4 Sec. 205 E/B .02 F/E Interstate I-4 50th Streetand I-4 Both applications were disapproved by the Department of Transportation on November 9, 1982. The two signs for which Petitioner sought permits were to be located on a piece of property owned by Mr. E. B. Rood (hereafter referred to as Rood property). The Rood property is located adjacent to I-4, east of 50th Street, which runs north and south. The west facing sign application (see Respondent's Exhibit 11) was denied by the Department of Transportation because of a conflicting existing sign, Permit No. 7716-12, held by Foster and Kleiser, Intervenor. Permit No. 7716-12 was for a westerly facing sign physically located on the Rood property, pursuant to a lease between Intervenor and E. B. Rood. (See Respondent's Exhibit 4.) On November 3, 1982, Mr. E. B. Rood provided written notice to Foster and Kleiser that he was cancelling the lease. By the terms of the lease, the Foster and Kleiser sign then had to be removed within 30 days. On November 9, 1982, when the Petitioner's application was denied, the sign erected pursuant to Permit No. 7716-12 was still physically standing on the Rood property. Sometime prior to December 3, 1982, the sign was removed by Foster and Kleiser and the Department of Transportation was notified that the sign had been dismantled. (See Respondent's Exhibit 9.) Subsequent to dismantling its west facing sign, the Intervenor, Foster and Kleiser, applied for and received a permit for a westerly facing sign on a piece of property adjacent to I-4 just west of 50th Street and the Rood property. This second piece of property, located west of the Rood property, is referred to as the Bize property. At the time Foster and Kleiser applied for the westerly facing sign permit on the Bize property, there were no pending applications for a conflicting sign, and the previous conflicting sign on the Rood property had been dismantled. The application filed by Petitioner for a permit for an easterly facing sign on the Rood property was denied because of a conflicting permit, No. AG558- Permit AG558-12 was for a sign on the Bize property which would face east adjacent to I-4. At the time of Petitioner's application on November 4, 1982, no sign had actually been erected pursuant to Permit No. AG558-12. Permit No. AG558-12 had been issued to Foster and Kleiser in February, 1982, pursuant to an application accompanied by a written lease containing the purported signature of Mr. John T. Bize, the named lessor. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6.) Mr. John T. Bize died on January 1, 1977, and, therefore, was deceased on February 19, 1982, the date of the lease submitted by Foster and Kleiser with its application for Permit No. AG558-12. The only witness signature appearing on the lease was that of Thomas Marc O'Neill. Mr. O'Neill did not observe or witness the lessor sign the lease and felt, at the time he signed, that he was witnessing the signature of Ronald L. Westberry, who signed the lease on behalf of Foster and Kleiser. At the time he signed as a witness, Mr. O'Neill was and continues to be an employee of Foster and Kleiser. Subsequent to its disapproval of Petitioner's application for an easterly facing sign permit, the Department of Transportation was informed by Petitioner of the invalid lease on which Permit No. AG558-12 had been issued. By letter dated November 17, 1982, the Department notified Foster and Kleiser of the invalid lease and gave Foster and Kleiser 30 days within which to correct the problem. On November 22, 1982, the Department received a new lease for the Bize property and sign permit AG558-12. The new lease contained the following addendum: Effective date of lease shall be the of [sic] closing of purchase of said property or erection of signs, which- ever is first. There was no further evidence of the actual effective date of the lease. The Department of Transportation has a policy of requiring, with an application for a sign permit, a lease or other written evidence that the landowner has given permission to use his property for outdoor advertising purposes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's two applications for outdoor advertising sign permits. DONE and ENTERED this 20 day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Houllis, Esquire 10525 Park Boulevard North Seminole, Florida 33542 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven L. Selph, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1441 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Mr. Paul Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On November 3, 1982, outdoor advertising sign permits AR946-06 and AK947-06 were issued by the Department of Transportation to Sandy Advertising Company. The permits were for a location on the west (north) side of U.S. Highway 90 approximately two miles east of its intersection with U.S. Highway 29 within the city limits of Pensacola, Florida. Sandy Advertising Company transferred those permits to Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. Annual renewal payments have been made each year in a timely manner by Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. No permit tags have been displayed at the Lamar sites and no sign has been built or maintained at the Lamar sites since issuance of the permits. Without having submitted an application for a permit to the Department of Transportation, Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc., obtained a building permit from the City of Pensacola for the erection of an outdoor advertising sign located in Escambia County approximately 3,790 feet east of State Road 296 on the north side of U.S. Highway 90. Pursuant to the building permit, Outdoor Media erected a sign at that location. The sign had an east and a west face and was less than 500 feet from the site for which permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 were issued. Each face of the sign required a separate permit from the Department of Transportation. Learning of the erection of Outdoor Media's sign, the Department notified Petitioner to remove it. Instead Outdoor Media applied for two sign permits for each face of the sign. On August 8, 1988, the Department of Transportation received Petitioner's applications for a state outdoor advertising permit. The applications were for each face of the sign located on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The applications were denied on the ground that two other permits, permit AK946- 06 and permit AK947-06, had been issued to Lamar Advertising of Pensacola, Inc., for a location on the same side of the highway within one thousand feet of Petitioner's site. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the sole basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by the Department of Transportation. Petitioner meets all other permit requirements. In 1984, the legislature extensively revised Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. See Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida. Of particular concern in this proceeding are the changes to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, and whether those changes apply to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The revisions to this section introduced very specific tag display as well as sign erection and maintenance requirements for all permits. The revisions increased the fee schedules and provided that all permits expire annually on January 15. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, as amended states in part: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other persons in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side- to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. The effective date(s) of the amendments to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, is stated in Section 27 of Law 84-227. Section 27 specifically and explicitly made permits issued prior to June 30, 1984 subject to the new provisions of Law 84-227. Section 27 states: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. In spite of the language of Section 27, it is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within thirty (30) days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with Sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. While DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes, it is applied statewide and has been held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule in Case NO. 5227R, Final Order issued December 29th, 1988. DOT relies upon the definition of "non-conforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes, states in part: `Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] 1/ DOT does not rely upon the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227. The exceptions are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits." It is DOT's view that permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained or displayed. These "secret signs" can only be discovered after the application is submitted and DOT checks its computer records. The effect of DOT's interpretation is that pre- 1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can exist into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as the permittee renews its permit. This interpretation is directly opposed to the legislature's purpose in enacting the 1984 amendments, i.e., the prevention of advertisers stockpiling unused sites and permits. Moreover, this interpretation is contrary to the pre- or post-1984 statutory language and is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. DOT bases it's interpretation on the ground that the constitution prohibits the retroactive application of the 1984 amendments to permits existing prior to the effective date of those amendments. DOT did not offer any evidence as to the accuracy of its view on the requirements of the constitution. Failing such evidentiary support, DOT has failed to carry its burden of proof when utilizing an unpromulgated rule on a case by case basis. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this cause. Section 120.57(1) Florida Statutes. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida, to require that parties obtaining outdoor advertising permits post their permit tags within thirty (30) days and erect their signs within two hundred seventy (270) days or their permits would automatically become void. The amendment became effective July 1, 1984. The amendment also expressly and explicitly provided for treatment of pre-July 1, 1984 permits by stating" . . . any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. Section 479.01(12) only makes exceptions for nonconforming "signs lawfully erected." Section 479.07(9)(c) only provides that nothing in subsection (9), pertaining to spacing requirements or permitting of new signs after July 1, 1984, may be construed to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of the Act to become nonconforming. See the definition of "sign" contained in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes, and of "erect" contained in Section 479.01(4), Florida Statutes. However, in spite of the clear language of the statutes, DOT interprets the term "permitted signs" as including permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, but which have no sign erected on the site. DOT has placed an interpretation upon the statutes that is not apparent from their language. The plain language of Sections 479.01(12) and 479.07(9)(c) only applies to signs which have been constructed on the permit site. The sections do not apply where no sign has been constructed. Since no signs were ever erected on the sites covered by permit AK946-06 and AK947-06 neither Section 479.01(12) nor 479.07(9)(c) applies to Lamar's permits. Further, DOT interprets the amendment to Section 479.07, now codified as Section 479.07(5)(a), requiring permit display and sign erection within a specified time period, to be applicable only to permits initially issued after the effective date of July 1, 1984. The agency has not enforced that subsection against preexisting permits and renewals of such preexisting permits, irrespective of whether or not a sign has ever been erected on the permitted site. However, the agency has applied and enforced against preexisting permits all other portions of the amendments, including but not limited to the mandatory recurring uniform annual January 15 renewal date and increased renewal fee with regard to preexisting permits. The agency has taken this approach on the grounds that the constitution prohibited the amendment from being applied retroactively to such preexisting permits. In Administrative Case NO. 88-5227R, this interpretation was held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule. However, agencies have the choice of properly promulgating rules and applying them with the full force and effect of law or of fully explicating those policies by demonstrating the policies' reasonableness and factual accuracy on a case by case basis in Section 120.57 proceedings. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Amos v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 444 So.2d (Fla, 1st DCA 1983); Gulf Coast Home Health Services Of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 513 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). As noted earlier, the sole reason for DOT's policy was that it was required by the constitution. Such a bare bones claim as "the constitution requires it" is tantamount to the claim that was asserted in Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commission, 384 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1980) that a previous statutory interpretation was "wrong as a matter of law." In Florida Cities, no record foundation was made for the non-rule policy being followed in that case. The Florida Supreme Court held that such a rationale was not sustainable absent adequate record support for the application of non-rule agency policy. In this case, DOT has failed to affirmatively show the reasonableness and factual accuracy of the policy that sign permits which were issued prior to July 1, 1984, should not be subject to Section 479.07(5), Florida Statutes, enforcement and should be treated as if they constituted, erected and maintained signs for purposes of Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes. It is doubtful that DOT could ever show the accuracy of its view of the constitution. The case law in the area clearly establishes that permits such as these are not property in the constitutional sense. Such permits do not confer any right, estate or vested interest, and are revocable at the will of the legislature. Such permits are also subject to new permit conditions. State ex rel First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 187 So. 148 (Fla. 1939); City of Miami Beach v. Deauville Operating Corp., 129 So.2d 185 ( Fla. 3d DCA 1961) and Kawasaki of Tampa, Inc. v. Calvin, 348 So.2d 897 ( Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Moreover, the 1984 amendments to Chapter 479 do not require retroactive application to be applied to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The new permit conditions were applicable only upon the expiration of the old permits on January 15. Thereafter, the new permit conditions applied to the renewal. Therefore, since Lamar did not build any signs on the sites covered by either permit AK946-06 or AK947-06 within 270 days of its first renewal after the effective date of the statutory revisions to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and has not posted the required tags at the sites, permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 are void and cannot be used as a basis for denying Petitioner's sign applications. As in Florida Cities, having failed to establish the reasonableness and accuracy of its policy, the foregoing policy cannot form the basis of the permit denials. This is especially true in light of the fact that DOT's policy ignores the clear language of the statutory amendments.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order voiding Permits AK946-06 and AK947-06, held by Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company, Inc., and granting the applications of Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1990.
The Issue Whether the billboard structure owned by Petitioner, National Advertising Company, located adjacent to U.S. 1/State Road 5, at mile marker 87.5, City of Islamorada Village of Islands, Islamorada, Monroe County, Florida, is in violation of the provisions of Rule 14-10.007, Florida Administrative Code, or Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and the testimony of witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is the owner and operator of an outdoor advertising sign ("billboard") located adjacent to U.S. 1/State Road 5, at mile marker 87.5, City of Islamorada Village of Islands, Islamorada, Monroe County, Florida. In the immediate area of where the billboard's location, U.S. 1/State Road 5 is a U.S. Federal Aid Primary Highway, over which Respondent has jurisdiction. The billboard is permitted pursuant to state sign permit numbers AS788 and AS789. The billboard is 570 feet from the nearest permitted billboard. Respondent considers the billboard to be nonconforming because it is not in compliance with the current spacing requirements on the Federal Aid Primary Highway System. In 1984, the spacing of billboards on Federal Aid Primary Highways changed from 500 feet to 1,000 feet. When the spacing requirements changed, there was a savings provision in Subsection 479.07(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1984), that allowed signs that were conforming in 1984 did not become nonconforming because of the change in the spacing requirement. The billboard was permitted on August 26, 1986. Petitioner's Application for Outdoor Advertising Sign Permit, Tag No. AS788, indicates that the billboard is "500+" feet from the nearest permitted sign and that the method of marking site is that it was an "existing sign," which suggests that the billboard existed prior to the subject permit. If the billboard was built in 1986, it should not have been permitted because the spacing requirement in 1986 was 1,000 feet. This permit information is based upon a document produced as a result of a statewide billboard inventory prepared by a subcontractor of Respondent. There were mistakes in the statewide inventory. Tag numbers AS788 and AS789 could be original tags or replacement tags. The billboard was a ten-foot by 40-foot structure with a two-foot by 38-foot A frame; five poles; and six stingers horizontal made by two-foot by six-foot by 20-foot lumber. On July 21, 2001, a storm came through the City of Islamorada Village of Islands, which caused the five vertical poles that held the billboard erect to be broken. As the storm blew through, the upper structure of the billboard was blown over and rested on the ground. The upper structure of the billboard suffered little damage; importantly, the structural members of the billboard, with the exception of the five vertical poles, were intact and could be reused. Petitioner was prevented from re-erecting the billboard by the City of Islamorada Village of Islands. On June 18, 2002, Petitioner and the City of Islamorada Village of Islands entered into an agreement that allowed Petitioner to remove the billboard and avoid a fine in the amount of $100.00 per day. The value of the structural materials in the billboard immediately prior to the July 21, 2001, storm was $1,353.60. The cost of materials to repair the billboard immediately after the July 21, 2001, storm was $536.50. The replacement materials constitute 39.7 percent of the value of the materials in the sign prior to the storm damage. The only new materials needed to re-erect the billboard are the five vertical poles.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Transportation, issue a final order rescinding its Notice of Violation and allowing Petitioner, National Advertising Company, to re-erect its billboard at the same location and in the same configuration as previously permitted. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Ann Cowles, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Stop 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Stop 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
