Findings Of Fact On or about December 4, 1981, Respondent executed an Agreement with Daytona Sands Beach Club, Inc. (Beach Club), the developer of the project, which was back-dated to August 14, 1981. By the terms of this Agreement, Beach Club sold its interest in thirty-four units of a forty unit condominium time share development having a retail value of $150,000, to Respondent for fifteen percent of the retail value. Respondent testified that the Agreement was simply a financing arrangement whereby Beach Club assigned time-share periods in thirty- four units as collateral for a loan made by Respondent. He stated he received none of the indicia of ownership. However, this is not confirmed by the terms of the Agreement which specifically refer to a sale of Beach Club's interest to Respondent, and an arrangement by which Beach Club would then market and sell the units which Respondent had purchased from them. The Agreement also expressly provides that it "constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and there are no other terms, conditions, or agreements which are not set forth herein or referred to herein." Additionally, it was Respondent who had used this form Agreement previously in other projects and who provided this Agreement for execution by Beach Club. Of the thirty-four units involved in Respondent's Agreement with Beach Club time-share purchasers had acquired time-share periods in twenty-eight units prior to the execution of this Agreement. An Addendum to the Agreement expresses the intention of Beach Club and Respondent that "the present structure of the Sands Beach Club, Inc., contemplates right to use only and not fee simple title." This was a "right to use project" whereby time-share purchasers acquired no interest in the underlying real property and were simply leasing the right to use particular units for a specified number of weeks each year. Thus, Beach Club had an ownership interest in the project at the time the Agreement was executed with Respondent despite the fact that time-share purchasers had already acquired a right to use twenty eight of the thirty-four units referenced in the Agreement. Respondent knew this was a "right to use" project at the time the Agreement was executed. Several months after the execution of this Agreement and Addendum, Respondent had an Assignment prepared which he executed with Beach Club. Although this later executed Assignment specifically acknowledges the prior executed Agreement and Addendum, Respondent contends that this Assignment was prepared and executed for the sole purpose of providing him with additional security for his purported financing arrangement with Beach Club. However, by acknowledging the prior executed Agreement and Addendum which, by their terms refer to a sale of Beach Club's interest to Respondent, the Assignment confirms that Respondent was not simply providing financing in this transaction. Respondent did not execute any additional agreement in association with the transaction other than as set forth above. Specifically, there is no evidence that Respondent agreed in writing to honor fully the rights of time- share purchasers to occupy and use the facilities and to cancel their contracts and receive appropriate refunds, nor did Respondent agree in writing to comply with Chapter 721 or to assume all obligations of the seller to these purchasers. There is no evidence that notice of Respondent's Agreement with Beach Club was mailed to each purchaser.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing a $5,000 civil penalty against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1985, at Tallahassee Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert E. Austin, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 1930 Leesburg, Florida 32748 Richard B. Burroughs, Jr. Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Kearney, Director Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums & Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Permit Number 9330008850 (a building permit for the construction of a single-family residence and swimming pool) issued by Monroe County, Florida, to Fred Snowman is inconsistent with Monroe County's setback requirement pertaining to beach berms that are known turtle nesting areas.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility to administer the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Petitioner has the authority to appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission any development order issued in an area of critical state concern. Sections 380.031(18), 380.032, and 380.07, Florida Statutes. Monroe County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and is responsible for issuing development orders for development in unincorporated Monroe County, Florida. Monroe County issued the development order that is the subject of this appeal. Respondent Fred Snowman is a general contractor and is the owner of real property known as Lot 75, Matecumbe Ocean Beach subdivision, Lower Matecumbe Key, in Monroe County, Florida. The subject property is a residential lot that measures 100 feet by approximately 225 feet and was acquired by Mr. Snowman in September 1992. The subject property is bounded on the landward side by U.S. 1 and fronts the Atlantic Ocean. Respondent's lot is within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. On September 30, 1993, Monroe County issued building permit, Permit Number 9330008850, to Fred Snowman as Owner and General Contractor. This building permit is a development order in an area of critical state concern and is the subject of this proceeding. As reflected by the approved site plans, the permit authorizes the construction of a 2,472 square foot single-family residence with 1,568 square feet of porches, a 1,435 square foot storage enclosure below base flood elevation, and a swimming pool on the property. As permitted, all construction will be setback at least 75 feet from the mean high water line. There is no dispute between the parties as to where the mean high water line is located. Sections 9.5-335 through 9.5-345, Monroe County Code, are land development regulations that contain certain environmental performance standards relating to development. The purpose of these standards is "to provide for the conservation and protection of the environmental resources of the Florida Keys by ensuring that the functional integrity of natural areas is protected when land is developed." See, Section 9.5-335, Monroe County Code. Included in the environmental standards of the land development regulations is Section 9.5-345, Monroe County Code, entitled "Environmental design criteria," which provides, in relevant part: Disturbed Lands: All structures developed, used or occupied on land which are [sic] classified as disturbed on the existing conditions map shall be designated, located and constructed such that: * * * (3) On lands classified as disturbed with beach berm: * * * f. No structure shall be located within fifty (50) feet of any portion of any beach-berm complex which is known to serve as an active nesting or resting area of marine turtles, terns, gulls or other birds; There is little dispute that Lower Matecumbe beach is an active nesting area for marine turtles. Loggerhead turtles, the primary marine turtles which nest on Atlantic beaches in the Keys, are a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act. There are thirty beaches in the Florida Keys which consist of loggerhead nesting habitat. The beach that fronts Mr. Snowman's property on Lower Matecumbe Key is a known turtle nesting beach that is ranked as the second most heavily nested beach in the Keys. The Monroe County comprehensive plan recognizes the beaches on Lower Matecumbe Key as known loggerhead turtle nesting beaches. Pursuant to the comprehensive plan, the County has prepared endangered species maps as a tool to be utilized in identifying known turtle nesting areas. At the time Mr. Snowman obtained approval of his permit application from Monroe County, the County's endangered species maps omitted an approximately 1.5 mile stretch of Lower Matecumbe Beach, including Mr. Snowman's property, from its map designation of a known nesting habitat. However, since that approval, the map, which is subject to periodic updates, has been updated by the County to reflect that all of Lower Matecumbe Key, including Mr. Snowman's property, is considered by the County to be known turtle nesting habitat. Mr. Snowman did not rely on the designation on the endangered species map in making his decision to purchase the subject property or in designing the improvements he seeks to construct on the property. Surveys of turtle nesting behavior in the Florida Keys are accomplished through a network of volunteers. The nesting survey information obtained from this volunteer network provides very general locations with varying degrees of accuracy depending on the number and ability of the volunteers and the extent to which they can obtain access to privately owned beach front property. Because of the limitations in the survey data, is it generally not possible to determine whether turtles have nested on a particular lot. There was no evidence that turtles actually nest on Mr. Snowman's property. Marine turtles most commonly nest within the first 50 feet landward of the mean high tide line, although they have been known to go farther upland. Because of the compressed beach and berm habitat in the Keys, loggerhead turtles have been known to nest in grassy vegetation and woody vegetation more than 50 feet landward of the mean high water line. Mr. Snowman's property is properly designated as "Disturbed Lands" and there exists on this property a "beach-berm complex" which is known to serve as an active nesting area of marine turtles within the meaning of Section 9.5- 345, Monroe County Code. The setback requirement found in Section 9.5-345, Monroe County Code, applies to this development. Consequently, no construction of any structure may be located within fifty (50) feet of any portion the beach- berm complex which is known to serve as an active nesting area of marine turtles. There was a conflict in the evidence as to how much of Mr. Snowman's property should be considered to be a beach-berm habitat. The County has identified the landward extent of the beach-berm to be twenty-five feet from the mean high water line, so that the setback would be to a point at least 75 feet from the mean high water line. The Department has identified the landward extent of the beach berm to be 80 feet from the mean high water line so that the setback would be to a point at least 130 feet from the mean high water line. Section 9.5-4(B-3) contains the following definition that is pertinent to this proceeding: (B-3) "Beach berm" means a bare, sandy shoreline with a mound or ridge of unconsolidated sand that is immediately landward of, and usually parallel to, the shoreline and beach. The sand is calcareous material that is the remains of marine organisms such as corals, algae and molluscs. The berm may include forested, coastal ridges and may be colonized by hammock vegetation. There are two distinct ridges located on the Snowman property. Beginning at the mean high water line, there is an area of sandy beach followed by a ridge (the first ridge) that levels off approximately 25 feet from the mean high water line. Behind this first ridge is another ridge that levels off approximately 80 feet landward of the mean high water line. This second ridge contains the highest elevation point on Mr. Snowman's property, with the crest of the second ridge corresponding with the 5.9 foot elevation reflected on Respondent's site plan. There is no vegetation on the beach, which is an area of sandy substrate, until the landward downslope of the first ridge, where vegetation in the form of grasses and sea oats appear. Grasses and sea oats extend approximately 30-40 feet landward into the beginning of the second ridge. Behind the grasses and sea oats is woody vegetation, Bay Cedar, and shrubbery typical of beach front property. Also found on the property and landward of the first ridge are sea grape, wild sage, gray nicker pod, and prickly pear cactus. Monroe County considers this first ridge to be the extent of the beach berm complex on the Snowman property. The County identifies the back of the berm on the subject property as measuring 25 feet landward of mean high water and applied the 50 foot setback requirement from that point. The determination of the extent of the beach berm by the County is consistent with the definition of the term "beach berm" contained in Section 9.5-345(3)f, Monroe County Code, and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence presented at the formal hearing. Consequently, it is found that the beach berm complex on the Snowman property extends 25 feet landward of the mean high water mark so that the setback requirement was properly applied when the development order was issued. The Department asserts that the second ridge should be considered to be part of the beach berm. The Department's determination of the extent of the beach berm is bottomed on a more expansive definition of the term "beach berm" derived from its interpretation of various portions of the Monroe County Comprehensive Code. Inexplicably, the Department's interpretation of what should be considered to be included as part of the "beach berm" ignores the definition contained in Section 9.5-345(3)f, Monroe County Code. The Department interprets the term "beach berm" to include not only the initial increase and decrease in elevation near the shoreline, but also those areas of calcareous substrate that form the second ridge and include the highest elevation on the subject property. The Department considers the beach berm to terminate 80 feet from the mean high water line where the elevation of the second ridge decreases and levels off to a more consistent grade. The Department characterizes the first ridge as a primary dune the second ridge as a secondary dune. In support of its position, the Department cites the discussion of beach berms in the Florida Keys contained in Volume I of the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan. That discussion describes a berm in the Keys as the "higher, mostly vegetated dense-like sand ridges." According to the Comprehensive Plan, the biota characteristics of beach systems in the Keys occur in up to four distinct generalized zones or associations, assemblages of plants and animals that have adapted to the environmental conditions of that zone. The zones on Keys beaches are described by Volume I of the Comprehensive Plan as follows: The strand-beach association is dominated by plants that are salt tolerant, root quickly, germinate from seed rapidly, and can withstand wave wash and shifting sand. Commonly found species include Sea Purslane, . . . Beach Grass, . . . Sea Oats, . . . [and] Bay Cedar. On most Keys beaches this association occurs only atthe base of the berm since the beach zone is very narrow. These plants also occupy themost seaward portion of the berm and continuesome distance landward. * * * The next zone, "strand-dune" association,begins with a steep and distinct increase inslope upward from the beach. . . . The bermmay be elevated only several inches or as much as several feet above the level of the beach and may extend landward hundreds of feet as a flat-topped plateau or beach ridge. The foreslope of the berm, or beach ridge, is vegetated primarily by the above-listed species of the beach association. Grasses and herbaceous plants, which serve to stabilize this area, are most common. Proceeding landward, these pioneer species are joined by other species. * * * The strand-scrub association is generallyconsidered a transition zone between strand-dune and hammock forest. Shrubs and occasional trees occur more frequently here and become more abundant as one proceeds landward. Species often found include Seagrape, . . . Wild Sage (Lantana involucrata), [and] Gray Nicker. . . . The most landward zone on the berm is occupied by tropical hardwood hammocks. The term "berm" is identified in the Monroe County comprehensive plan as . . . a mound or ridge of unconsolidated sand that is immediately landward of, and usually parallel to, the shoreline and beach. A berm is higher in elevation than both the beach and the area landward of the berm. * * * The height and width of berms in the Keys is highly variable. They may range in height from slightly above mean high water to more than seven (7) feet above mean sea level. The width of berms in the Keys varies from tens of feet to more than 200 feet. Despite the support the Department found in the Comprehensive Plan for a more stringent setback requirement, the Department is not at liberty to ignore the definition of the term beach berm contained in the land development regulations. While both ridges that exist on the Snowman property may be considered berms or dunes, only the first should be considered a beach berm. The first ridge is ". . . a bare, sandy shoreline with a mound or ridge of unconsolidated sand" within the meaning of Section 9.5-4(B-3), Monroe County Code. The second ridge is above the vegetation line and is not ". . . a bare, sandy shoreline" within the meaning of the definition of beach berm contained in the Monroe County land development regulations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein and denies the appeal filed by the Department of Community Affairs as to building permit number 9330008850 issued by Monroe County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-7165DRI The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 32, and 33 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 9 and 23 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 24, 28, and 31 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 19 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence and as a misconstruction of the cited testimony. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 20, 22, and 34 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 30 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached since the setback is from any portion of the "beach berm complex" and not from any area that may be considered to be turtle nesting habitat. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are summaries of testimony that are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence and contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 and 8 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Sherry A. Spiers, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Nicholas W. Mulick, Esquire 88539 Overseas Highway Tavernier, Florida 33070 Randy Ludacer, Esquire Monroe County Attorney Fleming Street Key West, Florida 33040 Mr. Fred Snowman Post Office Box 771 Islamorada, Florida 33035 Carolyn Dekle, Director South Florida Regional Planning Council Suite 140 3400 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33021 David K. Coburn, Secretary Florida Land & Water Adjudicatory Commission Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Richard M. Moores is President of the Corporation, Daytona Sands, Inc. (SANDS, INC). He has never been a party to these proceedings. SANDS, INC.'s principal asset in 1981 was a forty unit motel which Moores ran on a day to day basis from an office located across the street. International Time-Share Consultants (ITSC) was, in 1981, a corporation in the business of developing and marketing vacation time-share resorts. Its principals were Donald Bentzoni, Kevin Curran, and Howard Shaw. The principals of ITSC are not parties to these proceedings. A real estate broker, Jimmy Townsend, introduced Moores to Bentzoni, Curran, and Shaw. The principals of ITSC negotiated with Moores for sale of its motel by SANDS, INC. and purchase thereof by ITSC, for conversion by ITSC into a vacation time-share resort. On May 8, 1981, SANDS, INC., represented by Moores, entered into an Agreement for Deed (Joint Exhibit 1). Briefly, this Agreement for Deed provided for a single sale of the SANDS, INC. (motel real property) by payment of a fixed price of $1,450,000.00 to SANDS, INC. (principal and President Richard M. Moores.) A complicated payment arrangement was devised and drafted by SANDS, INC.'s attorney with the primary purpose of imposing obligations on ITSC for the protection of SANDS, INC. and to insure at least the payment in a timely manner of the minimum amount negotiated. Twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) was to be paid on or before the signing of the Agreement For Deed; fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) was to be paid at the closing; an additional twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) was due on or before sixty (60) days from the closing date. [The initial $100,000 in payments] Thereafter, $950,000 of the remaining balance of the purchase price to bear interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum and to be payable as follows: $10,000 per month, the first such payment being due on the 90th day from and after the closing date and subsequent payments being due at thirty (30) day intervals thereafter until the $950,000 with interest is paid in full, subject to a thirty (30) day grace period, or (2) 25 percent of the gross amount of all cash received monthly . . . from purchasers as down payments at closing on the sale of time-share interests . . . to be developed by Buyer, plus all amounts received each month by the Buyer as developer of the time-sharing project as payments on promissory notes executed by purchasers [the third party installment contract paper] . . . the first such payment being due on the 90th day from and after the closing date, and subsequent payments being due at 30-day intervals thereafter until the $950,000 with interest is paid in full, subject to a 30-day grace period. (Joint Exhibit 1, Provision I). This translates that SANDS INC. was to be paid either $10,000 per month with the first payment due 90 days after closing or 25 percent of the combination of all cash down payments of third party purchasers and payments received on third party purchasers promissory notes, whichever of the two options was greater. The Agreement For Deed does not utilize the statutory term of art, "non-disturbance agreement" but also set out that after the initial one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) payments were made, SANDS INC. would execute a "covenant not to interfere," as long as sales of time-share units were made out of time-share unit 205 (the old 208-209 motel units). (Joint Exhibit 1, Provision II.) Specifically, the parties agreed that: At date of closing (as per 1(B) above), Seller [Daytona Sands, Inc.] shall execute as to motel units 208 and 209 [the new converted unit 205] an "agreement to release upon sale and closing of sale" in a form mutually agreeable to the parties. Said above described "agreement" shall authorize Buyer to make all desired modifications and upgrading of said rooms in order to appropriately convert the model units as desired of the time-share project. The signing of such an agreement as to those motel units shall also authorize Buyer [ITSC] hereunder to begin marketing the time-share unit weeks as to that motel unit subject to the terms of this Agreement after conversion from a motel unit to a time-share unit. (Joint Exhibit 1, pp. 8-9 Provision IV) Under the Agreement For Deed, sales additionally could be made from units ether than unit 205 (the old 208-209 motel units). SANDS INC. would execute a covenant not to interfere as to those units, provided SANDS INC. first was paid $30,000 as a release price per motel unit and as long as the sales were made in a certain sequence. Specifically, Seller shall likewise sign such above described "agreement to release upon sale and closing of sales" as to additional motel units (above and beyond 208 and 209) upon payment of a release price of $30,000 per motel unit. The parties agree that the sequence of motel units to be subject to the said "agreement" being signed by Seller upon payment of the $30,000 for each unit shall be in the following order: 104, 105, 212, 114 and 115. The signing of such "agreement" as to additional motel units shall likewise authorize Buyer to convert the motel units as above or begin marketing time-share-unit weeks as to those units. Seller, subject to this above sequence, reserves the right to establish which additional motel units, the agreement to release shall relate to from time to time upon payment of the $30,000 per unit price. In interpreting this release clause, each $30,00 reduction in the principal balance due of $950,000 (under paragraph I (D) above) shall entitle Buyer hereunder to have an additional motel unit (of Seller's choosing) subject to the initial agreed upon sequence by the subject for the next "agreement" . . . (Joint Exhibit 1, p. 9 Provision IV). Succinctly, the parties SANDS, INC. and ITSC contemplated that upon payment of each $30,000 increment, a new set of 2 motel rooms would be released (in a certain order) to ITSC by SANDS INC. through an "agreement to release upon sale and closing of sales" for ITSC to convert/renovate and sell time- share units out of. Deposits of third party purchasers' money would be used to meet the minimum increments due SANDS INC. or 25 percent of their gross could be optionally used to pay off ITSC's monetary obligations to SANDS INC. sooner. The Agreement For Deed also permitted ITSC to sell out of non-released units, provided 100 percent of the sale receipts for those units were deposited in escrow: XVI - To clarify the intent of the parties, Buyer, after closing date, shall have a right to market in escrow the time-share estates or interests of rights to use1 whether or not the "agreement" called for in paragraph IV [which provides for the release of a unit in a scheduled sequence followed by the subsequent execution of a "covenant not to interfere"--the non-disturbance clause] above has been executed as to a motel unit. (Joint Exhibit 1, Paragraph XVI page 13). On the side, SANDS, INC. (Moores) was to continue to manage the motel as a motel for a management fee paid from the motel profits pending sequential conversion/renovation of the facility into approximately 20 time-share units from its original 40 motel units. Apparently, everyone involved understood that a "show" or "model unit" would first be sold and then other units would subsequently be converted and marketed sequentially using sales money from previous unit sales. The project was undercapitalized from the beginning. ITSC had insufficient cash flow to meet its obligations to SANDS, INC. and so ITSC assigned its rights and obligations under the Agreement for Deed (Joint Exhibit 1) to Daytona Sands Beach Club. Neither SANDS, INC. nor Richard Moores were a signatory to the Assignment (Joint Exhibit 2). Daytona Sands Beach Club (CLUB) is a corporation organized specifically to fund the time-share project. CLUB's original principals were Donald Bentzoni, Kevin Curran, Howard Shaw, Bill Smith, Gladys Carter, Phyllis Cooper, Dennis Taylor, Dennis Showalter, Walter Foster and Jimmy and Ricky Townsend. With the exception of Jimmy and Ricky Townsend who together purchased a single $10,000 share and Bill Smith who pledged some other real property, each club investor contributed $10,000 so that CLUB was able to make the initial payment to SANDS, INC. On June 24, 1981, SANDS, INC. and CLUB closed with payment to SANDS, INC. of the initial $100,000.000 payment. Some CLUB principals changed over a period of time due to buying and selling of shares but at no time was SANDS INC. or Richard Moores an investor in CLUB. Everyone involved testified that ITSC stayed on as the original marketers for the time-share project pursuant to a contract with CLUB, however there appears to be no witness who has ever seen a formal, written contract between the two entities. Any contract with regard to the sale of real property must be in writing, as must any contract with or between corporate entities, and this one was not. At best, it was, from all the circumstances, an oral de facto contract for personal services of the principals of the ITSC corporation, payable by commission. However, it is also clear from the testimony of Bill Smith that ITSC principals and employees signed on conditional installment sales notes and security agreements with third-party purchasers. Apparently, anyone in CLUB or ITSC signed these contracts. Richard Moores signed none. SANDS, INC. (Moores) continued to manage the motel units. Construction for conversion/renovation to time-share units/weeks by CLUB began June 25, 1981, overseen by Bill Smith for a promised 2 percent of the sales. This "promise" was apparently made by Donald Bentzoni but whether the promise was on behalf of ITSC or CLUB is uncertain. Sales of time-share units/weeks began July 1, 1981. On August 12 or 13, 1981, Richard Moores accompanied Bill Smith, representing CLUB, to open a Sun Bank account for deposit of purchase moneys and paper from third party purchasers (called "escrow account") and an operating account, (called "special" account) but there is no record evidence that Moores was a signatory on any accounts into which monies from installment checks were placed, nor did he sign checks for operating expenses by ITSC or CLUB. Signatories on the so-called "escrow" account were Bill Smith, Howard Shaw, and Walter Foster. Bill Smith was the only signatory on the "special" account. Thereafter, CLUB used the so-called "escrow" account as a collection account until the grace period in which a third party purchaser might cancel a contract had passed, then transferred money (by 2 of the 3 signatures) to the operating account and Bill Smith alone disbursed therefrom to ITSC and others. The bank sent a notice to CLUB after every payment made by a third party purchaser. ITSC forwarded some of these payments to the bank and certainly had access to these notices from the bank to CLUB at least until Donald Bentzoni was terminated in November, 1981. Moores for SANDS, INC. had no access to these notices from the bank. Instead, he received a bank statement which reflected total monies deposited, not the number of installment contracts the bank was holding. CLUB and ITSC provided Moores with copies of each installment sales contract, but no one reported the number of contracts put into the bank account and no one otherwise indicated to Moores the identity of contracts or monies put into the bank account. In the summer and early fall of 1981 Moores had no time-share experience and was actively engaged full-time in running the motel. Because of the initial volume of contracts, numerous cancellations, and sometimes sporadic delivery of the contract copies, Moores piled-up his contract copies as they were delivered and did not maintain a personal day-to-day tally of which weeks or which units were successfully sold and which sales were cancel led within the cancellation period. Delivery of the contract copies to Moores was usually done by Trudy Showalter, bookkeeper for ITSC up until September 1, 1981, or by Bill Smith, a principal and eventually President of CLUB. Delivery was usually daily to either Moores' office or the front desk outside his inner office, but sometimes less frequently. There is no record evidence that Moores ever had anything to do with preparing a public offering statement for the time-sharing project as contemplated by both the Agreement for Deed and Section 721.07, F.S. (1981). Nor is there anything in the record to show Moores ever handled the marketing, talked to prospective third party purchasers, or participated in closings with third party purchasers. His participation in the conversion/renovation appears to have been limited to getting cars moved and cleaning up debris, which activities are reasonably attributable to hi's continued management of the motel. Sales did not meet expectations and internal dissension occurred among the principals of ITSC. Dissent likewise occurred between principals of ITSC and principals of CLUB as early as September, 1981. Sales not meeting expectations, internal conflict among the principals of ITSC, and problems with operating cash flow resulted as early as August, 1981 in Bill Smith becoming involved on a day to day basis with running the time- share project on behalf of CLUB. In September, Bill Smith became President of CLUB. When sales began on July 1, 1981, Bentzoni, Curran, and Shaw, the ITSC principals acting as ITSC, the paid marketers on behalf of CLUB, made the initial decision to sell out of all 20 projected units and not just unit 205. Thereafter, when Moores expressed concern, Donald Bentzoni apparently convinced everyone at ITSC and CLUB that Moores had given him oral permission to sell out of all 20 or at least 10 units not paid for by CLUB and not yet formally released by SANDS INC. On the basis of the published portions of Bentzoni's deposition and Bill Smith's testimony, I find this meeting of Moores and Bentzoni never truly occurred. Not until some time in August, however, did Moores realize that sales out of units other than unit 205 were being made. The undersigned finds this to be so after considering the evidence as a whole. Moores, although a licensed Florida real estate agent, had no previous time-share experience; every principal of ITSC, as well as Bill Smith (with CLUB) and several other CLUB principals did. Bentzoni was running up expenses and rationalizing it due to criticism from ITSC and CLUB principals. Moores had not been involved in active real estate sales for more than a decade. The time-share concept was very new to Florida and the statutory law had not yet congealed. 2/ Moores was off- premises most of the time, and he depended largely on Jimmy Townsend and Bill Smith to keep him informed. Moores apparently made the connection that sales were being made out of sequence just before Trudy Showalter left the project on September 1, 1981 because he then asked her how he could check up to be sure sales would not occur out of order and she explained the use of the inventory board posted in ITSC's offices and her desk inventory sheets. However, as Bill Smith explained, the inventory board intentionally indicated more sales than had actually occurred and indicated sales out of units which had not been sold and which were not being sold out of as part of ITSC's calculated marketing technique to stampede potential third party purchasers into buying on the misrepresentation that "all units are nearly sold out," when few unit-weeks had in fact actually had been sold. The undersigned finds Moores could not be expected to rely on the inventory board. Originally, the CLUB investors were supposed to receive a half-percent per month of gross sales in return for their $10,000 investment but cash flow had dried up. Alternatively, each of the investors was given a week out of unit 205, the only released unit. A non-disturbance drawn by someone associated with CLUB was signed by Moores on September, 17 1981. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) The actions of all concerned are inconsistent with a suggestion that Moores had agreed to allow sales out of other unreleased units for which he had not been paid or a suggestion Moores had agreed to give non-disturbances (or covenants not to interfere) contrary to the provisions of the Agreement for Deed. The initial regulation of time-sharing in Florida was by rules contained in Chapter 2-23, F.A.C., issued on an emergency basis in 1976 by the Florida Attorney General. None of the Respondents, however, was put on notice by the pleadings of any violation of the earlier rules, which, oddly enough, remained in effect until December 29, 1981. There was a lot of dissatisfaction among CLUB investors with Bentzoni starting in early September. Curran left the project in July or August 1981. Shaw subsequently resigned approximately August 20, 1981, critical of the marketing methods. Following an attempted ouster of Bentzoni at a CLUB shareholders meeting, Bill Smith persuaded Bentzoni to leave as marketer approximately November 10, 1981. However, in fact, sales were being made out of sequence. Moores had not been paid the release price per unit. By the end of the first three months of sales, neither CLUB nor ITSC had paid Moores the first $10,000 payment due September 24, 1981 under the Agreement For Deed. Moores objected to the sales out of these other units, but Moores, for SANDS INC., had no other leverage besides foreclosure, and foreclosure would have scuttled the entire project. Over Thanksgiving weekend, Richard Moores, Bill Smith and Jimmy Townsend took a trip by car and listened to a series of instructional tapes on time-sharing. Moores expressed a number of concerns which he had by way of conversation with other people about what was going on with CLUB's time-share project and ITSC's marketing of it. He thereafter spoke to a formal meeting of CLUB shareholders about these same hearsay concerns. He had heard CLUB and ITSC were employing non-licensed sales persons, failing to pay withholding taxes, failing to obtain the necessary withholding and social security numbers, and selling units out of sequence. Moores admits that at this meeting he told CLUB he wanted veto power over any future marketers they hired. There is no indication CLUB voted him this power or that he ever exercised such a veto. Moores checked the Agreement for Deed and realized at that point that Provision XVI provided for sales out of non- released units as long as the units were marketed in escrow. There is conflicting testimony in that Moores says Bill Smith told him he had no standing to object and Bill Smith says that Moores orally authorized continued sales out of 10 unreleased units instead of the total 20 claimed by Bentzoni, but the uncontradicted testimony of Moores and Bill Smith was that Bill Smith never told Moores that the monies were not being escrowed even though Bill Smith had a fair knowledge of time-sharing as far back as July 1981 and knew the statute required either that funds be escrowed or in the alternative that a non-disturbance instrument be issued. Even Bill Smith admits that he told Moores sales out of a lot of improper units had cancelled. During the time Bill Smith was president of CLUB, he knew that sales were being made without the requisite non-disturbance clauses being given. During the time he handled the sales on an interim basis, Bill Smith sold thirty (30) to forty (40) units but did not escrow monies; he did not give non-disturbance instruments; he did not request that Moores give non-disturbance instruments to third party purchasers. There was never a document of equal dignity entered into by SANDS INC. or Richard Moores which would vary the clauses of the Agreement for Deed concerning conditions precedent to be fulfilled by ITSC or its Assignee, CLUB, before non-disturbances would be granted by SANDS, INC. Bill Smith and perhaps some other unnamed persons participated in sales without being licensed to sell real estate in Florida. Some of these persons may have only been bookkeeping or clerical personnel. It is unclear whether they were employed by the principals of ITSC wearing their ITSC "hat" or their CLUB "hat" or by Bill Smith on behalf of CLUB. On December 15, 1981, Bill Smith wrote Richard Moores assuring him CLUB was in full compliance with all Florida Statutes including real estate sales. (Respondent Moore's Exhibit 2). Sometime in late 1981 or early 1982, CLUB entered into an agreement (which was back-dated to August 14, 1981, the date of the first sale to a third party purchaser which had not cancelled) with Smith & Smith through Steven K. Smith. (Joint Exhibits 3 and 4) Thereby, CLUB obtained additional cash financing in exchange for third party purchasers' time-share installment contracts, presumably worth a certain retail value of unit weeks. These were contracts from which the Agreement for Deed had contemplated proceeds going to SANDS, INC. unless escrowed in a separate third party purchaser escrow account. The proceeds from all sales from all unreleased units should have been escrowed by CLUB and had not been. CLUB retained some of the cash provided by Smith & Smith and used some of it to pay toward its indebtedness to SANDS INC. under the Agreement for Deed. Neither Moores nor SANDS, INC. were signatories to any agreement between CLUB and Smith & Smith or Stephen K. Smith. Based upon the testimony of Petitioner's expert accounting witness, Jerry C. Rhodes, no individual escrow accounts for third party purchasers were maintained; no single account or separate books were kept for these monies; no clear records of any income or disbursements from either CLUB's mislabelled "escrow" or "operating" account have been maintained. It is impossible to establish a completed audit trail of the monies taken in by ITSC or CLUB. The project failed and closed down on February 6, 1982, and third party purchasers did not get their accommodations. CLUB filed no request for formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and entered nd appearance before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Indeed, by Order of May 20, 1983, Hearing Officer Pfeiffer denied a Motion to join CLUB in these proceedings. The majority of the money from the CLUB "escrow" account at Sun Bank went to Daytona Sands Marketing Group, but Daytona Sands Marketing Group filed no response to the Order to Show Cause, did not request a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and was not represented at formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation enter a Final Order which: Imposes civil penalties of $10,000 upon International Time-Share Consultants, Inc., a corporation, for the misrepresentation charge and $10,000 for the failure to escrow and account for all monies during its period of involvement charge. Determines all principals of International Time-Share, Inc., are not parties to these formal proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S. Dismisses all charges against Daytona Sands, Inc. a corporation, and determines Richard Moores individually is not a party to these proceedings. Determines Daytona Sands Beach Club is not a party to these formal proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S. Determines Daytona Sands Marketing Group is not a party to these formal proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1985.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Alexander J. Milanick should be required to pay attorney fees and costs in the amount of $4,976.00 to Petitioner Charles Osborne to compensate Petitioner for his defense of an ethics complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Ethics.
Findings Of Fact The Town of Beverly Beach, Florida has a population of about 600 located in Flagler County, Florida. It is about one mile from north to south, and occupies about .4 square miles. It is bounded on the west by the Intracoastal Waterway and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Highway A1A is the main north-south route through the town. Mr. Osborne is an aerospace engineer who served on the Beverly Beach Town Commission from 1997 through March 1999. He was mayor from March 1999 until 2001. He has lived at 2641 Osprey Circle, in Beverly Beach, in a home constructed at that location, since 1995. This residence is closer to the southern boundary of Beverly Beach than to the northern boundary. Dr. Milanick is a dentist who, along with his brother John, and a person named McGee, during times pertinent, owned land immediately north of Beverly Beach. On the property then and currently owned by Dr. Milanick, and east of A1A, is a restaurant named the Shark House. The premises has also been known as Crabby Joe's. In 1995, Dr. Milanick applied to the Town Commission to have his property, and that of his brother, and that of McGee, annexed into the town limits of Beverly Beach. He did this by asking a Mr. Taylor to do what was necessary to cause the annexation to occur. Mr. Taylor thereafter filed a petition with the Town Commission. By Ordinance 95-9-4, the Town Commission, in 1995, assented to the request and it was made effective November 15, 1995. The Ordinance purported to annex the Milanick property into the Town of Beverly Beach and to zone it general commercial. Mr. Osborne was not a member of the Town Commission and was not mayor during this time. The Ordinance, however, was defective in four ways. The Ordinance purported to annex the property into Bunnell, Florida; it was not properly signed by all commissioners; it was not publicly noticed; and it did not provide a legal description of the property. It was not filed with either the Flagler County Clerk of the Court or the Florida Secretary of State. The matter languished until 1997 when Dr. Milanick determined that his property had not in fact been moved within the boundaries of Beverly Beach. Dr. Milanick brought this to the attention of the Town Commission in October 1997. At a Town Commission meeting on December 3, 1997, the Town Attorney stated that he had not had a chance to look into the Milanick and Shark House issue. At a Town Commission meeting on February 4, 1998, Dr. Milanick inquired as to the progress being made on the annexation of his property and was told that the Town Attorney would get with him and discuss the procedure. Subsequently, the Town Attorney, Pat McCormick, suggested that it would be necessary to start the process from the beginning if the land was to be annexed. At a Town Commission meeting on March 4, 1998, Mayor Osborne stated that there was no benefit to the annexation of the Shark House. One member of the Town Commission suggested that they honor past commitments. Dr. Milanick was in attendance at this meeting. At a Town Commission meeting on May 5, 1999, Dr. Milanick and his brother again attended the Town Commission meeting and requested the annexation of their property and discussed the procedure that would be necessary. At a Town Commission meeting on June 2, 1999, a motion was made to go forward with Ordinance 95-9-4 and to amend the official city map and legal description to include the Shark House property. The motion passed but Mayor Osborne vetoed it. During a regular monthly meeting of the Town Commission on July 7, 1999, James Kearn, an attorney retained by Dr. Milanick, who was authorized to act for Dr. Milanick, appeared and requested that the Commission direct the Town Clerk to sign Ordinance 95-9-4 and to forward it to the county and the state in order to determine if the Ordinance was valid. This request was approved by the Town Commission. Mayor Osborne, vetoed the measure. Thereafter, the veto was over-ridden by the Commission. At a Town Commission workshop on July 21, 1999, there was additional discussion regarding the annexation of the Shark House. Mr. Kearn accused Mayor Osborne of discussing the Milanick annexation matter with Sid Crosby, Clerk of the Court of Flagler County. Mayor Osborne denied the charge. The discussion became heated and accusatory and Mayor Osborne threatened to have the sheriff eject Mr. Kearn from the meeting. Subsequent to the action of the Town Commission of July 7, 1999, the Town Clerk, Douglas Courtney, took Ordinance 95-9-4 to Syd Crosby, Clerk of the Court for Flagler County. In a memorandum dated July 26, 1999, Mr. Courtney reported to the Town Commission that Mr. Crosby would not file Ordinance 95-9-4 because it was defective. One of the defects cited was that the instrument purported to annex the land into the City of Bunnell, Florida. No creditable evidence was adduced which indicated that Mayor Osborne visited Syd Crosby for the purpose of preventing the recording of the annexation of Dr. Milanick's property. Mr. Crosby concluded from the beginning that Ordinance 95-9-4 was not recordable. Mayor Osborne suggested some solutions which would permit the annexation, including, re-submission of a proper application. Over a period of time some "glitch" bills were considered which would annex the land. However, none passed. Mr. Kearn attended the Town Commission meeting on February 2, 2000, and the minutes of the meeting noted that he was accompanied by "a person taking notes." Following this meeting, in a February 16, 2000, letter to Dennis Knox Bayer, Town Attorney, Mr. Kearn claimed that Mayor Osborne had a personal vendetta against Dr. Milanick, and that he was exercising dictatorial efforts to prevent citizens to speak at town meetings. He further demanded that ". . . all Town officials, including you as their representative, refrain from saying things that are simply and blatantly false, which only serve to incite Mr. Milanick." At a town meeting on March 1, 2000, Mr. Kearn complained about the annexation not being on the agenda and Mayor Osborne stated that a request for inclusion on the agenda had not been made in writing. Mr. Kearn was permitted to speak for three minutes, he spoke for three minutes, and immediately thereafter Mayor Osborne adjourned the meeting. On or about April 25, 2000, Dr. Milanick and his brother John, filed suit against the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne personally, in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Flagler County. The suit alleged that the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne violated the civil rights of the Milanicks. The suit alleged that Mayor Osborne had a vendetta against Dr. Milanick and should be held personally liable to Dr. Milanick. The Circuit Court dismissed the civil rights count against Mayor Osborne and the town, and this dismissal was affirmed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The Circuit Court also dismissed the mandamus action, finding that the 30- day limitations' period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari applied and that a prima facie case for mandamus had not been established. The Fifth District Court of Appeal, on October 19, 2001, remanded that count to the Circuit Court with directions to grant the petition for mandamus, but upheld the dismissal of the civil rights counts. On January 23, 2003, the Circuit Court entered its Alternative Writ of Mandamus. The Writ incorporated the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint by reference and ordered that the Defendants take whatever steps necessary to sign and record Ordinance 95-9-4. When this occurred, Mr. Osborne was no longer an elected official of Beverly Beach. The Circuit Court complaint filed by Dr. Milanick recited that the recording of the ordinance did not occur because Mayor Osborne conferred with the Clerk of the Court to block recording of the ordinance. The adoption of the matters recited in the complaint as true, by the appellate court, does not make them proven facts because no evidence was taken in the case. The complaint, moreover, alleges actions, such as being tyrannical and peevish, which could not in any event constitute a violation of a person's civil rights. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Osborne took any action, as mayor, because he wished to obtain a personal advantage and does not allege that the annexation of Dr. Milanick's real property would affect Mr. Osborne's real property in terms of value or otherwise. As of the date of the hearing, Dr. Milanick's property had not been annexed into the corporate limits of Beverly Beach. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor, was not helpful in causing the annexation to occur and it is apparent that his relations with Mr. Kearn were not amicable. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor was irascible, intimidating, and controlling. Mr. Osborne believed that the annexation would bring no benefit to Beverly Beach and believed it would, "change the town's character." Mr. Osborne gained nothing directly or personally by preventing, or making difficult, the annexation of Dr. Milanick's land. As an elected official, he was permitted to advance his own ideas with regard to what he believed would be best for Beverly Beach and for himself as a citizen and property owner of Beverly Beach. He could act in this regard so long as he did not secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, as opposed to a general benefit. A letter signed by Mr. Kearn dated July 18, 2003, accompanied by an affidavit signed by Dr. Milanick, requested that the Commission conduct an investigation into the activities of Mr. Osborne during the period when he was the mayor of Beverly Beach. For reasons which become apparent hereafter, this letter, which had the words "Via Airborne Overnight Mail" stamped on its face, will be hereinafter referred to as the "Airborne" letter. The following statements were contained in the "Airborne" letter: Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land into the Town as a general commercial, simply because he personally did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town. He also met with the former Clerk of Court for Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to persuade the Clerk to not record anything regarding the annexation of such land, in order to prevent the completion of the annexation. He thus plainly put his purely personal concerns, ahead of his duties as mayor, and fiduciary duty to the citizens of Beverly Beach. The mayor still refused to oblige the Town's request, or to honor the duly adopted resolution, for his own personal reasons, irrespective of his duties as mayor to the citizens of Beverly Beach.... Even worse, he met with the former Clerk of Circuit Court of Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to attempt to persuade Mr. Crosby to not record any ordinance presented by the Town, annexing the Milanicks' property. Mayor Osborne repeatedly ignored and defied the will of the Town to complete the annexation, to pursue his own personal agenda, i.e., stopping annexation of land as general commercial. The "Airborne" letter then parroted items that indicated that the Circuit Court had found to be true, as follows: Additionally, Mr. Osborne simply does not allow anyone to speak with whom he disagrees, or to address matter that he does not want addressed. Mayor Osborne has... refused to put the Milanicks' matters or requests on the Town Council agenda; taken action regarding the Milanicks' properties, without any notice to the Milanicks, or without knowledge by the Milanicks that such action was being taken against their property, as required by the Town's own law; refused to allow the Milanicks to speak to matters that affect their personal and property interests, once the Town Council had opened discussion regarding the annexation and zoning of the Milanicks' properties; blatantly and willfully misrepresented the Milanicks' positions, actions, and statements at Town meetings, beyond the scope of the privilege normally attendant to a politician's statements at such meeting, in order to defeat the Milanicks' requests, and to harm the Milanicks; refused to honor Ordinances passed by previous Town councils, as detailed above; refused to follow through with completing the annexation approved by previous council members of the Town; worked to undercut the recording of the completion of the signing of the ordinance, and the recording of the ordinance, to complete the annexation, all as detailed above. The matters in paragraph 25, are misleading because they indicate that the Circuit Court found these items to be true when in fact no evidentiary proceedings with regard to these items occurred in the Circuit Court. Moreover, the Complaint alleged several matters which Dr. Milanick either knew to be untrue, or should have known that it was untrue. Specifically, the Complaint alleged that Mayor Osborne "did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town." This allegation implies that he was acting for some personal and specific reason financial reason, as opposed to a general opposition to development. This allegation, had it been true, would have been actionable pursuant to Section 112.313(6) The Complaint also alleged that Mayor Osborne met with Syd Crosby in order to prevent the annexation of the Milanicks' property. This allegation, coupled with the allegation as to a financial interest, bolsters the asserted improper purpose. Based on this Complaint, the Executive Director of the Commission issued a Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate, which was filed with the Commission on September 26, 2003, and assigned Complaint Number 03-091. Investigator Travis Wade of the Commission was directed to conduct a preliminary investigation into whether or not there was probable cause to believe a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, had occurred. That section reads as follows: (6) Misuse of public position.--No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others. This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31. Mr. Osborne learned of the Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate and thereafter retained Robert J. Riggio, of the firm of Riggio & Mitchell, P.A., located in Daytona Beach, as his attorney. Mr. Riggio worked on the case from October 24, 2003, until September 29, 2004. He charged $150 per hour, which is below the customary charge in the Daytona Beach area, and the hourly rate therefore, is reasonable. He expended 33 hours which is reasonable. He expended $180 in costs. These expenditures totaled $4,976 which was billed to Mr. Osborne. He paid the bill. On April 6, 2004, a second letter dated July 18, 2003, was sent to the Commission by Mr. Kearn by facsimile. This will be referred to as the "Fax" letter. This was precipitated by a request to Mr. Kearn from Investigator Wade that he provide a copy of the original letter. The "Fax" letter differed from the "Airborne" letter. In the second paragraph of the "Fax" letter the following sentence appears: "Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land just north of Mr. Osborne's manufactured home . . . ." And in the fourth paragraph of the "Fax" letter, the following sentence appears: "The Mayor objected, because it would serve to annex land as general commercial, just north of his own manufactured home." It further stated that his motivation was ". . . stopping land as commercial near him." Mr. Kearn testified under oath that when Investigator Wade was discussing the case with him, that he, Mr. Kearn, realized the "Fax" letter was a draft that had been sent to Investigator Wade in error. Mr. Kearn said that the "Fax" letter was a draft that had subsequently been edited by Dr. Milanick who knew, July 18, 2003, that Mr. Osborne did not live in a manufactured home located immediately south of the property which was sought to be annexed. Mr. Kearn said that it the "Airborne" letter was supposed to be the operative document. He said that he realized that the "Fax" letter was being used by Investigator Wade when he was talking to him on the telephone on June 8, 2004, and that he advised Investigator Wade of the error. He testified that he made it perfectly clear to Investigator Wade that the "Airborne" letter was the operative document. Investigator Wade's Report of Investigation, however, recites that during the telephone interview of Mr. Kearn, that Mr. Kearn advised him that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property, while he served as mayor and that Mr. Osborne's interest in stopping the annexation was to use his position for his personal benefit. At the hearing, Investigator Wade stated under oath that Mr. Kearn advised him during their telephone conversation that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property while he was serving as mayor. Investigator Wade stated that the issue of whether or not Mr. Osborne lived in the immediate vicinity of the Milanick property was the key element in his investigation because if that were true, stopping the annexation could be a personal benefit to Mr. Osborne. Mr. Wade was a disinterested and credible investigator and witness and his testimony is taken as true and accurate. Mr. Osborne did not live in either a manufactured or mobile home. The type of home he lived in is irrelevant. What is relevant is that Mr. Osborne did not live adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the Milanick property. In fact, Mr. Osborne did not live near the north side of town. He lived closer to the south side of town and it is unlikely that the annexation of the Milanick property would have an economic effect on Mr. Osborne's property. Mr. Kearn was aware of Mr. Osborne's resident address because he had him served with a civil suit at his residence in 2000. Mr. Kearn knew that Mr. Osborne did not live in a mobile home community, or in a manufactured home near the Milanick property, or anywhere near it. Nevertheless, he asserted that to be true when he talked to Investigator Wade. Mr. Kearn is the attorney and agent of Dr. Milanick. Mr. Kearn is, therefore, the alter ego of Dr. Milanick so that the actions of Mr. Kearn, are the actions of Dr. Milanick. The Commission, found in their Public Report, dated September 8, 2004, that Mr. Osborne's opposition to the annexation was not connected to any desire to secure a benefit for himself. The Commission dismissed the Milanick complaint on a finding of "no probable cause."
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter an order requiring Dr. Milanick to pay Mr. Osborne $4,976.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James J. Kearn, Esquire James J. Kearn, P.A. 138 Live Oak Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114-4912 Gary S. Edinger, Esquire 305 Northeast First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Martin A. Pedata, Esquire Martin Pedata, P.A. 505 East New York Avenue, Suite 8 DeLand, Florida 32724 Robert J. Riggio, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 400 South Palmetto Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether Petitioners are "affected persons" entitled to pursue the instant challenge to the City of Miami Beach's Year 2000 Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Section 163.31B4(9), Florida Statutes? If so, whether the City of Miami Beach's Year 2000 Comprehensive Plan is not "in compliance," within the meaning of Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged by Petitioners?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence and the stipulations of the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: City of Miami Beach: An Overview The City of Miami Beach is an incorporated municipality located within the jurisdictional boundaries of Dade County, Florida. It is governed by a seven member City Commission. The City consists of a main island and a number of smaller natural and man-made islands that lie to the east of the Dade County mainland. They are separated from the mainland by Biscayne Bay. To their east is the Atlantic Ocean. The City is now, and has been for some time, virtually fully developed. Less than 2% of the land in the City is vacant. Those parcels that are vacant are generally small in size and they are scattered throughout the City. The City is situated in the most intensely developed area in Dade County. Approximately 100,000 permanent residents live on the City's seven square miles of land area. In addition, the City has a sizable seasonal population Tourism is the backbone of the City's economy. Golf is among the activities visitors to the City are able to enjoy. There are two public 18-hole golf courses and one private 18-hole golf course in the City. The City also has a public 9-hole golf course, hereinafter referred to as the Par 3 Golf Course. Par 3 Golf Course and Surrounding Area The Par 3 Golf Course is owned by the City and leased to the American Golf Corporation, which operates the course. The course consists of nine relatively short holes. The longest of these holes is 180 yards. The shortest is 100 yards. The remaining holes average 150 yards in The course has been completely renovated and is currently in excellent condition. Since the renovation work, the number of players has increased significantly. Nonetheless, the course is still under-utilized. The land upon which the golf course is built is not environmentally sensitive. There are, however, a number of large, mature trees on the property. The Par 3 Golf Course is located on a 25 acre tract of land in the south central part of the City. It is bounded by 28th Street on the north, Dade Boulevard and Collins Canal on the south, Pine Tree Drive on the east, and Prairie Avenue on the west. All of these roadways are classified as "urban" by the Florida Department of Transportation Pine Tree Drive is one of the major north-south thoroughfares in the City. It is part of the Dade County Road System and has been assigned a Level of Service of "D" by the County. That portion of the roadway which borders the golf course has four lanes of through traffic, plus two parking lanes, and is divided by a median strip. The area surrounding the golf course is entirely developed. The development is primarily, but not exclusively, residential in nature. Residential structures are particularly predominant to the north and to the west of the golf course. Among the nonresidential structures found in the immediate vicinity of the golf course are: the Youth Center to the north; the Hebrew Academy's elementary school building, Miami Beach High School, and a City fire station, maintenance yard and fuel facility to the south; and the Fana Holtz Building, a five story building, with a basement parking garage, which currently houses the Hebrew Academy's junior and senior high school program, to the east on the other side of Pine Tree Drive. Parking is inadequate in the area of the golf course. The City is currently investigating ways to alleviate the parking problems in the area. Option to Exchange Property On June 7, 1989, at a regularly scheduled meeting, 1/ the City Commission voted to give the Hebrew Academy, a private educational institution, an option to purchase from the City a 3.87 acre portion of the Par 3 Golf Course located immediately adjacent to and north of the Hebrew Academy's elementary school building, in exchange for the Fana Holtz Building and the land on which it is situated. The Hebrew Academy has plans to construct a new junior and senior high school building, which will be able accommodate more students than the existing facility, on the land it will acquire if it exercises its option. The Hebrew Academy's acquisition of the land and its construction of a building on the site will disrupt the operations of the golf course. In addition, at least some of the large, mature trees that presently stand on the site will have to be removed. The course's third and fourth holes now occupy the land that the Hebrew Academy has been given the option to purchase. The course therefore will have to be redesigned to eliminate or relocate these holes if the Hebrew Academy purchases the land and constructs a building on it. Golfers playing the Par 3 Golf Course generally have the benefit of cool breezes that blow from the southeast. A multistory building situated on the land now occupied by the third and fourth holes will block some of these breezes that golfers playing other holes now enjoy. If the City acquires the Fana Holtz Building, it may move the offices of several City departments into the building. Such a move, coupled with an increase in the size of the Hebrew Academy's enrollment, would create a need for additional parking spaces in an area where parking is already a problem. Petitioners Falk and Miami Beach Homeowners Association Mildred Falk is now, and has been for the past 53 years, a resident of the City of Miami Beach. The Miami Beach Homeowners Association (Association) is a nonprofit organization of Miami Beach homeowners. Its primary purpose is to educate the public concerning matters of local interest in the City. For the past 15 years, Falk has been the President of the Association. Falk does not require formal permission from the Association's Board of Directors to address the City Commission on behalf of the Association. Falk has an understanding with the members of the Board that, if they take a position on an issue that will come before the City Commission, she will represent their collective views at the City Commission meeting in question without being formally requested to do so. Falk regularly appears before the City Commission in her capacity as a representative of the Association. As a general rule, though, she does not expressly state during her presentations that she is representing the Association. She considers it unnecessary to provide such an advisement because the persons she is addressing already know of her role as a spokesperson for the Association. On April 5, 1989, Falk Submitted a completed Lobbyist Registration Form to the City Clerk. On the completed form, Falk indicated that she had been employed by the Association to engage in lobbying activities with respect to a particular item, unrelated to the instant controversy, that was then before the City Commission. On February 5, 1990, Falk submitted another completed Lobbyist Registration Form to the City Clerk. On this completed form, she indicated that she had been employed to lobby with respect to "[a]ll issues that affect Miami Beach before the City Commission, Authorities or Boards." There was no indication on the form, however, as to what person or entity had employed her to engage in such lobbying activity. These are the only completed Lobbyist Registration Forms that Falk has filed with the City Clerk. Adoption of the City's Comprehensive Plan The City Commission considered the matter of the adoption of the City's Year 2000 Comprehensive Plan at public hearings held on September 7, 1989, and September 21, 1989. Notice of these adoption proceedings was published in the "Neighbors" section of the Miami Herald. 2/ The Miami Herald is a newspaper of general paid circulation in Dade County. The "Neighbors" section of the Miami Herald is circulated twice weekly along with other portions of the Herald in the following towns and municipalities: Miami Beach; Bal Harbour; Surfside; Bay Harbor Islands; Golden Beach; North Bay Village; Sunny Isles; and Indian Creek Village. The "Neighbors" section of the Miami Herald is: (a) published at least on a weekly basis; (b) printed in the language most commonly spoken in the area within which it circulates; (c) not a newspaper intended primarily for members of a particular professional or occupational group; (d) not a newspaper whose primary function is to carry legal notices; and (e) not given away primarily to distribute advertising. At the close of the public hearing held on September 21, 1989, the City Commission unanimously passed Ordinance No. 89-2664 adopting the City's Year 2000 Plan. On the future land use map (FLUM), adopted by the City Commission as part of the plan, that portion of the Par 3 Golf Course which the Hebrew Academy has the option to purchase is designated PFE (Public Facility- Educational). The property that the City will receive if the Hebrew Academy exercises its option has a land use designation of PF (Public Facility- Fire, Police, Other) on the FLUM. Policy l.2q. of the plan's future land use element contains the following discussion concerning the land use designation of these parcels of property: On June 7, 1989, the City Commission approved an option with the Hebrew Academy to exchanged [sic] private land for a portion of the Par 3 Golf Course. At the exercise of the option, the affected portion of the Par 3 Golf Course shall automatically be designated as Public Facilities [sic]- Educational. The property that the City will obtain will be designated as Public Facility- Other. 3/ During the public hearings that culminated in the City Commission's adoption of the City's Year 2000 Comprehensive Plan, Falk made oral presentations to the City Commission. She criticized the decision that had been made to allow the Hebrew Academy to purchase, at its option, the "affected portion of the Par 3 Golf Course" referenced in Policy 1.2q. of the plan's future land use element. It was her contention that, in accordance with a restrictive covenant entered into between the City, the Alton Beach Realty Company and the Miami Beach Improvement Company on June 17, 1930, the City was prohibited from allowing any portion of the land on which the golf course was built "to be used for any purpose whatsoever, other than for a golf course and/or golf links." At no time during her remarks did she contend that the plan ultimately adopted by the City Commission was contrary to any requirements dealing with the subject of urban sprawl. Nor did she argue that the notice of the adoption hearings that the City had provided was in any way deficient or inadequate. Falk did not identify herself at the adoption hearings as a representative of the Association. 4/ Nonetheless, in presenting her remarks to the City Commission, she was expressing not only her own views, but those of the Association as well. Prior to these hearings, she had informally polled the members of the Association's Board of Directors and they had each indicated to her that they opposed the "land swap" between the City and the Hebrew Academy. While they did not formally request that she appear before the City Commission to voice their concerns, it is not their standard practice to issue such requests. Neither Falk nor the Association submitted any written comments concerning the City's Year 2000 Comprehensive Plan during the City's review and adoption proceedings Urban Sprawl In November, 1989, the Department of Community Affairs published a Technical Memorandum (Volume IV, Number 4) which was designed "to help local governments and interested parties understand the requirements for discouraging urban sprawl that must be met to comply with Florida's planning requirements." The memorandum defines "urban sprawl" a- "scattered, untimely, poorly planned urban development that occurs in urban fringe and rural areas and frequently invades lands important for environmental and natural resource protection." According to the memorandum, "urban sprawl typically manifests itself in one or more of the following inefficient land use patterns: (1) leapfrog development; (2) ribbon or strip development; and (3) large expanses of low- density, single-dimensional development." These land use patterns are described in the memorandum as follows: Leap frog development occurs when new development is sited away from an existing urban area, bypassing vacant parcels located in or closer to the urban area that are suitable for development. It typically results in scattered, discontinuous growth patterns in rural areas which are frequently not appropriate for urban development * * * Strip or ribbon development involves the location of high amounts of commercial, retail, office and often multi-family residential development in a linear pattern along both sides of major arterial roadways. * * * Low-density, Single-dimensional development consists of single land uses, typically low-density residential, spread over large land areas. Frequently, the land is in rural, forestry, agricultural, or environmentally sensitive areas should be protected from urban development. The memorandum's description of "urban sprawl" is consistent with the definition most commonly employed by professional planners. In order to ascertain whether development meets the definition of "urban sprawl" used by the Department, it is necessary to determine whether the area involved is "rural" or on the "urban fringe." The memorandum suggests that such a determination may be based upon the area's population density. According to the memorandum, areas should be classified as follows based upon their population densities per square mile: Density Classification 0-200 Rural 201-500 Exurban 501-1000 Suburban 1001-2000 Medium [Urban] Density 2001-5000 High [Urban] Density 5000+ Highest Urban Density Among the techniques recommended in the memorandum to curb "urban sprawl" is "[p]romoting urban infill development and redevelopment." The construction of a multistory building on the Par 3 Golf Course and the conversion of the Fana Holtz Building to government use would not constitute any of the three types of development that the Department has indicated in its memorandum are characteristic of "urban sprawl." Rather, these activities would be in the nature of "infill development and redevelopment" inasmuch as they would occur, not in a "rural area" or on the "urban fringe," as those terms are used in the memorandum, 5/ but rather in the heart of an area of the "highest urban density."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs issue a final order in the instant case declining to find the City of Miami Beach's Year 2000 Comprehensive Plan not "in compliance" on the grounds urged by Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of August, 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13 day of August, 1990.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent committed violations alleged in an Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school psychologist. At all times material to this case, Respondent was a member of the Classroom Teachers Association (CTA) Bargaining Unit. At all times material to this case, Respondent was receiving benefits under a valid claim for Workers' Compensation benefits arising from an accident on January 7, 2000. In conjunction with investigations as to Respondent's eligibility for Workers' Compensation benefits, video surveillance of Respondent's activities was conducted on several occasions. At the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year, Dr. Laakso worked for Petitioner as a school psychologist in Area 3, and was assigned to Palm Beach Lakes High School, Forest Hill High School, and Conniston Middle School. His immediate supervisor was Mary Kate Boyle, the Area 3 Exceptional Student Education (ESE) Team Leader. On January 7, 2000, Dr. Laakso was working in his car while parked in the Palm Beach Lakes High School parking lot, and when exiting the car, hit his head on the door jamb causing a compression of his spine. He then received a second injury to his back while pulling psychological testing kits out of his car. Dr. Laakso submitted this injury to Petitioner as a workers' compensation injury, and it was covered as such. Christopher Brown, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon and one of Dr. Laakso's workers' compensation physicians, treated Dr. Laakso. On February 8, 2000, Dr. Brown placed Dr. Laakso on a "no-work" status. Dr. Laakso suffers from cervical spinal stenosis, which is a narrowing of the spinal canal. Because Dr. Laakso had underlying spinal stenosis secondary to arthritis, combined with disc herniations, his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Brown, diagnosed Dr. Laakso's stenosis as severe. Also on February 8, 2000, Ms. Boyle held an investigative meeting with Respondent and his then-attorney, Stephen Fried, to discuss Respondent's continued absences since January 7, 2000 (the date of Respondent's workers' compensation injury) and his work status. In a letter to Dr. Laakso dated February 9, 2000, Ms. Boyle explained what her expectations were with regard to Respondent's absence and work status. On February 9, 2000, Dr. Laakso requested unpaid sick leave for January 11, 2000 to May 31, 2000, which the School Board granted. In March of 2000, Dr. Laakso was released back to light duty work, with restrictions. Some of the physical restrictions placed on Dr. Laakso's activities included no overhead use of the right upper extremity and no heavy use of the right upper extremity greater than 5 pounds. In addition, Dr. Laakso was told to be careful and to try not to hurt himself. Dr. Brown also imposed a 10 mile driving restriction on Dr. Laakso because Dr. Brown believed Dr. Laakso's spinal stenosis placed him at increased risk if he hit his head or was in a car accident. Dr. Laakso argued against the driving restriction because he was capable of driving and believed that the restriction would "mess things up" if he was unable to use his car. Dr. Laakso neither asked for the driving restriction nor represented that he needed the restriction.4 Dr. Laakso conveyed the driving restrictions to both Ms. Boyle and Linda Meyers in Risk Management. On March 21, 2000, Dr. Laakso was given a light duty placement in which he was assigned to Atlantic High School watching the school's security cameras. This assignment was for Dr. Laakso's regularly scheduled 7.5 hours a day, and was within the physical and driving restrictions imposed by Dr. Brown. While on light duty assignment at Atlantic High School, Dr. Laakso reported to Assistant Principal, Marshall Bellin. Dr. Laakso also submitted his time sheets to Mr. Bellin for Mr. Bellin's verification and signature. After Mr. Bellin signed the light duty time sheets, Dr. Laakso faxed them to Ms. Boyle for payroll purposes. Around this time period, in approximately April of 2000, the third party administrator, FARA, who handles the School Board's Workers' Compensation claims, hired private investigator Richard Mains to conduct surveillance of Dr. Laakso. Mains observed Dr. Laakso at various times from April 3, 2000 through October 2, 2000. Mains documented Respondent's driving to and from his Matlacha home and the activities in which he engaged while there. Mains did not know whether Dr. Laakso was taking pain or anti-inflammatory medication, or whether Dr. Laakso was under the influence of these types of medications at the times Mains observed him. On May 17, 2000, Ms. Boyle held another investigative meeting regarding Respondent's absences while on light duty. The minutes from that meeting indicate that Ms. Boyle expressed her concern to Dr. Laakso regarding his absences, discussed his light duty assignment at Atlantic High School, and directed him to call her beeper if he was going to be absent. He was also directed to provide a doctor's note if he was absent. Dr. Laakso remained in the light duty assignment at Atlantic High School for the remainder of the 1999-2000 school year. On Wednesday, August 9, 2000, the first day of the 2000-2001 school year, Dr. Laakso again reported to Atlantic High School to resume his light duty placement. On August 15, 2000, Marshall Bellin signed Respondent's light duty sign-in sheet, which covered Dr. Laakso's work attendance for August 9, 10, 11, and 14, 2000. Around August 14 or 15, 2000, Dr. Laakso received verbal notification that because his driving restriction had been lifted, he was being taken off light duty assignment and was to report to Area 3. Prior to this verbal notification, Dr. Laakso had not been advised by his physicians that his driving restriction had been lifted. However, he subsequently learned through someone at the Risk Management Department that, in fact, the driving restriction had been lifted. Upon hearing the news, Dr. Laakso contacted Dr. Brown. When he went to see Dr. Brown, Dr. Brown explained to Respondent that the Board had sent him a questionnaire asking whether he believed that Dr. Laakso could drive a car as opposed to whether he should drive a car. Dr. Brown further explained that he responded that Dr. Laakso could drive a car, but felt he had made a mistake as he felt it was still dangerous for Dr. Laakso to drive. Accordingly, on August 17, 2000, Dr. Brown reinstated Dr. Laakso's driving restriction of no more than 10 minutes. On August 17, 2000, Dr. Laakso sent a memo to Ms. Boyle indicating that his driving restriction had been reinstated. A copy of the note from Dr. Brown was attached to this memo. Because of her continuing concern regarding Respondent's absences, on October 2, 2000, Ms. Boyle held another "investigative meeting" regarding Dr. Laakso's absences. This meeting resulted in Boyle's issuing Dr. Laakso a written reprimand for unacceptable and unexcused absences, failure to call in intended absences as required, and insubordination. The written reprimand specifically addressed Dr. Laakso's absences on August 9, 10, 11, 22, and September 20, 27, 28, and 29. Ms. Boyle believed her issuance of the written reprimand dated October 2, 2000, was consistent with the progressive discipline policy. At the time that Ms. Boyle wrote the reprimand, she also notified the District's Professional Standards Department and requested a formal investigation of Respondent's absences. Ms. Boyle then contacted Ray Miller in Professional Standards to be sure that she was following appropriate procedure. In October of 2000, Ray Miller received Respondent's case for investigation, and the investigation was assigned case number 101. Specifically, Miller investigated allegations involving Respondent's misuse of leave, unauthorized absence, failure to call in and report absences as required, and insubordination for the time period of January 2000 through December 2000. At the time of his interview with Respondent, Miller had a surveillance video and a report of Respondent's activities for April of 2000. Respondent neither denied that he was the subject of the video nor that he failed to report and call in his absences. Shortly before December 4, 2000, Miller signed off on the investigative report for case number 101, and on December 4, 2000, Paul Lachance issued a letter to Dr. Laakso indicating that the investigation was complete, and that a determination of probable cause had been made. The investigative report was then reviewed by the Case Management Review Committee to determine whether there was just cause to recommend discipline and, if so, provide a discipline recommendation. The Committee found just cause and recommended Dr. Laakso's termination. A number of meetings were held in December 2000 with representatives of Petitioner, Dr. Laakso, and his then- attorney, Mr. Fried. As a result of these meetings, an informal settlement was reached; Dr. Laakso's employment was not terminated, but rather he was transferred to the Area 1 ESE office. By a letter to the file dated January 8, 2001, Paul Lachance, Director of Professional Standards, administratively closed case number 01-101 against Dr. Laakso with "no action." While assigned to Area 1, Dr. Laakso was under the supervision of Area 1 ESE Team Leader, Paul Sayrs. As supervisor, Mr. Sayrs was responsible for keeping track of Respondent's attendance. Accordingly, Sayrs directed Respondent to call and notify secretary Judy Fabris if he was going to be absent, who in turn would notify Mr. Sayrs. While assigned to Area 1, Dr. Laakso missed work for several days in January and February 2001, and was also out for most of March and April 2001. On April 4, 2001, Mr. Sayrs sent Dr. Laakso a letter listing the dates of his absences and directing him to submit a doctor's note for the dates listed, as well as for any future absences. The next day, April 5, 2001, Mr. Sayrs sent another letter to Dr. Laakso advising him he was currently absent without approved leave. Mr. Sayrs advised Respondent further that due to an absence of correspondence from Respondent, Mr. Sayrs would assume Respondent had decided to discontinue working for Petitioner and Respondent's name would be submitted to the School Board for acceptance of Respondent's resignation. Dr. Laakso immediately contacted Dr. Sachs regarding Mr. Sayrs' request for medical documentation, but was unable to get an appointment with Dr. Sachs until April 20th. However, prior to his April 20th appointment, Dr. Laakso forwarded to Dr. Sachs a copy of the District's letter, which indicated he would be terminated if he did not provide the requested documentation prior to his appointment on April 20th. In response, Dr. Sachs accounted for Dr. Laakso's absences, noting they were due to his symptoms and cervical condition. Additionally, Dr. Laakso followed through by faxing his Request for Leave of Absence without Pay form with his signature, dated April 18, 2001, directly to Dr. Sachs for his signature. The leave was ultimately granted retroactive to March 8, 2001, prior to Dr. Laakso's being terminated by the District. On April 18, 2001, Dr. Laakso sent a handwritten note to Dan McGrath explaining his absences. Dr. Laakso attached to his note to Mr. McGrath two documents from Dr. Sachs, one dated April 15, 2001, and the other dated April 6, 2000. On May 18, 2001, Paul Sayrs evaluated Dr. Laakso's performance. The evaluation sheet indicated that Dr. Laakso was "presently on a medical leave of absence." Dr. Laakso has a second home in Matlacha, located on the other side of Cape Coral. Matlacha is located in the Fort Myers area and is approximately 150 miles from the West Palm Beach area, roughly a three-hour trip using country roads. Because he had not been feeling well, Dr. Laakso had not been taking care of his property in Matlacha. As a result, he received notices from the county telling him he needed to clear up the property or face a potential daily fine of $225. Specifically, the county informed Dr. Laakso that he needed to mow the grass, move a boat, register a pickup truck, and park the truck somewhere where it was not in open view. He asked for an extension in which to do these things, which was granted. However, the county advised Dr. Laakso that if he did not get the work done by the date established, the daily fine would be imposed. Although while at his Matlacha home Dr. Laakso did work outside of the restrictions imposed on him by his physician, he could work for 20 or 30 minutes and then go inside and rest, unlike when he was at work for the School Board, which required he work a full eight-hour day. While he was on his Matlacha property, he continued his daily swimming as part of his physical therapy, which he had discussed with, and received approval for, from Dr. Brown. At no time did Dr. Laakso attempt to hide the fact that he drove to the Matlacha property or that he worked in his yard while there. In fact, he disclosed this information when deposed in his workers' compensation case, and he discussed it with his doctor. While the doctor did not give Dr. Laakso permission for this type of conduct, Dr. Laakso did discuss it with him.5 Following the closing of the first investigation numbered 101, the office of Professional Standards received a memo from Diane Howard, Director of Risk Management, dated January 9, 2001. Ms. Howard was requesting a reinvestigation of Dr. Laakso's absences. In response to this memo, Miller did not interview Respondent, but instead viewed surveillance videotapes from August 11 through October 1 or 2, 2000. In addition to the videos, Miller reviewed memos from Nancy Patrick, Mary Kate Boyle, and Paul Sayrs. Miller testified that the difference between this investigation and the previous one was that it involved a different period of time, both for the videos and regarding issues of Respondent's attendance in January, February, and March of 2001. The allegations against Respondent for this investigation were that he was obtaining leave due to sickness or illness and that he was performing actions that were inconsistent with his alleged illness or sickness. This second investigation followed the same pattern as the first and was sent to the Committee for review. The Committee again recommended Dr. Laakso's termination. Dr. Laakso timely requested an administrative hearing, and these proceedings followed. The collective bargaining agreement describes procedures for discipline of employees, including this: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. The collective bargaining agreement also requires progressive discipline (reprimand through dismissal) . . . [e]xcept in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the district or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered in this case dismissing all charges in the Administrative Compliant, reinstating Respondent to his position of employment with the School Board, and providing Respondent with such back pay and attendant benefits as are authorized by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2003.
The Issue Whether respondent's registered building contractor's license should be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined based on allegations he violated (1) Section 489.129(1)(c), Florida Statutes, in that he violated a provision of Chapter 455, Florida Statutes; (2) Section 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes, in that he acted in the capacity of a contractor under a name other than on his registration; and (3) Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes, in that he failed, in two material respects, to comply with the provisions of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, respondent was licensed by the Construction Industry Licensing Board as a registered building contractor, having been issued a license number RR 0007671. He was not, however, licensed as a roofing contractor. Neither did he, at any time, qualify Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., with the Construction Industry Licensing Board. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 1). In 1968, respondent was issued a limited general contractor's license by Palm Beach County, Florida, under which he was authorized to install roofs only on structures which he constructed; he was not authorized to re-roof existing roofs. He has continuously renewed this local license, from 1968 to the present. On November 26, 1979, he qualified Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., with the Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board, which qualifications he has maintained to the present time. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 5). At all times material hereto, he held no other certificates of competency issued by Palm Beach County, Florida. At all times material hereto, he was the only qualifier for Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc. ( See Petitioner's Exhibit 5). On or about May 5, 1980, he signed and submitted a notarized letter of authorization to the Palm Beach County Building Department. By this letter, he authorized Linda DeVito, his daughter, to obtain local building permits in the name of Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., and accepted liability for all acts performed under the permits. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 6). On or about May 29, 1980, Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., contracted with Mr. and Mrs. Garrett McLaughlin to remove and replace the existing roof over the carport and entry-way of the McLaughlin's home, and waterproof the entire roof. The house is located at 2041 Upland Road, West Palm Beach, Florida. The contract was signed by an employee of the respondent, and contained a five-year warranty on the work performed by Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc. The contract price was $2,532.00. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 8). On or about June 16, 1980, Linda DeVito, as the authorized agent for Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., applied for a county building permit to perform the roofing work on the McLaughlins' home. Based on her application, a county building permit, number 80-14711, was issued to Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc. (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 7). This permit was issued based on respondent's letter of authorization, dated March 5, 1980, which was on file with the Palm Beach County Building Department. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 6 and 7). In or about August 1980, Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., completed the re-roofing work on the McLaughlins' home, without subcontracting it. Between May 29, 1980, and July 29, 1980, Mrs. McLaughlin paid Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., $2,532.00--the full contract price. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 10). A few weeks after the roofing work was completed, Mrs. McLaughlin checked the roof and discovered that the coating had not completely covered it. There were openings where stones were showing. She became concerned and called Gust Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc. She was told not to worry because the work was covered by a five-year warranty. During 1981, weeds began to grow on the McLaughlins' roof. In May or June of 1982, Mrs. McLaughlin called respondent to complain about the roof's condition. He told her that he had gotten out of the business before the work on the McLaughlins' home was completed, and that a company on Lake Avenue in West Palm Beach, Florida, had done the work on her home. He told her that he would call her back with further information, but never did. When respondent did not call back with further information, Mrs. McLaughlin checked the phone book and decided that respondent must have been referring to a company called Florida Exteriors. She called that company and was told that they would honor her warranty. But the roof on Mrs. McLaughlin's home was never repaired, even though the roof leaked where boards had been replaced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's contractor's license be suspended for six months, and that he be administratively fined $1000. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie A. Daniel, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gus Schmidt 602 North "A" Street Lake Worth, Florida 33460 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
