Findings Of Fact Petitioner Anna Holden is a forty-five year old white woman whose first marriage ended in divorce, after fifteen years, in January of 1973. Petitioner's youngest child, a son, lives with her in Gainesville, Florida. Petitioner works forty hours a week for the Alachua County Health Department. Intervenor Samuel Washington, petitioner's intended, is a twenty-seven year old black man who has never been married. He has, however, fathered an illegitimate daughter, who is now eight years old and lives with her mother and four siblings in Largo, Florida. Intervenor has never supported his daughter or sought to obtain custody. He is presently incarcerated at Florida State Prison, a maximum security facility, as punishment for aggravated sexual battery of a woman in June of 1976. His presumptive release date is in March of 1981. Intervenor has previously been convicted of breaking and entering and of aggravated assault on another woman. Ms. Holden and Mr. Washington met each other in early 1976, and began living together in March of 1976. They were living together at the time of the offense for which he is now imprisoned. Petitioner testified that she considered intervenor and herself husband and wife and that they both wore wedding rings. They have never been legally married to each other. After they had known each other four months, he proposed marriage to her, and they are now engaged to be married. For the past three or four summers, petitioner has spent vacations with intervenor's daughter. Petitioner and the daughter have also spent weekends together and gone together to visit the child's father. Petitioner has investigated day care centers and looks forward to making a home for intervenor and his daughter, upon his release from prison. Petitioner testified that she and intervenor love each other, and that she and intervenor's daughter love each other; she wants to give him a "link back to home and . . . something to work for." (T. 15). Petitioner visits intervenor weekly. She has the same visiting privileges respondent grants spouses of inmates. Respondent does not allow conjugal visits. Petitioner's visits to intervenor are spent on a portion of the prison grounds known as the visiting park. Ordinarily, 25 to 30 prisoners receive visitors between the hours of nine o'clock in the morning and three o'clock in the afternoon on visiting days. During visits, people stand around in groups or sit on benches. A notary public could effect the civil marriage between an inmate and a visitor inconspicuously during visiting hours, without creating a security problem. (Testimony of Councilman, T. 79) Bill Councilman, respondent's chaplaincy services coordinator, testified as an expert in religious and marriage counseling, without objection. In general, in his opinion, marriage has very few benefits in an institutional environment. Prison tends to destroy previously existing marriages. The incarcerated husband is likely to suffer a "castration complex," in general, in his opinion: Either his wife gets along fine without him, so that he feels unneeded, or she does not do well without him, in which case he is helpless to do anything about it. In general, according to the Rev. Mr. Councilman, marriage creates false hopes, causes an inmate husband anxiety, makes him consider trying to escape, and results in conflict between the inmate and prison guards and between the inmate and fellow prisoners who pry into his personal affairs. While "there may be an occasional experience where there would be benefits gained" (T. 51), the consequences of marriage would be adverse for intervenor, in the opinion of the Rev. Mr. Councilman, and the prognosis for a successful marriage is poor. Although he does not know the petitioner or the intervenor personally, he has read the intervenor's file, which includes a personal history and the results of certain psychological tests (which were not specifically designed to predict success in marriage). The file itself was not offered in evidence. David A. Schriemer, a mental health coordinator in respondent's employ testified as an expert in psychology and mental health, without objection. In his opinion, marriage by an inmate does not secure the presumptive benefits of marriage and is generally inadvisable. Any increase in the inmate's self esteem is likely to be short-lived, giving way to fear, suspicion and depression. Depression can result in aggression, hostility, a high level of anxiety, and escape attempts. Mr. Schriemer does not know the petitioner or the intervenor personally, but he has read the intervenor's file and concluded that intervenor's case is "a stereotypical example . . . in a predictive sense." (T. 100) In all likelihood, according to Mr. Schriemer, intervenor's marriage to petitioner would fail and have adverse consequences for the intervenor. Ronald B. Jones, director of respondent's adult services program office, testified as an expert in prison administration, without objection. He is opposed to petitioner's marrying intervenor because of the difference in age and "the abnormal situations that are created by marriage" such as "[s]tress factors" (T. 112); because when intervenor arrived at respondent's Reception and Medical Center, "he claimed [petitioner] as his legal wife . . . [to gain] faster visiting privileges" (T. 111); because the petitioner and the intervenor knew each other only briefly before his incarceration; because the ceremony itself would add little to the existing relationship; and finally, because "marriage in and of itself is not a fundamental right" (T. 112) so that it falls to respondent "to determine what is reasonable and responsible." (T. 113) Messrs. Councilman, Schriemer and Jones all share the view that no inmate should be permitted to marry except in order to legitimize a child; or in the event of a pregnancy where both the inmate and the proposed spouse acknowledge that they are the expectant parents; or where an inmate participates in a community release or furlough program and has a definite release date less than one year off. These exceptions to a general prohibition reflect respondent's current practice and were embodied in proposed Rule 33-3.13, Florida Administrative Code, which has been declared invalid. Andrew J. Roseman et al. v. State of Florida Department of Corrections, No. 79-1972R (Final order entered Feb. 4, 1980) appeal pending sub nom. State of Florida, Department of Corrections v. Andrew J. Roseman et al., No. UU-0192 (Fla. 1st DCA; notice of appeal filed March 6, 1980). Respondent has not attempted to promulgate any other administrative rule governing the marriage of inmates. Whatever the validity of respondent's employees' views as to the psychological transformation marriage may work in inmates generally, the weight of the evidence in the present case supports Mr. Jones' view, when he testified that, "the situation won't change [by virtue of petitioner's marriage to intervenor, except legally. Intervenor is] not going to do anything any different tomorrow [if married] than he would today [unmarried]: (T. 120). the ceremony would effect a change in legal status only. Petitioner would have her "total commitment . . . on paper" (T. 19), but, aside from this legalistic change, life would go on in the same way for intervenor inside and for petitioner outside the prison walls. Prospects for intervenor's rehabilitation would neither be enhanced nor diminished by his marriage to petitioner. Petitioner has offered to pay any costs that the marriage might entail. The parties' proposed findings of fact have been considered and adopted except to the extent that they have been deemed irrelevant or unsupported by competent evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent permit petitioner to marry intervenor within fifteen days of entry of the final order is this matter, at such time and place as respondent shall specify. That respondent bill petitioner for medical tests and other costs it may reasonably incur incident to the marriage. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 COPY FURNISHED: Diana B. McPherson, Esq. 309 N.W. First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Gerald B. Curington, Esq. Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1501 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard A. Belz, Esq. 2614 S.W. 34th Street Gainesville, Florida 32608 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
The Issue Whether respondent's license to practice optometry should be disciplined on charges that he failed to comply with, or violated, a lawful order of the Board of Optometry.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, respondent was licensed as an optometrist, having been issued license number 0001338 by the Board of Optometry (P1, P2). On January 28, 1981, a Final Order was entered by the Board of Optometry which applied to respondent and his license to practice optometry. The Final Order, which resulted from a disciplinary proceeding against respondent, provided in pertinent part: That Respondent's license be suspended for a period of three months, to be served from February 5, 1981 to May 4, 1981, or immediately upon the lifting of any stay or other intervening legal process. During the period of suspension the Respondent may not hold himself out as an optometrist or practice optometry. That Respondent pay a fine of $500.00 for each count of the Administrative Complaint, for a total of $2500.00 to be paid as ordered in the imposition of probation on the Respondent. That the Respondent serve a period of probation of three years, which shall commence on May 5, 1981, or three months after the lifting of any stay or other intervening legal process. The terms of the probations shall be as follows: The Respondent shall obey all laws and regulations of the State of Florida. The Respondent shall inform the Board of any change of his address, including his residence address and all locations at which he practices optometry. The Respondent shall appear before the Board to report on his activities in six months and semiannually thereafter. The Board shall give the Respondent notice of those meetings held at or near Miami, Florida at which the Respondent should appear. The Respondent shall pay the fine of $2500.00 imposed by February 5, 1982, or one year after the lifting of any stay or other intervening legal process. (e.s.) Respondent appealed this Final Order to the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida, which upheld the order. Respondent then filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied by order of the Court, dated January 13, 1982. On January 21, 1982, respondent filed a motion for stay with the Florida Supreme Court, which motion was later withdrawn. (Testimony of Gardner, P-5, R-1, R-3). By letter dated January 22, 1982, respondent asked for permission to appear before the Board of Optometry on February 6 and 7, 1982, and further requested that the order, which he had unsuccessfully appealed, be stayed pending his appearance. When he appeared before the Board of Optometry on February 6, 1982, asking for a less severe penalty, the Board's attorney advised that due process had transpired and that the Board had no further jurisdiction to reopen the case. The Board took no action. (Testimony of Gardner, R-1, R-3) Under the Board's Final Order, respondent's license to practice optometry was effectively suspended from January 28, 1982 (15 days after the Third District's denial of his petition for rehearing), until April 28, 1982. This suspension commenced immediately upon the completion or lifting of all intervening legal processes. Under Rule 9.340, Florida Rules of Appellate procedure, that event took place 15 days from the Court's order denying rehearing. (Testimony of Gardner, P-2, R-1, R-3) Under paragraph 3.d) of the Final Order, the $2,500 fine became due and payable on January 28, 1983, one year after the lifting of any stay or the completion of the intervening legal process. Respondent, however, failed to pay the fine by January 28, 1983. (Testimony of Gardner, P-2, P-3) On or about March 8, 1983, Mildred Gardner, Executive Director for the Board of Optometry, sent a "bill" to respondent indicating that the payment of respondent's fine was past due. (Testimony of Gardner, P-4) On or about March 22, 1983, respondent paid, by check, the $2,500 fine to the Board of Optometry. The check was subsequently cashed by the Board without express reservation or protest. (Testimony of Gardner, respondent, P-3)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent be administratively fined $500 for violating Section 463.016(1)(s), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R.L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1983.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at the Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. In accordance with plea arrangements, Petitioner was convicted of numerous charges of robbery, burglary, sexual battery, and false imprisonment in Circuit Courts in Dade and Broward Counties, Florida. He received numerous and various prison sentences, all of which were to run concurrently with a 99- year sentence. Assuming that Petitioner is eligible for statutory gain time for good behavior, his sentence would expire sometime prior to the year 2080. During July, 1981, Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of establishing a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under Parole and Probation Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the severity of the offense committed by the Petitioner, calculate a "salient factor score" and apply various aggravating or mitigating circumstances in determining a recommended PPRD. The examiner classified the offense as "greatest (most serious III);" determined a salient factor score of nine based upon prior convictions, total time served, the existence of burglary as a present offense of conviction, the number of prior incarcerations, and the Petitioner's age of first commitment; and applied numerous aggravating circumstances based upon the nature of various of the charges that had been lodged against Petitioner. The examiner recommended a PPRD of March 4, 2092. On August 26, 1981, the Parole and Probation Commission considered the examiner's recommendation and affirmed it. Petitioner is now pursuing a review of the PPRD before the Commission. In promulgating the rules which were in effect when Petitioner'S PPRD was determined, the Parole and Probation Commission sought to isolate factors that would predict the probability of a successful parole outcome. There is no perfect predictive device on a case-by-case basis. An inmate's past behavior and statistical relationships that can be isolated provide the best predictive devices. The Commission's C utilization of a system which first classifies the offense characteristics, then applies a salient factor score and aggravating or mitigating circumstances is designed to set a presumptive parole release date based on an inmate's past behavior and based upon the statistical relationships that have been found to exist. The evidence does not establish that the guidelines adopted by the Commission in its rules which were applied to the Petitioner are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The Parole and Probation Commission has amended the rules which were followed in the setting of the Petitioner's PPRD. The Petitioner continues to be affected, however, by the rules as they existed prior to the amendments because those rules provide the basis for his PPRD.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by engaging in unsolicited and unwanted sexually or romantically oriented behavior toward a subordinate female employee, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Gary D. Latham (Latham), began serving as a member of the Florida Parole Commission (Parole Commission) on July 24, 1992. At the time of the final hearing, he was continuing to serve as a parole commissioner. Claretha Billingslea Walker started to work for the Parole Commission on May 1, 1991, as an administrative secretary to the general counsel's office. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, she was known as Claretha Billingslea and will be referred to in this recommended order as Ms. Billingslea. Effective May 27, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of executive secretary to Commissioner Judith Wolson. On July 1, 1994, Ms. Wolson became Chairman of the Parole Commission. Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of senior executive secretary to the chairman. When a potential opening arose, Latham and Ms. Billingslea discussed the possibility of Ms. Billingslea accepting a position as Latham's executive secretary since Latham had previously interviewed Ms. Billingslea for an executive secretary position in his office approximately two years before. Ms. Billingslea was interested in coming to work for Latham because a number of her duties had been eliminated when Ms. Wolson was made chairman, but she was concerned about making such a move because she had been with Chairman Wolson's office such a short time. Latham discussed with Chairman Wolson and her administrative assistant, Gene Strickland, the possibility of transferring Ms. Billingslea to Latham's open position. Both Chairman Wolson and Mr. Strickland agreed that it would be a good opportunity for Ms. Billingslea to learn more about the duties in a commissioner's office because the work in the chairman's office was more administrative than the work in a commissioner's office. Neither Mr. Strickland nor Chairman Wolson was dissatisfied with Ms. Billingslea's work. Prior to hiring Ms. Billingslea, Latham also discussed the hiring with his future administrative assistant, Brenda Henry, and with his wife. Effective August 5, 1994, Ms. Billinglea was reassigned to the position of executive secretary to Latham. Because there is only one position of senior executive secretary at the Parole Commission (the chairman's secretary), this reassignment was nominally a demotion. It did not act as a demotion, however, because Ms. Billingslea's salary and benefits remained unchanged. In her capacity as Latham's executive secretary, Ms. Billingslea reported directly to Latham. As a career service employee, Ms. Billingslea could not be unilaterally fired by Latham, but as her direct supervisor Latham could set the wheels in motion for her termination. Ms. Billinsglea understood that the chairman would have to approve her termination. Latham had the authority to assign tasks to Ms. Billingslea and to grant or deny her leave or flex time. From the start of Ms. Billingslea's employment in Latham's office, Latham engaged in comments and behavior of questionable propriety. He told her that he would not be able to get any work done with such a pretty secretary. Ms. Billingslea took this as a joke. On another occasion, one of Ms. Billingslea's male friends complained to her that Latham had been rude to him when he called. She thought Latham might have been upset that she was receiving too many personal calls, but when she asked Latham about it, he told her no and said, "I guess I'll just have to get used to guys calling all the time with such a pretty secretary." Latham often stared at Ms. Billingslea, looking her up and down. In describing these looks, Ms. Billingslea stated, "The way he looks at me, it is really weird. And it makes me feel uncomfortable, the way he kind of stares and looks me up and down. It will be almost as if he's going to say something but he never said anything." Once when he was looking at her in this strange way, Ms. Billingslea asked him whether there was something he wanted to say, to which he responded, "No, that was my sexy look." At this time she took it as a joke. One day Latham told Ms. Billingslea that he had been on his way to a friend's house and had gotten lost and ended up on her street. He said that he had gone by her house and that she had a nice place. He asked her why she kept her blinds closed so tightly. When the Parole Commission denies parole, a report referred to as a 947.18 report is completed, justifying the decision not to grant the parole. Procedurally, the Parole Commission will make a decision to grant or deny parole at a meeting. The case is then assigned to a commissioner to prepare a 947.18 report. The report is prepared in the office of the commissioner, and two weeks after the initial consideration the case is placed back on the agenda for review and acceptance. At its meeting on September 21, 1994, the Parole Commission denied parole for an inmate who had been convicted of sexually abusing his daughters. Latham was assigned to prepare the 947.18 report. Ms. Henry drafted the report for Ms. Billingslea to type. The report was very sexually explicit. After the report was typed, Ms. Billingslea took it to Latham for his review. Both Latham and Ms. Billingslea commented that it was an interesting case. Latham closed his eyes and in a low voice began to describe the graphic details of the sexual abuse to Ms. Billingslea. Ms. Billingslea later asked Ms. Henry if the file contained any pictures. On September 27, 1994, Latham went into Ms. Billingslea's office and sat down in front of her desk. He informed her that he had "the hots" for her. He told her that she had done nothing to make him approach her in this way but that he did not know what had come over him lately; he had been attracted to a lot of young pretty women, and she was just "such a doll." He told her that he had nasty thoughts about her while he taught Sunday School. When she told him that she could not work for him if she were to be with him sexually, he responded that she would not be working for him but that he would be working for her. When she told him that she was not interested, he became defensive, stating that he had a lot of political power. His last words to her in that encounter were, "I might not be able to keep my hands to myself." Later that same day, as Ms. Billingslea was preparing to leave work, Latham asked her to stay late. Over and over, he asked her to stay and "be with him," initially standing behind her chair and preventing her from pushing back. Ms. Billingslea took Latham's remarks and actions on September 27 as an invitation to a sexual or romantic relationship, which she had neither solicited nor encouraged. Ms. Billingslea did not misunderstand Latham or his intentions. Ms. Billinsglea was afraid that her rejection of Latham's advances would cost her her job. She believed that Latham could cause her to be fired. On September 28, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was ill. She called her doctor's office and requested that the doctor call in a prescription for her to a local pharmacy. The doctor's office did call in a prescription. Ms. Billingslea advised Latham that she felt ill, to which Latham responded that she had just "better be to work." Ms. Billingslea took this remark as an admonishment not to take sick leave. On October 3, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was late for work. She tried to call the office to advise that she would be late, but no one answered the telephone. On October 3, 1994, Latham expressed concern to Ms. Billingslea that she was abusing or not accurately reporting her leave time. Ms. Billingslea perceived that Latham's attitude toward her became cool after their conversation on September 27. Latham had never said anything to Ms. Billingslea about being tardy or being absent from work prior to September 27 because he did not think that it was a big deal. After Ms. Billingslea spurned his advances, he began to voice his dissatisfaction with her work hours. Ms. Billingslea went to the Parole Commission's personnel officer, Frank Trueblood. She wanted to take time off from work to look for another job and asked Mr. Trueblood if there was any type of leave request that she could make which could not be denied by Latham. Mr. Trueblood questioned Ms. Billingslea about the underlying nature of her problems, and she told him about Latham's actions. Ms. Billingslea did not want to create a problem but wanted to find another job. Mr. Trueblood told Ms. Billingslea that she could file an informal complaint against Latham and that it would remain confidential. On October 5, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed an informal complaint against Latham. About 5:00 p.m. that day she met with Chairman Wolson, Mr. Strickland, and Clay Phillips to discuss the situation. Chairman Wolson told Ms. Billingslea that she would be transferred to another section. Ms. Billinglea did not display eagerness to file a formal complaint against Latham. Latham saw Ms. Billingslea in Chairman Wolson's office, and after Ms. Billingslea left, he asked to speak with Chairman Wolson. Latham wanted to know what was going, on but Chairman Wolson would only tell him that Ms. Billingslea was being transferred to Clemency and that Murlene Amison would be transferred to his office as his secretary. At first Latham was upset at the news of the transfer and told Chairman Wolson that it would be setting a dangerous precedent to make the transfer. Latham told Chairman Wolson that he would like to "save face" in the matter and be the one who would offer the transfer to Ms. Amison. Latham then became exuberant about the transfer, closing his fist, punching it up with a victory signal and saying, "Yes." He left Chairman Wolson's office. A few minutes later, Latham returned to Chairman Wolson's office and told her that he thought he had figured out what had happened. He said that Ms. Billingslea had been sexually harassing him and that he had talked with her and explained that he did not want to have an affair with her. This was the first time anyone at the Parole Commission had heard Latham's claim of sexual harassment by Ms. Billingslea. On October 6, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed a formal complaint against Latham. Latham tried to find out from Mr. Trueblood whether Ms. Billingslea had filed a sexual harassment complaint against him, but Mr. Trueblood would not tell him. Effective October 7, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was transferred to the position of executive secretary in Clemency. On October 7, 1994, Latham called Mr. Strickland to his office and thanked Mr. Strickland for the personnel move, indicating that it had "sav[ed] his butt." Latham asked Mr. Strickland to close the door and then told him that he had been attracted to Ms. Billingslea but nothing had happened, and now, because of the move, nothing would happen. Latham wanted to know what was on the paperwork regarding the transfer. Mr. Strickland told him that it indicated a lateral transfer. Latham knew that it was wrong for a supervisor to invite a subordinate employee into a sexual or romantic relationship. Since she has been at the Parole Commission, Ms. Billingslea has never received formal discipline relevant to any fact or issue in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Gary D. Latham violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and recommending a civil penalty of $4,000 be imposed, as well as a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Advocate Florida Commission on Ethics Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1997. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Gary D. Latham, pro se 4622 The Oaks Drive Marianna, Florida 32446 Mark Herron, Esquire Akerman, Senterfit & Eidson, P.A. 216 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-0503 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Kerrie J. Stillman, Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Did Respondent violate the provisions of Section 817.567, Florida Statutes (2004), or any lesser included offenses, Section 943.1395(6) and/or (7), Florida Statutes (2004), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b) and/or (c), by failing to maintain the qualifications established in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2004), requiring maintenance of good moral character?
Findings Of Fact Undisputed Facts: Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on September 5, 1995, and was issued Correctional Certificate Number 157626. Additional Facts: Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A11 is a copy of an interoffice memorandum from Respondent to the "Personnel Dept." This reference to the personnel department is taken to refer to the Florida Department of Corrections, in view of other proof in this record. The interoffice memorandum goes on to describe as the subject "transcript and diploma." The interoffice memorandum says "I have enclosed a copy of my diploma and transcript. Please place these in my personnel file and update my records and incentive. Thank you, W.S.D." The exhibit reflects in a handwritten note of unknown origins, "This diploma & transcript are ineligible for CJIP because this is not an accredited college." Nothing else in this record describes the nature of the transcript and diploma referred to in the interoffice memorandum concerning the particulars of the transcript and diploma that was mentioned on January 31, 1999, nor can it be reasonably inferred. As evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A15, Respondent prepared and signed an employment application with the Florida Department of Corrections for the position of Correctional Probation Officer on June 14, 2004. In the course of this application Respondent listed under the section related to college university or professional school "Southern Mississippi" at "Hattiesburg, Mississippi", which he allegedly attended from August 1996 through August 2003, participating in a course of study referred to as "Criminal Justice" at which, according to the application, he earned an M.S. degree. In fact Respondent had never attended the University of Southern Mississippi as explained in correspondence dated July 6, 2004, from Greg Pierce, University Registrar at the University of Southern Mississippi directed to Terry Foskey, a payroll specialist with the Department of Corrections, Region I Service Center, who had inquired of the University of Southern Mississippi concerning Respondent's status as a student. This correspondence is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A9. Moreover, a transcript, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A3, which Mr. Foskey had supplied a verification specialist in the registrar's office at the University of Southern Mississippi, Trudy Stewart or Steward, was found not to resemble a transcript from that university, as explained by Mr. Pierce in his correspondence. The transcript, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A3, had been received by Mr. Foskey on June 28, 2004. Mr. Foskey was uncertain of the information contained in the transcript. This led to his inquiry to the University of Southern Mississippi, with the determination being made that the transcript did not come from that university. While Mr. Foskey was attempting to clarify the status of the transcript with the University of Southern Mississippi, he was contacted by Respondent who asked if Mr. Foskey had received the transcript. Mr. Foskey replied that he had and asked what Respondent wanted done with that transcript. Respondent answered that he had pulled up information on a program known as ATMS, which the Florida Department of Law Enforcement uses to track certified officers, Respondent among them. As a result Respondent said that he needed this document, meaning the transcript, entered into the ATMS because he was transferring from his present position into another position he referred to as security. There was a series of e-mails as reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A8 from Respondent to Mr. Foskey. The first was on July 1, 2004. It says "Per telephone call, please place information in ATMS 2 and in my personnel file Thanks." Then the name and position of Respondent as Classification Officer at Santa Rosa CI-119 is provided. On that same date another e-mail was dispatched from Mr. Foskey back to Respondent which said "Thank you for the follow-up." As reflected in the exhibit, on July 7, 2004, Respondent sent an e- mail to Mr. Foskey, with the subject line being "Re: Transcript," which said in its text, "Mr. Foskey, how long does it take for the information to be entered into ATMS 2?" The change in employment position by Respondent that was being described for Mr. Foskey related to the application, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A15. Pertinent to this inquiry, the Correctional Probation Officer job being sought by Respondent required a bachelor's degree level of education as a prerequisite to filling the position. The reference made by Respondent to the M.S. degree from University of Southern Mississippi is perceived as Respondent's attempt to show that he had the necessary level of education to apply for the job. In relation to his pursuit of the Correctional Probation Officer position, on June 8, 2004, Respondent had filed a request for demotion with the Regional I Service Center Department of Corrections for personal reasons, requesting permission to move from his position of Senior Classification Officer to that of Correctional Probation Officer. This is reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A15A. As a result of the incident concerning the purported transcript from the University of Southern Mississippi, the Department of Corrections, Office of the Inspector General investigated. That investigation was conducted by David Ellis. In a discussion between Mr. Ellis and Respondent concerning the subject transcript, Respondent acknowledged that he had the documentation sent to personnel, taken to mean the personnel office with the Department of Corrections. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that he had requested that the transcript be sent to personnel and had supplied information to a company to have it sent. Respondent did not remember the name of the company, as he explained to Mr. Ellis. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that he had read a personnel memorandum on the Department of Corrections website about a university in southern Florida that would accept life experience for college credits and that he, meaning Respondent, searched the web and found that the University of Southern Mississippi did likewise. The memorandum about the university in southern Florida, refers to Florida Southern College, and is found to be that as reflected in Respondent's Exhibit numbered A5. Respondent then sent an e-mail to the internet company requesting information about college degrees. The company sent him a package explaining the process and he sent something back about his life experiences, with a check of $800.00 and a list of other college credits earned elsewhere. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that he then received the subject transcript at his home from the University of Southern Mississippi on a later date. This is found to be as arranged through the internet company. The transcript that he received at home, Respondent compared to the one that had been received by Mr. Foskey and Respondent told Mr. Ellis they were the same with the exception that his transcript copy had a seal in the middle. Respondent acknowledged to Mr. Ellis that he had not taken any of the courses on the transcript that has been described and had not earned any grades for any of those courses reflected on the transcript. When Mr. Ellis asked Respondent why he would send something to personnel that he had never officially done, Respondent replied because he thought it was all right. Mr. Ellis asked Respondent to give him information about the internet company that Respondent had referred to and any information regarding payment to that company by Respondent. Respondent called Mr. Ellis back and told him that the name of the company was CustomDegrees.com. It is found that Respondent's Exhibit numbered 4 is information from CustomDegrees.com that Respondent relied on. Nothing about this information from CustomDegrees.com provided to Respondent, and for which Respondent paid a service fee, could reasonably be interpreted to serve as the functional equivalent of having earned the degree from the University of Southern Mississippi for which Respondent intended to take credit. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A3A constitutes a handwritten educational history which Respondent provided to CustomDegrees.com for them to provide the degree which was falsely portrayed as having been issued by the University of Southern Mississippi.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding violations of the Statutes and Rules referred to and suspending Respondent's Correctional Certificate Number 157626 for 60 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry, P.A. 1308-B Dunmire Street Pensacola, Florida 32504 Michael Crews, Program Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at Sumter Correctional Institution near Bushnell, Florida. The Petitioner was convicted for sexual battery and robbery in proceedings before the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida. On April 23, 1976, he was sentenced to serve 20 years for robbery and five years for sexual battery. Petitioner is presently incarcerated in accordance with these commitment orders. On December 19, 1979, Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of recommending a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under the Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the gravity of the offense for which the Petitioner was sentenced, establish a "salient factor score" and consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The examiner classified the offense as "greatest (most serious II)." He set the salient factor score as one. The examiner recommended setting the PPRD at the top of the appropriate range given the offense characteristic and salient factor score, and further recommended aggravating this period because of the concurrent conviction for robbery. The examiner recommended a PPRD of September 7, 1982. The Parole and Probation Commission reviewed the recommendation and considered the robbery conviction as being a greater aggravating factor than applied by the examiner. The Commission set the PPRD for February 25, 1986. Petitioner sought further review of the PPRD by the Commission and was unsuccessful. Petitioner has also been unsuccessful in pursuing judicial relief in connection with the PPRD. Commission Rule 23-19.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, as applied to the Petitioner, provided: If present offense of conviction involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level shall be based on the most serious of the offenses, and the other offenses may be used as aggravating factors. This shall be applied to both consecutive and con- current sentences. In adopting its rules, the Commission sought to develop criteria to predict the likelihood of successful parole. An inmate's history is the most reliable predictive device. Statistically, an inmate who has been convicted for more than one offense is a greater parole risk than an inmate who has been convicted for only one offense. The Commission's rule is thus a reasonable device for predicting the likelihood of successful parole.
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1991, the Petitioner, Douglas Adams, filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule. In the Petition, the Petitioner challenged Rules 33-22.005(5) and 33- 22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rules. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-22.005(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Section III. Report of Investigation. Upon receipt of the Disciplinary Report, the Senior Correctional Officer shall review the report and, when the facts suggest that the alleged violations is significant, he shall cause the report to be forwarded to the Correctional Officer Chief. Upon approval of the Correctional Officer Chief, or in his absence the Senior Correctional Officer, an impartial investigation of the charge against the inmate shall be conducted. This investigation shall be completed without unreasonable delay. Any delay at any state must be justified in the report. The Correctional Probation Supervisor shall review the report and cause an impartial investigation to be conducted for inmates participating in the Supervised Community Release Program. The investigating officer is responsible for obtaining the inmate's version of the offense as well as contacting the charging officer and any other staff members or inmates who have information pertaining to the allegation and the charge. The inmate charged shall be offered staff assistance and asked if he has any material witnesses to offer in his behalf. If the inmate has no witnesses, it must be noted in the report. If names of witnesses are given, the investigating officer shall then interview both inmate and staff witnesses and, if appropriate, have the Witness Statement Form DC4-856 completed. If inmate witnesses or staff witnesses are not contacted, a statement as to why they were not contacted must be included. Opinions as to innocence or guilt shall not be made by the investigating officer. The investigator shall sign and date the report. Rule 33-22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (2) The Hearing Officer or Disciplinary Team can request further investigation or evidence, the appearance of additional witnesses or the statements of unavailable witnesses. . . . . Witnesses shall not be called or certain information disclosed if doing so would create a risk of reprisal, undermine authority or otherwise present a threat to the security or order of the institution. The inmate witnesses must be willing to testify but may offer an oral or written statement to the investigating officer in lieu of personal appearance. Notations shall be made in the report with reasons for declining to call requested witnesses or for restricting any information. The Petitioner has alleged that the Challenged Rules are invalid because the rules are "contrary to due process contained in enabling legislation. Section 20.315, Florida Statutes (1989)" and are vague, arbitrary and capricious. The Petition does not include any alleged facts supporting the Petitioner's assertion that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious."
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Paul R. Layton, is an inmate presently confined at the Tomoka Correctional Institution, Daytona Beach, Florida. Given a choice the Petitioner would not wear his hair any longer than his collar. His personal feeling, however, is that the rule is used as a harassment technique and is used to dehumanize and institutionalize the prisoners. The Respondent's rationale for the rule is that requiring prisoners to keep their hair short aids in identification of the individual prisoners within the institution and in the event of an escape. Prisoners have attempted escapes by altering their appearance. The Department of Corrections, pursuant to the challenged rule, has required prisoners to cut their hair such that it is above their collar and off of their ears. The Department houses approximately 27,000 inmates, all of whom are required to wear similar uniforms. When a prisoner escapes, the Department of Corrections must provide a current photograph of the escaped prisoner to law enforcement agencies. Requiring short standardized haircuts substantially reduces the cost and difficulty such current photographs. Petitioner contended that the rule is discriminatory in that female inmates are not subjected to the same haircut standards. The majority of female inmates wear their hair long and when they change the length of their hairs they are rephotographed. Shorter hair is more sanitary for those prisoners who are involved in food preparation. Long hair can also constitute a safety hazard for those inmates who operate machinery.
