Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Petitioner, Ernest Walker, was an inmate incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution. Respondent is a state agency charged by law with determining what persons may be placed on parole, fixing the timing conditions of parole, and determining violations of parole. Respondent is charged by Section 947.16, Florida Statutes, with the responsibllity of interviewing inmates, and establishing presumptive parole release dates, and thereafter reviewing those dates. Pursuant to its statutory charge, Respondent conducted an interview of Petitioner, Ernest Walker, and established his original presumptive parole release date to be June 21, 1988, by action certified by Respondent on September 2, 1981. Subsequently, in special Commission action taken on October 17, 1983, Petitioner's PPRD was extended to June 21, 2008, based upon the receipt of a mental health status report, which, according to the record in this cause, was treated as "new information" not available at the time the Petitioner's initial PPRD was established.
Findings Of Fact On his application form Petitioner was asked if he had ever been arrested. He checked the box indicating "yes." The form further inquired "If yes, list any and all arrests and dispositions. This may or may not be grounds for denial. If additional space is required, use back of application." To that inquiry, Petitioner indicated a charge for grand theft. He did not indicate the disposition of the charge but did indicate a date of 1958. At the conclusion of the application form Petitioner swore that the information contained therein was true and correct. Petitioner's history of arrests indicates, among others, the following: July 24, 1945 larceny of an automobile; August 31, 1945 unauthorized use of an automobile without owners consent; in addition Petitioner was convicted on July 3, 1947 for grand larceny and sentenced to the Florida State Prison for a period of two (2) years; on August 17, 1949, Petitioner was convicted of auto larceny and sentenced to the Florida State Prison for a period of three (3) years; and on March 11, 1959, Mr. Davis was convicted of robbery and sentenced to the Florida State Prison for the full term of fifteen (15) years. Mr. Davis was released from State custody in 1970. Since that time the available evidence does not indicate any further arrests or convictions of Mr. Davis. At the final hearing in this case Mr. Davis testified that the reason he did not fully disclose his prior arrest record was because he thought that the disclosure of one arrest would lead the Department of State's office to his complete record. This testimony is not accepted as credible. Mr. Davis is now able to vote in Florida elections.
Recommendation In light of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's application for a Class "F" Unarmed Security Guard License be denied. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether or not on or about October 24, 1975, the Respondent, Dallas Norman House was convicted upon a plea of not guilty and a verdict of guilty of the offense of unlawfully and knowingly possessing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of Subsection 841(a)(1), Title 21, United States Code, and unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally importing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, into the United States, in violation of Subsection 952(a), Title 21, United States Code, and thereby was guilty of a crime against the laws of the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing in violation of 475.25(1)(e), F.S. Whether or not the Respondent, Dallas Norman House, was committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of five (5) years on each of counts one and two of the aforementioned charges and that the execution of those sentences should run concurrently, to be followed by a parole term of five (5) years and thereby is guilty of a violation of 475.25(2), F.S., by being confined in a state or federal prison.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Dallas Norman House, is registered as a non-active salesman under certificate no. 0041416 held with the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission since October 1, 1976. Prior to that date the Respondent held the same certificate number as an active salesman beginning October 4, 1974 through September 30, 1976. Copies of these registrations may be found as part of Petitioner's Composite Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence. On October 24, 1975, the Respondent, Dallas Norman House, was adjudged guilty upon his plea of not guilty and a verdict of guilty of the offenses of; (1) unlawfully and knowingly possessing marijuana a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of 841(a)(1), Title 21, United States Code; and (2) unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally importing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance into the United States, in violation of 952(a), Title 21, United States Code. The Respondent was adjudged guilty and convicted, and committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of five (5) years on each of the two counts with the execution of the two sentences to run concurrently, to be followed by a parole term of five (5) years. The terms of the judgement and commitment may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit #2, admitted into evidence. On August 2, 1976, the Respondent, Dallas Norman House surrendered himself at the Federal Prison Camp, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida to begin the service of the aforementioned sentences as imposed and at the time of the hearing was serving that sentence.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this cause, it is recommended that the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission, revoke the registration of the Respondent, Dallas Norman House, certificate no. 0041416. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Dallas Norman House c/o Superintendent E.V. Aiken Post Office Box 600 Eglin Air Force Base Eglin, Florida 32542
The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding in which the Petitioner originally sought a determination pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, that Rule 33-6.006, Florida Administrative Code, was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. This case began with the filing of a Petition For Administrative Determination on December 23, 1986. On March 26, 1987, this Hearing Officer issued a Final Order of Dismissal which granted the Department's motion to dismiss. The Final Order Of Dismissal concluded that the Petitioner had failed to allege standing to challenge Subsections (2) through (9) of Rule 33-6.006, because his allegations were insufficient to show that his substantial interests were affected by those subsections of the rule. The Final Order Of Dismissal went on to conclude that the Petitioner had sufficiently alleged standing to challenge Subsection (1) of the challenged rule, but also concluded that the Petitioner had failed to sufficiently allege facts sufficient to show the invalidity of the rule. In this regard the Final Order Of Dismissal specifically stated at paragraph 12: In order to sufficiently allege the invalidity of an existing rule, a rule challenge petition must assert, at a minimum, that the challenged rule is in some specified way a departure from statutory authority granted to the rule enacting agency by the Legislature. Where, as here, the rule is nothing more than a repetition of the statutory provision, the rule may be unnecessary, but it is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it does not in any way depart from the statutory mandate. Because of the identical provisions of the subject rule language and the applicable statute, the Petitioner has not, and cannot, allege any facts sufficient to show that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because he has not, and cannot, allege any differences between the statutory mandate and the rule mandate. The Petitioner sought appellate review of the Final Order Of Dismissal. In Diaz v. Florida Department of Corrections, 519 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), appeal dismissed, 525 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1988), the First District Court of Appeal issued an opinion which primarily addressed the constitutionality of the statutory authority for the challenged rule. In that opinion the court concluded as follows: Accordingly, we declare section 945.10(2) Florida Statutes (1985), to be unconstitutional. The case is remanded to the DOAH hearing officer for further proceedings to determine the validity of Rule 33-6.006(1) in light of this opinion. On March 21, 1988, the appellate court issued its mandate and the case was once again before the Hearing Officer for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. The appellate court decision left undisturbed the conclusion that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge Subsections (2) through (9) of Rule 33-6.006. Accordingly, the issue on remand is limited to a determination of the validity of Subsection (1) of Rule 33-6.006, Florida Administrative Code. As discussed in the conclusions of law, that determination involves a consideration of statutory amendments which took effect after the appellate court decision and were, therefore, not considered by the appellate court. At the final hearing, both parties presented the testimony of witnesses and the Petitioner also offered several exhibits. During the course of the hearing the Petitioner was granted leave to file two late exhibits consisting of selected portions of the Department's Policy and Procedure Directives and selected portions of the Florida State Prison Institutional Operating Procedures. The Respondent was granted leave to file post-hearing objections to any late-filed exhibits. The late-filed exhibits were submitted by the Petitioner and the Respondent promptly filed objections to same. Upon consideration, the objections to the exhibits are overruled and the late-filed exhibits are received as part of the record in this case. Following the hearing, a transcript of tide proceedings at hearing was also filed. Thereafter, both parties filed timely proposed final orders containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties' proposed final orders have been carefully considered during the preparation of this final order. Specific rulings on all findings of fact proposed by the parties are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated herein.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Findings stipulated by the parties Florida Administrative Code Chapters 1S, 22I, 28, and 33, as found in the Florida Administrative Code Annotated, through the April 1988 supplement, are true and correct copies of those rule chapters. The Petitioner's current address is: Enrique J. Diaz Inmate Number 065599 Florida State Prison Post Office Box 747 Starke, Florida 32091 The Respondent's name and address is: Florida Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Department rule on which an administrative determination is sought is Rule 33-6.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, which states: No inmate of any institution, facility, or program shall have access to any information contained in the files of the Department. The statutory provisions on which the subject Department rule is based are Sections 944.09 and 945.10, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's interests are substantially affected by Rule 33- 6.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, in that: He is a convicted felon, lawfully confined in the custody of the Department. He wishes to obtain from the Department, for the lawful cost of copying, documents he was once given by the Department, but which he no longer has in his possession, including, but not limited to: Institutional grievances filed by him. Grievance appeals filed by him. Disciplinary Reports issued against him. Disciplinary Report Worksheets issued against him. He wishes to obtain from the Department, for the lawful cost of copying, documents which are public records and which can be obtained by anyone from sources outside the Department, including, but not limited to: His Judgment and Sentence forms. His Uniform Commitment to Custody form. He wishes to obtain from the Department documents which are public records and which are normally provided to any member of the public requesting same, including, but not limited to: The Department's annual report. Ordinary records kept in the normal course of business, such as might be kept by any state agency. He had been refused any and all documents from the Department because of Rule 33-6.006(1), Florida Administrative Code. FINDINGS BASED ON EVIDENCE AT HEARING Inmates are given copies of any disciplinary reports they receive at the time they receive the disciplinary report, plus the results of any subsequent disciplinary hearing. These copies are carbon copies rather than photocopies. Inmates are given answers to inmate requests, institutional grievances, and grievance appeals they file. These answers are given to the inmate with a copy of his original filing. The act of giving an inmate another, identical, copy of any disciplinary report, disciplinary worksheet, inmate request, institutional grievance, or grievance appeal he had previously been given does not create a security problem. The act of giving an inmate another, identical, copy of his Judgment and Sentence forms, which are public documents contained in the files and records of the appropriate Clerks of Court, does not create a security problcm. Copies of the above documents are routinely made for attorneys and the news media. The actual cost of providing these copies is charged. The Department would not provide copies of the above documents if it were known the copies would be given to an inmate. The Department's Administrative Gain Time Manual is made available to the news media, the public, and attorneys. The Department refuses to make this manual available to inmates. The Florida State Prison Institutional Operating Procedures (IOPs) are public records, but the Department refuses to make copies of them for individual inmates because of Rule 33- 6.006(1), even though some of the IOPs are in the prison law library. The Department's Policy and Procedure Directives are freely available to the public, but the Department refuse to make them available to inmates. Florida State Prison, where the Petitioner is incarcerated, has approximately 1164 inmates. In accordance with state statute, the institution keeps a file on each inmate. Each file consists of from two to eighteen legal size folders of documents. The files include such material as investigation reports, disciplinary reports, special review information, presentence reports, psychological and medical reports, detainers, gain time, and other information. There are three people in the Florida State Prison records department responsible for inmate files. It takes the FSP record department three or four hours daily to file newly received documents. The FSP records department also has other duties, such as posting gain time, cell changes, and disciplinary reports. The FSP records department has received few, if any, requests for information from the public or the news media. Most of their requests come from attorneys. The attorneys' requests for information place additional burdens on the small FSP records department staff. By way of example, it took approximately two hours to "screen" the Petitioner's file at FSP and his file is smaller than that of 75 or 80 per cent of the inmates. Florida State Prison has only three photocopy machines for the entire institution. The machines are used extensively and are subject to frequent malfunctions. The Admissions and Release office maintains the official file on each inmate at the central office. Currently, there are 33,000 inmates in custody. The primary reason that the Admissions and Release office does not want inmates to have hands-on access to their central office files is to maintain the integrity of the record. The Department has had to use the files in court to defend and substantiate the calculations for release dates. The Admissions and Release office has denied all inmate requests for copies of information from its files. The Admissions and Release office is currently shorthanded. Whenever there is a new court decision affecting inmate rights or sentences, the office is flooded with correspondence and requests from inmates. The office has already received some grievances and requests from inmates concerning the appellate court decision in this case. The office expects a flood of requests if inmates are given access to Department records. During the past four years the Admissions and Release office has had very few requests for access to its files from the news media or the general public. The Department's central files contain access codes for the Department's computers. If inmates could obtain the access codes, it would compromise the integrity of the Department's computer records. Before release of any information from the Department's central office files, the information is screened for confidential information. Even documents which appear to be facially innocent have to be read to determine whether they contain information about informants or victims. The Department is concerned that if inmates are allowed broad access to Department files, such access will create security problems. But the Department is even more concerned about the sheer volume of requests that would result from allowing broad access and the impact the expected volume of requests would have on Department staff and copying equipment. The Department is also generally of the view that it is virtually impossible to write a rule which would describe which documents should be available for inmate access and which should not. Rather, the Department is of the view that decisions regarding release of documents to inmates must be made on a case by case basis after review of each document in each file.
The Issue Whether a contract exists for the lease of office space in Shalimar, Florida, between the Department of Corrections (DOC) and International Investment Counsel, Inc. (IIC).
Findings Of Fact On or about May 18, 1998, DOC issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Lease No. 700:0792, Shalimar Probation and Parole Office (the Lease). IIC, DOC’s current landlord for the Shalimar Probation and Parole Office, and another bidder, Bonafied Business Associates, Inc. (Bonafied), timely filed responses to the RFP. DOC opened and initially determined both proposals to be responsive to the RFP. Following evaluation of the bids by an evaluation committee, DOC posted its decision to award the lease to IIC. Bonafied timely filed a notice of protest. After Bonafied filed its notice of protest, Bonafied met with DOC and pointed out that IIC’s proposal did not clearly specify 40 exclusive parking spaces required by the RFP. Before the expiration of the 10-day period within which Bonafied was required by statute to file its formal written protest, DOC informally notified Bonafied that it intended to withdraw its award to IIC and repost its intent to award the lease to Bonafied. For logistical reasons, DOC did not communicate to IIC its intent to withdraw its award of the lease on or before July 17, 1998, the deadline for Bonafied to file its formal written protest. Notwithstanding that failure of notice to IIC of DOC’s intent to withdraw the lease award, Bonafied failed to perfect its protest and file a formal written protest by the deadline of July 17, 1998, as required by Section 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Subsequently, Bonafied rented the office space offered in its bid to another tenant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered directing Department of Corrections to execute a lease with IIC for the Shalimar Probation and Parole Office consistent with the contract now in force between IIC and the DOC. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn S. Raepple, Esquire Cheryl G. Stuart, Esquire Hopping, Green, Sams and Smith, P.A. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1998. Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Scott E. Clodfelter, Esquire Obed Dorceus, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 David Theriaque, Esquire 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301-2646 Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are all inmates at the Florida State Prison (FSP) and are subject to the terms of DOC Rule 33- 3.04(9), which requires that the return address of all outgoing mail must contain the inmate's name, identification number and institutional name and address with abbreviations. Petitioner Herzog, in March, 1985 failed to receive directly a letter sent to him from a correspondent in Beacon, N.Y., which was addressed to "Mr. Frederick Herzog, 081003, P. 0. Box 747, Starke, Florida 32091" because, as is indicated by stamp on the front of the envelope, the inmate's number and cell location must be included in the address. As will be seen below from the testimony of Ms. Seally, an inmate's cell number is no longer required. On two other occasions Mr. Herzog attempted to send letters to Beacon, N.Y., utilizing envelopes which reflected his return address merely as P. O. Box 747, Starke, Florida, 32091. These letters were not put into U.S. mail channels by prison mail room personnel because of the failure to reflect the institution's name and address in the return address. Petitioner Abdul Hakgem Jahmal N. Shabazz, also known as Owen D. Denson, on at least two occasions attempted to send letters to various individuals, one in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and one in Nokomosis, Florida, in envelopes bearing the return address, Post Office Box 747, A-013625, either Florida State Prison, Starke, Florida or merely Starke, Florida without identification of the prison. Both were returned to him for failure to have the institution's full name in the return address. Allen Penoyer, representative for Petitioners herein, was denied receipt of mail sent to him which included nude photographs. Neither Petitioner Milton nor Mummakil testified at the hearing or presented any evidence in their behalf. According to Mr. Dugger, Superintendent of FSP, the full identification without abbreviation of the prison name is required in inmate return addresses because of experience in the past which has indicated that inmates often misrepresent their location in correspondence to outsiders which sometimes results in extorting or gaining by fraud, money or other favors. The inclusion of the full prison return address would, it was hoped, give the outside addressees information as to where the letters originate. In one instance, a woman sent an inmate correspondent $10,000.00. The checks were intercepted and when questioned by prison officials, the woman indicated that from the mail she had received, she had no knowledge or indication that she was sending money to an inmate. Another reason for the rule was that some prisoners were subscribing to stock market publications and other periodicals and not paying for them when billed. Without the full return address, the publisher had no idea its publication was coming to a prison. In several instances, the publishers contacted prison officials requesting something be done about the situation. Mr. Dugger further indicated that some correspondents, even those who know an inmate is incarcerated, think the facility is a jail rather than the state prison and that the inmate's sentence is shorter than it actually is. Some correspondents have even shown up on a misrepresented discharge date expecting to see an inmate to whom they have sent money when in reality, the discharge date has been far in the future. Brenda Sealey, the supervisor of the mail room at FSP insures all mail comes in and goes out in proper fashion and that DOC rules for mail are followed. At one point, prison officials interpreted the rule which requires complete address to include the cell number but this policy is no longer followed. Currently, mail will be delivered to prisoners if mail room personnel can in any way find the prisoner somewhere within the DOC. Even though the rule requires an inmate number as a part of the address, as a courtesy, mail room personnel will deliver mail that does not contain this if they can find the prisoner. They will send the mail to another institution if the inmate has been moved. The rule requiring the use of the complete, unabbreviated name of the institution is still being implemented and applies to all routine mail but not to legal mail. Christmas cards, graduation and birthday cards, and the like are all routine mail and must have full return address. Identified legal mail is not held up because of technicalities.
Findings Of Fact Respondent stipulated that petitioners are substantially affected by the proposed rule. The evidence showed that its provisions would apply to them. PFB Pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB) is a chronic condition afflicting 45 to 50 percent of black men. PFB occurs when facial hair grows back into the skin. It is by no means a medical emergency, but complicating infections do occur. Once the beard hairs grow out a centimeter or more there is little or no likelihood that they will curl back and bury themselves in the facial skin. The accepted treatment is to let the beard grow. 1/ v EXISTING PRACTICE Until recently, prisoners with PFB were given prescriptions authorizing them to grow their beards no longer than one quarter inch. Dr. Julian Avilas, a physician at Union Correctional Institution, now routinely prescribes letting the beard grow at least 10 millimeters. David E. Watson, an assistant superintendent at Florida State Prison, testified that the practices in place at Union Correctional Institution were the same as would be required under the proposed rule. He originally testified that "closely trimmed" meant clean shaven. He was clean shaven at the hearing, and testified that to trim a beard closely was to sieve as closely as he had the morning of the hearing. Under skillful examination on redirect, however, he said that closely trimmed meant only as long as medically necessary. On December 1, 1983, Josh Green was given a prescription permitting him to grow his beard, but no longer than one quarter inch. He gets "bumps" whether he shaves with a razor or trims with clippers, which are preset to trim close enough to the skin to make the length of the beard less than one quarter inch. Generally speaking, the inmates do not have access to scissors. Two weeks before the hearing, he was required to shave cleanly, even though he showed the prescription to the guard who required this. Prisoners call these prescriptions "passes" and many keep them on their persons. Prison medical personnel gave Joseph Redman a prescription directing him to grow his beard no longer than one quarter inch, some time before December 19, 1983, the day a guard told him to trim his beard. He refused, believing his beard to be less than a quarter inch, and was sentenced to 30 days disciplinary confinement as a result. No measurements were ever taken. Herman L. Bentley's prescription also specifies that he is not to grow his beard longer than one quarter inch. Since the prescription was written on November 22,, 1983, however, guards have required him to shave cleanly seven or eight times, the prescription notwithstanding. Jerome Henry Carter was given a prescription for an indefinite period directing him to grow his beard, but no longer than a quarter inch, in December of 1983. Officer Smith nevertheless required him to shave in February of 1984, even though he was told of the prescription. Gary Reed has also had the experience of being required to shave "all the way" even though prison medical authorities had written a prescription directing him to let his beard grow, to a length less than one quarter inch. Joe Lewis Holland's prescription directed that he be allowed to grow his beard to a length of at least 10 millimeters. After the prescription was written in January of 1984, he and a guard had a disagreement about the length of his beard. HAIRCUTS Joe Lewis Holland also got into a dispute with a guard about whether his haircut was in good taste. He was wearing a neat, clean "moderate Afro" before the barber cut his hair close to the scalp, at the guard's direction. See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. The barber gave him one haircut, then another, then a third, before enough hair had been cut to suit the guard. Hennard Harris' hair was "tight, in a ball," off his neck and ears. When he declined a guard's request that he comb it out so the guard could see how long it was, the guard ordered that it all be cut off. RULE RATIONALE Mr. Watson explained the considerations behind forbidding full beards and requiring short haircuts. According to his uncontroverted testimony, uniformity of prisoners' appearance is a desideratum in and of itself. There are health and sanitation problems with longer hair. Many inmates are involved in food preparation. The prison issues toothpaste, but not shampoo. In a fight, long hair can be pulled more readily than short hair. Some inmates work in close proximity to machinery. Although some visitors to the prison have short hair and do not wear beards, it is easier, in general, to distinguish inmates from visitors if the former are all close shaven. (Prison uniforms also help in this regard.) Escapees would be able to alter their appearance more rapidly if they had long hair (by cutting it off) or a beard (by shaving) than if they were put to the trouble of acquiring a wig or a false beard. The policy of requiring prisoners to forego beards and keep their hair short is not uniformly observed in the United States. Nevada and Nebraska have different policies in their prisons. Both petitioners and respondent filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which have been considered in preparation of the final order. To the extent findings of fact have not been adopted, they have been deemed unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, cumulative or subordinate.
The Issue This cause came on for consideration before the Hearing Officer on Respondent's motion to dismiss this proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner lacks standing to maintain this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, asserting that Petitioner is net a "party" within the meaning of Section 120.52 (10) Id), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On May 28, 1980, Petitioner, Charles E. Roberts, Jr., pleaded guilty to a lewd and lascivious act in violation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes. His conviction occurred in Case No. 79-9480B, in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Hillsborough County, Florida. Thereafter, on May 30, 1980, Petitioner was adjudged guilty and sentenced to five years in the State prison system. Subsequently, Petitioner, in keeping with the terms and conditions of Section 917.012, Florida Statutes, was evaluated by the State of Florida, Department of Corrections, and the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and was placed in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, by transfer from his confinement in the prison system to Florida State Hospital. At the time of the hearing in this cause, Petitioner was in residence at Florida State Hospital awaiting transfer back to the State prison system. By this proceeding, Petitioner seeks to contest Respondent's determination that all appropriate treatment modes for Petitioner have been exhausted.
