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DONNA CLARK vs STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES AND CHARLES W. CROWELL, 89-005711 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Oct. 19, 1989 Number: 89-005711 Latest Update: Aug. 03, 1990

Findings Of Fact Respondent Charles W. Crowell, a State Farm agent under the terms of an agency agreement declaring him an independent contractor, has never employed 15 or more employees at any one time. During the 20 weeks next before petitioner Donna Clark left his employ, he had no more than three full-time and two part- time employees. As a State Farm agent, Mr. Crowell is contractually bound not to represent other insurance companies. State Farm, which has employed more than 15 persons at all pertinent times, prescribes policy forms, premiums, fees and charges for insurance, and prescribes underwriting rules its agents (and so their employees) must follow. Most premiums reach State Farm in the form of checks drawn by insured persons. But, as required by state law and his agreement with State Farm alike, Mr. Crowell maintains a separate premium fund account, into which customers' cash premium payments are deposited. Moneys are disbursed directly from this account to State Farm, which has the right to audit the account. State Farm determines Crowell's compensation based on the amount of premiums it receives on policies he has written, and writes him checks accordingly. At year's end, State Farm reports these payments to the IRS on a form 1099, not on a W-2 form. Mr. Crowell receives no compensation directly from the premium fund account. When an agent retires and in certain other instances, State Farm allocates policies among remaining agents, while honoring preferences policyholders express for particular agents. But it does not restrict agents to a particular territory or otherwise dictate where its agents conduct business. State Farm reserves the right to approve any advertising by an agency using State Farm's name or logo. But certain business cards bearing the logo are "pre-approved," except for the name of the agent or other employee in the agent's office which is to appear on the card. Mr. Crowell sets his own hours and it was he who decided the office would open at nine and close at five. Some days he does not open his office for business, even though State Farm offices are open. If he closes his office on days State Farm is closed, it may well be because he cannot do business with State Farm. But he is free to keep office hours on such days if he chooses. His compensation does not depend directly on the amount of time his office is open, or on the amount of time he spends at work. Mr. Crowell, not State Farm, decides whom to employ in his office, and sets hours, salaries and benefits for these employees. He, not State Farm, personally pays wages and benefits (if any), along with employment taxes for which employers are liable on account of their employees. But, on unemployment compensation tax forms, gives as the employer's name "CHARLES W. CROWELL STATE FARM INSURANCE COS" and signs as Charles W. Crowell Agent." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. Mr. Crowell drew salary checks in favor of Ms. Clark and other employees in his office on his own business checking account, which is not subject to audit by State Farm. These salary checks did not bear State Farm's name or logo. The parties have stipulated, as follows: "5. Crowell's office is located at 908 Michigan Avenue in Pensacola, Florida, and he personally owns the property and building where his office is located. State Farm has no interest or property rights in this facility. The only forms, manuals, and other documents located in Crowell's office which are the property of State Farm are insurance product information, including names of policyholders. The equipment, furniture and other supplies located at or used in Crowell's office are owned or leased by Crowell, and not State Farm. Crowell personally hired Donna M. Clark, and State Farm took no part in, exercised no control over, and had no input regarding Crowell's decision to hire Ms. Clark. Crowell sets the work hours, wages and benefits of his employees, including the number of employees employed by his business, without consultation with or the approval of State Farm. Crowell personally pays the salaries or wages and employment taxes, including Florida Workers' Compensation, Unemployment Compensation, Social Security (FICA) and federal tax withholding, on all of his employees, including Ms. Clark, and State Farm pays no salaries to or taxes on behalf of any of Crowell's employees. State Farm provides no benefits to the employees of its State Farm agents, and Crowell decides whether employment benefits such as health or life insurance are provided to Crowell's employees, including whether there is any cost to the employee. Such policies can be purchased by the State Farm Agent from State Farm, if he chooses to do so. Crowell, not State Farm, maintains all personnel records on his employees, including Ms. Clark. State Farm does not have any personnel records as to petitioner Donna Clark. Crowell's business is to sell State Farm policies and service State Farm policyholders. State Farm prescribes policy forms, premiums, fees and charges for insurance, and prescribes underwriting rules pertaining to writing State Farm insurance. Employees of State Farm Agents such as Mr. Crowell are not required to attend State Farm meetings or training sessions. State Farm offers training on topics selected by State Farm Agents, to which the State Farm Agents, such as Mr. Crowell, may choose to send their employees, for a fee payable to State Farm. State Farm requires Crowell to maintain a premium fund account, which is a trust account for the deposit of insurance premiums which are the property of State Farm. All cash premiums from policyholders are deposited to the premium fund account, and premium funds are promptly forwarded to State Farm. Premiums paid by check are sent directly to State Farm, and the large majority of premiums received by Crowell are by check. The premium fund account is subject to auditing by State Farm. As part of the audit of the premium fund account, State Farm develops a profit and loss statement which compares the claims experience of policies serviced by the Agent to the premiums generated by those policies and thus reflects the profit or loss to State Farm. Such profit and loss statement is for State Farm's own use in determining its own profitability and does not show or indicate the success of Mr. Crowell in his personal business as an insurance agent. Crowell maintains separate accounts for his personal and business funds which are not subject to any auditing by State Farm. Crowell is not paid for his sales activities out of the premium fund account, but is paid on a commission basis after all premium funds have been deposited with State Farm. Crowell personally directed Clark to attend certain training courses conducted by the local district manager of State Farm on underwriting insurance and product knowledge only. State farm does not require State Farm Agents to send their employees to training courses conducted by State Farm. State Farm does not allow employees of State Farm Agents to attend training courses concerning financial management or conduct of the agency, and Clark did not attend any such courses." Although not stipulated by the parties, evidence showed that, at one of the training courses Ms. Clark attended, a speaker told employees in attendance that they comprised State Farm's "front line." State Farm decides, with input from its agents, which courses and seminars to offer, but it is up to individual agents to decide who, if anybody, attends from their offices. State Farm employees known as agency managers coordinate operations of agents in their assigned area. When the agency manager decides another agent is needed, he recruits a trainee, who works for State Farm for two years or so (unless discharged earlier.) After this period of training, State Farm offers most trainees the opportunity to terminate employment and become agents. With State Farm's permission, an agent may incorporate. Even as independent contractors, agents receive contributions from State Farm toward personal insurance premiums, which are treated as part of the agents' income. The State Farm manager for the Pensacola area while Ms. Clark worked in Mr. Crowell's office offered bonuses to agents' employees who won contests, although this violated company policy. Ms. Clark did not, however, participate in any contest or receive a bonus. A number of unlicensed people in Mr. Crowell's office sign policies when he is unavailable. Because this practice is widespread, Insurance Commissioner Gallagher has insisted that insurance agents see that more office staff are licensed. Accordingly, State Farm's agency manager has asked State Farm agents to identify office personnel for licensure. Employees of a State Farm agency must be approved by State Farm, in order to obtain licenses. After an agent identifies an employee and the employee sits for an examination, State Farm does a background check and makes its decision about sponsorship. Ms. Clark did not seek licensure as an insurance agent, although she was among those who signed policies. In the course or her work, she spoke directly with underwriting personnel in Jacksonville, on Mr. Crowell's behalf or with his acquiescance.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petition. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Realtions 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Karen Lessard, Esquire 15 West LaRua Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Kathryn Errington, Esquire HARRELL, WILTSHIRE, SWEARINGEN, WILSON & HARRELL, P.A. 201 East Government Street P.O. Drawer 1832 Pensacola, FL 32501 Mary Jarrett, Esquire 2065 Herschel Street P.O. Box 40089 Jacksonville, FL 32203

Florida Laws (2) 760.02760.10
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DOUG LANCASTER FARMS, INC. vs DOBSON'S WOODS AND WATER, INC., AND WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, AS SURETY, 20-003360 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Center Hill, Florida Jul. 28, 2020 Number: 20-003360 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondents (“Dobson’s” and “Western Surety”) should be required to pay an outstanding amount owed to Petitioner, Doug Lancaster Farms, Inc. (“Lancaster Farms”).

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, the record as a whole, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Oden Hardy was the general contractor for a project in Apopka, Florida, known as the Space Box project. Dobson’s, a subcontractor on the Space Box project, contracted to purchase 269 trees (including Live Oaks, Crape Myrtles, Elms, and Magnolias) for $53,245.00 from Lancaster Farms. Dobson’s supplied Lancaster Farms with all the information needed to file a “notice to owner” as authorized by section 713.06, Florida Statutes. A truck from Dobson’s picked up the trees and transported them to the site of the Space Box project. Upon arriving with the trees, Dobson’s discovered that there was no means by which the trees could be watered at the site. Rather than attempting to jury rig some manner of watering system as requested by Oden Hardy, Dobson’s transported the trees to its place of business, and the trees remain there. The parties have stipulated that Dobson’s has paid all of the invoices except for Invoice No. 5810, totaling $12,580.00. There is no dispute that the trees at issue are “agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(1). There is also no dispute that Dobson’s is a “dealer in agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(2).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Doug Lancaster Farms, Inc., against Dobson’s Woods and Water, Inc., in the amount of $12,630.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry K. Dobson Dobson's Woods and Water, Inc. 851 Maguire Road Ocoee, Florida 34761-2915 Kelly Lancaster Doug Lancaster Farms, Inc. 3364 East County Road 48 Center Hill, Florida 33514 Western Surety Company Post Office Box 5077 Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57117-5077 Kristopher Vanderlaan, Esquire Vanderlaan & Vanderlaan, P.A. 507 Northeast 8th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34470 (eServed) Steven Hall, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Honorable Nicole “Nikki” Fried Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569591.17604.15604.21604.34713.06 DOAH Case (1) 20-3360
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CHARLES STRANGE vs BOYER PRODUCE, INC., AND SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 93-005740 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Oct. 08, 1993 Number: 93-005740 Latest Update: Mar. 23, 1994

The Issue The issue is whether Boyer Produce, Inc. and its surety, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, owe petitioner $1,751.80 as alleged in the complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In July 1993, petitioner, Patricia Thomas, was given authority by her brother to sell all remaining watermelons on his farm located in Citra, Florida. This amounted to approximately one truckload. She eventually sold them to respondent, Boyer Produce, Inc., a dealer (broker) in agricultural products located in Williston, Florida. Its owner and president is Kennedy Boyer (Boyer), who represented his firm in this proceeding. As an agricultural dealer, respondent is required to obtain a license from and post a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). In this case, the bond has been posted by respondent, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, and is in the amount of $75,000.00. Although the parties had never had business dealings before this transaction, through a mutual acquaintance, Randy Rowe, respondent learned that petitioner was interested in selling her watermelons. After Boyer visited the field and examined three watermelons which he described as "good," Boyer offered to purchase a truckload for 4 per pound if all melons were of the same quality. Thomas declined and counteroffered with a price of 5 per pound. The parties then agreed to split the difference and arrived at a sales price of 4 per pound. During the negotiations, Rowe acted as an intermediary between the parties and observed the formation of the contract as well as the loading of the goods onto the truck. Although the matter is in dispute, it is found that both parties agreed that Thomas would be paid 4 per pound for "good" watermelons delivered. This meant that petitioner would not be paid unless and until the watermelons were delivered to their final destination in "good" condition. In the trade, being in "good condition" meant that the watermelons would meet U. S. Grade No. 1 standards. Respondent also agreed to provide a truck and driver at petitioner's field and to transport the produce to Brooklyn, New York, the final destination. At the same time, petitioner was given the responsibility of loading the watermelons on the truck. To assist petitioner in meeting her up- front labor costs, respondent advanced $500.00 as partial payment for the shipment. Winston Smith was hired by respondent to transport the melons to New York. He arrived at petitioner's field on Saturday, July 16, 1993, and remained there while approximately 46,000 pounds of melons were loaded on an open top flat bed trailer. One of the loaders said the melons were "packed real tight," and four bales of straw were used in packing. According to Rowe, who observed the loading, the watermelons packed that day were in "good" condition, and any nonconforming watermelons were "kicked" off the truck. Also, by way of admission, the driver, as agent for Boyer, acknowledged to Rowe that the melons loaded were in "good" condition. Late that afternoon, a thunderstorm came through the area and, due to lightening, no further loading could be performed. Since around 46,000 pounds had already been loaded, petitioner desired for the truck to be sent on its way north. Smith, however, told petitioner he wanted 50,000 pounds in order to make his trip to New York worthwhile and he would not go with anything less. Acceding to his wishes, petitioner agreed to meet Smith the next morning and load an additional two hundred watermelons, or 4,000 pounds, on the truck. Smith then drove the loaded truck to a nearby motel where he spent the night. That evening it rained, and this resulted in the uncovered watermelons and straw getting wet. The next morning, Smith telephoned petitioner and advised her to meet him at 9:00 a. m. at a local Starvin' Marvin store, which had a weight scale that could certify the weight of the shipment. Petitioner carried two hundred watermelons to the store at 9:00 a. m., but Smith did not arrive. Around noon, she received a call from Smith advising that his truck was broken down at the motel and would not start. The watermelons were then taken to the motel and loaded onto the trailer. In all, 50,040 pounds were loaded. Smith's truck would still not start after the watermelons were loaded, and Smith refused to spend any money out of his own pocket to repair the truck. Not wanting to delay the shipment any longer, petitioner gave Smith $35.00 to have someone assist him in starting the vehicle. In order for the repairs to be made, the loaded trailer had to be jacked up and the truck unhooked from and later rehooked to the trailer. This was accomplished only with great difficulty, and Smith was forced to "jostle" the trailer with the power unit for some two hours altogether. According to Rowe, he warned Smith that such jostling could bruise the melons and "mess them up." Smith was also cautioned early on that he should make the necessary repairs as soon as possible so that the load of watermelons would not continue to sit uncovered in the sun. The truck eventually departed around 9:00 p. m., Sunday evening after the uncovered trailer had sat in the sun all day. The shipment was delivered to Brooklyn on the following Tuesday afternoon or evening, and it was inspected by a government inspector on Wednesday morning. According to the inspection report, which has been received in evidence, the load was split evenly between crimson and jubilee melons, and 23 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the two types of melons failed to meet grade. No greater than a 12 percent "margin" is allowed on government inspections. Almost all of the defects cited in the report were attributable to the melons being "over-ripe." The buyer in New York rejected the entire shipment as not meeting standards. Respondent then sold the shipment for only $1350.00 resulting in a loss of $350.00 on the transaction. In addition, respondent says the driver (Smith) accepted $1200.00 instead of the $2,000.00 he would have normally charged to transport a load to New York. When petitioner asked for her money a few weeks later, respondent declined, saying the goods had not met specification when delivered to their destination, and if she had any remedy at all, it was against Smith, the driver. If petitioner had been paid 4 per pound for the entire shipment, she would have been entitled to an additional $1,751.80, or a total of $2,251.80. Petitioner contends that the melons failed to meet grade because of the negligence of the driver. More specifically, she says the loaded melons sat in the sun for almost two days, including all day Sunday after being soaked from the Saturday evening rain. If wet melons are exposed to the hot sun for any length of time, they run the risk of "wet burning," which causes decay. But even if this occurred, only 1 percent of the shipment was found to have "decay" by the government inspector. Petitioner also says that by being jostled for two hours on Sunday, the melons were bruised. Again, however, the melons were rejected primarily because they were over-ripe, not bruised. Therefore, and consistent with the findings in the inspection report, it is found that the jostling and wet burning did not have a material impact on the quality of the melons. Respondent contended the melons were close to being fully ripened when they were picked and loaded. In this regard, Charles Strange, Sr. agreed that if the melons sat in the field for another four or five days, they would have started "going bad." By this, it may be reasonably inferred that, unless the melons were loaded and delivered in a timely manner, they would have become over-ripe and would not meet grade within a matter of days. Therefore, a timely delivery of the melons was extremely important, and to the extent respondent's agent, Smith, experienced at least a twenty-four hour delay in delivering the melons through no fault of petitioner, this contributed in part to their failure to meet grade. Petitioner is accordingly entitled to some additional compensation, a fair allocation of which is one-half of the value of the shipment, or $1125.90, less the $500.00 already paid.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring respondent to pay petitioner $625.90 within thirty days from date of the agency's final order. In the event such payment is not timely made, the surety should be liable for such payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard A. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company Post Office Box 1985 Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1985 Patricia Thomas Post Office Box 522 Archer, Florida 32618 Kennedy Boyer 15A South West 2nd Avenue Williston, Florida 32696

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68604.20604.21
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SANTOS SAMARRIPPAS vs. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING, BUREAU OF COMPLIANCE, 88-005967 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005967 Latest Update: Mar. 07, 1989

Findings Of Fact Respondent is Santos Samarrippas, Sr., a farm labor contractor and holder of a certificate of registration issued by Petitioner at all times pertinent to these proceedings. Respondent's current certificate of registration was issued April 26, 1988. Respondent has renewed his certificate of registration on an annual basis since 1984. As of January 9, 1989, Respondent was indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $5,195.27. This sum represents unpaid unemployment compensation taxes, along with interest and penalties for nonpayment from 1984 to through 1988. In April of 1985, Respondent was informed of his liability for unpaid unemployment compensation taxes in 1984. He completed, after consultation with Petitioner's representative, requisite forms for tax reporting purposes, but neglected to pay the delinquent taxes. Respondent continued his failure to completely pay the required taxes in 1986 and 1987. He made only "pittance" payments. In 1988, Respondent and Petitioner's representative agreed upon a payment plan whereby Respondent agreed to pay the delinquent taxes, penalties and interest at a rate of $100 per week until the total amount owed by him was paid. Respondent made those payments from February 21, 1988 until April 5, 1988. He then ceased to make further payments. The proof establishes that Respondent, after subtraction of the minor payments he made, owed Petitioner a total sum for delinquent taxes, interest, and filing fees for each of the following years in the amounts shown: AMOUNT YEAR $2039 1984 $ 504 1985 $1468.09 1986 $1183.56 1988 Respondent made two timely quarterly tax reports to Petitioner out of a total of 14 required in the period 1984-88, but never made timely payments of the amounts of unemployment compensation taxes owed to Petitioner Also, Respondent never made full payments of the amount of taxes owed. As a result of Respondent's nonpayment of unemployment compensation taxes, Petitioner notified Respondent by letter dated November 17, 1988, of intent to revoke Respondent's Florida Farm Labor Contractor Certificate of Registration for his failure to comply with applicable rules of the United States or the State of Florida relating to unemployment compensation.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking Respondent's certificate of registration as a farm labor contractor. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Joel Chawk, Esquire Post Office Drawer 8209 Lakeland, Florida 33802-8209 Santos Samarrippas, Sr. 3501 Avenue K Northwest Winter Haven, Florida 33881 Moses E. Williams, Esquire Suite 117 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0658 Hugo Menendez, Secretary 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Stephen Barron, Esquire 131 Montgomery Building 2563 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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NOLAN FARMS, INC. vs M. PAGANO AND SONS, INC., AND FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, 95-004512 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Sep. 11, 1995 Number: 95-004512 Latest Update: Dec. 11, 1995

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent owes Petitioner money for watermelons and, if so, how much.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner and Respondent M. Pagano & Son's, Inc. (Respondent) have done business for 20 years. Petitioner grows watermelons, and Respondent buys watermelons for resale. Petitioner's employees have always done business with Respondent by telephone with Morris Pagano. Following a telephone call between Mr. Pagano and Buddy Session, who is Petitioner's salesman, Petitioner sold Respondent a load of watermelons at 14) per pound on May 9, 1995. The weight of the watermelons was 43,560 pounds. On May 10, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent two loads of watermelons at a preagreed price of 14) per pound. The weight of the first load was 40,080 pounds, and the weight of the second load was 44,940 pounds. On May 13, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent two loads of watermelons at a preagreed price of 8) per pound. The weight of the first load was 47,660 pounds, and the weight of the second load was 47,740 pounds. On May 14, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent a load of watermelons at a preagreed price of 8) per pound. The weight of the load was 45,920 pounds. On May 15, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent a load of watermelons at a preagreed price of 8) per pound. The weight of the load was 43,420 pounds. The total due for the seven truckloads of watermelons was $32,780.40. After a few days, Mr. Session telephoned Mr. Pagano and asked for payment. As in all other telephone calls that he initiated, Mr. Session called Mr. Pagano at Respondent's telephone number. At no time did Mr. Pagano or anyone else inform Mr. Session or anyone else employed by Petitioner that the sale was not to Respondent. Following the telephone call, Mr. Pagano sent his field representative to Petitioner's office to settle the account. The field representative was the same person who normally represented Respondent. The market for watermelons had deteriorated since the beginning of May. Respondent's field representative tried to negotiate the price down on this basis, but he did not mention anything about a change in the identity of the buyer. Mr. Session refused to reduce the price, noting that they did not have any complaints about the quality of the watermelons. The field representative then gave Mr. Session a check dated May 22, 1995, drawn on Morris Pagano, Inc., in the amount of $22,214, which Mr. Session accepted as part payment of the amount due. On June 7, 1995, Carlie Nolan Mancil, as president of Petitioner, sent a certified letter, return receipt requested, to Mr. Pagano at Respondent, advising of the unpaid balance of $10,566.40 and warning that he would file a complaint with the Department of Agriculture, if payment were not made within 10 days. Respondent never responded to the letter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order determining that Respondent M. Pagano & Son's, Inc. owes Petitioner the sum of $10,566.40. ENTERED on October 19, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 19, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Buddy Session Nolan Farms, Inc. 3401 Sand Road Cape Coral, FL 33909 M. Pagano & Son's, Inc. 59 Brooklyn Terminal Market Brooklyn, NY 11236

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68604.15604.20604.21
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MID FLORIDA SOD COMPANY vs. AMERICAN SOD, INC., AND PEERLESS INSURANCE COMPANY, 85-002060 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002060 Latest Update: Mar. 10, 1986

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearings the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). However, since the pallets were not an agricultural product produced by Petitioner and were not considered in the price of the bahia sod but were exchanged back and forth between Petitioner and his customer, including Respondent American, they are not considered to be an agricultural product in this case and are excluded from any consideration for payment under Section 604.15-604.30, Florida Statutes. The amount charged Respondent American for these pallets was $1,188.00. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent American was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 3774 by the Department, and bonded by Respondent Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless) in the sum of $15,000 - Bond No. SK-2 87 38. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Peerless was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). During the month of January, 1985 Respondent American purchased numerous pallets of bahia grass sod from Petitioner paying $16.00 per pallet but has refused to pay for 240 pallets at $16.00 per flat for a total amount of $3,840.00 picked up by Respondent American's employees and billed by Petitioner between January 16, 1985 and January 26, 1985. Respondent American did not contest having received 204 pallets of bahia grass sod represented by invoice number. 6774- for 18 pallets on 1/16/85; 6783, 6785, and 6788 for 18 pallets each on 1/17/85; 6791, 6793, 6794, 6795, and 6800 for 16 pallets each on 1/18/85 and 6799 for 18 pallets on 1/18/85, 6831 for 18 pallets on 1/28/85; and 6834 for 16 pallets on 1/30/85 but contested invoice numbers 6835 and 6836 for 18 pallets each on 1/26/85. Gary L. Curtis stipulated at the hearing that Respondent American had received the 36 pallets of bahia grass sod represented by invoice numbers 6835 and 6836 which left only the matter of Respondent American's contention that it was owed credit for 20 pallets of bahia sod received in December, 1984 that was of poor quality and fell apart and had to be replaced because it could not be used. The evidence was insufficient to prove that any of the sod purchased by Respondent American from Petitioner fell apart or was of poor quality and as a result could not he utilized by Respondent American.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent American be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $3,840.00. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent American fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered then Respondent Peerless be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ron Weaver, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe W. Kight, Chief License and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary L. Curtis, President American Sod Company, Inc. Post Office Box 1370 Longwood, Florida 32750 Mid Florida Sod Company 4141 Canoe Creek Road St. Cloud, Florida 32769 Peerless Insurance Company 611 Aymore Road/Suite 202 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Raymond E. Cramer Esquire Post Office Box 607 St. Cloud, Florida 32769

Florida Laws (5) 120.57604.15604.17604.20604.21
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BUBBA HURST vs MCKAY AND ASSOCAITES, INC., D/B/A G. S. P. FARMS AND MADDOX FARMS AND STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY CO., 91-007366 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bushnell, Florida Nov. 15, 1991 Number: 91-007366 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1992

The Issue Whether respondents owe petitioner money on account of watermelon sales?

Findings Of Fact Last spring, her first working on behalf of respondent McKay & Associates, Inc., Pat Harper nee ' Maddox accompanied Randy Finch, the company president, to Florida to help buy and ship produce. Because petitioner Bubba Hurst had sold watermelons to Ms. Harper season before last, she sought him out again. On Tuesday night, May 28, 1991, Ms. Harper orally agreed on behalf of McKay & Associates, Inc. (after Ruth Neuman, the company's secretary-treasurer, had been consulted by telephone) to pay Mr. Hurst 12 cents a pound for two truckloads of watermelons "as is." (Earlier she had seen the watermelons piled in the smaller trucks in which petitioner's crew had brought them from the fields to the melon yard, after harvesting them that day.) With Wednesday morning came a truck and driver (engaged by Ms. Harper or Mr. Finch) to haul the watermelons from petitioner's melon yard to truck scales some ten miles away, then to a farm in Denton, Georgia, for crating and transshipment to their ultimate intended destinations in Maryland and Pennsylvania. After the first truck left at 4:58 that afternoon, loaded with watermelons aggregating 43,280 pounds, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, a second truck and driver arrived. Mr. Finch had agreed to pay Mr. Hurst cash for the watermelons, but a complication arose before they could settle that night: Only after the crew had gone home was it discovered that the second truck was overloaded by some 9,000 pounds; and the driver refused to risk the fines he might incur by hauling an overload. As a result, it was not clear exactly how many watermelons McKay & Associates, Inc. would owe petitioner for. After some discussion, Mr. Finch wrote and signed a check in petitioner's favor but left blank the amount; petitioner then endorsed and returned the check. The plan was, once the exact amount was known, for Mr. Finch to complete the check, cash it, and give Mr. Hurst the proceeds. Afterwards it occurred to Mr. Hurst that if the check were made out for more than what he was to be paid for the watermelons, he could have problems with the Internal Revenue Service. Apprehensive, he asked Mr. Finch to void the check, which he did, by writing "VOID" across it. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Later somebody filled in an amount ($5,193.60, which corresponds to the first load, 43,280 pounds at 12 cents per) and wrote "melons no good," perhaps in anticipation of a formal administrative proceeding like the present one. The check was never negotiated. On Thursday, May 30, 1991, while watermelons were being unloaded from the second truck, two men with a brief case full of cash expressed an interest in the lightening truckload. When Ms. Harper told Mr. Hurst, he said the watermelons were hers to do with as she pleased. She then sold the load to the two men for 12 cents a pound cash, and handed the money over to petitioner. The excess watermelons on the second truck had been offloaded onto a third truck. Of like capacity as the first, the third truck was empty when it accompanied the overloaded truck to the melon yard on Thursday morning. With the departure of the second truck, Ms. Harper and Mr. Finch told Mr. Hurst to fill the third truck up and agreed to buy that truckload. For a while, Mr. Finch was actually "in the line" handing some watermelons along for loading in the third truck, and rejecting others. They weighed 20 pounds each on average. Meanwhile, when Ms. Neuman saw the first truckload, after its arrival in Denton, Georgia, on Thursday morning, she exclaimed, "My God! These are sun scald[ed]!" At hearing, she testified she was incredulous Florida would let such watermelons leave the state. Ms. Neuman telephoned Mr. Finch and told him she was sending the first load back, but that she would take the other load if it "meets federal." She also called the trucking company (then reportedly owned by the late Sam Walton), however, and told the trucker not to load any more watermelons. When Evelyn Hurst, Bubba's mother, answered the telephone at the melon yard lunchtime Thursday, she was asked to tell the driver of the third truck to call home because there was an emergency. The driver made a telephone call, after which he told Mrs. Hurst nothing was wrong at his home. Then he made a second telephone call. After that call, he ordered a stop to the loading then in progress. Bubba Hurst was eating when his mother called with word that no more watermelons were being loaded onto the third truck. He then telephoned the motel where Mr. Finch was staying, and inquired. Mr. Finch told him to finish loading the third truck; and later went to the melon yard and told the driver that loading should go forward. Loading resumed. Later Mr. Finch raised with the driver the possibility of taking the load to New York, but the driver declined the suggestion. Around four o'clock Thursday, the renewed efforts to fill the third truck with watermelons came to an abrupt end, about 250 melons shy of a full load, and the driver, who had ordered the halt, drove away. Mr. Hurst called the motel, and spoke to Ms. Harper, in hope of obtaining the cash he had been promised for his watermelons, but to no avail. The next day the first truck returned from Georgia with the watermelons whose presence on the other side of the state line had so surprised Ms. Neuman; and a federal agricultural inspector, a friend of Mr. Hurst's father, arrived at petitioner's melon yard to inspect them. Mr. Hurst told the inspector (who had been called by Ms. Neuman) that he was welcome to inspect but that the whole load had been sold "as is" and that he - Mr. Hurst - would not be paying for the inspection. Hearing this, the inspector left. Disinterested testimony established that inspections by USDA- certified inspectors are routinely called for by shippers when produce is refused by buyers claiming that produce spoiled before reaching them; but that, at least in the environs of Wildwood, Florida, it is not customary to call for a federal inspection at the point from which watermelons are shipped (unless the shipment is to the Government itself.) Of course, these particular watermelons had already been to Georgia and back. After the inspector left, the driver of the first truck asked that the watermelons be removed from his truck. When Mr. Hurst told him he was trespassing and asked him to leave the melon yard, the driver (or Ms. Neuman by long distance telephone call) summoned a Sumter County deputy sheriff. But the deputy sheriff, informed upon his arrival that the melon yard was a good quarter mile on the Marion County side of the county line, left to perform other duties. Still loaded, the first truck eventually left the melon yard a second time.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DACS order McKay & Associates, Inc. to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order. That, in the event McKay & Associates, Inc. fails to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order, DACS order payment by State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., to the extent necessary to satisfy the requirements of Section 604.21(8), Florida Statutes (1991), for disbursal to petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see findings of fact Nos. 5 and 6. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, petitioner said the load may have been as many as 250 melons light. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11, the value of the second load established by the evidence is $4,591.60, representing 38,280 pounds at 12 cents a pound. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 1 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2 and 3, Ms. Neuman's testimony that she directed her agents to procure federal inspection before the first truck left has not been credited, but she did try to arrange one later. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, the second truck load was never rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 5 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see paragraphs 5 and 6 of the findings of fact. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 7 is immaterial. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 8, Mr. Finch agreed to buy the third truckload and ordered that loading go forward even after Ms. Neuman registered her dissatisfaction with the first load. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Julian E. Harrison, Esquire 324 West Dade Avenue Bushnell, Florida 33513 John Sowa, Esquire Robert L. Rehberger, Esquire 5025 North Henry Boulevard Stockbridge, Georgia 30281

Florida Laws (6) 604.15604.17604.18604.20604.21672.316
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LA ESTANCIA, LTD vs FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, 20-003582BID (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 13, 2020 Number: 20-003582BID Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2024

The Issue The issue is whether Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“Florida Housing”) review and scoring of the applications responding to RFA 2020-104 SAIL Funding for Farm Worker and Commercial Fishing Worker Housing (“the RFA”) were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, the record as a whole, the stipulated facts, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2020).2 Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the financing of affordable housing in Florida. Florida Housing is authorized by section 420.507(48), to allocate federal low income housing tax credits, State Apartment Incentive Loans (“SAIL”), and other funding by means of competitive solicitations. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60 provides that Florida Housing will allocate its competitive funding through the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. Funding is available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications, which is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as described in rule 67-60.009(4). 1 Pueblo Bonito’s Exhibit 1 is the deposition of Nancy Muller of Florida Housing. 2 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references shall be to the 2020 version of the Florida Statutes. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award up to an estimated total of $5,131,050 in SAIL Financing for the construction or rehabilitation of affordable housing developments for farm workers and commercial fishing workers. The RFA was issued on April 15, 2020, and a modified version was issued on April 24, 2020. The application deadline was May 19, 2020. La Estancia and Pueblo Bonito submitted applications proposing the rehabilitation of existing farm worker housing in Hillsborough and Lee Counties, respectively. Both applications were deemed eligible for funding. A review committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (“the Board”). The scoring of the applications was based on a 100-point scale. Applicants submitting a Principal Disclosure Form that had been stamped “pre-approved” received five points. The remaining points were awarded based on the subjective scoring of narrative sections within the applications, and the maximum points were available as follows: Current and Future Need for Farm Worker or Commercial Fishing Worker Housing in the Area (“Need”): 15 points Experience Operating and managing Farm Worker or Commercial Fishing Worker Housing (“Experience”): 20 points Outreach, Marketing, and Referral (“Outreach”): 30 points Resident Access to Onsite and Offsite Programs, Services, and Resources (“Access”): 30 points. With regard to Need, the 2019 Rental Market Study prepared for Florida Housing by the Shimberg Center for Housing Studies at the University of Florida determined that 14.2 percent of Florida’s farm workers are employed in Hillsborough County and 2.55 percent are employed in Lee County. Pueblo Bonito noted in its application that its development is only three miles from the Collier County line, and 5.63 percent of the state’s farm workers are employed in Collier County. La Estancia did not reference Manatee County in its application but noted in its request for a formal administrative hearing that its development is a similar distance from Manatee County, and 6.88 percent of the state’s farm workers are employed there. The Shimberg study also calculated need for farm worker housing type by county with 3,813 multifamily units needed in Hillsborough County, 741 multifamily units needed in Lee County, 1,546 multifamily units needed in Collier County, and 2,337 multifamily units needed in Manatee County. For some RFAs, Florida Housing imposes additional conditions on applications for developments located in Limited Development Areas (“LDAs”). The main purpose of an LDA is to protect Florida Housing’s funded developments in a particular area. An LDA is generally an area that Florida Housing has placed a boundary around that limits different types of new development. Florida Housing annually publishes an LDA Chart on its website listing areas or counties that may apply in the RFA cycle for the coming year. The mere existence of an LDA does not prohibit development within the LDA. This is especially true for rehabilitation projects like those proposed in the instant case. An RFA must specifically reference the LDA in order for the LDA to apply. The first draft of the 2020 LDA Chart was not published by Florida Housing until May 29, 2020, and thus the modified RFA issued on April 24, 2020, included no reference to the LDA Chart. Nor did the RFA include any specific provisions regarding LDAs. The first draft of the 2020 LDA Chart and each subsequent draft or amendment included Lee County for farm worker housing. Florida Housing indicated that the basis for Lee County’s LDA designation was a downward trend in occupancy rates. The occupancy rate for the housing stock in Lee County for the period of August 2019 through January 2020 was 91.67 percent as compared to 95.83 percent for the period of September 2019 through February 2020. Based on this trend, Lee County was proposed as an LDA for the 2020/2021 Florida Housing RFA funding cycle, which became effective July 10, 2020. The following table reflects how the review committee awarded points to the two applicants: Pueblo Bonito La Estancia Principal Disclosure Form (5) 5 5 “Need” (15) 12 12 “Experience” (20) 16 17 “Outreach” (30) 27 27 “Access” (30) 25 24 Total (100) 85 85 In the event of a tie, Florida Housing designed the RFA and the associated rules to incorporate a series of “tie-breakers.” The tiebreakers, in the order of applicability, were: By points received for the Need criterion, with more points preferred. Both applicants received 12 points for need. By SAIL Request Amount Per Unit, with lower SAIL funds per unit preferred. Both applicants requested $50,000 in SAIL funds per unit. By Total SAIL Request Amount as a percentage of Total Development Cost (“TDC”), with applicants whose SAIL request amount is 90 percent or less of TDC preferred. Both applicants’ Total SAIL Request Amount was 90 percent or less of their respective TDCs. By a Florida Job Creation Preference. Both applicants satisfied this preference. By lottery numbers randomly assigned to the applications when they were submitted to Florida Housing. Pueblo Bonito had lottery number 1, and La Estancia had lottery number 2. Nancy Muller was the Review Committee member assigned to review and score the “Need” narrative section of the Applications responding to the RFA. Ms. Muller is currently a Policy Specialist with Florida Housing. Prior to her current position, Ms. Muller was, for many years, the Director of Policy and Special Programs. In reviewing and scoring the applications submitted to Florida Housing in the instant case, Ms. Muller indicated that she first read the narrative question of the RFA and broke the question down into four separate component parts. The components included: (a) current and future need for farm workers over the next 10 to 15 years; (b) location and proximity of farms and other types of farm work that typically use farm worker labor; (c) information concerning the types of crops, seasons, etc. and the demand for specific farm worker housing; and (d) whether waivers have been requested or granted for either the proposed Development or Developments in the area. Next, Ms. Muller reviewed each application against those component parts and ultimately awarded La Estancia and Pueblo Bonito 12 points each for their respective response to the need section. Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s corporate representative, testified that just because the documented need for farm worker housing is higher in Hillsborough County than it is in Lee County does not mean that La Estancia should have received a higher score in the narrative section than Pueblo Bonito because the RFA “sets forth a much more nuanced request for the description of the current and future needs in the area for the proposed development. So it’s not limited to just a flat-out look at the county under the Shimberg study. If [that] were the case, we wouldn’t need to have a narrative scoring component of the RFA.” Ms. Muller and Ms. Button persuasively testified that numeric need was just one of the components an applicant needed to address in responding to the needs question. In fact, Ms. Muller indicated she recognized the greater numeric need for farm worker housing in Hillsborough County, and the greater need factored into her consideration of that particular component. However, Ms. Muller pointed out that because both proposed projects were rehabilitation of existing units, neither was actually addressing nor reducing the numeric need for new units. Ms. Muller acknowledged that La Estancia’s response at this component of the need analysis was “stronger” because of the greater need. Nevertheless, Ms. Muller indicated that while La Estancia demonstrated a greater numeric need, Pueblo Bonito’s response was “stronger” in other areas of the overall need response. Specifically, Pueblo Bonito provided a stronger response as to the location and proximity of farms and other types of farm work that use farm worker labor. Ms. Muller considered and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of each response and no one component was weighted greater than any other component. Based on the scoring and tie-breakers, the review committee recommended Pueblo Bonito for funding. However, the Board’s deliberations were not to be limited to the review committee’s recommendation or information provided by the review committee. With regard to the Board’s funding selection, the RFA stated that: [t]he Board may use the Applications, the Committee’s scoring, any other information or recommendation provided by the Committee or staff, and any other information the Board deems relevant in its selection of Applicants to whom to award funding. The Board met on July 17, 2020, to consider the review committee’s recommendation and preliminarily selected Pueblo Bonito for funding, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process.3 Florida 3 The RFA also employed a “Funding Test” to be used in the selection of applications for funding. The “Funding Test” required that the amount of unawarded SAIL funding must be enough to fully fund that applicant’s SAIL request amount. After the selection of Pueblo Bonito for funding, there was only $1,131,050 in SAIL funding remaining, and that was not enough to fund La Estancia’s $4,200,000 SAIL request. Housing staff did not inform the Board that Lee County had been designated as an LDA for farm worker housing on the 2020 LDA Chart. Also, there is no evidence that any Board member knew of Lee County’s LDA status or of declining farm worker housing occupancy when they voted to select Pueblo Bonito for funding. La Estancia could not have presented the information regarding Lee County’s LDA status to the Board. The RFA contains a “noninterference” clause prohibiting an applicant or its representative from contacting Board members or Florida Housing’s staff “concerning their own or any other Applicant’s Application” during the period beginning with the application deadline and continuing until the Board “renders a final decision on the RFA.” If an applicant makes such contact in an attempt to influence the selection process, then that applicant’s application is disqualified. As a result, La Estancia was unable to correct the review committee’s omission of information regarding declining farm worker housing occupancy levels in Lee County. Ms. Button testified that it was Florida Housing’s practice not to apply new standards or requirements that changed after the application deadline when scoring applications. She stated that Florida Housing scores “based on the terms of the RFA and we wouldn’t retroactively apply something to those applications after they’ve been submitted.” She specifically testified that if a county is designated as an LDA after the application deadline, Florida Housing would not apply that designation to the application. She also testified that one of the reasons for not considering new requirements after the application deadline is that applicants would not be allowed to amend their applications to address these new requirements. Even if the July 10 LDA designation had applied to this RFA, there is no evidence that it would have changed Florida Housing’s scoring decision. The primary purpose for the LDA designation is to discourage new construction that could harm existing developments. In this case, both applicants are proposing to rehabilitate existing developments, and the evidence shows that Florida Housing would not prohibit the funding of a rehabilitation project even if it were in an LDA. Florida Housing has funded the rehabilitation of farm worker developments located in LDAs since 2013 or 2014. In RFA 2017-104, the only previous farm worker RFA in evidence, the LDA designation did not even apply to rehabilitation projects that were in Florida Housing’s portfolio. Ms. Muller testified that because the two applicants in this case both involved rehabilitation of developments in Florida Housing’s portfolio, the LDA designation would have been “moot,” unless the physical occupancy rates were dire, which they were not. She also testified that “preservation of existing developments is of much less, if any, importance related to LDA.” Ms. Button testified that she did not specifically inform the Board of the LDA designation “because it’s not relevant to the terms for which the applications were scored for this RFA, it was not a part of the RFA terms, and the applicants did not, you know, apply with that designation put in place. It’s for a future prospective funding cycle and it was not effective until after the application due date.” The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Florida Housing’s review and scoring of the applications responding to the RFA were not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a Final Order dismissing La Estancia, Ltd.’s formal written protest and awarding funding to Partnership in Housing, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Suite 500 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed)

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68420.504420.507 Florida Administrative Code (1) 67-60.009 DOAH Case (1) 20-3582BID
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CHARLES W. WARD, JR., D/B/A WARD FARMS vs MADDOX BROTHERS PRODUCE, INC., AND FIREMAN`S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, 90-007470 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Nov. 26, 1990 Number: 90-007470 Latest Update: Jan. 24, 1991

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of the parties, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Charles W. Ward, Jr., is a co-owner, with other members of his family, of a cattle ranch in south Hendry County known as Ward Farms. Respondent, Maddox Brothers Produce, Inc., is a licensed agriculture dealer engaged in the business of brokering agriculture products in the State of Florida. As an agriculture dealer, respondent is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). One such requirement of the Department is that all dealers post a surety bond with the Department's Division of Licensing and Bond. To this end, respondent has posted a $50,000 surety bond with Fireman's Fund Insurance Company as the surety. In addition to raising livestock, petitioner also grows watermelons on his property. Pursuant to an agreement by the parties, between April 16 and May 15, 1990, respondent harvested and then transported petitioner's watermelons to other destinations outside the state. The parties have stipulated that respondent still owes petitioner $53,980.92 as payment for the watermelons. Respondent has agreed to pay petitioner the above sum of money on or before February 15, 1991, or within fifteen days after the agency's order becomes final, whichever is later. Otherwise, payment shall be made from respondent's bond posted by the surety, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that respondent, a licensed agriculture dealer, is indebted to petitioner in the amount of $53,980.92, and that such debt be satisfied in accordance with the time limitations set forth in this recommended order. Otherwise, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company shall be obligated to pay over to the Department the full amount of the bond, or $50,000. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles W. Ward, Jr. Star Route, Box 72 LaBelle, Florida 33440 Patricia Maddox Harper 4253 Kingston Pike Knoxville, Tennessee 37919 Barbara J. Kennedy, Esquire Fireman's Fund Insurance Company Post Office Box 193136 San Francisco, California 94119-3136 Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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HOMESTEAD POLE BEAN COOPERATIVE, INC. vs MO-BO ENTERPRISES, INC., AND ARMOR INSURANCE COMPANY, 95-002377 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 09, 1995 Number: 95-002377 Latest Update: Dec. 01, 1995

The Issue Whether Homestead Pole Bean Cooperative, Inc., is owed $10,475.35 for agricultural products ordered by and delivered to Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Homestead is an agent for producers of Florida-grown agricultural products. Mo-Bo is a dealer in such products in the normal course of its business and is bonded by Armor. During the period from December 2, 1994, until January 9, 1995, Mo-Bo ordered green beans and squash from Homestead. In accordance with the longstanding practice of Homestead when doing business with Mo-Bo, the orders were accepted by telephone and the items were loaded onto trucks sent by Mo-Bo to Homestead's warehouse. Homestead sent the following invoices to Mo-Bo for agricultural products order by and delivered to Mo-Bo: December 6, 1994 Invoice Number 75636 $2,590.00 December 15, 1994 Invoice Number 75895 5,253.85 December 21, 1994 Invoice Number 75994 200.00 January 2, 1995 Invoice Number 76161 576.00 January 5, 1995 Invoice Number 76232 (109.00) January 12, 1995 Invoice Number 76348 1,332.00 January 12, 1995 Invoice Number 76349 632.50 TOTAL $10,475.35 The invoice amounts were adjusted by Homestead to account for credits given for products which were unsatisfactory, and payment was due twenty days from the date of each invoice. Despite repeated demands, Mo-Bo has not paid any of the amounts reflected in these invoices. As of September 6, 1995, the date of the formal hearing, $10,475.35 remained due and owing to Homestead.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc., to pay $10,475.35 to Homestead Pole Bean Cooperative, Inc., and, if Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc., does not pay this amount, ordering Armor Insurance Company to pay this amount, up to its maximum liability under its bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles W. Nelson, Jr., Comptroller Homestead Pole Bean Cooperative, Inc. 26000 South Dixie Highway Post Office Box 2248 Naranja, Florida 33032 Charles D. Barnard, Esquire 200 Southeast 6th Street Suite 205 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Mark J. Albrechta, Esquire Armor Insurance Company Legal Department Post Office Box 15250 Tampa, Florida 33684-5250 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (5) 120.57475.37604.15604.19604.21
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