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DOUGLAS L. ADAMS, ET AL. vs. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 84-004373RX (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004373RX Latest Update: Apr. 23, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Douglas Lavern Adams, Edwin Paul, Stanley Blanding, Carl B. Cribbs, Efron Yero, and James M. Cook are all incarcerated in the State of Florida at Respondent's facility, the Union Correctional Institution located at Raiford, Florida. On November 15, 1984, the Department of Corrections forwarded to the Bureau of the Administrative Code for publishing in the next available issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly, its proposed Rule 33-5. The proposed rule in question was published in Volume 10, No. 46 on November 21, 1984. The stated purpose and effect of the proposed rule was to clarify and revise policies and procedures relating to visitation with inmates. The proposed rule purported to make certain changes to pre-existing Rule 33-5 as outlined in the proposal which, among other things, allowed superintendents to make exceptions to any provision of this rule on an individual case by case basis, based on the best interests of the inmate, the security and welfare of the department, or both with the qualification that the exception could not be more restrictive than the provisions of the rules and with the further requirement that all visiting policies promulgated by the superintendent shall be subject to approval by the Secretary of the department. Petitioners contend that the proposed changes severely limit their prior existing visiting rights. Specifically, Petitioners' contentions include: Rule 33-5.01 is without legislative authority in that the Secretary has no authority from the legislature to delegate policy making authority to superintendents; Rule 33-5.04 is an invalid rule for the same reason and because it deprives hospital inmates of family visits in an arbitrary and capricious manner, without a valid penological objective, and in violation of both equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions and is fatally vague and invalid in that by stating, "any other special status" it fails to specify what status prisoners will be prohibited from visitation; Rule 33-5.07(5) constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative authority to an employee; Rule 33-5.08(2) is arbitrary, capricious, and without any known penological objective, constitutes an abuse of discretion, and is unreasonable in that it is without a rational basis for the potential reduction of visiting days; Rule 33-5.08(3) is discriminatory on its face, is fatally vague, and insufficient in specificity to inform Petitioners what circumstances will be considered; Rule 33-5.08(4) is without a rational basis in fact and is fatally vague; Rule 33-5.10(c) is an unconstitutional rule in that by authorizing unwarranted searches and invasions of privacy of visitors, this would discourage visitation and thereby deprive Petitioners of visits; Rule 33-5.08(12)(c) is fatally vague and overbroad and discriminates against female visitors in an arbitrary and capricious manner by permitting their exclusion if they are "not appropriately clothed or are dressed in revealing attire . . . and other like attire"; Rule 33-5.08(14) and (15) constitute an abuse of discretion and are discriminatory in an arbitrary and capricious manner in that they refer without defining or explaining "security" reasons for allowing non-contact visits; (j) Rule 33-5.04 and 33-5.08(2) render the proposed rule ambiguous and vague because prisoners will not be able to ascertain if they are entitled to visits and the rules cannot be uniformly applied on a just and rational basis; (k) that Respondent has failed to provide adequate notice of the proposed rule to those inmates in administrative, disciplinary, and close management status. The proposed changes to the rules came about after Respondent conducted a survey of the existing visitation policies of all institutions within its system. This review indicated a need for a statewide set of standards for visitations while at the same time allowing the superintendents of the various institutions the flexibility to tailor standards at the individual institutions to local needs and the special needs of the inmates. The survey showed a need for some flexibility within the rules to accommodate the uniqueness of the individual facilities and the special needs inherent therein while at the same time addressing the overall needs constant throughout the system such as security, inmate health and welfare, and safety of both staff and inmate population. Primary among the concerns considered by the Department was the security aspect. The need to control contraband and to maintain order and discipline within the confines of any given facility is obvious. Without question a valid concern of the staff is the ability to control who and what goes into the facility. The superintendent has the inherent power to interdict the introduction of drugs, alcohol, weapons and similar contraband into a facility. He or she also has the responsibility to insure against the potential for disturbance caused by obviously inappropriate clothing worn by staff visitors to a sexually segregated institution. James M. Cook is an inmate at the Union Correctional Institution who has received special visits of the type to be governed under proposed Rule 33- 5.04 in the past. On those occasions he had to establish for his proposed visitor the classification the visitor would fall under, such as distance from the facility travel led or other criteria. In his opinion the proposed rule is somewhat vague. He contends it does not give specifics as to mileage, clothing to be worn, etc., in detail adequate for the proposed visitor to know what is required. He understands from a conversation with his classification officer that the distance requirement to be applied under the new rule is 400 miles but this criteria is not specifically stated in the proposed rule nor can it be determined from reading the rule. As to female visitors, he contends that that portion of the proposed rule which provides for appropriate clothing is insufficient in detail to insure the visitors will be properly dressed for the visit. It has been his experience in the past that if a female visitor is improperly dressed, as determined by the institution's personnel, the guards require her to wear a shapeless smock. Under the terms of the new rule, Cook said, he is required to inform his visitor what can and cannot be worn, but because the rule is devoid of detail, it is difficult for him to do this. Proposed Rule 33-5.06(3) does not, as Cook asserts, require the inmate to inform the visitor in detail of the particulars of the visiting program only the basics, such as hours, days, and, to be sure, the need for non-provocative apparel. The question on the distance requirements for special visits is also of concern to inmate Cribbs whose mother lives in Tampa, a 350 mile round trip from this facility. Cribbs contends the proposed-rule has no specifics in it as to mileage for special visitors. In the past, his mother, coming from Tampa, has been able to visit on both Saturday and Sunday and because of the distance, has made a two day visit out of the trip. The new rule, according to Cribbs, leaves everything up to the superintendent regarding visiting privileges and depending upon the determination of that officer, his mother may be forced to come this long distance to see him only on one day of the weekend. Under the current policy, inmates are allowed visitors on both Saturday and Sunday and the new rule, he feels, will change this benefit to allow visits normally only once per weekend. Cribbs is also concerned about the dress requirements of the new rule. He is concerned with the term "like attire" which he feels makes it difficult for him to tell his female visitors what to wear. Petitioner, Stanley Blending, has also had visitors on both days of the weekend in the past. He had a need for this benefit because his grandmother came from Canada for a visit once a year and, in addition, his son comes up to visit from time to time and the two day visit is required for him to talk with the young man regarding family problems. At UCI he currently gets two days of visits and, in his opinion, these two day visits have had a beneficial, rehabilitative effect. As in the case of Cribbs, Blanding's family comes from Tampa and that distance makes it necessary for them to have a two day visit. He is concerned and believes that the proposed rule will limit visits to one day per weekend which, in his opinion, would severely limit the amount of visitation he would receive. He is also concerned, about the proposed rule regarding appropriate dress for female visitors. The proposed rule says nothing about the institution providing a smock for inappropriately dressed females as has been done in the past. Combining the two changes, if his visits were reduced to one day or his female visitors were barred because of "improper" clothing, either situation would have an adverse effect on him. The current rule does not provide what is appropriate clothing and under the terms of the new rule, he would have a difficult time explaining to his female visitors what "appropriate" clothing is. Inmate Yero was in disciplinary confinement in December, 1984 and then placed under investigation. While he was in that status from October 26, 1984 through early January, 1985, he did not get to see nor did he ever receive notice of the proposed rule. Prior to October, 1984, he was allowed visitors from one to two hours. This was the rule for prisoner in disciplinary confinement. The new rule would allow the superintendent to restrict visitors to prisoners in Yero's status. The new rule adds the word "infirmaries" to the list of special status inmates. He signed the Petition herein with only limited knowledge of its contents. Inmate Paul is presently a hospital inmate and has been intermittently since 1982. He is housed in the hospital because of a disability which confines him to a wheel chair not because of any contagious or infectious disease. He understands the new rule to state that since he is in the hospital, he could be denied visitors even though he is not a patient but a special housing prisoner who is considered to be a regular inmate. He was advised that when his sister from New York called to arrange a visit with him, she was told that because he was in the hospital, he could have only a one hour visit with her. The new rule could prohibit him from having visitors at all, he says, and leaves too much discretion with the superintendent. The one hour rule which applies to inmates in the hospital has had an adverse effect on him since he has been deprived of visits from his sister. He and his sister are orphans, he says, who have just been recently reunited after a long separation. He contends that the new rule puts too much control in the hands of the superintendent. It is too vague and gives the superintendent authorization to make decisions which he should not have. The propriety of placing control, the right to make decisions, and discretion in the hands of the superintendent is clear. Without question, the superintendent is the individual most qualified to make those decisions and to exercise those functions. Adams' mother is old. Because of this and because she cannot walk far, the past changes in parking and entry procedures have cut down on her visits to him. Because of this, he is not likely to be affected by the potential for a change to one day visits. However, as to the dress rule, he would have difficulty in telling his family what they could or could not wear based on the descriptions or lack thereof in the proposed rule. During the four years he has been in confinement, he has found it difficult to know or determine who is going to do what at any given time. His mother has told him that she would like to visit him but doesn't want to go through all the difficulties she has to encounter when she does visit. She states to him that the metal in her bra sets off the metal detector utilized to screen visitors and as a result, she wears a tank top on her visits which would be prohibited by the new rules. He considers this to be deleterious to him and his welfare and he contends that the new rule will destroy any uniformity among the 79 or so different facilities within the DOC. There is no evidence that the sole alternative to a metal braced bra is a tank top. Numerous other modes of dress are available to women of all ages, sizes, and shapes. According to Harry Singletary, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Corrections, the Department is presently reviewing all rules and policy and procedure directives in an effort to do away with the latter and make all controlling directives for the Department in the form of Rules. The intent is to promulgate standards for statewide application to meet the needs of the families of the inmates, the inmates, and the institutions. Mr. Singletary contends that the majority of changes set out in the proposed rules make them more liberal for the inmate or increase security for the institution. Both of these goals are worthy and supportable. It was the intent of the drafters of the rule to standardize procedures so that visitation would be made easier and safer and to increase uniformity among the institutions so that prisoners moving from one institution to another could know what to expect. It is the Department's position that a rule should not create surprises for the inmates and should liberalize and simplify procedures for them as much as possible. As to proposed Rule 33-5.01, the reason for the new language was to give the Superintendent the discretion to provide more visitation for the inmates and their families and to deal with special needs of the inmates or the institution. The change here is to liberalize - not penalize. The terms of the proposed rule provide that Superintendents' interpretations cannot be more strict than the terms of the rule and it in essence legitimizes superintendents being more liberal than the rule calls for. Based on the population and size of the UCI visitor park, notwithstanding the concerns of Mr. Adams that the Legislature and recent court decisions will have the effect of significantly reducing the population at UCI, there should he no change in visitor policy as it exists now at this institution. As a matter of fact, if the population decreases, there would be less pressure or reason to reduce the visit days for each inmate to make more time available for others. The fact that some language is less than specific (i.e., 6 hours instead of 9 am to 3 pm) reflects an intention on the part of the drafters to give the superintendent latitude to tailor local policy to the needs of the inmates and his institution. It is recognized that there may be some abuses by superintendents, but if this should occur, it would be the exception rather than the rule and there are adequate remedies existing in the DOC rules through grievance procedures to rectify any such abuse. With regard to proposed Rule 33-5.04, dealing with special status inmates, the change here proposed adds only the word "infirmaries." The existing rule was changed only to describe all types of facilities. The rule originally was designed to prevent the spread of disease incident to the closeness of prison populations. However, it is Mr. Singletary's confirmed opinion that ambulatory or non-infectious patient- inmates, such as Mr. Paul, one of the Petitioners here, would be allowed visitors in the visitor park the same as any other inmate, on regular hours. Proposed Rule 33-5.07(5) is a new offering which gives the Superintendent authority to act to promote discipline but provides adequate safeguards to prevent abuse. Proposed Rule 33- 5.08(3) is also new and it gives the inmates the opportunity to tell the superintendent what they need and provides for extra visiting time when justified. It also gives specific factors that inmates are to use to justify extra visiting time. It was intended to promote uniformity. Proposed Rule 33-5.08(10) dealing with searches, is designed to provide for a method to prevent the introduction of contraband into the institution. It is for the security of the institution and if reasonable, should provide no problems. There are presently no dress codes applicable to visitors coming into UCI or any other institution. Proposed Rule 33- 5.08(1)(c) applies to both men and women and is based on the need for security in the institution. The intent of the agency was to limit the opportunity for rude, suggestive, or untoward comments by inmates which could give offense to the resident inmate relative of the visitor to whom the comments are directed and which could incite fights or other violence. Proposed Rules 33-5.08(14) and (15) both exist in the present rule. Subparagraph 14 deals with people in protective custody and death row inmates as well as violent inmates. Subparagraph 15 deals with those instances where contact visits might jeopardize security. Those inmates in normal status would not be separated. The rules are based on the need to maintain security and prevent the passing of weapons, the spread of disease, or inappropriate conduct as is periodically demonstrated by inmates and visitors. The machinery designed by the agency to deal with those instances envisioned by the rule where a Superintendent of a particular institution might want to impose a standard stricter than that encompassed in the rule, requires that superintendent to submit his proposal to the Secretary of DOC along with justification and documentation indicating a need for a stricter standard. It is also envisioned that prisoners requesting a transfer from one institution to another write in advance to the new institution to get the local policy regarding a particular area or, wait to be briefed as to local policy during the incoming orientation on arrival. Just as the institutional superintendent must justify imposing a stricter standard than called for in the rule, it is, as well, the responsibility of the inmate who request extra visiting time, to present factors justifying the extension, the grant or denial of which is within the prerogative of the superintendent. Admittedly, while the rule does not define specific criteria for the superintendent to use in making his decision, it will be based on the reasonableness of the request and the sufficiency of the reasons submitted by the inmate. In short, the inmate must make his case and is not limited as to the factors he may use to show the need for extra time or for the change in location. The decision is within the discretion of the superintendent and is similar to other areas such as release, privileges, and the like in which the superintendent has been held capable of legitimately utilizing his discretion.

Florida Laws (5) 120.54120.6820.0520.315944.23
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs RICHARD F. RONNICK, 98-002879 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jun. 29, 1998 Number: 98-002879 Latest Update: Mar. 11, 1999

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1997), by pleading or having been found guilty of a crime which involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. (All Chapter and Section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of real estate licensees in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a real estate broker pursuant to license no. 0414405. The last license issued is inactive. On December 15, 1997, Respondent entered into a plea of guilty to aggravated assault and leaving the scene of an accident with injuries. Both crimes are third-degree felonies under Sections 784.02(1) and 316.027(1)(a), respectively. The court adjudicated Respondent guilty and sentenced Respondent to two years of community control to be followed by two years probation. Both sentences ran concurrently. The court also imposed miscellaneous fines in the cumulative amount of $255 and ordered Respondent to pay probation costs. On January 13, 1998, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner voluntarily disclosing his plea and conviction. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history. Both convictions involve a single incident which occurred on November 23, 1996, at the Draft House, 1615 Lee Road, Orlando, Florida, a bar in Orange County, Florida. Respondent touched the female owner of the bar on her buttocks. The owner's son took offense to the incident. When Respondent left the bar, the owner's son followed Respondent to Respondent's car in the parking lot. The owner's son hit Respondent in the nose with his fist. Respondent got into his car. The owner's son smashed the windshield of Respondent's car with a steel bar. Respondent left the scene to call for help. When Respondent drove away, Respondent's car struck the owner's son. Respondent did not remain at the scene because he feared for his own safety. Respondent stopped a few blocks away and called 911. The extent of injuries of the person struck by Respondent's car was not established at the hearing.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(f), and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Richard F. Ronnick 4271 Biltmore Road Orlando, Florida 32804-2201 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 316.027475.25 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2 -24.001
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DAVID ANSGAR NYBERG vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 92-000006RX (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 08, 1992 Number: 92-000006RX Latest Update: Jun. 07, 1993

Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, David Ansgar Nyberg, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Petitioner has challenged Rule 33-12.001(2), Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-12.001(2), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-12.001, Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: Prior notice of adoption, amendment or repeal of a rule shall be made available to persons or parties directly affected by the rule as required in 120, F.S. Notice to those directly affected by a proposed rule shall be by: . . . . (b) Publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly at least 14 days prior to any proposed hearing. . . . . (d) Posting by memorandum notice of the intended action on the inmate and personnel bulletin boards of all major institutions, road prisons, community correctional centers, community vocational centers and offices throughout the state directing that complete proposed rules are available in each institutional library or office. A copy of the notice shall be circulated among the inmates in all disciplinary, administrative or close management confinement areas of all facilities.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.54120.56120.68944.09
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DARRYL JAMES MCGLAMRY vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 91-002804RE (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Belle Glade, Florida May 08, 1991 Number: 91-002804RE Latest Update: Oct. 15, 1991

Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Darryl McGlamry, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. The Challenged Rule, Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code. On January 23, 1991, the Respondent filed Rule 33ER91-1. This emergency rule was filed by the Respondent to alleviate problems created by a high increase in the number of close custody inmates caused by changes in the Respondent's rules during 1990. Pursuant to Section 120.54(9)(c), Florida Statutes, Rule 33ER91-1 was only effective for ninety (90) days. Therefore, Rule 33ER91-1 was due to expire on or about April 24, 1991. On April 23, 1991, the Respondent filed the Challenged Rule. The Challenged Rule is identical in its terms to Rule 33ER91-1. The Challenged Rule should have expired on July 22, 1991. The instant challenge was instituted on May 8, 1991, before the Challenged Rule expired. The amendments to Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, filed by the Respondent on July 1, 1991, do not repeal the effect of the Challenged Rule prior to July 1, 1991.

Florida Laws (4) 120.54120.56120.68944.09
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BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. WILTON MCLEAN REAVIS, JR., 84-003146 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003146 Latest Update: Jul. 03, 1985

Findings Of Fact In 1977, Dr. Reavis applied for licensure as a medical doctor in Florida by endorsement pursuant to Section 458.051, [now Section 458.313(3)], Florida Statutes. Dr. Reavis was licensed in January 1978 by the Board. Dr. Reavis moved to Lakeland, Florida in 1978, where he has practiced medicine continuously since that time. The Board without actual notice to Dr. Reavis entered a Final Order on February 5, 1981, which purported to declare null and void the license of Dr. Reavis to practice medicine in Florida. Dr. Reavis became aware of the Board's action in 1984 when he sought to renew his license. Dr. Reavis immediately took steps to have the Board's order of February 5, 1981, rescinded. The Board reinstated the license of Dr. Reavis on February 15, 1984, but concurrently gave notice of its intent to reprimand Dr. Reavis for violation of Rule 21M-22.17, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 21M-22.17, Florida Administrative Code was enacted on December 12, 1983. Rule 21M-22.17, Florida Administrative Code, requires a doctor licensed by endorsement to present evidence to the Board of actually practicing in Florida. It is this provision of the rule which the Board alleges Dr. Reavis violated.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medical Examiners dismiss forthwith the Notice of Intent to Reprimand, and take no penal action against the Respondent, Dr. Wilton Reavis. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Tully, Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Office of the Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas L. Clarke, Jr., Esquire P.O. Drawer J Lakeland, Florida 33802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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DONALD EUGENE HALPIN AND RICHARD EDWARD JACKSON vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 91-001656RX (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Arcadia, Florida Mar. 18, 1991 Number: 91-001656RX Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1993

The Issue Whether Rules 33ER91-1 and 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?

Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, Donald Eugene Halpin and Richard Edward Jackson, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the emergency rules at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing the rights of inmates, the operation and management of correctional institutions, classification of inmates and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code. Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, governs, among other things, the classification of inmates. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, governs the classification of inmates for purposes of determining the type of custody an inmate should be subjected to. Pursuant to Rule 33-6.009(3), Florida Administrative Code, inmates may be classified in one of five custody classifications: minimum, medium-out, medium-in, close or maximum. History of Changes in Custody Grade Classification of Inmates Since 1990. In June of 1990, Donald D. Dillbeck, an inmate of the Respondent, was classified and placed in a minimum custody classification, which is the least restrictive custody classification. While outside of the institution in which he was housed and while working at a vocational center, Dillbeck escaped from custody of the Respondent and murdered a woman in the parking lot of a shopping center in Tallahassee, Florida. In response to this murder, then Governor Bob Martinez issued an executive order ordering that all medium or minimum custody classifications of capital-life felons be revoked and that all capital-life felons be classified as close custody, the second most restrictive custody classification. Governor Martinez's executive order was followed by the promulgation by the Respondent of Rule 33ER90-4, Florida Administrative Code, amending Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. Effective January 23, 1991, the Respondent promulgated Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, amending Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. Effective April 23, 1991, at approximately the same time that Rule 33ER91-1 expired, the Respondent promulgated Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, amending Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, Prior to the First 1991 Emergency Rule. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, prior to its amendment by Rule 33ER91-1, and other subsequent amendments, contained the following general provisions, pertinent to this proceeding: Section (3) contained provisions concerning the manner in which custody grades of inmates were determined; Section (4) contained provisions placing restrictions on the placement of certain inmates into the community; and Section (5) contained provisions placing restrictions on the assignments that certain inmates could be given. In general, Rule 33-6.009(3), Florida Administrative Code, provided the following: Five classes of custody were established. Rule 33-6.009(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code; An initial questionnaire and reclassification questionnaires were required to be completed for all inmates. Rule 33-6.009(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code; Inmates were awarded a numerical score as a result of the completion of the initial and reclassification questionnaires. Each inmate's custody classification was initially determined based upon this numerical score. For example, an inmate with an initial score of six or more and an inmate with a reclassification score of eight or more was classified as close custody. Rule 33-6.009(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code; If an inmate's numerical score was below the score for close custody and the inmate was not within thirty-six months of release, the inmate's custody classification had to be raised to close custody if any of a number of factors referred to as a "custody checklist" applied to the inmate. For example, an inmate serving a sentence for first or second degree murder had to be classified as close custody even if that inmate's questionnaire score was below six points (on an initial questionnaire) or below eight points (on a reclassification questionnaire). Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code; Additionally, an inmate had to be classified as close custody even if the inmate's score was below six or eight points until the minimum mandatory portion, if any, of the inmate's sentence was satisfied or the inmate was within thirty-six months of release, if the inmate was serving time for certain specified offenses. Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)4, Florida Administrative Code; An inmate's custody grade questionnaire score could also be modified upward based upon consideration of other factors specified in Rule 33- 6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code, such as whether the inmate's primary offense had been reduced as a result of a plea bargain. Custody grade scores could be modified downward based upon the same factors but only if the custody checklist was met. Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code; Finally, all custody assignments had to be reviewed and approved by the superintendent or his designee. Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)6, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.009(4), Florida Administrative Code, prohibited the placement of an inmate on work release or other community contract bed if the inmate met any of a number of specified factors, including conviction of 1st or 2nd degree murder (unless the inmate had completed the mandatory portion of the inmate's sentence and was within twelve months of release). Rule 33-6.009(5), Florida Administrative Code, prohibited inmates from being assigned to a road prison, vocational center, forestry camp or to a work camp not adjacent to a major institution if the inmate met any of a number of specified factors, including conviction of 1st or 2nd degree murder. Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, amended the substance of Rule 33-6.009(3), (4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1 did not amend the five classes of custody established in Rule 33-6.009(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1 did not amend the requirement that initial and reclassification questionnaires be completed for all inmates contained in Rule 33-6.009(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1 did not amend the manner in which inmates are awarded a numerical score as a result of the completion of the initial and reclassification questionnaires. Each inmate's custody classification is still initially determined based upon this numerical score. Rule 33-6.009(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1 did amend Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, by eliminating the requirement that the custody classification of an inmate with a grade below the score for close custody had to be raised if any of the factors on the "custody checklist" applied to the inmate. Therefore, for example, an inmate serving a sentence for first or second degree murder is not automatically classified as close custody even if that inmate's questionnaire score is below the six points (on an initial questionnaire) or below eight points (on a reclassification questionnaire). Rule 33ER91-1 also amended Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, by eliminating the requirement that an inmate be classified as close custody even if the inmate's score was below six or eight points until the minimum mandatory portion, if any, of the inmate's sentence was satisfied or the inmate was within thirty-six months of release based upon the specified offenses formerly contained in Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)4, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1, also amended Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code. In essence, the amendment to Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code, requires that the Respondent consider a number of factors to either increase or decrease an inmate's custody grade questionnaire score. Generally, all of the factors which the Respondent was required to consider under Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, and all of the factors which required close custody under Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, must only be considered by the Respondent under the emergency rule. Rule 33ER91-1, eliminated the requirement contained in Rule 33- 6.009(3)(d)6, Florida Administrative Code, that all custody assignments be reviewed and approved by the superintendent or his designee. The superintendent of a prison is now required under the emergency rule to review and approve all modifications to the custody classification resulting from an inmate's questionnaire. Rule 33ER91-1 repealed Rule 33-6.009(4), Florida Administrative Code, and its prohibition on the placement of an inmate on work release or other community contract bed if the inmate met any of the factors specified in this portion of the rule. Finally, Rule 33ER91-1 repealed Rule 33-6.009(5), Florida Administrative Code, and its prohibition on inmates being assigned to a road prison, vocational center, forestry camp or to a work camp not adjacent to a major institution if the inmate met any of the factors specified in this portion of the rule. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirements of Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, are arbitrary or capricious. Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, is for all practical purposes identical to Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, was declared invalid in a Final Order entered on October 1, 1991, in Darryl James McGlamry v. Department of Corrections, Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 91-2804R.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.54120.56120.68944.09
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs LINDA L. PAIGE, 97-002798 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake Butler, Florida Jun. 10, 1997 Number: 97-002798 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has failed to maintain the qualifications for certification as a correctional officer, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on August 31, 1994. She was issued correctional certificate number 145457. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a corrections officer at the Union Correctional Institution (UCI). She worked the 4:00 p.m.-12:00 midnight shift. R. E. Jernigan, Correctional Officer Inspector at UCI, received an anonymous telephone call on January 6, 1995. The caller stated that Respondent would be attempting to bring drugs into the institution on that date. As a result of this information, Inspector Jernigan arranged for a search of the correctional officers beginning the 4:00 p.m.-12:00 midnight shift. This included a search of the Respondent and her belongings. Correctional Officer Dana L. Alverez assisted in the search. Respondent gave her jacket to Officer Alverez to search. In the upper left pocket of the jacket, Officer Alverez discovered three fingertips cut from a rubber glove, containing what appeared to be marijuana. Officer Alverez removed the substance from the jacket and turned it over to Lieutenant D.L. Nichols. Lieutenant Nichols retained the substance until he turned it over to Inspector Jernigan. Inspector Jernigan notified the Union County Sheriff's Office about the results of the search. Lieutenant Gary Seay of that office responded to the institution. Lieutenant Seay took possession of the substance and placed Respondent under arrest. Lieutenant Seay packaged and sealed the substance in an evidence envelope. He mailed the package via certified mail to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement laboratory in Jacksonville for analysis. Crime Laboratory Analyst Niels H. Bernstein, tested the substance submitted by Lieutenant Seay in this case. Mr. Bernstein examined the package in which the substance was enclosed. He determined that the package was properly sealed. Mr. Bernstein then opened the package and tested the substance according to industry approved methods. He determined that the submitted substance was cannabis, 0.6 grams. UCI terminated Respondent's employment. Respondent entered into and successfully completed a Pre-Trial Intervention Program in regards to the criminal charges filed against her. Upon completion of the program, the criminal charges were dismissed. Respondent's testimony that she did not know her jacket contained cannabis is not credible.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Petitioner's certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Linda L. Paige-James Post Office Box 614 Macclenny, Florida 32063 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (7) 120.57893.02893.03893.13943.13943.1395944.47 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.001111B-27.005
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DOUGLAS ADAMS vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 91-008115RX (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 20, 1991 Number: 91-008115RX Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1993

Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1991, the Petitioner, Douglas Adams, filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule. In the Petition, the Petitioner challenged Rules 33-22.005(5) and 33- 22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rules. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-22.005(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Section III. Report of Investigation. Upon receipt of the Disciplinary Report, the Senior Correctional Officer shall review the report and, when the facts suggest that the alleged violations is significant, he shall cause the report to be forwarded to the Correctional Officer Chief. Upon approval of the Correctional Officer Chief, or in his absence the Senior Correctional Officer, an impartial investigation of the charge against the inmate shall be conducted. This investigation shall be completed without unreasonable delay. Any delay at any state must be justified in the report. The Correctional Probation Supervisor shall review the report and cause an impartial investigation to be conducted for inmates participating in the Supervised Community Release Program. The investigating officer is responsible for obtaining the inmate's version of the offense as well as contacting the charging officer and any other staff members or inmates who have information pertaining to the allegation and the charge. The inmate charged shall be offered staff assistance and asked if he has any material witnesses to offer in his behalf. If the inmate has no witnesses, it must be noted in the report. If names of witnesses are given, the investigating officer shall then interview both inmate and staff witnesses and, if appropriate, have the Witness Statement Form DC4-856 completed. If inmate witnesses or staff witnesses are not contacted, a statement as to why they were not contacted must be included. Opinions as to innocence or guilt shall not be made by the investigating officer. The investigator shall sign and date the report. Rule 33-22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (2) The Hearing Officer or Disciplinary Team can request further investigation or evidence, the appearance of additional witnesses or the statements of unavailable witnesses. . . . . Witnesses shall not be called or certain information disclosed if doing so would create a risk of reprisal, undermine authority or otherwise present a threat to the security or order of the institution. The inmate witnesses must be willing to testify but may offer an oral or written statement to the investigating officer in lieu of personal appearance. Notations shall be made in the report with reasons for declining to call requested witnesses or for restricting any information. The Petitioner has alleged that the Challenged Rules are invalid because the rules are "contrary to due process contained in enabling legislation. Section 20.315, Florida Statutes (1989)" and are vague, arbitrary and capricious. The Petition does not include any alleged facts supporting the Petitioner's assertion that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious."

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.54120.56120.6820.315944.09
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs VERONICA A. SMITH, 04-000399PL (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Feb. 03, 2004 Number: 04-000399PL Latest Update: Dec. 17, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character by pleading guilty to the felony charge of child neglect pursuant to Subsection 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002), as set forth in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Veronica A. Smith, is a certified correctional officer in the State of Florida. She was issued Correctional Officer Certificate No. 135464 on December 11, 1992. Respondent was employed by the Lee County Sheriff's Office as a correctional officer during the period September 21, 1992, through June 24, 2002. On or about June 12, 2002, Respondent was charged by Information with two counts of felony child neglect in violation of Subsection 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002), by the state attorney for the Twentieth Circuit Court, Lee County, Florida. On or about May 27, 2003, Respondent, while represented by counsel and in open court, withdrew her previous plea of "not guilty" to the Information and entered a plea of guilty to one count of felony child neglect before the circuit court for Lee County, Florida, State of Florida v. Veronica Smith, Case No. 02-1878CF. Said plea was accepted and the court entered an Order Withholding Adjudication dated May 27, 2003, which withheld adjudication of guilt but placed Respondent on probation for a period of two years under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Following notification of her arrest, the Lee County Sheriff's Office opened an internal affairs investigation relating to the underling charges which resulted in her termination on June 24, 2002, from her position as Bailiff Corporal with the Lee County Sheriff's Department. By pleading guilty to felony child neglect, Respondent has failed to uphold her qualifications to be a correctional officer by failing to maintain her good moral character. Although Respondent's employment record does not show any prior disciplinary violations, she has failed to produce any evidence in explanation or mitigation of the conduct which resulted in her arrest and plea before the circuit court or in her termination of her employment with the Lee County Sheriff's Office.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002). Respondent's certification as a correctional officer be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Veronica A. Smith Post Office Box 6812 Fort Myers, Florida 33911 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.60827.03943.085943.13943.1395943.255
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