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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BUREAU OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL OVERSIGHT vs WILLIAM J. LITSCH, PMD, 18-002891PL (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jun. 06, 2018 Number: 18-002891PL Latest Update: Jun. 13, 2019

The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent violated section 456.072(1)(k), Florida Statutes, by failing to repay a student loan issued or guaranteed by the state or the Federal government in accordance with the terms of the loan as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact The Department of Health, Bureau of Emergency Medical Oversight, is the state agency charged with the investigation and prosecution of complaints against licensed paramedics pursuant to chapters 456 and 401, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a paramedic in the state of Florida, holding certificate number PMD 16223. Respondent’s license is currently active and does not expire until December 1, 2018. Respondent’s current address of record is 763 Tumblebrook Drive, Port Orange, Florida 32127. The Florida Department of Education (DOE) is the state agency responsible for guaranteeing student loans in cooperation with the United States Department of Education under the Federal Family Education Loan Program. As the guarantor of a student loan, DOE is bound to purchase the debt of a borrower who fails to satisfy their loan obligations. On July 7, 1993, Respondent executed an “Application/Promissory Note for a Florida Stafford Loan” with a requested loan amount of $3,500.00. The stated purpose of the loan was “for [Respondent’s] attendance at Daytona Beach Community College [DBCC] for the term(s) that begins on 8/93 and ends on 4/94.” The lender was Chase Manhattan Bank, Lender Code 807807. The loan proceeds were, as is normal for student loans, paid directly to DBCC on Respondent’s behalf for his tuition, fees, and educational expenses. On January 7, 1994, Respondent executed an “Application and Promissory Note for Federal Stafford Loans” for a subsidized Federal Stafford Loan, with a requested loan amount of $1,750.00, with a loan period of January 1994 to May 1994. Pursuant to the Borrower Certification and School Certification, the loan proceeds were for Respondent’s attendance at DBCC. The lender was “Chase,” Lender Code 807807. The loan proceeds were, as is normal for student loans, paid directly to DBCC on Respondent’s behalf for his tuition, fees, and educational expenses. On June 1, 1994, Respondent executed an “Application and Promissory Note for Federal Stafford Loans” for a subsidized Federal Stafford Loan, with a requested loan amount of $3,500.00, with a loan period of August 1994 to May 1995. Pursuant to the Borrower Certification and School Certification, the loan proceeds were for Respondent’s attendance at DBCC. Respondent requested a deferment of repayment for applicable in-school and grace periods. The lender was Chase Manhattan Bank, Lender Code 807807. The loan proceeds were, as is normal for student loans, paid directly to DBCC on Respondent’s behalf for his tuition, fees, and educational expenses. On May 30, 1995, Respondent executed an “Application and Promissory Note for Federal Stafford Loans” for a subsidized Federal Stafford Loan, with a requested loan amount of $3,500.00, with a loan period of August 1995 to “end of deferment.” The loan proceeds were for Respondent’s attendance at DBCC. Respondent requested a deferment of repayment for applicable in- school and grace periods. The lender was Chase Manhattan Bank, Lender Code 807807. The loan proceeds were, as is normal for student loans, paid directly to DBCC on Respondent’s behalf for his tuition, fees, and educational expenses. On August 19, 1996, Respondent executed an “Application and Promissory Note for Federal Stafford Loans” for a subsidized Federal Stafford Loan, with a requested loan amount of $3,500.00, with a loan period of August 1996 to May 1997. The loan proceeds were for Respondent’s attendance at Valencia Community College on Respondent’s behalf for his tuition, fees, and educational expenses. Respondent requested a deferment of repayment for applicable in-school and grace periods. The lender was Chase Manhattan Bank, Lender Code 807807. The loan proceeds were, as is normal for student loans, paid directly to Valencia Community College. On August 22, 1997, Respondent executed an “Application and Promissory Note for Federal Stafford Loans” for a subsidized Federal Stafford Loan, with a requested loan amount of $3,500.00, with a loan period of August 1997 to May 1998. The loan proceeds were for Respondent’s attendance at DBCC. Respondent requested a deferment of repayment for applicable in-school and grace periods. The lender was Chase Manhattan Bank, Lender Code 807807. The loan proceeds were, as is normal for student loans, paid directly to DBCC on Respondent’s behalf for his tuition, fees, and educational expenses. Between August 22, 1997, and June 14, 2005, the evidence demonstrates that Respondent made no payments on any of the above-referenced loans. On June 14, 2005, Respondent filed an on-line Federal Consolidation Loan Application and Promissory Note by which Respondent consolidated his outstanding student loans. By the time the loans were being consolidated, they were held by the Sallie Mae Trust. Respondent’s total loan amount after consolidation was $17,500.00. Pursuant to the Loan Consolidation Disclosure Statement and Repayment Schedule, the first of 180 monthly payments of $128.751/ on the consolidated student loans was scheduled for August 21, 2005. DOE was the guarantor of all of Respondent’s student loans, including the consolidated student loan. The Federal Family Education Loan Program Claim Form demonstrates that Respondent received a deferment of payment for 59 months, followed by forbearance from payment of 63 months -- a total of 10 years and two months. As a result, Respondent’s payment due date was extended to October 21, 2015. In the more than 25 years since Respondent made application for his first student loan, he has yet to repay any of the loan proceeds paid to DBCC and Valencia Community College on his behalf for tuition, fees, and educational expenses. An educational loan default occurs when a borrower fails to make required payments on a loan for 270 days. On November 3, 2016, having received no payments from Respondent on his loan since payments became due on October 21, 2015, the lender submitted a default claim to DOE. On November 10, 2016, DOE determined Respondent defaulted on his student loan obligations and purchased Respondent’s debt from the lender. At the time of the default, Respondent’s full $17,500.00 principal balance remained, as well as $3,794.90 of capitalized interest and $995.71 of unpaid interest. Respondent has made no payments against his student loan obligations since DOE purchased his student loan obligations on November 10, 2016.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Bureau of Emergency Management Oversight, enter a final order: finding that Respondent failed to repay a student loan issued or guaranteed by the state or the Federal government in accordance with the terms of the loan; imposing a suspension of Respondent’s paramedic certification until new loan payment terms are agreed upon, followed by probation for the duration of the student loan; imposing a fine equal to 10 percent of the defaulted loan amount calculated as of the date of the Final Order, to be deposited into the Medical Quality Assurance Trust Fund; and requiring Respondent to pay the costs related to the investigation and prosecution. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 2018.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68456.072456.07390.80390.902
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HISHAM ABOUDAYA vs EVEREST UNIVERSITY, 11-001496 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Mar. 21, 2011 Number: 11-001496 Latest Update: Jan. 25, 2012

The Issue The issues in this case are: Whether Respondent, Everest University (the "School"), discriminated against Petitioner, Hashim Aboudaya, on the basis of his place of natural origin (Middle Eastern), race (Caucasian), and/or religion (Muslim) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act by twice failing to promote Petitioner to the position of associate dean or director of Student Services; and Whether the School retaliated against Petitioner based on his place of natural origin, race, and/or religion by refusing to pay for his doctoral level college courses.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Caucasian male, born in Lebanon and, therefore, of Middle Eastern heritage. He is a practicing Muslim. In July 2003, Petitioner began teaching as an adjunct professor at the School, teaching computer information services and teaching a few classes per year. In or around August 2007, Petitioner was promoted to senior network administrator, a non-teaching position, for the School. At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner served in that position. He currently teaches classes on an as-needed basis also. The School is a private college formerly known as Florida Metropolitan University. There are ten related campuses in the State of Florida, with one being in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. The Melbourne campus has two locations, one on Sarno Road and the "main" campus on U.S. Highway 1. Petitioner holds two master's degrees, one in management and one in computer resources and information management, from Webster University in Saint Louis, Missouri. He is pursuing a third master's degree, but it is "on hold" pending his completion of studies in a doctoral program. The doctoral program being sought by Petitioner is in the field of business administration with a major field of study in computer security. The degree is being pursued on-line through Capella University based in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Petitioner's resume indicates that the Ph.D. will be "done in the end of 2007," but it has obviously taken longer than planned. Petitioner has applied for several vacancies listed at the School, but for purposes of this proceeding, the following are relevant: (1) The associate academic dean position advertised in January 2010; (2) The associate academic dean position advertised in April 2010; and (3) The director of Student Services position advertised in August 2009. Associate Academic Dean Positions The following qualifications were specified in the School's job description for the associate academic dean positions. The applicant must: Possess the necessary academic credentials and work related experience mandated by the Company, State accreditation agencies and any other regulatory agency that monitors compliance. Have a minimum of 2 years practical work experience in business or education. Have a minimum of 1 year teaching experience, but The years of experience may be waived at the sole discretion of the college president so long as the incumbent meets the accreditations, State and Federal requirements necessary to hold the position. There was also a job posting (as opposed to a job description) for the associate dean position on a website associated with Corinthian Colleges, Inc. ("CCI"), the School's parent company. That job posting indicated that a master's degree was required for the job and included other requirements not set out in the School's official job description. The college president, Mark Judge, could not verify the accuracy of the job posting. There is no persuasive, credible evidence that the job posting was produced by the School or intended to be used as the basis for filling the associate dean position. The first associate dean position was for the Sarno Road site which housed the School's allied health programs, e.g., medical assistant training, pharmacy technician associate degrees, medical insurance billing and coding, and healthcare administration. Besides the requirements set forth in the job description, the School was looking for someone with health- related experience as well. Terri Baker, a registered nurse, was ultimately hired to fill the associate dean position. Baker had approximately 20 years of experience with the School. During that time, Baker had taught classes in the allied health program, had served as a program director, and was an associate dean at other campuses within the CCI system. Baker does not hold a master's degree, but the job description issued by the School does not require that level of education. The job posting, which appeared in a publication issued by the School, does say that a master's degree is required, but there is no competent and substantial evidence to suggest the job posting supersedes the job description. Notwithstanding her level of schooling, it is clear Baker was a perfect fit for the job. The decision to appoint her, rather than Petitioner, to the position was based on factors other than race, national origin or religion. The second associate dean position was advertised in the Spring of 2010. The job description for that job is the same as the previous associate dean position. However, there are many different duties and expectations associated with the second position. For example, while the first position was related directly to the allied health programs at the School, the second position had a different focus. The person filling this position would be working on the main Melbourne campus, rather than the satellite campus. His or her duties would be directed toward tasks such as transfer of credit analysis, scheduling, and registering new students. The dean would also be responsible for monitoring the School's compliance with accreditation standards and internal audit standards. Betty Williams was hired to fill the second associate dean position. Williams had significant management experience in academic settings. She had served as an academic dean for one of the School's competitors and had extensive knowledge and experience with compliance accreditation standards. As compared to Petitioner, Williams was a much better fit for the position. Her experience would allow her to step into the position and begin working on problems immediately without the necessity of a period of training and acclimation. Director of Student Services Position The director of Student Services was expected to help students who were experiencing hardships in their academic progress. The director would help students who were forced to withdraw from school for financial or other personal reasons. He/she would provide support for students taking online classes and assist students trying to re-enroll into school following dismissal or withdrawal. A close working relationship with students was an important factor in this position. The School's job description listed the following requirement for the director of Student Services position: Bachelor's degree required Minimum of 3 years practical work experience or equivalent training Excellent communication and customer service skills Excellent computer skills The person who ultimately was hired for this position, Stacey Jacquot, was an outstanding employee at the School and had been selected as its Employee of the Year in two different positions. Jacquot is a Caucasian female; neither her religion, nor her place of natural origin was alluded to at final hearing. The hiring of Jacquot, as opposed to Petitioner, for this position was based on Jacquot's experience and background. She had worked in the student services department for the school as both an online coordinator and as a re-entry coordinator. Thus, her experience was directly related to the requirements of the position. Petitioner provided unsubstantiated testimony that by virtue of his teaching a number of classes over the past few years, he has some experience in counseling students concerning their issues. However, even if true, his experience did not match that of Jacquot. Request for Reimbursement for Doctoral Coursework Petitioner alleges retaliation by the School. The specific retaliatory action was the denial of his request to be reimbursed for coursework as he pursued a doctorate degree. In February 2010, Petitioner submitted a request to the School, asking that tuition expenses for his coursework be paid under the School's tuition reimbursement program. The program is set forth in policies maintained by the School and is available to "eligible employees for eligible classes." A benchmark for reimbursable tuition is that the courses being taken enable the employee to be more efficient in a current role or prepare them for a role at the next level of their employment. There are a number of written policies addressing the tuition reimbursement program. Those policies are fluid and have changed from time to time over the past few years. The policies are implemented and overseen by the director of Organizational Development for CCI, Jeanne Teeter. Teeter resides and works in California, corporate home of CCI. It is Teeter's duty to ultimately approve or deny all requests for tuition reimbursement by employees of all of CCI's colleges around the country. Teeter reviewed Petitioner's request for tuition reimbursement pursuant to a preliminary approval by the School's president, Mark Judge. It was Judge's initial decision to approve Petitioner's request, but Judge sent it to Teeter for a final decision. Teeter had never met Petitioner and did not know anything about him, except as found in his personnel file and his application for tuition reimbursement. Teeter, as was her normal procedure, considered the relevance of the degree being sought, not only to Petitioner's current role, but as to potential future roles as well. Because the course work for which reimbursement was being sought related to an advanced degree, a doctorate, Teeter was less inclined to approve it. Approval would necessitate a clear line of sight between the employee's current role to a role that would require a Ph.D. Inasmuch as Petitioner's role as senior network administrator did not require a doctorate and there was no clear line of sight between his present position and that of a professor or management employee requiring one, Teeter declined the request. At the time she made her decision, Teeter was not aware that Petitioner had made a discrimination claim against the School. Her decision, therefore, could not be retaliatory in nature. Rather, she acted in concert with the policies that address tuition reimbursement and made a decision based solely upon those policies. Petitioner appears to be an energetic and hard-working member of the School's staff. His testimony was credible, but was sometimes off the point. Although he is a well-educated person with three college degrees and is pursuing others, it is clear that English is his second language.1/ Petitioner seemed to be sincere in his belief that he was discriminated against, but did not provide persuasive evidence to support that claim.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Hisham Aboudaya in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2011.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68509.092760.01760.11
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs LATMA CHRISTIAN ACADEMY (4204)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Madison, Florida Nov. 07, 2017 Number: 17-006102SP Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024
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LEONARD K. WILLIAMS vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 92-000692 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 03, 1992 Number: 92-000692 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1992

The Issue Whether or not the Department of Banking and Finance is required by law to transmit $2,159.41 to the State of Florida Department of Education or $2500.00 to the Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact DOE, through its Office of Student Financial Assistance, functions as a guarantee agency for purposes of the guaranteed student loan programs. In this capacity, DOE issues a loan guarantee to a participating lender, such as a bank, when the lender has applied for the guarantee in connection with making a student loan to a student borrower. If the student borrower defaults on repaying the loan to the lender, the lender submits to DOE a claim for DOE to repay the loan to the lender. When DOE repays the loan to the lender, the promissory note evidencing the debt is assigned to DOE which then pursues collection of the loan against the defaulting student borrower. On or about November 18, 1988, Petitioner Leonard K. Williams applied for a guaranteed student loan to be made by the Florida National Bank. On or about December 11, 1988, DOE issued its guarantee and the loan was made by the bank to Petitioner. Petitioner's first payment to repay the loan was due on February 1, 1990. He made no payments then or thereafter. On July 1, 1990 he was in default. DOE, as the guarantee agency, paid the bank's claim on December 27, 1990 and the bank assigned the promissory note evidencing Petitioner's indebtedness to DOE. Petitioner purchased a winning Florida Lottery ticket for the Play 4 drawing of November 19, 1991. On November 26, 1991, Petitioner submitted his claim to DOL to claim the prize of $2,500.00. On November 26, 1991, DOE certified to DOL that Petitioner had an outstanding defaulted student loan and requested that the lottery prize money won by Petitioner be transmitted to the Comptroller to be credited toward the Petitioner's student loan debt. The total principal and interest accrued on that debt as of December 11, 1991 was $2,159.41. On December 4, 1991, Petitioner requested from DOE a form captioned, "Physician's Certification of Borrower's Total and Permanent Disability." On January 3, 1992, DOE received the completed form signed by Petitioner's physician, Anne L. Rottman, M.D. Dr. Rottman treated Petitioner from August 18, 1986 through July 19, 1990, treating him for chronic cervical and lumbar spinal pain. She was unable to state when Petitioner's condition began or when he became unable to work, as the condition and disability commenced prior to the date she first saw him on August 18, 1986. Petitioner's condition was static during the time she treated him. Petitioner was unable to work during the time she treated him.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order which withholds $2,159.41 from Petitioner's lottery winnings and transmits that sum to the Department of Education and which also transmits the balance of $340.59 to Petitioner. Since the money has already been effectively transmitted as recommended, the Final Order could simply ratify those prior transmittals. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott C. Wright ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17 day of September, 1992. Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Leonard K. Williams 1425 NE 13th Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Leonard K. Williams Post Office Box 490955 College Park, Georgia 30349 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles S. Ruberg Assistant General Counsel State Board of Education The Capitol, Suite PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

USC (1) 34 CFR 682.402(c)(1) Florida Laws (3) 120.57159.4124.115
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DIANE ANDREW vs SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 15-007041 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Dec. 14, 2015 Number: 15-007041 Latest Update: Aug. 19, 2016

The Issue Whether Petitioner, who is employed as an occupational therapist by a local school board, is considered a “teacher” eligible for the 2015 State of Florida Best and Brightest Scholarship Program.

Findings Of Fact The 2015 Florida Legislature Appropriations Act created the Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program, chapter 2015- 232, p. 27, Item 99A. The eligibility pre-requisites for applying to and being awarded the Scholarship (up to $10,000) were established in the Scholarship. The Scholarship provides as follows: Funds in Specific Appropriation 99A are provided to implement Florida's Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. The funds shall be used to award a maximum of 4,402 teachers with a $10,000 scholarship based on high academic achievement on the SAT or ACT. To be eligible for a scholarship, a teacher must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment and have been evaluated as highly effective pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, or if the teacher is a first-year teacher who has not been evaluated pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. In order to demonstrate eligibility for an award, an eligible teacher must submit to the school district, no later than October 1, 2015, an official record of his or her SAT or ACT score demonstrating that the teacher scored at or above the 80th percentile based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. By December 1, 2015, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall submit to the department the number of eligible teachers who qualify for the scholarship. By February 1, 2016, the department shall disburse scholarship funds to each school district for each eligible teacher to receive a scholarship. By April 1, 2016, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall provide payment of the scholarship to each eligible teacher. If the number of eligible teachers exceeds the total the department shall prorate the per teacher scholarship amount. The Scholarship does not define the word “teacher.” Petitioner, who timely filed an application for the Scholarship, contends that she is a “teacher” and is therefore eligible for the award. Respondent and Intervenor contend that Petitioner is an occupational therapist, and, as such, she is not considered a “classroom teacher,” which is the target group that the Legislature intended for the teacher scholarship program to cover. Petitioner contends that even if the Scholarship is limited to “classroom teachers,” she meets the statutory definition of a “classroom teacher” and is therefore eligible to receive the Scholarship. It is undisputed that the 2015 Scholarship language is vague as to whether the Scholarship is limited to classroom teachers. In 2016, the Legislature made it clear that the award is intended to only cover “classroom teachers.” Legislation enacted in subsequent legislative sessions may be examined to ascertain legislative intent. See Crews v. Fla. Pub. Emp’rs Council 79, AFSCME, 113 So. 3d 1063, 1073 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)(citing Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d 1216, 1230 (Fla. 2006)). Recently, the Governor signed chapter 2016-62, Laws of Florida. Section 25 of chapter 2016-62 enacts section 1012.731, Florida Statutes, the Florida Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program.1/ Section 1012.731(2) provides that the “scholarship program shall provide categorical funding for scholarships to be awarded to classroom teachers, as defined in s. 1012.01(2)(a), who have demonstrated a high level of academic success.” The Legislature's amendment of the language, just a year after the first appropriation, confirms that the Legislature intended the award to go to "classroom teachers," as defined in chapter 1012. Petitioner was hired by Respondent as an occupational therapist. She has worked as an occupational therapist for Respondent for approximately 17 years. Petitioner does not hold a Florida teaching certificate and her position as an occupational therapist does not require a Florida teaching certificate. Instead, Petitioner is licensed by the Florida Department of Health, which has jurisdiction over ethical violations committed by occupational therapists licensed in Florida. In her position as an occupational therapist, Petitioner reports to Respondent’s director of Pupil Support Services, who supervises all therapists within Sarasota County Public Schools. Petitioner’s stated job goal is “[t]o facilitate the handicapped student’s independent functioning in the school setting.” Petitioner’s performance responsibilities, as set forth in her job description, are to: Conduct appropriate evaluation of students referred for possible exceptional student education needs and prepare reports of the evaluation and findings. Plan intervention and service delivery programs to meet student’s individual needs. Implement and direct interventions essential to meeting targeted students’ needs. Provide information and consultative services to appropriate personnel in support of students with disabilities. * * * Establish schedules for meeting with students, conferencing with parents and assisting in rehabilitation techniques. Provide resources to all stakeholders involved in the evaluation, identification of student needs and rehabilitation of students. Petitioner delivers therapeutic services individually or in a small group setting, in a room assigned to her, or in a classroom, usually at the same time a teacher is delivering instruction to the entire class. Petitioner completes “lesson plans,” which are referred to in the therapy setting as “plans of care.” Plans of care differ in substance from lesson plans prepared by teachers because lesson plans set out a teaching plan for the entire class, whereas plans of care set out therapeutic goals and activities directed to one student that complies with the goals set forth in a student's Individualized Education Plan (IEP). As an occupational therapist, Petitioner is responsible for maintaining a “class roster,” which is referred to in the therapy setting as a “caseload.” Occupational therapists maintain a caseload for student accountability purposes and for Medicaid billing purposes. Petitioner’s therapy sessions are assigned a “700” course code, which correlates in the Florida Department of Education's course directory to “related services.” Joint Exhibit O is an example of courses offered to students by Respondent. The course list includes math, language arts, physical education, science, social studies, art, Chinese, music, and occupational therapy. Petitioner is listed as the “teacher” for the occupational therapy course. Unlike the other listed “teachers,” Petitioner is not instructing students in a subject area; she is delivering a service. See § 468.203(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). Succinctly stated, the difference, in this context, between “occupational therapy” and the other listed “courses,” is that occupational therapy is not a subject area that a student learns about; it is a service that a student receives to help them to achieve independent functioning. Although listed as “course” by Respondent, occupational therapy, as compared to the other listed “courses,” is not a “course” within the meaning of section 1012.01(2)(a).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Sarasota County enter a final order finding Petitioner ineligible for the Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 2016.

Florida Laws (12) 1002.661003.011012.011012.341012.57120.569120.57468.1125468.203486.021627.6686641.31098
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GREGORY J. AULL vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 02-003473 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 05, 2002 Number: 02-003473 Latest Update: Jan. 23, 2003

The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue may retain Petitioner's after-tax lottery prize of $4,074.50 and apply it to reduce the outstanding arrearage for child support in the amount of $11,050.00 as of October 23, 2002.

Findings Of Fact DOR and DOL are the agencies of the State of Florida charged with the duty for the administrative enforcement of the intercept of lottery prize winnings to satisfy past due child support debt. Petitioner made a claim to a lottery prize in the amount of $4,074.50 after-tax on or about May 28, 2002. DOR notified DOL that Petitioner was indebted to the state for court-ordered child support through the court depository and administrative cost in the amount of $13,049.25. Pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, Petitioner's entire lottery prize in the amount of $4,074.50 after-tax was transferred to DOR by DOL. Petitioner was given written notice on May 30, 2002, of the DOR's intent to intercept his lottery prize in the amount of $4,074.50, it had received from DOL, and apply it to partially satisfy his unpaid child support debt. Petitioner requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, regarding the final decision by DOR to retain the $4,074.50 and apply it to the certified child support debt. Petitioner disputes the claim by DOR that he owes child support that is being collected through a court. On October 19, 1984, Catherine Siler, the custodial parent of the children, signed a non-AFDC application for child support enforcement with the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the predecessor to DOR. On October 19, 1984, DOR filed a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) petition with the Clerk of Court in Escambia County, Florida, to be forwarded to Indiana. On October 26, 1984, the Escambia County Clerk of Court requested that the Indiana court issue an order to require child support payments to be paid through the Escambia County, Florida Clerk of Court Depository. On May 24, 1985, the Indiana court entered an order requiring the child support payments in the case of Catherine Silver v. Gregory Aull be paid through the Escambia County, Florida Clerk of Court Depository. Florida has received and continues to receive child support payments from Petitioner on behalf of Catherine Siler. At a May 8, 1998, hearing, the Indiana court determined that Petitioner had a support arrearage of $23,009.00. The Indiana court ordered Petitioner to pay the arrearage at the rate of $50.00 per week beginning May 15, 1998. The order required Petitioner to execute a voluntary Wage Withholding Order. Petitioner consistently made payments toward the arrearage and on May 28, 2002, Petitioner had a child support arrearage in the amount of $13,049.25. On October 23, 2002, Petitioner had an arrearage of $11,050.00. DOR intends to apply Petitioner's lottery prize in the amount of $4,074.50 to partially satisfy his past due child support debt.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order wherein it retains the $4,074.50 lottery prize of Petitioner and apply it to reduce the accrued arrearage of $11,050.00 as of October 23, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory J. Aull 107 Georgia Avenue St. Cloud, Florida 34769 Chriss Walker, Esquire Child Support Enforcement Department of Revenue Post Office Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louise Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.5724.115409.2557
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION vs CHRISTINA G. WHITE, 99-001592 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Apr. 02, 1999 Number: 99-001592 Latest Update: Aug. 24, 1999

The Issue The issue for resolution in this proceeding is whether Respondent's lottery prize should be withheld to be applied against an unpaid student loan.

Findings Of Fact In an application and promissory note dated June 30, 1987, Respondent, Ms. White, applied for an auxiliary student loan in the amount of $2,000 to attend school at Orlando College in Orlando, Florida, for the loan period June 1987 through June 1988. The loan was issued by Florida Federal Savings and Loan Association (lender) in one disbursement on or about September 2, 1987. Interest accrues on the loan at a variable rate which is currently 10.27 percent per year. This loan is Loan Number AL00010400 (loan 10400) which was guaranteed by the federal government through the DOE. In an application and promissory note dated December 9, 1987, Respondent applied for a second auxiliary student loan in the amount of $2,000 to attend the school for the same loan period. That loan was made by the lender in one disbursement on or about March 8, 1988. Interest accrues on that loan at a variable interest rate which is currently 10.27 percent per year. That loan is Loan Number AL00014434 (loan 14434) which was guaranteed by the federal government through DOE. As auxiliary loans, each of Respondent's loans accrued interest from the date of disbursement. For auxiliary loans, the borrower is required to make loan payments even while attending school. However, a borrower may request a deferment or forbearance from payment for several reasons, including attending school on a minimum part-time basis. While an auxiliary loan is in deferment/forbearance status, interest still accrues on the loan. In an application dated January 4, 1988, Respondent requested a deferment of repayment because she was attending school on a full-time basis. That application was approved for any payments due between June 22, 1987, through June 20, 1988. Following the deferment period, Harper-Smith and Associates, Inc., the lender's loan servicer (herein referred to as HSA) sent Respondent a repayment disclosure letter dated August 31, 1988. The letter outlined the terms and conditions of the repayment schedule assigned to both of Respondent's loans. As of the date of the disclosure letter, Respondent owed $4,082.40 in outstanding principal and capitalized interest for both loans. Additionally, Respondent owed a total of $36.23 in accrued unpaid interest. The disclosure letter indicated that Respondent's first payment of $56.06 was due September 20, 1988. Respondent failed to make any payments on the loans and Respondent was declared in default by HSA. HSA filed a lender application for claim payment with DOE dated May 11, 1989. On November 23, 1989, DOE, as guarantor of the loans, paid HSA for both of Respondent's defaulted auxiliary student loans. When DOE acquired loan 10400 and loan 14434, the outstanding interest was capitalized, resulting in a balance of $4,680.86 ($4,082.40 in claim principal and $598.46 in claim interest). This sum is subject to a variable interest rate which is currently 10.27 per cent per year. Since DOE acquired Respondent's loans, payments received from the Respondent's federal income tax returns (herein referred to as IRS offsets) have been applied to Respondent's outstanding balance as follows: 4/09/91 $1,082 3/30/92 $1,628 10/04/93 $1,140 5/08/95 $ 614 5/08/95 $ 727 After applying each IRS offset payment according to federal regulations (outstanding interest first, then principal), Respondent's account had a net balance of $1,445.43 in principal due on May 8, 1995, and all interest was paid through that date. DOE's earlier certification of amount owed was based on DOE's records which did not include the 1993 and 1995 IRS offsets. Ms. White provided the evidence of those and DOE verified that those should be applied against her debt. On June 30, 1995, Respondent filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. The filing occurred less than seven years after Respondent's loans went into repayment on September 20, 1988. On October 17, 1995, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, issued a "Discharge of Debtor" order in Respondent's case, number 95-03350-687. That order provides in pertinent part, "The above-named debtor is released from all dischargeable debts . . . . . . [including] debts dischargeable under 11 U. S. C. [Section] 523." On April 28, 1996, the Department subrogated (sold) loan 10400 to the United States Department of Education (USDOE). DOE still owns loan 14434. On May 8, 1995, the day the last IRS offset payment was applied, Respondent owed $722.72 in principal on loan 14434 which currently accrues interest at the rate of 10.27 percent per year. No other payment was received between May 8, 1995, and the time the DOE received Respondent's lottery winnings which are the subject of this action. Ms. White produced evidence that an additional $941.69 was withheld in an IRS offset, but that was after her lottery winnings were withheld. By letter of February 12, 1999, the DOE notified the Department of the Lottery (Lottery) that Respondent owed DOE $2,811.88, in principal and interest, as a consequence of her outstanding defaulted student loan. That amount has been amended as explained in paragraph 8, above. Pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, the Lottery transmitted Respondent's $800 lottery prize to the DOE. By letter of February 25, 1999, DOE notified Respondent that it was in receipt of her $800 lottery prize in accordance with Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes. DOE applied Respondent's lottery winnings to her outstanding balance on the remaining loan, number 14434, held by DOE in accordance with federal requirements.2 DOE's letter also advised Respondent of her right to request a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, to contest the action. This proceeding arose when Respondent made her request for formal hearing. DOE has demonstrated that even when the five IRS offsets noted above were properly applied to both loans, there remained a balance due on loan 14434 of $722.72 in principal as of May 8, 1995, plus interest accruing since that date, plus $585.11 in collection costs. DOE also demonstrated that loan 14434 was not discharged in bankruptcy, because it was not in repayment for more than 7 years when the bankruptcy petition was filed, the minimum time required in order for a student loan to be eligible for discharge.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DOE enter a final order which authorizes Respondent's lottery prize of $800 be applied toward her outstanding debt for a defaulted student loan. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1999.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.5724.115
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RICHARD CORCORAN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs IZZADEEN ACADEMY (9350)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Kissimmee, Florida Apr. 30, 2021 Number: 21-001432SP Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024
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ENRIQUE BENITEZ vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 97-004432 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 22, 1997 Number: 97-004432 Latest Update: Mar. 03, 1998

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's lottery prize is subject to an outstanding debt to a state agency.

Findings Of Fact By letter of June 9, 1997, the Department of Education, Office of Student Financial Assistance (Department), notified the Department of the Lottery (Lottery) that Petitioner owed the Department $26,356.28, as of June 9, 1997, as a consequence of outstanding defaulted student loans. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, the Lottery transmitted the prize amount ($24,781.66), less Federal income tax withheld ($6,938.86), to the Department. By letter of June 10, 1997, the Department notified Petitioner that it was in receipt of his prize money, less Federal income tax withheld, and that, since the amount owed the Department exceeded the amount of the prize, it planned to apply the entire sum it had received ($17,842.80) to the outstanding indebtedness. The Department's letter also advised Petitioner of his right to request a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, to contest the Department's decision. Petitioner filed a timely request for a formal hearing to contest the Department's decision, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of an administrative law judge to conduct the formal hearing Petitioner had requested. At hearing, the proof demonstrated that Petitioner was the recipient of three student loans, each of which was funded by Centrust Savings Bank (Centrust) and guaranteed by the Department. The first loan (No. 7701) was in the amount of $3,000, which was disbursed on December 19, 1986. The second loan (No. 557720) was in the sum of $5,000, which was disbursed on January 29, 1987. The third loan (No. 631534) was for $5,000; however, only $2,500 was disbursed. That disbursement occurred on November 26, 1987. Petitioner defaulted on the student loans, and Centrust filed a claim with the Department. The Department, as guarantor, paid the lender the amounts due on the loans as follows: A.) On August 12, 1993, the Department paid the claim on Loan No. 557720. At the time, the principal due was $5,021.562 and interest due was $1,942.59, for a total of $6,964.15. B.) Also on August 12, 1993, the Department paid the claim on Loan No. 631534. At the time, the principal due was $2,510.78, and interest due was $971.29, for a total of $3,482.07. C.) Finally, on January 20, 1994, the Department paid the claim on Loan No. 7701. At the time, the principal due was $3,118.28, and interest due was $2,458.40, for a total of $5,576.68. As of June 9, 1997, the date the Department received the proceeds of Petitioner's lottery prize, the balance due on the defaulted loans, with accrued interest, was as follows: Loan No. 7701, $7,842.80; Loan No. 557720, $9,096.52; and Loan No. 631534, $4,548.25. In total, as of June 9, 1997, Petitioner owed the Department $21,487.57, as principal and accrued interest owing on the defaulted loans.3

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which approves the application of the $17,842.80 of Petitioner's lottery prize the Department received toward the partial satisfaction of the debt owing the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1998.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.5724.115
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