The Issue The issues concern the intention by Petitioner to levy an $836 fine for the alleged operation of a commercial vehicle on a low-limit bridge when the commercial vehicle exceeded the weight limit for that bridge. See Section 316.545, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On December 17, 1990, a commercial vehicle driven by William Roy Grayson for the carrier Massey Franklin (Massey Trucking) came into Florida from Georgia on US Highway 17. In doing so it crossed the bridge over the St. Marys River. Petitioner has jurisdiction over that bridge. Petitioner in accordance with law had limited the weight that could be placed on that bridge by a commercial vehicle. That weight restriction was 32 tons. The commercial vehicle in question was weighed shortly after entering Florida at an inspection station operated by Petitioner. It weighed 80,720 pounds. Persons such as Mr. Grayson who operate commercial vehicles coming into Florida across the subject bridge are warned of the weight limit on the bridge by posted signs using symbols from the manual on Uniform Traffic Highway Administration as the national standard in accordance with Title 23 US Code. Those silhouette symbols used to post the weight limit for the bridge show a single unit truck with the weight limit of 27 tons and a combination truck with a weight limit of 32 tons. The truck in question was a combination truck. These warning signs on the weight limit were posted in Georgia at the time in question for the south bound traffic. Respondent's truck was south bound on that date. The first sign in Georgia before you enter Florida states "weight limit restrictions ahead." The second sign provides weight limit symbols showing a combination truck with a limit of 32 tons and notes that the distance from that restriction is three miles. The third sign before arriving at Scrubby Bluff Road in Georgia has the weight limit symbol of 32 tons for a combination truck and notes that this is the last exit before being restricted in weight. A fourth sign shows weight limit symbols with 32 tons for a combination truck and an arrow describing the exit from Scrubby Bluff Road to Interstate 95. The truck in question exceeded the weight limit by 16,720 pounds and was assessed a fine .05 per pound for a total penalty of $836.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which imposes a fine in the amount of $836, pursuant to Section 316.545(3)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 1991. APPENDIX The proposed facts by the Petitioner are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Franklin Massey Massey Trucking 101 Wind Creek Lane Enterprise, AL 36330 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact During the time in question, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school bus driver. She had become a bus driver in October or September, 1991. On August 17, 1993, Petitioner suspended Respondent without pay as a result of the incidents that are the subject of the above-styled proceeding. On April 25, 1993, while driving an empty school bus to Tampa to pick up students on a field trip, Respondent stopped at a gas station for fuel. Hungry, she found that she had not brought any money with her. She appropriately charged the fuel on the school credit card. But, contrary to Petitioner's policy, she charged a soda and a bag of chips on the same card. When she returned to Ft. Myers and submitted her charge slip, she forgot to mention the personal items. She did not offer to reimburse Petitioner for the personal charges, which totalled $1.69, until demand was made for this amount. While returning from Tampa on the same day driving the loaded school bus, Respondent was proceeding west on Tucker Grade Road approaching the intersection with US 41. Failing to notice a marked railroad crossing, Respondent drove the bus over the crossing without stopping, opening the door, and looking and listening for a train, as required to do by Petitioner's policy. A train was in fact approaching, although some distance away. Evidence offered by Petitioner that Respondent operated her loaded bus at an unsafe speed on three consecutive days in May, 1993, is discredited. Petitioner's sole witness on this matter had repeated clashes with Respondent, for which Petitioner's witness bears at least an equal share of the responsibility. Moreover, Petitioner's witness admitted to changing lanes more than once while operating a loaded school bus to block Respondent's bus from passing when Respondent was trying to service her longer, crosstown route. Petitioner's witness was uncertain as to their relative speeds and only vaguely recalled the incidents allegedly taking place in May. On March 26, 1993, Respondent received an evaluation for the 1992-93 school year. The evaluation indicated that she had reached an "effective" level of performance for a wide variety of responsibilities. This is the lower of the two possible marks that are satisfactory. Two other marks are available to designate unsatisfactory performance; the better of these is that the task is "inconsistently practiced." Respondent's evaluation during the 1991-92 school year was about the same, although she received "inconsistently practiced" for attitude and appearance (the latter for failing to wear her uniform). During the 1991-92 school year, Respondent received two evaluations. The first was dated November 15, 1991. She received "inconsistently practiced" for adhering to driving laws and for a safe driving record. The notes mention a "preventable accident" on October 11, 1991, and that Respondent had exceeded the speed limit by 10 miles per hour at one location at an unspecified time. The remaining marks were "effective." Another evaluation for the 1991-92 school year, which was dated December 13, 1991, contained all "effective" marks. The charging of a bag of chips and soda has already received more attention than the act and omission merit. Failing to stop, look, and listen for a train, while operating a loaded school bus, is a very serious offense. Failing even to notice the crossing is not a defense; rather, such an admission raises a question of Respondent's fitness as a school bus driver. This seriousness of this offense is aggravated by Respondent's record. In a brief career operating a school bus for Petitioner, Respondent has already been involved in a "preventable accident" and has been detected operating her bus at an excess speed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Lee County School Board enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment contract. ENTERED on March 15, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 15, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-3: adopted or adopted in substance. 4-5: rejected as unnecessary. 6: adopted or adopted in substance. 7-8: rejected as subordinate. 9-14: adopted or adopted in substance. 15-16: rejected as subordinate. 17: rejected as repetitious. 18: rejected as unnecessary. 19-20: rejected as subordinate. 21-22: adopted or adopted in substance. 23-26: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 27: rejected as irrelevant. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 4-5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6-7: rejected as unnecessary. 8-10: adopted or adopted in substance. 11-12: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 13: rejected as irrelevant. 14-15: adopted or adopted in substance. 16-18: rejected as subordinate. 19: adopted or adopted in substance. 20: rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Acting Superintendent Lee County School Board 2055 Central Ave. Ft. Myers, FL 33901-3916 Hon. Douglas L. "Tim" Jamerson Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400 Daniel H. Kunkel Kunkel Miller & Hament Suite 785, 1800 Second St. Sarasota, FL 34236 Robert J. Coleman 2300 McGregor Blvd. P.O. Box 2089 Ft. Myers, FL 33902
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Hayes & Hayes Trucking triple axle dump truck being driven by Norman Williams on June 20, 1990, on U.S. 92 between 56th Street and Orient Road in Tampa, Florida, was being operated with its air axle up, resulting in its being over the maximum weight for its tandem rear axles, as well as for its steering axle, under Section 316.535, Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact On June 20, 1990, Norman Williams was operating a dump truck owned by Hayes & Hayes Trucking on 56th Street in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. The truck was equipped with a steering axle, tandem rear axles and a middle "mini-axle" that can be lowered to carry heavy loads. When required to carry heavy loads, the "mini-axle" can be raised only during turning but must be lowered upon completion of the turn. When Williams got to U.S. 92, he raised the "mini-axle" and made a right turn onto U.S. 92, headed east. He did not lower the "mini-axle" after the turn. While headed west on U.S. 92, about a hundred yards east of 56th Street, Rebecca Stalnaker, a DOT Motor Carrier Compliance Officer, observed the dump truck Williams was driving traveling east on U.S. 92 with its air axle up. She made a U-turn to check the load. After making her U-turn, Stalnaker followed the truck, which was traveling in the left lane of the eastbound traffic on U.S. 92, for approximately a mile. Three or four times, Stalnaker changed to the right lane to verify that the truck's air axle still was up. After following for about a mile, Stalnaker put on her blue light to get the driver of the truck to pull over and stop. For the first time, Williams saw Stalnaker in his side view mirror and, as he began to pull into the right lane, put his truck's air axle down. Williams pulled the truck off the right side of the road. When Stalnaker confronted Williams and accused him of driving with the air axle up, Williams replied that he thought it was permissible to drive with the air axle up in town when driving in traffic in streets having traffic signalization. Stalnaker required Williams to put the air axle back up and drive his truck to a weigh station. The scale showed that the front, steering axle of the truck was supporting 19,980 pounds and the rear, tandem axles of the truck were supporting 47,400 pounds. After weighing the truck, Stalnaker issued a citation and $181.50 fine to Hayes & Hayes Trucking. The company paid the fine and required Williams to reimburse the company. The company never challenged the fine, and there is no evidence in the record that the company authorized Williams to challenge it on the company's behalf. Williams requested that the Commercial Motor Vehicle Review Board drop the fine. The Review Board and the Department acquiesced in Williams' standing, but the Review Board declined to drop the fine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order upholding the $181.50 fine it assessed against Hayes & Hayes Trucking in this case. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1991.
The Issue The issues in this case are (1) whether the Petitioner, the Department of Transportation, should assess against the Respondent, Cypress Creek Landscape Supply, Inc., a penalty for violating the Taylor Road bridge weight restriction, and (2), if so, the amount of the penalty.
Findings Of Fact On February 9, 1990, a commercial motor vehicle owned and operated by the Respondent, Cypress Creek Landscape Supply, Inc., was driven over the bridge over Alligator Creek on Taylor Road (County Road 765A), a federal aid primary highway near Punta Gorda, Charlotte County, Florida. The vehicle, loaded with mulch, was weighed at 71,760 pounds. The Taylor Road bridge is part of a route that can be taken by I-75 traffic wishing to bypass one of the Department's I-75 weight stations. The bridge is posted as being restricted to a maximum weight of 22 tons. The weight restriction is posted at the bridge, and warnings that the weight restricted bridge is ahead appear at conspicuous places at terminals of all intermediate crossroads and road junctions with the section of Taylor Road containing the weight restricted bridge. Notices are posted twice near the exit from I the Respondent's vehicle used to bypass the Department weight station. From these locations, the Respondent's vehicle could have been turned around to avoid the weight restricted bridge. A Department Compliance Officer cited the Respondent for violating the maximum weight restriction for the Taylor Road bridge and assessed a $1,388 penalty, calculated at five cents per pound by which the scaled weight of the vehicle (71,760) exceeded the maximum weight (44,000 pounds). The Department's Form 509-13, Revised 05/89, titled the "Load Report and Field Receipt," specifies that, in subtracting the legal weight from the the scaled weight to determine the amount of overweight, a ten percent tolerance should be added to the legal weight. This is how the Department interprets and applies the requirement of Section 316.545(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989), that, for enforcement purposes, all scaled weights of the gross or axle weight of vehicles and combinations of vehicles shall be deemed to be not closer than 10 percent to the true gross weight.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding the Respondent, Cypress Creek Landscape Supply, Inc., guilty of violating the Taylor Road bridge weight restriction and assessing a $1,168 penalty (reduced from $1,388). RECOMMENDED this 29th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Steven P. Lewis, President Cypress Creek Landscape Supply, Inc. 12734 North Florida Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Elyse S. Kennedy Executive Secretary Commercial Motor Vehicle Review Board Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Florida Department of Transportation was the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutes involving commercial carrier vehicle weights on covered vehicles operated on the streets and highways of this state. It does so through its Office of Motor Carrier Compliance staffed with uniformed certified law enforcement officers who have the authority to conduct random safety and compliance inspections of commercial vehicles being operated in this state. On November 14, 1991, Officer Joseph Borras stopped a 1985 Chevrolet truck, owned by the Respondent, LaCroix, on State Road 702 in Palm Beach County, for a routine inspection. Officer Borras requested the driver to produce his driver's license and the registration slip for the vehicle. This registration slip, which was to expire on December 31, 1991, reflected the weight/length of the vehicle as 7860 pounds and the gross vehicle weight/load, (GVW/LOD) as 7860 pounds also. Since the GWV/LOD weight, (that prescribed by statute for use in these situations) was 7860 pounds, the weight used as legal weight for assessing penalty was 7,999 pounds. Officer Borras then weighed the vehicle at the scene utilizing a set of recently calibrated Department-owned scales, using the standard weight procedures. This weighing of Respondent's vehicle at that time showed it to weigh, loaded, 12,800 pounds. When the 7,999 pound maximum legal weight was subtracted from the actual weight, Respondent's truck was seen to be 4,801 pounds overweight. That excess, taxed at 5 per pound, resulted in a civil penalty of $240.05. This sum was paid by the Respondent by check at the scene. Officer Borras, who was described by the Respondent as being very polite and cooperative at all times, listened to the Respondent's protestations to the effect that the GVW/LOD figure on the registration slip was obviously in error since it was the same as the empty weight of the vehicle, but had no options in the matter. He is mandated to go by the GVW/LOD figure which appears on the registration slip. It is the responsibility of the vehicle's owner to insure that the GVW/LOD figure which appears on the registration slip is correct. Here, Respondent failed to do this, effecting re-registration of the vehicle by mail on December 31, 1990. The registration slip for the prior year, it is noted, also reflected 7,860 pounds as the GVW/LOD. In 1989 it was 10,500 pounds with a weight/length of 7,860 pounds. In 1992, both weight/length and GVW/LOD limits for this same truck were raised to 14,999 pounds. Clearly, the weight/length figure is in error on that form as well. Mr. LaCroix, after the truck was cited and released, proceeded to the city dump, his intended destination, where, prior to dumping, his vehicle was weighed to determine the dump charge. No evidence was produced on the issue of the reliability of those scales. They reflected, however, a loaded vehicle weight of 11,940 pounds, and an empty weight of 8,000 pounds. Because of the unknown reliability of the dump scales and the certified accuracy of the Department's portable scales, the weight determined by Officer Borras is accepted as correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered imposing a civil fine of $240.05 on the Respondent, LaCroix Construction Company, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1992. Vernon L. Whittier Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. - 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ronald C. LaCroix President LaCroix Construction Company, Inc. 5900 Biscayne Drive Lake Worth, Florida 33463 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Department of Health has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed dentists such as Respondent. In particular, Petitioner is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Dentistry has found probable cause exists to suspect that the licensee has committed one or more disciplinable offenses. Respondent Pasquale Almerico, Jr., a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania School of Dental Medicine, has been licensed to practice dentistry in the State of Florida since 1984. Respondent's address of record is 704 North Alexander Street, Plant City, Florida. The Events On February 16, 2010, patient P.D., a 60-year-old female, presented to Respondent's dental office to discuss the replacement of a partial, removable denture that was causing discomfort. The partial denture, which another dentist installed some 15 years earlier to fill the gaps created by lost teeth in the lower-left portion of P.D.'s mouth——specifically, teeth numbers 18 and 19——was secured by a metal “C-clasp” attached to tooth number 20. Noticing immediately that the partial denture was ill fitting, Respondent recommended its replacement with a three- unit cantilever bridge at teeth numbers 19, 20, and 21. As explained during the final hearing, a cantilever is a type of fixed bridge that attaches to adjacent teeth on one end only. Thus, in this instance, abutment crowns on teeth numbers 20 and 21 would connect to a pontic (an artificial tooth) extending into the gap formerly occupied by tooth number 19. P.D. consented to the suggested treatment during the February 16 office visit, at which point Respondent removed the existing crown on tooth number 20, took a radiograph of the relevant area, and performed a thorough clinical examination of teeth numbers 20 and 21. Although Respondent observed some abrasion2/ on the distal surface of tooth number 20 where the C- clasp of the partial denture had been attached, the teeth otherwise appeared healthy——i.e., neither Respondent's direct visualization of the teeth nor his review of the radiograph suggested the presence of decay. At the conclusion of the February 16 visit, Respondent prepared teeth numbers 20 and 21 (a process that involves the use of a drill to remove enough enamel from the teeth so that the bridge will fit properly), took a final impression, and provided P.D. with a temporary bridge. P.D. returned to Respondent's office on March 3, 2010, at which time Respondent removed the temporary bridge and performed a “try-in” with the metal framework of the new bridge. During this process, Respondent directly visualized tooth number 20 and, as was the case during the previous visits, observed no signs of decay.3/ However, Respondent noticed that the metal framework would not seat correctly, which prompted him to take a new impression. Thereafter, on March 10, 2010, Respondent removed P.D.'s temporary bridge and conducted a try-in with the new metal framework——affording him a third opportunity to visualize tooth number 20. Once again, Respondent observed no indications of decay or any other issues. Of the opinion that the second impression had yielded a satisfactory framework, Respondent scheduled P.D. to return at a later date for the seating of her new bridge. Upon P.D.'s return on March 24, 2010, Respondent removed the temporary bridge and directly visualized tooth number 20 for a fourth time; no decay was observed. Respondent then proceeded to seat the cantilever bridge, which fit well and caused the patient no discomfort. At that point, it was anticipated that P.D. would follow up with Respondent in six months for routine cleaning and maintenance. As it happens, though, P.D. returned to Respondent's office a mere five days later, on March 29, 2010. During the visit, P.D. reported that her new bridge was “hurting” and that she was feeling “pressure constantly.” Notably, however, P.D. denied that the pain was of such intensity that it kept her awake at nighttime, which militated against a conclusion that the patient was suffering from an abscess.4/ In response to P.D.'s complaints, Respondent adjusted and flossed the bridge. That an adjustment was made so soon after the bridge's seating, although less than optimal, was by no means unusual; indeed, Petitioner's expert witness concedes that neither the timing of the March 29 visit nor P.D.'s report of pressure necessitated a clinical examination or the taking of an x-ray on that date.5/ Nine days later, on April 7, 2014, P.D. appeared at Respondent's office once again, this time with the complaint that she was biting her cheek. During the clinical examination that ensued, Respondent surmised that the cheek biting, if any, had been caused by a different, aging bridge located in the upper left of P.D.'s mouth (at teeth numbers 11 through 14).6/ Respondent did, however, notice that the new bridge was hitting high, which prompted him to make a minimal adjustment using a rubber wheel. Although Petitioner contends that Respondent should have taken an x-ray during the April 7 visit to rule out an abscess, the evidence demonstrates that P.D. exhibited none of the clinical symptoms sometimes attendant to such a condition. Save for her report of “cheek biting,” P.D. presented with no complaint of severe——or, for that matter, any——pain,7/ nor did she exhibit any discomfort during the adjustment. Moreover, P.D. did not react adversely when Respondent used the end of his examination mirror to perform percussion on the bridge. Finally, Respondent detected no inflammation below the gum line. Subsequently, on April 13, 2010, P.D. returned to Respondent's office and reported that the new bridge was “catching her lip.” P.D. complained of no other pain relating to the new bridge, and Respondent's clinical examination yielded no indications (e.g., thermal sensitivity or sensitivity to percussion) that the patient was suffering from an abscess.8/ Owing to the dearth of symptoms suggestive of endodontic involvement, Respondent determined that an x-ray was unnecessary. However, Respondent made a minimal adjustment to the new bridge and sent P.D. on her way, with the expectation that the patient would return in six months for a follow-up visit. Although P.D. would return a mere six days later, on April 19, 2010, her complaints at that time related only to the aging bridgework at teeth numbers 11 through 14 (seated years earlier by another dentist), which Respondent discovered was “hitting hard.” Significantly, P.D. raised no issues concerning her new bridge at teeth numbers 19 through 21, and Respondent's examination revealed, yet again, no signs of endodontic involvement.9/ As such, Respondent did nothing more than make a slight adjustment to the bridge at teeth numbers 11 through 14.10/ Soon thereafter, P.D. scheduled another appointment and returned to Respondent's office on April 27. On this occasion, as with the previous visit, P.D. voiced no complaints concerning her new bridge, and Respondent observed no signs of inflammation, cheek biting, or any problems. This time, however, P.D. accused Respondent of “breaking” the bridgework at teeth numbers 11 through 14 and suggested that he provide a replacement free of charge. Respondent was understandably dismayed by P.D.'s demand, for he had never caused any damage to the 11 through 14 bridge; moreover, the bridge in question, although in poor condition, was by no means “broken.” At that point, Respondent terminated his relationship with P.D. Expert Testimony As noted previously, Petitioner advances two unrelated theories in support of its charge that Respondent violated the minimum standard of care. First, Petitioner contends that, prior to the seating of the new bridge on March 24, 2010, Respondent failed to treat decay supposedly present on the distal surface (i.e., the part of the tooth that faces the back of the mouth) of tooth number 20. In light of Respondent's concession that the standard of care requires the removal of existing decay prior to the seating of a bridge, Petitioner's first theory boils down to a factual dispute over whether decay was present on tooth number 20 on March 24, 2010. In an attempt to establish the presence of decay, Petitioner adduced testimony from Dr. Solomon Brotman, an eminently qualified dentist with more than 30 years of practical experience. Although Dr. Brotman concedes that he never clinically examined P.D., he nevertheless maintains that the presence of “substantial” decay on tooth number 20 is demonstrated by x-rays in Respondent's possession when the bridge was seated.11/ Dr. Brotman further opines that the x-rays of tooth number 20 are not reasonably susceptible to any other interpretation (e.g., abrasion or erosion), and that Respondent may have missed the decay because it is “sometimes” tooth colored. Finally, Dr. Brotman asseverates that, in cases involving interproximal decay, it is appropriate to make a diagnosis based solely on an x-ray. Respondent counters with testimony from Dr. Robert Fish, an expert with an equally impressive background, who credibly asserts that the x-rays in question are not suggestive of decay but, rather, abrasion12/ that likely resulted from the ill-fitting “C-clasp” of the removable partial denture——an opinion that jibes with Respondent's persuasive testimony that he observed abrasion on the distal surface of tooth number 20. Dr. Fish further contends that, had decay been present, it is highly unlikely that Respondent would have missed it given the number of times he directly visualized tooth number 20 prior to the seating.13/ The short of it is that decay quite possibly existed on the distal surface of tooth number 20 at the time Respondent seated the bridge. However, Respondent's persuasive account of his clinical observations of the tooth, buttressed by the credible testimony of Dr. Fish, leaves the undersigned with substantial doubt on this point. As such, Petitioner has failed to sustain its burden of proof. The undersigned now turns to Petitioner's alternative theory, namely, that “continuing, localized dental pain” required Respondent to rule out the possibility of an abscess at the root of tooth number 20. In relevant part, the Amended Complaint alleges: Continuing, localized dental pain is a symptom of endodontic involvement. Minimum standards of diagnosis and treatment in the practice of dentistry require that when a patient complains of continued dental pain, a dentist take radiographic images of the symptomatic area to determine whether there is endodontic involvement. . . . Patient appointed with Respondent for relief of pain five times [after the bridge was seated] . . . . Respondent Dr. Almerico did not take radiographs of that area or otherwise rule out endodontic involvement during those visits. By failing to take radiographic images to determine possible endodontic involvement at bridge #19-21, Respondent failed to meet minimum standards of dental diagnosis and treatment when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. (emphasis added). Fairly read, the Amended Complaint alleges the standard of care as follows: when a patient reports continuing, localized dental pain, a practitioner must take an x-ray of the symptomatic area or otherwise rule out endodontic involvement. As Respondent correctly argues, however, the testimony of Petitioner's expert departs substantially from the theory pleaded in the charging document. First, contrary to paragraph 27 of the Amended Complaint, which alleges a failure to take x- rays “or otherwise rule out” an abscess, Dr. Brotman's formulation of the standard of care absolutely requires the taking of an x-ray to eliminate the possibility of endodontic involvement. To muddy the waters further, Dr. Brotman's articulation of the prevailing standard at times focused not on P.D.'s supposed reports of continued pain but, rather, the fact that Respondent made more than one adjustment to the new bridge subsequent to its seating: A Sure. I think we fell below the minimum standards on 4/7, 4/13 and 4/19 of 2010, because each of those visits, because the patient came back with the bite having shifted, which for that reason Dr. Almerico continued to adjust the bite on each visit. * * * BY MR. PRICE: Q Doctor, you just gave an opinion that is the standard of care that a patient with more than one adjustment, they automatically get an X-ray. You just gave that as a standard-of-care opinion, didn't you? A Yes, sir. (emphasis added).14/ In light of the significant degree to which Dr. Brotman's testimony deviates from the theory charged in the Amended Complaint, it is concluded that Petitioner has failed to convincingly articulate the minimum standard of performance against which the undersigned, as fact-finder, can independently evaluate Respondent's conduct. Even assuming that Petitioner had established the standard of care (as pleaded), there is a dearth of credible evidence that P.D. presented with continuing, localized pain relating to the new bridge. As detailed previously, P.D.'s report on April 7 that she was “biting her cheek” involved the older bridge at teeth numbers 11 through 14; on her next visit, she complained only that her new bridge was “catching her lip”; on April 19, P.D. merely informed Respondent that the older bridge was “hitting hard”; and, on her final visit, P.D. complained of nothing at all (save for her dubious request for a free replacement of the older bridge).15/ Such hardly constitutes a pattern of ongoing, localized pain. In any event, the persuasive evidence demonstrates that Respondent “otherwise ruled out” endodontic involvement through his clinical observations. Indeed, as Dr. Fish persuasively explained during his testimony, P.D. presented with none of the symptoms16/ sometimes associated with the presence of an abscess——e.g., sensitivity to temperature, exquisite pain, sensitivity to percussion, a fistula, or inflammation——during the office visits of April 7, 13, 19, and 27, 2010, thereby obviating the need for an x-ray. Ultimate Factual Determinations It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is not guilty of violating section 466.028(1)(x).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Dentistry dismissing Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2014.
The Issue Whether or not the July 21, 1991 civil penalty imposed against Respondent's truck for weighing more than the weights posted for the bridge at the St. Mary's River on US-17 (SR 5), Nassau County, was correct and properly assessed pursuant to Sections 316.545 and 316.55, F.S.
Findings Of Fact On July 21, 1991, the bridge at St. Mary's River on US-17 a/k/a SR 5 in Nassau County, Florida was posted on both sides of the river at 32 tons (64,000 pounds) for a combination truck-tractor semi-trailer. (P-1) On that date, and in that place, Weight Inspector Harvey L. Vickers stopped Respondent's combination truck-tractor, semi-trailer and subsequently weighed it at the #2 scale at Yulee, Florida. He then issued Load Report 37553K (P-2) to Respondent's driver. In so doing, Inspector Vickers checked a box on the Load Report showing that the vehicle in question was traveling north. However, his more detailed written narrative Case Report described the vehicle as traveling south. (R-3) Inspector Vickers also filled out the Load Report to show that the vehicle weighed 79,340 pounds and was in excess of the posted legal weight by 15,340 ponds. The appropriate subtraction showing overweight poundage was not originally done by Inspector Vickers in the proper columns or boxes of the Load Report, but Inspector Vickers corrected the Load Report by inserting arrows to show the proper location of the figures. He used the arrows, instead of making erasures, because the Load Report form is on NCR paper which cannot be erased. The weighing and fine were imposed between 7:50 p.m. and 8:25 p.m. on July 21, 1991. The vehicle's weight/overpoundage was calculated out at $.05 per pound for a fine of $767.00. In this instance, the "carrier" technically was Unit Transportation, but the fine was actually paid by Respondent. Respondent's Bill of Lading (R-2) indicated that the vehicle picked up its shipment in Doraville, Georgia. The load was comprised of paper weighing 44,000 pounds, destination Sanford, Florida. (R-2) Sanford Florida is south of the location where Respondent's truck was stopped and weighed by Inspector Vickers. The logical and reasonable inference therefrom is that the truck was traveling south and had crossed the low-weight bridge prior to the time it was stopped by Inspector Vickers. Also, the vehicle would have had to have been traveling south in order to have already crossed the bridge when stopped by the Florida inspector because the north end of the bridge is in Georgia and the south end of the bridge is in Florida. On July 2, 1991, the #2 scale which was used by Inspector Vickers on July 21, 1991 to weigh Respondent's truck had been inspected and certified as weighing "light" by 40 pounds. This certification had been done, pursuant to statutory mandate, by the Florida Department of Agriculture. (P-4) Thus, it is probable that Respondent's vehicle actually weighed 40 pounds more than that recorded by Inspector Vickers on his Load Report. 1/ Respondent presented a Brunswick Georgia weight ticket purportedly showing that the vehicle in question had a gross weight of 76,760 pounds 2/ on July 21, 1991 at 5:42 p.m. However, the truck I.D. number on this weight ticket (R-5) did not match that of the unit number on the Load Report (P-2), and there is no direct evidence as to whether or not any weight was added to either truck after that weighing in Brunswick Georgia and before the truck which was penalized crossed the St. Mary's Bridge. There is, therefore, no competent evidence to show that Respondent's truck weighed less than the 79,340 pounds recorded by Inspector Vickers on the Load Report.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the penalty of $767.00 was correctly assessed against Respondent pursuant to the provisions of Sections 316.545 and 316.555, F.S. and that since Respondent has already paid his fine, nothing else is owed between the parties. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of March, 1992. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Leamington (Petitioner herein), is a road maintenance and construction contractor doing business since approximately 1985. John Hummell is Petitioner's President and is responsible for all bids submitted for contract awards. Petitioner contracts primarily with the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent herein). Since 1985, Petitioner has entered into approximately forty-one (41) contracts with Respondent. Petitioner was one of seven bidders on State Job #17030-3536, Contract E-1706, let by Respondent in District I. Respondent notified Petitioner of its decision to award the bid to the second lowest bidder, Simco, by notice posted on April 19, 1993 stating that Leamington's bid was rejected because it was considered not to be responsible and was not in the best interest of the Department (to contract with Leamington). The work in question involves the repairs of the bridge located at SR- 789 at Little Ringling Causeway west of Sarasota in Sarasota County. The work entails removal and replacement of silicone sealant on the bridge deck and replacement and rejacketing of piling with grout epoxy. The bid tabulations revealed that Petitioner's bid was approximately $500.00 less than that of the second lowest bidder, Simco, Inc., of Sarasota. The Department has a procedure called the "district contracts procedure". Part of the procedure calls for the awards committee to review bids and determine who the bid should be awarded to. The awards committee, which was chaired by Glenn Ivey, the District Director of Operations, reviewed the bid submitted for project E-1706. The awards committee voted unanimously to reject Leamington's bid on Contract E-1706. The decision to reject Petitioner's bid, by the awards committee, was based on Petitioner's performance on its more recent Department contracts. Specifically, the awards committee considered projects E-1649, for sidewalk repair in several counties; contract E-1545, a concrete repair job in Lakeland; and contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair job. Leamington's contract on the concrete repair job (E-1545) was rated as being poor when Leamington was, in effect, asked to leave the job. Based on Leamington's poor workmanship and difficulties encountered on that contract, Respondent terminated work on the contract after approximately sixty percent (60 percent) of the work was completed. The remainder of that project was completed by another contractor. Specifically, Job No. E-1545 called for Petitioner to remove and replace portland concrete slabs on Memorial Boulevard in Lakeland. Petitioner failed to restore the concrete slabs to a smooth surface, making it necessary for Respondent to have the slabs ground such that motorists had a smooth driving surface. After several warnings, Respondent cancelled the project and, as noted, approximately forty percent (40 percent) of the work was completed by another contractor. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair contract. On that project, Petitioner was advised that the shoulder had to be graded at a certain angle and was shown, by several of Respondent's engineers, the proper manner in which to accomplish the task. Petitioner failed to grade the shoulder at the correct angle as requested. Petitioner also routinely failed to provide proper traffic control during the performance of Contract E-1652 and frequently disputed Respondent's employees advice as to work instructions and ways to eradicate the poor workmanship on that project. Additionally, Petitioner failed to use skilled workers and did not have ample equipment on the job to perform the work on Contract E-1652. Initially, Petitioner had limited equipment at the beginning of the work on Contract E-1652. After Petitioner received a letter from Respondent advising that there wasn't adequate equipment to complete the project, Petitioner obtained additional equipment. The Department terminated Petitioner's work under Contract E-1652 because Petitioner had approached the contract deadline for completion and due to of the numerous problems the Department experienced with Petitioner in getting the work completed acceptably. Bobby Cranford, the Assistant Maintenance Engineer for the Petitioner's Sarasota Maintenance Unit, recommended that Petitioner not be awarded any more roadway shoulder repair contracts based on the difficulties experienced by Petitioner's "poor" workmanship on contract E-1652. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Petitioner's work performance on Contract E-1649, a sidewalk repair job which encompassed several counties. Petitioner did not have the required personnel and expertise to perform the sidewalk job correctly. Petitioner was kept informed of deficiencies and necessary corrections to correctly perform the sidewalk repair job, however, the proper repairs have not been made. The Respondent introduced a composite of twenty-three (23) photos showing the extent of the problems Petitioner needed to correct the sidewalk repairs with notes as to the corrective action that was needed. Specifically, Petitioner used little expansion joint materials and no edging tools were utilized on the project. Similar problems were found throughout the four county area in which Petitioner was engaged on the sidewalk project. By letter dated May 13, 1993, Respondent advised Petitioner of the numerous problems on contract E-1649. Specifically, Petitioner's President was told of visual inspections which showed substandard work on the original work as well as the work wherein Petitioner attempted to correct deficiencies which were discovered by Respondent. For example, Petitioner was advised that at 506 First and Main Streets in Wachula, there were sections of concrete sidewalk removed and scheduled for replacement with adjacent sections now damaged. Petitioner was further advised that workers had driven trucks on the sidewalk damaging several slabs not marked for replacement. Finally, Petitioner was asked to correct broken sprinklers at the work site and to resolve a claim filed by a Mrs. Campbell, which was registered with Respondent. The awards committee also relied upon an independent inspection report prepared by Bobby Cranford. That report is a forty (40) page report citing numerous deficiencies on the sidewalk repair project. Respondent requires that contractors employ english speaking superintendents at each work site to assist in communicating with its inspectors. Petitioner utilized superintendents who did not speak english and thereby created a language barrier making communication difficult with Respondent's personnel. Respondent had to monitor Petitioner's projects extensively and at a cost which increased the Department's overhead disproportionately when compared to other projects let to other district contractors. Based on a review of Respondent's work on Petitioner's recent contracts, no other contractors performing contracts in District I had a performance record as poor as Petitioner. When the awards committee made its decision to reject Petitioner's bid on the subject contract, it also relied on a memorandum from , Wally Clark, a District I attorney. In the memorandum it was concluded that Petitioner had subcontracted work to Hummell, Inc., a separate entity and that the required prior written approval of the subcontracting had not been obtained from Respondent. The investigation also revealed that the subcontractor, Hummell, Inc., had not been paid for its services (by Petitioner). An internal audit also prepared by Wall revealed that Hummell, Inc. was an unpaid subcontractor of Petitioner. The awards committee also considered allegations from Phillip Spears, a subcontractor of Petitioner, who had not been paid for work performed on Respondent's contracts. The committee also considers a newspaper article which stated that Petitioner was under investigation by local law enforcement officials for failure to pay subcontractors on the Interstate 75 project. Dennis Hall is the District Investigator for District I. Hall accompanied Wall, the author of the internal audit report, on investigations and interviews in compiling the audit report. One of the persons interviewed by Wall and Hall was Larry Zavitz. Zavitz was an inspector employed by Petitioner in excess of twenty- eight (28) years and had performed the inspection on Petitioner's sidewalk repair project under Contract E-1649. During the interview of Zavitz, he admitted to receiving a loan of $1,000.00 from John Hummell which Zavitz had not fully repaid at the time of the interview. Upon Zavitz admission of accepting the loan, he was asked and later resigned from the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner's protest of the rejection of its bid on Contract E-1706 be rejected and the Department enter its award of the subject contract to the second lowest responsible bidder, Simco, Inc. of Sarasota. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 8th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Haydon Burns Building 562 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 William H. Roberts, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Michael E. Riley, Esquire 106 East College Avenue Post Office Box 10507 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact The facts reveal that Jose Gonzalez, a driver for the Respondent, operating one of Respondent's tractor/trailer pieces of Respondent, went to a rock company located in Hollywood, Florida, on February 13, 1978, for the purpose of picking up a load of "P" rock. This rock was purchased from Miramar Lakes, d/b/a Miramar Rock on that date and the driver, Gonzalez, was given a weight ticket. The weight ticket from Miramar Rock reflected a gross weight of 72,360 pounds, which is the total of the equipment and load. (The scales at Miramar peck used to weigh the Respondent's equipment and load had been certified by the Petitioner to be accurate on June 7, 1977, and again on April 11, 1978.) The weather on February 13, 1978, was clear and the purchase, loading and weighing done on the subject equipment was without incident, until the driver attempted to pull away from the weight scales. At that moment the universal joint and yoke snapped and this caused the vehicle to be inoperable. Gonzalez left the truck at the Miramar Rock Company. At that point, the load was covered by a canvas and the trailer was not seeping or leaking water from the rock aggregate. Later, on February 13, 1978, a mechanic employed by the Respondent came to effect repairs to the vehicle, but due to the unavailability of certain parts necessary to complete the repairs, did not finish the work until February 14, 1978. When the repairs had been completed on that date, the driver, Gonzalez, removed the truck from the Miramar Rock compound and entered the roads of Broward County, Florida. At around 9:15 a.m. on February 14, 1978, Gonzalez arrived at the intersection of Hollywood Boulevard and Flamingo Road in Broward County, Florida, eastbound on Hollywood Boulevard. At that intersection, officers employed by the Florida Highway Patrol, Weights Division, intercepted the Des Rocher truck and caused the vehicle to stop. After the stop the equipment being operated at that time was established to be a vehicle measuring between 37 feet to 38 feet from the front axle to the rear axle, and the peak of the rock load was located in the center rear portion of the trailer. Officer Wilkerson of the Florida Highway Patrol observed water dripping out of the rear tailgate after making the stop. Gonzalez was asked to produce a weight ticket and in response to this request produced the weight ticket given him by Miramar Rock on February 13, 1978. Officer Wilkerson commented that this ticket was from the day before and that a ticket bearing the current date was required. Gonzalez was then told that the truck would be weighed with the method for weighing the truck being by two portable scales. Officer Wilkerson weighed one side of the truck and Officer Herron went to the other side of the truck. Wilkerson weighed the steering axle on his side of the truck; the drive axle on his side of the truck, and two tires on the rear tandem axles on his side of the truck. It is not known what Officer Herron did, if anything, in effecting the purposes of this inspection and weigh-in, because Officer Herron did not appear at the hearing in this cause and was not seen by Officer Wilkerson in conducting his inspection activities, if any. Therefore, the total weight of the truck as ascertained from the inspection ostensibly conducted by these officers was not shown by competent evidence. However, it was demonstrated through the testimony in this hearing that the plan which the officers had for making the roadside inspections was one which called for basically stopping all trucks of the category of aggregate haulers that were eastbound through the intersection on Hollywood Boulevard, to the exclusion of pickup trucks and moving vans. After stopping the former category of trucks, some were weighed and others were not. As a result of the stop, Gonzalez was ticketed for a weight violation and that ticket was in the amount of $136.45 as an assessed penalty. Gonzalez then took the truck back to the Des Rocher installation which contained a set of scales and between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. the truck was weighed and shown to be 35.64 tons, or 71,280 pounds as the gross weight including the equipment and load. (The scales that were utilized had been certified by the Petitioner on June 7, 1977, and again on May 8, 1978.)
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Respondent, Sanwa Growers, Inc., owns and operates over the highways of the state of Florida a commercial vehicle identified as a 1987 Ford truck, VIN 9BFPH70P3HDM03333, Florida license number H1056W (vehicle). On November 13, 1990 the Respondent's vehicle while traveling on highway I-4 in Hillsborough County, Florida was stopped and weighed by the Department. The total weight of the vehicle was 24,100 pounds consisting of 10,540 pounds on the steering axle and 13,560 pounds on the rear axle. A Load Report and Field Receipt was completed which indicated the legal weight (declared gross vehicle weight) of the vehicle to be 19,999 with a tax class weight (gross vehicle weight) of 24,100 pounds which resulted in the vehicle being 4,101 pounds overweight. The Respondent was assessed a penalty of $0.05 per pound for each pound the truck was overweight which resulted in a total penalty assessed the Respondent of $205.05. The Respondent paid the penalty as assessed and was issued a Field Receipt. The gross vehicle weight (GVW) of the vehicle as declared by the Respondent in accordance with Section 320.01(12), Florida Administrative Code, on vehicle's registration certificate issued on September 19, 1990 was 19,999 pounds which was the legal weight indicated on the Load Report issued on November 13, 1991. On November 13, 1990 the GVW (legal weight) of the vehicle as declared by the Respondent was 19,999 pounds. The GVW of the vehicle as declared by the Respondent on the initial registration dated May 11, 1988 was 29,500 pounds. However, on the subsequent registration of the vehicle dated January 4, 1989, the declared GVW by the Respondent was 16,090 pounds which was the same as the net weight of the vehicle shown on the registration. Although the registration issued on January 4, 1989 expired on December 31, 1989, there was no evidence of a registration being issued upon expiration. The next registration that was issued subsequent to January 4, 1989 that is in evidence was issued on September 19, 1990 apparently for the purpose of increasing the GVW from 16,090 pounds to 19,994 pounds. This was the registration in effect at the time the vehicle was weighed on November 13, 1990. On November 15, 1990, two days after the weighing, the registration was corrected by increasing the GVW from 19,999 pounds to 29,500 pounds. There was insufficient evidence to show that the GVW set out in each of the registrations in evidence was not the GVW as declared by the Respondent at the time of issuing the registration or that the issuing agency incorrectly listed the GVW as declared by the Respondent on any of the registrations in evidence. On November 13, 1990 the Respondent's vehicle was 4,101 pounds overweight when stopped and weighed in Hillsborough County, Florida on I-4 and the calculation of the penalty ($0.05 x 4,101 pounds - $205.05) is correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order finding the Respondent subject to the penalty as assessed and denying its request for refund of the penalty. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-3727 The following contributes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120- 59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in the case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Covered in the Preliminary Statement but adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 3. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 2 and 4. - 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Respondent did not submit or file any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Wendy Wheelock Qualified Representative Sanwa Growers, Inc. 5107 State Road 674 East Wimauma, FL 33570 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
