The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been certified as a Correctional Officer in the State of Florida since March 9, 1994. There was no evidence that he had been the subject of any prior disciplinary action. At all times material to this proceeding, the Department employed Respondent as a Correctional Officer. 2/ On December 21, 1999, Respondent reported for his scheduled duty shift at the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center (the TGK Center). The TGK Center is a jail located in Miami-Dade County and operated by the Department. Respondent was scheduled to work the shift beginning at 6:30 a.m. and ending at 2:30 p.m. On December 21, 1999, Respondent was assigned as a unit manager at the TGK Center. His responsibilities included the care, custody, and control of all inmates in his assigned unit of the facility. Respondent was responsible for conducting visual inspections of the unit and inmate headcounts. Visual inspections and inmate headcounts are separate procedures. In a visual inspection, the officer looks for anything out of the ordinary by walking around the entire unit, looking into each cell, and checking on all inmates. In a headcount, the officer accounts for the presence of each inmate by counting the inmates in the unit. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was required to document his activities at the TGK Center by making written entries in a Unit Logbook. Upon reporting for duty at 6:30 a.m., Respondent made an entry in the Unit Logbook recording the time, his presence on duty at "0630," and his receipt of certain equipment from the previous shift. Respondent made a second entry in the Unit Logbook at 6:43 a.m. As the first line of the second entry, Respondent inserted in the Unit Logbook the following: "0643-Visual check of unit/inmates all app QRU." The first line of the second entry would convey to other officers reviewing the Unit Logbook that Respondent had determined through a visual inspection that all was well throughout the unit at approximately 6:43 a.m. 3/ As the second line of the second entry, Respondent inserted in the Unit Logbook the following: "H/C B W H." That entry would convey to other officers reviewing the Unit Logbook that Respondent had intended to conduct an inmate headcount and list each inmate in one of the following categories: Black, White, or Hispanic. Because no numbers were inserted next to each designated category, it would have been clear to other officers reviewing the Unit Logbook that Respondent had not completed the inmate headcount. Respondent became preoccupied with preparations for serving the inmates their morning meal, which he intended to serve early because he was expecting supplies to be delivered that morning. Respondent did not complete the headcount he had intended to take. Shortly before 9:30 a.m., Respondent assigned an inmate trustee to assist him with the meal preparations and told the trustee to find another inmate to help. The trustee then went to another part of the unit to look for another inmate to help with preparations for the meal. Shortly thereafter, Respondent heard the inmate trustee screaming, and Respondent immediately went to investigate. At 9:30 a.m., Respondent arrived at cell 5520 and observed inmate Carlos Nevis hanging in front of the window of the door. Mr. Nevis' body was readily observable from outside the room through the window of the door. Rigor mortis had set in, which indicated that Mr. Nevis had hanged himself prior to the time Respondent reported to work. Respondent did not perform a visual check of the inmates in the unit at 6:43 a.m. as he recorded in the Unit Logbook. Had Respondent actually performed the visual checks at that time, he would have discovered Mr. Nevis' body. The first line of the second entry made by Respondent in the Unit Logbook entry at 6:43 a.m. indicating that he had made a visual check of the "unit/inmates" and that all appeared "QRU" was false. Respondent had not performed a visual inspection to determine the status of the unit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that Respondent's certification be suspended for a period of six months and that he thereafter be placed on probation for a period of two years. As a special condition of probation, Respondent should be required to complete an ethics course approved by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2002.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this administrative complaint, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at the Putnam Correctional Institution (Putnam). He was certified August 14, 1987 by certificate #14-87-502-13. He is 26 years old. In September 1987, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Special Agent Jimmie Collins was tipped off by Michael Adkins, an inmate at Putnam, that a correctional officer was interested in selling one or two kilograms of cocaine. Collins approached Adkins' wife, Phyllis, who agreed to assist Collins in a criminal investigation. At Collins' instructions, Phyllis Adkins set up a meeting with Respondent, telling him she was a mediator or broker for a cocaine buyer named "Joe." Mrs. Adkins wore an electronic transmitter to a meeting with Respondent on September 2, 1987 and her conversation was monitored and taped by Agent Collins. At the September 2, 1987 meeting, which took place in the open at a restaurant parking lot, Respondent and Mrs. Adkins discussed in the most general terms an exchange of "coke" for money. "Samples" were discussed. No one made any commitment to anyone with regard to samples or a sale. The Respondent's behavior was described by both participants as "freaked" or frightened. Later, Mrs. Adkins set up another "meet" with Respondent for September 23, 1987 under similar conditions. At that time, she had with her another FDLE agent, Joe Nickmier, who posed as the imaginary narcotics dealer named "Joe." Respondent brought with him another person, Chris Sanford. Agent Collins was surprised that Respondent brought someone with him because such an exposure of a proposed drug deal to several persons was contrary to his experience with the secretive, suspicious, and paranoid behavior of "real dopers." As a result, Agent Collins felt that Respondent was involved in something he did not know about. Collins was further surprised when the masquerading "Joe" concurred with Respondent's ordering Chris Sanford to stand back away from their conversation, since Sanford's involvement had the potential of raising the circumstances to a standard sufficient for FDLE to make a charge against both Respondent and Sanford for "conspiracy" in use, trafficking, or selling of a controlled substance. During the conversation involving Respondent, Phyllis Adkins, and "Joe," on September 23, 1987, which conversation was also monitored and taped by Agent Collins, there is a suggestion that Respondent would exchange 17-18 or 22 ounces of some kind of drug for money, but the language employed by all concerned is vague and unconnected. Respondent avoided any commitment to the others, including giving them his phone number. At the conclusion of this meeting, Agent Collins had formed the opinion that Respondent did not fit the category of "a real doper" but was just an individual out to make some money. Collins felt that he had a reasonable expectation that the Respondent would sell cocaine if he could get it but that Respondent could not get cocaine from the Putnam County Sheriff's Office or the Daytona Police Department. It is not clear where Agent Collins got the idea that Respondent had offered to obtain any controlled substance from the respective evidence rooms. This concept was not volunteered or admitted by Respondent in either of the taped meetings with Phyllis Adkins and/or "Joe." Phyllis Adkins and "Joe" suggested to Respondent several times on September 23, 1987 that Respondent's contact must be in law enforcement in Daytona, but no "evidence room" was ever mentioned. It may be that Agent Collins relied on out-of-court (hearsay) information from Michael or Phyllis Adkins, but his reliance on such hearsay statements, in the absence of some direct supporting evidence, does not support a finding that Respondent ever made an offer to get contraband drugs from any sealed evidence room. In a subsequent March 1988 interview, Respondent admitted to prison inspectors and to Agent Collins that he had, indeed, made both parking lot contacts with Phyllis Adkins and that he knew he was operating outside the scope of his employment duties as a correctional officer when he did so, but that he was just conducting his own investigation into drug dealing to "set up" inmate Michael Adkins for FDLE. Respondent's stated purposes were to further his career and to impress his father, a Florida highway patrolman. Respondent admitted that he knew the prison investigator at Putnam but that he did not report his activities to the prison investigator. Special Agent Jimmie Collins consulted FDLE legal personnel and determined not to prosecute the Respondent criminally because there was insufficient evidence of either conspiracy or of a substantive statutory violation. Two times in January 1986, far previous to any of the events giving rise to the current charges, Respondent had approached another FDLE Special Agent, Paul Fuentez, giving him the names and addresses of several known drug dealers and requesting the opportunity to go undercover with Fuentez to acquire evidence against them. Fuentez met twice with the Respondent, face to face, and at that time, Respondent admitted to using drugs with such persons. Fuentez instructed Respondent not to "do" drugs with suspects and not to proceed with any independent investigation on his own. Respondent told Fuentez at that time that he had been awake all night. Fuentez felt that Respondent was "hyper," and might still be on drugs, and therefore Fuentez told Respondent that they could not work together as long as Fuentez had the opinion that the Respondent was on drugs. On September 23, 1987, the day of the Respondent's second meeting with Mrs. Adkins and his only meeting with "Joe," Respondent phoned Fuentez twice. The first time, the Respondent said he had been talking to a prisoner named Michael Adkins who was dealing drugs with a Puerto Rican named "Joe." The Respondent specifically asked Agent Fuentez if Adkins had been dealing with "Joe" when Adkins had been arrested for the crime for which Adkins was currently incarcerated. Fuentez' testimony indicated that Respondent was clearly asking about the past status, not the present status, of the people named. At the time of this first call, Fuentez knew about Collins' investigation at Putnam but did not know Respondent had been specifically targeted. Fuentez formed the opinion that Respondent was trying to find out about FDLE investigations. He told Respondent he did not have time to look up information about the people Respondent had named and ended the phone call. Later the same day, Respondent called back to Fuentez and told him to forget the whole thing. Since the "meet" of September 23 occurred after dark and Respondent's phone calls to Fuentez seem to have occurred during business hours, the undersigned infers that both Respondent's phone calls to Fuentez preceded his "meet" with Phyllis Adkins and "Joe" on September 23, 1987. Respondent also had a conversation with Robin Edwards, a local police officer. Respondent related to him that he had been approached by a Putnam inmate, Michael Adkins, to buy or sell drugs. Mr. Edwards advised Respondent to talk to his trooper father or his superiors. At formal hearing, Edwards could not date this conversation closer than that it could have been in September 1987, but even so, it appears not to be an afterthought devised by Respondent only due to the March 1988 confrontation of Respondent by investigators. Lenard Ball is a Correctional Officer Inspector II. Upon his testimony, it is accepted that a standard of correctional officer behavior prohibits them from operating outside a correctional institution. Unless they are acting as prisoner escorts, correctional officers' authority ends at the boundary of their respective institutions. Upon Officer Ball's testimony, it is also accepted that each correctional institution may institute a policy permitting criminal investigations within that institution to be pursued by only one correctional officer, and that at Putnam, all officers are required to report all such conversations as Respondent was having with Michael Adkins to one of two superiors. In Ball's opinion, Respondent's actions were clearly prohibited by anti-fraternization rules and by rules prohibiting Respondent from placing himself and others in danger. Respondent was never an institutional investigator. In fact, he had only been certified as a correctional officer for approximately one month when the material events occurred. At formal hearing, Respondent testified credibly that the entire episode was only intended by him to achieve more in his position, that he had no connection with anyone in the local police department or the sheriff's office who could give him access to drugs, and that he had no other access to those evidence rooms. Respondent had consistently denied any mention of evidence rooms since the March 1988 investigation. Petitioner did not establish that Respondent had ever had any access to any controlled substances through any evidence rooms or otherwise. (See Finding of Fact 5) Further, Respondent represented that his phone conversations with Agent Fuentez scared him, that he only attended the September 23, 1987 meeting with Phyllis Adkins and "Joe" because he had been threatened by Michael Adkins with being turned in to FDLE, and that he took Chris Sanford, a Fire Department employee, with him to the September 23, 1987 "meet" as a witness for his own protection. Chris Sanford did not testify. Michael Adkins did not testify. There is therefore no further support or dispute to Respondent's intent or motivation from original sources.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of bad moral character as defined in Rule 11B-27.001(4)(c) F.A.C., issuing a reprimand accordingly, and placing his certificate on probationary status for two full years, subject to specific terms and conditions for appropriate education, training and supervision to be imposed by the Commission in its expertise, and providing for revocation of his certificate in the event those conditions are not timely met. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-2450 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Except where subordinate or unnecessary, PFOF 1-7, 10- 13, 16, 19-21 are accepted. PFOF 8-9 are accepted to the degree described in the RO. The PFOF contain argument and the quotation is only part of several pages and does not accurately reflect the exhibit or record as a whole. PFOF 14-15 and 17 are only part of several pages and do not accurately reflect the exhibit or record as a whole. PFOF 18 is rejected as unproved. Respondent's PFOF: None filed to date. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert S. Smith 2720 Edgemore Palatka, Florida 32077 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffery Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact A. Standing. The Petitioner, Peter B. Dolinger, is not incarcerated by the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is, therefore, not subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Petitioner is an independent paralegal who owns and operates a sole proprietorship specializing in prisoner related issues. The intended scope of the Petitioner's business is to include research and pleading preparation for licensed members of the Florida Bar; agency representation before state agencies, in a qualified non-attorney representative status. The Petitioner, while representing an inmate in an unrelated administrative proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings, Archie White v. Parole and Probation Commission, DOAH Case No. 92-2392RXP, sought the release of the inmate's records from the Respondent. The request was denied by the Respondent pursuant to Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code. Archie D. White v. Parole and Probation Commission, DOAH Case No. 92- 2392RXP, is no longer pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. A Final Order was entered in that case in June, 1992. The Respondent. The Respondent is the state agency required to adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (9) When it is reasonably believed that a party may divulge information contained in the files of the department to an offender, the department shall restrict release of any information to that party. The Petitioner has alleged that Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, "facially fails to establish an adeqaute [sic] standard for agency decisions. In other words, a person of common intelligence may imply the utilization of a 'reasonable' etst [sic] or standard thstb [sic] differs in totality from thst [sic] of another, most notably in the absence of definition, guidelines or policy on the standard to be applied."
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against her and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, including the "[s]tipulated [f]acts" contained in the parties' Prehearing Stipulation,2 the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since February 18, 2003, certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. She holds Correctional Certificate Number 229286. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections (Department) as a correctional officer and assigned to the South Florida Reception Center (SFRC), a "transient institution for inmates that are [transferring] from one facility to another." Sergeant Shirley McLain is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, employed by the Department as a correctional officer and assigned to SFRC. Respondent and Sergeant McLain have known each other since the time they attended the correctional academy together. In August of 2005, Respondent was responsible for supervising inmates working on the "outside grounds" of SFRC, while Sergeant McLain oversaw the operations of the SFRC property room, where personal items taken from inmates are brought and stored until they are returned or other otherwise disposed of. Sergeant McLain "never supervised" Respondent. In August of 2005, Ricardo Bigio was an inmate at SFRC. Shortly after his arrival at the facility, he had a watch and chain confiscated from him. He was permitted to send these items home. Two days later, Sergeant McLain found Inmate Bigio in possession of another watch and another chain. Upon being told by Inmate Bigio, in response to her questioning, that he had obtained these items "through visitation," Sergeant McLain informed him, since these items were brought into the institution "illegally," they were "now contraband" and he could not have them "sen[t] . . . home." At the suggestion of a fellow inmate, Inmate Bigio approached Respondent and asked her to "speak to Sergeant McLain to see if she would let [him] send [this confiscated] jewelry home." During their conversation, Respondent mentioned to Inmate Bigio that "her dad needed a car." Inmate Bigio told Respondent that, if Respondent spoke to Sergeant McLain about his jewelry, he "would be able to send her to somebody [he knew in the used car sales business] to get a good deal on a car" for her father. Respondent agreed to help Inmate Bigio by speaking to Sergeant McLain about sending his jewelry home. Respondent and Inmate Bigio then went to Sergeant McLain's office, where Respondent asked Sergeant McLain if she would "let[] [Inmate Bigio] send this chain and this watch home," an act that that Respondent believed was within Sergeant McLain's power as the officer in charge of the SFRC property room. Sergeant McLain responded to Respondent's request in the negative. Respondent said, "Okay," and then left with Inmate Bigio. Respondent returned to Sergeant McLain's office with Inmate Bigio "off and on" for the next three or four days to repeat her request that Sergeant McLain allow Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home. On each occasion, in response to the request, Sergeant McLain reiterated that the jewelry "was contraband and [therefore Inmate Bigio] could not send it home." On August 10, 2005, approximately a week after she had first raised the matter with Sergeant McLain, Respondent once again asked Sergeant McLain to permit Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home. This time, in making her request, Respondent revealed her motivation for interceding on Inmate Bigio's behalf. She explained to Sergeant McLain that, if Sergeant McLain granted the request and allowed Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home, Inmate Bigio would make the necessary arrangements with his "people [who] own[ed] a car lot" to enable Respondent to purchase for her father a $5,000.00 car for only $2,000.00. Respondent provided this explanation as to why she was taking up Inmate Bigio's cause in the hopes that Sergeant McLain's having this information would make Sergeant McLain more inclined to grant the permission Respondent was requesting on Inmate Bigio's behalf. Sergeant McLain was taken aback that Respondent would strike such a deal with an inmate. She advised Respondent, as she had in response to Respondent's previous requests, that Inmate Bigio would not be permitted to send his jewelry home.3 Sergeant McLain subsequently reported the incident to the SFRC assistant warden. Inspector Arlethia Clark with the Department's Inspector's General Office subsequently investigated the matter. As part of her investigation, Inspector Clark interviewed Respondent on November 17, 2005. Respondent was placed under oath for the interview. Respondent told Inspector Clark that Sergeant McLain, in describing her August 10, 2005, conversation with Respondent, had "twisted the story around." Respondent knowingly made the false claim that she had gone to Sergeant McLain merely to report the illicit offer that Inmate Bigio had made and to seek guidance from Sergeant McLain "as a supervisor" as to what to do, not to persuade Sergeant McLain to allow Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home so that she would be able to purchase a car for her father at a discount (which, in fact, contrary to Respondent's sworn statement to Inspector Clark, was the actual reason she had gone to Sergeant McLain). Inspector Clark also interviewed Inmate Bigio and Sergeant McLain. Based on the findings of her investigation, Inspector Clark "found that there was bartering between, or an attempt to barter between," Inmate Bigio and Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of Allegations One and Two and, based on these findings of guilt, revoke her certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ Petitioner forfeited his Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Investment Plan account by entering a nolo contendere plea to two counts of violating section 893.13(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony.
Findings Of Fact The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Mr. Combs began working for DOC on May 25, 2001, as a Correctional Officer Level 1 at the Union Correctional Institution (“Union Correctional”) in Raiford, Florida. Union Correctional is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 inmates, and Mr. Combs assisted with their care and custody. In January of 2006, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Sergeant. While his responsibilities were very similar to those of his previous position, Mr. Combs was now supervising other correctional officers. In October of 2011, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Lieutenant, and was responsible for supervising 50 to 70 correctional officers at Union Correctional. In April of 2013, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Captain, and transferred to Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. A captain is the highest ranking correctional officer on a given shift, and Mr. Combs supervised approximately 50 correctional officers at a time, including sergeants and lieutenants. Like Union Correctional, Florida State Prison is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 prisoners. A colonel manages Florida State Prison, and it has two separate units. One of those units is a work camp housing lower- custody inmates who may work outside the facility, and the main prison is the other unit. Each of the units is run by its own major. In February of 2015, Mr. Combs was promoted to Major and took charge of the work camp at Florida State Prison. At some point in 2014 and prior to his promotion to Major, Mr. Combs had begun taking Oxycodone recreationally. Mr. Combs typically purchased one Oxycodone pill three to four times a week, and Dylan Hilliard (a Correctional Officer 1 at Florida State Prison) was Mr. Combs’ primary source of Oxycodone. Mr. Hilliard usually worked at the main prison, but he occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs knew Mr. Hilliard because of their employment with DOC. Mr. Combs purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard at the latter’s home in Lawtey, Florida. However, some transactions occurred in Mr. Combs’ state-issued housing on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Hilliard charged Mr. Combs $35 for an Oxycodone pill, and that was a discount from the $38 price Mr. Hilliard charged others. Mr. Combs allowed his subordinates (Sergeants Jesse Oleveros and Evan Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. After returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard, Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give Mr. Combs an Oxycodone pill free of charge. Operation Checkered Flag was a joint task force led by the Bradford County Sheriff’s Office, and its purpose was to arrest individuals involved with the distribution and use of illegal drugs. The authorities arrested Mr. Hilliard after he engaged in an illegal drug transaction with an undercover agent from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. A subsequent search of Mr. Hilliard’s cell phone revealed text messages between Mr. Hilliard and several other DOC employees, including Mr. Combs. Mr. Hilliard referred to Mr. Combs as “Chicken-Hawk” or “Hawk” in those text messages, and the two of them used car part terminology as a code for different milligram sizes of Oxycodone. Operation Checkered Flag ultimately resulted in the arrest of 10 DOC employees. The authorities arrested Mr. Combs on July 1, 2015, based on allegations that he had committed six felonies relating to the alleged unlawful and illegal purchase and distribution of Oxycodone. DOC fired Mr. Combs on approximately July 1, 2015. Mr. Combs initially denied all of the allegations. However, after spending nearly 56 days in jail, Mr. Combs reached an agreement with the State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County that called for his criminal charges to be reduced in exchange for his cooperation with Operation Checkered Flag. During an interview on August 20, 2015, with members of Operation Checkered Flag, Mr. Combs admitted that he had purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. In addition, Mr. Combs admitted that on six or seven occasions he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave the prison grounds so that they could purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. The State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County chose to dismiss most of the charges against Mr. Combs. The Information ultimately filed against Mr. Combs set forth two counts alleging that he violated section 893.13(2)(a)1., by illegally purchasing Oxycodone on March 23, 2015, and March 31, 2015. Those purchases occurred approximately 10 miles from Florida State Prison at Mr. Hilliard’s residence in Lawtey, Florida. Neither Mr. Combs nor Mr. Hilliard was on duty during those transactions. On August 25, 2015, Mr. Combs pled nolo contendere. The Bradford County Circuit Court entered judgment against Mr. Combs based on the two violations of section 893.13(2)(a)1., but withheld adjudication. All of the conduct underlying Mr. Combs’ nolo contendere plea occurred while he was employed by DOC. The SBA Determines that Mr. Combs Forfeited his FRS Benefits At all times relevant to the instant case, Mr. Combs was a member of the FRS. The FRS is the legislatively-created general retirement system established by chapter 121, Florida Statutes. See § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. The SBA is the governmental entity that administers the FRS Investment Plan, a defined retirement benefits contribution plan. § 121.4501(1), Fla. Stat. Via a letter dated August 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that a hold had been placed on his FRS account due to the criminal charges. As a result, no distribution of employer contributions from Mr. Combs’ account would be permitted until the SBA had evaluated the final disposition of those criminal charges. Via a letter dated September 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that he had forfeited his FRS benefits as a result of his nolo contendere plea. In support thereof, the SBA cited section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, which provides for the forfeiture of a public employee’s FRS retirement benefits upon the entry of a nolo contendere plea to certain types of offenses. The SBA’s letter closed by notifying Mr. Combs of his right to challenge the SBA’s proposed action through an administrative hearing. Mr. Combs requested a formal administrative hearing and asserted that the crimes for which he was convicted did not fall within the scope of section 112.3173(2)(e). In other words, Mr. Combs argued that his convictions were not associated with his employment at DOC and thus did not amount to a violation of the public trust. Testimony Adduced at the Final Hearing Mr. Combs testified that he was responsible for the work camp and the supervision of the correctional officers assigned there. He also testified that he would occasionally supervise correctional officers who normally worked in the main prison. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Hilliard was his primary source of Oxycodone and that Mr. Hilliard occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs was aware that two Florida State Prison employees who worked directly under him (Sergeant Jesse Oleveros and Sergeant Evan Williams) were purchasing Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave Florida State Prison grounds six or seven times in order to purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give him an Oxycodone pill after returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs acknowledged during his testimony that DOC policy prohibits correctional officers from leaving prison grounds during their shift. Mr. Combs acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs also acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to be on prison grounds with illegal narcotics. Finally, Mr. Combs acknowledged that as a sworn officer with the Department of Corrections, he had an obligation to report any criminal activity committed by a correctional officer working at Florida State Prison, regardless of whether that correctional officer reported to him. Findings of Ultimate Fact An examination of the circumstances associated with Mr. Combs’ Oxycodone purchases from Mr. Hilliard demonstrates that there is a nexus between Mr. Combs’ employment as a correctional officer with DOC and his commission of the crimes to which he pled nolo contendere. For instance, Mr. Combs came to know his primary source of Oxycodone (Mr. Hilliard) through their mutual employment with DOC. Indeed, Mr. Combs supervised Mr. Hilliard when the latter was assigned to the work camp at Florida State Prison. Also, Mr. Combs knew that these transactions were illegal. As noted above, he and Mr. Hilliard used a code based on car part references to disguise the actual subject of their communications. Contrary to DOC policy and Florida Law, Mr. Combs allowed two of his subordinates (Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their duty shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs would then receive a free pill from Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams. Mr. Hilliard sold Oxycodone to Mr. Combs at a reduced price. It is reasonable to infer that Mr. Combs received this discount due to his high-ranking position at Mr. Hilliard’s place of employment and because Mr. Combs facilitated Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams’ purchases of Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs willfully violated DOC policy and Florida law by allowing correctional officers to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs knowingly violated his obligation as a sworn correctional officer by not reporting the criminal activity committed by Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs defrauded the public from receiving the faithful performance of his duties as a correctional officer. The public had a right to expect that one of its employees would not purchase drugs from someone he supervised. The public also had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not use his authority at Florida State Prison to facilitate Mr. Hilliard’s illegal drug sales to other DOC employees. In addition, the public had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not engage in illegal transactions on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Combs realized a profit, gain, or advantage through the power or duties associated with his position as a Major at DOC. Specifically, Mr. Combs satisfied his Oxycodone habit through purchases made from a DOC employee who he supervised. Also, Mr. Combs used his position to facilitate other sales by Mr. Hilliard, and Mr. Combs’ assistance led to him receiving free Oxycodone and a discounted price on his Oxycodone purchases. The findings set forth above in paragraphs 49 through 57 are the only ones needed to establish a nexus between Mr. Combs’ public employment and the two counts to which he pled nolo contendere. That nexus is evident from Mr. Combs’ testimony, Mr. Combs’ Responses to the SBA’s Requests for Admissions, and the Stipulated Facts. It was not necessary to consider the exhibits to which Mr. Combs raised objections, i.e., the arrest warrant, the warrant affidavit, and the audio recordings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of specified offenses that were committed prior to retirement, and that pursuant to section 112.3173 he has forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2016.
Findings Of Fact CASE HISTORY This case arises based upon an Administrative Complaint brought by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation against one Alfonso Bach setting forth allegations as established in the Issues portion of this Recommended Order. The date of the Administrative Complaint is May 6, 1981. Following a request for formal hearing the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 13, 1981. After assignment, a formal hearing was held on July 21, 1981, in keeping with Subsection 120.57(l), Florida Statutes. In the course of the hearing no testimony was presented by either party; the Petitioner offered a series of exhibits, 1-3. These exhibits are discussed in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order. MATERIAL FACTS After reviewing the Petitioner's proffered Exhibits 1-3 and upon consideration of argument in support of and in opposition to the admission of these exhibits, the exhibits have not been admitted. Consequently, there being no other basis for determining facts, no material facts are found.
Recommendation It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the prosecution by Administrative Complaint referred to herein, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, PD 0005572, be dismissed. 1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September 1981.
