The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, the Act or Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office is a law enforcement agency that employs roughly 3,400 individuals, of whom approximately 1,200 are sworn law enforcement officers and 700 are sworn corrections officers. The remaining employees are civilian or non-sworn. Murphy was hired as a deputy sheriff by PBSO on October 26, 1992. He was continuously employed in that capacity until his termination on October 11, 2002. For portions of the time he worked for PBSO, Murphy also was employed at a Home Depot store and in his father's towing business. Murphy’s career at PBSO was the fulfillment of a life dream, one for which he had worked extraordinarily hard. Murphy's father worked in law enforcement, and instilled within his only son a dream "to serve and protect." Despite his family background, Murphy was not an obvious candidate for a career in police work. Murphy was a marginal student all his life. He failed second grade, and passing any academic subject was a struggle. Yet, he persevered, determined to realize his dream of following his father's footsteps. Murphy worked long hours on schoolwork, sports, and in the family towing business. He was able to attain a high school diploma by applying himself diligently to his academics and seeking out extra help. With constant practice and repetition of his class work, Murphy was able to master material well enough to pass necessary courses, but he was not good at transferring knowledge and information to other settings. Despite his weak academic history, or perhaps because of the perseverance it showed, Florida State University awarded Murphy a partial football scholarship. In pursuit of his life dream, Murphy chose to major in criminal justice. Again, he experienced academic difficulty. As he had done in grammar school and high school, Murphy sought out extra tutelage and put in whatever hours it took to complete his degree. In due course, Murphy applied for and obtained a job at PBSO, having fulfilled all its employment criteria, including being licensed to carry a firearm and having passed a psychological evaluation. Murphy's first assignment was road patrol. Road patrol in most law enforcement agencies, particularly those in large urban areas such as Palm Beach County, is an entry-level position, and a baptism by fire. Every traffic stop is potentially life threatening. Road patrol officers may be called upon on a moment's notice to provide back up to fellow officers who are under fire. Virtually every interaction with the public calls for grace and good judgment under stressful circumstances. The most ordinary of days on road patrol result in a need to generate reports. There are, as Murphy noted, "hundreds of formulas" which deputies must understand so that they can properly document traffic accidents. A working knowledge of Florida Statutes, criminal and civil procedure, and related court rules, is also required. It soon became apparent that Murphy was unsuited to road patrol. With its incessant demands upon him to quickly access and apply academic training to the infinite variables of street policing, road duty revealed that Murphy was unable to translate his classroom learning to the demands of the job. His supervisors were therefore obliged to spend a disproportionate share of time addressing situations created by Murphy's sub-par performance. After two years, Murphy was assigned to Palm Beach International Airport (PBIA). Murphy found this position more congenial. Freed of the stress of road patrol and its unceasing paperwork demands, Murphy’s weak academic skills were no longer a constant irritant to his supervisors. Nonetheless, Murphy's annual job evaluations make clear that in either assignment, his job performance was marginal. Murphy maintained excellent physical fitness and a professional appearance at all times, but was often rated borderline in areas involving judgment, ability to withstand pressure, and relations with colleagues and the public. As far back as his 1993-94 evaluation, Murphy's supervisors cited concerns regarding his common sense, and his ability to make sound decisions and to exercise good judgment. Murphy found it difficult to stay awake when assigned to the midnight shift, a problem that was easily remedied with a schedule change. Much more problematic was his difficulty in quickly and effectively writing reports. Murphy's deficiencies in report writing were noted on at least three annual evaluations, and PBSO made a good faith effort to assist Murphy in remediating his deficiency by providing him extra report writing training. Murphy places substantial significance upon an incident which he states occurred in April 1995 when he was on routine road patrol and was one of several deputies asked to respond to a domestic disturbance call. The incident involved unholstering his gun. Based upon Murphy's description of the incident and resulting symptoms years after the fact, doctors diagnosed PTSD. The 1995 incident was not documented in any PBSO records presented at hearing. The only evidence regarding PTSD is contained in Murphy's description of the event and his reaction to it, which he related to a number of doctors he saw in connection with his pending dispute with PBSO regarding his fitness for duty. Murphy expressed to some of these doctors that the transfer to PBIA was provoked by the 1995 incident, but there is no record or testimony corroborating Murphy's opinion in this regard. Murphy has always enjoyed his posting at PBIA, but his personnel file reflects that after three years there, his job performance remained well below reasonable expectations. Although he could handle most of the everyday tasks presented to deputies assigned to the airport, he at times appeared confused when called upon to make a decison for which there was no blueprint. He lacked the knowledge of criminal law and procedure, as well as basic airport operation, reasonably expected of a deputy with his experience. Supervisors gave Murphy credit for a "can-do" attitude and for promptness. However, he had a propensity to blame others or make excuses for his mistakes. It followed that Murphy continued to require a disproportionate share of attention of supervisors, even on routine decisions. Several years into his career, he continued to struggle with basics, for example, maintaining composure when challenged by members of the public or given constructive feedback by colleagues or supervisors. In 1998, it was recommended that Murphy be required to re-enter the field training officer ("FTO") program, and spend at least six months on road patrol to provide "much needed experience and the self confidence that is presently lacking." By the 1998-99 evaluation, supervisors' impatience with Murphy was growing. While acknowledging his ambition and willingness to pursue educational opportunities, the report noted his continued propensity to become aggressive with co- workers and antagonistic to supervisors and "apparent inability to control his temper." Murphy completed the FTO remedial training recommended the previous year, as well as eight additional courses aimed at improving his performance, and achieved an overall performance evaluation of "average, meeting the basic requirements of most [job] descriptions." In early 2000, Murphy received a 90-day unsatisfactory performance notice. In-house remedial training was offered, but the tone of the evaluator was decidedly impatient and frustrated. Murphy's supervisors began to document specific instances of their dissatisfaction with his performance. One example from his 2000 evaluation reads: "After an incident where [Murphy] had taken 21 hours to complete a simple drug arrest, he was placed with an FTO in the airport. These training sessions had little effect on his overall job performance. " While some improvements were noted in 2001, Murphy was again counseled on common sense, judgment and job knowledge. Against this background, an incident occurred on January 18, 2002, which would eventually result in Murphy’s termination. Early that morning, Murphy was off-duty and in a hurry to catch a flight out of PBIA to Washington D.C. via Charlotte. As a result of five years’ experience enforcing airport security protocols, Murphy was well aware that it was impermissible to leave baggage at the skycap station while he parked his car. However, Murphy identified himself as a deputy assigned to the airport and insisted that the skycaps check his baggage for him while he parked. Inside the airport, Murphy observed a lengthy passenger screening line. Murphy admits to feeling "entitled," in that this would be his first vacation in two years. Determined to make his flight, he formed an intent to cut to the front of the line to pass through the metal detectors and then to his gate. Murphy made contact with a fellow deputy, David Shoemaker (Shoemaker) who had been assigned to the airport less than six months. Shoemaker told Murphy to come around the metal detector, which he did, chatting briefly with National Guard officers on duty, as well as the "screening people,” all of whom were well known to him from his years of service at PBIA. At hearing and at all times since the incident, Murphy has attempted to deflect responsibility, saying, ”My intent was to cut in line. My intent was to go through the screening process. However, the deputy sheriff was on duty. I did what I was told, and I walked around the screening area. " It was Murphy, not Shoemaker, who was the experienced sheriff's deputy in this situation. Murphy was reasonably expected to know, particularly in the post-September 11 environment, that it was inappropriate, and possibly illegal, to seek special treatment based upon his personal acquaintance with security personnel. Members of the general public witnessing this "professional courtesy" could be reasonably expected to be irritated, angry, or even in fear for their safety, inasmuch as Murphy was dressed in civilian clothing; the public had no way of knowing that he was any more "safe" than the wheelchair-bound elderly people and babies who are screened in the interests of passenger safety. In this instance, one person was sufficiently annoyed or concerned to report the incident to airport officials and to seek an explanation. By this time, Murphy and his bags were enroute to Charlotte, N.C. At the Charlotte Airport, Murphy and his luggage were briefly detained and searched, and he was thereafter allowed to proceed to his final destination. At some point while on vacation, Murphy called a person named Gilbert Johnson, whom Murphy identified as a friend of his from the National Guard. According to Murphy, "Gilbert had told me that everybody was telling me [sic] I was going to jail for a federal crime, and I was very scared and very worried. " There was no evidence to suggest that Murphy was ever in danger of being jailed for a crime, federal or otherwise. However, the poor judgment he exercised in the service of making his plane would, in time, result in credible medical evidence that Murphy could not, at all times relevant, fulfill the requirements for service as a sheriff's deputy, with or without accommodations. Shortly after the January 18 incident, PBIA officials asked that Murphy be removed from his airport posting, at least until the incident could be investigated. Even before he returned from vacation, PBSO had decided that Murphy would be reassigned to road patrol. Upon his return to work, Murphy met with supervisors. At some point in this meeting, he ceased to participate, instead exercising his right to be represented by counsel. Murphy was informed that he would be suspended with pay pending the outcomes of routine criminal and administrative investigations. Although the facts surrounding the incident were in all material respects undisputed, it took months for PBSO to conclude its internal affairs investigation, which ended with a recommendation that Murphy receive a two-day suspension for having improperly used his status as a law enforcement officer to gain special privileges not available to the general public. No state or federal agency pursued criminal charges against Murphy. Neither the internal affairs investigation nor criminal investigation(s), if any there were, played any role in Murphy's eventual termination. Murphy's anxiety about what he perceived as immense threats to his employment and to his liberty persisted and fed on themselves. The delay in completing the internal affairs investigation exacerbated his fears, particularly his baseless belief that he would be sent to jail for having sought and received special treatment at PBIA. Murphy persisted in the belief that jail was a real possibility, and he was consumed with worry. Almost as distressing to Murphy was the possibility that he would be returned to road patrol, a job for which Murphy correctly believed he was unsuited. In the immediate aftermath of the PBIA incident, Murphy's problems, real and imagined, combined to cause him to decompensate. He became physically ill and emotionally distraught to a degree which rendered him unfit for duty. To his credit, Murphy informed his supervisor that he was uncertain of his present ability to adequately back up fellow officers should the need to do so arise. Concerned for Murphy's well being, a PBSO supervisor sent to his home deputies to check on him, and immediate arrangements were made to have him evaluated by Dr. Raul Diaz (Dr. Diaz). Dr. Diaz supported Murphy's belief that he was at the time temporarily unfit for duty. Dr. Diaz recommended psychological evaluation by Dr. Myles Cooley ("Dr. Cooley"). At hearing, Murphy stated his belief, but offered no evidence, that officers who are the subject of an internal affairs investigation are granted administrative leave to preserve their full salary and benefits pending the outcome of the investigation. In this case, PBSO insisted that Murphy take family medical leave beginning on Februry 1, 2002. By this time, Murphy felt he was able to return to work and sought to persuade PBSO to return him to PBIA. To that end, he cooperated with PBSO's efforts to obtain medical and psychological evaluations. He also proceeded on a parallel track, seeing medical professionals of his own choosing and cooperating in the testing, evaluation, and medication regimens they recommended. In February 2002, Murphy's attorney provided PBSO with signed prescription pad notes from two medical doctors, Sanford Kaufman and Kevin Inwood. Dr. Kaufman’s note read, "No psych diagnosis other than reactive stress. Okay to return to work, no restrictions." Dr. Inwood wrote, "Pt. Is fit for duty after today exam not completed." Neither note indicated the respective doctor's area of specialization, credentials, what tests had been performed on Murphy, what information concerning Murphy had been furnished to them, and from what sources. Standing alone, these doctors' notes did not furnish a factual basis upon which a reasonable person could conclude that Murphy was fit for duty. Meanwhile, Murphy continued to cooperate in evaluations commissioned by PBSO. Dr. Cooley saw Murphy in March and April 2002, and conducted exhaustive testing, including evaluations for attention dysfunction, learning disabilities, and other disorders that might affect his job performance. In speaking with doctors in the course of these evaluations, and in his testimony at hearing, Murphy acknowledged that both before and after being diagnosed with ADD, ADHD, and PTSD, he was fully able to perform the numerous activities of daily living pertinent to a man of his age who has always been active in sports and has held physically demanding jobs. Murphy is unrestricted in his ability to lift, see, hear, breathe, swim, sit, stand, bathe, and dress, all of which are necessary to the performance of active police work, and countless other jobs requiring an individual to be in good physical condition. At all times material to this case Murphy is qualified to work in construction, having built the home he lives in. He is also licensed to operate any type of vehicle, continues to work in the family towing business, and has worked in retail. In his final report dated April 8, 2002, Dr. Cooley concluded, in pertinent part: In this examiner's opinion, Mr. Murphy does have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and is significantly intellectually limited. He does not qualify for a diagnosis of a learning disability because his IQ and his academic skills are quite similar. In a more generic sense, however, he is clearly learning disabled based on his limited cognitive skills particularly in the verbal domain. Finally, Mr. Murphy appears to be experiencing a Generalized Anxiety Disorder or an Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety. Mr. Murphy's behavior in the presence of this examiner indicates severe anxiety and fear that he reacts to with anger, denial, defensiveness, and suspicion and he tries to protect himself from people and procedures he does not fully understand. He could truly benefit from some counseling as he awaits the resolution of his employment status. Dr. Cooley's evaluation was forwarded to Murphy's counsel, and to Dr. Diaz, who, after re-evaluating Murphy and reviewing prior test results and Dr. Cooley's report, prepared a second report for the PBSO. In this report dated May 9, 2002, Dr. Diaz concluded that "Murphy, within reasonable probability remains not fit for duty to function in law enforcement at this time." Dr. Diaz left open the possibility that with appropriate treatment, Murphy may, at some future date become fit for law enforcement duty. However, on September 16, 2002, Murphy's own doctor, forensic psychiatrist Harley Stock (Dr. Stock), opined in pertinent part: . . . Murphy is likely to have difficulties in carrying out the following specific duties and responsibilities of a law enforcement officer: Subdue resisting offenders using appropriate force, including the use of deadly force – Deputy Sheriff Murphy may become emotionally overwhelmed if placed in a position in which lethal force may be necessary. In this regard, such behavior may lead to the endangerment of the public or other officers. Conduct law enforcement investigations – Deputy Murphy has a difficult time formulating appropriate law violations. Because of his limited cognitive abilities, he will have difficultly preparing and distributing reports. These deficits may manifest themselves in difficulty coordinating activities at crime scenes; collecting crime scene evidence; conducting interviews, taking sworn statements, formal confessions or depositions; preparing reports of affidavits; and presenting testimony in both civil and criminal proceedings. Should Deputy Murphy be placed in a situation in which his anxiety level overwhelms him, he will have difficulty interacting with the public. His judgment is likely to be impaired in such a situation and he may not follow appropriate procedures. He is also likely to have difficulties in the following area performance aptitudes: Data Utilization – Deputy Sheriff Murphy will have difficulty calculating or tabulating data or information in a systemized way. He also may have difficulty performing actions subsequent to these computational operations. In terms of situational reasoning, Deputy Sheriff Murphy is likely to have difficulty exercising good judgment and decisiveness in those situations that are unexpected and involve exposing the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office to significant litigation. Based on the above, it is this examiner's opinion that Deputy Sheriff Murphy should be considered permanently unfit for duty. It is further my opinion that no reasonable accommodation can be offered and that his impairment is a direct result of his employment as a law enforcement officer. . . . No purpose is served by additional invasive recitation of the content and conclusions of reports and testimony provided by doctors who evaluated Murphy. The evidence regarding Murphy's fitness for duty, with or without accommodation, has been carefully considered and demonstrates that no combination of job accommodations, medication, treatment or training, would render Murphy able to fulfill the requirements for service as a deputy sheriff at any time material to this case, including at the time he was terminated on October 11, 2002. Notwithstanding the medical evidence, Murphy contends that PBSO had, and continues to have, the ability to ". . . put me into another law enforcement position, which they can clearly still do." With all respect for Murphy's opinion, the unambiguous testimony provided by Respondent’s human relations office is that PBSO does not distinguish between what a deputy is required to do at the airport, on road patrol, or behind a desk. To the contrary, officers assigned to PBIA, or off duty officers for that matter, may be mobilized on a moment's notice to address a profoundly dangerous and chaotic situation, at their assigned post, or elsewhere in the jurisdiction. Contrary to the assertion in his FCHR charge, there was no evidence that Murphy "ask[ed] for help with his law enforcement duties." He rejected as insulting any discussion of being placed in a civilian position or a position involving a substantial wage cut. The only accommodation he sought was re- assignment to PBIA in his former position.
Recommendation Based on the above Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s charge of discrimination and dismissing his complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael G. Whelan, Esquire Whelan, DeMaio & Kiszkiel, P.A. 80 Southwest Eighth Street, Suite 1830 Miami, Florida 33130 Jack Scarola, Esquire Searcy Denney Scarola Barhart & Shipley, P.A. 2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On March 22, 1995, Southern was convicted of the commission of a public-entity crime, as defined within Subsection 287.133(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Southern pled guilty to one count of 18 U.S.C., Section 371, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, in the United States Court for the Middle District of Florida. Pursuant to Subsections 287.133(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, Southern made timely notification to DMS and provided details of the convictions. On September 20, 1995, DMS issued a notice of intent, pursuant to Subsection 287.133(3)(e)1., Florida Statutes. On October 3, 1995, pursuant to Subsection 287.133(3)(e)2., Florida Statutes, Southern timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to determine whether it is in the public interest for Southern to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3., Florida Statutes, establishes factors which, if applicable to a convicted vendor, will mitigate against placement of that vendor upon the Convicted Vendor List. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.d., Florida Statutes, establishes "[p]rompt or voluntary payment of any damages or penalty as a result of the conviction" as a factor mitigating against placement on the Convicted Vendor List. Southern paid restitution, fines and court costs totaling $30,193.00. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.e., Florida Statutes, establishes "[c]ooperation with state or federal investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. According to Ernest F. Peluso, Assistant United States Attorney, since early in 1994, George Peterson, President of Southern, provided active, accurate and meaningful support to the federal investigation. Mr. Peterson willingly provided documents, records and statements to illuminate the extent of the conspiratorial plan. Mr. Peterson fully cooperated with DMS in connection with its investigation initiated pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.f., Florida Statutes, establishes "[d]isassociation from any other persons or affiliates convicted of the public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. This subsection is not applicable. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.g., Florida Statutes, establishes "[p]rior or future self-policing by the person or Florida affiliate to prevent public entity crimes" as a mitigating factor. Southern retained Michael N. Kavouklis, Esquire, to act as an ombudsman or clearinghouse for the receipt of information pertaining to any wrongdoing involving the solicitation of compensation or gratuities to customers. Each employee has received a copy of a notice directing them to report such actions to Mr. Kavouklis. The notice has also been posted in the work place as a reminder. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.h., Florida Statutes, establishes "[r]einstatement or clemency in any jurisdiction in relation to the public entity crime at issue in the proceeding" as a mitigating factor. Southern was not debarred from contracting with any governmental entity. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.i., Florida Statutes, establishes "[c]ompliance by the person or affiliate with the notification provisions of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b)" as a mitigating factor. Southern provided notice of the public entity crime violation by letter on February 17, 1995. This occurred before its conviction on March 22, 1995. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.j., Florida Statutes, establishes "[t]he needs of public entities for additional competition in the procurement of goods and services in their respective markets" as a mitigating factor. Public entities have a frequent and continuing need for roofing services. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.k., Florida Statutes, establishes "any demonstration of good citizenship" as a mitigating factor. Southern provided numerous documents detailing its involvement in numerous community and charitable activities. This Joint Stipulation provides a full and complete factual basis for determining whether Southern should be placed on the Convicted Vendor List. In light of the facts and criteria set forth in subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.a.-k., Florida Statutes, there are no disputes issues of material fact between DMS and Southern which would require a formal hearing. Both parties concur that it is not in the public interest to list Southern on the Convicted Vendor List, pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a Health Insurance, Ordinary-- Combination Life, including Health Insurance, and an Ordinary Life, including Health Insurance Agent in the State of Florida. On or about August 25, 1983, a warrant for the arrest of Respondent was issued by the U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa, Florida. This warrant was based on an indictment charging Respondent, among others, with seven counts of knowingly and intentionally devising and intending to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money by means of false representations from insurance companies, banks, financial institutions, merchants and credit card companies. Respondent, upon advice of counsel, entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney and, pursuant thereto, pleaded guilty to Counts (1) and (7) of the indictment. Pursuant to this plea, Respondent was found guilty of Counts (1) and (7), alleging mail fraud, was sentenced to four years confinement for each count, and incarcerated at the Federal Correction Institute at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Respondent is now 48 years old. He was first licensed as an insurance agent in Florida in 1970 and has been continuously so licensed since that time. From 1973 forward, excluding the time Respondent was imprisoned, he worked for Federal Employee Benefit Association, an insurance agency owned by Joseph Baio specializing in selling health insurance policies to federal employees. During this period, Respondent dealt with hundreds of clients and Baio received no complaints regarding Respondent's work as an insurance agent. Baio is fully aware of Respondent's conviction and sentence. Nevertheless, he rehired Respondent when he was released from prison and will continue to employ Respondent if Respondent keeps his license. Upon his release from prison, Respondent was sent to a half-way house for six months and upon release therefrom was placed on probation. Respondent has fully complied with the terms of his probation and expects to be released from probation three months early one year from now because of such compliance. Respondent contends that his participation in the crimes of which he was convicted was that of an innocent who merely witnessed signatures and was unaware of the fraudulent nature of the documents on which his name appeared as witness. One of those documents was used to submit fraudulent claims to insurance companies for property losses. Respondent's insurance business has been limited to life and health policies. Numerous letters of character reference were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 8. These letters uniformly commended Respondent as a man of high moral character and as an honest insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was found guilty of breaking and entering in 1974, and was charged with burglary and attempted escape in 1976. The burglary charge was, upon adjudication reduced to trespassing and too attempted escape charge was dropped. Respondent's license application form contains the question, "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony?" Details are required if a "yes" answer is given. Petitioner disclosed the 1974 breaking and entering conviction but did not include either of the 1976 charges or the 1976 misdemeanor conviction. However, this was not an attempt by Petitioner to withhold information, but was rather a misunderstanding of the request to list all felony charges regardless of disposition and not merely those involving felony convictions. Petitioner's reputation for truthfulness was attested to by the police officer who arrested him in 1974 and 1976, and monitored his subsequent rehabilitation. Petitioner readily admitted the acts for which he was arrested in 1974, and has never been otherwise known to lie. Petitioner, who was 26 years old at the time he filed his application in April of 1980, has overcome his earlier difficulties. Since 1976, he has completed a drug therapy program, taken mental health technician courses at a community college, and worked as a counselor and supervisor in a community mental health facility. He is currently a convenience store manager in Fort Pierce, and recently trained part-time with a local insurance agency in anticipation of licensing.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Ricky D. Brown for filing for examination as ordinary-combination life including disability agent be granted. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon Country, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ricky D. Brown 601 North 15th Street Fort Pierce, Florida 33450 Leon Rolle, Esquire Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner 220 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, the holder of a Class "D" security officer license (Number D93-17516) issued by the Department. McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "McRoberts") is an agency that offers security services. For approximately one year and eight months (and at all times material to the instant case), Respondent was employed as a security officer by McRoberts. He was assigned to service the Antillean Marine Shipping (hereinafter referred to as "Antillean") account. His supervisor was David Bowling. Antillean demanded that McRoberts supply security guards who spoke both English and Spanish. Respondent met this requirement, although he was not fluent in English. Respondent and all other McRoberts security officers assigned to the Antillean account were given written post orders which they were expected to obey. Respondent received his written post orders prior to April 22, 1995. These post orders included the following: Security officers are not permitted to sit in their personal vehicles during their shift. There will be NO SLEEPING on duty. Personnel found sleeping will be fired on the spot. Roving officer must make key rounds every hour. Please note: If the officer does not make rounds, he will not get paid for that time. (Important) The only thing we asked of you is to do the job you were hired for and the client will be satisfied and there will be no problems. NO SLEEPING ON POST !! Excuses will not be accepted. POST Number 1: Security officer will be responsible for front gate. All vehicles entering terminal after hours (unless management personnel) will be stopped to identify occupants. Visitors to vessels (unless visiting captain or officers) will be required to remain at front gate until crewman is located. Rover (Post Number 2) will locate crewman. On April 22, 1995, while on duty at Antillean (at Post Number 1), Respondent was sitting in his personal vehicle in violation of the post orders. Bowling observed Respondent in the vehicle and issued him a Notice of Failing Performance (which is essentially a written reprimand) for having committed this violation. The notice contained the following "comments" made by Bowling: S/O was on property in his car (laying down in the back seat). He told me that he has been doing this for a year. 1/ I told him that Morales 2/ does not allow it. He agreed w/me that he knows better. On May 26, 1995, Bowling again observed Respondent in Respondent's personal vehicle while Respondent was on duty at Antillean (at Post Number 1). This time Respondent had his eyes closed and was apparently asleep. Accordingly, Bowling issued Respondent another Notice of Failing Performance, which contained the following "comments" made by Bowling: I arrived at 0515. C. Figueroa was inside his car asleep at Post 1. In accordance with McRoberts' written policy, Respondent was docked four hours pay for having been asleep while on duty. Respondent was angry at Bowling for having issued him the Notice of Failing Performance that had resulted in this loss of pay. On June 9, 1995, when Bowling approached Respondent and asked him to sign a log sheet, Respondent vented his anger by yelling at Bowling. Respondent accused Bowling of taking food out of the mouths of Respondent's children. Respondent then threatened Bowling by telling Bowling that he would see Bowling "on the streets" and that Bowling was not "going to live much longer." 3/ While making these threats, Respondent came close to, but did not touch, Bowling. He had no intention of actually harming Bowling, but Bowling nonetheless reasonably feared for his safety. Another supervisor was called to the scene and escorted Respondent away. Bowling prepared and submitted a written report describing the incident. Respondent's employment with McRoberts was subsequently terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding the evidence sufficient to establish that Respondent committed the three violations of subsection (1)(f) of Section 493.6118, alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and (2) disciplining him for having committed these violations by suspending his license for a period of two months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of January, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1996.
Findings Of Fact On January 20, 1986, Petitioner, Paul A. Cusmano, filed an application for Filing for Examination as an Independent, Public or Company Employee Adjuster with the Department of Insurance. Because of the conviction mentioned below, the Department of Insurance denied Petitioner the opportunity to take the examination by letter dated May 29, 1986. The records of the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, Florida reflect that on August 29, 1984, a criminal Information was filed in Case No. 84-6169F charging Petitioner with Grand Theft in violation of Section 812.014 (1)(2)(b), Florida Statutes based on his alleged theft of a check in the amount of $9,557.30. Grand Theft is an offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner was found guilty as alleged by the court on April 22, 1985 and on June 3, 1985, the Judge withheld adjudication of guilt and placed him on probation for a period of 18 months. In comments made in open court at the time of the sentencing, the Judge indicated in his opinion the situation arose out of a legitimate dispute over a debt owed by the victim of the theft to the Petitioner, and should be the subject of civil litigation. He indicated he had no choice but to find Petitioner guilty because of the way Petitioner chose to handle the situation. The Judge commented he felt the Petitioner was not a criminal, and since the question of restitution was discretionary, chose not to order restitution. Petitioner's business associates and friends are uniform in their favorable assessment of him and are convinced he is neither of a criminal bent nor dishonest. All feel he would be no risk to the public and, with his qualifications in the construction business, would be an asset to the industry. If permitted to sit for examination and successful in taking it, Petitioner intends to work as an adjuster in the field of construction insurance. He feels he can work properly there, knows it well, and can prevent unethical contractors from taking unfair advantage of the insurance companies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's application for examination for licensure as an Independent, Public or Company Employee Adjuster be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of October, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Legal Division Department of Insurance and Treasurer 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul A. Cusmano 6912 S.W. 18th Court Pompano Beach, Florida 33065 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Ins. Comr. The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2016), by failing to secure payment of workers’ compensation coverage, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order (“SWO”) and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (“Third AOPA”); and, if so, whether Petitioner correctly calculated the proposed penalty assessment against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence admitted at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Background The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the Workers' Compensation Law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. The Department is the agency responsible for conducting random inspections of jobsites and investigating complaints concerning potential violations of workers’ compensation rules. Gregg Construction is a corporation engaged in business in the State of Florida. Gregg Construction has been operating as a business since November 9, 2007. William Gregg is the owner of Gregg Construction and its sole employee. The address of record for Gregg Construction is 166 Big White Oak Lane, Crawfordville, Florida 32327. On June 15, 2017, the Department’s investigator, Lewis Johnson, conducted a routine visit to a jobsite to conduct a compliance investigation. Mr. Johnson observed Mr. Gregg use a table saw, measure, and cut a piece of wood. Mr. Johnson then observed Mr. Gregg nail the wood to the exterior wall of the home at the jobsite. After Mr. Johnson inquired about the work Mr. Gregg was performing, Mr. Gregg ultimately told Mr. Johnson that he was working as a subcontractor for Respondent. Based on Mr. Johnson’s observations, Mr. Gregg was performing construction-related work at the job site. Mr. Johnson then conducted a search of the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”), which revealed that Respondent did not have active workers’ compensation coverage for Mr. Gregg. Based on the results of his investigation, on May 10, 2017, Mr. Johnson issued a SWO to Respondent for failure to maintain workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. On May 10, 2017, Mr. Johnson hand-served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculations (“Records Request”) on Respondent. The Records Request directed Respondent to produce business records for the time period of May 10, 2015, through May 11, 2017. While Respondent provided tax returns, it did not provide sufficient business records to the Department. Penalty Assessment To calculate the penalty assessment, the Department uses a two-year auditing period looking back from the date of the SWO, May 10, 2017, also known as the look-back period. Generally, the Department uses business records to calculate the penalty assessment. If the employer does not produce records sufficient to determine payroll for employees, the Department uses imputed payroll to assess the penalty as required by section 440.107(7)(e) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028. Eunika Jackson, a Department penalty auditor, was assigned to calculate the penalty assessment for Respondent. Based upon Mr. Johnson’s observations at the jobsite on May 10, 2017, Ms. Jackson assigned National Council on Compensation Insurance (“NCCI”) classification code 5645 to calculate the penalty. Classification code 5645 applies to work involving carpentry. Ms. Jackson applied the approved manual rates for classification 5645 for the work Mr. Johnson observed Mr. Gregg perform. The application of the rates was utilized by the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and rule 69L- 6.027 to determine the penalty assessment. The manual rate applied in this case was $15.91 for the period of May 11, 2015, through December 31, 2017; and $16.92 for the period of January 1, 2016, through June 10, 2017. The statewide average weekly wage, effective January 1, 2017, was used to calculate the penalty assessment. Mr. Johnson discovered that Mr. Gregg previously held an exemption, which expired on April 26, 2013. Although Mr. Gregg currently has an exemption, his exemption was not in effect during the audit period. On June 6, 2017, the Department issued its first AOPA that ordered Respondent to pay a penalty of $46,087.72, pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d). On August 1, 2017, Petitioner issued the Second AOPA based upon records submitted by Respondent, which reduced the penalty assessment to $14,752.62. After this matter was referred to the Division, on January 23, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment and issued the Third AOPA based upon records submitted by Respondent. Based on the Department’s calculation, the record demonstrates that the penalty assessment, based on records provided by Respondent, would be $9,785.50.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order finding the following: that Respondent failed to secure and maintain workers’ compensation coverage for Mr. Gregg; and that Respondent shall pay a penalty of $9,785.50.1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Mclendon Builders, Inc. (“Mclendon Builders”), had insufficient workers’ compensation insurance during the time period in question; and, if so, the amount of the resulting penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement in chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2018),1/ that employers in Florida secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. While an exemption can be obtained for up to three corporate officers, any employer in the construction industry with at least one employee must have workers’ compensation coverage. § 440.02(15), Fla. Stat. If a construction business utilizes subcontractors and a subcontractor does not have workers’ compensation coverage, then the employing entity is responsible for having the subcontractor covered. The Department fulfills its enforcement duty by conducting compliance investigations, and a compliance investigation can begin with a Department investigator visiting a worksite. Mclendon Builders has been doing business in Florida since 2006. It renovates and builds homes. At all times relevant to the instant case, Lawrence Eaton was employed by the Department as a compliance investigator. Mr. Eaton monitored construction, non-construction, and agricultural entities to ensure that they have obtained workers’ compensation coverage. On August 29, 2016, Mr. Eaton was in Destin, Florida, and drove past a house that was being renovated. After stopping at the house, he noticed two men, Jeff Ladue and Joe Martin, installing tile inside the house. Mr. Ladue and Mr. Martin reported that they were working for Andrew Mclendon, the owner of Mclendon Builders. After finishing his conversation with Mr. Ladue and Mr. Martin, Mr. Eaton looked for any records pertaining to Mclendon Builders within the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”) and the Division of Corporations. CCAS is a database maintained by the Department, and it enables Department investigators, such as Mr. Eaton, to ascertain if any construction company operating in Florida has workers’ compensation coverage or if an owner has an exemption. CCAS indicated that Mr. Mclendon had an exemption but that there was no coverage for Mclendon Builders. After reporting this information to his supervisor, Mr. Eaton received authorization to issue a Stop-Work Order to Mclendon Builders on August 29, 2016, requiring Mclendon Builders to “cease all business operations for all worksites” in Florida.2/ Mr. Eaton also served, on August 29, 2016, an Order of Penalty Assessment stating that Mclendon Builders would be penalized in an amount “[e]qual to 2 times the amount [Mclendon Builders] would have paid in premium when applying approved manual rates to the employer’s payroll during periods for which it has failed to secure the payment of compensation within the preceding 2-year period.” Along with the Stop-Work Order and the Order of Penalty Assessment, Mr. Eaton served a “Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation.” The aforementioned document required Mclendon Builders to provide the Department with time sheets, check stubs, federal income tax documents, and other business records reflecting Mclendon Builders’ payroll from August 30, 2014, through August 29, 2016 (“the audit period”). Sarah Beal is a penalty auditor for the Department, and she was responsible for calculating the penalty owed by Mclendon Builders. Using the business records provided by Mclendon Builders, Ms. Beal determined who was on Mclendon Builders’ payroll during the audit period and how much compensation each person with no workers’ compensation coverage received. The gross payroll amount for each person was divided by 100 in order to create a percentage, and the percentage associated with each person was then multiplied by an “approved manual rate.” An approved manual rate is associated with a particular class code. A class code describes an employee’s scope of work based on the type of work he or she performs on a daily basis. The National Council on Compensation Insurance publishes the Scopes Manual, and the Scopes Manual sets forth class codes for numerous types of work. Multiplying the gross payroll percentage by an approved manual rate results in a workers’ compensation insurance premium for a particular employee. As required by section 440.107(7)(d)1., each premium amount is multiplied by two in order to calculate a penalty associated with each employee for whom workers’ compensation insurance was not obtained. Ms. Beal then added the individual penalties associated with each person who received compensation from Mclendon Builders during the audit period in order to calculate the total penalty of $31,244.80. During the final hearing, Mr. Mclendon did not dispute that Mclendon Builders lacked workers’ compensation coverage. Instead, he argued that the penalty should be reduced because some of the people employed by Mclendon Builders during the audit period performed work outside Florida. Specifically, Mr. Mclendon testified that Mclendon Builders had large projects outside Florida in 2015, 2016, and 2017, involving the construction of restaurants. However, Mr. Mclendon provided no documentation to corroborate his testimony. Without such corroboration, Mr. Mclendon’s testimony is unpersuasive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order imposing a penalty of $31,244.80 on Mclendon Builders, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment on the basis of age.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Boots is 56 years old. Prior to his termination, he had been employed in the life insurance business by Respondent or its predecessors for over 20 years. Until early 1988, Petitioner's employer was Security Trust Life Insurance Company. During that year, Respondent or its parent, Southlife Holding Company, purchased the assets or stock of Security Trust Life Insurance Company. In any event, the result from Petitioner's point of view was that Respondent became his new employer. Following the change in ownership, the operations of the two companies were combined. Prior and subsequent to the merger of operations, Petitioner was the manager of the Orlando district office, which was primarily involved in the sale of debit insurance. The physical turnover of operations in the Orlando office took place on or about March 7, 1988. Prior to this date, representatives of Respondent had conducted meetings with the employees of Security Trust Life Insurance Company and discussed with them, among other things, the compensation that they could expect to receive as employees of the new company, especially during the start-up period. Following the merger, Petitioner believed that Respondent was not living up to the promises that it had made to him and the employees under his supervision. Unable to reach his immediate supervisor, Petitioner called Ted Lazenby, who is president and chairman of the board of Southlife Holding Company. Petitioner voiced his complaints to Mr. Lazenby. Following the telephone conversation, Mr. Lazenby contacted Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Frank Gregor, and expressed his displeasure with Petitioner and his attitude. Mr. Gregor consulted with his immediate supervisor, James C. Bellamy, who is the senior vice president of Respondent. Messrs. Gregor and Bellamy had previously discussed Petitioner's attitude that Respondent was poorly managed and cheap with its employees. Messrs. Gregor and Bellamy had already discussed Petitioner's record with Respondent. In general, it was not good, and the Orlando district did not show signs of the kind of growth necessary for a successful debit insurance business. Petitioner's production record was the worst in the division and the region. The manager of the next-worst district was also fired. With Mr. Lazenby's complaint as a catalyst, Messrs. Gregor and Bellamy decided to terminate Petitioner. The following morning, Mr. Gregor visited Petitioner in the Orlando office and fired him, citing Petitioner's poor record combined with questionable judgment in complaining to the head of the holding company. Respondent replaced Petitioner with a 44 year old man, who had been assistant manager of the Orlando office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be dismissed. ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on this 16th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-7 Adopted or adopted in substance. There was a conflict in testimony between Mr. Gregor and Petitioner as to when the merger took place. Mr. Gregor's testimony has been given the greater weight, but the difference is immaterial to the outcome of the case. 8-9 Rejected as subordinate to the finding that Petitioner's performance was substandard. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Adopted. Rejected as irrelevant. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent 1 Adopted 2-3 Rejected as legal argument. 4-6 Adopted. Rejected as recitation of testimony. Adopted. Rejected as irrelevant and subordinate. 10-12 Adopted in substance. 13-15 Rejected as subordinate. 16. Rejected as recitation of testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 N. James Turner Buso & Turner, P.A. 17 South Lake Avenue, Suite 104 Orlando, FL 32801 Joseph A. Woodruff Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis 2100 One Commerce Place Nashville, TN 37239
Findings Of Fact The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 25, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 2, 2009, the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 6, 2009, the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on April 20, 2009, and the 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on September 21, 2009, attached as "Exhibit A," "Exhibit B," "Exhibit C," Exhibit "D," and Exhibit "F," respectively, and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department's Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the request for administrative hearing received from LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: On February 25, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation (hereinafter "Department") issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers' Compensation Case No. 09-049-D? to LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. On February 25, 2009, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and incorporated herein by reference. On March 2, 2009, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $249,479.80 against LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. On March 2, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as "Exhibit B" and incorporated herein by reference. On March 6, 2009, the Department issued a 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. The 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $235,409.69 against LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. The 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days ofreceipt of the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. On March 6, 2009, the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. A copy of the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as "Exhibit C" and incorporated herein by reference. On April 20, 2009, the Department issued a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $52;334.24 against LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. On April 20, 2009, the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on LUIS AMAYA, D/8/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. A copy of the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as "Exhibit D" and incorporated herein by reference. On May 1, 2009, LUIS AMAYA, D/8/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP filed a petition for administrative review with the Department. The petition for administrative review was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 19, 2009, and the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 09-2763. A copy of the petition is attached hereto as "Exhibit E" and incorporated herein by reference. On September 21, 2009, the Department issued a 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. The 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $30,869.44 against LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. The 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. On September 21, 2009, the 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP. A copy of the 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as "Exhibit F" and incorporated herein by reference. On September 23, 2009, the Department received a letter from LUIS AMAYA, D/B/A MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND MAY I HELP YOU HANDYMAN SERVICE, CORP, stating that he wished to withdraw his request for administrative hearing. A copy of the letter to withdraw the request for hearing is attached hereto as "Exhibit G" and incorporated herein by reference. On September 23, 2009, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as "Exhibit H" and incorporated herein by reference.
