The Issue Whether the Petitioners are liable for sales tax, penalties and interest as assessed by the Department of Revenue (the Department) and if so, in what amount?
Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated to the facts stated in paragraphs 2-59.1/ The Department of Revenue is an agency of the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 20.21, Florida Statutes, and is authorized to administer the tax laws of the state, pursuant to Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. The Department was authorized to conduct an audit of each of the Petitioners and to request information to determine their liability for taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Legendary Holding, Inc. (Holding) is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida effective October 23, 1996, and was so organized from 1999-2003. Holding's corporate address is 4100 Legendary Drive, Suite 200, Destin, Florida 32541. Holding was subject to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended and in effect (IRC) during 1999-2003 and for federal income tax purposes, Holding was a subchapter "s" corporation during this time. Holding was also subject to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, during 1999-2003. Petitioner Harry T's, Inc. (Harry T's), is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida effective November 9, 1998, and was so organized during Harry T's Audit Period, defined as December 1, 1999 through March 31, 2003. Harry T's was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Holding. During its Audit Period, Harry T's corporate address was 4460 Legendary Drive, Suite 400, Destin, Florida. Harry T's was subject to the IRC and for federal income tax purposes was a qualified subchapter S subsidiary of the s-corporation parent, Holding. Petitioner Beachside Inn Destin, Inc. (Beachside) was a corporation organized under the laws of Florida effective March 6, 2000, and was so organized during the Beachside Audit Period, defined as May 1, 2000, through May 31, 2003. Beachside, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Holding, was administratively dissolved on October 14, 2004, for failure to file an annual report. During the Audit Period, Beachside's principle place of business was 2931 Scenic Highway 98, Destin, Florida, 32541. Its corporate address was 4460 Legendary Drive, Suite 400, Destin Florida. Beachside was subject to the IRC and for federal income tax purposes was a qualified subchapter S subsidiary of the s-corporation parent, Holding, during the Beachside Audit Period. Petitioner Legendary Restaurant Associates, Inc. (Restaurant) is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida effective October 7, 1999, and was so organized during Restaurant's Audit Period, defined as December 1, 1999, through March 31, 2003. During this time Restaurant was a wholly owned subsidiary of Holding and Restaurant's corporate address was 4460 Legendary Drive Suite 400, Destin, Florida. Restaurant was subject to the IRC and for federal income tax purposes was a wholly-owned, qualified subchapter S subsidiary of the s-corporation parent, Holding, during the Restaurant Audit Period. Legendary, Inc. (Legendary) is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida during 1999-2003, and its corporate address was also 4460 Legendary Drive, Suite 400, Destin, Florida, during this time. Legendary was also a wholly-owned subsidiary of Holding. Legendary was subject to the IRC and for federal income tax purposes, was a qualified subchapter S subsidiary of the s-corporation parent, Holding. Legendary Resorts, LLC (Resorts), is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Florida and was so organized during 2000-2003. Resorts, whose corporate address was also 4460 Legendary Drive, Suite 400, Destin, Florida, was administratively dissolved on September 16, 2005, for failure to file an annual report. Legendary entered into a cooperative business agreement (CBA) with certain subsidiaries of Holding prior to or during 1999-2003. The terms of the CBA between Legendary and these subsidiaries were identical other than the name of the "manager" subsidiary and the percentage of compensation paid to Legendary and the formula for sharing profits varied from time to time. Legendary also entered into a management agreement with certain other of Holding's subsidiaries, and the terms of these agreements were identical. FACTS RELATED TO PETITIONER HARRY T'S AUDIT Harry T's was a registered dealer who filed form DR- 15 (Sales Tax Return) with the Department for each month of Harry T's Audit Period. Harry T's used the cash basis of accounting during its Audit Period. The Department sent Harry T's a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records (Form DR-840) to conduct an audit of Harry T's books and records for this purpose. The Department and Harry T's entered into an Audit Agreement agreeing that a sampling method is the most effective, expedient, and adequate method in which to conduct an audit of Harry T's books and records. Gina Imm, a Department tax auditor, examined and sampled the available books and records of Harry T's to determine whether it properly collected and remitted sales and use tax in compliance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Harry T's was the tenant party in a lease with Legendary for the property upon which Harry T's operated its business prior to January 1, 2000. Under the terms of the lease agreement between Harry T's and Legendary, Harry T's paid rent equal to eight percent of the gross sales to Legendary. On January 1, 2000, the lease was terminated. On January 1, 2000, Harry T's entered into a CBA with Legendary, which was effective throughout Harry T's Audit Period. Harry T's operated a business on property owned by Holdings during Harry T's Audit Period. Accounting entries were made each month during the Audit Period to record the amount of CBA compensation that was accrued by Harry T's to Legendary under the CBA. However, no rent was recorded on the income tax or accounting books of either Harry T's or Legendary during the Audit Period. Further, no amount of money labeled as CBA compensation was transferred from Harry T's to Legendary during Harry T's Audit Period and no payments labeled as "rent" were transferred from Harry T's to Legendary. Based upon the business decisions of the Chief Financial Officer of Legendary, cash was transferred periodically from Harry T's to Legendary during the Audit Period. Based upon the business decisions of the Chief Financial Officer of Legendary, cash was also transferred from Legendary to Harry T's. During Harry T's Audit Period cash was also transferred from Legendary to Holdings. These amounts were reflected as dividend distributions and varied in amount and time from (a) Holdings insurance and mortgage indebtedness obligations associated with the property used by Harry Ts and owned by Holding, and (b) the amounts accrued under the CBA's. Any amounts collected by Harry T's and not paid directly to third parties were distributed periodically to Holdings as corporate dividends. The Department determined that the transfers of cash from Harry T's to Legendary reflected rental consideration paid as CBA compensation, and directed the Department's auditor to assess sales tax against the amounts recorded as CBA compensation accounting entries. Harry T's paid ad valorem taxes due on the property on which Harry T's operated during each year of Harry T's Audit Period. The Department auditor assessed sales tax on the amounts of ad valorem taxes paid by Harry T's on behalf of Holding. The Department determined that Harry T's owed $58,844.02 in additional sales tax for the CBA compensation and ad valorem taxes paid, plus statutory interest and penalties. On September 5, 2003, the Department issued to Harry T's a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (form DR- 1215) for Audit No. A0233016246, stating that Harry T's owed $69,249.79 in taxes, $29,422.03 in penalties, and $6,612.44 in interest for a total of $94,330.64, and that interest continued to accrue on the unpaid assessment. By letter dated October 9, 2003, Harry T's agreed to the portions of the assessment related to food and beverage, but objected to the assessment for all other amounts including the CBA fees. Harry T's paid $10,953.62 for the uncontested assessment amounts. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) for audit number A0233016246 on January 27, 2004. The NOPA stated that the total owed by Harry T's was $69,249.79 in taxes, $29,422.03 in penalties, and $11,831.88 for a total of $110,501.72. The NOPA reflected a payment of $10,953.62 paid for the uncontested amounts of the audit assessment, and showed a balance due of $99,548.10 as of the date of the NOPA. The Department received Harry T's formal written protest on April 23, 2004. FACTS RELATED TO RESTAURANT'S AUDIT Petitioner Restaurant was a registered dealer who filed form DR-15 (Sales and Use Tax Return) with the Department for each month of the Restaurant Audit Period. Restaurant used the cash basis of accounting. The Department sent Restaurant a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records (Form DR-840) to conduct an audit of Restaurant's books and records for the purposes of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The Department and Restaurant entered into an Audit Agreement stipulating that a sampling method is the most effective, expedient, and adequate method by which to conduct an audit of Restaurant's books and records. Gina Imm examined and sampled the available books and records of Restaurant to determine whether Restaurant properly collected and remitted sales and use tax in compliance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Restaurant was the tenant party in leases for the property upon which Restaurant operated its business prior to January 1, 2000. On January 1, 2000, Restaurant terminated its leases for these properties. Restaurant entered a CBA with Legendary prior to the beginning of Restaurant's Audit Period, December 1, 1999 through March 31, 2003. The CBA between Restaurant and Legendary was effective throughout the Restaurant Audit Period. Restaurant operated the "Crystal Beach Coffee Company" and "Tony's By the Sea" on property owned by Floridian Homes of Crystal Beach, Inc. (FHCB), an unrelated third party, during the Restaurant Audit Period. Restaurant operated "Blues" on property owned by an individual, Mr. Peter H. Bos, during the Restaurant Audit Period. 37. Restaurant operated "Rutherford's 465" on property owned by Regatta Bay Investor, Ltd., a Florida limited partnership, during the Restaurant Audit Period. Accounting entries were made each month during the Restaurant Audit Period to record the amount of CBA compensation that was accrued by Restaurant to Legendary under the CBA; however, no rent was recorded on the income tax or accounting books of either Restaurant or Legendary during the Restaurant Audit Period. No amount of money labeled as CBA compensation was transferred from Restaurant to Legendary and no payments labeled as "rent" were transferred from Restaurant to Legendary. Based upon the business decisions of the Chief Financial Officer of Legendary, cash was transferred periodically from Restaurant to Legendary, and cash was also transferred from Legendary to Restaurant during the Restaurant Audit Period. Any amounts collected by Restaurant during the Restaurant Audit Period and not paid directly to third parties were distributed periodically to Holdings as corporate dividends. The Department determined that the transfers of cash from Restaurant to Legendary reflected rental consideration paid as CBA compensation, and directed the Department's auditor to assess sales tax against the amounts recorded as CBA compensation accounting entries. Restaurant paid ad valorem taxes due on the property on which Restaurant operated during each year of the Restaurant Audit period. The Department assessed sales tax on the amounts of ad valorem taxes paid by Restaurant on behalf of Holding. The Department determined that Restaurant owed $17,880.71 in additional sales tax for the CBA compensation and ad valorem taxes paid, plus statutory interest and penalties. On September 5, 2003, the Department issued the Restaurant a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Form DR- 1215) for audit number A0231102584, stating that Restaurant owed $26,092.10 in taxes, $8,940.31 in penalties, and $1.808.87 in interest for a total of $36,841.28. The Department noted Restaurant's payment of $8,745.53 for the portions of the assessment related to food and beverage sales, leaving a balance due as of that date of $28,095.75. The Department informed Petitioner Restaurant that interest continued to accrue on the unpaid assessment. The Department issued its NOPA for audit number A0231102584 on March 17, 2004, to Restaurant. The total owed by Restaurant as stated in the NOPA was $26,092.10 in taxes, $8,940.34 in penalties, and $3,378.99 in interest for a total of $38,411.43, less the $8,745.53 already paid, for a total balance due on that date of $29,665.90. Restaurant protested the NOPA, and the Department referred the matter to the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution Section. On March 28, 2005, the Department issued its Notice of Decision upholding the assessment of tax for the CBA fees and ad valorem taxes paid by Restaurant, and on April 6, 2005, the Department received the Restaurant's formal written protest. FACTS RELATED TO BEACHSIDE'S AUDIT Petitioner Beachside Inn Destin, Inc. (Beachside) was a registered dealer who filed form DR-15 (Sales and Use Tax Return) with the Department for each month during the Beachside Audit period, May 1, 2000, through May 31, 2003. Beachside used the cash basis of accounting during the Beachside Audit Period. Beachside and the Department entered into an Audit Agreement stipulating that a sampling method is the most effective, expedient, and adequate method by which to conduct an audit of Beachside's books and records. Gina Imm, a Tax Auditor for the Department, examined and sampled the available books and records of Beachside to determine whether Beachside properly collected and remitted sales and use tax during the Audit Period in compliance with the requirements of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Legendary Resorts, LLC (Resorts) entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with FHCB and Lester J. Butler, Timothy Fulmer and Mitt Fulmer, three of Resorts' shareholders (the Shareholders), in April 2000, for the acquisition of the Beachside Inn assets by Resorts. Subsequent to the execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement, the parties discovered that a condition precedent to the agreement, i.e., the assumption by Resorts of the major indebtedness of FHCB could not be accomplished as contemplated because it would cause the existing lender to violate its loan consideration limits with respect to the Legendary Group. After discovering this problem, Resorts entered into a Triple-net Lease dated March 1, 2000, with the Shareholders for a beachfront lot and entered into a Triple-net Lease dated March 1, 2000, with FHCB for the Beachside Inn assets that were originally the subject of the Asset Purchase Agreement. These Triple-net Leases were designed to transfer control, and the benefits and burdens of ownership, of the Beachside Inn assets to Resorts pending resolution of the financing contingency and the closing under the Asset Purchase Agreement. Beachside entered into a CBA with Legendary prior to the beginning of the Beachside Audit Period, which was effective throughout the Beachside Audit Period. Although Resorts was the party entitled to all rights, and subject to all obligations, under the Triple-net Leases and Asset Purchase Agreement, the financial accounting and cash management functions and activities during the terms of the Leases were handled by and recorded in Beachside because these leases were designed to permit the Legendary Group to take over the operations of the Beachside Inn assets pending closing and because the Legendary Group intended to place the assets in Beachside under the Asset Purchase Agreement upon the closing of the asset purchase. Resorts and Beachside operated the Beachside Inn assets on property owned by FHCB and the Shareholders during the Beachside Audit Period. Accounting entries were made each month to record the amount of CBA compensation that was accrued by Beachside to Legendary under the CBA but no rent was recorded on the income tax or accounting books of either Beachside or Legendary during the Beachside Audit Period. No money labeled as CBA compensation was transferred from Beachside or Resorts to Legendary and no payments labeled as "rent" were transferred from Beachside or Resorts to Legendary. Based on the business decisions of the Chief Financial Officer of Legendary, cash was transferred periodically from Resorts and/or Beachside to Legendary and from Legendary to Resorts and/or Beachside during the Beachside Audit Period. After Resorts and Beachside operated the Beachside Inn assets for a period of time at a material loss, Resorts was not able to arrange for suitable substitute financing to close on the purchase of the Beachside Inn assets under the Asset Purchase Agreement. Resorts, FHCB and the Shareholders reached an agreement on or about August 15, 2003 (the Termination Date), whereby Resorts terminated its rights under the Asset Purchase Agreement and the two leases. In exchange, the Shareholders transferred ownership of the beachfront lot to Resorts. Federal income tax returns for calendar years 2000, 2001, and 2002 were filed by Resorts which reflected the results of operating the Beachside Inn assets. Following the Termination Date, all of the historic accounting entries made by Beachside reflecting the operation of the Beachside Inn assets were moved from its books and records to the books and records of Resorts for administrative reasons and consistency with the legal documents. Beachside and Resorts made insurance payments on behalf of the owners of the property upon which Resorts operated its business for each year of the Beachside Audit Period. They also made payments for loans on behalf of the owners of the property and paid ad valorem taxes due on the property upon which Resorts operated for each year of the Beachside Audit Period. The Department assessed Beachside sales tax on the amounts of ad valorem taxes, insurance payments and loan payments paid by Beachside on behalf of FHCB and the Shareholders. On October 27, 2003, the Department issued Beachside a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (form DR- 1215) for audit number A030582778, stating that Beachside owed $69,436.01 in taxes, $30,606.77, and $7,635.33 for a total of $107,678.11. The Department noted Beachside's payment of $8,936.01 for the portions of the assessment related to sales of good and beverage, and reflected a balance due after payment of $98,742.10, with interest continuing to accrue.2/ Beachside made an additional payment of $8,936.01 toward the balance due on the uncontested amount of the assessment. On February 19, 2004, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment for audit number A030582778, stating that the total amount owed by Beachside was $69,436.01 in taxes, $30,606.77 in penalties and $8,917.55 in interest for a total of $108,960.33, less $17,872.02 previously paid by Beachside, for a balance as of that date of $91,088.31. On April 16, 2004, Beachside protested the NOPA, and the Department referred the matter to the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution Section. On March 28, 2005, the Department issued its Notice of Decision upholding the assessment of tax for the payment of ad valorem taxes, insurance and loans by Beachside on behalf of Holding. On April 6, 2005, the Department received the Beachside's formal written protest of audit number A030582778. ADDITIONAL FACTS In addition to the Stipulated Facts submitted by the parties, the undersigned makes the following findings based upon the stipulated exhibits submitted. With respect to the CBAs, the documents provided "the Co-Operator and Manager have agreed to enter into this Agreement for each to provide certain assets to the Business and for Manager to provide, on a cost effective basis, Management Services as required from time to time by the Business." The Agreements state that "each have various assets including fixtures, employees, contractual relationships, knowhow and real estate which they wish to combine to operate a restaurant and bar (the Business)." The CBAs do not name a physical location and do not have provisions for care and repair of the premises; for rights of access and inspection; for eminent domain or condemnation; for default; for provision of utilities or for subletting, all provisions typically seen in a commercial lease. By contrast, the Triple-Net Lease for the Beachside Inn Assets (Stipulated Exhibit 10) contains all of these provisions. The CBAs provide for payment of management services, expenses of the business, and all services and assets necessary for the operations of the business. They are clearly not limited to provision of a location. With respect to the Beachside Assets, the Triple-Net Lease (the Beachside lease) was entered after the Asset Purchase Agreement and expressly acknowledges the existence of that document. However, the Beachside lease by its terms does not provide a right of purchase at a nominal sum at the end of the lease. It provides options to extend the term of the three-year lease for five additional terms of three years each, governed by the same terms and provisions. It also provides a right to purchase the premises at any time during the term of the lease and up to six months after any extensions of the lease which shall be exercised by affecting a closing under the Asset Purchase Agreement. The Beachside Lease for the Beachside Inn assets has other provisions that are relevant to these proceedings. For example, the Beachside Inn lease defines the term "rent" as including the base rent ($100 per month) plus any state sales tax imposed "upon any and all rents or other payments provided in this lease." It provides for surrender of the premises at the expiration of the lease, including terms for removal of any trade fixtures, personal property and signs. Most importantly, the Beachside Inn lease expressly states the following: 26. a. The Lease does not create the relationship of principal and agent or of partnership or of joint venture or of any association between Landlord and Tenant, the sole relationship between the parties hereto being that of Landlord and Tenant. * * * c. This Lease and the Exhibits, if any, attached hereto and forming a part hereof, constitute the entire agreement between Landlord and Tenant affecting the Premises and there are no other agreements, either oral or written, between them other than are herein set forth. . . .
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that: The Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties and interest against Petitioner Harry T's is sustained for the portion attributable to payment of ad valorem taxes only; The Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties and interest against Petitioner Legendary Restaurant Associates, Inc., is sustained for the portion attributable to payment of ad valorem taxes only; and The Department's assessment for additional sales tax penalties and interest against Petitioner Beachside Inn, Inc., be sustained in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2006.
The Issue Whether a final order dismissing the Petitioner's rule challenge should be entered because Respondent, United Safety Council, Inc., doing business as Florida Safety Council (United Safety Council), is not an "agency" within the Florida Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and there is no claim challenging a rule enacted by Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department). HOLDINGS United Safety Council is not an “agency” within the definition of section 120.52(1), Florida Statutes (2010); thus Project Refocus' rule challenge against United Safety Council is not subject to the APA. Consequently, United Safety Council's Motion for Summary Final Order is Granted. Project Refocus' petition in the instant case does not challenge a Department rule or action, and the Department was never added or served as a party. Therefore, the Department's motion to remove it as a party is Granted.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent, KaShamba Miller-Anderson, violated section 112.3145(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), by willfully failing to file a 2015 CE Form 1, “Statement of Financial Interests”; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently a member of the Riviera Beach City Council. As a member of the Riviera Beach City Council, Respondent served as a “local officer” as defined in section 112.3145(1)(a), throughout the year 2015. Respondent was aware that she was required to file a CE Form 1 every year, including for the year 2015. Financial disclosures are filed in order to allow the public to monitor public officials and employees for any conflicts of interest that may arise. The requirement that financial disclosures be filed is intended to deter corruption and increase the public’s confidence in government. In 2016, Respondent received e-mails at the address kmiller@rivierabch.com. She received regular mail at the address 430 West 28th Street, Riviera Beach, Florida 33404. The CE Form 1, “Statement of Financial Interests,” for calendar year 2015 was required to be filed on or before July 1, 2016. There is a grace period for filing the form that expired on September 1, 2016. After the expiration of the grace period, an automatic fine of $25 per day was imposed for each day the form is late, up to a maximum fine of $1,500. The maximum fine accrued on October 31, 2016. The Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections (Palm Beach SOE) office sent Respondent the original blank 2015 financial disclosure form, along with the requirements for filing the form, before June 1, 2016. She was instructed to file her completed form no later than July 1, 2016. Respondent failed to file her 2015 CE Form 1 by either July 1, 2016, or September 1, 2016. Respondent received notice from the Commission regarding her failure to file her 2015 CE Form 1. On July 31, 2016, the Palm Beach SOE sent a delinquency memorandum to Respondent at 430 West 28th Street, Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 by certified mail. The mail was unclaimed. The July 31, 2016, memorandum included the following statement: Pursuant to State law, please be advised that although you are delinquent in filing Form 1, a grace period is in effect until September 1, 2016. If your form is not received by September 1, 2016, we will be required by law to notify the Commission on Ethics of the delinquency. A fine of $25 for each day late will be imposed, up to the maximum penalty of $1500. In addition, pursuant to enacted legislation, the Commission on Ethics must initiate investigations of delinquent filers in certain circumstances. This can result in you being removed from your public office or employment. Respondent took no action to file her form by September 1, 2016. If she had done so, it would have been considered timely. Commission staff sent Respondent a courtesy letter on September 7, 2016, and advised her that she was accruing a fine of $25 per day for failure to file her 2015 CE Form 1. The Commission also e-mailed Respondent on September 20, 2016, using the e-mail address kmiller@rivierabch.com. Respondent accrued the maximum fine of $1,500 as of October 31, 2016, as authorized by section 112.3145(7)(f), for failing to file her CE Form 1 for the year 2015. On November 4, 2016, the Commission again e-mailed Respondent at the same e-mail address, advising her that the maximum fine had accrued and she still needed to file her 2015 CE Form 1. The November 4, 2016, e-mail attached a blank 2015 CE Form 1 and a form to appeal her fine. Respondent did not avail herself of the opportunity to appeal the fine that had accrued. On February 21, 2017, the Commission sent Respondent a Notice of Assessment of Automatic Fine by certified mail, using the 430 West 28th Street address. Respondent acknowledged receipt of the February 2017 notice. This e-mail also provided the appeal process for contesting the maximum fine. Respondent did not pay the fine at that time because she did not have the funds to do so. She believed, in error, that she now could not file the 2015 CE Form 1 until she paid the fine. Her belief, however misplaced, was sincere. On June 16, 2017, the Commission mailed Respondent a Notification of Issuance of Default Final Order at the 430 West 28th Street address. The Notice was not returned to the Commission as undeliverable. On June 22, 2017, Respondent paid the $1,500 fine. On June 28, 2017, Respondent filed her CE Form 1 for calendar year 2015. Respondent did not have a particularly compelling reason for not timely filing her 2015 CE Form 1. Her position on the city council is a part-time position, for which she is not assigned an assistant. She admitted at hearing that the notice and the form simply got lost on her desk, and she did not make it a priority. However, Respondent claims that while filing her 2015 CE Form 1 was not the priority it should have been, she never intended not to file the form, and she never indicated to anyone that she would not do so. Respondent filed her 2015 CE Form 1 and paid the fine prior to the finding of probable cause in this case. There are some differences between the financial disclosure Respondent filed when she initially ran for office and the one filed for 2015. Those differences however, are not so great as to support an inference or finding that she was attempting to hide something by not filing timely. The term for which Respondent was elected expired on March 21, 2018. She was re-elected for another term which began March 21, 2018.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter a final order and public report finding that no violation of section 112.3145(8)(c) has been demonstrated. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Melody A. Hadley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A. 131 North Gadsden Street (32301) Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of violating the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, as alleged in the Petition for Relief.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This proceeding involves an age discrimination complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) by Petitioner, Michael A. Demchak. The complaint alleges that Respondent, City of Ormond Beach (City), unlawfully refused to hire him on account of his age. In a preliminary determination made on June 11, 2002, the Commission's Executive Director concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. Mr. Demchak is a white male born on July 16, 1935. He worked as a police officer with the City of New York for twenty years (1957-1977); as a counselor and employment developer (1985-1986) and supervisor (1993-1997) with Daytona Beach Community College; as an investigator with the State Attorney's Office in Daytona Beach for an undisclosed period of time; and as a substitute teacher with the Volusia County School District (1988 and 1989). In addition, Mr. Demchak served for two years in the United States Army, having received an honorable discharge in 1956. He has also been a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida for over twenty-five years, and has worked in that profession, at least part time, for many years. For the last four years, Mr. Demchak has been employed by Prudential Real Estate in Daytona Beach selling real estate. His specific income from that job since filing his complaint was not disclosed, but he described it as being not "very good" and only a "few thousand dollars." He received a B.A. in Management from Adelphi University in 1976. In 2001, the City reorganized its Code Enforcement function and created in lieu thereof a new Community Improvement Division (Division). The purpose of the change was to give the new department a "kinder, gentler name for the public," to focus less on the writing of citations, and to provide instead a more customer-oriented service for its citizens. Prior to the change, the City had emphasized enforcement activities rather than assisting the citizens in complying with code regulations. Joanne Naumann, who had some thirty years' experience in code enforcement, mainly in Orange County, was named its manager. At the same time, the City created at least one position in the new Division, a Neighborhood Improvement Officer. In late January or early February 2001, the vacant position was advertised in the Daytona Beach News Journal. According to the advertisement, the position's primary duties included "inspecting properties and developments for compliance with Land Development Code, City Ordinances, and State Statutes." Minimum qualifications included a Bachelor's degree in Public Administration or related field. The City also desired someone with "[s]ome experience in interpreting regulations related to zoning and other codes, [and] [k]nowledge of state and local environmental protection standards and regulations." Having read the foregoing newspaper advertisement, by application dated February 12, 2001, Mr. Demchak applied for the new position with the City. He was then sixty-five years of age and was one of around twelve applicants for the job. All applications were forwarded to Ms. Naumann for a preliminary review. Eight of the applicants, including Mr. Demchak, were selected by Ms. Naumann for a 30-minute initial interview, although one of the eight declined to be interviewed. There was no "favorite" candidate for the job, and the City did not have a particular candidate in mind when the applications were filed. Ms. Naumann and the City's director of the Human Resources Department, Lorenda Volker, conducted these interviews, although Ms. Naumann made the ultimate recommendation for hiring. Neither interviewer knew any of the candidates personally. Each of the seven candidates was asked the same questions, and the two interviewers recorded the candidates' answers on an Interview Questionnaire. The interviewers' impressions of the candidates, however, were not recorded on that document. This same process was used by the City for filling virtually all of its job vacancies. Both Ms. Naumann and Ms. Volker independently reached the same conclusions regarding Petitioner: that he was "brash"; that he was "arrogant"; that he was "authoritative"; that he was "evasive" in his answers; and that he had a "know it all" attitude. Both interviewers were also unhappy with what they perceived to be an unsolicited sexist comment made by Mr. Demchak at the end of the interview. While Ms. Naumann agreed that Mr. Demchak had extensive work experience listed on his application (which was why he was selected for an interview), she desired someone who could "reach out to the community" rather than taking a "heavy-handed" position with the citizens. This was consistent with the City's desire to create a more customer-oriented department rather than an authoritarian department which existed prior to the organizational change. Indeed, without good customer skills, an applicant would be rejected, and neither interviewer perceived Mr. Demchak as having those skills. After the initial round of interviews, the interviewers narrowed the field to four candidates who were invited for a second round of interviews by Ms. Naumann alone. For the reasons described in Finding of Fact 8, Petitioner was not asked to participate in this round of interviews. The four candidates were then ranked, based on the outcome of their respective interviews. After the highest ranked candidate accepted another position, and the second ranked candidate could not pass a background check, the position was offered to, and accepted by, the third ranked candidate, Joshua A. Wall, then a 28-year-old white male. The age of the other three ranked candidates is not of record. Mr. Wall graduated from Florida State University in 1996 with a degree in criminology. After graduation and until he accepted this position, he was employed at a golf club in the City as a proshop assistant and sales clerk. He was hired because of his good demeanor, his outstanding customer service skills, and his ability to coordinate activities, all of which were required for the position of Neighborhood Improvement Officer. In addition, he possessed a degree in criminology. Since being hired, Mr. Wall has done an "excellent" job for the City. In choosing Mr. Wall, the City did not consider age as a criterion, and it did not reject Petitioner's application for that or any other discriminatory reason. In fact, the City employment records show that in the same year that Petitioner applied for the job, the City hired at least eleven persons who were fifty years of age or older, and almost half of its new employees that year were more than forty years of age. Although the City later advertised a second Neighborhood Improvement Officer vacancy, Mr. Demchak did not apply for that position. A person "approximately 50 years old" was eventually selected for the job. Petitioner contended at hearing that even though the application did not ask for the candidate's age, the interviewers obviously knew his age by merely examining the documents attached to his application, and that they then used his age as a basis for his rejection. The evidence shows otherwise, however. He also contended that the interviewers were "disinterested" during the interview, that they were biased in their selection process, and that they concocted their negative impressions of him only after he filed his discrimination complaint. There is no credible evidence to support these contentions. Mr. Demchak further denied that he made a sexist comment during the interview, and he contended that his comments were misconstrued. However, both interviewers were offended by the statement. Finally, Petitioner criticized the impartiality of the Commission investigator who conducted the investigation of his complaint prior to its referral to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even if this were true, however, the Commission's investigative report has not been considered in the resolution of this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying the Petition for Relief and finding that no unlawful employment practice has occurred. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2003.
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (the Act), Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the parties dispute whether Respondent was substantially justified in bringing the Administrative Complaint against Petitioner and/or whether special circumstances exist which would make the award of attorney's fees and costs unjust.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a licensing and regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 455, 456, and 466, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Fish has been a dentist licensed by the State of Florida, where he has maintained a practice. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Fish was represented by Max Price, Esquire. By letter dated April 30, 1997, Allen Horowitz, D.D.S., filed a complaint against Dr. Fish. By letter dated October 22, 1997, Laura Eggnatz Tepperberg, an Investigation Specialist II employed by the Department, notified Dr. Fish that there was a pending investigation and enclosed documents that supported the investigation. By letter dated November 20, 1997, Mr. Price notified Ms. Tepperberg that he represented Dr. Fish and requested a copy of the complete investigation file as soon as the investigation was completed. This letter also suggested that Dr. Horowitz was retaliating against Dr. Fish because Dr. Fish had served as an expert witness for the plaintiff in a civil action brought against Dr. Horowitz. On December 15, 1997, Ms. Tepperberg completed her Investigative Report. By letter dated March 9, 1998, Mr. Price acknowledged receipt of a copy of the Department's investigative file. The letter requested a copy of a videotape that was referred to by the investigative material but was not enclosed in the package of materials that had been provided. By letter dated March 10, 1998, counsel for the Department advised Mr. Price that he had overlooked the videotapes when preparing the package of material and was in the process of having a copy made for him. By letter dated April 24, 1998, the Department mailed a copy of the videotape to Mr. Price. By letter dated April 30, 1998, Mr. Price advised the Department that the videotape had been damaged in transit and requested a second copy of the videotape. By letter dated June 12, 1998, the Department mailed Mr. Price a second copy of the videotape. By letter dated June 26, 1998, Mr. Price advised the Department that the second copy of the videotape had been damaged in transit and requested a third copy of the videotape. On July 9, 1998, the Department caused a third copy of the videotape to be hand-delivered to Mr. Price. In his correspondence pertaining to the videotape, Mr. Price repeatedly asserted that he would need to review the entire investigative file, including the videotape, before he could file a response to be considered by the Probable Cause panel. By letter dated July 24, 1998, Mr. Price filed his response to the investigative file. The Department received the letter and attachments in Tallahassee on July 28, 1998. Dr. Fish's response to the investigative file disputed, but did not disprove, the evidence supporting the allegations against him. By letter dated July 28, 1998, Mr. Price filed a supplemental response to the investigative file. The Department received the supplemental response in Tallahassee on August 7, 1998. This supplemental response also disputed, but did not disprove, the evidence supporting the allegations against him. On July 31, 1998, the Probable Cause Panel met in Fort Myers and found that probable cause existed to file an administrative complaint against Dr. Fish. The Probable Cause Panel had before it at its meeting on July 31, 1998, an investigative report and supporting documentation. That packet of information substantially justified the Department's decision to initiate the Administrative Complaint that underpinned DOAH Case No. 99-3742. In its Proposed Recommended [sic] Order, the Department stipulated that Dr. Fish's response dated July 24, 1998, and his supplemental response dated July 28, 1998, were not reviewed by the Probable Cause Panel at or before its meeting of July 31, 1998. The parties stipulated that Dr. Fish was entitled to file his response within 20 days after he received the entire investigative file on July 9, 1998. Dr. Fish's response filed July 24, 1998, was timely. The parties stipulated that Dr. Fish was entitled as a matter of law to have his timely response considered by the Probable Cause Panel prior to its consideration and vote of probable cause on July 31, 1998.3 The failure to do so constituted a due process violation. On June 1, 2000, the undersigned granted the Department's Amended Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction and closed DOAH Case No. 99-3742. Dr. Fish thereafter timely filed his petition for attorney's fees and costs4 pursuant to the Act. The parties stipulated that the proceeding below was initiated by the Department5, that Dr. Fish qualified as a prevailing small business6, and that he incurred attorney's fees and costs in excess of $15,000.00, which Section 57.111(4)(d)2, Florida Statutes, sets as the maximum that can be awarded. Consequently, if Dr. Fish is to be awarded attorney's fees and costs, the amount of the award should be $15,000.00. Section 57.111(4), Florida Statutes, mandates an award of attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing small business party as follows: (4)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, an award of attorney's fees and costs shall be made to a prevailing small business party in any adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding pursuant to chapter 120 initiated by a state agency, unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes, defines the term "substantially justified" as follows: (3)(e) A proceeding is "substantially justified" if it had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by the state agency. The Act does not specify what acts constitute special circumstances which would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust within the meaning of Section 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department failed to establish the existence of special circumstances which would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust. The Department established that it had information that substantially justified the filing of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 99-3742. Dr. Fish did not prove that the Probable Cause Panel's failure to consider his responses to the investigative file vitiated that substantial justification.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Alexander J. Milanick should be required to pay attorney fees and costs in the amount of $4,976.00 to Petitioner Charles Osborne to compensate Petitioner for his defense of an ethics complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Ethics.
Findings Of Fact The Town of Beverly Beach, Florida has a population of about 600 located in Flagler County, Florida. It is about one mile from north to south, and occupies about .4 square miles. It is bounded on the west by the Intracoastal Waterway and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Highway A1A is the main north-south route through the town. Mr. Osborne is an aerospace engineer who served on the Beverly Beach Town Commission from 1997 through March 1999. He was mayor from March 1999 until 2001. He has lived at 2641 Osprey Circle, in Beverly Beach, in a home constructed at that location, since 1995. This residence is closer to the southern boundary of Beverly Beach than to the northern boundary. Dr. Milanick is a dentist who, along with his brother John, and a person named McGee, during times pertinent, owned land immediately north of Beverly Beach. On the property then and currently owned by Dr. Milanick, and east of A1A, is a restaurant named the Shark House. The premises has also been known as Crabby Joe's. In 1995, Dr. Milanick applied to the Town Commission to have his property, and that of his brother, and that of McGee, annexed into the town limits of Beverly Beach. He did this by asking a Mr. Taylor to do what was necessary to cause the annexation to occur. Mr. Taylor thereafter filed a petition with the Town Commission. By Ordinance 95-9-4, the Town Commission, in 1995, assented to the request and it was made effective November 15, 1995. The Ordinance purported to annex the Milanick property into the Town of Beverly Beach and to zone it general commercial. Mr. Osborne was not a member of the Town Commission and was not mayor during this time. The Ordinance, however, was defective in four ways. The Ordinance purported to annex the property into Bunnell, Florida; it was not properly signed by all commissioners; it was not publicly noticed; and it did not provide a legal description of the property. It was not filed with either the Flagler County Clerk of the Court or the Florida Secretary of State. The matter languished until 1997 when Dr. Milanick determined that his property had not in fact been moved within the boundaries of Beverly Beach. Dr. Milanick brought this to the attention of the Town Commission in October 1997. At a Town Commission meeting on December 3, 1997, the Town Attorney stated that he had not had a chance to look into the Milanick and Shark House issue. At a Town Commission meeting on February 4, 1998, Dr. Milanick inquired as to the progress being made on the annexation of his property and was told that the Town Attorney would get with him and discuss the procedure. Subsequently, the Town Attorney, Pat McCormick, suggested that it would be necessary to start the process from the beginning if the land was to be annexed. At a Town Commission meeting on March 4, 1998, Mayor Osborne stated that there was no benefit to the annexation of the Shark House. One member of the Town Commission suggested that they honor past commitments. Dr. Milanick was in attendance at this meeting. At a Town Commission meeting on May 5, 1999, Dr. Milanick and his brother again attended the Town Commission meeting and requested the annexation of their property and discussed the procedure that would be necessary. At a Town Commission meeting on June 2, 1999, a motion was made to go forward with Ordinance 95-9-4 and to amend the official city map and legal description to include the Shark House property. The motion passed but Mayor Osborne vetoed it. During a regular monthly meeting of the Town Commission on July 7, 1999, James Kearn, an attorney retained by Dr. Milanick, who was authorized to act for Dr. Milanick, appeared and requested that the Commission direct the Town Clerk to sign Ordinance 95-9-4 and to forward it to the county and the state in order to determine if the Ordinance was valid. This request was approved by the Town Commission. Mayor Osborne, vetoed the measure. Thereafter, the veto was over-ridden by the Commission. At a Town Commission workshop on July 21, 1999, there was additional discussion regarding the annexation of the Shark House. Mr. Kearn accused Mayor Osborne of discussing the Milanick annexation matter with Sid Crosby, Clerk of the Court of Flagler County. Mayor Osborne denied the charge. The discussion became heated and accusatory and Mayor Osborne threatened to have the sheriff eject Mr. Kearn from the meeting. Subsequent to the action of the Town Commission of July 7, 1999, the Town Clerk, Douglas Courtney, took Ordinance 95-9-4 to Syd Crosby, Clerk of the Court for Flagler County. In a memorandum dated July 26, 1999, Mr. Courtney reported to the Town Commission that Mr. Crosby would not file Ordinance 95-9-4 because it was defective. One of the defects cited was that the instrument purported to annex the land into the City of Bunnell, Florida. No creditable evidence was adduced which indicated that Mayor Osborne visited Syd Crosby for the purpose of preventing the recording of the annexation of Dr. Milanick's property. Mr. Crosby concluded from the beginning that Ordinance 95-9-4 was not recordable. Mayor Osborne suggested some solutions which would permit the annexation, including, re-submission of a proper application. Over a period of time some "glitch" bills were considered which would annex the land. However, none passed. Mr. Kearn attended the Town Commission meeting on February 2, 2000, and the minutes of the meeting noted that he was accompanied by "a person taking notes." Following this meeting, in a February 16, 2000, letter to Dennis Knox Bayer, Town Attorney, Mr. Kearn claimed that Mayor Osborne had a personal vendetta against Dr. Milanick, and that he was exercising dictatorial efforts to prevent citizens to speak at town meetings. He further demanded that ". . . all Town officials, including you as their representative, refrain from saying things that are simply and blatantly false, which only serve to incite Mr. Milanick." At a town meeting on March 1, 2000, Mr. Kearn complained about the annexation not being on the agenda and Mayor Osborne stated that a request for inclusion on the agenda had not been made in writing. Mr. Kearn was permitted to speak for three minutes, he spoke for three minutes, and immediately thereafter Mayor Osborne adjourned the meeting. On or about April 25, 2000, Dr. Milanick and his brother John, filed suit against the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne personally, in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Flagler County. The suit alleged that the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne violated the civil rights of the Milanicks. The suit alleged that Mayor Osborne had a vendetta against Dr. Milanick and should be held personally liable to Dr. Milanick. The Circuit Court dismissed the civil rights count against Mayor Osborne and the town, and this dismissal was affirmed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The Circuit Court also dismissed the mandamus action, finding that the 30- day limitations' period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari applied and that a prima facie case for mandamus had not been established. The Fifth District Court of Appeal, on October 19, 2001, remanded that count to the Circuit Court with directions to grant the petition for mandamus, but upheld the dismissal of the civil rights counts. On January 23, 2003, the Circuit Court entered its Alternative Writ of Mandamus. The Writ incorporated the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint by reference and ordered that the Defendants take whatever steps necessary to sign and record Ordinance 95-9-4. When this occurred, Mr. Osborne was no longer an elected official of Beverly Beach. The Circuit Court complaint filed by Dr. Milanick recited that the recording of the ordinance did not occur because Mayor Osborne conferred with the Clerk of the Court to block recording of the ordinance. The adoption of the matters recited in the complaint as true, by the appellate court, does not make them proven facts because no evidence was taken in the case. The complaint, moreover, alleges actions, such as being tyrannical and peevish, which could not in any event constitute a violation of a person's civil rights. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Osborne took any action, as mayor, because he wished to obtain a personal advantage and does not allege that the annexation of Dr. Milanick's real property would affect Mr. Osborne's real property in terms of value or otherwise. As of the date of the hearing, Dr. Milanick's property had not been annexed into the corporate limits of Beverly Beach. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor, was not helpful in causing the annexation to occur and it is apparent that his relations with Mr. Kearn were not amicable. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor was irascible, intimidating, and controlling. Mr. Osborne believed that the annexation would bring no benefit to Beverly Beach and believed it would, "change the town's character." Mr. Osborne gained nothing directly or personally by preventing, or making difficult, the annexation of Dr. Milanick's land. As an elected official, he was permitted to advance his own ideas with regard to what he believed would be best for Beverly Beach and for himself as a citizen and property owner of Beverly Beach. He could act in this regard so long as he did not secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, as opposed to a general benefit. A letter signed by Mr. Kearn dated July 18, 2003, accompanied by an affidavit signed by Dr. Milanick, requested that the Commission conduct an investigation into the activities of Mr. Osborne during the period when he was the mayor of Beverly Beach. For reasons which become apparent hereafter, this letter, which had the words "Via Airborne Overnight Mail" stamped on its face, will be hereinafter referred to as the "Airborne" letter. The following statements were contained in the "Airborne" letter: Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land into the Town as a general commercial, simply because he personally did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town. He also met with the former Clerk of Court for Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to persuade the Clerk to not record anything regarding the annexation of such land, in order to prevent the completion of the annexation. He thus plainly put his purely personal concerns, ahead of his duties as mayor, and fiduciary duty to the citizens of Beverly Beach. The mayor still refused to oblige the Town's request, or to honor the duly adopted resolution, for his own personal reasons, irrespective of his duties as mayor to the citizens of Beverly Beach.... Even worse, he met with the former Clerk of Circuit Court of Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to attempt to persuade Mr. Crosby to not record any ordinance presented by the Town, annexing the Milanicks' property. Mayor Osborne repeatedly ignored and defied the will of the Town to complete the annexation, to pursue his own personal agenda, i.e., stopping annexation of land as general commercial. The "Airborne" letter then parroted items that indicated that the Circuit Court had found to be true, as follows: Additionally, Mr. Osborne simply does not allow anyone to speak with whom he disagrees, or to address matter that he does not want addressed. Mayor Osborne has... refused to put the Milanicks' matters or requests on the Town Council agenda; taken action regarding the Milanicks' properties, without any notice to the Milanicks, or without knowledge by the Milanicks that such action was being taken against their property, as required by the Town's own law; refused to allow the Milanicks to speak to matters that affect their personal and property interests, once the Town Council had opened discussion regarding the annexation and zoning of the Milanicks' properties; blatantly and willfully misrepresented the Milanicks' positions, actions, and statements at Town meetings, beyond the scope of the privilege normally attendant to a politician's statements at such meeting, in order to defeat the Milanicks' requests, and to harm the Milanicks; refused to honor Ordinances passed by previous Town councils, as detailed above; refused to follow through with completing the annexation approved by previous council members of the Town; worked to undercut the recording of the completion of the signing of the ordinance, and the recording of the ordinance, to complete the annexation, all as detailed above. The matters in paragraph 25, are misleading because they indicate that the Circuit Court found these items to be true when in fact no evidentiary proceedings with regard to these items occurred in the Circuit Court. Moreover, the Complaint alleged several matters which Dr. Milanick either knew to be untrue, or should have known that it was untrue. Specifically, the Complaint alleged that Mayor Osborne "did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town." This allegation implies that he was acting for some personal and specific reason financial reason, as opposed to a general opposition to development. This allegation, had it been true, would have been actionable pursuant to Section 112.313(6) The Complaint also alleged that Mayor Osborne met with Syd Crosby in order to prevent the annexation of the Milanicks' property. This allegation, coupled with the allegation as to a financial interest, bolsters the asserted improper purpose. Based on this Complaint, the Executive Director of the Commission issued a Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate, which was filed with the Commission on September 26, 2003, and assigned Complaint Number 03-091. Investigator Travis Wade of the Commission was directed to conduct a preliminary investigation into whether or not there was probable cause to believe a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, had occurred. That section reads as follows: (6) Misuse of public position.--No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others. This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31. Mr. Osborne learned of the Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate and thereafter retained Robert J. Riggio, of the firm of Riggio & Mitchell, P.A., located in Daytona Beach, as his attorney. Mr. Riggio worked on the case from October 24, 2003, until September 29, 2004. He charged $150 per hour, which is below the customary charge in the Daytona Beach area, and the hourly rate therefore, is reasonable. He expended 33 hours which is reasonable. He expended $180 in costs. These expenditures totaled $4,976 which was billed to Mr. Osborne. He paid the bill. On April 6, 2004, a second letter dated July 18, 2003, was sent to the Commission by Mr. Kearn by facsimile. This will be referred to as the "Fax" letter. This was precipitated by a request to Mr. Kearn from Investigator Wade that he provide a copy of the original letter. The "Fax" letter differed from the "Airborne" letter. In the second paragraph of the "Fax" letter the following sentence appears: "Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land just north of Mr. Osborne's manufactured home . . . ." And in the fourth paragraph of the "Fax" letter, the following sentence appears: "The Mayor objected, because it would serve to annex land as general commercial, just north of his own manufactured home." It further stated that his motivation was ". . . stopping land as commercial near him." Mr. Kearn testified under oath that when Investigator Wade was discussing the case with him, that he, Mr. Kearn, realized the "Fax" letter was a draft that had been sent to Investigator Wade in error. Mr. Kearn said that the "Fax" letter was a draft that had subsequently been edited by Dr. Milanick who knew, July 18, 2003, that Mr. Osborne did not live in a manufactured home located immediately south of the property which was sought to be annexed. Mr. Kearn said that it the "Airborne" letter was supposed to be the operative document. He said that he realized that the "Fax" letter was being used by Investigator Wade when he was talking to him on the telephone on June 8, 2004, and that he advised Investigator Wade of the error. He testified that he made it perfectly clear to Investigator Wade that the "Airborne" letter was the operative document. Investigator Wade's Report of Investigation, however, recites that during the telephone interview of Mr. Kearn, that Mr. Kearn advised him that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property, while he served as mayor and that Mr. Osborne's interest in stopping the annexation was to use his position for his personal benefit. At the hearing, Investigator Wade stated under oath that Mr. Kearn advised him during their telephone conversation that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property while he was serving as mayor. Investigator Wade stated that the issue of whether or not Mr. Osborne lived in the immediate vicinity of the Milanick property was the key element in his investigation because if that were true, stopping the annexation could be a personal benefit to Mr. Osborne. Mr. Wade was a disinterested and credible investigator and witness and his testimony is taken as true and accurate. Mr. Osborne did not live in either a manufactured or mobile home. The type of home he lived in is irrelevant. What is relevant is that Mr. Osborne did not live adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the Milanick property. In fact, Mr. Osborne did not live near the north side of town. He lived closer to the south side of town and it is unlikely that the annexation of the Milanick property would have an economic effect on Mr. Osborne's property. Mr. Kearn was aware of Mr. Osborne's resident address because he had him served with a civil suit at his residence in 2000. Mr. Kearn knew that Mr. Osborne did not live in a mobile home community, or in a manufactured home near the Milanick property, or anywhere near it. Nevertheless, he asserted that to be true when he talked to Investigator Wade. Mr. Kearn is the attorney and agent of Dr. Milanick. Mr. Kearn is, therefore, the alter ego of Dr. Milanick so that the actions of Mr. Kearn, are the actions of Dr. Milanick. The Commission, found in their Public Report, dated September 8, 2004, that Mr. Osborne's opposition to the annexation was not connected to any desire to secure a benefit for himself. The Commission dismissed the Milanick complaint on a finding of "no probable cause."
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter an order requiring Dr. Milanick to pay Mr. Osborne $4,976.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James J. Kearn, Esquire James J. Kearn, P.A. 138 Live Oak Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114-4912 Gary S. Edinger, Esquire 305 Northeast First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Martin A. Pedata, Esquire Martin Pedata, P.A. 505 East New York Avenue, Suite 8 DeLand, Florida 32724 Robert J. Riggio, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 400 South Palmetto Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
