Findings Of Fact Application No. 76-00292 is for a consumptive use permit for one well located in the Green Swamp, Lake County. The water withdrawn is to be used for industrial purposes. The application seeks a total withdrawal of 3.642 million gallons per day average annual withdrawal and 5.112 million gallons maximum daily withdrawal. This withdrawal will be from one well and a dredge lake and constitutes in its entirety a new use. The consumptive use, as sought, does not exceed the water crop as defined by the district nor otherwise violate any of the requirements set forth in Subsections 16J-2.11(2) , (3) or (4), Florida Administrative Code. The Southwest Florida Water Management District's staff recommends issuance of a permit with the following conditions: That the applicant shall install totalizing flowmeters of the propeller-driven type on the subject well. The applicant shall record the pumpage from the subject well on a weekly basis and submit a record of that pumpage to the district quarterly beginning on January 15, 1977. The permit shall expire on December 31, 1980. The procedural requirements of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto, have been complied with as they pertain to this application. The intended consumptive use appears to be a reasonable, beneficial use which is consistent with the public interest and will not interfere with any legal use of water existing at the time of the application.
Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that a consumptive water use permit in the amounts and manner sought for by the subject application be issued subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 3 above. ENTERED this 5th day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Florida Rock Industries, Inc. Staff Attorney Post Office Box 4667 Southwest Florida Water Jacksonville, Florida Management District Post Office Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512
The Issue Whether Respondent John M. Williams deposited fill in waters of the state without a permit from the Department of Environmental Protection. If so, what is the appropriate corrective action and penalty?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Williams and the Cowford Subdivision Petitioner John M. Williams is a retired mechanic. In 1992, he became acquainted with the Cowford subdivision in Walton County, near Bruce, Florida. The subdivision fronts the Choctawhatchee River. Mr. Williams purchased lot 29 of the subdivision. Three or four years later, he bought lot 30. All told, Mr. Williams paid approximately $47,000 for the lots, an electric power line and an "above-ground" septic tank. The purchase price of the lots was $38,000. Running an electric line and installation of an electric light pole cost about $4,000. Mr. Williams paid about $5,000 for the septic tank and its installation. Mr. Williams' ultimate goal in purchasing the lots and adding the improvements was to build a house on the property for use in his retirement. Attempt to Obtain the Necessary Permits The septic tank was not purchased by Mr. Williams until after he had obtained a permit for its construction. At the county offices where he went to obtain the necessary permit, he was "sent over to the power company." (Tr. 216). At hearing, he described what happened there: I paid my money to get my power and they -- well, they informed me . . . once I got my power on I had 6 months to get my septic tank in the ground or they would turn my lights off. So here I had a $3,500 light pole put up and I couldn't very well see this thing going down. So, I went ahead to the Health Department. (Id.) Mr. Williams' testimony is supported by a Walton County Environmental Health Notice dated March 8, 1999, that states, "The Walton County Building Department will not be issuing approval for power for any residence until final approval of the septic system is obtained from the Walton County Environmental Health Office." P7, the first page after Page 3 of 3, marked in the upper right hand corner as PAGE 10. At the Health Department, on April 12, 1999, Mr. Williams applied for an "Onsite Sewage Treatment and Disposal System" permit on a form bearing the following heading: STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ONSITE SEWAGE DISPOSAL SYSTEM APPLICATION FOR CONSTRUCTION PERMIT Authority; Chapter 381, FS & Chapter 10D-6, FAC P7, page 1 of 3. According to the form, he paid the $200 fee for the permit on April 29, 1999. The payment was made within a month or so after the installation of the power line. An attachment to the "Walton County Environmental Health Onsite Sewage Treatment and Disposal System Application," made out by Mr. Williams on April 12, 1999, contains the following warning: OTHER AGENCY PERMITS: As the owner or agent applying for an OSTDS permit it is my responsibility to determine if the proposed development is in compliance with the zoning requirements of Walton County. I further assume responsibility to obtain any applicable permits from other State and Local Government Agencies. P15, page 2. (emphasis supplied) (See also P7, the second page after Page 3 of 3, marked in the upper right hand corner as PAGE 11). On May 5, 1999, about three weeks after Mr. Williams submitted the construction permit application, the site where the septic tank would be installed was evaluated by an EH Specialist, an inspector. On the same day, an Onsite Sewage Treatment and Disposal System Construction Permit was issued for an "above-ground" 900-gallon septic tank. Installation With county personnel present and under county supervision, the septic tank was installed on a ridge on Mr. Williams property about 17 feet above mean sea level. Fill dirt was brought onto the site and placed on top of the tank to create a septic tank mound. No dredging of the property was done in connection with the installation. Chance Discovery After a complaint was registered with DEP about dredge and fill activity on one of the lots near Mr. Williams, Gary Woodiwiss, then an environmental specialist in the Department assigned to conduct inspections in Walton and Holmes Counties, visited the Cowford subdivision in July 2000. During the visit, Mr. Woodiwiss noticed the septic tank mound on Mr. Williams' property and that the mound, in part, consisted of fill dirt. Being of the opinion that the both the fill dirt and the septic tank system constituted "fill" and that the fill may have been deposited in jurisdictional wetlands, that is, "waters of the state," Mr. Woodiwiss consulted with DEP personnel about the status of the site and DEP jurisdiction. Ultimately, DEP determined that the site of the septic tank mound, within the flood plain of the Choctowhatchee River, was jurisdictional wetlands. The Department took action. DEP Action On November 16, 2000, Mr. Woodiwiss issued a memorandum to the DEP file with regard to "John Williams. Unauthorized Fill in Flood Plain." The memo states: Site is located next to Charles Riley who is the subject of Department action for filling jurisdictional wetlands. Williams was erroneously given a permit by Walton County health Dept. to install a septic system in 1999, which he subsequently installed. I visited the site with the administrator for the septic tanks program in Walton and she indicated that they would pay for the installation of a new system on a new lot for Mr. Williams. I recommend that the removal of the system and relocation of the inhabitants of the lot to an area outside of the immediate flood plain. P6. (emphasis supplied) Five days later, on November 21, 2002, a warning letter was generated by Mr. Woodiwiss under the signature of Bobby A. Cooley, Director of District Management for DEP. The letter advised Mr. Williams as follows: Recent Department survey data established at your property has determined that your entire lot is below the mean annual flood line of the Choctawhatchee River and is subject to dredge and fill jurisdiction of the Department. Any construction on the property including placement of a mobile home, septic tank and drainfield or other structures must first receive a dredge and fill permit from the Department. Preliminary assessment of your proposed development of the property indicates that you may not meet the public interest criteria of Chapters 403 and 373 Florida Statutes for qualifying for a permit. R5. By this letter the Department informed Mr. Williams both that he was in violation of the law by not having secured a permit for the filling of the site and warned that, on the basis of a preliminary assessment, it was not likely that he would be eligible for an after-the-fact permit. The assessment of whether the site was eligible for a permit was re-stated in writing again, but with added certainty in a Compliance Assessment Form (the Form) prepared by DEP personnel. In Section V. of the form, there appears, together with the signature of the "Section Permit Processor and a date of "11/09/2000", the following: Project is not permittable due to type of wetland system being impacted and project must not be "Contrary to the Public Interest". The project could affect the public health, safety and welfare and property of others. The project is of a permanent nature. P13. Although the permit processor entered her assessment on November 9, 2000, and other sections of the form were entered on November 1, 2000, by Mr. Woodiwiss, the Compliance Assessment Form bears a final date of February 1, 2001. The Form shows the "Event Chronology" that led to the issuance of the NOV. The chronology, consistent with the testimony at hearing, reveals the following: 25 Jul.00. Complaint inspection for fill in wetlands on adjacent lot. Found isolated fill areas in a slough and adjacent to an apparent upland area. Vegetation is 100% jurisdictional but soil is composed of alluvial deposits in ridge like configurations, one of which the respondent wished to live on. Solicited the jurisdictional team for a district assist in determining jurisdiction. 21 Aug.00. District assist. Hydrologic indicators and vegetation present in sufficient quantities to establish jurisdiction. John Tobe PhD. Requested that the mean annual flood be established on the site in order to augment his determination. October 11, 2000. District assist by Bureau of Survey and mapping and the establishment of a survey line of the 2.33 year (16.42 feet above MSL) mean annual flood elevation on the adjacent violation site. The whole site is clearly under the MAF, which extends approximately 200 meters up grade towards SR 20. The elevation of the MAF is consistent with hydrological indicators (porella pinnatta) that indicate such a flood elevation, as reported in previous studies. November 7, 2000. Met with Crystal Steele and Mike Curry of Walton County DOH to establish why Mr. Williams has a septic tank permit. They indicated that the permit was issued in error and that they would require the system to be moved. Ms. Steele stated that the County would pay for Mr. Williams to have a new system installed on another site because of the oversight. There are currently two moveable vehicles on the site, one of which is connected to the system, the other has a contained service for sewage. November 21, 2000. WLI [presumably Warning Letter Issued] November 27, 2000. Call to Mr. Williams. He wants to get money back or swap property for higher. I advised him to approach the owner Mr. Martin and make his situation known. January 22, 2000. Mr. Williams has refused to remove the fill and requests an NOV. P13, (emphasis supplied) MAF and Wetland Delineation There was considerable testimony introduced at hearing about establishment of the mean annual flood ("MAF") line for the purpose, among others, of its relationship to the elevation of the septic tank mound. The issue stemmed, no doubt, from Dr. Tobe's request that MAF be established in order to "augment his determination" with regard to DEP jurisdiction based on employment of the methodology in DEP's wetland delineation rule, see paragraph 13, above. Resolution of the issue is not necessary to augment the determination that all of lots 29 and 30 of the Cowford subdivision are located in wetlands that constitute "waters of the state." That the septic tank and the fill dirt were deposited on wetlands under the jurisdiction of DEP was clearly established by Dr. Tobe in his testimony at trial and the evidence in support of it. Petitioner concedes as much in his Proposed Final Order. Environmental Harm and Human Health Exposure Wetlands whose surface area is covered by the septic tank mound have been filled. The filling has caused environmental damage. An assessment of the damage was not offered at hearing but it appears from this record that the damage is minimal. During the time the septic tank has been on Mr. Williams' property, it has never been below the flood waters of the Choctawhatchee River and therefore has not yet caused direct hazard to human health. Corrective Action and Penalty It will be expensive to remove the septic tank; the expense will be more than the cost of installation. Petitioner fears, moreover, that it will render his property worthless. There is no evidence that Petitioner's violation of Department permitting requirements was willful. He has no history of violations previous to this one. Options to continued retention of a septic system through use of a portable wheeled waste remover or use of an upland drain field on another property are either not viable or so problematic as to be impractical. DEP Modification of its Position At the outset of the hearing, DEP announced that it no longer intended to seek civil penalties of $1,500 as it had intended when the NOV was issued. All that is sought by DEP by way of corrective action or penalty is removal of the septic tank and monetary reimbursement for the cost of the investigation of $250 (see Tr. 9, lls. 17-25, and Tr. 10, lls. 1-5.)
The Issue Whether the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has issued an agency statement defined as a rule which has not been adopted by rulemaking as required by Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes. (All statutory citations are to the 2000 codification of the Florida Statutes. All rule citations are to the current Florida Administrative Code.)
Findings Of Fact On April 20, 2001, DEP's Southwest District office issued an Intent to Issue with respect to Tampa Bay Desal's application for a NPDES permit for the construction and operation of a proposed desalination facility (DEP File No. FL0186813-001-IW1S). DEP's Intent to Issue for the Tampa Bay Desal NPDES permit provided in part: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's proposed permitting decision may petition for an administrative proceeding (hearing) under sections 120.569 and 120.57 of the Florida Statutes. The Intent to Issue for the NPDES permit also specified the type of information that must be included in a petition filed under Sections 120.569 and 120.57. SOBAC timely challenged DEP's proposed agency action concerning the Tampa Bay Desal permit application. The challenge is currently pending as DOAH Case No. 01-1949. The Intent to Issue the Tampa Bay Desal permit also included the statement: "Mediation under section 120.573 of the Florida Statutes is not available for this proceeding." On June 7, 2001, SOBAC filed a Petition to Invalidate Agency Statement under Section 120.56(4). SOBAC alleged that the statement regarding mediation met the definitions of a rule but was not adopted by rulemaking as required by Section 120.54(1)(a). By correspondence dated June 13, 2001, DEP notified counsel for SOBAC of DEP's willingness to participate in mediation in an effort to resolve the issues underlying the administrative challenge. However, DEP's offer to participate in mediation was predicated, at least in part, on the following conditions: the parties would agree on the selection of the mediator; any discussions and documents introduced in the mediation would remain confidential; and notwithstanding the mediation, discovery in the administrative proceeding would continue, and the parties would be prepared to proceed to the final hearing as scheduled. On or about June 14, 2001, Tampa Bay Desal agreed, at least in principle, to participate in mediation with SOBAC under those conditions. There was no evidence that either DEP or Tampa Bay Desal ever agreed to toll the administrative proceeding (DOAH Case No. 01-1949) pending mediation. On or about June 15, 2001, counsel for SOBAC contacted DEP and accepted DEP's offer to participate in a mediation conference. On or about July 23, 2001, the Department, SOBAC and Tampa Bay Desal participated in a mediation conference in an effort to resolve the issues underlying SOBAC's challenge to Tampa Bay Desal's permit application. Mediation efforts failed. According to the evidence, SOBAC is an organization with an interest in various environmental permitting activities in and around Tampa Bay. SOBAC monitors local newspapers for DEP notices of intent to issue permits. Besides the Tampa Bay Desal permit, SOBAC has become aware of three other DEP notices of intent of interest to SOBAC. One was a notice of intent to issue a permit to Tampa Electric Company (TECO) for NPDES permit modifications relating to and for purposes of accommodating the Tampa Bay Desal project. This notice of intent also contained the statement: "Mediation under Section 120.573, Florida Statutes, is not available for this proceeding." SOBAC nonetheless requested mediation under Section 120.573. When the time to challenge the notice of intent was about to expire, SOBAC also filed an administrative challenge under Sections 120.569 and 120.57. The TECO challenge also was referred to DOAH, where it was given Case No. 01-2720 and consolidated with Case No. 01-1949. TECO never agreed to mediation, and DEP never responded to SOBAC's request for mediation. Another case involved a TECO air pollution permit unrelated to the desalination project. The notice of intent to issue stated: "Mediation is not available for this proceeding." The evidence did not indicate that SOBAC took any action with respect to this notice of intent to issue. The third case involved IMC Phosphates Company and a permit to operate a barge loading facility handling phosphate materials. The notice of intent to issue stated: "Mediation under Section 120.573, F.S. is not available in this proceeding." SOBAC filed an administrative challenge to this permit under Sections 120.569 and 120.57. IMC never agreed to mediation. The evidence was not clear whether SOBAC received a response to its request for mediation. After initiating the instant proceeding, SOBAC researched the Florida Administrative Weekly (FAW) from September 1999 through the date of final hearing and found 30 notices of intent, all of which stated essentially that mediation was not available for (or in) the proceeding, and one notice of intent. No further explanation was given. Of the 30, 24 were electric power plant siting cases, 4 were water quality exemptions, one involved a state revolving loan fund, and one was a joint coastal permit case with consent to use sovereign lands and requested variances. SOBAC presented no evidence as to DEP intents to issue not published in FAW. However, DEP entered into the record evidence of one other DEP notice, apparently not published in FAW, of intent to issue a coastal construction control line permit stating that mediation under Section 120.573 was available and describing procedures to be followed for mediation. SOBAC presented no other evidence to explain why mediation was not offered in the examples given or why it was offered on the one occasion. There also was no evidence as to whether any of the statements regarding availability of mediation reflected by the evidence were intended to mean that mediation was available in one type of case but not in another. Such an intent would have to be inferred. But the evidence was not sufficient to infer such an intent. SOBAC complains that the statements in DEP's notices of intent as to availability of mediation under Section 120.573 force SOBAC to either waive rights or timely initiate administrative challenges under Sections 120.569 and 120.57 and incur litigation costs which might be unnecessary if mediation were initiated. But there was no evidence of any case in which the parties agreed to mediation under Section 120.573. (The failed attempt at mediation in DOAH Case No. 01-1949 was not conducted under Section 120.573.) Second, even if the parties agreed to mediation under Section 120.573, the evidence did not prove the likelihood that mediation would be successful; if not, and if administrative litigation resumed, mediation would have added to the cost of litigation.
The Issue The issues are whether the proposed amendment to Rule 40E- 2.041(1), Florida Administrative Code, exceeds the agency's grant of rulemaking authority; enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific law implemented; or is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency discretion, and vests unbridled discretion in the agency.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Osceola Fish Farmers Association, Inc. (OFFA), is a non-profit corporation whose members consist of tropical fish farmers in Osceola County, Florida. The parties have stipulated that OFFA has standing to bring this action. Respondent, South Florida Water Management District (District or Respondent), is a public corporation operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, with its principal office in West Palm Beach, Florida. Among other things, the District has the authority to regulate the uses of water within its geographic boundaries, including Osceola County. On an undisclosed date, the District began test drawdowns (a lowering of the elevation of the water through control structures) in the Alligator Chain of Lakes just east of St. Cloud in Osceola County, where OFFA's members are engaged in tropical fish farming. The drawdowns were undertaken for the purpose of allowing the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FFWCC) to conduct demucking activities in the lakes to enhance aquatic habitat. Prior to beginning work, the FFWCC obtained an Environmental Resource Permit from the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). However, the District did not require either itself or the FFWCC to obtain a consumptive use permit on the theory that a lake drawdown for demucking activities was not a consumptive use and therefore did not require a permit. In an effort to halt future scheduled drawdowns, OFFA participated in a United States Army Corps of Engineers proceeding which culminated in the preparation of an Economic Impact Statement for FFWCC's drawdowns; filed a complaint with DEP under Section 373.219(2), Florida Statutes, alleging that an unlawful consumptive use (without a permit) was taking place (which complaint was found to be insufficient); filed an action for injunctive relief in circuit court under Section 403.412, Florida Statutes (which was dismissed or dropped for undisclosed reasons); and finally initiated a proceeding against the District under Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, alleging that the District had adopted "an incipient non-rule policy of exempting lake 'drawdowns' from water use permitting requirements" (DOAH Case No. 00-3615RU). To avoid the consequences of an adverse ruling in the latter action, the District began rulemaking proceedings to adopt an amendment to Rule 40E-2.041(1), Florida Administrative Code, to codify its policy relative to lake drawdowns. As amended, the rule reads as follows: Unless expressly exempt by law or District rule, a water use permit must be obtained from the District prior to any use or withdrawal of water. The drawdown of lakes for environmental, recreational, or flood control purposes is not regulated by Chapter 40E-2 or 40E-20, F.A.C. (Underscored language represents amended language). Petitioner has challenged only the amendment, and not the existing rule. The effect of the rule is obvious - a lake drawdown for one of the three stated purposes in the rule will not require a permit, while all other lake drawdowns will. As specific authority for the proposed amendment, the District cites Sections 373.044 and 373.113, Florida Statutes. The former statute authorizes the District to "adopt rules pursuant to [Chapter 120] to implement the provisions of this chapter," while the latter statute authorizes it to "adopt rules pursuant to [Chapter 120] to implement the provisions of law conferring powers or duties upon it." The District has cited Sections 373.103(1), 373.219, and 373.244, Florida Statutes, as the specific laws being implemented. The first statute provides that if specifically authorized by DEP, the District has the authority to "administer and enforce all provisions of this chapter, including the permit systems established in parts II, III, and IV of [Chapter 373], consistent with the water implementation rule"; the second statute provides in relevant part that the District may "require such permits for consumptive use of water and may impose such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure that such use is consistent with the overall objectives of the district or department and is not harmful to the water resources of the area"; and the third statute provides for the issuance of temporary permits while a permit application is pending. In regulating the uses of water within its boundaries, the District administers a comprehensive consumptive water use permit program under Part II, Chapter 373, Florida Statutes. Both parties agree that under Section 373.219(1), Florida Statutes (2000), all "consumptive uses" of water require a permit, except for the "domestic consumption of water by individual users," which use is specifically exempted by the same statute. The global requirement for permits is also found in Rule 40E-2.041 (the rule being amended), as well as Rule 40E- 1.602(1), which provides in relevant part that unless expressly exempted by statute or rule, "[a] water use individual or general permit pursuant to Chapters 40E-2 or 40E-20, F.A.C., must be obtained prior to use or withdrawal of water " The term "consumptive uses" is not defined by statute, but the District has promulgated a rule defining that term. By Rule 40E-2.091, Florida Administrative Code, the District has adopted by reference a document known as the "Basis for Review for Water Use Permit Applications with the South Florida Water Management District." Section 1.8 of that document contains definitions of various terms used in the permitting program, including "consumptive use," which is defined as "[a]ny use of water which reduces the supply from which it is withdrawn or diverted." The District's policy for lake drawdowns, as proposed in the rule amendment, is inconsistent with this definition. On this disputed issue, Petitioner's evidence is accepted as being the most persuasive, and it is found that a lake drawdown for any purpose is a consumptive use of water. Section 373.219(1), cited as a specific law being implemented, provides that the District "may require such permits for consumptive use of water and may impose such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure such use is consistent with the overall objectives of the district and department and is not harmful to the water resources of the area." The District construes this language as authorizing it to decide which uses of water are a "consumptive use," and which are not, and to implement a rule which codifies those decisions relative to lake drawdowns. Not surprisingly, Petitioner views the statute in a different manner and argues that the statute simply allows the District to create a permit program that is consistent with Chapter 373; that under the law a permit is required for all consumptive uses, including lake drawdowns; and that the District has no authority to carve out an exception for a lake drawdown from the permitting process, no matter what the purpose. As noted above, the District has identified three instances (for environmental, recreational, and flood control purposes) when a lake drawdown does not require a consumptive use permit. These terms are not so vague that a person of common intelligence would have difficulty understanding them. However, the proposed rule contains no prescribed standards to guide the District in its administration of the rule.
The Issue This proceeding concerns an Intent to Issue a dredge and fill permit given by the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") to Respondent, Edmund Burke ("Burke"), for construction of a retaining wall and wooden pile-supported bridge crossing a portion of the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The ultimate issues for determination are whether Petitioner has standing to challenge the proposed DER action, and if so, whether the proposed agency action complies with the requirements of Sections 403.91 through 403.938, Florida Statutes, and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edmund Burke, on January 15, 1988, filed with the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") application number 431441608 for a permit to construct a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge approximately 80 feet long and 10 feet wide connecting the mainland with an island in the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The bridge was to span a 50 foot canal or creek ("channel") in the River. One of two retaining walls was to be located on the mainland peninsula. The other retaining wall was to be located on the island (the "initial project"). Between January 15, 1988, and April 28, 1989, the initial project was modified by Respondent, Burke, to satisfy DER concerns over potential impacts, including secondary impacts, relevant to the application. The width of the bridge was reduced from 10 feet to 6 feet. The retaining wall initially planned at the point where the bridge intersects the island was eliminated. The retaining wall on the mainland side of the bridge was relocated above mean high water. Sixty feet of the proposed bridge runs from mean high water to mean high water. An additional 10 feet on each end of the bridge is located above mean high water. The project remained a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge (the "modified project"). The Intent to Issue, dated April 28, 1989, indicated that the modifications required by DER had been made, that the modifications satisfied DER concerns relevant to the initial project, and that DER intended to issue a permit for construction of the modified project. The elimination of the retaining wall obviated any necessity for backfill on the island. The reduction in the width of the bridge virtually eliminated the secondary impacts on the surrounding habitat, resulted in less shading of the water, and precluded vehicular traffic over the bridge. The final modification that was "necessary in order for [DER] to approve this application" was the reduction in the width of the bridge from 10 feet to 6 feet. Petitioner's Exhibit 17. DER's requirement for this final modification was communicated to Mr. Cangianelli in a telephone conversation on April 6, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 18), and memorialized in a letter to Respondent, Burke, on April 14, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 17). The final modification was made, and the Intent to Issue was written on April 28, 1989. Petitioner's Case. Property commonly known as Harbor Estates is adjacent to the site of the modified project. A constructed harbor and contiguous park are located within the boundaries of Harbor Estates. Both are used by residents of Harbor Estates and both are proximate to the site of the modified project. The harbor entrance and site of the modified project are located on opposite sides of a peninsula approximately 40 feet wide and approximately 125 feet long. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that can navigate under the modified project need only travel the length of the peninsula, a distance of approximately 125 feet through the channel, in order to reach the harbor entrance. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that cannot navigate under the proposed bridge must travel around the island, a distance of approximately 1800 feet in the main body of the St. Lucie River, in order to reach the harbor entrance. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that prior to the construction of the bridge the channel was navigable by boats not capable of passing under the bridge after the bridge was completed. Petitioner, Harbor Estates Associates, Inc., submitted no evidence to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of modifications required by DER. Of Petitioner's 26 exhibits, Exhibits 1-19, 24 and 25 were relevant to the initial project but were not material to claims in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of the modifications required by DER. Petitioner's Exhibit 20 was cumulative of DER's Exhibit 6B. Petitioner's Exhibits 22 and 26, respectively, concern a 1980 bridge permit and a Proposed Comprehensive Growth Management Plan for Martin County, Florida. Petitioner offered no expert testimony in support of the pleadings in the Petition including assertions that: the modified project will have a direct adverse impact upon water quality and the welfare or property of others; the channel is navigable by deep-draft motor vessels; the modified project will result in shoaling that will have to be corrected at the expense of Harbor Estates; the modified project will result in prohibited destruction of mangroves; or that the modified project will cause any of the other specific adverse effects described in the Petition. The testimony of fact witnesses called by Petitioner was not material to Petitioner's claims that modifications required by DER were inadequate. The testimony of Bob Nicholas was relevant to allegations of prior violations but was not dispositive of any issue concerning the adequacy of modifications required by DER. The testimony of William Burr was admitted as rebuttal testimony relevant to precedents in the general area of the modified project but failed to address the adequacy of modifications required by DER. Petitioner consistently demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the applicable law, the proper scope of the formal hearing, and the distinction between argument and evidence. Petitioner repeatedly attempted to establish violations of laws not relevant to the proceeding including local laws and other environmental laws. Petitioner attempted to establish issues by arguing with witnesses during direct and cross examination, and by repeatedly making unsworn ore tenus representations of fact. There was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact in this proceeding because Petitioner failed to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings. Petitioner presented no evidence refuting Respondent, Burke's, showing that the modifications required by DER were adequate to assure water quality and the public health, safety, or welfare, or the property of others. Evidence presented by Petitioner was not material to the issue of whether the modifications required by DER were adequate for the purposes of the law applicable to this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose, primarily to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or approval of the proposed activity. Respondents' Case. The island to be accessed by the modified project is approximately 2.5 acres in area and contains mostly wetland. The island is approximately 900 feet long. The portion of the island that is beyond DER permit jurisdiction is less than 200 feet long and less than 50 feet wide. The site of the modified project is located in Class III waters. Respondent, Burke, provided adequate assurances that portions of the modified project not extending over open water will be constructed upon property owned by him. The single retaining wall to be constructed at the southeastern terminus of the modified project will be constructed landward of DER jurisdiction. The modified project permits neither the installation of water or electrical conduits to the island nor any excavation, filling, or construction on the island. Respondent, Burke, must provide notification to DER before any such activity is begun. The bridge will accommodate no vehicular traffic larger or heavier than a golf cart. Golf cart access is necessary in order to accommodate a physical disability of Respondent, Burke. The modified project employs adequate methods to control turbidity, limit mangrove alteration on the island, and limit potential collisions with manatees. Vegetation, including mangroves, will not be removed. Incidental, selective trimming of vegetation will be allowed to create access to the island. The single retaining wall to be constructed on the mainland will be located landward of mangroves. Turbidity curtains will be used during construction to minimize short term water quality impacts. The modified project requires turbidity screens to be installed if there is any indication of sedimentation. No mechanical equipment will be located on the island during construction. No boats will be moored at the site of the modified project. The modified project will cause no significant downstream shoaling or silting. The site of the modified project is located approximately 15 feet from an existing fishing platform. No significant shoaling has been associated with that platform. The impacts associated with the modified project are similar to the impacts associated with single family docks in the area. No significant shoaling has been associated with such docks. The modified project is not a navigational hazard. The elevation is sufficient to accommodate small boats, canoes, and row boats. Reflective devices are required to alert night boat traffic of its presence. There is adequate clearance under the bridge to prevent obstruction. DER reviewed all applicable rules and criteria in considering the modified project. The modified project will have no adverse effect upon public health, safety or welfare, or the property of others. The modified project will not adversely impact the conservation of fish, wildlife, or their habitats. The modified project will not adversely affect navigation, the flow of water, or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The modified project will not adversely impact fishing value or marine productivity in the area. The modified project will have no adverse impact upon recreational values in the vicinity. The modified project was reviewed in a manner that is customary for similar projects reviewed by DER. It is common practice for DER employees, as they did in this case, to rely upon opinions of other DER professionals in formulating an intent to issue. Other projects within DER jurisdiction in the general geographic area of the modified project and within the same region were considered in DER's review process. Other docks and marinas have been constructed and are proposed for construction within the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. Bridges including pedestrian bridges have been and are proposed to be constructed in Martin County. DER did not require a hydrographic study because the modified project was considered a minor project. DER review took into account the intended future use of the island property and DER's past experience with Respondent, Burke. As part of its review, DER reviewed a conceptual bridge to a single family residence on the island which would not require any fill or construction of retaining walls. In addition, DER considered previous violations on the island under Florida Administrative Code Rules 17-4.070, 17-4.160, and 17-4.530 in connection with an earlier permit that expired before the initial project was begun. Respondent, Burke, provided reasonable assurances that he is the owner of the site of the proposed project. Respondent, Burke, signed DER's property ownership affidavit and submitted a survey. DER's Intent to Issue does not authorize any construction in any area within the jurisdiction of DER other than the modified project. The Intent to Issue constitutes compliance with state water quality standards. DER has not received any requests for a jurisdictional determination in the general geographic area of the modified project. No enforcement action has been initiated by DER or at the request of a third party against Respondent, Burke, for alleged violations of DER rules.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order on the merits issuing the requested permit and awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs in accordance with this Recommended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of April, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Although most of Petitioner's proposed findings were cast in the form of "fact", they were in substance argument and rejected accordingly. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in part in Finding 1 Findings as to ownership are rejected as beyond the jurisdiction of the undersigned. Finding as to the late filed exhibit is rejected as irrelevant. 2-4, 10-12, Rejected as either irrelevant 16, or not supported by the record. 5 and 6, 37, 40 Rejected as unsupported by 42 the record. 7, 8, 15 Rejected as irrelevant 17, 21-29 and immaterial 9, 13, 14, 18-20 Rejected as immaterial 30-33, 35 and 36 37(a), 38, 39, 41, 48 20(A) Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial except the last sentence is included in Finding 13 34 Included in Finding 12 Rejected as not supported by the record, hypothetical and immaterial. Rejected as not established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent, Burke, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Respondent. Burke's, Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 15 and 16 Included in Finding 1 17, 26, 27 Included in Finding 2 18, 48 Included in Findings 15 and 16 19, 30, 31, 42 Included in Finding 13 20, 21, 44 Included in Findings 4 and 14 22, 23, 25, 32 Included in Finding 17 24 Included in Finding 16 25, 36-38 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 18 Included in Finding 3 Included in Finding 10 Included in Finding 19 35, 39, 43 Included in Finding 20 40, 41 Included in Finding 11 45-47 and 49 Included in Finding 16 51 and 52 Included in Findings 6-8 54 Included in Finding 5 and 8 50 and 53 Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial Respondent, DER, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 and 2 Included in Findings 1 and 2 3 Included in Finding 10 4 and 5 Included in Finding 16 6, 9 Included in Finding 2 7 and 8 Included in Findings 9 and 11 10 Included in Finding 13 11 Included in Finding 15 Included in Finding 17 and 14 Included in Finding 16 COPIES FURNISHED: Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia E. Comer Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia V. Bartell Qualified Representative 615 S.W. St. Lucie Street Stuart, FL 34997 J. A. Jurgens Jones, Foster, Johnson & Stubbs, P.A. 505 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, FL 33402
The Issue The issue to be determined by this Order is whether the Petition for Formal Proceedings filed with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) on February 4, 2009, was timely 1/ and, if so, whether Petitioners have standing to challenge the DEP?s issuance of the Minor Modification to FDEP Operation Permit 171331-002-UO for IW-1 under 171331-003-UC (the Permit Modification).
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Conservation Alliance is a Florida not-for-profit corporation in good-standing, with its corporate offices currently located at 5608 Eagle Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida. The Conservation Alliance has approximately 200 members. Elaine Romano is a resident of St. Lucie County, Florida. The DEP is an agency of the State of Florida having jurisdiction for permitting UIC facilities and the waste-streams being discharged to such facilities, pursuant to chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. Pursuant to that authority, the DEP issued the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding. FPUA provides utility service to the City of Fort Pierce, Florida. FPUA owns and operates a Class I industrial injection well (IW-1), discharges to which are the subject of the Permit Modification. Allied owns and operates a chlorine bleach manufacturing facility which produces a brine waste-stream that is proposed for disposal to IW-1. Issuance of the Permit Modification On December 19, 2008, the DEP issued a Notice of Permit, Permit Number 171331-002-UO (FPUA operation permit), which authorized the operation of IW-1 at the Gahn wastewater treatment plant. The Gahn wastewater treatment plant and IW-1 are owned and operated by the FPUA. The FPUA operation permit authorized the disposal of concentrate and water treatment by- product from FPUA?s reverse-osmosis water facility at a permitted rate of 2.8 million gallons per day. FPUA also owns and operates water production wells that serve the City of Fort Pierce potable water supply system. IW-1 was constructed within 500 feet of three of the FPUA production wells, which required FPUA to obtain a variance from setback requirements. On July 17, 2008, prior to the issuance of the FPUA operation permit, Allied submitted an application for a major modification of the FPUA operation permit. The application proposed the disposal to IW-1 of up to 21,600 gallons per day of a brine waste-stream that is a by-product of the production of chlorine bleach. The application cover letter provides that “[w]hile we have been notified that this project is only a Minor Permit Modification, we feel by submitting for a Major Permit Modification that the Department will have the ability to review the application and downgrade the application to a Minor Permit Modification, if needed.” On December 30, 2008, the DEP issued the Permit Modification as a minor modification of the FPUA operation permit. The Permit Modification allowed a maximum of 21,600 gallons of brine to be received at the FPUA facility and disposed of in IW-1. Notice of the Permit Modification On or about September 12, 2008, a paralegal for Ruden McClosky, Lucinda Sparkman, requested information from the DEP regarding the procedure for receiving notification of permit applications and DEP action thereon. Her request was subsequently refined to request notice regarding two permits, those being “injection Well Construction, application #171331- 003,” and the other being “Water-Industrial Wastewater, application #FLA017460-004.” DEP File No. 171331-003 is that pertaining to the Permit Modification. At the time of the request, Ruden McClosky represented Odyssey Manufacturing Company (Odyssey), an economic competitor of Allied.3/ On September 24, 2008, Ms. Sparkman asked to be “put on the distribution list for the URIC permit for Fort Pierce.” From September 24, 2008 through December 15, 2008, Ms. Sparkman made periodic requests for information, and received periodic updates from the DEP. On December 19, 2008, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an e- mail indicating that the FPUA operation permit had been issued, and later that same day sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the permit. On December 19, 2008, Ruden McClosky made a public records request to FPUA for, among other items, records pertaining to the disposal of brine to the Gahn Water Plant underground injection well, and any agreements between FPUA and Allied regarding the disposal of brine. The request was made on behalf of Florida Tire Recycling, Inc. (Florida Tire). On December 22, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman a copy of the notice of intent for the FPUA operation permit. There is no record evidence of further communication or inquiry between Ruden McClosky and the DEP from December 22, 2008 to January 14, 2009. On January 9, 2009, notice of the Permit Modification was published in the Fort Pierce Tribune. The notice was prepared and publication arranged by counsel for Allied. The published notice provides the information required by rule 62-110.106(7)(d), and stated that any challenge to the Permit Modification was required to be received by DEP within 14 days of publication or, for persons that requested actual notice, within 14 days of receipt of such actual notice. On January 14, 2009, Ms. Sparkman called her contact person at the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. That call was not returned. On January 21, 2009, Ms. Sparkman again called the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. In response to Ms. Sparkman?s inquiry, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the Permit Modification. Ms. Sparkman made further inquiry on January 21, 2009, as to whether the notice of the Permit Modification had been published in a newspaper. On January 22, 2009, the DEP replied that “[e]verything was noticed as required.” On January 22, 2009, the Fort Pierce Tribune prepared an affidavit of publication of the notice. The affidavit of publication was received by counsel for Allied on January 28, 2009, who sent the affidavit to the DEP by certified mail on January 29, 2009. Alleged Defects in the Notice of Permit Modification Petitioners have alleged a number of procedural defects that they contend render the published notice ineffective to establish a deadline of 14 days from the date of the notice to file a challenge to the Permit Modification. Late Proof of Publication Petitioners allege that Allied filed the proof of publication with the DEP more than seven days from the date of publication, and that delay made such publication ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Although the proof of publication was provided to the DEP on or shortly after January 29, 2009, the evidence demonstrates that Allied provided the proof of publication to the DEP immediately upon receipt from the Fort Pierce Tribune newspaper. The delay in filing was not within the control of Allied, or anyone else associated with the Permit Modification. As established by rule 62-110.106(9), proof of publication is required by the DEP to provide assurance to the DEP that required notice has, in fact, been published, with the sanction being the delay or denial of the permit. The rule does not suggest that a delay in providing proof of publication to the DEP serves to alter or extend the time for filing a petition. There is little case law construing the effect of a delay in providing proof of publication on the petition rights of a person challenging the proposed agency action. However, the undersigned agrees with, and adopts, the following analysis of the issue provided by Administrative Law Judge P. Michael Ruff: . . . the purpose of requiring an applicant to publish notice of agency action is to give substantially affected persons an opportunity to participate in an administrative proceeding. See Section 403.815, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17- 103.150(4), Florida Administrative Code. Consequently, the crucial element in the Department's publication requirement is that the notice be published to trigger the commencement of the time for affected persons to request a hearing. The requirement that proof of publication be provided to the Department does nothing to affect the rights of third parties, but merely is a technical requirement which allows the Department to determine whether a third party has timely exercised its rights to contest a published notice of intended agency action. If an applicant publishes notice of intended agency action, but fails to timely provide the Department with proof of that publication, the deficiency is one which is easily cured. No harm will occur because the permit will not be issued until proof of publication is received by the Department, in any event, because of Rule 17-103.510(4), Florida Administrative Code. Bio-Tech Tracking Systems, Inc. v. Dep?t of Envtl. Reg., Case No. 90-7760, ¶32 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 3, 1991; Fla. DER May 17, 1991). The filing of the notice beyond the seven-day period in rule 62-110.106(5) was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Notice Prepared by Counsel Petitioners allege that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel, rather than the DEP, and that the notice was therefore ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Publication of the notice of the Permit Modification was not required, since it was a minor modification. Thus, publication was at Allied?s option. Rule 62-110.106(10)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: Any applicant or person benefiting from the Department?s action may elect to publish notice of the Department?s intended or proposed action . . . in the manner provided by subsection (7) or (8) above. Upon presentation of proof of publication to the Department before final agency action, any person who has elected to publish such notice shall be entitled to the same benefits under this rule as a person who is required to publish notice. The most logical construction of rule 62-110.106 is that the DEP is responsible for preparing required notices pursuant to rule 62-110.106(7)(c), but that non-required notices may be prepared and published at the applicant?s or beneficiary?s option without direct DEP involvement. In this case, the notice was prepared by an authorized agent of the corporate “person” that benefitted from the Permit Modification. The more salient point regarding the preparation of the notice is whether it contained all of the information required by rule. The evidence demonstrates that it did, and that the notice was sufficient to provide a meaningful and complete point of entry to the public of the Permit Modification and the rights attendant thereto. The fact that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Actual Notice Petitioners allege error in the notice process because actual notice of the Permit Modification was not provided to Petitioners. The basis for the alleged deficiency was that Mr. Stinnette had, in 2003, asked to be placed on the DEP?s UIC mailing list, but did not receive the notice of the Permit Modification. Rule 62-110.106(2) provides that published notice establishes the point of entry for the public to challenge proposed agency action “except for persons entitled to written notice personally or by mail under Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes, or any other statute.” Section 120.60(3) provides that a notice of proposed agency action shall be mailed “to each person who has made a written request for notice of agency action.” The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Stinnette was acting solely as an agent of Indian Riverkeeper when he requested to be placed on the UIC mailing list. He was not requesting notices in his personal capacity, or as an agent of the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano. Thus, Indian Riverkeeper was entitled to notice of the Permit Modification. Indian Riverkeeper is not a party to this proceeding. The undersigned is not willing to attribute a request for actual notice to any person other than the person requesting such notice. The DEP?s failure to provide written notice of the Permit Modification to Indian Riverkeeper did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Information Pursuant to Rule 62-528.315(7) Finally, Petitioners argue that the published notice was ineffective because it did not include the name, address, and telephone number of a DEP contact person, citing rule 62- 528.315(7)(d). The provision cited by Petitioners involves DEP notices that are required when the DEP has prepared a draft permit, draft consent order, or has scheduled a public meeting as identified in rule 62-528.315(1). The notice requirement in rule 62-528.315(7) does not apply to a notice of proposed agency action, which is governed by rule 62-528.315(10), and which provides that: “[a]fter the conclusion of the public comment period described in Rule 62-528.321, F.A.C., and after the conclusion of a public meeting (if any) described in Rule 62- 528.325, F.A.C., the applicant shall publish public notice of the proposed agency action including the availability of an administrative hearing under Sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S. This public notice shall follow the procedure described in subsection 62-110.106(7), F.A.C. (emphasis added). The published notice of the Permit Modification was consistent with the notice described in rule 62-110.106(7), and therefore complied with rule 62-528.315(10). For the reasons set forth herein, there were no defects in the published notice of proposed agency action that serve to minimize the effect of that published notice on the time for filing a petition challenging the Permit Modification, that adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, or that affect the fairness of this proceeding. Representation of Petitioners by Ruden McClosky Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding FPUA. Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding Allied. The parties stipulated that an attorney-client relationship was formed between the Petitioners and Ruden McClosky on or after January 1, 2009. No further specificity was stipulated. On February 3, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to the Conservation Alliance regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. The engagement was accepted by Mr. Stinnette on behalf of the Conservation Alliance on February 4, 2009. The Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named the Conservation Alliance as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 4, 2009. On February 10, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to Ms. Romano regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. There is no evidence that the engagement was accepted by Ms. Romano. Ms. Romano testified that she has never spoken or corresponded with anyone from Ruden McClosky, and had no knowledge that she was being represented by Ruden McClosky. Ms. Romano had no input in drafting any of the petitions filed on her behalf, and had no recollection of having ever read the petitions. The Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named Ms. Romano as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 12, 2009. Both of the Ruden McClosky engagement letters reference an “Other Client” that had an interest in challenging the Permit Modification, which “Other Client” would be responsible for paying all fees and costs, and would be involved in the approval of all work performed by Ruden McClosky. The parties stipulated that the “Other Client” was Odyssey. The date of an engagement letter is not dispositive as to the date on which an attorney-client relationship is established. It is, however, evidence that can be assessed with other evidence to draw a conclusion as to the date that the relationship commenced. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that requests for notice made prior to January 21, 2009, regarding the FPUA operation permit and the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding were made on behalf of Odyssey or Florida Tire, existing clients of Ruden McClosky. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of the Conservation Alliance with regard to the instant case no earlier than January 21, 2009, the date on which Ruden McClosky received notice that the Permit Modification had been issued. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of Ms. Romano with regard to the instant case after January 21, 2009, if at all. Filing of the Petitions The 14th day after publication of the notice of the Permit Modification fell on January 23, 2009. On February 4, 2009, the initial Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed challenging the DEP issuance of the Permit Modification. The Petition named the Conservation Alliance as a party. On February 12, 2009, an Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed that, among other things, added Ms. Romano as a party. Allegations of Standing - Conservation Alliance The Conservation Alliance is a non-profit, Florida corporation incorporated in 1985. It has at least 100 members that reside in St. Lucie County. It was formed for the general purpose of protecting the “water, soil, air, native flora and fauna,” and thus the environment of St. Lucie County. In the Petition for Formal Proceedings, as it has been amended, the Conservation Alliance made specific allegations as to how the issuance of the Permit Modification may affect its substantial interests. Those allegations are related, first, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the FPUA public water supply that serves members of the Conservation Alliance and, second, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the ability of the members to recreate and enjoy the waters of St. Lucie County. FPUA Water Service In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “[m]embers of the Alliance own real property or otherwise reside within the service area of FPUA, and are, in fact, serviced by FPUA.” As a result, the members “will be adversely affected by the injection of the Allied waste stream into IW-1, which is located within 500 feet of three potable water supply sources, from which . . . Romano and the Alliance?s members are provided with potable water,” resulting in “a potential for those contaminants and hazardous materials to get into Petitioners? source of potable water.” Mr. Brady, the Conservation Alliance?s president, does not receive water service from the FPUA. Mr. Brady did not know how many members of the Conservation Alliance received water service from the FPUA. Persons living in unincorporated areas of Fort Pierce do not receive potable water from the FPUA. A mailing address of “Fort Pierce” does not mean that the person lives in the incorporated City of Fort Pierce. Mr. Brady “assumed” many of the members lived in the City of Fort Pierce, but offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support that assumption. Mr. Stinnette testified that he was “confident that we have members that receive water from [FPUA]” but was not able to quantify the number of said members. As with Mr. Brady, Mr. Stinnette offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support his belief. Recreational and Environmental Interests In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “. . . Romano and the Alliance?s members utilize and protect the waters of St. Lucie County. Petitioners? recreational and environmental interests will be adversely affected if the Allied waste stream leaves the injection well area and flows into the rivers, streams, and or ocean.” Mr. Brady understood that one member of the Conservation Alliance, George Jones, fished in the C-24 canal, although Mr. Brady had not personally fished there for 25 years. Mr. Brady otherwise provided no evidence of the extent to which members used or enjoyed the waters in or around St. Lucie County. Mr. Stinnette has recreated in various water bodies that are tributaries of the Indian River Lagoon system. He indicated that he had engaged in recreational activities in and on the waters of St. Lucie County with “dozens” of people over the past 16 years, some of whom were members of the Conservation Alliance. There was no evidence offered as to how many of those persons were members of the Conservation Alliance, as opposed to members of other organizations or of no organization at all, or whether they were current members during the period relevant to this proceeding. Mr. Stinnette testified that the previously mentioned Mr. Jones said that he kayaked in the waters of St. Lucie County but, as to the recreational activities of other members, testified that “I don't know, I don't keep up with their day-to-day activities to that extent.” Although Mr. Jones testified at the hearing, he provided no information as to the nature or extent of his recreational uses of the waters of St. Lucie County. The only evidence of Mr. Jones? use of the waters of St. Lucie County is hearsay. Thus, the only finding that can be made as to the recreational use of the waters of St. Lucie County by current members of the Conservation Alliance is limited to the recreational use by a single member, Mr. Stinnette. Petitioner, Elaine Romano Ms. Romano is a member of the Conservation Alliance. The allegations regarding Ms. Romano?s substantial interests in this proceeding were the same as those of the Conservation Alliance as set forth above. FPUA Water Service Ms. Romano has her primary residence at 3436 Roselawn Boulevard, Fort Pierce, Florida. Her residence is not served by FPUA. Ms. Romano is the executor of the estate of her mother, Marion Scherer. The estate owns a residence at 1903 Royal Palm Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida that is currently vacant. That residence is served by FPUA. The estate is not a party to this proceeding. Recreational and Environmental Interests Ms. Romano attends certain meetings and functions of the Conservation Alliance, but offered no testimony of her use or enjoyment of any natural resources that could be affected by the Permit Modification. In that regard, her interest in this case was precipitated by a desire to support her mother?s interest in ecology.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Proceeding as amended. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Application for consumptive use permit No. 75-00225 is a request for an existing use to be withdrawn from the Floridan Aquifer from two different wells. These two wells are located in the Hillsborough Basin and in Polk County. The property contiguous to the wells encompasses approximately 80.9 acres. The water is to be used for citrus processing and disposed of off site. The permit seeks, for average daily withdrawal, 2.98 million gallons per day for one well and 1.566 million gallons per day for the other well for a total average daily withdrawal of 3.864 million gallons per day. For maximum daily withdrawal the permit seeks 4.096 million gallons per day for one well and 2.792 million gallons per day for the other well for a total maximum daily withdrawal of 6.888 million gallons per day. The amount of water sought to be consumptively used by this application greatly exceeds the water crop of the subject lands owned by applicant. Mr. John C. Jennings and Mr. William Sunderland, owners of property adjacent to the Kraft property, appeared in their own behalf and stated that they felt that their wells were being hurt because of the large quantities of water pumped by Kraft. They did not attempt to offer expert testimony nor did they claim to be hydrologists. They did note that each had substantial problems with their wells running out of water.
Recommendation It does not appear that the district has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the objections and comments of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland with regard to the effect of the applied for consumptive use on their property. These objections were apparently raised for the first time at the hearing. As noted in paragraph 6, if the wells of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland are substantially affected in an adverse manner by applicant's use of such large quantities of water, such a use would not seem to be a reasonable, beneficial use as is required for permit unless further conditions were placed upon the permit. Therefore, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District staff further investigate the effect of the applied for consumptive use on the wells located on the property of John C. Jennings and William Sunderland prior to the Board taking formal action on this application. ENTERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Staff Attorney Southwest Florida Water Management District P. 0. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Douglas T. Moring, Esquire Kraftco Corporation Kraftco Court Glenview, Illinois 60025
The Issue This is an appeal from Resolution No. P60-99 of the Monroe County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission"), in which the Planning Commission approved the decision of the Monroe County Planning Department ("Planning Department") denying two applications for building permits submitted by the Appellants, Robert and Ruth Stoky ("the Stokys"). One application requested a building permit to reconstruct a screened porch and to build an elevated deck in the rear of the Señor Frijoles/Cactus Jack's restaurants, which are located at 103900 Overseas Highway, Key Largo, Florida; this application was assigned building permit number 99-3-857 ("permit number 99-3-857"). The second application requested a building permit to reconstruct a trellis as a separate structure associated with the Sundowner restaurant, also located at 103900 Overseas Highway, Key Largo, Florida; this application was assigned building permit number 99-3-858 ("permit number 99-3-858"). The instant appeal was forwarded by the Planning Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Article XIV, Monroe County Code, the Hearing Officer Appellate Article, and Monroe County ("the County") has appeared as Appellee in this case. In their Initial Brief, the Stokys abandoned their appeal of the decision of the Planning Commission approving the Planning Department's denial of their application for permit number 99-3-858; therefore, the ultimate issue presented in this appeal is whether the Planning Commission's Resolution No. P60-99 should be affirmed, reversed, or modified with respect to the its decision approving the Planning Department's denial of the Stokys' application for permit number 99-3-857.
Findings Of Fact Application No. 76-00493 is for an existing consumptive use permit for five wells located in the Peace River Basin, Polk County on 608.6 acres. The permit seeks a total average annual withdrawal of 7.2 million gallons per day and a maximum daily withdrawal of 14.97 million gallons per day. Ninety-five percent of the water withdrawal will be used for industrial purposes and five percent will be used for irrigation. The Southwest Florida Water Management District's staff recommends issuance of the permit with the following conditions: That the applicant shall install totalizing flow meters of the propeller-driven type on all withdrawal points covered by the application except that well located at Latitude 28 degrees 03' 13", Longitude 81 degrees 47' 54". That the applicant shall record the pumpage from the above meters on a weekly basis and submit a record of that pumpage quarterly to the district beginning January 15, 1977. That the permit shall expire on December 31, 1980
Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that a consumptive use permit be granted in the amounts applied for in Application No. 76-00493 subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 2 above. ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Coca Cola Company Post Office Box 247 Auburndale, Florida 33823
