The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate should be granted.
Findings Of Fact On his application for licensure as a real estate sales associate Petitioner answered in the affirmative to question numbered 1 requesting background information. Question numbered 1 reads, in part, as follows: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to, even if you received a withhold of adjudication? On January 30, 2000, Petitioner, who had just turned 19 years of age, was arrested for grand theft, loitering and prowling, resisting arrest without violence, and burglary of an unoccupied structure. The affidavit forming the basis for the charges indicates that a police officer saw Petitioner standing next to a truck, that a window in the truck had been broken and the truck had been burglarized, that several items of property that had been removed from the truck were on the ground next to the truck and Petitioner, that Petitioner ran away from the police officer, and that he was apprehended after a pursuit on foot. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty, and adjudication was withheld. He was sentenced to one year of community control, which was followed by two years of probation, 80 hours of community service, and restitution in the amount of $200 for the truck window he broke. On March 14, 2000, Petitioner was arrested and charged with criminal mischief over $1,000, a third-degree felony. He was driving his motor vehicle around on a golf course. The affidavit forming the basis of the charge states that the damage was done willfully and maliciously. Petitioner pled guilty. The record in this cause suggests that adjudication was withheld but is not clear as to the sentence that was imposed. On July 30, 2002, Petitioner violated his probation with some type of traffic offense. His probation was extended and additional community service hours were required of him. Petitioner's probation was terminated on March 13, 2003. By letter dated September 7, 2004, the Department directed Petitioner to submit three letters of recommendation and to appear at the October 20, 2004, meeting of the Florida Real Estate Commission in support of his application. Although Petitioner received that letter, he failed to submit any letters of recommendation and failed to appear at the Commission's meeting. At the time of the final hearing in this cause Petitioner was employed in pharmaceutical sales and was engaged to be married.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 419 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Watkins, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether the decision to award the bid for Parcel No. 93S101, State Road 84 Spur, was in accordance with the governing rules and statutes or was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact In October of 1993 the Respondent declared that a spur property located at State Road 84 (the subject matter of these proceedings) was a surplus parcel. Such property is comprised of two identifiable tracts identified in this record as parcel 101-A and parcel 101-B. The Respondent utilizes a manual entitled "Disposal of Surplus Real Property" as its guide for the procedures used to comply with statutory and rule provisions regarding the disposal of surplus parcels. Since 1993 the Department has made several attempts to market the spur property. Such attempts included offering parcel 101-A to the Petitioner for no consideration. As recently as October of 2000 the Department offered the spur property to the Petitioner at no cost. The offer did include some conditions but same did not materially affect whether or not Davie would or could accept the transfer. For whatever reasons, the Petitioner did not accept the offer. Subsequently, the Respondent withdrew the offer in writing. Additionally, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that it intended to make the spur property (both parcels) available to the public through the competitive bid process. It was contemplated that the bid process would allow any person from the public to competitively place bids for the subject property. Nevertheless, the Petitioner was advised that it would be given an opportunity to acquire the property. A letter of February 7, 2001, from the Department to the Petitioner advised the town of its right to acquire the property but did not in any manner prohibit or prevent the Town of Davie from bidding on the spur property. In fact, the Petitioner did not bid on the subject property. Further, the Petitioner did not and does not intend to purchase the subject property. The only way the Intervenor seeks to acquire the property is without cost. The Petitioner had actual knowledge of the Department's intention of making the property available through competitive bid. The Town of Davie did nothing to oppose the bid process. On May 30, 2001, the spur properties were advertised for competitive bidding with sealed bids to be opened by the Department on June 14, 2001. On June 21, 2001, the Town of Davie by and through its town administrator contacted the Department in order to exercise the town's right of refusal on the property. Accordingly, on June 25, 2001, the Respondent posted a notice stating it would reject all bids. On July 12, 2001, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that it had ten days to exercise its right to purchase the property. In connection with the proposed sale the Department offered the property to the Town of Davie at the approved appraised value of $1.9 million. The Petitioner made no counter-offer. Instead, on July 27, 2001, the Town of Davie responded to the offer stating it would accept the parcel for a public purpose for no consideration. Thereafter, the Respondent posted a "Revised Bid Tabulation" indicating it would award the spur property to the highest responsive bidder, the Intervenor. The Petitioner has not proposed to pay for the spur property. The Petitioner did not have an appraisal of the spur property prepared. The Petitioner did not bid on the spur property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order confirming the award of the spur property to the Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael T. Burke, Esquire Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke & George, P.A. 790 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 400 Post Office Box 030220 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33303-0220 Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 350 East Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1130 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Respondent, as Mayor of the City of Oviedo, violated Sections 112.313(8) and 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, David Knickerbocker (Knickerbocker) served as the elected mayor of the City of Oviedo (City), Seminole County, Florida, from September 1991 to September 1993. The mayor of the City attends and participates in City Council (Council) meetings but does not have a vote in Council matters. Knickerbocker is and has been at all times material to this case, a state-registered real estate broker and part-owner of Oviedo Realty, doing business as Century 21 Oviedo Realty, in Oviedo Florida. The property involved in this case consists of three tracts of commercial/industrial zoned property on Evans Street within the city limits of Oviedo. The three tracts consist of two vacant parcels of property (Tracts I and III), which flank a center parcel of property (Tract II) upon which a warehouse structure has been built. In 1984 Knickerbocker was the real estate agent involved in the sale of Tract II to Rudy Vuckovic. In 1985, Mr. Vuckovic constructed a large warehouse-type building on Tract II. Knickerbocker was also the real estate agent involved when Mr. Vuckovic purchased the adjacent vacant lots, Tracts I and III, in 1984 and 1986, respectively, from Harry O. Hall for the price of $45,000 each. From October, 1991 until January, 1993, Knickerbocker's company, Century 21 Oviedo Realty, Inc., listed for sale, Tracts I, II, and III. From December 1992 until the end of May 1993, Duke Realty also listed for sale Tracts I, II, and III. As of June 7, 1993, the three parcels of property had not been sold. Mr. Vuckovic telephoned Knickerbocker the morning of June 7, 1993, to say that he needed to obtain contracts for sale of Tracts I and III that week. He agreed to pay ten percent commission to Knickerbocker if Knickerbocker sold the lots for him. Vuckovic's asking price for each lot was $35,000. At the regular public meeting of the Council on Monday evening, June 7, 1993, city manager Eugene Williford (Williford) requested and obtained the Council's authorization to explore the possibility of purchasing an 8,000 square feet building on Evans Street for use as a public works facility. The Evans Street building which the City Manager was discussing on June 7, 1993 was the large warehouse-type building that Mr. Vuckovic had constructed on Tract II. In his brief presentation, the City Manager attempted to minimize the information he divulged publicly, being careful not to compromise the City's future bargaining position. During the Council's public discussion of Tract II, there was no mention made by Williford, Knickerbocker, or anyone else of Mr. Vuckovic's two vacant lots, Tracts I and III, nor was there any indication that Williford was interested in pursuing the purchase of those two lots. Knickerbocker did not mention during the meeting that he had knowledge concerning any of the three tracts. After the June 7 Council meeting concluded, Knickerbocker, Williford, and Councilman Hampton walked out together to the parking lot behind city hall. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that the three men did discuss the purchase of Tracts I, II, and III. Williford advised Knickerbocker that if the City purchased Tracts I and III, that one of the lots could be used as a compound for confiscated vehicles and the other lot could be used for storing materials. The possible means of financing the vacant lots and the building on Tract II was also discussed. The information concerning the City's interest in purchasing Tracts I and III were divulged to Knickerbocker because of his position as mayor. The post-meeting discussion between Knickerbocker and Williford about Tracts I, II and III took place in the presence of Councilman Hampton but was not a duly noticed public hearing open to the public and recorded as a public meeting. No other persons were present. At no time during the evening of June 7, 1993, did Knickerbocker tell the city manager or any city council member that Mr. Vuckovic was desperate to quickly sell Tracts I and III. Within a few days after June 7, 1993, Knickerbocker tried unsuccessfully to find investors who would be interested in purchasing Tracts I and III. On Thursday, June 10, Knickerbocker called Williford to tell him that Orange Bank now owned Tract II and that Milton West of Orange Bank would be contacting Mr. Williford to discuss selling the building to the City. During his June 10 conversation with Williford, Knickerbocker did not tell Williford that Mr. Vuckovic owned Tracts I and III nor did Knickerbocker tell Williford that Mr. Vuckovic was in a hurry to sell those two lots. On Thursday, June 10, 1993, Knickerbocker told his mother, Dorothy Knickerbocker, that Mr. Vuckovic had two vacant lots adjacent to Tract II that he needed to sell in a hurry and that the two lots were a "very good buy." Knickerbocker further told his mother that the City was interested in purchasing the building between the two lots. No evidence was presented that Knickerbocker directly divulged to his mother that the city was interested in purchasing Tracts I and III. Shortly after his conversation with his mother on June 10, 1993, Knickerbocker called Mr. Vuckovic and negotiated a purchase price of $31,000 each for Tracts I and III. Knickerbocker had agreed with his mother that he would forego his commission on the sale of the property. Knickerbocker drafted two contracts for sale of Tracts I and III, and on Saturday, June 12, 1993, delivered those contracts to his mother for her signature and then to Mr. Vuckovic for his signature. Both signed the contracts in Knickerbocker's presence. On Monday, June 14, 1993, Knickerbocker advised Williford that his mother and brother, Tom Knickerbocker, had contracted to buy Tracts I and III. Prior to his June 14 conversation with the city manager, Knickerbocker had not told the city manager of his family's interest in purchasing Tracts I and III. The night of Monday, June 14, 1993, Knickerbocker asked Councilman Hampton, a surveyor, to survey Tracts I and III. Knickerbocker did not tell Mr. Hampton at that time that Mrs. Knickerbocker and her son, Tom, were buying the property. On Wednesday, June 16, 1993, Knickerbocker delivered the two contracts for sale to Attorney Joseph Scuro so he could take them to closing on June 30, 1993, the closing specified on the contracts. In attempting to bring the sale to closure, Attorney Scuro learned of some significant encumbrances on the property and encountered difficulty in contacting the attorneys of other parties who had interests in the property. Mr. Scuro advised Knickerbocker of the problems that he was having in closing the property sale. On July 9, 1994, Attorney Scuro left a message at Knickerbocker's office that he was withdrawing from representing Knickerbocker's mother in the purchase of Tracts I and III. On July 22, 1994, Mr. Scuro talked with Knickerbocker concerning his withdrawal of representation of Knickerbocker's mother. He advised Knickerbocker that there were problems with encumbrances on the vacant lot and that the contracts to purchase the lots in which the city was interested had become a political issue. At that time, Knickerbocker advised Mr. Scuro that Mrs. Knickerbocker had decided not to buy the two lots. On or about Thursday evening, July 22, Knickerbocker telephoned Williford at his house and told him that his mother had withdrawn her offer to purchase Tracts I and III. On Friday, July 23, 1993, Knickerbocker telephoned the Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission) office in Tallahassee and sought an opinion from the Commission's staff. He talked with Public Information Officer, Helen Jones and advised her, among other things, that he had told his mother and brother not to buy the lots because of appearances. Knickerbocker also contacted the State Attorney's Office for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit and asked a prosecutor there if it would be possible for the State Attorney to conduct an investigation of his conduct relative to Tracts I and III. On Monday, August 2, 1993, during a regularly scheduled public meeting, the Council approved the contract the city manager had negotiated for the purchase of Tract II.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that David Knickerbocker violated Sections 112.313(6) and 112.313(8), Florida Statutes; imposing a civil penalty of $2,000 per allegation ($4,000 total); and issuing a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1786EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-31 (Stipulated Findings of Fact): Accepted. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance to the extent that Knickerbocker initiated the discussion initially concerning the building, which led to a discussion of all three tracts. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The last two sentences are rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 10: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 11: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 12-17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 19-21: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 22-23: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 25: The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 4: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 5: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Accepted. Paragraphs 8-10: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 11-12: Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 15-17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 19: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 21: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 22: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is accepted in substance to the extent that these may have been things that Knickerbocker considered but rejected to the extent that it implies that he was unaware of the City's interest in purchasing the vacant lots. It is obvious the City's interest in the vacant lots would have an impact on the value of the lots. Paragraphs 23-24: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 25: Rejected to the extent that it is representative of the entire conversation between Hampton, Williford, and Knickerbocker. All three men discussed the interest in the purchase of the vacant lots by the city and the financing of such a purchase. Paragraph 26: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 27: Rejected as constituting argument and recitation of testimony. Paragraph 28: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 29: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses the first sentence is rejected. The first portion of the second sentence is accepted in substance. The second portion of the second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 30-32: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 33-34: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 35: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 36: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 37-38: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 39: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 40: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 43: Rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 44-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 47: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 48: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 49: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 50: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 51: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 52: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 53-55: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 56: Accepted in substance to the extent that one of the reasons that Mrs. Knickerbocker did not go through with the transaction was because of the encumbrances on the property, but rejected to the extent that it implies that was the only reason. Tom Knickerbocker testified that his mother told him that one of the reasons she was not going to continue with the purchase was that it did not look good with Knickerbocker running for mayor. Paragraph 57: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance as to what Knickerbocker told Scuro but not to the extent that it implies that that was the only reason she did not continue with the purchase. Paragraph 58: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 59-60: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 61: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, it is rejected. Paragraph 62: The first sentence is accepted in substance that Knickerbocker told Scuro that he was unaware of the City's interest in the vacant lots but rejected to the extent that the statement was true. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Having judged the credibility of the witness, I reject the last two sentences. Paragraph 63: The first two sentences are accepted in substance as to what Knickerbocker told Williford, but rejected to the extent that it implies that what Knickerbocker told Williford about being unaware of the City's interests in the lots was true. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 64-65: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 66: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted to the extent that Ms. Jones relayed the opinion of the attorney who had reviewed her typed notes of the conversation and that the attorney's opinion was based on those notes. It should be noted that the attorney did opine that there would probably be no problem with Section 112.313(8) as long as the information used came from public records or public meetings and that the attorney did not give an opinion concerning Section 112.313(6). Paragraph 67: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 68: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 69: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 70: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Marty E. Moore, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Michael L. Gore, Esquire 20 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Orlando, Florida 32801 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahasee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue The issues in this case are (1) whether mailing lists, when stored as digital data on magnetic tapes, constitute “tangible personal property” subject to the Florida sales and use tax, and, if so, then (2) whether a list reseller is entitled to claim the “sale for resale” exemption when it acquires a mailing list as digital data on magnetic tape but delivers the list to its customer either (a) as digital data on a different removable medium such as a diskette or (b) in alphabetic format, printed on pressure-sensitive labels, Cheshire labels, or 3 x 5 cards.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Dunhill International List Co., Inc. (“Dunhill”) is a Florida corporation having its home office and principal place of business in Boca Raton, Florida. Respondent Department of Revenue (“Department”), an agency of the State of Florida, is authorized to administer the state’s tax laws. Dunhill’s Business Dunhill is engaged in the business of furnishing mailing lists to direct-mail marketers, telemarketers, and e-mail marketers. Instead of owning an inventory of mailing lists, Dunhill obtains them, as and when needed, from list owners and suppliers. Dunhill acquires the various lists its customers request pursuant to leases that customarily authorize a particular customer of Dunhill’s to use the owner’s list for just one mailing.1 Essentially a middleman, Dunhill subleases the mailing lists, in which it has but a limited leasehold interest, to its customers.2 Dunhill does not make personal use of the mailing lists it secures for and on behalf of its clients; to Dunhill, the lists are commodities. At all times relevant to this case, Dunhill’s suppliers (the list owners) frequently delivered the mailing lists to Dunhill as digital data stored on magnetic tapes from which the data could be transferred into Dunhill’s computer.3 Once the data comprising a particular mailing list were loaded into Dunhill’s computer, Dunhill would cause the list to be printed in alphabetic format onto the medium of its customer’s choosing, e.g. pressure-sensitive labels, Cheshire labels, or 3 x 5 cards. Sometimes Dunhill delivered a mailing list to its client as digital data stored on a diskette or other removable medium besides magnetic tape. Occasionally, the magnetic tape itself was delivered to Dunhill’s customer. Dunhill’s suppliers charged Dunhill a fee for the magnetic tape, which was payable in addition to the rent for use of the mailing list stored thereon. During the relevant period of time this fee was $25. Dunhill, in turn, charged its customers an additional fee for whichever medium was used to deliver them the lists they had ordered. For Dunhill and its suppliers, however, the commercially valuable properties that drove these transactions——the goods without which none of these deals would have occurred——were the mailing lists, not the magnetic tapes. The parties have stipulated that Dunhill collected and remitted to the Department all sales taxes due and payable on the transactions between Dunhill and its customers. Dunhill did not, however, pay sales tax on any part of the cost of the mailing lists that it leased from its suppliers. Instead, Dunhill provided duly issued resale certificates to its suppliers, thereby relieving the suppliers of the obligation to collect sales taxes. The Audit and Protest Beginning in April 2001, the Department conducted a sales and use tax audit of Dunhill’s business records for the period from March 1, 1996 through February 28, 2001. Due to the voluminous nature of Dunhill’s records, the parties agreed that the Department could employ a sampling method to calculate the amount of tax owed, if any, based on a representative sample of Dunhill’s business documents. On December 5, 2001, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment in which Dunhill was informed of the Department’s conclusion that the aggregate amount of $69,481.00 was due and payable as a tax on the total consideration paid for each mailing list-containing magnetic tape that Dunhill allegedly had used and consumed in those transactions where, as often happened, Dunhill’s customer was provided a mailing list via some medium besides magnetic tape. The Department also sought to collect $24,105.56 in interest through December 5, 2001, plus interest accruing after that date at the rate of $21.10 per day, and to impose a penalty of $34,740.57. On January 31, 2002, Dunhill filed a letter with the Department protesting its liability for the proposed assessment.4 This led the Department to issue a Notice of Decision, on July 9, 2002, which sustained the assessment in full. Thereafter, Dunhill timely initiated the instant administrative proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order withdrawing the tax assessment against Dunhill. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2003.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, trick, scheme or device in a real estate transaction in violation of Section 475.25, Florida Statutes. Whether the license of Respondent should be revoked or suspended or whether the Respondent should be otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered real estate salesperson who holds license no. 0098090. He was employed as a "listing solicitor" by World Wide Property Services, Inc., a registered real estate broker (now dissolved) for about a month, from December, 1975 to January, 1976, soliciting listings for real estate in Florida. The solicitation was by telephone nationwide except Florida Seymour L. Rottman was President of World Wide Property Services, Inc. and Lee Small was Vice President of the corporation during the time Respondent was employed. The purpose of World Wide Property Services, Inc. was to secure listings of and purchasers for various Florida properties. Mr. Rottman subpoenaed witness for Petitioner at subject hearing. During Respondent's period of employment he and Mr. Small were in charge of hiring salesmen for the company and hired Respondent. Respondent was employed to obtain listings by telephone from property owners who lived out of state but owned Florida property. The procedure followed was for a salesman to call an out of state land owner picked from a list of prospects and inquire if he or she would be interested in selling their property at a higher price than it had been purchased for. This was termed a "front" call and the salesman was termed as a "fronter". If the prospect expressed interest in listing the property, his or her name was provided to World Wide Property Services, Inc. who then mailed literature to the property owner describing the efforts that would be made by that organization to sell the property. Enclosed with this material was a listing and brokerage agreement. This agreement provided that the owner of the property would pay a prescribed listing fee to World Wide Property Services, Inc. which would be credited against a 10 percent commission due that firm upon sale of the property. In return, the corporation agreed to include the property in its "listing directory" for a one year period, direct its efforts to bring about a sale of the property, advertise the property as deemed advisable in magazines or other mediums of merit, and to make an "earnest effort" to sell the property. The accompanying literature explained that the listing fee was necessary in order to defray administrative costs of estimating the value of the property, merchandising, advertising, brochuring and cateloging the information. The material also stated that advertising would be placed in various foreign countries and cities of the United States. In addition, it stated that the property would be "analyzed", comparing it to adjacent property to arrive at a price baked on recent sales of neighboring property and also review the status of development and zoning in the immediate area of the property to assist in recommending a correct selling price for approval by the owner. During the curse of the calls to prospects Respondent advised them that the property would be advertised internationally and in the United States and that bona fide efforts would be made to sell the property. She represented herself as a salesman for that organization. After the promotional literature was sent to the prospect, the salesmen including Respondent, made what was called a "drive" call to answer any questions and to urge that the property be listed. After making these calls Respondent had no further contact with the property owner. The listing fee was $325. The salesmen received approximately one-third of the fee, about $100 per listing. The salesmen, including Respondent, telephoned the prospects and then read from the script entitled "front" and "drive". The instructions from the broker was to stay within the script but Respondent was not monitored at all times. During the course of operation of less than a year World Wide Property Services, Inc. secured about 200 listings and grossed approximately $80,000 to $90,000 in the "advance fee" listings, but no sales were made. Respondent said he visited the properties World Wide Property Services, Inc. had for sale in Florida and that most of it was salable. Respondent testified that he read from the script heretofore referred to as "front" and "drive" but varied it from time to time. He was aware of articles stating foreign investors were interested in buying Florida property and thought it entirely possible. Respondent did not attempt to make sales inasmuch as it was not the job for which he was employed. Petitioner contends: that while a salesman for World Wide Property Services, Inc. Respondent solicited and obtained listings by telephone of property owners and that as an inducement to list the property, falsely represented that the property could be sold for a price far in excess of its purchase price; that a bona fide effort would be made to sell the property and that it would be listed nationally and internationally and that the company had foreign investors wanting to purchase United States property; that Respondent solicited Frank Austin, a number of times by telephone and induced him to send to World Wide Property Services, Inc. $285.00 claiming Mr. Austin's property bought for $4,700 could be sold for $14,000 `but that no offer to purchase was ever made. Respondent contends: that he never misrepresented or fraudulently represented anything to any client; induced any potential customer to get his money and that the property was mostly salable.
Recommendation Reprimand the Respondent in writing. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Clifford C. Woodard 231 Roxboro East Longwood, Florida 32750
Findings Of Fact A Quit-Claim Deed was executed the 3rd day of March, 1975, by Bayshore 21, Inc., first party to Marc Broxmeyer an undivided 70 percent interest; Gerald Schefflan and Pearl Schefflan, his wife, an undivided 20 percent interest; and Yetta Young an undivided 10 percent interest. The deed was recorded in Official Records Book of Dade County, Florida. The deed reflects that no documentary stamp taxes were affixed to the deed. At the time of the conveyance there existed upon the property three outstanding mortgages: one in the amount of One Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($1,450,000) in favor of Washington Federal Savings and Loan; one in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollars ($1,880,106) in favor of Sidney Salomon, et al.; and Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($12,500) in favor of Harold Kravitz. The total consideration for the conveyance amounted to Three Million Three Hundred Forty- Two Thousand Six Hundred Six Dollars ($3,342,606). The undisputed facts of the transaction as outlined at the hearing and agreed to by the Petitioners' attorney are as follows: Prior to August 17, 1974, all the outstanding stock of a corporation known as Tepmon of Florida, Inc., (Marvin Glick, presidents and controlling person and Eugene J. Howard, secretary) was held by Sidney Salomon, Jr., Hid Salomon, III, Elliot Stein, the Estate of Preston Estep and John Soult. On or about April 17, 1974, these people entered into an agreement for purchase and sale of corporate stock with Bayshore 21, Inc., pursuant to which Bayshore 21, Inc., agreed to purchase for Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($3,500,000) all of the outstanding capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. At the time, Tepmon of Florida, Inc., had as its only asset a certain parcel of real property known as the Golden Strand Hotel, as shown by suit, Shoprite Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Tepmon, Inc., et al. in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, Case No. 74-29983. Pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement, a closing was to be held in various stages on August 19 and 20, 1974, at which time Sidney Salomon, et al., delivered to Bayshore 21, Inc., all of the capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Bayshore 21, Inc., in turn executed and delivered at the closing a chattel mortgage in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollars ($1,880,106), the security for which there was sixty-nine (69) shares of capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., which stock represented the outstanding stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., and carried with it the ownership and control of said corporation. Also given to Sidney Salomon, et al, by Bayshore 21, Inc., at the closing was a purchase money mortgage in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollars ($1,880,106), which mortgage secured the real property known as the Golden Strand Hotel. The reason for the two separate security devices, one the chattel mortgage secured by the outstanding sixty-nine (69) shares of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., stock and the other the real property mortgage secured by the Golden Strand Hotel, was that the parties contemplated that upon Bayshore 21's acquisition of the outstanding Page 3 of 7' pages capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., Tepmon would be dissolved and completely liquidated. Mindful that such liquidation would render valueless as collateral the capital stock of Tepmon, the parties provided in a collateral security agreement, dated August 20, 1974, that the purchase money real estate mortgage would constitute the substitute collateral security for repayment of the outstanding purchase money obligation owed by Bayshore 21, Inc., to Sid Salomon, et al., effective upon the dissolution of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Subsequent to acquiring all the capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., Bayshore 21, Inc., did in fact effectuate a complete dissolution and liquidation of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Pursuant to such dissolution, the sole asset of Tepmon of Florida, Inc, the Golden Strand Hotel, should have become titled in the name of Tepmon of Florida, Inc.'s sole stockholder, Bayshore 21, Inc., in order to give effect to the validity of the purchase money mortgage. This is not what occurred however, as Sidney Salomon, et al., point out in their Cross-Claim to the aforementioned suit, the truthfulness of which assertions have been admitted by the Petitioners. The September 5, 1974 deed of conveyance of the Golden Strand Hotel from Tepmon of Florida, Inc., to Petitioners (which should have been to Bayshore 21, Inc.) contained only minimum stamps in the amount of eighty-five cents (85). As a result of the Cross-Claim in the aforementioned suit filed by Sidney Salomon, et al., against Petitioners, a stipulation and agreement was entered into resolving the matter in a manner which gave effect to the purchase money real estate mortgage given by Bayshore 21, Inc., to the Salomons. Pursuant to such stipulation, the Petitioners agreed that "the allegations made in the Cross Claim . . . are true and correct and Cross Claimants are entitled to the relief prayed for therein. Cross Defendants [Petitioners] have no defenses thereto, legal or equitable, or any kind whatsoever Pursuant to this stipulation, the Petitioners agreed to execute Quit-Claim Deeds conveying any interest they may have received in the property pursuant to the September 5, 1974 deed of conveyance from Tepmon of Florida, Inc., to Bayshore 21, Inc., the entity which was the sole stockholder of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., at the time of its dissolution and liquidation. By Quit-Claim Deeds dated January 2, 1975, Gerald and Pearl Schefflan conveyed their interest to Bayshore 21, Inc., Yetta Young conveyed her interest back to Bayshore 21, Inc., Marc Broxmeyer conveyed his interest back to Bayshore 21, Inc., and the last Board of Directors of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., comprised of Marvin Glick and Eugene Howard, also conveyed any interest that entity may have retained back to Bayshore 21, Inc. At this point Bayshore 21, Inc., finally held the title it was supposed to have acquired upon the dissolution and liquidation of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Also at this point the validity of the purchase money real estate mortgage given by Bayshore 21, Inc., to Sidney Salomon, et al., was reestablished and the parties were returned to the posture called for and required by their purchase and sale agreement dated April 17, 1974. When, on March 3, 1975, Bayshore 21, Inc., conveyed title to the Golden Strand Hotel to the Petitioners in this action, by unstamped deed, the conveyance was a voluntary conveyance. At the time of the conveyance, three outstanding mortgages encumbered the real property. Such mortgages were a One Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollar ($1,450,000) mortgage in favor of Washington Federal Savings and Loan; the One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollar ($1,880,106) purchase money mortgage in favor of Sidney Salomon, et al.; and a Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollar ($12,500) mortgage in favor of Harold Kravitz. When Petitioners took title to this real property, they took title subject to three outstanding mortgages. The Hearing Officer further in summary finds: The transactions related in the foregoing findings of fact ultimately transferred title of real property to Bayshore 21, Inc., pursuant to an agreement dated April 17, 1974. Fee simple title was then transferred from Bayshore, Inc., to Petitioners by Quit-Claim Deed dated March 3, 1975, subject to mortgage liens.
Recommendation Affirm the assessment of documentary stamp taxes made by the Respondent in this cause. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Eugene J. Howard, Esquire 2212 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137
The Issue Whether the proposed repeal of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69I-44.021 amounts to an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of sections 120.52(8)(b) and/or (e), Florida Statutes, (2015).1/
Findings Of Fact Unclaimed Property The Department is responsible for administering and enforcing chapter 717, Florida Statutes. The aforementioned chapter is entitled as the “Florida Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act,” and it requires the Department to: (a) receive unclaimed property; (b) safeguard unclaimed property; and (c) process claims for the return of unclaimed property to its rightful owner. See generally ch. 717, Fla. Stat. Chapter 717 applies to property such as traveler’s checks, money orders, gift certificates, bank deposits, and proceeds from life insurance policies that have been outstanding, unredeemed, or inactive for a certain number of years. See §§ 717.104(1) & (2), .1045, .106, & .107, Fla. Stat. In return for a fee, licensed private investigators, certified public accountants, and attorneys research the Department’s unclaimed property records in order to assist their clients with making claims on unclaimed property. See §§ 717.124, .135 & .1400, Fla. Stat. Pursuant to sections 717.124 and 717.126, Florida Statutes, the Department is authorized to require proof of entitlement, personal identification, and (if applicable) proof of the filer’s authority to act as the claimant’s agent. See § 717.124, .126, Fla. Stat. Also, “the burden shall be upon the claimant to establish entitlement to the property by a preponderance of evidence.” § 717.126(1), Fla. Stat. Section 717.138, Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to adopt rules to implement the provisions of chapter 717. The Department has utilized that authority to adopt Florida Administrative Code Rule 69I-20.0021, which sets forth the procedures for filing unclaimed property claims. Rule 69I-20.0021 has several provisions requiring claimants to demonstrate to the Department that they are entitled to the unclaimed property at issue. For instance, rule 69I-20.0021(1) provides that “[c]laims for unclaimed property in the custody of the Department shall be submitted to the Department on the form(s) prescribed and supplied by the Department, together with documentation proving entitlement to the unclaimed property.” (emphasis added). Rule 69I-20.0021(1)(b) mandates that “[a] complete paper format claim shall include the correct claim form identified in this rule, fully completed with all blanks filled in and manually signed and dated by all claimants or the Claimants’ Representative, proof of entitlement, and all supporting documentation as described and required by this rule, and Rule 69I-20.00022, F.A.C.” (emphasis added). Also, rule 69I-20.0021(2) provides that “[t]he Department will only review the merits of a claim that has been deemed complete as filed. The Department will determine whether the claimant has established ownership and entitlement to the unclaimed property.” (emphasis added). Rule 69I-20.0021 also incorporates by reference certain forms. For example, rule 69I-20.0021(4)(a) states that “[c]laims by apparent owners for unclaimed property shall be submitted on Form DFS-UP-106, entitled Claim Filed by Apparent Owner, which is hereby incorporated by reference, effective 1-3-05.” This form must be accompanied by “[p]roof demonstrating that the claimant is the owner and is entitled to the unclaimed property as required by Rule 69I-20.0022, F.A.C.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69I-20.0021(4)(c)2. (emphasis added). Also, rule 69I-20.0021(6) states that “[a]ll claims for unclaimed property filed by a Claimant’s Representative shall be submitted on Form DFS-UP-108, entitled Claim Filed by Claimant’s Representative on Behalf of the Claimant, which is hereby incorporated by reference, effective 1-3-05.” This form must be accompanied by “[p]roof demonstrating that the person(s) or entity being represented is entitled to the property being claimed consistent with Rule 69I-20.0022, F.A.C.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69I-20.0021(6)(b)4. (emphasis added). Escheated Property The Department also plays a role in administering (and returning to its rightful owner) other types of property governed by other chapters within the Florida Statutes. For instance, the Department is involved with: (a) property resulting from judgments deposited with a court pursuant to section 43.19, Florida Statutes; (b) escheated property gathered pursuant to section 732.107, Florida Statutes; (c) property held by a personal representative pursuant to section 733.816, Florida Statutes; and (d) funds held by a guardian following the death of a ward pursuant to section 744.534, Florida Statutes. When a person dies with an estate but has no known heirs, the decedent’s property escheats to the state. See § 732.107(1), Fla. Stat. That property is sold, and the proceeds (i.e., the “escheated funds”) are paid to the Department for deposit into the State School Fund pursuant to section 732.107(2), Florida Statutes. In 2009, the Department was receiving repeated inquiries from claimants regarding the proper claim forms for property governed by sections 43.19, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534, Florida Statutes. The Department responded by adopting rule 69I-44.021 which establishes a hard copy claim form specifically for the aforementioned properties. Unlike rule 69I-20.0021 which requires a claimant to demonstrate to the Department that he or she is entitled to the unclaimed property in question, rule 69I-44.021(1) requires a potential claimant to simply prove his or her entitlement to a court. That is consistent with provisions within chapter 732 that require courts (rather than the Department) to determine whether a claimant is entitled to escheated property. See §§ 732.107(3) and (4), Fla. Stat. (requiring an action to re- open the administration of probate and prove entitlement to a probate judge, while allowing the Department of Legal Affairs the right of intervention to protect the state’s interests). For those claimants who successfully demonstrate to a court that they are entitled to particular funds, rule 69I- 44.021 incorporates by reference a form (Form #198) that those claimants are to file with the Department.3/ Unlike the situation with claimants using the forms incorporated by reference in rule 69I-20.0021, claimants using the form incorporated by reference in rule 69I-44.021 are not required to prove to the Department that they are entitled to the property in question. In 2013, the Florida Legislature amended section 717.124, to provide that the claims procedure for unclaimed property also applies to property governed by sections 43.19, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534. See § 717.124(8), Fla. Stat. (providing that “[t]his section applies to all unclaimed property reported and remitted to the Chief Financial Officer, including, but not limited to, property reported pursuant to ss. 43.19, 45.032, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534.”). As a result of an internal review of its rules, the Department determined that rule 69I-44.021 should be repealed given that section 717.124(8), effectively made the procedure set forth in rule 69I-20.0021 applicable to escheated property. Choice Plus Pursues Escheated Property for its Clients Choice Plus is a private investigative agency licensed pursuant to chapter 493 that files claims with the Department as a claimant’s representative (“locator”). In exchange for its services, Choice Plus receives a fee paid from approved property claims. In addition to seeking the recovery of unclaimed property pursuant to chapter 717, Choice Plus also assists in the recovery of funds that have escheated to the State of Florida pursuant to section 732.107. Choice Plus files several hundred claims in Florida for unclaimed property each year. It files five to 10 claims in Florida each year for escheated property. The President of Choice Plus testified during the final hearing that Choice Plus had filed 19 claims for escheated property with the Department using Form #198 and attaching the pertinent documentation. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69I- 44.021(2)(a) (providing that “[t]he claim form must be accompanied by a certified copy of the final order or judgment awarding the funds to each claimant, supporting documentation establishing each claimant’s right to the funds, and a government-issued photographic identification issued to each claimant.”). According to the President of Choice Plus, the Department began to require Choice Plus to re-establish entitlement to escheated funds in 2013. In other words, the Department now allegedly conducts its own review of the evidence that a court already found to be sufficient for establishing entitlement. Choice Plus asserts that proving entitlement to escheated funds a second time causes it to spend additional time and money in making a claim. According to Choice Plus, this extra effort adds $5,000 to the cost of the average claim for escheated property. In fact, Choice Plus is currently appealing the Department’s denial of an escheated property claim. That appeal is proceeding under appellate case number 1D15-3184 before the First District Court of Appeal and involves the estate of a deceased Florida resident named Eleanor Rigley.4/ Because Ms. Rigley died intestate and without any known living heirs, the proceeds from the sale of her residence escheated to the State of Florida and were paid to the Department for deposit in the State School Fund. See § 732.107, Fla. Stat. Choice Plus learned of Ms. Rigley’s escheated property and hired a genealogist who found ten individuals related to Ms. Rigley. Choice Plus subsequently entered into contracts with each of the ten individual claimants authorizing Choice Plus to obtain the escheated funds on their behalf. In accord with section 732.107 and rule 69I-44.021, Choice Plus then petitioned the Pinellas County Circuit Court to reopen Ms. Rigley’s estate and declare that the ten Choice Plus clients were Ms. Rigley’s heirs. On June 12, 2013, the Pinellas County Circuit Court entered an Order reopening Ms. Rigley’s estate and declaring the ten Choice Plus clients to be Ms. Rigley’s heirs. The Circuit Court then directed the Department to distribute the funds from Ms. Rigley’s estate to the claimants. On July 12, 2013 and as required by rule 69I-44.021, Choice Plus filed with the Department Form #198, a certified copy of the Pinellas County Circuit Court’s Order awarding the escheated funds to the claimants, supporting documentation submitted to the Circuit Court, and a photocopy of each claimant’s government-issued photo identification. However, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to deny Choice Plus’s claim on January 23, 2014, and ultimately issued a Final Order on June 29, 2015, denying the claim. In that Final Order, the Department allegedly concluded that it has sole jurisdiction to determine the disposition of funds within its possession, including escheated funds held pursuant to section 732.107. Accordingly, the Department concluded that the Circuit Court’s ruling was not binding on it. The Department also allegedly concluded that the denial was justified because Choice Plus failed to submit “appropriate documentation” connecting the individual claimants to Ms. Rigley by a preponderance of the evidence. In the ensuing appeal, Choice Plus argued that the Department’s Final Order must be reversed because the Department does not have the authority to determine entitlement to escheated funds held by the Department pursuant to section 732.107. As for why the Department lacks the necessary authority, Choice Plus argued that section 717.124 is the only provision within chapter 717 that applies to escheated funds held by the Department. The 2013 amendment to section 717.124, which added subsection (8), merely stated that “[t]his section applies to all unclaimed property reported and remitted to the Chief Financial Officer, including, but not limited to, property reported pursuant to ss. 43.19, 45.032, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534.” (emphasis added). In contrast, the amendment did not state that “[t]his chapter applies to all unclaimed property reported and remitted to the Chief Financial Officer, including, but not limited to, property reported pursuant to ss. 43.19, 45.032, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534.” (emphasis added). Thus, Choice Plus argued that the Department cannot apply section 717.126 to escheated fund claims because the Florida Legislature only made section 717.124 applicable to such claims. As noted above, section 717.126 mandates that “the burden shall be upon the claimant to establish entitlement to the property by a preponderance of evidence.” In other words, Choice Plus argued that the Department cannot second-guess the Pinellas County Circuit Court, an argument that carries over into this proceeding. The Department responded in its Answer Brief by asserting that it has correctly determined that the chapter 717 claims process applies to all unclaimed property once it is transferred to the Department, including unclaimed estate proceeds that may eventually escheat to the State of Florida.5/
