The Issue Whether Respondent acted contrary to the agency's governing statutes, rules or policies, or the bid specifications in its proposed decision to award Contract No. T1285 to Intervenor Kamminga & Roodvoets, Inc. ("K & R").
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of the proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On May 14, 2008, the Department released its bid solicitation for Contract T1285. The proposed contract was for the construction of a one-way pair through Lake Alfred, including new construction, reconstruction, milling and resurfacing, widening, drainage improvements, lighting, signalization, signing and pavement marking and landscaping on State Road 600 (U.S. 17/92). Polk County, the location of the project, lies in the Department's District 1. Qualified contractors, including Mid-State and K & R, received an electronic disk containing the solicitation, bid blank, plans and specifications for Contract T1285. The letting date for this project was June 18, 2008. Bids were to be submitted on or before that date via Bid Express, the electronic bidding system used by the Department. No party submitted a protest of the terms, conditions, and specifications contained in the solicitation pursuant to Subsection 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes. The work to be performed on Contract T1285 included the installation of limerock road base to be paid for in accordance with line item 0175, Optional Base Group 09 ("Base Group 09"). The bid documents included a set of "Supplemental Specifications." Section 6 of the Supplemental Specification was titled "Control of Materials." Subsection 6-3.3, titled "Construction Aggregates," provided as follows: "Aggregates used on Department projects must be in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-103."2 Under the heading "Developmental Specifications" is a February 15, 2008, revision to the Construction Aggregates subsection that provides: Subarticle 6-3.3 (Page 54) is expanded by the following: 6-3.3.1 Department Directed Source for Aggregates: For this Contract, obtain aggregates for use in limerock base from the following vendor: Vulcan Construction Materials LP. Upon award of the Contract, provide the vendor and the Department a schedule of project aggregate needs. Once a schedule has been provided to both the Department and vendor, the Engineer will issue written authorization, with a copy to the vendor, for the purchase of aggregates from the vendor. This authorization is required before aggregates will be released by the vendor. Pick up the required aggregate such that the project schedule will be maintained. Payment to the vendor by the Contractor will be due upon receipt of the materials pursuant to the Department's Vendor Contract No. BDH50. This rate is the unit price agreed upon by the Department and the vendor and will be made available to bid proposal holders at the time of bid at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/aggregate /aggregate.htm. The Department will make payment to the Contractor for the aggregates on progress estimates as a part of the bid unit price for the appropriate pay items. The rate is subject to change and adjustments for such changes will be made to the bid unit price of the appropriate pay items. Disputes with the vendor concerning aggregate supply will not be cause for Contract time adjustments, time suspensions or monetary adjustments to the Contract amount. The Contractor will be solely responsible for providing the necessary advance notice to the vendor and other coordination to obtain timely aggregate supply for the project. The import of Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1 was that all bidders would be required to obtain the limerock needed for Base Group 09 from a single vendor, Vulcan Construction Materials LP ("Vulcan"). The winning bidder would agree to pay Vulcan in accordance with a separate contract negotiated between Vulcan and the Department. The hyperlink provided in Developmental Specification 6-3.3.13 led to a document called "Aggregate Guidance" produced by the Department's State Construction Office. The front page of the Aggregate Guidance document contained "Bidder Information" consisting of a spreadsheet setting forth the Vulcan price per ton for limerock base and limestone coarse aggregate, with the price varying depending on the date and port of delivery. Between January and June 2008, the Vulcan price per ton for limerock base from both the Port of Tampa and Port Canaveral was $16.93. The Aggregate Guidance page contained additional hyperlinks with the following titles: "Aggregate Vendor Contract Usage," "Aggregate Vendor Contract," "Aggregate Vendor Projects List," "Aggregate Vendor Authorization Letter," "Aggregate Vendor Contract Frequently Asked Questions," and "Aggregate Price Adjustment Sheet." Alvin Mulford is the vice-president of Mid-State who, along with his estimator, put together his company's bid for Contract T1285. Mr. Mulford testified that his company has been bidding on Department work, and that he has never before seen a provision similar to Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1. Mr. Mulford directed his estimator to obtain clarification from the Department, to be sure that the bidders were required to purchase the limerock base from Vulcan. One reason for Mr. Mulford's concern was the "exorbitant" rate charged by Vulcan in comparison to other vendors. The restriction to a single supplier was so abnormal, and that supplier's rate was so out of line with the market, that Mr. Mulford decided to seek guidance from the Department through the question and response internet bulletin board provided by the Department for its projects. The question posed by Mid-State was as follows: Does the contractor have to use Vulcan materials for the limerock base at a rate of $16.93 per ton as stated in the Developmental Specifications 6-3.3.1? If so from which location is the material to be picked up? Is it also true that payment to the vendor (Vulcan Materials) will be due immediately upon receipt of the materials? I wanted to clarify this issue as it is unusual for the contractor to be limited to the use of only one vendor. The Department's response was as follows: The unit rate for the Material can be found at the following website: http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/ Aggregate/Aggregate.htm Pickup locations for the Material can be found at the following website: http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/ Aggregate/Aggregate.htm Payment should be issued by the Contractor to the Vendor (Vulcan Construction Materials LP) upon receipt of the materials as defined in Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1. Because the Department's response did no more than redirect him to the Department's website, Mr. Mulford decided to look at the website in more detail. He investigated the hyperlinks, including the Vulcan contract with the Department. When he clicked on the hyperlink titled "Aggregate Vendor Contract Usage," he found a document that provided as follows, in relevant part: Aggregate Vendor Contract Usage by Districts With the execution of the contract with Vulcan Construction Materials LP, contract number BDH50, Vulcan has committed to provide aggregate in the types and quantities defined in the contract (attached). The process for this contract in Districts 1, 5, and 7, is as follows: Include in the projects identified in the attached spreadsheet the appropriate special provision beginning with the July 2007 lettings. The District Specifications Engineer and District Construction Office will need to coordinate this effort. There are two special provisions for the purpose of notifying construction contract bidders of the Department's intention toward the aggregate. The first special provision is the mandatory version that will direct the bidder to obtain aggregates for the specified work from Vulcan. The second special provision provides the bidder an option to obtain its aggregates from Vulcan. * * * After these projects have been awarded, the contractor is required to notify FDOT and Vulcan a schedule of its aggregate needs for the project. After receiving this schedule, FDOT's Resident Engineer will issue written authorization to the contractor, with copy to Vulcan. This authorization is required before Vulcan will release aggregate to the contractor. Payment to Vulcan will be from the contractor. FDOT will pay cost of aggregate on progress estimates as part of the contractor's bid price for the work. The contractor is required to include in its bid price for the work the cost of the aggregate at the Vulcan rate. The Vulcan rate will be posted on the FDOT State Construction Website showing the rate. When adjustments are made to the Vulcan rate, FDOT will make adjustments in the construction contract unit price. . . . (Emphasis added.) Mr. Mulford testified that he understood the underscored language in the hyperlinked document to be a directive to the bidders and therefore a mandatory requirement of the bid specifications. He did not ask the Department for further clarification because he believed the requirement was clearly stated in the hyperlinked document. David Sadler, the director of the Department's office of construction, testified that the hyperlinked document was developed by his office to offer guidance to the districts as to the concept behind and use of the aggregate vendor contract. The document was not a part of the bid solicitation document. Mid-State's bid price was $7,429,398.44. Mid-State's price for Base Group 09 was $619,645.80, or $19.30 per square yard. This price reflected the Vulcan rate for limerock base of $16.92 plus tax and Mid-State's costs for the work associated with Base Group 09. 19. K & R's bid price was $7,370,505.24, or $58,893.20 lower than the bid price of Mid-State. K & R's price for Base Group 09 was $256,848.00, based on a stated unit price of $8.00 per square yard for limerock base. K & R's price for Base Group 09 was $362,797.80 lower than that of Mid-State, accounting for more than the differential between the overall bids of Mid-State and K & R. Marcus Tidey, Jr., K & R's vice president in charge of its Florida division, testified that K & R was well aware that the Vulcan price for limerock base was $16.93, and that K & R understands its obligation to pay that price to Vulcan should K & R be awarded Contract T1285. Mr. Tidey testified that at the time of bid submission, he cut K & R's bid price to $8.00 per square yard as a competitive strategy to win the contract. Mr. Tidey made a conscious decision that K & R would absorb the difference between $8.00 bid price and the Vulcan price of $16.93. Mr. Tidey testified that K & R needed to win this job in order not to have its crews and equipment sit idle during the economic downturn, and therefore decided to take all of its markup, roughly $250,000, out of the bid. He could have made the $250,000 cut on any item or items in the bid, but decided on Base Group 09 because the limerock base was a big item and therefore easy to cut by a large amount. Mr. Tidey also testified that the contract provides a $400,000 incentive payment for early completion of the job, meaning that K & R will be able to work "faster and smarter" and make up for the price reduction at the end of the job. Mr. Tidey testified that he obtained the Vulcan prices from the Department's website as instructed by Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1. He did not click on the hyperlinks, which appeared to reference the contract between the Department and Vulcan and therefore was of no concern to him. The Department and K & R dispute Mid-State's assertion that the underscored language of the hyperlink set forth in Finding of Fact 15 was a requirement of the bid specifications, based on Mr. Sadler's direct testimony and the underlying illogic and unfairness of requiring bidders to seek out hidden specifications. The Department and K & R concede that if the bid specifications did in fact require the bidders to include in Base Group 09 the full costs associated with obtaining the limerock base from Vulcan, then K & R's bid is nonresponsive. Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1 directed bidders to the Department's webpage for the purpose of obtaining the current Vulcan rate quote. It did not instruct the bidders to investigate the hyperlinks or to assume that the information contained therein was mandatory. Absent an instruction to bidders to review the information contained in the hyperlinks, the Department could not make such information mandatory without placing less curious bidders at a competitive disadvantage. The Department had no intent to play hide-and-seek with the bid specifications in the manner suggested by Mid-State. In addition, K & R points to three line items of the bid specifications in which the Department eliminates competition, instructing the bidders not to bid and inserting a fixed unit price and bid amount for all bidders as to those items. K & R reasonably asserts that the Department was fully capable of treating Base Group 09 in the same fashion, had it intended to require the bidders to pass through to the Department all the costs associated with obtaining the limerock base from Vulcan. However, the Department supplied the bid quantity (31,106 square yards) and left it to the bidders to determine the price per unit they would bid. K & R's bid was responsive. Nothing in the bid specifications prevented K & R from absorbing part of the cost of the Vulcan limerock base and passing the savings on to the Department, or required bidders to pass on to the Department the full costs of complying with the bid specifications regarding Base Group 09. The sole remaining issue is whether K & R's bid, though facially responsive, was materially unbalanced. The Department routinely conducts reviews of bid line items that appear "unbalanced," i.e., for which there appear to be significant differences between the price bid and the Department's cost estimate, in order to determine whether the price difference is due to a quantity error by the bidder. The Department's review confirms that the bid quantity specified on the bid blank is accurate. If a quantity error is found, the bids are recalculated using the bidders' unit prices and the correct quantities to determine whether the bid rankings would change. A bid for which there is a discrepancy between the bid and the Department's estimate is termed "mathematically unbalanced." A mathematically unbalanced bid that affects the ranking of the low bid is "materially unbalanced." A mathematically unbalanced bid is acceptable, but a materially unbalanced bid affords the bidder an unfair competitive advantage and must be rejected. The Department followed its usual procedure in analyzing the K & R bid to determine whether it was unbalanced. Philip Gregory Davis, the Department's state estimates engineer, testified that there were some unbalanced items in the K & R bid, but no quantity errors that would have changed the ranking of the bids. Richard Ryals, the project designer who conducted the unbalanced bid review, testified that the quantities were correct for Base Group 09. As noted above, K & R's low bid for Base Group 09 was an intentional strategy, not the result of a quantity error. K & R's current bonded capacity qualification with the Department is $258 million in contracts at any one time. K & R posted a bid bond, and has more than enough capacity to comfortably perform this contract. There is no economic danger to the Department in accepting K & R's low bid.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing Mid-State's formal written protest and awarding Contract T1265 to K & R. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this cause is whether costs and attorney's fees are due Petitioner, hereinafter PROCTOR, from Respondent, hereinafter HRS, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as a result of Division of Administrative Hearings Case Number 91-5963-BID, and, if so, the amount of costs and fees.
Findings Of Fact The petition for fees and costs herein is brought exclusively under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and relates back to a bid protest wherein PROCTOR and TCC #3 LTD., INC., hereafter TCC, were the only bidders on HRS lease 590.236. PROCTOR was the protestant/Petitioner and TCC was the apparent successful bidder/Intervenor in Derick Proctor v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. HRS' Invitation to Bid (ITB) for lease 590:236 required bidders to submit evidence of control of the property being offered, including the parking areas. Evidence of control could take the form of a deed for the property, an option to purchase the property, or a lease or option to lease showing a right to sublease. TCC did not submit a document labelled "deed," "option to purchase," "lease," or "option to lease" with its bid. TCC submitted as its evidence of control a contract for sale and purchase of the property with Hernando Plaza, Ltd., executed by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves to be general partners of the limited partnership. At all times material, the actual record title of the property submitted by TCC for the bid was in the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation. At the times of the bid opening, evaluation, and August 27, 1991 notice of intended award, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with an entity other than the record owner. Up to then, at least, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as being the owner of the property. The ITB did not require an abstract of title to be submitted with the bid. HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contained provisions for future disclosures from successful bidders. Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS' ITB attempted at the time to protect HRS by requiring successful bidders to post an irrevocable letter of credit to be forfeited in the event a successful bidder could not perform and for future disclosures concerning the chain of title. (See the recommended order in the underlying case). HRS accepted the contract to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza, Ltd. as TCC's required evidence of control, believing it to constitute an option to purchase. (See Findings of Fact 15-17 infra, this final order). On August 27, 1991, PROCTOR received from HRS a notice of intent to award the bid to TCC. This notice constituted the "window" for protests, if any, to be filed. PROCTOR then timely filed a notice of intent to protest and a formal written protest of the award to TCC. The filing of this protest resulted in an automatic suspension of the bid solicitation and contract award process and referral of the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(c), Florida Statutes. This protest formed the basis of the underlying bid case, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. No later than the time of the Prehearing Order of September 23, 1991 in Case No. 91-5963BID, the law firm of Gibbs and Rudzik had made known to the hearing officer and counsel for both PROCTOR and HRS its retention as counsel for TCC. TCC moved for leave to intervene in a motion filed September 30, 1991, which was granted in an order of October 4, 1991. In a letter of October 10, 1991, counsel for PROCTOR made counsel for HRS aware of a question of whether TCC could obtain good title to the property. Counsel for PROCTOR proposed in a letter of October 14, 1991 to counsel for HRS that HRS reject both PROCTOR's and TCC's bids and rebid the lease, but this letter was primarily devoted to determining if HRS wished to interpose a new defense that PROCTOR's bid was unresponsive. In the instant fees and costs case, PROCTOR relies on its October 14, 1991 letter as the point from which HRS should have acted to avoid incurring attorney's fees and costs. After the receipt of the two letters, HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract but proceeded to formal hearing on October 30, 1991. PROCTOR and HRS share the mutual impression that had HRS accepted PROCTOR's proposal to reject both bids, HRS would have to have allowed TCC an opportunity to protest that decision. At the final hearing in Case No. 91-5963BID, evidence was offered that Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had a conditional option to purchase the property from the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. However, it was not established at the hearing that the conditions of the option had been fulfilled or that TCC or Hernando Plaza, Ltd. could otherwise gain good title to the property through a valid option. It was concluded as a matter of law in Case No. 91-5963BID, that on its face, the ITB stated that control could be evidenced merely by attachment of an "option to purchase," that the ITB stated no further requirements concerning the internal provisions of the option to purchase, and that TCC's conditional contract for purchase constituted a conditional option to purchase. The conditions of the option to purchase and the chain of title, among myriad other matters were subjects of proof at the formal hearing. The conditions of the option to purchase and various complicated real property concepts arising from recorded and unrecorded parts of the chain of title constituted the thrust of the recommended order's assessment that TCC's "control" was speculative only. It is here noted that the totality of the "chain" of title might have been unavailable even by "abstract" due to the lack of recordation of some documents. The lengthy formal hearing adduced evidence concerning the factual issue of whether or not the conditional option to purchase was between TCC and an entity which had such a sufficiently unequivocal interest in the proposed property that it could convey title to TCC in time for TCC to fulfill its obligations under its proposed lease to HRS. There is no evidence that HRS knew of these problems on August 27, 1991, when it gave notice of its intent to award the bid to TCC. Hernando Plaza, Ltd. was the entity with which TCC had contracted. At formal hearing, TCC relied on the legal concept that all interests in the property had merged in the non-title holder, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. This concept, together with recorded and unrecorded elements in the chain of title which were presented at formal hearing, were determined in the recommended order to be too "speculative" on the issue of TCC's control. However, it was also found, upon evidence submitted at formal hearing, that TCC's bid contained no other material deviations from the requirements of the ITB, that the signator of TCC's bid had sufficient status to submit the bid for the TCC corporation, and that TCC's signator could not submit the bid as an agent of the owners of the real property. TCC and its bid signator had never purported to have submitted the bid on behalf of the owners of the real property. (See the recommended order of the underlying bid case.) These issues were raised by PROCTOR and they addressed more than just the facial compliance of TCC's original bid documents which was all HRS had to consider when it made its initial decision in favor of TCC and against PROCTOR. However, the recommended order found HRS to have materially deviated in a number of ways from the bid process in its initial evaluation of PROCTOR's bid, not the least of which was determining that PROCTOR had complied with the ITB requirements for demonstrating control. All such evaluation flaws had been committed by HRS in favor of PROCTOR. Both TCC's and PROCTOR's bids were ultimately found to be unresponsive in the recommended order entered on December 20, 1991. The recommended order also found both had standing to be involved in the bid protest and formal hearing. The recommended order recommended rejecting both bids and readvertising the ITB. The Final Order of HRS entered on January 20, 1992 dismissed PROCTOR's protest on the basis that he lacked standing to protest, as his bid was unresponsive, and awarded the bid to TCC. HRS did not give PROCTOR notice that his bid was not responsive until it issued its Final Order. The Final Order of HRS was appealed to the First District Court of Appeals by PROCTOR. The First District Court of Appeals entered an order on June 22, 1992 finding PROCTOR had standing and remanding the case back to HRS for the purpose of a decision of the issue of whether TCC's bid was also unresponsive. On July 27, 1992, HRS entered its Amended Final Order determining both bids to be unresponsive and that the lease should be relet for bids. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the Amended Final Order of HRS in a per curiam opinion without discussion on October 13, 1992. HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract until after this per curiam opinion. No motion for rehearing was filed with respect to either of the First District Court of Appeals' orders entered June 22 or October 13, 1992, nor was any notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court filed. PROCTOR did file a motion for rehearing solely on the court's denial of PROCTOR's motion for appellate fees. Mandate was issued by the Clerk of the First District Court of Appeals on December 3, 1992. HRS entered an Order Directing Release of Bid Protest Cost Bond on December 18, 1992, in which HRS stated: Petitioner, Derick Proctor, has prevailed in the above styled bid protest. Petitioner's domicile and principal place of business is Vero Beach, Florida. Petitioner has one employee. Petitioner is a sole proprietorship. Petitioner's net worth does not exceed $2,000,000.00. HRS was not a nominal party in the underlying bid case. HRS did not initially challenge PROCTOR's "small business party" status in this instant fees and costs proceeding. Therefore, that allegation of the fees and costs petition is not at issue. Also, Petitioner's "small business party" status is now stipulated to exist. The parties have stipulated that the maximum statutory fee is $15,000.00 and that $15,000.00 is a reasonable fee if an award of attorney's fees is due. HRS has not protested or objected to the amount of costs claimed, $411.25, if costs are due.
Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint filed August 30, 1990, and assigned DOAH Case No. 90-6107, Respondent alleged that Petitioner, as a licensed auction business, accepted the consignment of property from Ms. Erma Grant in April, 1988. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Petitioner failed to provide Ms. Grant a written agreement evidencing the consignment, as required by Section 468.388 for consignments involving property whose estimated value is over $500. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Petitioner failed to pay Ms. Grant the auction proceeds within 30 days of the auction. Based on the factual allegations set forth above, the Administrative Complaint charges that Petitioner violated Section 468.389(1)(j), which prohibits a violation of any statute, through the violation of Section 468.388 by failing to obtain a written consignment agreement; Section 468.389(1)(c), which prohibits the failure to account for or to pay, within a reasonable time not to exceed 30 days, money belonging to another which has come into the control of an auctioneer or auction business through an auction; and Section 468.389(1)(e), which prohibits conduct in connection with a sales transaction which demonstrates bad faith or dishonesty. Based on the alleged violations set forth above,the Administrative Complaint requests the Board of Auctioneers to enter a final order revoking or suspending Petitioner's license, imposing an administrative fine, issuing a reprimand, placing Petitioner on probation, and awarding other appropriate relief. Respondent predicated its allegations largely on a complaint that it received from Ms. Grant. By letter dated April 23, 1990, Ms. Grant recounted that she had advertised a moving sale in March or April, 1988. She reported that Petitioner contacted her and asked that she let him take everything to sell at an auction. Following the sale, she stated that she called Petitioner and consigned to him several items, including a davenport, china cabinet, a still- life picture, and two padded chairs. Ms. Grant charged in her letter that she did not hear from Petitioner following the consignment. Residing in Vermont, she returned to Florida in November, 1988, and immediately contacted Petitioner. She charged that Petitioner explained that he did not have the money, but thought that he had sent her a check. He reportedly promised to examine his records. Ms. Grant letter states that Ms. Grant returned to see Petitioner on March 6, 1989. The letter reads: "[Petitioner] had already told a cousin of mine that he had sent a check to me for $227. Some of my boys must have cashed it on me." It is unclear to whose "boys" the letter refers. Ms. Grant continued to pressure Petitioner for payment, according to the April 23 letter, but Petitioner refused to pay or show herrecords that he had already sent a check. Ms. Grant alleged that on April 11, 1989, Petitioner offered her $100. About a week later, Petitioner told her that he would be sending her a check for $50 and allegedly admitted that he had no copy of any prior check. Ms. Grant, who was 75 years old at the time and had recently been in poor health, ended her letter with a request for assistance and provided Respondent with her address in Vermont, to which she was returning in the next few days. Respondent opened a formal investigation shortly after receiving Ms. Grant's complaint. On June 4, 1990, Respondent's investigator contacted Ms. Grant, who stated that she had still not received anything from Petitioner. The following day, the investigator contacted Petitioner, who said that he could not remember accepting any property from Ms. Grant on consignment. They set up an appointment for June 6. On June 6, Ms. Grant telephoned the investigator and informed him that a friend of hers in Cocoa, Mr. Alcide Quesnel, had received a call from Petitioner, who offered him the sum of $200 to send to Ms. Grant. The investigator contacted Mr. Quesnel on the same day, and he confirmed that he had received from Petitioner the sum of $200 the prior evening to send to Ms. Grant. Mr. Quesnel explained that he had introduced Ms. Grant to Petitioner. Mr. Quesnel later tried to change his story by telling the investigator that Petitioner did not give him themoney. Instead, someone unknown to him put the money in his pocket and he assumed that it was for Ms. Grant because he had known that she and Petitioner had been having some problems. By letter dated June 9, 1990, Ms. Grant provided Respondent's investigator with a copy of the $200 check that she had received from Mr. Quesnel. She added that Mr. Quesnel had telephoned her on the evening of June 5 and informed her that Petitioner had given him the $200, she was to call the investigator and tell him that she had received the money, and Petitioner did not want a receipt. In addition to the interviews of Ms. Grant, Petitioner, and Mr. Quesnel, the investigator received an affidavit from Ms. Grant's sister, who swore that she witnessed Petitioner pick up the furniture from Ms. Grant's house in April, 1988. By internal memorandum dated December 31, 1990, a law clerk of Respondent advised the attorney handling DOAH Case No. 90-6107 that she did not believe that Respondent could prove by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was guilty of any violations of Chapter 468. Respondent served the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal the same day. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, Respondent is a state agency and initiated the underlying case giving rise to the present claim for attorneys' fees; Petitioner is a prevailing small business party; and the attorneys's fees and costs are reasonable as to those expended in connection with theunderlying case. The fees in connection with DOAH Case No. 90-6107 are $1920. There is no indication that Petitioner incurred any costs in connection with DOAH Case No. 90-6107.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the decision of the respondent, Department of Corrections (Department), to award the subject bid to intervenor, Doctors and Physicians Laboratories, Inc. (Doctors), comported with the essential requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact Background On October 16, 1991, the Department of Corrections (Department) issued invitation to bid number 91-CO-5369 (hereinafter "the ITB"), which sought to secure appropriate services to perform drug tests on certain applicants for employment and existing employees of the Department. The deadline for submitting bids was established as 11:00 a.m., November 7, 1991. At the time of the deadline, the Department had received four bids, including those of petitioner, Toxicology Testing Service, Inc., and intervenor, Doctors and Physicians Laboratories, Inc. (Doctors). Petitioner's bid was $372,000, and Doctors' bid was $315,491.60. Based on its evaluation, the Department ranked Doctors first and petitioner second, with composite scores of 91.67 and 90.38, respectively, and proposed to award the contract to Doctors. Petitioner filed a timely formal written protest to contest the Department's decision, and charged that the Department materially departed from the evaluation criteria contained in the ITB. The Invitation to Bid Pertinent to this case, section 4.7 of the ITB established the evaluation criteria to be used in determining the acceptability of the bids as follows: 4.7 Evaluation Criteria Criteria Point Value 1. References 5 2. Firm Profile 5 3. Firms Qualifications 15 Understanding of Scope of Services 25 Bid Price 50 100 And, section 4.7.5 of the ITB established the following methodology to be utilized in awarding points for the bid price criteria: The award for bid price shall be determined as follows: The Bidder who submits the lowest bid price will be awarded 50 points. All others bidders will be awarded points based on the following formula: Bid Price Points = 50 X [1-A/B] where: A = the difference between the percentage of the bid being evaluated and the low bid(s). B = the low bid. The lowest bid price will be computed by multiplying the unit prices for Items 1, 2 and 3 for all three years by the estimated quantity. The estimated quantity is for bidding purposes only and is not a guarantee. The total annual cost for Items 1 and 2 for all three years will be added to determine the Total Cost for all three years. The vendor with the lowest Total Cost will be awarded the 50 points. Negative points will not be awarded. Pursuant to the provisions of section 5.13 of the ITB, the contract was to be awarded to the bidder that received the highest overall point total under the criteria established by section 4.7 of the ITB. The Department's evaluation and the protest Based on its evaluation of the bids, the Department's evaluation committee awarded petitioner 49.34 points for its technical proposal (items 1-4 of the evaluation criteria) and Doctor's 41.67 points for its technical proposal. Bid price points were then established through a preexisting computer program, which derived 41.04 points for petitioner and 50 points for Doctors. When totalled, petitioner received 90.38 points and Doctors received 91.67 points. Accordingly, the Department proposed to award the contract to Doctors. Petitioner filed a timely protest to contest such award. The gravamen of that protest is petitioner's contention that the Department applied a methodology other than that established by the ITB to derive the bid price points and that had it utilized the methodology established by the ITB petitioner would have received the most points and been the prevailing bidder. 1/ Consistent with petitioner's contention, the proof demonstrates that the computer program used to derive the bid price points and the methodology established by the ITB to derive such points differed with regard to the definition of A in the formula, discussed supra. In the computer program, factor A was defined as the difference between the price of the bid being evaluated and the low bid. In the ITB, factor A was defined as the difference between the percentage of the bid being evaluated and the low bid. The Department was not, however, aware of this dichotomy until the subject protest, believing that its ITB conformed with the methodology it had previously programed for its computer, and, at hearing, offered proof, which is credited, that use of the word "percentage" in the definition of A was a typographical error which should have read "price." Notably, the Department heavily weighed price (50%) in its ITB, and it is apparent the Department intended to use a formula that would create a difference in price scoring that was relative to any difference in the bid prices. Use of the formula, as correctly defined in its computer program, would accomplish such goal. Use of the formula, as incorrectly defined by the ITB and interpreted by petitioner in these proceedings, would not accord any meaningful weight to price. 2/ Under such circumstances, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the Department departed from the essential requirements of law when it declined to apply the methodology as interpreted by petitioner to award the contract. Moreover, for the reasons that follow, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Department's decision to stand by its award based on the correctly defined methodology departed from the essential requirements of law. Here, the proof demonstrates that petitioner, upon receipt and review of the ITB, was well aware that the formula for awarding points based on price was nonsensical, and most likely, in error. 3/ Notwithstanding, petitioner took no action under the provisions of general condition 6 and special condition 4.4 of the ITB to raise any question or seek any clarification or interpretation of the formula from the Department. 4/ Rather, petitioner submitted its best price offer, more likely than not, without reliance on the erroneous formula set forth in the ITB. 5/ Under such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the Department's award of the contract, based on an application of the correct definition of factor A, accorded any bidder an unfair advantage or otherwise departed from the essential requirements of law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing the subject bid protest. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of May 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May 1992.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence addressed at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The request for sealed bids for the construction of the Project was advertised on October 9, 16 and 23, 1991. There were six addenda to the original bid documents which added, deleted or modified provisions of the original bidding requirements, contract requirements, administrative requirements and technical specifications. The original bid documents plus the six addenda will be referred to herein as the "bid documents". The bid documents required that all bids be in full accord with the contract documents. Sealed bids for the Project were opened on October 30, 1991. Wright submitted the lowest lump sum bid for the Project, with Sovran submitting the second lowest lump sum bid and Kellogg submitting the third lowest lump sum bid. At the time of the bid opening, the bid documents listed only four casework manufacturers that were approved to furnish casework for the Project. Empire Custom Cabinets, Inc. (Empire) was not listed as one of the four approved casework manufacturers in the bid documents. The bid documents did not require the bidder to list the casework manufacturer it intended to obtain the casework from, but only that the bidder name the casework subcontractor. The only work item in the bid documents which requires identifying the name of the manufacturer on the subcontractor's list is the metal roof system. Because Empire's bid on the casework was extremely low compared to other bids received by Wright on the casework, Wright called Empire prior to submitting its bid to confirm that Empire's bid was submitted per plans and specifications. Although Wright did not specifically inquire of Empire at this time as to which manufacturer Empire was obtaining the casework from for the Project, Empire did advise Wright that Empire's bid on the casework was according to plans and specifications. Additionally, Empire did not divulge or advise Wright at this time that the bid was based on Empire manufacturing the casework for the Project. Based on this representation from Empire, Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor, and calculated its lump sum bid for the Project using Empire's bid. Although Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor in its bid, this did not create an irregularity in Wright's bid since Wright's bid was per plans and specification without exception or exclusion. This would require Wright to furnish casework for the Project manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents regardless of which subcontractor Wright listed as the subcontractor for casework. By letter dated November 1, 1991, the Board's architect for the Project requested Wright to have Empire submit written certification by one of the four approved casework manufacturers that its casework was being furnished to Empire for the project. By letter dated November 4, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire's bid on the casework for the Project was based on casework to be manufactured by Empire. On the same day, Wright furnished the architect for the Project a copy of Empire's letter of November 4, 1991. In response to a request by the Board, Wright, by letter dated November 7, 1991, advised the Board that Wright would furnish casework manufactured by one of the four approved manufacturers listed in the bid documents for the Project. By letter dated December 3, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire would need to withdraw its bid if Empire was required to use casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents. On that same day, Wright furnished the Board a copy of Empire's letter and requested that the Board allow Wright to remove and replace Empire with Steven Ward and Associates, Inc. (Ward), as the casework subcontractor since Ward would be able to furnish and install casework manufactured by LSI Corporation of America, Inc., one of the four approved casework manufacturers. No Action has been taken on that request. The bid documents provide for a subcontractor to be removed and replaced from the list of subcontractors after the bid is opened if there is a showing of good cause and written approval by the Board and the Project architect is obtained. Although Empire's bid on the casework for the Project submitted to Wright was based on Empire manufacturing the casework, there is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that at the time Wright submitted its bid on the Project it had reasonable grounds to believe that Empire's bid on the casework was based on Empire furnishing and installing casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. After determining that Empire could not perform under its bid, Wright obtained a bid from Ward for furnishing and installing the casework for the Project which was less than Ward's original bid submitted to Wright before the bid opening. However, this bid was substantially more than Empire's bid, and if Wright is allowed to substitute Ward for Empire, Wright will have to absorb the additional costs since the bids were lump sum bids. Wright is neither attempting to furnish casework from a manufacturer that is not approved, nor is Wright requesting an increase in the lump sum bid price. The advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project required that all bidders be prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date. Sovran and one other bidder were not prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date in accordance with Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran received the bid documents for the Project approximately one month before the bid date but did not file a Notice of Protest of the prequalification requirement contained in the Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran holds a certificate as a general contractor licensed in the State of Florida in accordance with Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. As a certified general contractor Sovran, pursuant to Section 489.125, Florida Statutes, was authorized to bid on the Project notwithstanding the Board's prequalification requirement. This was explained by the Board's representative at the bid opening. The bid documents required that a subcontractor list be submitted by all bidders, and when submitted with the bid becomes an integral part of the bid. The purpose of the subcontractor list was to prevent bid shopping, and to allow the Board an opportunity to review the subcontractors to determine if any subcontractor on the list had performed unsatisfactorily on previous Board projects. Neither the statutes relating to competitive bidding nor the bid documents prohibit the listing of the general contractor together with a subcontractor on a subcontractor list. The subcontractor list submitted by Sovran indicated "Sovran Constr/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the masonry work and "Sovran/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the poured-in-place concrete work. "Naples" is Naples Concrete and Masonry Work, Inc. The bid received by Sovran from Naples was for both labor and materials for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran neither requested nor did Naples furnish Sovran a bid to provide labor only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. There was no agreement between Sovran and Naples whereby Sovran would supply the materials and Naples would furnish the labor for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran did request and receive bids from other companies for furnishing materials only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran listed itself, the general contractor, along with Naples on the subcontractor list for the purpose of supplying the materials for the poured-in- place concrete and masonry work. Sovran's main reason for supplying the materials was that Naples was not bondable. Without a payment bond from Naples, Sovran would be without protection and could be forced into paying double for the materials in the event Naples failed to pay the material suppliers. Although the Superintendent of the Lee County Schools has recommended to the Board that the Board accept Wright's bid for the Project, the Board has not voted on that recommendation. The fact that Wright used Empire's bid to calculate its lump sum bid in no way excuses Wright for the requirement set out in the bid documents that casework used for the Project (when the time comes) be manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. Wright gains no economic advantage in this regard since the lump sum bid price remains the same. The advertisement for Sealed Bids on the Project provides that the Board reserves the right to waive any and all irregularities of any bid received.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a Final Order dismissing the instant bid protest and awarding to Wright the contract for the construction of Elementary School "C", Job No. 91063. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13 day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 91-7597B1D The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1 - 3(1,2 and 3 , respectively); 4 - 5(6); 6(4); 7 - 9(5); 12(10); 13(11); 15 - 16(12); 17(13); 18 - 19(16); 20(29); 21(18); 23(19); 24 - 25(20); 26(22); 27(23); 28(22); 29 - 30(29); 32 - 33(25); and 34(26). Proposed finding of fact 10 is rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record in that Wright's bid was as per plans and specifications without exceptions or exclusions which included the use of casework manufactured by one of the approved casework manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 11 is rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record in that the Board knew of Empire's bid being based on nonconforming materials prior to issuing its Notice of Intent. However, the only information the Board had in reference to Wright's bid before issuing its Notice of Intent was that Wright had bid as per plans and specifications and would be installing casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. The only question was whether Empire could furnish casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 14 is neither material nor relevant. How the Board's architect interpreted Wright's bid is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed finding of fact 22 is unnecessary to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 31 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed findings of fact 35 and 36 are covered in the Preliminary Statement. The timeliness of Kellogg's protest is not an issue and therefore, a finding that it was timely is unnecessary. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent While not specifically adopting proposed finding of fact 1, where material or relevant or necessary to this proceeding, and supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record the stipulated facts have been adopted. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2(4,5); 3(9); 4 - 5(7); 7 - 8(8); 10(16); 11(14); 12(31); 13(21); and 15(23). Proposed finding of fact 6 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed finding of fact 9 and 14 are neither material nor relevant. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Intervenor See ruling on Respondent's proposed finding of fact Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2 - 3(21); 4(24); 5 - 6(21); 13(23); 14(24,28); 15(22); 16 - 17(23,24); and 18(28). Proposed findings of fact 7 through 12 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Gurley, Esquire Norton, Gurley & Darnell, P.A. 1819 Main Street, Suite 610 Sarasota, FL 34236 Marianne Kantor, Esquire The School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, FL 33901 James M. Talley, Esquire Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Keiner, Wack & Dickson, P.A. Post Office Box 712 Orlando, FL 32802 Karl Engel Superintendent Lee County School Board 2055 Central Avenue Ft. Myers, FL 33901 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Lee County School District (District) Invitation to Bid #4908 (ITB) was provided to the vendors on December 9, 1992. The ITB sought bids for 61 hardware and tool items to be used in the District Supply Department. The District maintains an inventory of hundreds of miscellaneous hardware items. Quantities of available materials are monitored through a computerized system which is used to generate a list of items which need to be replenished. The District has historically utilized ITB's to acquire hardware items in order to maintain appropriate inventory levels. Eight sealed bids were opened on January 6, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. Bids were submitted by Parker-Mahn Ace Hardware, W.W. Grainger, Action Bolt & Tool, Biscayne Electric & Hardware Distributors, Bob Dean Supply, Scotty's, Shadbolt & Boyd, and the Petitioner. The ITB states that the School District of Lee County: reserves the right to waive minor variations to specifications, informalities, irregularities and technicalities in any bids; to reject any and all bids in whole or in part with or without cause, and/or to accept bids that in its judgement will be in the best interest of the District. The District further reserves the right to make awards on a multiple, lump sum, or individual item basis or combination as shall best serve the interest of the District unless otherwise stated. Three of the vendors bid on all 61 items. The remaining vendors bid on some but not all of the items. The bids were tabulated by personnel in the Purchasing Department. The information in the bids is set forth in tabulation sheets which facilitate comparison of buds. On January 7, 1993, the Petitioner sent a letter to the Respondent stating that there were only "two authentic submissions: Ace Hardware and S.W. Supply, Inc." The tabulation sheets and additional materials included in the bid responses were forwarded to the Supply Department where supply personnel reviewed the submissions and made recommendations to the Purchasing Department as to which vendors should receive awards. As part of the evaluation of the bid proposals, the District determined that the cost of the total bid award would be lower if the awards were made on an individual item basis. The District considered prompt payment discounts in making this determination. The total amount of the proposed awards to the eight vendors is $7,104.55. Were the Petitioner to receive awards for all items, the total amount of the award would be $7,965.00, accounting for the Petitioner's proposed prompt payment discount. The Purchasing Department posted a Notice of Intention to Award on January 15, 1993. The proposed awards were made on an individual item basis. All eight vendors received awards. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner timely filed a notice of protest. Subsequent to the January 15 posting, the Petitioner discovered several errors in determining the proposed awards. In the Petitioner's formal protest, four awards are identified as incorrect. Despite the Petitioner protest, the first item identified was correctly awarded because the Petitioner failed to account for the prompt payment discount offered by the winning vendor. A second item protest was based on clerical error and was withdrawn by the Petitioner. The two remaining items were resolved and were addressed in a corrected Notice of Intention to Award posted February 16, 1993. There is no evidence that the errors were other than mistakes made in calculation or transcription of bid data from the vendor's documents to the bid tabulation form. No further specifically challenged items were identified by the Petitioner prior to the hearing. General condition 1.d. of the ITB states as follows: For purposes of evaluation, the bidder must indicate any variances from specifications, terms and/or conditions regardless of how slight. If variations are not stated in the proposal, it will be assumed that the product or service fully complies with the specifications, terms and conditions herein. (emphasis supplied) General condition 6 of the ITB states as follows: Use of brand names, trade names, make, model, manufacturer, or vendor Catalog Number in the specifications is for the purpose of establishing a grade or quality of material only. It is not the District's intent to rule out other competition; therefore, the phrase OR APPROVED EQUAL is added. However, if a product other that specified is bid, it is the vendor's responsibility to submit with the bid brochures, samples and/or detailed specifications on item(s) bid. The District shall be the sole judge concerning the merits of bids submitted. If a bidder does not indicate what he is offering in the proper blank and if the bidder is successful in being awarded the item(s) then the bidder shall be obligated to furnish the specified item(s). If packing is different from that specified, the bidder must note manner and amounts in which packing is to be made. (emphasis supplied) Only one vendor, Parker-Mahn Ace Hardware, proposed to supply all items exactly as specified in the ITB. The remaining vendor proposals included at least some items which varied in some respects from the items identified in the ITB. Where a vendor fails to identify that a product bid is "not as specified", the proposal is evaluated as if all specifications have been met, in which event, price is the determining factor in determining the award. Where a vendor identifies a variance related to a specified item, the proposal is evaluated as if all specifications other than the identified variance are met. If the product is determined by the Supply Department to be the equivalent of the product identified in the ITB, price is again the determining factor in determining the award. Where the ITB specifies a brand name followed by the word "ONLY", the vendor may not bid another brand. Where the ITB does not qualify the brand name as "only", the vendor may propose an equivalent product. Where a vendor does not identify the brand name of the item to be supplied, the vendor presumed to be bidding an item which will meet the specifications. If the vendor delivers goods which are not as specified, the District rejects delivery and cancels the order. The evidence establishes that, where bid items were not as specified in the ITB, the District had access to sufficient information to permit a determination of equivalency and an award of bids. The evidence fails to establish that, except as stated herein, the Petitioner should have received an award other that as set forth in the February 16, 1993, Notice of Intent to Award. General condition 5 of the ITB states as follows: Cash discount for prompt payment of invoices will be considered in making awards. The District prefers cash discount items which allow at least twenty (20) days for approval and payment of invoices. Four vendors included proposals for prompt payment discounts in the responses. One vendor offered a 2 percent discount for payment within 20 days, one offered a 1 percent discount for payment within 15 days and one offered a 1 percent discount for payment within 10 days. The Petitioner offered a 12 per cent discount for payment within five days, but only if the Petitioner received the award for all items bid. The District preference for a 20 day payment period reflects the time needed to accept delivery, process invoices and make payment for goods received. The District has accepted a five day prompt payment discount when the purchase was for a single item and the delivery date was specified. Such payment is otherwise difficult and results in other vendor payments being delayed. There is no evidence that based on the costs of goods involved in this bid, the savings are of such event as to warrant such extraordinary treatment of deliveries and invoices. General condition 16 of the ITB states as follows: Any and all special conditions that may vary from these General Conditions shall have precedence. Special condition 1 of the ITB states as follows: A SAMPLE OR COMPLETE SPECIFICATION SHEET MUST ACCOMPANY EACH BID ITEM THAT IS NOT "AS SPECIFIED." IF AN ITEM CANNOT BE EVALUATED, IT WILL BE DISQUALIFIED. Parker-Mahn Ace Hardware submitted product brochures or other materials related to items bid. The Petitioner submitted an extensive selection of photocopies pages from a hardware product catalog. W.W. Grainger submitted an index of part numbers and identified where such parts could be located in the Grainger catalog, which was on file with the District. Action Bolt and Tool included product information by brand name and model number in the ITB response. The remaining four vendors (Biscayne Electric & Hardware Distributors, Bob Dean Supply, Scotty's, and Shadbolt & Boyd) attached no specification sheets or other descriptive materials for items bid. As stated previously, the ITB directed vendors to submit specification sheets for "not as specified" items. The request for such information was intended to facilitate the review of the bids by eliminating the need for District personnel to consult vendor product catalogs already in the District files. The ITB also provided for disqualification where an item could not be evaluated. The Petitioner asserts that the failure to submit such product information materials with the bids is a material defect which cannot be waived and which renders the bids nonresponsive. The evidence fails to support the assertion. Of the four vendors which included no specification sheets, all four had product catalogs on file in the Purchasing and/or Supply Departments of the Lee County School Board. The District had sufficient information to evaluate the bids submitted by the vendors with catalogs on file. The Petitioner asserts that it was disadvantaged by the District's decision to waive the failure to attach specification sheets where catalogs were on file, because it was allegedly not possible to compare his bid to those submitted by the other vendors. The evidence does not support the assertion. The relevant catalogs are on file in the Purchasing and Supply Departments of the District and are available for public inspection. There is no evidence that the Petitioner sought at any time to reference the materials on file. The fact that the omitted specification sheets made such a comparison less convenient than it would have been had such sheets been attached to the bids does not render the bid proposals nonresponsive. At hearing, the Petitioner challenged many of the individual intended awards announced by the District. Prior to the hearing, the Petitioner had not asserted that such items were inappropriately awarded. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would be entitled to an award of any of the additional items challenged at hearing. In the case of individual items, a bidder other than the Petitioner would be entitled to the award if the Petitioner's challenge succeeded. None of the other bidders challenged the proposed bid awards. No vendors intervened in this proceeding. Accordingly the Petitioner is not affected by such individual awards and is without standing to challenge the items first identified at hearing. The Petitioner asserted that if the low bidder for each identified product is disqualified, and the next lowest bid included in the total bid calculation, the Petitioner's total bid, including the prompt payment discount, would be lower than the total of individual bids, and that accordingly, he would be entitled to an award of all items. The evidence fails to support the assertion. The Petitioner identified one item at hearing for which the Petitioner should have received the award. The ITB sought bids to supply 24 galvanized one quart metal funnels, item #58115. One of the vendors proposed to supply a plastic funnel at a cost of .56 each. The next lowest bidder was the Petitioner which proposed to supply the metal funnel requested at a cost of $1.44 each. On a previous bid, a plastic funnel was proposed by a vendor and rejected by the District as not meeting the specifications. Although in the instant case, purchasing personnel were informed by supply personnel that a plastic funnel would serve the same purpose and was acceptable, the vendors were not provided the opportunity to bid on the provision of the plastic funnels. General condition 9.c. of the ITB states as follows: If the material and/or services supplied to the District is found to be defective or does not conform to specifications, the District reserves the right to cancel the order upon written notice to the seller and return the product to the seller at the seller's expense. In other words, the District has the right to reject delivery and cancel orders for items which are not as specified in the ITB and for which no variance was identified by the successful vendor. A vendor delivering goods which are not as specified in the vendor's proposal will not be invited to participate in the ITB process for an indeterminate period of time. At hearing, the Petitioner asserted that item #58800 (a plastic sheet of twelve garden hose washers) was mistakenly awarded to a vendor whose proposal was for individual washers rather than the sheet. The Respondent acknowledged that accordingly the proposed vendor's bid was not the lowest. The next two lowest bids (one of which is an "as specified" bid) were received from vendors other than the Petitioner. The Petitioner therefore would not receive this award. The Petitioner asserts that some bidders did not complete "drug-free workplace" forms. Although correct, the assertion is irrelevant. Such forms are used to determine award winners where there are identical bids ("ties"). There were no tie bids related to this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: The School Board of Lee County enter a Final Order directing that the District Purchasing Department refrain from purchasing item #58115 pending the next invitation to vendors to submit bids for miscellaneous hardware supplies and otherwise DISMISSING the Petitioner's Notice of Bid Protest. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 93-1260BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 7. Rejected, irrelevant. Item #58038 does not require that ONLY an Ace Hardware item may be bid. Based on the ITB, it is clear that the item bid by Action Bolt & Tool meets the specifications set forth in the proposal. 11-12. Rejected, irrelevant. 14. Rejected, irrelevant. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner attempted to obtain the materials used by District personnel to evaluate the bids. 16-17. Rejected, irrelevant. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 9. Rejected, immaterial. 23. Rejected, irrelevant. 28. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. James A. Adams Superintendent School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901-3988 Garey F. Butler, Esquire Humphrey & Knott 1625 Hendry Street Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Marianne Kantor, Esquire School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901-3988
The Issue Whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in determining to award the bid for its district office to Koger Properties, Inc. (Koger) and whether the petitioner submitted the lowest and best bid under the terms of the bid specifications.
Findings Of Fact GENERAL BACKGROUND - STIPULATED FACTS Petitioners received a formal Invitation to Bid on Lease No. 590:1784 from HRS, District V. The purpose of the ITB was to obtain competitive proposals for the leasing of office space by HRS within a specifically defined area. Petitioners timely submitted their bid in response to the ITB. All timely received bids were first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness. Petitioners' bid was determined to be responsive to the technical requirements of the ITB. Responsive bids were then presented to a bid evaluation committee for comparison and formulation of a recommendation for award. In comparing the various responsive bids and formulating a recommendation for award, the members of the bid evaluation committee were required to visit each proposed facility and to apply the evaluation criteria as contained in the ITB package. By memorandum dated July 30, 1986, the bid evaluation committee recommended that the bid be awarded to Koger although petitioners submitted the lowest rental price. On or about August 5, 1986, petitioners received notice from HRS of its intent to award Lease No. 590:1784 to Koger. By letter dated August 6, 1986, petitioners notified HRS of their intent to protest the intended award of Lease No. 590:1784 to Koger. The Notice of Intent to Protest was timely filed pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10- 13.11, Florida Administrative Code. Thereafter, the petitioners timely filed their formal written protest. Petitioners are substantially affected by the decision of HRS to award the lease to Koger. THE BIDDING PROCESS The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issued an Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form (ITB) seeking approximately 39,968 net rental square feet of office space in Pinellas County, Florida, to be used as the district administrative offices. The ITB set forth the method in which the bids would be evaluated as follows: EVALUATION OF BIDS Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsive- ness. This includes submittal on bid submittal form, inclusion of required information and data, bid signed and notarized, etc. Non responsive bids will be withdrawn from further consideration. Responsive bids are presented to a bid evaluation committee for com- parison and formulation of a recom- mendation for award. This is accomplished by a visit to each proposed facility and application of the evaluation criteria. The committees recommendation will be presented to the department's official having award authority for final evaluation and determin- ation of successful bidder. EVALUATION CRITERIA The successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated in the bid submittal form. The ITB also provided that "the department agrees to enter into a lease agreement based on submission and acceptance of the bid in the best interests of the department and the state." In accordance with the ITB a pre-bid conference was held on April 29, 1986; however, neither petitioners nor any representative of petitioners attended the pre-bid conference. Further, petitioners made no oral or written inquiries concerning the ITB or the evaluation criteria to be utilized. Bids received from the following providers were determined to be responsive and presented to the bid evaluation committee for comparison and formulation of the recommendation for award: James P. & Margaret R. Gills (1100 Building) Koger Properties, Inc. (Koger) LTBCLH Partnership (Justice Building) Procacci Real Estate Management Co., Inc. (ICOT Building) Elizabethan Development, Inc. (Handy City Building). BID EVALUATION COMMITTEE The bid evaluation committee was composed of the following people who, along with their staffs, would occupy the leased property: Robert Withrow, Chairman of the Committee and District Administrative Services Director; Samuel Kinsey, Financial and Accounting Director for District V; Patricia Bell, Program Manager for Aging and Adult Services; Fredrick M. O'Brien, General Services, Manager for District V; and Pegi Hollingsworth, Personnel Officer. Each member of the evaluation committee received a bid package consisting of the bid specifications and the bids submitted. Each member also received a bid evaluation sheet which was used to rate each bidder. They received no other instructions with regard to the evaluation criteria. Although each specific evaluation criterion was weighted, i.e., given a comparative value, the committee members were not specifically instructed as to how points should be assigned for each category. The evaluation committee went to each of the proposed buildings for the purpose of making a comparative evaluation based on the evaluation criteria provided. However, the primary focus was on the Koger Building and the petitioners' 1100 Building because they had submitted the lowest rental rates of the five bidders considered. After the viewing process, the members of the committee, except Mr. Withrow, discussed the factors that should be considered in applying each of the evaluation criterion. Although the committee members had not formulated the evaluation criteria to be used, they were uniquely qualified to apply the evaluation criteria provided to the specific needs and requirements of the HRS offices that would occupy the building. Though the committee members were in agreement as to the various factors to be included in each of the criterion listed, they did not discuss the points that would be awarded to each facility. Each member independently assigned points to each facility based on his or her own evaluation of the facility's comparative value in each of the listed categories. Koger received the best evaluation from all five committee members with point totals of 98, 98, 98, 98 and 99 out of a possible 100 points. Petitioners' building was ranked last of the five buildings evaluated by four of the members, with point totals of 75, 77, 71 and 75, and fourth by Mr. Withrow with a total of 81 points. Based on the comparative evaluation of the buildings, the committee recommended that the bid be awarded to Koger. By letter dated July 30, 1986, the District V office received authorization from the HRS Director of General Services to award the bid to Koger as being in the best interest of the department and state. THE EVALUATION CRITERIA The ITB included the evaluation criteria list used by the committee to ascertain the relative value of each building. At the top of the page it is stated: The successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated... The evaluation criteria are divided into three general areas: (1) Associated Fiscal Costs, (2) Location, and (3) Facility. Each general area includes subcategories, with each subcategory being given a total maximum value. Each of the criteria disputed by petitioners is discussed below. 1(a) Rental rates for basic term of lease. (Weighting: 45) All of the bids received by HRS were within the rental limits established by the Department of General Services and also much lower than expected. Even the highest bid was lower than anticipated, and Koger's and petitioners' bids were considered especially desirable. The bids received, listed at present value for the ton year basic lease period, are as follows: BIDDER TOTAL COST AMOUNT MORE THAN LOW BID 1100 BUILDING $1,881,690.1 KOGER 1,993,131.4 $111,441.3 JUSTICE 2,473,559.8 591,869.7 ICOT 2,655,306.1 773,616.0 HANDY CITY 3,223,202.0 1,341,511.9 Rental rates for the basic term of the lease were given a weighted value of 45. All of the committee members gave petitioners 45 points, as the low bidder, and all gave Koger 44 points as the next low bidder. However, four of the members simply agreed that the low bid would receive the maximum amount of points with each subsequent low bidder receiving one less point than the one before it, which resulted in the high bidder receiving 41 points even though its bid was 1.7 times greater than the low bid. Only Mr. Withrow made an attempt to prorate the points based on the differences in the amount bid, thus resulting in the high bidder receiving only 20 points. However, even Mr. Withrow awarded Koger 44 points based on the minimal difference between the Koger bid and the petitioners' bid. Both Mr. Withrow and Mr. Kinsey explained the award of 44 points to Koger by comparing the difference in the amounts bid to the HRS District V budget or the budgets of the entities using the facilities. However, the purpose of the evaluation was to compare each facility to the other facilities. Thus, the award of points for rental rates should have been based on a comparison of the rates offered. Although it was reasonable to assign the maximum number of points to petitioners, as the low bidders, the amount of points assigned to the remaining bidders should have been based on a comparison of the amount of each bid to the low bid. This would have made a significant difference in the points awarded to Justice, ICOT, and Handy City; however, even using a strict mathematical computation would not significantly affect the points awarded Koger due to the minimal difference in Koger's bid and petitioners' bid. Koger would receive no less than 42 points, only 2 points less than awarded, regardless of the method of mathematical computation used. 1/ 2(a) Proximity of offered space in central or preferred area of mad boundaries (Weighting: 5) All the members of the committee agreed that Koger is in the most preferred area because its location is more accessible to the employees and the persons who visit the office than any of the other buildings. Koger is in northeast St. Petersburg, minutes from the interstate. The 1100 Building is located in a more congested area in downtown Clearwater on the extreme northern boundary of the designated area. In making a comparison Of the building locations, all of which were located within the map boundary, the committee jusifiably determined that the building that was the most strategically located, in terms of accessibility, would be considered to be in the most preferred area. Thus, Koger was awarded five points by all committee members. The 1100 Building received 2, 0, 1, 3 and 1 points. Although all committee members awarded Koger the highest points, only one committee member resided closer to the Koger Building than the other buildings. Mr. Withrow, who lives closer to the 1100 Building than Koger, gave the 1100 Building only 1 point because it was more inaccessible to the district clients and employees. Further, the District Administrator, who approved the lease to Koger, resides closer to the 1100 Building. 2(b) Frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation within proximity of the offered space (Weighting: 5) Both Koger and the 1100 Building received the maximum of five points in this category except from Mr. Withrow who gave the 1100 Building four points. The committee members felt that the bus transportation as about the same for each building. Although the 1100 Building had more buses passing the facility due to its location in downtown Clearwater, the committee considered the destination of the buses and concluded that a person would wait the same length of time for a bus to take him to his destination from either the Koger Building or the 1100 Building. Mr. Withrow differed on the points awarded because he considered the Koger location to be better due to its proximity to the airport. The district office has a large number of people that visit from Tallahassee and other districts in the state. 2(c) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on the efficient and economical conduct of departmental operations planned for the requested space. (Weighting: 3) Koger received the maximum of 3 points from every committee member in this category; the 1100 Building received 0 points from every member. Although this category is listed within the general area of "Location", the committee members followed the category requirement and considered all environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building. In the 1100 Building, committee members noted problems with the air conditioning system and the elevators. The building was not maintained well, and the bathrooms were small and poorly ventilated. The HRS parking at the 1100 Building was not conveniently located. To get to the parking lot from the building an employee would have to cross a parking lot adjacent to the building, cross an intersection and then walk up to a block to get to his or her car. Many of the office employees work late and would be walking to their cars after dark, and there was concern expressed for employee safety considering the parking arrangement offered by petitioners. Koger had none of the problems observed at the 1100 Building. Further, Koger was better suited for the handicapped because there was no need to use a ramp as there was at the 1100 Building. 3(a) Conformance of space offered to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid. (Weighing: 10) 3(b) Susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization. (Weighting: 10) 3(c) Provisions of the aggregate square footage in a single building. Proposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two locations...within 100 yards of each other. (Weighting: 10) Koger's bid is for a two-story building containing approximately 39,000 square feet. The 1100 Building is a 15-story building. It would provide approximately 39,000 square feet on the second, fourth, fifth, part of the eighth, part of the ninth, and twelfth floors. The space allocation in the 1100 Building, spread over 6 floors, would provide a major problem in efficiently locating the staff. Certain offices could not be placed on certain floors because of space restrictions, and related offices could not be placed in close proximity to each other. Offices that needed to be on the same floor could not be located on the same floor. Because the space offered by petitioners is spread over 12 floors, accessibility to related offices would be much more difficult. Further, the limited space per floor makes it more difficult for HRS to properly utilize the space provided. None of the testimony provided by the committee witnesses related the "conformance of the space offered to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid" (e.s.) The ITB lists the offices and rooms required, giving sizes for each. Other than the total square footage, which petitioners met, there were no other specific requirements contained in the ITB. None of the committee members compared the conformance of the space offered to the specific room and office requirements. Indeed, the testimony of the committee members indicate that accessibility of the space was considered under criteria 3(a) rather than the conformance of the space to the ITB. Since the space offered by petitioners apparently complied with the requirements of the ITB, petitioners should have received 10 points for that category. The points awarded under 3(b) and 3(c), however, were proper. The space offered by the 1100 Building is not susceptible to an efficient layout or good utilization of the space offered. Further, the committee legitimately differentiated between the single buildings offered by each bidder, under 3(c), by considering where the space was located within the building. Obviously, factor 3(c) reflects a concern that the space offered not be too separated. It clearly provides that proposals for space in two separate buildings will get fewer points than single building proposals, and there is no indication that all single building proposals should receive the same maximum points. This factor clearly relates to the proximity of the spaces offered to one another, with contiguous space getting the most points. 3(d) Offers providing street-level space (Weighting: 2) Approximately half of the space offered by Koger is street-level space. Koger received two points. The 1100 Building provides no street-level space; it received no points in this category. Petitioners do not contend that they should have gotten any points, but assert Koger should only have gotten one point because not all its space was street-level space. THE COMPARATIVE EVALUATION The evaluation committee members were very conscientious in comparing the relative values of the buildings offered based on the criteria provided and their observations. Their evaluations were not made arbitrarily, but based upon the factors set forth in the evaluation criteria. Although errors were made in calculating the values awarded for categories 1(a) and 3(a), these errors were not due to arbitrary action by the committee members. Further, should the appropriate points under 3(a) be added to petitioners evaluations and three points be subtracted from Koger's evaluations (two points for 1(a) and one point for 3(d)), petitioners evaluations would be 79, 80, 76, 80 and 84, and Koger's would be 95, 95, 95, 95 and 96. The strategic plan for HRS, 1986-1991, Goal 12, is to enhance employee morale and job satisfaction in several ways, one of which is to replace or upgrade 90 percent of substandard physical work environments by December 31, 1990. The testimony and evaluations show, and the committee members found, that the Koger Center would provide a better work environment than the petitioners' 1100 Building. Based on the criteria set forth in the ITB, the Koger bid is the "lowest and best" bid.
The Issue Whether the Department of General Services should award state contracts for "walk-up convenience copiers" to Xerox Corporation in categories where Xerox was the only responsive bidder, or should reject Xerox's bid and solicit new bids on grounds that competitive bids were not received and there is no basis or excepting the award from competitive bid requirements; Whether the Department should disqualify Xerox's bid in one category for alleged material deviation from bid specifications where Xerox failed to initial a change in its bid price.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DGS reject Xerox's single responsive bids and readvertise; and That Xerox's bid for category Group-I, Type 3, Class 12, monthly rental acquisition plan, be rejected as nonconforming. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1984.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent, by and through his employees: (a) sold unregistered securities in the secondary market which were marked up in excess of 10 percent of the prevailing market price and which were not exempt from registration; (b) permitted an agent to service accounts prior to the agent's effective date of registration in the State and concealed such action; and (c) failed to maintain minimum net capital requirements for his corporation; and (d) failed to properly supervise the activities of his employees and agents.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owned the stock of a holding company and was an officer in a wholly owned subsidiary of the holding company. Respondent and another individual owned the stock of Dean, Johnson and Burke Holding Company ("Holding"). Holding owned the stock of Dean, Johnson and Burke Securities, Inc. ("Securities"). Respondent was the Secretary of Securities. Respondent had ultimate responsibility for disbursements and profits for Holding and Securities. Respondent monitored the checkbooks and daily expenses for Securities. Respondent's accountant provided financial information to Respondent concerning the daily operations of both companies. The information was provided on forms supplied by Respondent. Respondent kept a daily record of how much each company made or lost, how much was owed, and other accounting information. Respondent made sure that the bills were paid and that the credit of each company remained good. Respondent also controlled the hiring of key personnel. Brent A. Peterson was a manager and principal for Securities. 2/ Mr. Peterson set prices for the firm. Mr. Peterson engaged in transactions in which prices were set for securities to be sold to customers in excess of 10 percent above and below the prevailing market price. Out of 457 trades, approximately 38 were sold at prices that exceeded a 10 percent markup (the "marked up securities"). The marked up securities were sold at prices in excess of 10 percent of the prevailing market rate. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., ("NASD") determined that the securities were marked up in excess of 10 percent of the prevailing market price based upon Securities' contemporaneous costs. When a dealer is simultaneously making a market in a security (a "market maker"), the NASD looks to the prevailing market price for the purpose of determining if a markup exceeds 10 percent. The prevailing market price is the price at which dealers trade with one another, i.e., the "current inter-dealer market." 3/ When a dealer is not simultaneously making a market in a security (a "non-market maker"), the contemporaneous costs of the dealer are used for the purpose of determining if the securities have been marked up in excess of 10 percent. The contemporaneous costs reflect the prices paid for a security by a dealer in actual transactions closely related in time to the dealer's retail sales of that security. Such a standard is normally a reliable indication of prevailing market price in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Securities was not a market maker in the marked up securities. Even though securities may be sold at the same market price by one firm that is a market maker and one that is not a market maker, the latter may be deemed by the NASD to have marked up the security by more than 10 percent depending on the firm's contemporaneous costs. Many of the marked up securities were sold to customers at the same market price as that the customers would have paid other brokerage houses. 4/ Since Securities was not a market maker in the marked up securities, the standard used by the NASD to determine the amount of markup was the contemporaneous costs paid by Securities. The securities involved in the 38 trades were marked up more than 10 percent over Securities' contemporaneous costs. Respondent sold unregistered securities that were not exempt from registration. Unregistered securities may be sold if they are reasonably related to the current market price. The marked up securities were not reasonably related to the prevailing market price because they were marked up more than 10 percent over Securities' contemporaneous costs. Robert M. Long sold securities to customers as an employee of Securities prior to the effective date of his registration with Petitioner. Mr. Long was registered with Petitioner as a registered representative on May 18, 1988. Mr. Long was employed by Securities, from April 19, 1988, through September 20, 1989. Mr. Peterson advised Mr. Long that Mr. Long was authorized to trade securities. Pursuant to Mr. Paterson's advice, Mr. Long sold securities in Tel-optics prior to the effective date of his registration with Petitioner on May 18, 1988. Respondent concealed the sale of securities by Mr. Long prior to the effective date of his registration with Petitioner. Mr. Long's registered representative number was 34. Relevant order tickets showed Mr. Long as the person engaged in the sale of securities prior to May 18, 1988. Registered representative number 30 had been used on the order tickets at the time of the trades. After Mr. Long was registered with Petitioner, Mr. Long's number 34 was added to the order tickets and number 30 was crossed out. Securities operated with a net capital deficiency of approximately $30,000. The net capital deficiency resulted from the failure to accrue liabilities. The net capital deficiency was discovered by Mr. Long and Jeff Clark, an examiner for the NASD. The invoices for bills for the unaccrued liabilities were not filed where bills and invoices were normally filed and were found by Mr. Long concealed in drawers and other remote locations in the office. The net capital deficiency was discovered by Mr. Long on August 28, 1989, but not reported to Petitioner until September 19, 1989. Mr. Long did not notify Petitioner of the net capital deficiency at Securities until the deficiency could be verified by Mr. Clark.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent is guilty of committing the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, requiring Respondent to cease and desist from all violations of Florida statutes and rules, and imposing a fine in the aggregate amount of $9,000. The fine should be imposed in the amount of $2,000 for selling securities in excess of a 10 percent markup and $3,500 for each of the other two acts that constituted violations of applicable statutes and rules. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of July, 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1991.
