Findings Of Fact On August 24, 1967 Thomas York, an employee of Yell for Pennell, one of the fund members, was injured while so employed and, as a result of the injury, is a paraplegic. A judge of industrial claims has entered an order requiring the payment of $42.00 per week compensation plus medical and nursing expenses for York. Nursing care has recently been running $91.00 per week. York is the only outstanding claim for the 1967 fund year. The average medical expenses for York over the past several years has averaged $8,800 per year. For the 1975 year the medical costs for York were $17,14O. Thomas York is 57 years old. Because of his physical condition aggravated by a drinking problem his life expectancy is approximately five years. The proposed assessment, if each fund amber pays the full amount of time assessment, will produce less than $50,000 income to the fund. The medical payments on behalf of York have materially increased during the past three years. If this trend continues the assessment herein requested will be used up in less than two years. Each fund member is individually and collectively liable for the compensation and medical expenses for York. In the event the fund fails to make payments when due and suit is brought on behalf of York the Trustees or individual embers will be liable for the payments as well as attorney's fees. The fund is current on weekly compensation payments to York, but has deferred payments of medical expenses with the concurrence of the doctor. The present assets remaining in the fund to make payments is less than $1,000. The primary insurance carrier for the fund, State Fire & casualty Company, went into receivership and no payments can be anticipated from this source. The Trustees brought legal action against various parties to recoup expenses to the fund resulting from the default of the primary carrier, but to date those actions have not been marked with success.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Central Phosphates, Inc. ("CPI"), a Delaware corporation, engaged in the business of processing phosphate and manufacturing phosphate fertilizer. Petitioner rents and operates a phosphate fertilizer processing plant which is located in the vicinity of Plant City, Florida (the "Plant"). At issue in this proceeding is whether a sales tax under Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977), is due on the rental of the Plant. The Plant was constructed in 1974. The construction was financed in an arrangement involving CF Realty, a sister company of CPI which is wholly owned along with CPI by CF Industries, Inc. CF Realty originally purchased the equipment and other personal property that constitute the Plant from certain contractors. CF Realty then sold the Plant to Plantlease Corporation ("Plantlease"), a New York for profit corporation. Plantlease is a wholly owned subsidiary of Morgan Guarantee Company, a New York lending institution. Plantlease was organized solely and specifically to acquire title to the Plant and to lease the Plant back to CPI, which would operate the Plant. Plantlease paid for the Plant by assuming CF Realty's indebtedness on the construction loan and by paying some additional cash. Plantlease then leased the Plant to CPI for an initial term of 15 years. At the end of this initial term CPI has the right to elect to extend the lease for an additional two years or it may elect to purchase the Plant from Plantlease. At the end of the first extended term, CPI has the option of renewing the lease for a second renewal term of two years, or purchasing the Plant. If the lease is extended to the full 19 years, CPI is entitled to purchase the Plant at the end of that term. CPI makes quarterly rental payments to Plantlease pursuant to the lease. Since the first payment of rent in May, 1975, CPI has also been paying to Plantlease a sales tax of four percent of the amount of each payment pursuant to Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977). Plantlease, in turn, has remitted these payments to the Florida Department of Revenue with which it has registered as a dealer. Plantlease, as a potential claimant of a refund of the allegedly erroneously paid rental tax, has waived its right to a refund as reflected in its letter dated May 4, 1978, to the Florida Department of Revenue. Since May, 1975, CPI has paid sales taxes into the State Treasury in the amount of $861,322.55 which rental tax along with all other rental tax payments paid on the Plant since May, 1978, would be refunded if CPI were not liable for the rental tax. On May 8, 1978, CPI filed an Application for Refund with the Comptroller's Office of the State of Florida seeking a refund of the amount allegedly erroneously paid by CPI to the State Treasury and giving reasons for the claim for a refund. CPI bases its claim for a refund on the grounds that the Plantlease rental of the Plant to CPI constitutes an occasional or isolated sales transaction under Section 212.02 (9), Florida Statutes (1977). By letter dated May 30, 1978, the Comptroller's Office denied CPI's Application for Refund and determined that CPI's transaction with Plantlease was not exempt from Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977), and the regulations pursuant thereto. On or about July 7, 1978, CPI timely filed a Petition for a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1977), hearing on the issue of whether, for aforementioned reasons, a refund was due on the sales tax paid on the Plant. By application dated May 9, 1975, and received by respondent on May 12, 1975, Plantlease applied to respondent for a certificate of registration to engage in or conduct business as a dealer. Item 10 on the form application calls for "Type of Business." In the blank provided, Plantlease's agent has supplied "Rental of personal property." Underneath the blank, in parentheses, are examples of types of businesses, "Grocery, hardware, jewelry " Exhibit A-I, attached to Joint Exhibit No. 2. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's application for refund. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX Except for the final paragraph, the findings of fact in the recommended order are based on the parties' stipulation, which was received as joint exhibit No. 2. Paragraphs one, two, three, five, nine and ten of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been adopted in toto. The first sentence of paragraph four of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been rejected as not being supported by the evidence. The second sentence has been adopted, in substance. Paragraph six of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted except for the second sentence, which is actually a proposed conclusion of law. Paragraph seven of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance. Paragraph eight of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted except for the second sentence, which is actually a proposed conclusion of law. Paragraphs eleven and twelve of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been rejected as contrary to the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Alvarez, Esquire Gary P. Sams, Esquire Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams Post Office Box 5617 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed real estate salesman with license number 0364554. On or about August 13, 1982, Richard J. and Gav Greco entered into a lease purchase agreement with James C. and Phyllis Waid for residential property located at 1685 Markham Woods Road, Longwood, Florida. The purchase price of the Waid property was $190,000 towards which the Grecos made a $10,000 non-refundable deposit and agreed to pay a monthly rental of $1000. On or about November 14, 1982, the Grecos executed an Agreement with Respondent and his wife by which the Grecos assigned all rights and privileges relating to the lease and purchase of the residence at 1685 Markham Woods Road to the Alvarados. The consideration to be given for this Agreement was a payment of $10,000 by the Alvarados to the Grecos, with $5000 payable upon signing of the Agreement and $5000 payable within six months. The Alvarados, as assignees, agreed to abide by all provisions of the lease purchase agreement and were to make their first $1000 monthly lease payment to the Waids on December 4, 1982. Respondent gave Richard J. Greco a check in the amount of $5000 dated November 14, 1982 and requested that he hold the check for a couple of days before depositing it. Greco complied with the request, but was advised on December 3, 1982 that Respondent's $5000 check had been returned unused by Respondent's bank due to the fact that Respondent's account had been closed. Respondent has never paid the Grecos any part of the $10,000 due them under the assignment executed November 14, 1982. Respondent made no monthly lease payments on the property to the Waids. By letter dated February 25, 1983, James C. Waid notified the Grecos and the Alvarados that the lease purchase agreement was in default and that the $10,000 deposit paid by the Grecos was being forfeited because the rent was in arrears. The Grecos paid the Waids an additional $4000 on March 1, 1983, which represented the unpaid lease payments, for a general release from all obligations under the lease purchase agreement. Respondent and his wife executed a promissory note on March 1, 1983 whereby they agreed to pay the Grecos $10,000 on or before March 16, 1983, but no payments have ever been made pursuant to this promissory note. The Grecos brought suit against Respondent and his wife for damages arising out of this transaction, and obtained a Final Judgment on June 30, 1983 in Case No. 83-1191-CA-03-P, Circuit Court in and for Seminole County, in the amount of $15,101.28. The Grecos have not been able to execute this Final Judgment and therefore no payments on this judgment have been made to them by the Respondent or his wife. At the time of this transaction, the Alvarados were family friends of the Grecos. Richard J. Greco entered into this transaction with Respondent primarily because of the personal acquaintance and not because Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman. However, Greco knew that Respondent was licensed and therefore assumed that he was a man of integrity who would deal fairly with him in this real estate transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a Period of one (1) Year. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, Fl. 32802 Ignacio J. Alvarado 5166 Glasgow Avenue Orlando, Fl. 32819 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Fl. 32802 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, F.S., Chapters 120.455 and 475, F.S., and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is now and at all times material hereto was a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida having been issued License No. 0418629, in accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. The last license issued was as a salesman with a home address of 594 Andrews Street, Ormond Beach, Florida, 32075. From April 8, 1987, until September 11, 1987 he was on inactive status. From September 11, 1987 until at least November, 1987, he was on active status. His license expired March 31, 1988 and has not been renewed. Respondent and the owners (Goldsmiths) of certain property at 49 Sea Island Drive, North Ormond Beach, Florida, entered into an equity sharing agreement on October 1, 1986. Thereafter, Respondent was half owner of the property, and acted as agent for himself and the Goldsmiths for management and rental of the property. Sometime in early 1987, Respondent's former wife contacted Richard M. Dow of Watson Realty Corporation concerning Watson Realty Corporation's assuming management and rental authority over the property. Mr. Dow gave Respondent's wife a packet of information which included several types of material, including but not limited to, a blank standard lease form which had been stamped at the top with the name WATSON REALTY CORPORATION 425 S. YONGE STREET [U.S. 1] ORMOND BEACH, Florida 32074 The name "Watson Realty" was also printed in the body of the lease as agent for the premises, which, like all other crucial information was left blank. No agreement was ever reached by which Watson Realty Corp. or Mr. Dow were to take over management of the premises. On or about April 1, 1987, while still on active license status, the Respondent negotiated a six month lease of the premises at 49 Sea Island Drive, North Ormond Beach, Florida, with Sidney and Edythe Hirsch. By filling out the blank lease form obtained from Watson Realty Corp., Respondent entered into the six-month lease on behalf of himself and the Goldsmiths. He filled out the blank spaces with his name as lessor and the Hirsches as lessees, and crossed out the "Watson Realty Corp." in the body of the lease, substituting his own name therefor. He failed to cross out the stamped Watson Realty Corp. name and address at the top of the page. At the time of the signing of the lease, Respondent advised Mr. Hirsch that he was a licensed real estate agent because he had been taught he must make such disclosures in personal dealings so as not to take advantage of laymen. At formal hearing, he denied ever representing himself as an agent of Watson Realty Corp. or of Mr. Dow. Mr. Hirsch likewise testified that no such representation was made, only that Respondent said something like, "I work with them." Both Respondent and Mr. Hirsch concur that Respondent represented himself as the owner of the property in question without mentioning the Goldsmiths' interest. Hirsch knew and agreed to the scratching through of the Watson corporate name in the body of the contract, and to the substitution of Respondent's name therefor, but no one thought to cross through the stamped Watson name and address at the top of the page. In connection with the lease, Mr. Hirsch gave to the Respondent a $600 security deposit. Respondent shared the rent proceeds with the Goldsmiths even though he did not include their names on the lease or specifically advise the Hirsches of the Goldsmiths' interest in the property. Although the better course of action would have been for Respondent to make a fuller disclosure and to accurately make out the lease agreement with regard to the Goldsmiths' interest, no fraud or intent to defraud either the Goldsmiths or the Hirsches was demonstrated in Respondent's omissions in this regard. At no time alleged herein was Respondent registered as a real estate salesman in the employ of Watson Realty Corp. and at no time was the Respondent employed by Watson Realty Corp. in any capacity. Upon the termination of the lease period, the Hirsches vacated the house and made demands upon the Respondent for the return of their $600 security deposit. The Respondent refused to return the deposit because of substantial damage to the property in three rooms of the house. Hirsches' attorney and Respondent met to attempt to resolve the issue and then had a trial date set. Respondent appeared on the originally scheduled trial date but the case was continued. Respondent separated from his wife and moved to a different address without maintaining contact with the Hirsches' attorney, the court, the Department of Professional Regulation, or the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC). Over a period of time, he lived at several addresses and eventually moved out of state. Although he was still living in the State of Florida at the time, he did not appear for trial on the security deposit demand, and on January 14, 1988, the Hirsches obtained a civil judgment against Respondent for payment of the $600 security deposit. Respondent had not satisfied the judgment as of the date of the filing of the Administrative Complaint herein and did not do so up through the date of formal hearing. Although Respondent expended a great deal of effort at formal hearing attempting to establish that he never received actual notice of the trial date for the $600 civil damages suit due to his frequent change of addresses during the course of his divorce, that is immaterial because the law presumes notice once suit is filed and properly served as apparently occurred in that case. Unless set aside, the judgment against Respondent was final and Respondent owed Hirsch the money due under it. However, under the circumstances, it is found that Respondent did not fail to pay Hirsch on the judgment through any intent to defraud, but merely through a misunderstanding as to the effect of the judgment. Mr. Hirsch eventually sought and obtained reimbursement of the $600 judgment amount from the FREC client security fund. The fund paid after significant unsuccessful attempts had been made to find Respondent. Respondent also maintained that he did not know about the reimbursement proceedings instituted by FREC until four days before formal hearing and he made offers at formal hearing to pay off this amount. He was not charged in the pending Administrative Complaint in this proceeding with any fraud with regard to his failure to respond to service in the FREC client security fund reimbursement proceeding.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-6331 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF): Petitioner' s PFOF: Petitioner filed no PFOF. Respondent' s PFOF: 1,13,14 Accepted in part; the remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts as found. 2-5 Rejected as subordinate to the facts as found. 6-12 Rejected as immaterial and as referencing and relying upon matters outside the record as created at formal hearing. 15,16 Rejected in part as subordinate to the facts as found and in part as cumulative and otherwise as mere argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr. Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. Frederick A. Bentley 402 Daytona Avenue Holly Hill, Florida 32017 Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32802 Kenneth Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of issuing checks from his escrow account without sufficient funds so as to constitute culpable negligence, breach of trust, misrepresentation, or concealment, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; failing to reconcile escrow accounts, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e) and (k), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61J2-14.012, Florida Administrative Code; employing an unlicensed person, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(c), Florida Statutes; failing to maintain business records, in violation of Section 475.5015, Florida Statutes; and violating a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate Commission by failing to pay a citation within the required time, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. If Respondent is guilty of any of these allegations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent became a licensed real estate salesperson in 1987. The following year, he became a licensed real estate broker, and he has remained a broker continuously since that time. From September 30, 1996, through January 30, 2000, Respondent was the qualifying broker of Express Realty and Investments, Inc. (Express Realty). At no time relevant to this case was Novellete Faye Hanse a Florida-licensed real estate broker or real estate salesperson. At all relevant times, Ms. Hanse was the office manager of Express Realty. Respondent formed Express Realty in 1995. Respondent was the sole director and president. Ms. Hanse's son was an officer of Express Realty from the time of its formation. Respondent met Ms. Hanse in 1991. She informed Respondent that she was a licensed mortgage broker. Respondent and Ms. Hanse agreed in late 1991 to form a joint real estate/mortgage broker operation in a single office. However, when Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992, Respondent, who has been a licensed general contractor since 1978, engaged exclusively in construction until 1995. Respondent formed Express Realty to pursue the prior plan of a joint real estate/mortgage broker operation. The two businesses occupied an office building owned by Ms. Hanse, who did not charge Respondent's business any rent. The address was 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. Express Realty served as an escrow agent in a contract dated May 9, 1999, for the sale and purchase of real property located at 6360 Southwest 23rd Street in Miramar. In this capacity, Express Realty, held various funds in escrow for the closing. For the closing, Express Realty issued two checks payable to the closing agent, totaling $19,169.08, and drawn on its escrow account. The checks, which are dated July 15, 1999, and signed by Ms. Hanse, bear the name, "Express Realty & Investments, Inc. Escrow Account" and bear the address 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. The bank failed to pay these checks due to insufficient funds. After receiving a complaint that Express Realty had failed to produce these escrow funds at the closing, Petitioner's investigator conducted an audit of Respondent's escrow account. At the audit, which took place the day prior to the day scheduled, the investigator found Ms. Hanse, but not Respondent, at the Express Realty office. Despite repeated requests on and after the day of the office visit, the investigator could not obtain relevant records from Ms. Hanse or Respondent concerning the real estate transaction for which Express Realty had issued escrow checks with insufficient funds. On August 23, 1999, the Florida Real Estate Commission issued a citation to Respondent at 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. The citation was served on Respondent within one week of the date of issuance. The $100-citation was for the failure to give the required disclosure or notice in a real estate transaction. The citation gave Respondent 30 days to contest the citation or 60 days to pay the citation. After the deadline, the investigator contacted Respondent and asked him about the citation. Respondent stated that he had forgotten about it. When Respondent still failed to pay the citation, the investigator called again, and Respondent stated that he had mailed the money, but it had been returned due to a faulty address. Respondent paid the citation approximately four months after it had been served on him. Shortly after Respondent belatedly paid the citation, Petitioner received another complaint concerning a contract for the sale and purchase of real property located at 850 Southwest 9th Avenue in Hallandale. In this transaction, Ms. Hanse represented herself to be a licensed real estate broker, showed the property to prospects, and accepted $5000 in escrow on behalf of Express Realty. In July 2000, Petitioner's investigator conducted an audit of Express Realty's escrow account. Again, the investigator was unable to find any documents by which he could undertake an independent reconciliation of the account or otherwise document the role of Express Realty in the subject transaction. At the hearing, Respondent claimed that he was unaware that Ms. Hanse had been conducting real estate business without his authority in the name of Express Realty. Although he admitted that she was an employee of Express Realty, he disclaimed any knowledge that she had removed him from the escrow account and otherwise taken over the management of the real estate broker company. However, Respondent could not explain why, after his claimed discovery of these misdeeds in the summer of 1999, he did nothing to prevent Ms. Hanse from continuing to use Express Realty as the means by which to conduct unlicensed real estate activities, as she did a few months later. Under the circumstances, Petitioner proved that Respondent was at all times aware that Ms. Hanse was conducting unlicensed real estate activities through Express Realty.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Counts I-IV and VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint, imposing a $5000 administrative fine, and suspending his license for three years; provided, however, if Respondent fails to pay the fine in full within 180 days of the final order, his license shall be revoked without further notice. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Hisey, Deputy Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Dean Saunders, Chairperson Florida Real Estate Commission Division of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Hardy L. Roberts, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Carstarphen Watkins Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Wayne Wagie 11900 North Bayshore Drive, Unit No. 5 Miami, Florida 33181
The Issue Has Respondent failed to secure that payment of workers' compensation for his employees, Section 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2004), justifying the entry of a stop-work order, Section 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), and the entry of a financial penalty against Respondent, Section 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes (2004)?
Findings Of Fact William Pangrass is a workers' compensation investigator for Petitioner. On July 27, 2004, following a public complaint, Mr. Pangrass went to a work site location in Gainesville, Florida. This visit was made to ascertain whether Respondent had secured workers' compensation for persons employed at the work site. He observed several persons doing framing and related activities that constituted construction. Respondent was at the work site supervising activities. Mr. Pangrass asked Respondent to provide proof of workers' compensation insurance for persons employed at the work site. Respondent told Mr. Pangrass that Respondent had a leasing arrangement with Modern Business Associates, Inc. (MBA) to provide lease employees for the job, which would make the leasing company responsible for workers' compensation coverage. The personnel leasing company (MBA) takes employees that would ordinarily work for an employer, hires them and leases them back, making the leasing company the employer for purposes of providing workers' compensation insurance. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 8 is a certificate of liability insurance for MBA in relation to Respondent. However, on the date in question, July 27, 2004, there was a dispute concerning coverage for the employees Travis Guarino and Thomas Hunter. On that subject, Respondent first told Mr. Pangrass that those two employees had just walked on the job that morning and that Respondent had not had time to inform MBA, so that the leased employees could be covered for workers' compensation insurance. Later Respondent told Mr. Pangrass that the employee names had been called into MBA so that workers' compensation insurance could be provided. Mr. Pangrass received a written communication from MBA concerning workers' compensation coverage for the employees at the work site, to include Messrs. Guarino and Hunter. This document is dated July 28, 2004. It is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 9. It says "the two new employees were covered from the time they began work for Mr. Marston." It refers to them by name with the date of hire/coverage reflected as 7/27/04. When Mr. Pangrass received Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 9, he called MBA and someone, who is not identified in the record, told Mr. Pangrass that they had received his application, taken to mean Respondent's application and that the subject employees were covered as of 5:30 that day. This is taken to mean 5:30 p.m. July 27, 2004. As part of the investigation Mr. Pangrass utilized the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS). The CCAS printout, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1, shows that Respondent and Marston Builders did not have separate workers' compensation insurance coverage apart from that provided by MBA. On July 27, 2004, at 3:27 p.m., Mr. Pangrass served Respondent with a written request for production of business records for penalty assessment calculation, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4, requesting various categories of records maintained by Respondent. The next day Mr. Pangrass received from Respondent copies of cancelled checks drawn on the account of Ronnie W. Marston, Jr., d/b/a Marston Builders, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. Some checks were paid to the order of Respondent. Some were paid to Lisa Marston for child support, day care, insurance and registration. One check was written to an auto sales company for the purpose "Nissan Sentra." Some checks were written to named individuals reflected in the list of employees on the work site July 27, 2004. Other checks were written to named individuals not at the work site on that date. The other persons referred to were in addition to Respondent and Lisa Marston. Some checks written to the third-party individuals noted the purposes, such as "sub-work" or "contracting labor." Other checks written to named individuals did not identify the purpose. Concerning payments made to Respondent in the checking account, all checks that were written to Respondent had dates in 2004. Prior to 2004, Respondent personally had been exempt from receiving workers' compensation coverage as a sole proprietor, notwithstanding his status as an employee. He is no longer entitled to elect exemption from coverage under terms set forth in Section 440.05, Florida Statutes, effective December 31, 2003. This is further reflected in the employer exemptions report pertaining to Respondent maintained by Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2. When the law changed, corporate officers could still elect exemption, sole proprietors could not. At all times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent was a sole proprietor. Based upon his belief that Messers. Guarino and Hunter were employed at the work site without workers' compensation coverage, Mr. Pangrass issued a stop-work order on July 27, 2004, at 3:27 p.m., Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 6. This decision was supported by the field interview worksheet completed by Mr. Pangrass, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 3. Based upon information discovered in the cancelled checks showing the payments that have been referred to, Mr. Pangrass entered an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on August 4, 2004, calling for $106,135.46 in penalties under authority set forth in Section 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes (2004). The Amended of Order of Penalty Assessment is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 7. It has attached a worksheet setting forth calculations pertaining to the persons who received the checks described. These calculations include class codes, the period of non-compliance, the gross payroll, the payroll column divided by 100, approved manual rate, premium calculations and penalty calculations the product of the proper premium multiplied by 1.5. The class codes were derived from the Scopes Manual, a listing published by NCCI that includes all occupations with job descriptions and classification numbers assigned to them. The Scopes Manual is used in the insurance industry and has been adopted by Petitioner in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021. The classification code selected to perform penalty calculations was that of "Carpentry- Detached One or Two Family Dwellings." This classification is Number 5645. The calculation of an assessed penalty included workers found at the work site on July 27, 2004, who were paid by MBA. As reflected in the cancelled checks, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5, those workers were also paid by Respondent. For this reason, they were considered to be dually employed and payments not received from the lease company entitled the employees to workers' compensation coverage from Respondent. Calculations in the penalty worksheet supporting the assessment included payments to Respondent and Lisa Marston. The portion of the check payments received in the name of Respondent were outside the December 21, 2003 date, when the right to select to exemption from workers' compensation coverage as an employee who was a sole proprietor had expired. The calculations and the worksheet include checks written to Lisa Marston upon the theory that the payments benefit Respondent no less so had they been paid to Respondent directly, who in turn paid Lisa Marston. Calculations in the worksheet leading to the assessed penalty included checks written to individuals regardless of the stated purpose for the check, as well as those for whom the purpose of the payments was not made known.
Recommendation Upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered keeping the stop-work order in effect pending payment of the modified penalty assessed for failure to secure payment of workers' compensation. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Ronnie W. Marston d/b/a Marston Builders 25506 North West County Road 241 Alachua, Florida 32615 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate. Petitioner is also responsible for regulating the practice of real estate on behalf of the state. Respondent is licensed as a real estate broker under license number 0602015. The last license was issued to Respondent as a broker t/a Oliver Realty and Management, 2431 Lot a Fun Avenue, Winter Park, Florida. On August 23, 1994, Respondent was licensed as a real estate sales person. He was employed by Mr. Kevin Jon Pribell, a licensed real estate broker. On August 29, 1994, Mr. Pribell terminated Respondent's employment. On August 30, 1994, Mr. Pribell delivered a copy of a termination form to Respondent at Respondent's residence. Mr. Pribell agreed to compensate Respondent on all transactions that were pending on or before the date of termination. The First Transaction On August 23, 1994, Respondent made an offer to purchase residential property for $80,500. Mr. Bruce and Mrs. Benitta Tegg owned the property (the "sellers"). The details of the offer were described in a standard contract for sale and purchase approved by the Florida Association of Realtors and the Florida Bar Association and in an attached addendum. The addendum required the sellers to hold a purchase money first mortgage of $80,500, amortized over 12 years at an annual interest rate of 8.5 percent. The addendum stated that the sellers were to receive $29,000 at closing as payment of the first 48 months payments. The sellers would then receive 30 equal monthly installments of $893.60, which would total $26,808. The unpaid balance was due in a balloon payment of $46,980.47 at the end of 78 months. The total amount to be paid the sellers, including interest, was $102,788.47. Respondent included a $1,000 earnest money deposit with the contract for sale and purchase. The sellers accepted Respondent's offer. Closing was set for September 6, 1994. 2/ On September 1, 1994, Respondent submitted a document to the sellers for their acceptance and signature. The document was entitled, "Partial Purchase/Cash Flow Agreement" (the cash flow agreement"). Respondent never mentioned the cash flow agreement to the sellers as part of the original offer. The cash flow agreement required the sellers to assign the mortgage of $80,500 to Orange Hearing Aid Center Employee Pension Plan (the "pension plan"). Respondent would have no money invested in the property initially. The initial payment of $29,000 would be a loan from the pension plan to Respondent. Respondent would repay the pension plan over time. The loan from the pension plan to Respondent was to be secured by the sellers' property. In the event Respondent defaulted on the loan from the pension plan, the sellers' property would be sold. The sale proceeds would first pay off the loan from the pension plan to Respondent. Any remaining sale proceeds would go the sellers. The sellers refused to accept Respondent's amendment of the original offer. Respondent defaulted on his original offer. The transaction did not close. The sellers' real estate agent divided Respondent's $1,000 earnest money deposit with the sellers because Respondent defaulted on the original offer accepted by the sellers. Respondent did not attempt to engage in "equity skimming." 3/ The sellers were not required to transfer title to Respondent prior to receiving $29,000. Respondent would not receive any other equity in the property. 4/ The cash flow agreement had the effect of converting Respondent's obligation on the purchase money mortgage from recourse to non-recourse debt. 5/ It also had the effect of subordinating the purchase money mortgage to the $29,000 loan to Respondent. 6/ Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent is not guilty of dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction. Respondent disclosed the terms of the cash flow agreement to the sellers approximately six days before the scheduled closing. The sellers had adequate time to review the proposal. They chose to reject it. The sellers received approximately $500 after Respondent's default. That amount was reasonable compensation for taking their property off of the market for two weeks. The Second Transaction On September 1, 1994, Respondent offered to purchase a residential property owned by Ms. Gloria Alexander. Respondent offered to purchase the property for $114,500. Ms. Alexander accepted the offer. On September 1, 1994, Respondent was not licensed as a broker. Respondent's employing broker had terminated Respondent's employment two days before the contract for the second transaction was executed. The second transaction was not pending on or before August 29, 1994, when Respondent was still employed by Mr. Pribell, and Mr. Pribell was not legally entitled to a commission on the second transaction. In an abundance of caution, Respondent indicated on the contract that the selling broker was Mr. Pribell. Respondent acted in his own behalf in the second transaction. He was the buyer, i.e., a principal and not an agent for a principal. Respondent indicated on the written offer that he was acting as the buyer's agent. Respondent made a good faith attempt to disclose on the contract that he had been terminated from Mr. Pribell's employment and was not acting as the agent of the selling broker. Respondent did not deceive anyone and did not intend to do so. Respondent did not violate Sections 475.42(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(e) by operating as a broker without a valid broker's license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(e), and Sections 475.42(1)(a). RECOMMENDED this 14th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner and its controlling person are entitled to licenses as, respectively, an employee leasing company and a controlling person of an employee leasing company.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has operated as an employee leasing company since November, 1989. Susan J. Haggerty is the president and controlling person of Petitioner. An employee leasing company assumes from the employer many of the administrative responsibilities normally associated with employment. The employee leasing company replaces the original employer by employing the employees and leasing them back to their original employer. For each leased employee, the employee leasing company assumes responsibility for workers compensation, employee benefit plans, unemployment compensation, withholding, and social security payments. The former employer enters into an agreement with the employee leasing company under which it pays a set amount to lease its former employees. The amount includes the leasing company's markup and all of the costs projected to be associated with the employee, including compensation and the items described in the preceding paragraph. In the case of Petitioner, the fee is not subject to readjustment, even if one of the items, such as workers compensation, later proves to be higher than projected. Due to the enactment of new legislation regulating employee leasing companies, on July 13, 1992, Petitioner and Ms. Haggerty filed with Respondent a joint application for licensure. Petitioner and Ms. Haggerty had been operating in their respective roles for at least six months prior to January 1, 1992, which qualifies them for licensure under the "grandfathering-in" provisions cited in the Conclusions of Law. Following receipt of the joint application on July 13, 199, Respondent informed Petitioner, by letter dated July 20, 1992, that the application was missing various items. The letter requested, among other things, financial statements for the two preceding years, including a corrected statement for 1991 and a certification that there had been no material adverse changes in financial statements since the date of the last statement. The portion of the application of the controlling person also required various items, such as fingerprints. The letter advised that the missing material must be supplied by August 5, 1992, if Respondent were to be able to issue the licenses by the statutory deadline of October 1, 1992. By letter dated July 30, 1992, Petitioner supplied additional information in response to the July 20 letter. By letter dated August 7, 1992, Respondent informed Petitioner that various deficiencies continued to exist. Among other things, the letter states that the 1991 financial statement must conform to generally accepted accounting principles, include a statement of cash flows, and describe loan receivables by footnote. Also, the letter asserts that the 1991 financial statement shows a tangible accounting net worth deficiency of about $109,000 when adjusted for loan receivables to controlling persons. By letter dated September 25, 1992, Petitioner submitted a financial statement dated August, 1992, containing footnotes describing loan receivables. By letter dated October 19, 1992, Petitioner references a letter dated October 8, 1992, from Respondent and encloses documentation concerning Ms. Haggerty's personal finances. In the October 19 letter, Ms. Haggerty promises that she will attend Respondent's November 2 meeting to answer questions regarding her previous employment. The letters dated July 20 and August 7 from Respondent are the only formal notification of deficiencies, errors, or omissions given Petitioner within the time permitted by statute. Consistent with its practice, Respondent considered the joint application to be separate applications of the employee leasing company and the controlling person. Consistent with Respondent's practice, it would, if appropriate, grant a license to a controlling person without granting a license to the employee leasing company with which she is associated. Respondent's first meeting at which it considered Petitioner's application was October 5, 1992. Ms. Haggerty and an attorney were in attendance. Although Board members wanted information as to where Ms. Haggerty had previously worked, they would not let her speak. At Respondent's November 2 meeting, Board members developed a long list of information that they wanted in order to consider the application. Petitioner's attorney, who was in attendance, asked that they memorialize their demands in a letter. When Respondent took up Petitioner's application at the December 8 meeting, Ms. Haggerty was not in attendance. Warned by its counsel that the statutory time limit had expired on the application so that the applicants were deemed licensed, Respondent elected to take no action as to Ms. Haggerty's controlling person application and to deny Petitioner's application. Respondent's order concerning Petitioner, which was entered December 18, 1992, states that the application is denied due to the failure to submit a completed application for licensure, reflect all liabilities in the financial statements, disclose a disputed workers compensation premium in the financial statements, comply with the statute requiring the payment of workers compensation premiums, comply with Section 468.525(3)(c) and (d) regarding tangible accounting net worth and positive working capital, and comply with Section 468.531(1)(d) regarding providing Respondent with false or forged evidence of the purpose of obtaining a license. The final order also predicates the denial of the application on a misrepresentation of fact regarding the issue of disputed premiums. By stipulation, the parties have identified the specific issues for denial of the corporate application as the failure to identify and account for workers compensation premiums owed Hartford Insurance Company and the treatment of "related party items" in the financial statements. The application form contains an affidavit regarding workers compensation. A portion of the affidavit attests: "I further certify that . . . all premiums due as of this date have been fully paid to all Worker's Compensation insurance carriers except for disputed premiums listed below:". The form contains blanks for the name of any carriers and the disputed amounts. Signing the affidavit as president of Petitioner, Ms. Haggerty left blank the above-described portion of the application form, thereby attesting that there were no disputed workers compensation premiums. As of July 13, 1992, this representation was accurate and complete. As is typical with workers compensation, the carrier performs annual audits to determine if any premium arrearages exist. Petitioner's fiscal year- end with Hartford was November. The audit for fiscal year-end 1991 was not yet completed by July, 1992. It was only at the end of August, 1992, that Ms. Haggerty or anyone else at Petitioner learned that Hartford would be asserting a premium arrearage. After Hartford completed the audit and claimed an arrearage, Petitioner's auditor asserted that at least a portion of the arrearage, which was in the form of a surcharge, was unlawful. Ms. Haggerty fully discussed the matter with Petitioner's independent professional consultants. Petitioner's outside accountant ascertained the appropriate amount to be reserved for the contingent liability. In accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, the accountant prepared the August, 1992, financial statement, in which the appropriate amount for the liability is recorded among other current liabilities totalling $265,450 and the contingent liability is discussed in a footnote. Tangible accounting net worth is calculated by taking the total assets, exclusive of intangible assets such as goodwill, and reducing the total adjusted assets by the total liabilities. The August, 1992, financial statement reveals total assets of $439,462 without any intangible assets. Reduced by the total liabilities of $388,426, the financial statement discloses a tangible accounting net worth of $51,036. Positive working capital, or net working capital, is calculated by taking current assets and reducing them by current liabilities. Current assets include cash, inventories, receivables to be paid within one year, work in progress, and related-party receivables to be paid within one year. The August, 1992, financial statement reveals current assets of $417,566 and current liabilities of $384,990, for a positive working capital of $32,566. The August, 1992, financial statement discloses a related-party item of a promissory note from Ms. Haggerty to the corporation in the amount of $68,867. The note was a demand note, which, under generally accepted accounting principles, is treated as a current asset and is properly includible in determining positive working capital. Likewise, the note is properly includible in determining tangible accounting net worth. In fact, Ms. Haggerty repaid $40,000 in October, 1992, and, by year end, the corporation cancelled the remaining balance of the note in compensation for sums due to Ms. Haggerty. Ms. Haggerty is of good moral character and meets all other requirements for licensure as a controlling person.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Employee Leasing Companies certify for licensure to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suncoast Resource Management, Inc. as an employee leasing company and Susan J. Haggerty as a controlling person of an employee leasing company. ENTERED on December 9, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 9, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-871 Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3-4: rejected as irrelevant. 5-7: adopted or adopted in substance. 8-13: rejected as legal argument. 14-16: adopted or adopted in substance. 17-19: rejected as legal argument. 20-41: adopted or adopted in substance. 42: rejected as subordinate. 43: rejected as unnecessary. 44-47: rejected as not finding of fact. 48-50: rejected as unnecessary. 51-63, 70-79, and 82-92: rejected as irrelevant, repetitious, subordinate, and unnecessary. 64-69: adopted. 80-81: adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Anna Polk, Executive Director Board of Employee Leasing Companies 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0767 H. Richard Benchimol Benchimol, Hoft, and Strouse P.A. One Urban Centre 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard, Stuie 985 Tampa, Florida 33609 Michael A. Mone Office of the Attorney General Administrative Law Section Pl-10 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399
