Findings Of Fact Respondent Carter is the owner of real property located at 102 Hummingbird Lane, Crescent City, Putnam County, Florida, ("The Property") The Property has a shore length of 68.5 feet on Crescent Lake. Crescent Lake is a "water of the state" as defined in Section 403.031, F.S. The agency, now DEP, is the state agency charged with environmental concerns and permission to use submerged state lands. There are two types of authorization an applicant must receive in order to construct a dock on state owned submerged lands. The first is regulatory, which addresses issues concerning environmental impacts. The second is proprietary, which addresses issues concerning use of state owned submerged lands. Mr. and Mrs. Hageman, Petitioners herein, own property adjacent on the east of Mr. Carter's property. 1/ They have a 240 foot dock in place going out into Crescent Lake. Mr. Carter's westerly neighbor also has a shorter dock going into the lake. The Carters purchased the Property from an estate, with the announced intention to erect their own dock for water recreational purposes. Before closing the sale, they were warned off the property by Mr. Hageman who claimed his riparian rights would be violated if any dock were built on the Property. After inquiries to DEP and the Army Corps of Engineers, the Carters purchased The Property anyway. DEP has no jurisdiction to regulate docks under 1000 square feet. Mr. Carter received DEP Exemption 542504222 to construct a dock under 1000 square feet on The Property. Mr. Carter constructed a single family private use dock, including a boat shelter, extending from The Property into Crescent Lake. The dock was built approximately 35 feet from Hagemans' property line, straight out into the water, and 25 feet from the property line of his neighbor on the other side. This placed the Carter dock roughly perpendicular to the approximate center of Mr. Carter's shoreline. Petitioners conceded that Mr. Carter honored his westerly neighbor's property line, but asserted that he should have, and had not, honored his easterly property line, the line dividing his and Petitioners' property, waterward beyond the shoreline. In all, Petitioners Hageman have filed three formal petitions against the Carter dock. See Findings of Fact 16, 18, and 33, infra. All three petitions herein oppose the Carter dock as constructed upon a theory that it crosses Petitioner's riparian rights line and therefore violates the setback criteria found in Rule 18-21.004(3)(d) F.A.C.; that it blocks a channel exclusive to Petitioners' use and poses an impediment to navigation of all boats, particularly Petitioners' sailboat; that its boat shelter is enclosed contrary to rule; that it does not meet the ten-to-one rule; and that it blocks Petitioners' view and lowers their property value. The Hagemans initially filed a complaint with the DEP in regard to the dock. In response to the Hagemans' complaint, Steven Biemiller, an environmental specialist in the dredge and fill compliance/enforcement section of DEP's northeast district, and John Hendricks of the Army Corps of Engineers visited the Property on July 25, 1994. They found that the Carter dock as built exceeded 1,000 square feet in surface area. It was, however, consistent in length, width, and alignment with other docks in the area, including Petitioners' dock. Mr. Biemiller calculated Carter's dock to be 1,400 square feet. It therefore exceeded the state exemption criteria and required a state permit. Mr. Carter had constructed his dock without a valid permit from the state agency, and DEP responded by issuing him a warning letter. Carter and DEP thereafter entered into Consent Order O.C.G. 94-2443 to address the unpermitted dock construction. Testifying as an expert in the agency's enforcement and compliance procedures, Mr. Biemiller established that negotiated consent orders of this type are a standard agency procedure to resolve minor permitting violations. His testimony is accepted on that issue and to the effect that the purpose of all consent orders, including the one at issue here, is to return the non-complying structure to compliance with the applicable state rules and statutes. The consent order provides, in pertinent part, that Mr. Carter will (a) pay the agency $300.00, which amount includes a $200.00 civil penalty and $100.00 for agency costs and expenses; AND (b) reduce the size of his dock to under 1,000 square feet or obtain an after-the-fact permit whereby the agency would authorize the 1400 square foot dock to remain in place as already constructed. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the consent order. The consent order herein addressed DEP's environmental concerns by jump-starting the permit process through which the agency could examine the environmental impacts posed by the dock project. In Mr. Biemiller's expert opinion, this consent order accomplished the agency's statutory and regulatory goals at that point because Mr. Carter paid his fine and applied for a dredge and fill permit. Agency permit 542558842 was issued to Mr. Carter on November 16, 1994. It approved the proposed project and authorized construction of a private use dock having a 4.75-foot wide plus 230-foot long access walkway, a 10.3-foot wide and 20.3-foot long covered boat shelter, plus an 8.5-foot long and 12.8-foot wide waterward "L" platform, within Crescent Lake, Putnam County. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the permit. The Hagemans' concerns about the Carter dock and boat shelter blocking their view and diminishing their property value were raised by their petitions, but no evidence or argument was presented on the latter issue. "View" and market value concerns are not addressed by the jurisdiction or authority conferred upon DEP by either statute or rule, and may not be considered here. In determining whether or not to issue dredge and fill permits, the agency examines a project's impact on water quality, its biological impacts, whether the project is contrary to the public interest and how it impacts, if at all, on wetlands. The agency does not look at riparian rights. Those rights are addressed, if at all, by agency review of applications for consents of use and the rules applicable thereto. Thomas Wiley was the field inspector for the dredge and fill permit which is at issue. He visited Mr. Carter's property with another agency employee, Erica Robbins, to conduct a site assessment. Mr. Wiley prepared the Permit Application Appraisal. Mr. Wiley has a Bachelor of Science degree in environmental biology and twelve hours towards his Masters degree in the same discipline. He has been employed by the agency for four and a half years as a environmental specialist. During that time, he has reviewed approximately 300 dredge and fill applications. He was accepted as an expert in the agency's environmental resource permitting procedures and the impacts of dredging and filling projects on wetlands. Mr. Wiley recommended issuance of the permit in part based on his determination that the long term adverse impacts of the Carter dock on water quality are minimal and that the long term adverse impacts of the project on submerged resources also are minimal. His expert opinion on these issues is accepted, as is his unrefuted mixed fact and opinion testimony that the project site contains submerged beds of eelgrass (vallisnaria). These eelgrass beds end approximately 20 feet landward of the Carter boat shelter and dock. Carter's boat shelter and dock do not pose a significant impact to the eelgrass and will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife. The Carter boat shelter has one almost closed side, one side which descends to about one and a half feet above the water and two open ends. It is not substantially different from other local boat shelters. There are water hyacinths in the same area as the eelgrass and nearer to the shoreline. DEP has issued a permit to Mr. Hageman to clear such water hyacinths from a 25-foot swath in front of his property so as to keep clear the channel to his dock and boat shelter. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that Mr. Hageman has been zealous in his removal of water hyacinths and has exceeded the 25-foot limitation. Existence of this permit allowing Mr. Hageman to remove hyacinths and existence of this larger cleared swath of water/shoreline is not dependable evidence of the Hagemans' riparian rights claim and does not alter or affect DEP's determination that no aquatic plants will be seriously endangered by the Carter dock and boat shelter. The parties stipulated that the construction of Carter's dock has not, and will not, degrade the water quality of Crescent Lake and that the water quality standards set forth in Chapter 62-302 F.A.C., are not violated because of the construction of the dock. The parties stipulated that the Carter dock as constructed will not adversely affect the fishing or recreational value or marine productivity on Crescent Lake. The parties stipulated that the dock as constructed will not adversely affect any historical or archaeological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061 F.S. In determining whether a dock poses a navigational impediment, DEP looks for the presence of marked navigational channels and the proximity of the dock to other docks in the area. The credible competent evidence as a whole shows that the Carter dock is similar to the Hagemans' dock and is located about 100 feet west of the Hagemans' dock. The Carter structure also conforms with the prevailing alignment of all docks in the immediate area and its distance from neighboring structures is sufficient so that the Carter dock will not present a hindrance to navigation. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the Hagemans have sailed in and out from their adjacent dock without any obvious problems occasioned by the Carter dock. There is plenty of room between the Carter and Hageman docks so that the Carter dock has not so far obstructed the Hagemans' ability to navigate their sailboat. Mr. Carter has provided reasonable assurances that his dock is not contrary to the public interest under Section 373.414 (1)(a) F.S. In determining the cumulative impacts a project may have, the agency looks at the total impact of past, present and future projects on water quality and function in wetland systems. Mr. Wiley determined it is reasonable to expect other lakefront property owners will construct docks into the lake, but based on his experience and expertise, he concluded that Mr. Carter's project's long-term impact still will continue to be minimal. The permit is appropriate and insures compliance with all applicable statutory and rule guidelines for dredge and fill permits. Mr. Carter also applied to the agency for a consent of use for submerged state lands. This was appropriate because Crescent Lake is a "water of the state". A consent of use is generally a letter of authorization for minor projects, such as single family docks, bulkheads and dredging that occur on state owned land and submerged land. The ten-to-one ratio found in Rule 18- 21.005(1)(a)2 F.A.C. allows an applicant to have ten square feet of preempted area for every linear foot of the shoreline that he owns. If an applicant meets the rule criteria, he is issued a consent of use. Generally, if an applicant exceeds the criteria, he would be issued a lease, as opposed to a consent of use. The agency issued a consent of use to Mr. Carter on December 5, 1994. The Hagemans filed a petition challenging the consent of use. DEP acts as staff for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The authority to issue consents of use has been delegated to a planning manager. In the instant situation, that planning manager was Russell Price. Russell Price is employed by DEP as planning manager of the submerged land section and has served in that capacity for two years. Mr. Price holds a Bachelor of Science degree in biology, has a year of education towards his Master's degree in biology, and has reviewed approximately two to three hundred applications for consents of use. Mr. Price was accepted as an expert in state lands determination and regulation. In issuing the consent of use to Mr. Carter, Mr. Price relied on his education, training and experience in state lands regulation, and considered the application, the drawings, the agency's regulatory permit section's field report, comments from staff of the Army Corps of Engineers and a memorandum from the agency's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. See Finding of Fact 40. Mr. Price opined, on behalf of the agency's interpretation of its own statute and rules, that the agency does not uniformly require a lease where the ten-to-one rule is minimally exceeded; that the agency will issue a consent of use if the applicant's structure is still relatively small and is configured in the minimum way possible to obtain access at reasonable water depths; that in its discretion, the agency does not apply the ten-to-one rule to require leases; 2/ and that consents of use are issued to single docks that are the minimum length necessary to reach reasonable access to navigable waters. Mr. Price issued the consent of use in this case after determining that Mr. Carter's dock as constructed was a single family dock configured in the minimum size and length necessary to achieve reasonable access to navigable waters and that the nearshore area located adjacent to Mr. Carter's upland property required that his dock exceed the ten-to-one ratio in order to access reasonable water depths for navigation. In so doing, Mr. Price relied on the DEP Permit Application Appraisal measurement of the water depth at the end of Carter's dock as 4.5 feet deep and analyzed the configuration and angle of the other docks in the area. This was in accord with the specific language of Rule 18-21.005(1)(a)1 F.A.C. 3/ Evidence adduced at formal hearing suggests that there has been some erosion, possibly due to the removal of the water hyacinths and that shows that it is environmentally desirable to avoid recreational contact with the eelgrass, especially by boats. These factors also support the reasonableness of Carter's dock configuration, even though it minimally exceeds the ten-to-one rule. Petitioners Hageman contended that their riparian rights may be determined by projecting a line straight waterward from the upland fence line between their lot and Mr. Carter's property. If that is the appropriate determination of their riparian rights, then the Carter dock does cross that projected line, but that projected line has not been placed by a surveyor or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. At best, there has been a post erected by Mr. Hageman as the result of a prior lawsuit concerning easements. Respondent Carter's property is narrower than Petitioners' property and somewhat wedge-shaped. Petitioners assert that because the lake curves, Mr. Carter's riparian rights form a narrow pie slice-shaped area in the water. However, without a legal determination to that effect, there is only the foregoing unsupported assertion concerning either landowner's riparian rights. Although the agency's rules require a 25-foot setback of a dock (10- foot setback for marginal docks) from the applicant's riparian rights line, 4/ the agency does not measure the setback of a dock by that rule unless there has already been a determination of a riparian rights line by a court of law. DEP witnesses clearly enunciated and explicated agency policy that DEP does not affirmatively take it upon itself to determine riparian rights as between private land owners because the agency has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to do so. To Mr. Price's knowledge, the agency has never determined the riparian rights line of two private property owners. The agency relies on circuit courts to resolve those types of disputes. In response to the Hagemans' concerns about encroachment on their asserted riparian rights and in an abundance of caution, Mr. Price sent aerial photographs, the county plat map, and the drawings submitted with Mr. Carter's application to the DEP's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. He requested that the Bureau make a guesstimation of the common riparian rights line based on a methodology it has developed for estimating riparian rights lines. The memorandum constitutes little more than legal research discussing various methodologies courts have used in the past for determining riparian rights. It reaches no definite conclusion with regard to the riparian rights between the Hagemans and Carter. Beyond explaining and supplementing the direct evidence of the agency policy to rely on courts to determine riparian rights, its contents and conclusions are unreliable hearsay which is outside the parameters of Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S., because no one connected with the preparation of that report testified at formal hearing. No reliable determination of the riparian rights line dividing the Petitioners' property and the property of Applicant/Respondent Carter was presented as evidence at formal hearing. DEP is not aware that any court determination specifically setting out the boundaries of the parties' riparian rights exists. DEP did not require Mr. Carter to institute a lawsuit to establish riparian boundaries before considering his application. This also appears to be common agency procedure. The agency addressed the absence of a clear showing of riparian rights and implemented its policy directed thereto in the standard language of the consent of use, which provided in pertinent part, as follows: 2. Grantee agrees that all title and interest to all lands lying below the historical mean high water line or ordinary high water line are vested in the Board, and shall make no claim of title or interest in said lands by reason of the occupancy or use thereof * * * 5. Grantee agrees to indeminity, defend and hold harmless the Board and the State of Florida from all claims, actions, lawsuits and demands arising out of this consent. * * * 12. In the event that any part of the structure(s) consented to herein is determined by a final adjudication issued by a court of competent jurisdiction to encroach on or interfere with adjacent riparian rights, Grantee agrees to either obtain written consent for the offending structure from the affected riparian owner or to remove the interference or encroachment within 60 days from the date of the adjudication. Failure to comply shall constitute a material breach of this consent and shall be grounds for its immediate termination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that dismisses the three petitions, ratifies the consent order, and issues the after- the-fact permit and consent of use with the safeguards already contained therein to protect the Petitioners' riparian rights in case the Petitioners hereafter obtain a circuit court determination of those riparian rights. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1995
The Issue The only issue to be resolved is whether a 440-square-foot dock to be constructed by the Town of Fort Myers Beach (Town) creates a navigational hazard and therefore cannot qualify for a regulatory exemption pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state agency having jurisdiction over the construction and permitting of docks. The Department also acts as the staff to the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board of Trustees) concerning the use of sovereign submerged lands owned by the Board of Trustees. The Town is a small municipal corporation located on a barrier island (Estero Island) just west-southwest of the City of Fort Myers in Lee County. Matanzas Pass, designated by the Department as a Class II Outstanding Florida Water, lies between Estero Island and the mainland. The Shanoskys own property at 177 Hercules Drive, Fort Myers Beach. The parcel lies on the north side of the proposed dock. Their home was constructed in 1952, and they are the second owners. An L-shaped dock extending from the shoreline into Matanzas Pass was built by the first owner in the 1970s and still remains in place. The dock is approximately the same length (49 feet) as the pier proposed by the Town. Michael Steck owns property on the south side of the proposed dock at 190 Hercules Drive, Fort Myers Beach. The parcel was purchased only for boating purposes, as there is no residence on the property. An L-shaped dock extending into Matanzas Pass was in place when he purchased the property in 2001. His dock extends slightly further from the shoreline into the water than the proposed new dock. Background Since at least 1944, or long before the Town was incorporated, a dock extended from the public right-of-way at the end of Hercules Drive into Matanzas Pass. By 1953, private docks were located on what are now Petitioners' properties, directly adjacent to the public dock. Due to age and weather-related factors, the public dock deteriorated over time and was completely removed by the Town in October 2015. The width of Matanzas Pass from shoreline to shoreline at that point is more than 750 feet, while the navigational channel is more than 300 feet wide. Over the years, the old Town dock changed configurations several times. In 2002, the dock was extended to 49 feet beyond the bulkhead of the shoreline and remained unchanged until its removal in 2015. After the dock was removed, a number of residents urged the Town to build a new dock that will be used for fishing and viewings. Boats will not be moored at the pier. Except for Petitioners, all residents in the area support that effort. Besides multiple neighborhood meetings, several public meetings were conducted by the Town Council concerning the construction of a new dock. On May 22, 2017, Mr. Baker, the former public works director, sent all area residents a letter, along with a preliminary drawing of the dock. Town Ex. 2. The letter advised residents that they should contact him if they had any questions or concerns. Mr. Steck resides in Illinois and only spends two or three weeks each year in Florida. He did not receive a copy of the letter. The Shanoskys' primary residence at that time was in New Jersey. Ms. Shanosky testified that they received a copy of the letter "almost in June, [or] the very end of May." On June 23, 2017, Ms. Shanosky emailed Mr. Baker and stated that they just received the Town's letter and they "DO NOT approve these plans that were outlined in your May 22, 2017 letter to us." Town Ex. 1. On May 24, 2017, the Town authorized Mr. Kincaid, its engineering consultant, to file an application with the Department. On June 17, 2017, Mr. Kincaid submitted to the Department a request for verification of an exemption to perform the following activity: To install a 440 square foot pier at North end of Hercules Avenue, Town of Fort Myers Beach, Florida 33931 in Matanzas Pass, Class II Outstanding Florida Waters, Unclassified for shellfish harvesting, Lee County. Based on the information provided in the application, and using the criteria in section 403.813(1)(b), on July 3, 2017, the Department's Fort Myers District Office issued a letter informing the Town that pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-330.051(5)(b), the proposed activity qualifies for an exemption from the need to obtain a regulatory permit under Part IV of chapter 373, Florida Statutes. Dep't Ex. 1. Pertinent to this case was a determination by the Department that the proposed dock would not create a navigational hazard. The letter further informed the Town that while the proposed activity is located on sovereign submerged lands owned by the Board of Trustees and requires authorization to use those lands, the activity qualifies for an automatic consent by rule pursuant to rule 18-21.005(1)(b). That action is not in dispute. The Department's letter did not require the Town to publish notice of the verification or to provide separate written notice to the adjoining property owners. Consequently, there is no evidence that notice of the Department's action was published or given to Petitioners. They did not learn of the verification until February 15, 2018, when Ms. Shanosky performed a Google search and learned that an application had been filed with the Department and an exemption had been verified. She spoke by telephone that day with Ms. Mills, the Department's program permitting administrator in the Fort Myers office, who confirmed this action. On February 21, 2018, Ms. Shanosky emailed Ms. Mills and expressed her objections to the dock. These objections included not only navigational concerns, but also a fear that, like the old dock, the new dock would continue to be used by "nighttime partiers with their litter and noise."1/ By email dated February 21, 2018, Ms. Mills provided Ms. Shanosky with instructions on how to request a hearing. On February 23, 2018, Ms. Shanosky informed Mr. Steck of the Department's action. Collectively, they filed their Petition on March 8, 2018. The Petition alleges the dock does not qualify for an exemption under section 403.813(1)(b) because: (a) it will create a navigational hazard by impeding Petitioners' ability to access their own docks, and (b) it will create a navigational hazard in the open waters that are contiguous to their docks. There was no evidence regarding the open waters allegation, and, therefore, only the first allegation remains in issue. At hearing, Petitioners testified that if the Town would agree to shorten the length of the dock by an undisclosed number of feet, it would resolve the dispute. The Project The public right-of-way at the end of Hercules Drive is approximately 47 feet wide. Town Ex. 10. Because the Town has less than 65 linear feet of shoreline on its right-of-way, the requirement that the new dock be at least 25 feet from the riparian lines of adjoining property owners does not apply. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-330.051(5)(b)4. A seawall runs along the shoreline in front of Petitioners' properties, from which their docks extend into the water. Until recently, there was no seawall in front of the Town right-of-way. As a part of a separate stormwater project, the Town has backfilled the area between Hercules Drive and where the adjacent seawall ends and constructed a new seawall to fill in the gap. The Town has attempted to center the new dock in the middle of its property. A 30-foot concrete sidewalk will be built from Hercules Drive to the new seawall. The dock will extend approximately 49 feet from the seawall into Matanzas Pass, which corresponds to the length of the old dock. The new dock is comparable in size and consistent in design with other private docks in the area. It does not extend forward of existing structures owned by Petitioners into the Matanzas Pass channel. The first 25 feet of the dock will be six feet wide, while the remaining 24 feet will have a 12-foot, 4-inch wide platform, with handrails. Although the new dock substantially replicates the old dock, the square footage of the terminal platform has been reduced. The distance between the new pier and the closest part of the Shanosky dock is 53 feet, while the closest part of the Steck dock is 52 feet. Except for being a foot or two closer to the Shanosky side, this distance corresponds to the separation which existed before the old dock was removed. The average speed of the current in the area where the dock will be constructed is 1.45 miles per hour. Except in stormy weather or when waters are extremely rough, the current will not create a navigational concern for Petitioners when accessing their docks. Petitioners' Concerns The Shanoskys currently moor a twin-engine, 24-foot jet boat at their dock, and their children use two personal watercrafts. The personal watercrafts will not be impacted in any manner by the new dock. Mr. Shanosky, a self-described recreational boater, is "entertaining the thought" of purchasing even a larger boat, a 48-foot trawler, which would require him to remove one lift on his dock. Mr. Shanosky testified that before the old dock was removed, mooring his boat was "extremely difficult, challenging, and hazardous," and the new dock will make access "dangerous." But at the same time he admitted that during the 13 years the old dock with the same dimensions was in place, he experienced only one incident, and this allision was caused by a "hard current," resulting in the boat striking his own dock. There is no evidence that during that period, he voiced any concerns to the Town regarding a navigational hazard. According to Ms. Shanosky, if the new dock is built, it will be "much harder" to dock their boat, especially if people are fishing on the pier. Mr. Steck describes himself as a "recreational boater and racer but not a professional." He currently owns a 44-foot Trimaran, which has an eight-foot bowsprit and is approximately 30 feet wide. Pet’r Ex. 6. Although the boat has been moored in Chicago for the last few years, he intends to ship it to Florida at some time in the future. Mr. Steck's boat has a small engine (27 horsepower) and is very light. He steers with a rudder, which requires him to have speed when docking his vessel. Without speed, he cannot steer. If the new dock is constructed, he testified that it will be a "nerve racking" experience to dock his boat on the inside of his pier because of the narrow space between the two docks. However, when he purchased a 44-foot vessel years ago, he did so with the knowledge of the old dock, and that he had no more than 52 feet or so of space between his dock and the Town's dock. Mr. Steck has docked his boat on both the inside and outside of his dock. Even when the old dock was in place, he never experienced an allision. Mr. Steck agrees that if he docks on the outside or seaward part of the pier, there will be no navigational issues. According to Petitioners' expert, there is no "margin of safety" with the new dock, and if the mariner's calculations are slightly off, or there is a sudden gust of wind, it would "very likely" cause a collision with the mariner's dock or the new Town pier. However, the record shows that between 2002 and 2015, with the same margin of safety, except for one incident during a sudden "hard current," neither Mr. Shanosky nor Mr. Steck experienced an allision. The Town's expert established that the location of the new dock meets industry standards for boat-maneuvering requirements between a structure and the opening of a slip perpendicular to the structure. The standards call for a minimum space (or width) of 1.5 times the vessel's length that would be moored to the slip. This space between the structure and the slip is known as the "fairway." The fairway for the Shanosky's 24-foot boat meets or exceeds industry standards. If moored on the inside of his dock, Mr. Steck's 44-foot vessel with an eight-foot bowsprit will encroach on the Town's riparian right-of-way.2/ To avoid encroachment, he must dock his boat on the outside of the pier, which extends slightly further into the water than the new Town dock. When docked in this manner, the fairway meets industry standards and will not cause any interference. From 2002 until October 2015, the old dock was the same length and size as the proposed dock. Therefore, Petitioners will face the same navigational concerns, no more or no less, than they faced during that 13-year period. While it may create an inconvenience for Petitioners, or cause them to be more cautious during ingress and egress from their docks, the new dock will not create a navigational hazard.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order reaffirming that the Town is entitled to (1) an exemption from permitting requirements to construct a new dock, and (2) automatic consent by rule to use sovereign submerged lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2018.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner should be granted a dredge and fill permit for construction of a multi-family dock in either of the two configurations proposed in its application filed pursuant to Section 403.918 Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Secret Oaks Owners' Association, Inc. is a not-for-profit Florida corporation with its principal place of business in First Cove, St. Johns County, Florida. DER is the State agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing permits under Chapter 403, Florida Statutes and its applicable rules. Martin Parlato and his wife Linda Parlato are the owners of, and reside on, Lot 10, Secret Oaks Subdivision, First Cove, St. Johns County, Florida. They have standing as Intervenors herein under the following facts as found. Petitioner claims rights to dredge and fill pursuant to an easement lying along the southerly boundary of Lot 10 in Secret Oaks Subdivision, which is a platted subdivision in St. Johns County, Florida. The easement runs up to and borders the St. Johns River, a tidal and navigable river in St. Johns County, Florida. Petitioner filed an application for dredge and fill permit with DER on September 18, 1992. The dock was proposed to be five feet wide and 620 feet long including a 20 foot by 10 foot terminal platform and six associated mooring pilings. On November 3, 1992, the Petitioner filed an alternative proposal with DER. That submission proposed construction of an "L" shaped walkway into the St. Johns River to connect the easement with an existing private dock to the north, which dock is owned by the Intervenors. The walkway is proposed to be five feet wide and may extend approximately 80 feet into the river, and then turn north and run parallel to the shoreline a distance of 41 feet to connect with the existing dock. Additionally, the existing dock would be reclassified as multi-family and four mooring pilings would be placed on the south side of the terminal platform. It is undisputed that a DER permit is necessary to construct either dock requested by Petitioner. While Petitioner sought to create an issue regarding a dock that once was located emanating from the easement and connecting with the present dock emanating from Lot 10 in a configuration similar to the Petitioner's proposed auxiliary dock configuration, the previous dock was never permitted and would be subject to DER rules and potential removal orders if it still existed, unless some "grandfathering" legislation or rule protected the structure. No such "grandfather" protections have been affirmatively demonstrated. Instead, it was orally asserted, without any corroborating circuit court orders, that after Petitioner prevailed over Intervenors in circuit court on various real property, riparian rights, and property damage issues due to Intervenors' removal of the old dock, the circuit court had conditioned further relief upon Petitioner obtaining the necessary DER permit. In its Notice of Permit Denial dated January 22, 1993, DER stated several reasons why reasonable assurances had not been given by Petitioners that water quality would not be violated and that the project was not contrary to the public interest, and further stated, by way of explaining how the permit might still be granted, that, "Compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 17- 312.080(1) and (2) can be achieved for either proposal by complying with the following requirements: Determine the legal status of the easement to establish ownership and control; Design a structure to provide a sufficient number of slips to accommodate all members in sufficient depth of water so that the grassbeds will not be disturbed by boating activity, or specifically limit only the area of the dock in water greater than three feet to be utilized for mooring boats or boating activity and record this action in a long-term and enforceable agreement with the Department; Obtain documentation from adjacent landowners that demonstrates they fully recognize and consent to the extent of activity which may occur in the water by either proposal (i.e., single dock or access walkway). Subsequent to the denial of Petitioner's application, Petitioner and DER representatives met and discussed DER's recommendations for reasonable assurances outlined in the Notice of Permit Denial. DER representatives have also orally recommended alternatives for hiring a dock-master or creating assigned boat slips, but DER has received no formal submissions of information from the Petitioner. All of Petitioner's and DER's proposals have not been reduced to writing. No long-term enforceable agreement as proposed by DER in the Notice of Permit Denial has been drafted. The project site is located on the eastern shore of the St. Johns River, three-quarters of a mile north of Cunningham Creek and one mile south of Julington Creek, at First Cove, a small residential community in the extreme northwest of St. Johns County, where the St. Johns River is approximately 2.5 miles wide. Located at the proposed project site are submerged grass beds (eel grass) that extend from approximately 100 feet to 450 feet into the St. Johns River in depths of two to three feet of water. The water at the proposed project site is classified as Class III Waters suitable for recreational use and fishing, but the area is not listed as an Outstanding Florida Water. The grass beds at the proposed project site are important for the conservation of fish and wildlife and the productivity of the St. Johns River. They provide detritus for support of the aquatic based food chain and they provide a unique, varied, and essential feeding and nursery habitat for aquatic organisms. They are valuable for the propagation of fish. Endangered West Indian manatees seasonally graze on the eel grass in this locale during their annual migrations. Absent the replacement of the auxiliary dock, lot owners' primary access to the larger dock is by swimming or boating from the upland of the pedestrian easement to the larger dock. This can mean sporadic interaction with the eel grass. However, DER's experts are not so much concerned with the individual and occasional usages of Petitioner's lot owners but with the type of activity common to human beings in congregate situations encouraged by multi- family docks. The proposed construction of the auxiliary dock does not intrude on the eel grass as the dock does not extend 100 feet from the upland. The grassbeds end some 200 feet east of the west end of the dock. DER experts testified that the time-limited turbidity and scouring associated with construction of either proposed configuration would have very minimal impact, but the continual increased turbidity of the water over the eel grass to be anticipated from multi-family use of either dock may detrimentally affect juvenile aquatic life and the Manatees' feeding ground. The auxiliary dock as proposed provides no facilities for docking watercraft. The permit application provides for a maximum of four facilities for docking watercraft, presumably by tying up to four end buoys. Petitioner intends or anticipates that only four boats would ever dock at one time under either configuration because of planned arrangements for them to tie up and due to an Easement and Homeowners Agreement and Declaration recorded in the public records of the county. Among other restrictions, the Agreement and Declaration limits dock use and forbids jet ski use.1 The permit application seeks a multi alternative dock construction. Petitioner intends to control the use of the dock(s) only by a "good neighbor policy" or "bringing the neighborhood conscience to bear." Such proposals are more aspirational than practical. Petitioner also cites its Secret Oaks Owners' Agreement, which only Petitioner (not DER) could enforce and which Petitioner would have to return to circuit court to enforce. Petitioner has proposed to DER that it will limit all boating and water activity to the westward fifty feet of the larger dock, prohibit all boating and water activity on the auxiliary dock, and place warning signs on the docks indicating the limits of permissible activity, but Petitioner has not demonstrated that it will provide any mechanism that would insure strict compliance with the limited use restrictions placed on the homeowners in Secret Oaks by their homeowners' restrictive covenant. Testimony was elicited on behalf of Petitioner that Petitioner has posted and will post warning signs and will agree to monitoring by DER but that employing a dock master is not contemplated by Petitioner, that creating individual assigned docking areas is not contemplated by Petitioner, and that there has been no attempt by Petitioner to draft a long term agreement with DER, enforceable by DER beyond the permit term. The purpose of the dock is to provide access to the St. Johns River for the members of the Secret Oaks Owners' Association which includes owners of all sixteen lots, their families, and social invitees. Although there are currently only three or four houses on the sixteen lots, there is the potential for sixteen families and their guests to simultaneously use any multi-family dock. Although all sixteen lot owners do not currently own or operate boats, that situation is subject to change at any time, whenever a boat owner buys a home or lot or whenever a lot owner buys a boat. All lots are subject to alienation by conveyance at any time. It is noted that this community is still developing and therefore anecdotal observations of boating inactivity among homeowners before the old dock was torn down are of little weight. No practical mechanism has been devised to limit homeowners' use of the dock(s) if a multi-family permit is issued. Also, no practical mechanism has been devised to exclude any part of the boating community at large from docking there. Thomas Wiley, a DER biologist, accepted without objection as an expert in the environmental impacts of dredge and fill activities, and Jeremy Tyler, Environmental Administrator for DER's Northeast District, also accepted without objection as an expert in environmental impacts of dredge and fill activities, each visited the site prior to formal hearing. They concurred that the application to construct the 620 foot long dock presented the potential for a number of boats to be moored or rafted at the pier at any one time, particularly weekends and holidays, and that multiple moorings might greatly exceed the capacity intended by Petitioner. Wiley and Tyler further testified, without refutation, that over-docking of boats could hinder or block the use of the waters landward of the terminal structures by adjoining property owners. Congregations of power boats at marinas and facilities designated for multi- family use also pose a threat to the endangered West Indian manatees. With regard to alternative two of the application to reconstruct the unpermitted "L" shaped walkway, such a configuration would extend 80 feet of the "mean high water line", then run 41 feet parallel to the shoreline of Lot 10 before attaching to the existing pier and that the parallel portion of the walkway lies immediately adjacent to, and inshore of, the extensive submerged grass beds. According to Wiley and Tyler, it can reasonably be expected that boaters would utilize this walkway as a convenient boat loading/off facility rather than walking to and from the terminal end of the existing 620 foot long dock. Water depths vary from two to three feet offshore of the proposed structure, and the operation of boats, jet-skis, and other watercraft would result in prop scouring of the silt/sand bottom and damage to grass bed areas, degrading water quality and adversely impacting important habitat areas. The DER experts concluded that the applicant had not provided reasonable assurances that the proposed structures would not cause hindrances to ingress and egress or the recreational use of State waters by adjacent property owners, including Intervenors at Lot 10, that grass habitat areas will not be adversely impacted or inshore water quality will not be degraded by boating and related activity. The potential for intensive use of either of the proposed docks could result in a large number of boats and/or water activity at and around the docks. Submerged grass beds occur in waters generally less than three feet deep in areas near the docks. Any boating activity landward of 450 feet from the shore could seriously damage the extensive grass beds that occur there. Boating activity is likely to occur in the areas of the grassbeds if a number of boats are using the dock(s) at the same time or if a boater desires to minimize the length of dock to be walked, in order to reach the uplands. That damage is expected to be from prop dredging and resuspension of bottom sediments onto adjacent grasses. Upon the evidence as a whole, the project is neutral as to the public health, safety, welfare, and property of others, except to the extent it impacts the Intervenors as set out above. The anticipated increase in water-based activities around the proposed dock(s) will cause shifting, erosion and souring that can be harmful to the adjacent grass beds. The anticipated increase in water based activities around the proposed dock will adversely affect marine productivity because the clarity of the water in the area of the grass beds will be decreased. The project may be either temporary or permanent but should be presumed permanent. The project does not affect any significant historical or archeological resources. The current condition of the eel grass beds in the area is lush and valuable as a fish and wildlife habitat. In the course of formal hearing, DER witnesses testified that absent any disturbance of the grassbeds, DER would have no complaints about either proposed project configuration. After considering and balancing the above criteria, it is found that Petitioner has not provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project in either form would not violate state water quality standards and that it would not be contrary to the public interest.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the permit application be denied without prejudice to future applications. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of July, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Patco proposes to build a dock offshore of a condominium it is now constructing on Anna Maria Key in Manatee County, Florida. At the proposed dock, condominium residents could moor 22 boats in Watson's Bayou, which opens onto Sarasota Pass (also known as Anna Maria Sound). A house owned by Mildred S. Mansfield, petitioner Peter's mother, sits on a waterfront lot on the north shore of Watson's Bayou. The main part of the proposed dock would parallel the edge of the bayou, running 248 feet in a north-south direction, 30 to 45 feet offshore. Some 47 marine pilings six inches in diameter would support the decking on the main part, which would be elevated four feet above mean sea level. At its mid- point, the main part of the dock would be joined to the land by a perpendicular- access walkway with the same open substructure and at the same height as the main part of the dock. Of the ten pilings planned as the foundation for the access walkway, six would be seaward of the mean high water line. Eleven catwalks or finger piers are planned to extend perpendicularly into the bayou from the main part of the dock, at intervals of 24 to 28 feet. Two six inch marine pilings would support each catwalk or finger pier at a height of slightly more than three feet above mean sea level. Between every pair of finger piers, two boat slips are planned; and slips are planned on either side of every finger pier. Between every pair of slips not separated by a finger pier, Patco proposes to place a mooring piling, equidistant from the two finger piers nearest it. These ten mooring pilings would stand seaward of the finger piers, but no more than 70 feet seaward of the mean high water line. Patco also plans to put in two pilings along each of two imaginary lines, running shoreward from either end of the main part of the dock, and perpendicular to the main part of the dock. The purpose of these pilings, which would be about eight feet apart, would be to discourage boat traffic between the main part of the dock and the shore. Two boulders would be placed in shallow water for the same purpose. A water system and electrical service are planned for the dock, but neither fuel nor lubricants are to be dispensed and no waste or sewage system is planned. Patco plans to operate the facility, including emptying containers it intends to provide for trash, until it sells the dock to an association of slip owners, who will take over its management. Patco will not allow people to live aboard boats moored at the dock and a condition of any sale to an association will be that the association not allow live-aboards. With occasional breaks, there is a fringe of black, white and red mangroves along the shore opposite the main part of the proposed dock. Louise Robertson testified without contradiction that mangroves bordering Patco's property have been trimmed and in some cases cut down. The access walkway is planned for one of the natural breaks in the mangrove fringe, however, a spot where there are no mangroves. Applicant's Exhibit No. 6. The waters of Watson's Bayou are Class III waters. Experience with a similar dock built by Patco near the proposed site some 15 months before the hearing indicates that the proposed dock would not violate DER's water quality standards. Shortly before the hearing, a biologist's superficial examination of waters in the vicinity of the dock that has been built revealed no water quality problems as a result of the dock. Increased boat traffic in the vicinity would result in additional oils and greases in the water but, after reasonable opportunity for mixture with the waters of Watson's Bayou, oils and greases would probably not exceed 15 milligrams per liter, or otherwise violate the criteria set forth in Rule 17-3.05(2)(r) Florida Administrative Code. Patco plans to engage a subcontractor to put the pilings in. The subcontractor would "jet" the pilings by using a pump mounted on a barge to force water down to the bottom through a hose. This process would result in sand being temporarily suspended in the water. Patco proposes to curtain off or "diaper" the area where pilings are to be jetted in, so as to contain the turbidity, and so as to keep silt out of an oyster bed nearby. The parties stipulated that the project would not violate turbidity standards, if such precautions are taken. The parties also stipulated that the proposed dock would not violate DER's dissolved oxygen or biochemical oxygen demand standards. The evidence established that DER has reasonable assurance that none of its water quality standards would be violated by the dock Patco proposes to build. At mean sea level, there is ample water at the site of the proposed slips to float any vessel capable of entering Watson's Bayou from the waters outside. The channel into Watson's Bayou from Sarasota Pass is only three feet deep at low tide. This shallow channel prevents boats drawing more than a few feet from entering the Bayou through the channel, but a 46 foot ketch once came in on a high tide. In the proposed slips, mean sea level depths would range from six or seven feet at the seaward end of the finger piers to three or four feet at the landward end of the slips. Mean low water depths are about seven/tenths of a foot lower. With a spring tide, the water may fall six inches below mean low water levels. There is virtually no danger that boats would run aground in the proposed slips. The bottom underneath the proposed dock is sandy and wholly devoid of grasses or other marine vegetation. Between the shore and the main part of the dock however, there is an oyster bed whose northern edge is approximately five or ten feet south of the site proposed for the access walkway. This oyster bed extends about 280 feet in a southerly direction, but does not extend as far west as the site proposed for the main part of the dock. Jetting in the proposed pilings would not result in the death of a single oyster. As long as boats stay on the seaward side of the main part of the proposed dock, the oysters would not be harmed by boat traffic. Other fauna at the site include some benthic polychaetes, tunicates and other arthropods. The jetting in of pilings would injure and displace any of these creatures who were in the immediate vicinity, but their mobility is comparable to that of fishes and they would soon reestablish themselves. Once in place, the pilings would afford a habitat for barnacles and related marine life. A public boat launching ramp is situated 150 to 200 feet from the southern end of the proposed dock. The ramp is far enough away from the proposed dock that construction of the dock would not interfere with launching boats. The water in this part of Watson's Bayou is deep enough that the proposed dock would not create a serious impediment to navigation. Under certain wind conditions, however, a sailboat beating into the main part of Watson's Bayou from the ramp might have to make an additional tack or two if the proposed dock is built. Conversely, with southerly winds, a boat under sail making for the ramp from the main part of Watson's Bayou might have to tack more often if Patco builds the dock it proposes. The dock Patco plans to build would not create a navigational hazard nor cause erosion of the shoreline. The parties stipulated that the dock would not substantially alter or impede the natural flow of navigable waters. The State of Florida owns the bottom into which Patco plans to jet pilings. Respondent DER contacted Florida's Department of Natural Resources about the proposed dock in October, 1978. By letter dated November 21, 1978, the Department of Natural Resources advised the DER that the project would "not require a lease . . . as this application is considered a private dock." DER's Exhibit No. 1. On the strength of biological and ecological surveys and repeated visits to the site by Linda Allen, an environmental specialist in DER's employ, the DER gave notice of its intent do issue the permit Patco seeks. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DER grant Patco's application for permit on the following conditions: That no submerged or transitional vegetation be destroyed in constructing the dock. That the construction area be diapered so as to restrict siltation to the smallest practicable space and, in any event, so as to separate the work area from the oyster bed. That no dredging by any method be used to gain access to the dock. That the owner of the dock allow no docking except in slips seaward of the main part of the dock. That the owner of the dock maintain lines and floats between the ends of the main part of the dock and the landward pilings; and take other appropriate steps to discourage boat traffic between the main part of the dock and the shore. That the owner of the dock forbid living on board boats moored at the dock; forbid the discharge of sewage and garbage into the water; and furnish trash receptacles for the dock. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX Paragraphs one through eleven, thirteen through seventeen and nineteen through twenty-two of respondent Patco's proposed findings of fact, have been adopted, in substance. Paragraph twelve of respondent Patco's proposed findings of fact has been adopted insofar as the plan for pilings and boulders. The evidence did not establish that this, without more, would suffice to protect marine life on the bottom between the shore and the main part of the dock. Paragraph eighteen of respondent Patco's proposed findings of fact reflects the evidence in that it was shown that the proposed dock would not degrade water quality below minimum standards for Class III waters; but degradation of water quality as a result of oils and greases can be expected, within lawful limits. COPIES FURNISHED: Dewey A. Dye, Jr., Esquire Patricia A. Petruff, Esquire Post Office Box 9480 Bradenton, Florida 33506 Alfred W. Clark, Esquire Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Peter W. Mansfield 1861 Meadow Court West Palm Beach, Florida 33406
The Issue Whether Wayne Zimmet's proposed single-family boat dock and lift project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(c).1
Findings Of Fact Both Wayne Zimmet and Scott Rosenblum own property in Tequesta, Florida, in a community known as North Passage, which has a man-made navigation and drainage easement canal that terminates at its eastern end at Mr. Rosenblum's property, which is Lot 74, at 8738 Riverfront Terrace. Mr. Zimmet's property, which is Lot 75, at 8750 Riverfront Terrace, is south of the eastern terminus of the canal. The Rosenblum and Zimmet properties are adjacent and share a common boundary. There is an existing dock extending from Mr. Rosenblum's property into the canal. The existing dock is perpendicular to, and extends west from the middle of, the shore of the eastern terminus of the canal. There is a wooden walkway leading from the residence on Mr. Rosenblum's property to the existing dock. However, there also has been a wooden walkway leading from Mr. Zimmet's property to the existing dock. As indicated in the Preliminary Statement, there is a dispute between Mr. Zimmet and Mr. Rosenblum as to who is entitled to access and use the existing dock--and in particular the south side of the existing dock. That dispute will be resolved in state circuit court.2 For purposes of this proceeding, it will be assumed that Mr. Rosenblum has the right to use the existing dock. On or about May 25, 2006, Mr. Zimmet filed an application requesting an ERP exemption to install an eight-foot by twenty-foot (160-square feet) marginal dock with a two-pile elevator lift to designed to accommodate his boat, which is approximately 24.5 feet long (22 feet at the waterline) and eight feet wide. According to documentation submitted with the application, the proposed dock would be centered along the waterfront of his property and extend approximately four feet into the canal. The proposed boat lift would be skewed toward the western end of the proposed marginal dock with the intent being to dock his boat with the bow facing the west so that proposed dock could be used to enter and load the boat from the stern. This positioning of the proposed lift and boat at the proposed dock would skew a boat on the lift at the proposed dock about three feet to the west, away from the existing dock. Based on the evidence, it is found that Mr. Zimmet did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his proposed boat dock and lift, even if skewed to the west as indicated in the application drawings, would not "impede navigation" to and from the south side of the existing dock. (Otherwise, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift would not "impede navigation" in the canal.) This impediment to navigation to and from the south side of the existing dock is not a mere inconvenience. Although Mr. Rosenblum now only owns and uses a raft at the existing dock, he testified that he plans on purchasing and using a boat. Boats in the range of approximately 24.5 feet in length with a beam of 8 to 8.5 feet are common in the North Passage canal. A boat of that size docked at the south side of the existing dock would barely fit alongside Mr. Zimmet's boat, whether docked or on the lift, and there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for navigating a boat of that size commonly to or from the south side of the existing dock if Mr. Zimmet's boat were docked at the proposed dock or on the proposed lift. (Likewise, if a boat of that size were docked on the south side of the existing dock, there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for Mr. Zimmet to use his proposed dock and lift.) There was no evidence of any impediment to navigation to and from the north side of the existing dock.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that, absent a circuit court determination that Mr. Rosenblum does not have the right to access and use the south side of the existing dock, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift project is not exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2007.
The Issue The issue in these consolidated proceedings is whether the proposed single-family residential dock meets the requirements for a letter of consent for use of sovereignty submerged lands pursuant to chapters 253 and 258, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapters 18-20 and 18-21, such that the Consolidated Regulatory Exemption and Letter of Consent for Department of Environmental Protection File No. 0319584-003EE, as amended on September 30, 2020, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Parties DEP is the state agency charged with regulating specified activities in state jurisdictional surface waters, pursuant to chapter 373, part IV, Florida Statutes. Additionally, DEP is charged with performing all staff duties and functions for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Trustees" or "Board") related to the administration of state-owned lands pursuant to chapter 253, including sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves, pursuant to chapter 258. In this case, DEP is responsible for reviewing the application for the dock and issuing the Dock Approval that has been challenged in these proceedings. Fondriest owns the upland property riparian to the sovereignty submerged lands on which the Dock is proposed to be, at 1953 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida. She is the applicant for the Dock Approval that has been challenged in these proceedings. The Trust owns the upland property located at 1975 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida. This property is located immediately adjacent to, and west of, Fondriest's property. DeMaria and Appel own the upland property located at 1997 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key. This property is located two parcels west of Fondriest's property. Appel owns two other upland properties located on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. Crilly is the holder of a marine turtle permit issued by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission ("FFWCC"), and she volunteers as a sea turtle monitor for the Long Beach Drive area of Big Pine Key. History of the Dock Approval and Notice of Agency Action As stated above, on December 10, 2019, DEP issued a regulatory general permit and letter of consent to Fondriest, approving the 2019 Approval, which was then proposed as an 800-square-foot structure for use as a pier for non-motorized vessels. There was no evidence presented that Petitioners received a clear point of entry to challenge DEP's proposed agency action issued on December 10, 2019, either through receipt of written notice by mail, or constructively through publication of notice of the proposed agency action in a newspaper or other publication medium. The Trust filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on January 30, 2020; DeMaria filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on January 31, 2020; and Crilly filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on February 27, 2020. On September 11, 2020, Fondriest filed a revised application with DEP, reducing the size of the Dock to 500 square feet; requesting a verification of exemption from permitting, pursuant to rule 62-330.015(5)(b) and section 403.813(1)(b)2; and requesting authorization, pursuant to chapters 253 and 258, and chapters 18-20 and 18-21, to use sovereignty submerged lands. On September 30, 2020, DEP issued Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s Notice of Proposed Changes to Agency Action—i.e., the "Dock Approval"— 2 Because the Dock will have less than 500 square feet of over-water surface area, it is exempt, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). from permitting under chapters 373 or 403. Petitioners have stipulated that the Dock qualifies for the permitting exemption under section 403.813(1)(b). verifying the regulatory exemption and authorizing the use of the sovereignty submerged lands by a letter of consent.3 DEP's agency action proposing to approve the Dock supersedes all prior DEP agency action with respect to the Dock, and constitutes the proposed agency action at issue in these proceedings. Long Beach Drive and the Surrounding Area Fondriest's property is located on Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, in Monroe County. Long Beach Drive is located on a spit of land comprising the southern and westernmost part of Big Pine Key. The south side of Long Beach Drive, where Fondriest's, the Trust's, and DeMaria's and Appel's properties are located, borders the Straits of Florida.4 Thus, Fondriest's, the Trust's, and DeMaria's and Appel's properties are riparian to sovereignty submerged lands underlying the Straits of Florida. The land along Long Beach Drive is platted and has been developed for residential and commercial uses. The Long Beach Drive area of Big Pine Key is located within the Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve ("CBAP"), an Outstanding Florida Water and aquatic preserve consisting of approximately 6,000 acres of bays, mangrove forests, seagrass beds, and offshore patch coral reefs. The Long Beach Drive area, including Fondriest's property, is characterized by a rocky shore, with some narrow sandy beaches. The shore accumulates a significant amount of weed wrack consisting of seaweed, seagrass, and other debris. A beach berm created by wave and tide action 3 The Dock Approval states that the Dock does not qualify for the federal State Programmatic General Permit for section 404 of the Clean Water Act and section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. Separate federal approval for the Dock has been issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, and Monroe County has issued a Building–Floodplain–Development Permit for the Dock. 4 All references to the shore or shoreline along Long Beach Drive refer to the shore or shoreline abutting the Straits of Florida. exists along much of the shore. The berm is frequently overtopped by water during high tides and storms. The beach is disturbed due to frequent use by residents and sea turtle monitors. Among the activities that take place on the beach are kayak launching, beach walking, beach cleaning and restoration, vegetation planting, and sea turtle nest monitoring. Several docks already exist along the shore on Long Beach Drive. The longshore current along the shore at Long Beach Drive flows, and transports sand from, east to west. The existing mangroves, jetties, and points along the Long Beach Drive shoreline trap sand and cause accretion of updrift beaches and starvation of downdrift beaches. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the docks along the shoreline on Long Beach Drive do not significantly contribute to beach accretion, starvation, or erosion in the area. The Proposed Dock The Dock is a private residential single-family dock associated with Fondriest's single-family residence at 1953 Long Beach Drive. It will not be used for commercial purposes or residential habitation, and there are no boat houses, boat lifts, or other enclosures proposed or approved as part of the Dock. As approved, the Dock will occupy 498 square feet, consisting of a 142-foot-long by 3-foot-wide access dock and a 12-foot-long by 6-foot-wide (i.e., 72-square-foot) terminal platform, and extending a total length of 154 feet. The access dock will be constructed with pressure-treated lumber planks spaced half-an-inch apart, to allow light penetration. The supporting pilings are comprised of PVC-encased aluminum, spaced approximately 9 feet, 5 inches apart. The PVC casing will help protect the piles from corrosion, thus helping to protect water quality. The terminal platform, which also will be supported by PVC-encased aluminum pilings, will consist of fiberglass grating, which allows sunlight penetration in order to prevent shading of seagrasses and other benthic resources.5 The top of the terminal platform is designed to be a minimum height of five feet above the mean high water line ("MHWL"). Handrails will be constructed along each side of the dock for its entire length, to prevent vessel mooring in adjacent shallow areas, thus helping protect against damage to benthic resources. The Dock will be used solely for the water-dependent activities of launching vessels and swimming. Only non-motorized vessels, such as kayaks, canoes, and paddleboards, may be launched from the Dock, and then only when there is a minimum depth of 0.5 feet (six inches, or half-a-foot) of water at the terminal platform.6 Additionally, the terminal platform must include signs of at least one-square- foot each placed on each side of the platform, stating "no mooring of motorized vessels allowed." A ladder is proposed to be located on one side of the terminal platform to provide access to the water for swimming or kayak launching, and the Dock Approval imposes a requirement that the ladder cannot be located over seagrass or hard bottom benthic communities. Although some turbidity in the water column may be generated by launching kayaks or other non-motorized watercraft from the terminal platform, the turbidity would be temporary and would not exceed that currently generated by dragging or hauling a kayak or other vessel from the shore across the substrate, to access sufficient water depth for launching. To prevent potential trapping, under the Dock, of sea turtles and other animals, such as Key Deer, an enclosure consisting of barriers one inch apart must be constructed beneath the portion of the Dock's landward access ramp having less than three feet of clearance above grade. 5 This is a standard construction material frequently used for docks in Florida. As further discussed below, the benthic survey performed for the area comprising the footprint of the Dock showed that no seagrass beds or other significant benthic resources are present. 6 The 0.5-foot water depth is keyed to the mean low water datum. At mean high water, the water depth at the terminal platform is approximately 1.2 feet. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the rest of the Dock will be elevated approximately five feet above the MHWL, so will be of sufficient height to allow animals to pass under without being trapped or impeded, and will provide sufficient clearance for sea turtle monitors to pass under as they traverse the beach. The competent, credible evidence also shows that the Dock will not impede the flow of water. The design is such that there are no structures on, or beneath, the Dock that will act as dams to prevent, or otherwise affect, the flow of water under and around the Dock. The water depth at the end of the terminal dock is 0.5 feet at mean low water, and 1.2 feet at mean high water. The Dock does not extend out to a depth of four feet of water. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not interfere with navigation. The water depth between the shore and the end of the Dock's terminal platform is too shallow to accommodate motorized watercraft, and the Dock will be of sufficient height to enable persons using non-motorized watercraft to pass under it. The Dock will be constructed to meet the 2017 Southern Building Code, so will be able to resist 180-mile-per-hour, three-second wind gusts. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that in a storm, the decking and stringers on the Dock will be washed off the pilings and will not become windborne projectiles. The Dock pilings will be imbedded into the substrate to a minimum depth of five feet, using a vibration hammer, rather than drilling and punching the pilings into the substrate. Using a vibration hammer will generate less turbidity in the water column than using the drill-and-punch installation technique, and turbidity curtains must be erected and maintained around the construction footprint to control turbidity and protect water quality. Additionally, the pilings will be installed using a spud barge elevated above the substrate, which also will help reduce turbidity during construction. Any turbidity generated during construction will be temporary. Installing the dock pilings using a vibration hammer also will generate less noise than the drill-and-punch technique. The Jacksonville Office of the National Marine Fisheries Service has issued a biological opinion stating that the vibration hammer installation technique "may affect/is not likely to affect" certain species listed as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. Additionally, because the Dock will be constructed in an open waterbody, the noise generated by piling installation is anticipated to be insignificant. Construction of the Dock may only be conducted outside of sea turtle nesting season, which runs from April 15 to October 31. Dock construction activities also must meet the requirements and standards established by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to protect manatees, sea turtle species, the Smalltooth Sawfish, and the Eastern Indigo Snake. The 2011 Standard Manatee Construction Conditions for In-Water Work require vessels to navigate at slow speeds; manatee awareness signs to be posted; and construction to stop if a manatee is spotted within 50 feet of the construction site. In any event, manatees are unlikely to be present in the vicinity of the Dock, due to the very shallow water. The sea turtle and Smalltooth Sawfish construction conditions require vessels to operate at idle speeds in the vicinity of the project; turbidity curtains to be erected and maintained; and construction to be stopped if individuals of these species are observed within 50 feet of the construction site. The Eastern Indigo Snake, an upland species, is unlikely to be present at the Dock construction site. To prevent harm to individuals of this species, the letter of consent requires that educational materials be distributed to the construction crew and educational signs be placed at the construction site. No permanent exterior lighting is authorized for the Dock. This will prevent the Dock from attracting sea turtles and other marine species that are drawn to light. No turning basins, access channels, or wave break devices are proposed to be constructed for or used by the Dock. Fondriest's property has approximately 100 linear feet of riparian shoreline. There are no other docks existing on the shoreline along Long Beach Drive for at least 65 linear feet in either direction. The Dock will be constructed perpendicular to the shoreline, and will be located in Fondriest's riparian area, set back more than 40 feet from each riparian line demarcating her riparian area. Thus, the Dock will be located well outside the 25-foot setback from each riparian line. Biological and Other Resources in the Vicinity of the Dock Much of the shoreline along Long Beach Drive below the MHWL, including that along Fondriest's property, consists of bare, hard rock. The water is extremely shallow, and the bare rock is exposed at low tide. Site assessments conducted in 2020 at the location and in the vicinity of the Dock, show that limestone caprock, loose rubble, and some deeper depressions in the rock exist in the footprint of the Dock. The substrate consists of hard, highly uneven rock, with pools of tannin-stained water. Water pooled in the rock depressions is heated at low tide and, due to rotting vegetation, is nutrient-rich. The dissolved oxygen levels are very low, rendering the pools incapable of supporting substantial marine life other than cyanobacteria and filamentous algae, both of which indicate poor water quality. Some algae species are attached to the limestone caprock in the footprint and immediate vicinity of the Dock. However, recent biological resource assessments show that no seagrass beds, corals, or other hard bottom communities exist in the footprint of the Dock. Thus, the competent, credible evidence shows that there are no aquatic resources of any significant value in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock. A small seagrass bed is located near the terminal platform. The letter of consent requires avoidance of this seagrass bed during construction and use of the Dock. Additionally, as discussed above, turbidity curtains must be installed to prevent turbidity and siltation of this seagrass bed during construction. The evidence establishes that the area waterward of the MHWL along Long Beach Drive generally supports a rich aquatic community. Fish and aquatic invertebrates inhabit the water in the vicinity, and numerous bird species use the area waterward of the MHWL, including that bordering Fondriest's property, as feeding and foraging habitat. However, no non-speculative evidence was presented to show that the construction, presence, and use of the Dock will result in adverse effects to this aquatic community, or to any plant or animal species in this aquatic community. Additionally, the competent, credible evidence shows that none of these resources exist in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock, and conditions have been imposed in the letter of consent to ensure that the construction and use of the Dock will not adversely affect these resources. To the extent that the vibration hammer installation of the pilings will result in noise that may cause fish, birds, and other animals to leave the area, that effect will be temporary and will cease when piling installation is completed. Although some benthic or attached species, such as seahorses, may be unable to leave the area, so may be subjected to noise stress, no persuasive, non-speculative evidence was presented showing that these species inhabit the area in the vicinity of the Dock. Thus, any alleged harm to these species is speculative. Because the Dock may only be used for nonmotorized vessels such as kayaks and canoes, use of the Dock will not generate noise or otherwise adversely affect the aquatic habitat waterward of the MHWL along Long Beach Drive. The Key Deer is listed as an endangered species. Key Deer traverse and forage along the shore at Long Beach Drive. No credible evidence was presented showing that the Dock would adversely affect the ability of Key Deer to traverse and forage on the beach on, or adjacent to, Fondriest's property. As discussed above, the Dock will be elevated waterward of the MHWL to approximately five feet above grade. The evidence showed that this height is sufficient to allow Key Deer to pass underneath without being impeded or trapped. No credible evidence was presented showing that the three-foot wide access ramp would interfere with Key Deer foraging or traversing along the beach. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Loggerhead Sea Turtle and Green Sea Turtle, both of which are listed as endangered species, use the beach above the MHWL along Long Beach Drive, including the beach on Fondriest's property above the MHWL, for nesting. The FFWCC has determined, through its Florida Sea Turtle Nesting Beach Monitoring Program, that the shore along Long Beach Drive has a relatively low nesting density—i.e., within the lower 25% of nesting density values—for both of these sea turtle species. The evidence establishes that the Hawksbill Sea Turtle, Kemp's Ridley Sea Turtle, and Leatherback Sea Turtle do not use the beach along the Long Beach Drive shoreline for nesting. No competent, credible evidence was presented showing that significant sea turtle food sources are present in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock. The competent, credible evidence does not show that the Dock will adversely affect the habitat value of the beach on Fondriest's property for sea turtle nesting, or that it will otherwise adversely affect nesting sea turtles and hatchlings. As previously discussed, an enclosure will be constructed under the access ramp to prevent nesting sea turtles and hatchlings from becoming trapped under the Dock. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not adversely affect other protected species, including the Lower Keys Marsh Rabbit, the Keys Rice Rat, or the Mole Skink—none of which inhabit or use the marine/beach habitat present along the shore at Long Beach Drive. To this point, no evidence was presented showing that these species are, or ever have been, present on the beach at Long Beach Drive. Thus, no evidence was presented showing that the Dock adversely affect these species. The Dock will be Located in a Resource Protection Area 3 Areas within aquatic preserves are classified as Resource Protection Area ("RPA") 1, 2, or 3, for purposes of imposing restrictions and conditions on the use of sovereignty submerged lands, to protect discrete areas having high quality and transitioning habitat. The RPA 1 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that have resources of the highest quality and condition. Areas classified as RPA 1 are characterized by the presence of corals, marine grassbeds, mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, threatened or endangered species habitat, colonial water bird nesting sites, and archaeological and historical sites. The RPA 3 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that are characterized by the absence of any significant natural resource attributes. The RPA 2 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that are in transition, either having declining RPA 1 resources, or new pioneering resources within an RPA 3. Recent biological resource assessments conducted at the location of, and in the immediate vicinity of, the Dock show that no mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, archaeological or historical resources, or colonial water bird nesting sites are present. As discussed above, although sea turtles nest on the beach along Long Beach Drive, this area does not constitute significant sea turtle nesting habitat, and there is no significant food source for adult or juvenile sea turtles in the vicinity of the Dock. Thus, the evidence shows that the Dock will not be located in an RPA 1. The biological resource assessments also showed that no transitioning resources are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. The competent, credible evidence showed that current natural resource conditions at the site are the same as those that historically existed before Hurricane Irma struck the Long Beach Drive area in 2013. Thus, the evidence shows that the Dock will not be located in an RPA 2. Because there are no significant natural resource attributes or transitioning resources in the footprint and the immediate vicinity of the Dock, it is determined that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3.7 7 Some portions of the CBAP do contain seagrass beds, offshore coral patch reefs, and mangrove swamp communities, and provide habitat for protected species, including the Key Deer and colonial water birds, and, thus, merit an RPA 1 classification. By contrast, none of these habitats and conditions are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. The definitions of RPA 1, 2, and 3 in rules 18-20.003(54), (55), and (56), respectively, refer to "areas within aquatic preserves" which contain specified resources types and quality. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(54) through (56)(emphasis added). Additionally, rule 18-20.004(1)(a) provides that in determining whether to approve or deny a request to conduct an activity in an aquatic preserve, the Trustees will evaluate each request on a "case-by-case basis." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(1)(a)(emphasis added). These rules make clear that determining whether an activity will be located in an RPA 1, 2, or 3 necessarily entails a site-specific resource assessment to determine the type and quality of habitat, and the conditions present, at that specific site. As discussed above, the site-specific biological assessments conducted show that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3, and Petitioners did not present any site- specific evidence to rebut that classification. Cumulative Impacts Analysis In determining whether an activity proposed in an aquatic preserve may be approved, an analysis must be performed to determine the projected cumulative impacts of the activity. This analysis focuses on determining the impact of the proposed activity, combined with that of similar existing activities and similar activities currently under consideration for approval. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18- 20.006. A cumulative impacts analysis performed by Fondriest's expert witness, Sandra Walters, showed that the Dock, in conjunction with similar existing docks and all other applications for docks that could be proposed for approval, will not result in adverse cumulative impacts to the aquatic resources in the CBAP. Walters's cumulative impacts analysis took into account both the acreage and linear footage of parcels within the CBAP for which a dock similar to the one at issue in this proceeding could be approved for construction. In performing a cumulative impacts analysis using linear feet of shoreline, Walters calculated a total of 19,357 feet, or 22.6 miles, of shoreline in the CBAP. Of this linear footage, approximately 7,500 linear feet of shoreline along Long Beach Drive and approximately 1,200 linear feet of shoreline along the ocean side of the Cook's Island portion of the CBAP are developable, for purposes of having the potential to be developed for a minimum-sized single-family residential dock similar to that proposed in this case. Walters's estimate is conservative, in that it included, as developable linear shoreline footage, parcels that likely could not be developed due to rate of growth, conservation easement, or other land use or environmental restrictions. Walters's linear footage analysis showed that approximately 5.7% of the entire CBAP shoreline possibly could be developed for construction of a perpendicular dock. Assuming that each of these docks is four feet wide—which is a valid assumption, using the four-foot maximum access dock width permitted under the aquatic preserves rules—a total of .23% of the shoreline would be impacted if a perpendicular dock was developed on each eligible parcel. Walters opined, credibly and persuasively, that this impact to the resources in the CBAP would be de minimis. In performing a cumulative impacts analysis on an acreage basis, Walters calculated that if a minimum-size single-family residential dock were developed on each of the 68 total developable lots within the CBAP, a total area of approximately 34,000 square feet, or approximately .013% of the acreage in the CBAP, would experience impacts similar to those created by the Dock. Walter credibly and persuasively opined that this impact to the resources in the CBAP would be de minimis. Walters used a conservative approach—i.e., projecting a realistic "worst case" scenario—in performing the cumulative impacts analysis. Specifically, she considered all parcels for which a minimum-size single-family residential dock reasonably could be proposed for approval in the future, rather than limiting her consideration of cumulative impacts to only those currently proposed for approval by the listed agencies. Additionally, she included impacts of similar dock projects for parcels that likely would not qualify for dock approval due to development restrictions. Thus, the cumulative impacts that Walters projected in her analysis are likely greater than the actual cumulative impacts of similar dock projects that reasonably can be anticipated to be developed in the area in the future. Petitioners presented the testimony of Michael Czerwinski regarding the cumulative impacts analysis required under the aquatic preserves rule for approval of an activity in an aquatic preserve. Czerwinski's analysis projected the potential cumulative impacts if every parcel along Long Beach Drive were developed with a minimum-size single-family residential dock, including the parcels on which development restrictions have been imposed such that they would not be eligible to be developed for a single-family residential dock. Based on this assumption, Czerwinski opined that such "buildout" along Long Beach Drive would result in a "cascading" or "nibbling" effect on the resources in the CBAP, and that there would be adverse impacts on sea turtle nesting habitat. Additionally, based on the unsupported assumption of maximum "buildout" of a single-family residential dock on every parcel along Long Beach Drive, Czerwinski projected that the resources within the entire CBAP would be adversely affected as a result of the cumulative impacts from approval of the Dock. Czerwinski's cumulative impacts analysis did not take into account the numerous parcels in the CBAP, including several on Long Beach Drive, that are unable to be developed for single-family residential docks due to conservation easements and local land development restrictions. As such, his analysis considered impacts which could not reasonably be expected to result in the Long Beach Drive area from approval of the Dock. Additionally, based on the unreasonable assumption of maximum dock buildout on every parcel on Long Beach Drive, Czerwinski projected adverse impacts to the entire CBAP as a result of the Dock. This analysis again failed to take into account that numerous parcels within the boundaries of the CBAP that are not located in the Long Beach Drive area also are under development restrictions that will prevent the construction of docks on those parcels. Czerwinski's analysis did not comply with the provisions of rule 18-20.005(1) and (3), which expressly limit the consideration of impacts to only those likely to affect the preserve and which reasonably could be expected to result from the proposed activity. For these reasons, Czerwinski's testimony regarding cumulative impacts as a result of the Dock was not credible or persuasive. As discussed above, Monroe County has issued a permit authorizing the construction of the Dock. This evidences that the Dock is permissible under the Monroe County local comprehensive plan. Additionally, as discussed in detail below, the Dock is an allowable use that is consistent with the CBAP Management Plan ("Management Plan"). As previously discussed, the competent, credible evidence establishes that there are no significant biological resources in the footprint, or in the immediate vicinity, of the Dock. Thus, the Dock will not cause the loss of beneficial biologic functions that would adversely impact the quality or utility of the CBAP. As previously discussed, the competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not cause the loss of the beneficial hydrologic functions, either in the immediate vicinity of the Dock, or in the CBAP. As discussed above, the Dock will be a minimum-size single-family residential dock that will not adversely affect the quantity or flow of water. Accordingly, it is determined that the Dock will not have adverse cumulative impacts on the CBAP. Consistency with the CBAP Management Plan The Management Plan expressly identifies single-family private residential docks as an allowable use within CBAP, and specifies the standards that such docks must meet. Specifically, a dock may not extent waterward of the MHWL more than 500 feet or 20% of the width of the waterbody; must be designed to ensure maximum light penetration; the terminal platform may not be more than 160 square feet in area; and the access dock may not be wider than four feet. As discussed above, the Dock will comply with these standards. The Management Plan also delineates "management areas" within the CBAP, and describes resources and allowable uses within the different management areas. The Management Plan states that final determinations of allowable uses within a particular management plan are made by agency staff on a case-by-case basis. The sovereignty submerged lands along Long Beach Drive, out to a distance of 500 feet from shore, are designated as "Management Area SF/1." The sovereignty submerged lands bordering Fondriest's property are included within the Management Area SF/1. The resources included in Management Area SF/1 generally include grass beds, fringing mangroves, coral banks, coral heads, and hardbottom communities. However, as discussed above, the site-specific biological resource assessment surveys conducted on the sovereignty submerged lands bordering Fondriest's property showed that none of these resources are present at, or in the vicinity of, the Dock site. Furthermore, private single-family residential docks are expressly identified as an allowable use in the Management Area SF/1. Long Beach Drive is not a pristine, undeveloped shoreline. There are residences and some commercial uses along Long Beach Drive, with accessory uses such as seawalls, revetments, and private docks. The Dock is consistent with these existing uses and with the aesthetics of the shoreline on Long Beach Drive. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock is consistent with the CBAP Management Plan.8 Petitioners' Interests and Timeliness of Crilly's Petition The Trust's Interests The Trust owns a parcel of real property located at 1975 Long Beach Drive, immediately adjacent to, and west of, Fondriest's property. Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith are the trustees of the Trust. 8 Rule 18-20.004(7) states, in pertinent part: "[t]he aquatic preserve management plans shall be used by [DEP] to preserve and restore the distinctive characteristics identified by the inventories for each aquatic preserve. The management plans for each aquatic preserve are available for guidance purposes only." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(7)(emphasis added). Thus, to the extent a rule provision in chapter 18-20 conflicts with an aquatic preserve management plan, the rule controls. See Decarion v. Martinez, 537 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(an agency must follow its own rules). Neither Roberts nor Meredith, in their individual capacity, is a petitioner in these proceedings. Meredith testified that she and Roberts purchased the property at 1975 Long Beach Drive because of its location and the natural resources in the area, including the tide pool habitat in the rock depressions along the shore, and the animals that forage along, and inhabit, the shore. Meredith testified that she and Roberts both have a keen personal interest in, and use and enjoy, the natural resources along the shore at Long Beach Drive. They engage in bird watching; nature photography; kayaking; and observing nature, including Key Deer, birds, nesting sea turtles, and fish and invertebrates inhabiting tide pools in the rock depressions along the shore. After Meredith and Roberts purchased the property, they placed it in the Trust in order to preserve it, and its value as a residential property, for their children and grandchildren to enjoy in the future. Meredith and Roberts, as trustees of the Trust, have significant concerns about the aesthetic impact the Dock will have on the Trust property, particularly its impact on the view of the beach and the sunrise over the water. Meredith expressed her personal concern regarding the Dock's impacts on the biological resources at, and in the vicinity of, the Dock, and she also expressed concern that the Dock would interfere with her ability to safely walk along the shoreline. She testified that she was concerned that approval of the Dock would constitute a precedent, resulting in the construction of more docks and piers which would adversely affect the natural resources and the beauty of the beach. Meredith conceded that the Dock will be located within Fondriest's riparian area, will be set back more than 25 feet from the common riparian line, and will not cross the common riparian line into the Trust's riparian area. DeMaria's and Appel's Interests DeMaria is an original Petitioner in Case No. 20-2474, which is part of these consolidated proceedings, and Appel has moved to intervene and become a party to that case. DeMaria and Appel own the Deer Run eco-lodge bed and breakfast ("Deer Run") located at 1997 Long Beach Drive, immediately west of the property owned by the Trust. The Deer Run property is not located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. Appel owns two other parcels on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. DeMaria testified that she and Appel purchased the Deer Run property because they were attracted to the unspoiled natural environment along Long Beach Drive. Deer Run attracts guests from around the world, who are drawn to the natural environment. These guests engage in nature photography and in-water recreational activities, such as kayaking, paddle boarding, and windsurfing; and they use and enjoy the natural resources and aesthetics of the area. DeMaria and Appel both testified that the presence of a long dock in close proximity to Deer Run would interfere with the view of the water and sunrise from Deer Run, and would significantly detract from the natural beauty and aesthetics of the environment at, and in the immediate vicinity of, Deer Run. Both testified that the presence of the Dock would render Deer Run a less attractive destination for guests. DeMaria testified that the presence of the Dock would interfere with her personal view of the water and the sunrise over the water; her ability to walk along shoreline below the MHWL; and her personal use and enjoyment of the natural beauty and aesthetics of the area. DeMaria also volunteers as a sea turtle nest monitor under the authority of Crilly's marine turtle permit. She expressed concerns similar to those expressed by Crilly—specifically, that the existence of the Dock would interfere with her ability to safely traverse the shoreline below the MHWL on Long Beach Drive to perform her sea turtle monitoring activities. Appel echoed DeMaria's concerns regarding the alleged injury to Deer Run's ecotourism business as a result of the Dock. He also testified that the presence of the Dock on Fondriest's property would injure his personal use and enjoyment of the natural beauty and aesthetics of the Long Beach Drive area. Appel also serves as a volunteer sea turtle monitor, and, in connection with that activity, traverses the shoreline along Long Beach Drive. He testified that the presence of the Dock would interfere with his ability to safely traverse the shoreline below the MHWL to conduct sea turtle monitoring activities. Appel also testified regarding the potential for the Dock to be damaged in storms, resulting in flying and floating debris that may damage his properties and the natural resources in the area. Crilly's Interests and Timeliness of Petition Crilly is the holder of a marine turtle permit issued by FFWCC, authorizing her to monitor sea turtle nesting along the beach at Long Beach Drive. Other volunteer sea turtle nest monitors work with Crilly under the authority of her permit. Crilly and her team of sea turtle monitors walk the beach daily during sea turtle nesting season. Crilly's responsibilities under the marine turtle permit include monitoring sea turtle nesting and false crawls; collecting data on the number of hatchlings that emerge from each sea turtle nest; and collecting data on sea turtle nesting mortality. The data are provided to the FFWCC for use in sea turtle research. Crilly testified that the Dock will impede her ability and that of her team to safely traverse along the shore below the MHWL to perform the sea turtle monitoring duties authorized under her permit. Specifically, Crilly testified that because the property above the MHWL is private, she must walk along the shoreline below the MHWL. The rock is slippery with numerous depressions, and traversing under the Dock would be treacherous. She testified that "I personally would not crawl under a dock and, therefore, I would not ask any of my volunteers on my team to crawl under a dock." According to Crilly, if she and her sea turtle nest monitoring team are unable to traverse the shoreline where the Dock will be located, they will be required to retrace their steps to the roadway on Long Beach Drive, walk down the road to a public access point, walk down to the beach, and walk back to the Dock, significantly increasing the time and effort to conduct their sea turtle monitoring activities. Crilly testified that she "learned of" DEP's approval of the Dock on December 30, 2019. No evidence was presented regarding whether, or how, Crilly received notice of the 2019 Approval sufficient to provide a clear point of entry for purposes of commencing the time for her to challenge that proposed agency action. Crilly filed her Petition challenging the 2019 Approval on February 27, 2020. When DEP issued the Dock Approval on September 30, 2020, superseding the 2019 Approval, Crilly already had filed her Petition at DEP, and the Petition had been referred to DOAH. IX. Findings of Ultimate Fact Regarding Compliance with Applicable Rules The term "dock" is defined in chapters 18-20 and 18-21. Chapter 18-20, applicable to aquatic preserves, defines a dock as "a fixed or floating structure, including moorings, used for the purpose of berthing buoyant vessels either temporarily or indefinitely." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(19). Chapter 18-21, which generally governs approvals to use sovereignty submerged lands, defines a dock as "a fixed or floating structure, including access walkways, terminal platforms, catwalks, mooring pilings, lifts, davits and other associated water-dependent structures, used for mooring and accessing vessels." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.003(22). The Dock meets the definition of "dock" in both rules.9 As discussed above, the Dock Approval limits mooring to non-motorized vessels, and Fondriest, a riparian owner, will use the Dock to access the water for the water-dependent activities of kayaking, paddle-boarding, and other water-dependent activities such as swimming, snorkeling, and fishing, consistent with rule 18-20.004(1)(e)5. 9 The Dock is not a "pier," which is defined as "a structure in, or, or over sovereignty lands which is used by the public primarily for fishing or swimming." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(41)(emphasis added). As discussed above, the Dock is a private single-family residential dock that will be constructed on sovereignty submerged lands waterward of Fondriest's property. It will not be open to, or used by, the public for fishing or swimming. As previously discussed, the Dock meets the 500-square-foot threshold for purposes of exemption from regulatory permitting, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). The evidence also establishes that the Dock is a "minimum-size" dock, as defined in rule 18-21.002(39). Specifically, the Dock's area has been reduced to the smallest size possible that will provide Fondriest reasonable access to the water for kayak launching. The Dock's reduced size also will minimize impacts to resources at, and in the vicinity of, the Dock. Thus, the Dock has been designed to minimize any adverse impacts to fish and wildlife and threatened and endangered species habitat, as required by rules 18-21.004(2)(b) and (i), and 18-21.004(7)(d). Compliance with Aquatic Preserve Management Policies, Standards, and Criteria Rule 18-20.004 establishes the policies, standards, and requirements for approval of uses of sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves. As discussed above, the Dock extends a total of 154 feet waterward from the MHWL. This is substantially less than the allowable 500-foot maximum extent from the MHWL, and also is substantially less than 20% of the width of the Straits of Florida, which spans from the Florida Keys to Cuba. Thus, the Dock is consistent with rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not be located in an area of significant biological, scientific, historic, or aesthetic value. However, even if such resources were present, the Dock would not cause adverse impacts due to its specific design features and the use of best management practices during construction. As discussed above, the Dock will minimize shading by reduction of the width of the access dock from four feet to three feet; by elevation of both the access dock and the terminal platform five feet above mean high water; and by the use of light-penetrable grating for the terminal platform. The Dock is designed to ensure that vessel use will not cause harm to site- specific resources, as required by rule 18-20.004(5)(a)3. The types of vessels that may use the Dock are limited to non-motorized vessels, and the letter of consent is conditioned to allow vessel launching only when there is a minimum depth of 0.5 feet of water at the terminal platform. As previously discussed, the evidence establishes that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3. Nonetheless, the Dock will comply with design standards applicable to docks in an RPA 1 or RPA 2. Specifically, the Dock will be constructed of wooden planking less than eight inches wide, spaced half an inch apart after shrinkage; will be elevated five feet above the MHWL; and will have a terminal platform consisting of light-penetrable grating to minimize shading. As previously discussed, the terminal platform will have a total area of 72 square feet—well below the 160-square foot maximum size allowed in aquatic preserves under rule 18-20.004(5)(b)6. The Dock extends out from the shoreline to a depth of approximately -0.5 ft at mean low water. Thus, Dock meets the requirement that it may not extend out from the shoreline further than to a maximum water depth of -4 feet at mean low water. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(5)(b)3. Consistency with Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve Management Plan Rule 18-20.004(7), which addresses management plans for aquatic preserves, states, in pertinent part: "[t]he aquatic preserve management plans shall be used by the Department to preserve and restore the distinctive characteristics identified by the inventories for each aquatic preserve." Rule 18-20.004(3)(a) states, in pertinent part: "all proposed activities in aquatic preserves having management plans adopted by the Board must demonstrate that such activities are consistent with the management plan." For the reasons discussed in detail above, it is determined that the Dock is consistent with the Management Plan, and, thus, complies with rule 18-20.004(3)(a). Public Interest Demonstration Chapters 18-20 and 18-21 both require an analysis to determine whether an activity proposed to be conducted on sovereignty submerged lands meets an applicable public interest test. Rule 18-20.004(1)(b), the aquatic preserve rule's public interest test, states, in pertinent part: "[t]here shall be no further sale, lease or transfer of sovereignty lands except when such sale, lease or transfer is in the public interest (see subsection 18- 20.004(2), F.A.C., Public Interest Assessment Criteria)." However, with respect to private residential single-family docks, rule 18-20.004(4)(c) states, in pertinent part: "[f]or the purpose of this rule, a private, residential single-family docking facility which meets all the requirements of subsection 18-20.004(5), F.A.C., shall be deemed to meet the public interest requirements of paragraph 18-20.004(1)(b), F.A.C." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(1)(b)(emphasis added). As discussed herein, the Dock meets all applicable requirements in rule 18- 20.004(5). Accordingly, the Dock meets the aquatic preserves public interest test in chapter 18-20. The Dock also meets the public interest test codified in chapter 18-21. Rule 18-21.003(53) defines "public interest" as "demonstrable environmental, social and economic benefits which would accrue to the public at large as a result of the proposed action, and which would clearly exceed all demonstrable environmental, social, and economic costs of the proposed action." Rule 18-21.004(1) states: "[f]or approval, all activities on sovereignty lands must be not contrary to the public interest, except for sales which must be in the public interest." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004(1)(emphasis added). In this case, the Dock provides recreational water access to the riparian owner, and, as discussed extensively, will not have any adverse impacts on sovereignty lands, aquatic resources, or listed species. Thus, it is determined that the Dock is not contrary to the public interest, as defined in chapter 18-21. Petitioners assert that the Dock is inconsistent with article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution, which states: Sovereignty lands. – The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the states, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private use of portions of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not contrary to the public interest. Fla. Const., art. X, §11 (emphasis added). Chapters 253 and 258, and the implementing rules codified in chapters 18-20 and 18-21, authorize the use of sovereignty submerged lands for private residential single-family docks when not contrary to the public interest. As discussed above, the Dock is not contrary to the public interest under chapters 18-20 and 18-21. Thus, the use of sovereignty submerged lands for the Dock is consistent with article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution. Petitioners raised, as a public interest concern, their ability to walk below the MHWL along the shoreline on Long Beach Drive. The evidence shows that the Dock will, within its narrow footprint, present a minor hindrance to Petitioners' ability to walk unimpeded along the shoreline below the MHWL. However, the competent, persuasive evidence established that Petitioners will be able to duck under the Dock, or walk around the end of the terminal platform, where the water is relatively shallow. Importantly, Petitioners did not cite any statutory or rule provisions affording completely unencumbered access, by the general public, to all sovereignty submerged lands.10 Cumulative Impacts Rule 18-20.006 requires that an activity proposed in an aquatic preserve be evaluated for its cumulative impact on the aquatic preserve’s natural system. As extensively discussed above, Fondriest's expert, Walters, conducted a comprehensive cumulative impacts analysis that addressed all pertinent considerations in rule 18-20.006, and she concluded that the Dock will not have any 10 A key purpose of chapters 18-20 and 18-21 is to establish standards for approval of private uses of sovereignty submerged lands which may, to a certain extent, hinder the general public's access to those sovereignty lands. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004 ("[t]he following management policies, standards, and criteria shall be used in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands"); and Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004 ([t]he following management policies, standards, and criteria are supplemental to chapter 18-21 . . . and shall be uses in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves.") adverse cumulative impacts on the CBAP as a whole, or on any significant biologic, hydrologic, or other resources within the CBAP. As discussed above, Walters's analysis was comprehensive; her testimony was credible and persuasive; and her conclusion that the Dock will not result in adverse cumulative impacts to the CBAP, or to any resources within the CBAP, was rule- based, and considered all pertinent factual information. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will not cause adverse cumulative impacts to the CBAP, or to any resources within the CBAP, as required by rule 18-20.006. Minimization of Adverse Impacts to Sovereignty Submerged Lands and Resources Rule 18-21.004(2)(b) states, in pertinent part, that activities that would result in significant adverse impacts to sovereignty lands and associated resources may not be approved. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that there are no significant natural resources present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. Thus, the Dock will not have adverse impacts on such resources or on sovereignty submerged lands. Nonetheless, numerous protective measures have been imposed as conditions to the letter of consent, to minimize the potential for adverse water quality impacts and to protect aquatic resources. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will meet the resource impact minimization requirements in rules 18-20.004(5)(a)1. and 18-21.004(2). Measures to Avoid and Minimize Adverse Impacts to Listed Species and Habitat 18-21.004(7)(e) requires that "construction, use, or operation of the structure or activity shall not adversely affect any species which is endangered, threatened[,] or of special concern, as listed in rules 68A-27.003, 68A-27.004[,] and 68A-27.005." DEP consulted with FFWCC on the Dock application, to determine its potential impacts to species listed as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. As discussed above, FFWCC provided recommendations to minimize the Dock's potential impacts to several listed species, and those recommendations have been imposed as conditions to the letter of consent. As discussed above, the Dock will implement numerous measures to ensure that construction and use will not adversely affect manatees, sea turtle species, the Smalltooth Sawfish, and the Eastern Indigo Snake. As discussed above, Key Deer forage on and traverse the shore along Long Beach Drive. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not impose any substantial barrier to the Key Deer's use of the shore on Fondriest's property, and will not otherwise adversely affect the Key Deer. Also, as discussed above, the competent, credible evidence establishes that due to the lack of suitable habitat, other protected species, such as the Lower Keys Marsh Rabbit, Keys Rice Rat, and Florida Keys Mole Skink are unlikely to inhabit, or otherwise be present at or near, the Dock site. Thus, it is determined that the Dock will not have any adverse impacts on these species. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will not have adverse impacts to listed species and their habitat. Riparian Rights Chapters 18-20 and 18-21 require that the riparian rights of owners of upland riparian property adjacent to an activity seeking approval to use sovereignty submerged lands be protected. Rule 18-20.004(4) states, in pertinent part: "[n]one of the provisions of this rule shall be implemented in a manner that would unreasonably infringe upon the traditional, common law and statutory riparian rights of upland property owners adjacent to sovereignty lands." Rule 18-21.004(3) states, in pertinent part: None of the provisions of this rule shall be implemented in a manner that would unreasonably infringe upon the traditional, common law riparian rights, as defined in section 253.141, F.S., of upland riparian property owners adjacent to sovereignty lands. Satisfactory evidence of sufficient upland interest is required for activities on sovereignty submerged lands riparian to the uplands. All structures and other activities must be designed and conducted in a manner that will not unreasonably restrict or infringe upon the riparian rights of adjacent upland riparian owners. [A]ll structures, including mooring pilings, breakwaters, jetties and groins, and activities must be set back a minimum of 25 feet inside the applicant's riparian line. Exceptions to the setbacks are private residential single- family docks associated with a parcel that has a shoreline frontage of less than 65 feet, where portions of such structures are located between riparian less than 65 feet apart. Pursuant to rule 18-21.003(63), "satisfactory upland interest" means owning the riparian uplands or having some other possessory or use interest, as specified in the rule. Section 253.141(1) defines riparian rights as follows: Riparian rights are those incident to land bordering upon navigable waters. They are rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing, and fishing and such others as may be or have been defined by law. Such rights are not of a proprietary nature. They are rights inuring to the owner of the riparian land but are not owned by him or her. They are appurtenant to and are inseparable from the riparian land. The land to which the owner holds title must extend to the ordinary high watermark of the navigable water in order that riparian rights may attach. Conveyance of title to or lease of the riparian land entitles the grantee to the riparian rights running therewith whether or not mentioned in the deed or lease of the upland. Fondriest owns the upland property riparian to the sovereignty submerged lands on which the Dock is proposed to be located, and Petitioners stipulated that she has a satisfactory upland interest for purposes of rule 18-21.004(3). The Trust owns upland property bordering the Straits of Florida; thus, riparian rights inure to the Trust property, pursuant to section 253.141. As previously discussed, the evidence establishes that the Dock will be set back over 40 feet from the common riparian line between Fondriest's property and the Trust's property. To this point, Meredith acknowledged that the Dock would be set back more than 25 feet from the common riparian line, and will not intrude into the Trust's riparian area. No evidence was presented showing that the Dock would unreasonably interfere with the Trust's traditional riparian rights of navigation, boating, swimming, or fishing within its riparian area. Meredith testified that the Dock would obstruct the view of the waterbody, the shore, and the sunrise over the water, from the Trust property. She appeared to assert these interests on behalf of the Trust and herself. However, as more fully discussed below, under Florida law, the riparian right to an "unobstructed" view does not entail a view completely free of any infringement or restriction by structures or activities appurtenant to neighboring riparian properties. Rather, the right to an "unobstructed" view means that a riparian owner is entitled to a direct, unobstructed view of the channel of the waterbody and a direct means of ingress and egress to the channel. No evidence was presented that the Dock—which will be constructed perpendicular to the shoreline within Fondriest's riparian area—would obstruct the Trust's or Meredith's view of the channel of the Straits of Florida. Additionally, as previously discussed, the Trust presented no evidence to show that the presence of the Dock in Fondriest's riparian area would interfere with the Trust's direct ingress and egress to and from the channel of the Straits of Florida. Accordingly, it is determined that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the Trust's riparian rights. Similarly, it is determined that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the riparian rights incident to the Deer Run property, or to Appel's properties on Long Beach Drive. To this point, Demaria and Appel did not present any evidence showing that the Dock will obstruct their view of the channel of the Straits of Florida, either from the Deer Run property, or from Appel's properties. DeMaria and Appel also failed to present evidence showing that the Dock would interfere with direct ingress and egress to and from the channel of the Straits of Florida, either from the Deer Run property or from Appel's properties. Accordingly, it is determined that, consistent with section 253.141 and rule 18-21.004(3), the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the riparian rights of the Trust or of DeMaria and Appel. General Requirements for Authorization to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands As discussed above, the Dock will be constructed and used in a manner that will avoid and minimize adverse impacts to sovereignty submerged lands and resources, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(d). The competent, credible evidence also demonstrates that the construction and use of the Dock will not adversely affect listed species, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(e). As discussed above, the Dock will not unreasonably interfere with the riparian rights of the Petitioners, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(f). Additionally, the Dock will not constitute a navigational hazard, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(g). Due to the shallow water in the footprint and in the vicinity of the Dock, navigation in the area is typically by kayak or canoe. The competent, credible evidence shows that the Dock will not impede navigation of these types of vessels. Because the sandy beach areas on Long Beach Drive are in private ownership, the Dock will not interfere with the public easement for traditional uses of sandy beaches, as provided in section 161.141, Florida Statutes; thus, the Dock is consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(h). Also, as discussed above, the Dock will be constructed, operated, and maintained solely for the water-dependent uses of launching non-motorized vessels and swimming, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(j).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection issue a Final Order granting Respondent Julia Fondriest's application for a Letter of Consent to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands and verifying that the Dock is exempt from the requirement to obtain a regulatory permit, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia Fondriest Doug Scheele Lifetime Dock & Lumber, Inc. 24536 Overseas Highway Summerland Key, Florida 33042 Luna E. Phillips, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. Suite 1400 450 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Deborah K. Madden, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. Suite 1400 450 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Paul Joseph Polito, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Stop 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ralf Gunars Brookes, Esquire Ralf Brookes Attorney Suite 107 1217 East Cape Coral Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Noah Valenstein, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue is whether the applicants-respondents Floyd and Alice Melton have provided reasonable assurances that their proposed dock meets the requirements of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes (1989) and Chapter 17, Florida Administrative Code, for issuance of a dredge and fill permit. Only four issues of disputed fact are raised by the pleadings in these cases: (1) whether the project will adversely affect navigation as that term is used in Section 403.918(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes; (2) whether the project will adversely affect recreational values in the vicinity of the project, in the context of the public interest test of Section 403.918(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes; (3) whether an increased number of boats at the proposed dock would cause "pollution" which would violate water quality criteria promulgated by the Department, and (4) whether the pilings will harm seagrasses in the vicinity of the dock.
Findings Of Fact An 85' dock perpendicular to the shoreline of the Meltons' property at Lot 4, Block 2, Buccaneer Point Estates, Key Largo, was in existence in 1988, some portion of which was apparently constructed without the benefit of a dredge and fill permit. On October 20, 1988, Floyd Melton applied to the Department (hereinafter "DER") for an after-the-fact permit for a 48' x 20' section, as an addition to a previously existing structure. After DER received the Meltons' permit application, an agency field inspector visited the site to determine whether the Meltons' proposed project could be constructed in conformance with Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, including the "public interest" tests at Section 403.918(2), and the "Keys Rule," Rule 17-312.420, Florida Administrative Code. The project site is located in Class III, Outstanding Florida Waters. The relevant factual determinations that DER personnel had to make at the Melton site, to ascertain compliance with the Keys Rule, were (a) the water depths, and (b) the presence or absence of seagrass communities in the proposed boat mooring area. The proposed 90' dock would have terminated over seagrass community in less than 5' of water depth. DER informed the Meltons, on February 9, 19890, that the permit would be denied unless they redesigned the dock to extend a distance of 275' out from the shore (289' total length), to where a water depth of 5' existed, limited the dock to a 4' width, and elevated the access walkway 6 feet above mean high water, to prohibit mooring along it and to increase light penetration underneath the dock. The Meltons amended their permit application to so comply. There are seagrasses under the entire length of the proposed dock. There are dense seagrass communities at the terminus of the proposed dock, surrounded by less dense seagrass communities. Under the boat currently moored near the terminus of the Meltons' uncompleted dock, there is a dense seagrass bed that is not adversely affected by the presence of the boat, which is moored in 5' of water. There is a "halo" of denuded bottom extending 4-6 inches around each piling, and occasional gouges that extend beyond the halo, which features are an ordinary and expected effect of driving pilings into the sea bed. Petitioners' expert's uncontroverted testimony is that 10 pilings placed in the dense seagrass bed at the end of the proposed dock would have no effect on the viability of that seagrass bed, while 100 pilings "would definitely damage" its viability. The survey introduced by the Meltons shows six pilings where the terminal platform is to be constructed, and three more offshore pilings for mooring purposes, for a total of nine. Other existing mooring pilings shown in the survey, landward of the proposed terminal platform, are to be removed in accordance with the permit. The water depth at the end of the Meltons' existing 85' dock is between 3.0' and 3.25', which is comparable to other existing docks in the area. Fast boats, such as water-skiing boats and one-person watercraft, operating in shallow water over a seagrass bed can damage seagrasses by "prop scarring" or by stirring up sediments. At another dock in the area, where the water depth is 3.75' at the dock's terminus, there is evidence of damage to seagrass beds by such prop-scarring. The water depth at the end of Petitioner Traurig's dock is only 1.67' to 2.0', necessitating very careful boat operation to prevent damage to seagrasses. The stipulated modification to the permit allowing three mooring pilings and requiring mooring waterward of the terminal platform clarifies DER's understanding that boats would only be moored on the waterward side of the terminal platform. No more than one or two boats can reasonably be moored at the facility. That is no more than could have been moored at the previous dock; in fact, it is equivalent to the two moored at Petitioner Traurig's dock. The environmental impact of the proposed Melton dock would be far less than that of the other docks along this shoreline, primarily because it causes boats to be operated and moored in deeper water. Neither the proposed project, nor the one or two boats that can be expected to moor at the terminal platform, will have any adverse effect on Florida Bay or the seagrass communities in the immediate vicinity. The entire area of Florida Bay except for the shoreline area where the Melton and other docks in the vicinity are located is open for navigation. It is between 0.4 and 0.5 miles from the end of the proposed dock to the nearest navigation channel. The proposed dock is not a hazard to navigation in that nearest channel, the Intracoastal Waterway. It is, however, an inconvenience and can present a hazard to unwary nighttime recreational users in the waters next to the shoreline where the Melton, Clarke, and Traurig docks are located. Petitioners' witnesses' testimony focused on how the Melton dock would force them to change their usual paths while recreating in the area, or traveling to and from nearby docks. Water-skiers and "knee-towers" have had to modify the route they used to take when water-skiing or knee-towing past the Melton property, now that much of the dock is in place. Some boat operators, Petitioners' witnesses included, continue to operate their boats so close to the Melton dock that near- collisions take place. A sailor chose to forego landing his catamaran at a dock near the Melton dock because its presence would have given him "a hard time getting out." Youngsters on "hydoslides" and "wet bikes," and in small boats, have passed landward of the outermost pilings of the uncompleted Melton dock, literally going under the structure, on several occasions. One neighbor witnessed three nighttime collisions with the uncompleted Melton dock by boaters, each of which ended when the boaters extricated themselves from the pilings. Traurig's tenant next door to the Meltons, when traveling to and from her dock, complained that "you can't go straight out anymore. You have to go out and then around. You have to be cautious..." Petitioner Traurig stated that the Melton dock would "almost cause her to jump out of her unpowered sailboat and tow it into her dock," as it would limit her ability to tack in the close confines created by the new dock. Petitioner Charles Clarke, whose property is separated from the Meltons by Petitioner Traurig's property, stated that the proposed dock is "an obstacle essentially to navigation and enjoyment of that waterway as I used it...," and that he is prevented from tacking into his dock by the presence of the Meltons' dock. Buccaneer Point is full of docks. The neighboring docks are generally approximately 100' long, while the Meltons' dock that DER proposes to permit will be 289' long, with mooring pilings and a boat extending this facility between 300' and 310' offshore. Boaters will be required to avoid this dock while recreating in the area, and while travelling to and from nearby docks. The proposed dock will discourage boaters and water- skiers from traveling through the very shallow waters off the ends of the other docks in the vicinity, potentially injuring themselves and the benthic communities. The Melton dock will not cross over the riparian lines of the Melton property. The project is clearly in the public interest by preventing ongoing adverse impacts of the existing dock, allowing the recolonization of habitat in those disturbed areas, and by extending the dock to prevent the destruction of the bay bottom. This is accomplished by elevating the dock to 6' and restricting its width to 4' in order to allow better sunlight penetration below the dock. This is also accomplished by prohibiting the mooring of vessels other than seaward of the terminus platform, thereby keeping vessels in deeper water to prevent additional destruction of the seagrass beds throughout the area. During the course of the final hearing, the Meltons and DER entered into several stipulations which will promote the absence of impact to the seagrass community. They have agreed that the following conditions will be made part of any permit issued by DER: The dock structure will be modified so that it is T-shaped rather than L-shaped. The terminal platform and access walkway will be of the dimensions contained in DER's "intent to issue." The access walkway can intersect the terminal platform at any point along the platform's 40' length. There will be 3 mooring pilings placed seaward of the terminal platform. The permit will restrict the mooring of vessels to the seaward side of the terminal platform. The Meltons will remove the 3 mooring pilings located to the right of the dock and 2 of the 4 pilings located to the left of the dock. The Meltons will not use a water-based barge in less than 2' of water in connection with the dock construction or driving or removing the pilings.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting the Meltons' application for a dredge and fill permit, conditioned upon the stipulations and the mitigative recommendation set forth in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16 day of October, 1990. LINDA H. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16 day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NOS. 89-6051 and 89-6135 Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 3, 6, 7, 22d, 22g, 22j, and 22r have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 22f, 22h, 22i, and 22n- 22q have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5, 19, 22a, 22c, 22e, 22i, 22k, and 22m have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 8-18, 20, 21, 22b, 22s, and 22t have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 6, 8-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19-23, and 26 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. The Department's proposed finding of fact numbered 3 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5, and 25 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 11, 13, 16, 18, and 24 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Respondents Meltons' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-13 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael F. Chenoweth, Esquire 31 Garden Cove Drive Key Largo, Florida 33037 James S. Mattson, Esquire Joseph J. Vetrick, Esquire MATTSON, TOBIN & VETRICK Post Office Box 586 Key West, Florida 33037 Cecile I. Ross, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable for retirement contributions on compensation paid Thaddeus Kmiecik in his capacity as city dockmaster.
Findings Of Fact The City of Moore Haven is located west of Lake Okeechobee alongside a waterway that connects Stuart on the east coast with Ft. Myers on the west coast. Petitioner maintains docks that boaters may use overnight, provided they pay a docking fee. A dockmaster supervises the dock and collects the docking fee from boaters. Petitioner's first dockmaster served without compensation. Whenever he became ill or went out of town, he asked Petitioner to hire someone to replace him. Pursuant to Ordinance No. 156, which went into effect in 1982, Petitioner hired replacements for the first dockmaster. Ordinance No. 156 provides that specified docking fees shall be paid by all boats docking at the city docks between the hours of 6:00 pm and 8:00 am or at other times, if the boat remains docked over three hours. However, the ordinance allows the dockmaster to enter into special contracts with commercial users, subject to the approval of City Commission. Ordinance No. 156 states that the City Commission shall appoint one or more persons as dockmaster, who shall "check all boats at the City dock both evening and morning of each day." The ordinance requires the dockmaster to record all relevant information about the boat in a log. The ordinance states that the dockmaster is "responsible seven days a week for the collection of dockage fees, giv[ing] a receipt from a numbered book, and giv[ing] copies of all receipts to the City Clerk each working day." The dockmaster must also tell the City Clerk if the docks need repairs or maintenance. The dockmaster is also required to assume at least certain responsibilities of the City Manager if the position is vacant. The health of the original dockmaster deteriorated and it became necessary to hire someone else to collect the fees. By agreement between the original dockmaster and the person doing the collections, the dockmaster allowed the collector to retain a percentage of the docking fees collected. The remainder evidently was remitted to Petitioner. When the original dockmaster died, Petitioner hired Thaddeus Kmiecik as the new dockmaster. The agreement between Petitioner and Mr. Kmiecik requires that he answer directly to the City Commission. He is to ensure that the docking fees are collected and all money taken directly to City Hall. Boaters needing reservations call Mr. Kmiecik at home. Mr. Kmiecik is responsible for his own expenses, but he earns a commission, payable monthly, of 20 percent of the collected docking fees. From 1986 through 1993, Petitioner has filed IRS Forms 1099, showing that Mr. Kmiecik has received the following "nonemployee compensation": 1986--$1936.52; 1987-- $2324.83; 1988 1992--$3457.50; and 1993--$2621.08. The arrangement between Petitioner and Mr. Kmiecik is fairly loose. He has never received any training, except how to complete the receipt book, which is provided by Petitioner. He has never received any orders as to how to perform his job, except that he is to ensure that the docks are checked nightly for boats and that all docking fees are promptly remitted to Petitioner. Mr. Kmiecik does not check the docks in the morning, and the City Commission has never insisted that he do so, even though the ordinance so requires. Mr. Kmiecik has attended only one City Commission meeting and has never reported anything to the City Commission. He can hire anyone whom he chooses to help him or perform the services when he is out of town or otherwise unavailable. He may supplement his income from the docks by performing other services, such as taking boaters to the airport, and he retains all compensation for such additional services. Although not required to do so, Mr. Kmiecik sometimes wears a city uniform when he appears at the docks. But this is the uniform for his fulltime job at Petitioner's water plant. Other persons checking the boats at night do not have a uniform. Petitioner is a participating local agency in the State-Administered Retirement System. Petitioner makes retirement contributions on Mr. Kmiecik's pay for his work at the water plant in recognition of the fact that this position is a regularly established position under the State-Administered Retirement System. However, Petitioner has always treated Mr. Kmiecik as an independent contractor for his work as dockmaster and has thus made no retirement contributions for his dockmaster compensation. The record is silent as to when Mr. Kmiecik first became employed with Petitioner in the water plant and whether he has been continuously so employed. On June 3, 1993, Petitioner answered a questionnaire acknowledging that Mr. Kmiecik worked at the city water plant also. Based on the record, June 3, 1993, is the earliest date on which Mr. Kmiecik worked at the city water plant. By letter dated January 21, 1994, Respondent informed Petitioner that Mr. Kmiecik was an employee when performing dockmaster services and demanded retroactive retirement contributions from the unspecified date of his employment in that position. By letter dated January 25, 1994, Petitioner supplied additional information and requested further review of this decision. By letter dated March 7, 1994, Respondent advised Petitioner that Respondent had determined that Mr. Kmiecik was performing the services of dockmaster in an employer-employee relationship, rather than an independent contractor relationship. The letter adds that Mr. Kmiecik is filling a "regularly established position" as an operator of the water plant and is "performing additional duties" as the dockmaster. Petitioner requested a formal hearing on the issue. Based on the relevant law, Mr. Kmiecik is an independent contractor with respect to his dockmaster services.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order requiring the City of Moore Haven to pay retirement contributions with respect to the compensation paid Mr. Kmiecik for services as a dockmaster, retroactive to June 3, 1993. ENTERED on July 21, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 21, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1: adopted or adopted in substance. 2-3: rejected as subordinate. 4-10: adopted or adopted in substance. 11: adopted or adopted in substance, but only to the minimal extent of the use of the receipt books. 12-18: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED Steven A. Ramunni Watkins & Ramunni, P.A. P.O. Box 250 LaBelle, FL 33935 Jodi B. Jennings Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg C 2639 North Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
The Issue Whether the after-the-fact permit sought by Petitioner for a single family dock that has been constructed within the Indian River Aquatic Preserve, Malabar to Vero Beach, should be granted and, if so, the conditions that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Richard O. Thomas, resides at 13845 North Indian River Drive, Sebastian, Florida. Mr. Thomas is the owner of this real property, which fronts the intracoastal waterway in an area that is referred to as the Indian River Aquatic Preserve, Malabar to Vero Beach (IRAP). Construction of docks in the IRAP requires a permit from Respondent pursuant to Section 253.77(1), Florida Statutes. A dock is presently built in front of Petitioner's property and is within the IRAP. 1/ Petitioner began applying for a permit from Respondent to construct a single-family private dock in front of his property to extend into the IRAP in April of 1987. The size of main access docks and terminal platforms are limited by Respondent primarily to protect the fragile environment found in aquatic preserves such as the light-sensitive sea grass beds and attached algae found in the vicinity of Petitioner's dock and to minimize the effect of the construction of these type facilities on those areas. Petitioner sent a drawing of the requested dock to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) in April of 1987. DER thereafter forwarded a copy of the drawing to Respondent. The April 1987 drawing depicted a main access dock 200' long and 4' wide with a terminal platform in an ell shape to the south of the main access dock 16' wide and 10' long. The dock was to be elevated 4' in height with railings around the terminal platform. This drawing was not the drawing subsequently permitted by Respondent. In June 1987, Petitioner first learned that he needed, in addition to the other permits he was seeking, a permit from Respondent. After consulting Brian Poole, an Environmental Specialist employed by Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised drawing to Respondent on June 25, 1987. This drawing, stamped "Revised" by Respondent, was forwarded to Wilbert Holliday, an Environmental Specialist Supervisor, in Respondent's Orlando office. The June 1987 drawing depicts a main access dock 200' long and 4' wide with an ell shaped terminal platform facing south that is 6' long and 10' wide. The main access dock did not extend the length of the terminal platform. Petitioner made numerous telephone calls between June 1987 and October 1988, to Mr. Poole and to Mr. Holliday in an effort to determine the status of his request and in an effort to have his request approved. In the interim, Petitioner received conflicting instructions from Respondent, the Army Corps of Engineers, and DER as to how long the dock would have to be. Respondent's staff wanted the dock to be 500' in length so that the boats that would be moored at the dock would not be crossing sea grass beds that were located closer to shore. Petitioner testified that he engaged in a series of telephone conversations with Mr. Holliday concerning the pertinent permitting requirements. Pursuant to conversations with Mr. Holliday, Petitioner submitted a written request on October 17, 1988, for permission to build a dock "... no longer than 210 feet, 5 feet above mean low water, and with 1/2 inch spaces between deck planks. The platform is to be no more that 6 feet by 10 feet. The draft of the boat is to be used is no more than 18 inches. " Between October 17 and October 20, 1988, Petitioner informed Mr. Holliday that the ell platform had to be moved from south of the main access dock to north of it due to the county's concern for his neighbor's riparian rights. During that same telephone conversation Mr. Holliday informed Petitioner that his staff was still recommending that the dock be 500 feet in length. On October 20, 1988, Petitioner wrote Mr. Holliday a letter which voiced his displeasure as to that recommendation and which provided, in part, as follows: ... I again respectfully request that the dock length be 210 ft. long with platform area 160 sq. ft. and the dock to be 4 ft. in height with spaces 3/8 inches (they will shrink to 1/2 inches.) If the 4 ft. is disallowed then I need a lower platform area to get in and out of my two boats. My wife is 5 ft. 2 in tall. If this isn't's going to fly then I have no other recourse than seek a third party opinion. At Petitioner's request, Mr. Holliday gave Petitioner the name and number of John Peterson, an environmental specialist in Respondent's Tallahassee office. Petitioner and Mr. Peterson engaged in a lengthy telephone conversation about Petitioner's application. At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Peterson asked Petitioner to submit his final plan and informed Petitioner that he would be back in contact with Petitioner. A day or two after that conversation, Mr. Holliday called Petitioner and requested that Petitioner send to him Petitioner's final plan. On October 27, 1988, Petitioner sent to Mr. Holliday what Petitioner considered to be his final plan depicting a main access dock 4' x 210' with a 12' x 12' covered ell platform facing north. This 12' by 12' area (or 144 square feet) is the area Petitioner considers to be the terminal platform. The main access dock extended the length of the terminal platform and added to the terminal platform an area 4' wide and 12' long (or 48 square feet). The main access dock and the terminal platform were to be 5' above mean low water. Two boat slips were requested with an adjacent catwalk 3.5' above mean low water. On November 14, 1988, Casey Fitzgerald, as Chief of Respondent's Bureau of Submerged Lands Management, sent Petitioner a letter that stated in pertinent part: You are hereby authorized to proceed with construction of a two-slip single-family dock as depicted on the attached drawing ... . This authorization is specifically conditioned upon the following: The proposed dock shall be elevated +5 feet above the ordinary water line with 3/8 inch spaces between deck planks. The terminal platform area shall be elevated +3 feet above the ordinary water line. Vessels to moor at the dock shall have a maximum running draft of 18 inches, and shall be operated in a manner that will minimize impacts to the grassbeds at the site; and The attached general consent conditions shall be accepted and complied with. 2/ Please consider this the conditional authority sought under Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, to pursue this project. The letter in no way waives the authority and/or jurisdiction of any governmental entity, nor does it disclaim any title interest that the State may have in this project site. We appreciate your cooperation with our resource management objectives, and apologize for the long delay. If you have and questions, please feel free to contact me. No drawing was attached to Mr. Fitzgerald's letter of November 14, 1988. Petitioner thereafter constructed the dock in accordance with the plan he submitted on October 27, 1988. Construction on the dock and covered terminal platform was concluded in approximately March of 1989. The as constructed dock deviated from the plan submitted on October 27, 1988, in that Petitioner added two lowered platforms approximately 3.5' x 12' each around the north and east ends of the terminal platform to be used for access to moored boats. Petitioner concedes that these platforms were not part of the drawing of October 27, 1988, and he has agreed to remove them. Respondent calculated that the square footage of the terminal platform is 351 square feet (19' wide and 19.5' long). Respondent's calculations included the two lowered platform areas that Petitioner has agreed to remove and the portion of the main access dock that extends the length of the terminal platform. Petitioner made a good faith effort to follow the instructions of Respondent and to comply with the appropriate permitting procedure. He relied in good faith on the letter of November 14, 1988, and he reasonably assumed that the October 27, 1988, drawing was the one referred to in the November 14, 1988, letter. Mr. Fitzgerald did not testify at the formal hearing. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Mr. Fitzgerald, as the bureau chief, had greater authority in permitting matters than did either Mr. Holliday or Mr. Poole. While there is no question that Petitioner was permitted to construct a dock, there is no direct evidence as to which of the several drawings Petitioner submitted had been approved by Mr. Fitzgerald. Mr. Holliday did not recall having sent the October 27, 1988, drawing to Mr. Fitzgerald. After Mr. Peterson and Mr. Fitzgerald became involved in Petitioner's application, it is not clear what involvement Mr. Holliday had, other than to ask Petitioner to submit his final plan. It is clear that Mr. Fitzgerald had information pertaining to Petitioner's application available to him when he wrote Petitioner on November 14, 1988. The most reasonable inference 3/ to be drawn from the evidence is that Mr. Fitzgerald had for his review Petitioner's complete application file, including the drawing submitted October 27, 1988, and it was to the drawing of October 27, 1988, that his letter referred. The next contact between Petitioner and Respondent occurred June 1, 1990, when an inspection team from Respondent's field office, including Mr. Poole, visited the site and met with Petitioner. During this visit, Mr. Poole observed that the sea grass that had been visible before the dock was built had died and that underneath the structure was now white sand. Mr. Poole wrote a letter to Petitioner dated June 14, 1990, which asserted Respondent's understanding of an agreement reached during the on-site meeting of June 1, 1990, 4/ and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The terminal platform area will be reduced to no more than 160 square feet. This will require the removal of all the catwalks and reducing the ell-shaped platform area to 10' x 16' or any other shape so long as the size does not exceed 160 square feet. The resulting terminal platform may be lowered to a height of +3 feet above the ordinary water line to facilitate ingress and egress from the two vessels. The roof over the platform will be removed. ... It is our position that the roof is inconsistent with Chapter 18-20, FAC, and the adopted Indian River Malabar to Vero Beach Aquatic Preserve Management Plan. Section 18-20.004(5)(a)(2) provides for more restrictive modification for docks that fall within areas of special or unique importance, such as extensive seagrass beds. Section 18- 20.004(1)(f) requires that the structure be necessary to conduct water dependent activities, a roof over the platform is not necessary to access the water. ... * * * 6. You agreed to comply with the above requirements within 60 days. Your receipt of this letter will initiate the 60 day time clock. The letter of June 14, 1990, also discussed the requirement that Petitioner remove a boat hoist and that he not moor a commercially registered vessel at the dock. These two matters were resolved by the parties and were not at issue at the formal hearing. On October 24, 1990, James M. Marx, an Environmental Administrator with Respondent's Bureau of Submerged Lands and Preserves, sent a letter which advised that modifications to the dock in accordance with the letter of June 14, 1988, including removal of the roof, must be completed within thirty days of his receipt of the letter and that failure to do so will result in action that may result in removal of the entire structure. On December 26, 1990, Petitioner filed an application seeking approval of the dock as constructed less the two platforms he had agreed to remove. After the removal of the two platforms, the dock will be substantially in compliance with the drawing submitted by Petitioner on October 27, 1988. On April 4, 1991, Michael E. Ashey, as Chief of Respondent's Bureau of Submerged Lands and Preserves, advised Petitioner by letter that his after-the- fact permit application was denied on the following grounds: 1. Section 18-20.004(5)(b)(6) (sic), Florida Administrative Code, states in pertinent part: "terminal platform size shall be no more than 160 square feet." The existing structure has a terminal platform area of 392 square feet. 2. Section 18-20.004(5)(b)(1) (sic), Florida Administrative Code, limits the width of the main access walkway to 4 feet. The existing structure includes a main access walkway and a 3' x 42'11" catwalk adjacent to the walkway. The combined width of the access walkway structure exceeds the 4' width limit of the rule. 3. Section 18-20.004(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, states in pertinent part: "that activities shall be designed so that the structure or structures to be built in, on or over sovereignty lands are limited to structures necessary to conduct water dependent activities." The existing roof is not a necessary component to a water dependent activity. All three of the deviations raised by Mr. Ashey's letter of April 4, 1991, were reflected on the drawing that Petitioner submitted to Mr. Holliday on October 27, 1988. Petitioner understood that the terminal platform could not exceed 160 square feet. Petitioner believed that the terminal platform consisted only of the 12' x 12' platform that was attached to the main access dock. Petitioner did not understand that the 4' width of the adjacent main access dock would be included in calculating the square footage of the terminal platform, nor did he understand that the two unauthorized platforms (which did not appear on his final plans of October 27, 1988) would be included in calculating the terminal platform. The term "terminal platform" is not defined by rule. By internal memorandum, to which Petitioner did not have access, a "terminal platform" is considered to be that portion of the dock which is wider than the main access dock, generally at the terminus of the dock, and the area where boats are generally moored. Neither Mr. Poole, Mr. Holliday, Mr. Fitzgerald, or Mr. Peterson has the authority to permit the construction of a dock which contains the design of a terminal platform in excess of 160 square feet. Mr. Holliday and Mr. Poole testified that Respondent does not mark approved plans "approved" before returning the plans to the file so there is no way to distinguish preliminary plans from approved or permitted plans. There is no plan in Respondent's files pertaining to Petitioner's application marked "approved" or "permitted". On November 18, 1988, the date of Mr. Fitzgerald's letter to Petitioner, Mr. Fitzgerald served as the Bureau Chief, Department of Submerged Lands and Aquatic Preserves in Respondent's Tallahassee office. Mr. Holliday served as the Planning Manager of the East Central Florida field office located in Orlando. Mr. Poole served as an Environmental Specialist out of the Respondent's Melbourne office. The letter of November 14, 1988, was not routed through either Mr. Holliday or Mr. Poole. Petitioner and other members of his family, including his mother, his aunt, and his uncle have had skin cancers in the past. Young children and babies use the dock for recreational purposes during the day. Petitioner had not, prior to the construction of the structure, discussed his desire to have the terminal platform covered with either Mr. Poole or Mr. Holliday. The first drawing reflecting that the platform would be covered was the drawing of October 27, 1988. The roof on the dock would offer those using the dock during the day protection from the sun. Respondent has permitted at least two other docks located within an aquatic preserve that were roofed. Respondent is opposed to permitting the roof because of the shading that results from a solid structure. Neither Mr. Poole nor Mr. Holliday would have permitted the dock pursuant to the drawing of October 27, 1988, because neither believed the dock to be in compliance with his interpretation of the permitting requirements found in Chapter 18-20, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which requires that Petitioner remove the two lowered platforms on the north and east ends of the terminal platform within sixty days of the entry of the Final Order. It is further recommended that the Final Order find that the after the fact application submitted by Petitioner on December 26, 1990, is consistent with the authorization granted by the letter issued by Mr. Casey Fitzgerald on November 14, 1988. It is further recommended that the Final Order grant the after the fact application submitted by Petitioner on December 26, 1990. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1992.
