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GLADYS L. WHALEY vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 95-000059 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 09, 1995 Number: 95-000059 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1995

The Issue The central issue is whether the Petitioner is entitled to modify her deceased husband's retirement benefit option.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact. Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Lamar W. Whaley, Jr., deceased. From 1972 to 1990, Mr. Whaley was employed by the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners (Board) and as such was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Whaley retired from his position as a minibus driver with the Board on June 29, 1990. In anticipation of his retirement, Mr. Whaley filed an FR-9 Form with the Division of Retirement (Division). The FR-9 Form, entitled "Request for Audit," was signed by Mr. Whaley and dated November 6, 1989. The FR-9 Form is used by members of the Florida Retirement System who want estimates of the monthly payments which they will receive after they retire. The FR-9 Form provided a space where Mr. Whaley could list the name and birthdate of a joint annuitant. On the FR-9 Form, Mr. Whaley named the Petitioner and the Petitioner's birthdate in these spaces. On the line immediately after the spaces provided for name and birthdate of the joint annuitant, the FR-9 expressly states that "This is not an official beneficiary designation." By listing a joint annuitant and that individual's birthday on the FR-9 Form, the Division is able to calculate the monthly benefits that would be payable to a member under each of the four retirement options available. In response to Mr. Whaley's audit request, the Division calculated the amount of the monthly payments he and/or his survivor would receive under the four retirement options available. On or about November 22, 1989, the Division sent Mr. Whaley information which reflected an estimate of the monthly benefits he and/or his survivor would receive under each of the four retirement options from which he was eligible to select. Included with the estimate of retirement benefits sent to Mr. Whaley, was a document entitled, "What Retirement Option Should I Choose?". This information sheet listed sent to Mr. Whaley listed and described the four different options. In 1990, members of the Retirement System contemplating retirement were provided a Division Form FR-11, Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement (Application). The application listed the four different options and provided a brief description of each. Next to Option 1 was the following: "Benefit for the Member Only." A further notation on the application read, "SEE THE REVERSE SIDE FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THESE OPTIONS." The Application adequately described the consequences of the election of each option. The explanation read as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. This option does not provide continuing benefit to a beneficiary. Upon your death, the monthly benefit will stop and you beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions you paid which are in excess of the amount you received in benefits. If you wish to provide a beneficiary with a continued monthly benefit after your death, you should consider selecting one of the other three options. The option 1 benefit is the maximum form of lifetime payment and all other optional payments are derived by applying actuarial factors to the option 1 benefit. Option 2: A reduced monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. If you die before receiving 120 monthly benefit payments, your designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit payment in the same amount as you were receiving until the total monthly benefit payments to both you and your beneficiary equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. Option 3: A reduced monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. Upon your death, your joint annuitant (spouse or financial dependent), if living, will receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount as you were receiving. No further benefits are payable after both you and your joint annuitant are deceased. Option 4: An adjusted monthly benefit payable to you while both you and your joint annuitant (spouse or financial dependent) are living. Upon the death of either you or your joint annuitant, the monthly benefit payable to the survivor is reduced to two- thirds of the monthly benefit you were receiving when both were living. No further benefits are payable after both you and your joint annuitant are deceased. (Emphasis in original text.) On January 12, 1990, Mr. Whaley executed an Application. The Application listed the Petitioner as beneficiary and indicated that the retirement option selected was Option 1. In selecting Option 1, Mr. Whaley rejected all other options. The fact that Petitioner was listed on the application as a beneficiary is of no consequence given that Mr. Whaley chose Option 1. An explanation on the back of the retirement application expressly states, "This option does not provide continuing benefit to a beneficiary." Because Mr. Whaley chose Option 1, Petitioner, as his beneficiary, would have been entitled only to a refund of Mr. Whaley's contributions in the event that Mr. Whaley's contribution exceeded the amount of monthly benefits paid to him before prior to his death. Petitioner did not assert, nor did the evidence establish that the refund provision in Option 1 applies in the instant case. Petitioner stated that Mr. Whaley could read and was not mentally impaired at the time he completed the retirement application, yet Petitioner testified that the agency did not explain to Mr. Whaley the benefits of the plan which he selected. According to the testimony of Stanley Colvin, administrator and supervisor of the Division's Survivor Benefits Section, staff members are available to provide counseling to members who come in or call with questions relative to their retirement. There is no record that Mr. Whaley ever contacted the Division with questions regarding the various options. The pastor of the church which Petitioner is a member testified that Mr. Whaley may have needed help to understand the ramifications of legal documents. Mr. Whaley's daughter also testified that her father may not have understood the retirement option he chose. Both the pastor and Mr. Whaley's daughter testified further that in conversations with Mr. Whaley, he had indicated to them that he had taken care of the legal work necessary to ensure that his was family was taken care of in the event of his death. Notwithstanding the testimony of Petitioner and others, there is no evidence that at the time Mr. Whaley selected Option 1 he did not fully understand the nature and effect of his selection. Neither does the evidence support the claim that the selection of Option 1 by Mr. Whaley was inconsistent with his desire or intention at the time the choice was made. At the time of Mr. Whaley's retirement, he was in good health. Given this fact it is not unusual that he selected the option that would provide him with the maximum monthly benefit. Statements by Mr. Whaley that he had taken care of matters and that "things were in order" do not provide substantial evidence that the selection of Option 1 by Mr. Whaley was made only because he did not fully understand the consequences of his choice. The testimony revealed that upon Mr. Whaley's death, the Petitioner was the beneficiary of his life insurance policy and also the recipient of benefits under his social security. Under these circumstances, Mr. Whaley's selection of Option 1 was not necessarily inconsistent with his statement that things "were in order" or his listing Petitioner as beneficiary on the Application. On several documents provided to and/or completed by Mr. Whaley, it was clearly stated that once a member begins to receive his benefit, the option selection cannot be changed. The information sheet, "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?," mailed to Mr. Whaley on or about November 22, 1989, contained the following provision: Option Choice Cannot Be Changed Once you begin to receive your benefit your option selection cannot be changed. Therefore, it is important to carefully study your personal circumstances before making your decision . . . . The Application submitted to the Division by Mr. Whaley on or about January 25, 1990, contained a statement that "[o]nce you retire, you cannot add additional service nor change options." Finally, the Acknowledgment of Retirement Application sent to Mr. Whaley by the Division on or about February 8, 1990, provided in relevant part the following: ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT CHECK IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED! Mr. Whaley received his first retirement check on or about the last working day in July 1990. Petitioner testified that Mr. Whaley cashed this check in July or August of that same year. By cashing that check, Mr. Whaley was precluded from thereafter changing his retirement option. By selecting Option 1, Mr. Whaley received the maximum benefits payable to him during his lifetime. However, under the provisions of retirement Option 1, upon Mr. Whaley's death, his beneficiary, the Petitioner is not entitled to receive any benefits.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a final order denying the request of Petitioner to modify the retirement benefits elected by Mr. Whaley, the deceased husband of Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0059 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1a-1c. Rejected as not being supported by competent and substantial evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7-8. Accepted. 9-11. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Gladys Whaley 3807 East Norfolk Street Tampa, Florida 33604 Robert B.Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Legal Office Cedars Executive Center-Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 265 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (4) 120.56120.57121.031121.091 Florida Administrative Code (2) 60S-4.00260S-4.010
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MICHAEL A. FEWLESS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 18-005787 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 01, 2018 Number: 18-005787 Latest Update: Oct. 25, 2019

The Issue Whether the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (“the Department”) should be equitably estopped from requiring Michael A. Fewless to return $541,780.03 of retirement benefits.

Findings Of Fact The following findings are based on witness testimony, exhibits, and information subject to official recognition. FRS and the Termination Requirement FRS is a qualified plan under section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and has over 500,000 active pension plan members. The Department administers FRS so that it will maintain its status as a qualified pension plan under the Internal Revenue Code. Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ describes the benefits available to FRS members through the “Deferred Retirement Option Program (“DROP”): In general, and subject to this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the Florida Retirement System on behalf of the member, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the member shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Section 121.091 specifies that “[b]enefits may not be paid under this section unless the member has terminated employment as provided in s. 121.021(39)(a). ” Section 121.021(39)(a) generally provides that “termination” occurs when a member ceases all employment relationships with participating employers. However, “if a member is employed by any such employer within the next 6 calendar months, termination shall be deemed not to have occurred.” § 121.021(39)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Moreover, the employee and the re-employing FRS agency will be jointly and severally liable for reimbursing any retirement benefits paid to the employee. § 121.091(9)(c)3., Fla. Stat.2/ The termination requirement is essential to the FRS maintaining its status as a qualified plan under IRS regulations. As a qualified plan, taxes on FRS benefits are deferred.3/ The Department’s position is that after an entity becomes a participating employer, all new hires within covered categories are “compulsory members” of the FRS. If an entity has a local pension plan, then that entity must either close the plan before joining FRS or keep the plan open for members who exercise their right to remain in that plan. However, even if the entity chooses to keep the local plan open for current members, the local plan is closed to new members. The City of Fruitland Park, Florida (“Fruitland Park”), became an FRS employer on February 1, 2015. The mayor and commissioners of Fruitland Park passed a resolution on November 20, 2014, providing in pertinent part, that: It is hereby declared to be the policy and purpose of the City Commission of Fruitland Park, Florida that all of its General Employees and police officers, except those excluded by law, shall participate in the Florida Retirement System as authorized by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. All General Employees and police officers shall be compulsory members of the Florida Retirement System as of the effective date of participation in the Florida Retirement System so stated therein. (emphasis added). The Department notified Fruitland Park during its enrollment into FRS that all new hires were compulsory members of FRS for covered groups. Facts Specific to the Instant Case After graduating from the Central Florida Police Academy in 1985, Mr. Fewless began working for the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (“OCSO”) as a deputy sheriff and patrolled what he describes as “the worst area of Orange County.”4/ After five years, Mr. Fewless transferred into the detective bureau in OCSO’s criminal investigations division. Mr. Fewless received a promotion to corporal two years later and returned to patrolling.5/ Mr. Fewless soon received a transfer to OCSO’s special investigation’s division and worked in the gang enforcement unit.6/ It was not long before he was promoted to sergeant and sent “back to the road.” After 10 months, OCSO asked Mr. Fewless to take over the gang enforcement unit where he was promoted to lieutenant and ultimately to captain.7/ During his tenure as a captain, Mr. Fewless was in charge of OCSO’s internal affairs unit for five or six years. Mr. Fewless concluded his nearly 30-year tenure with OCSO as the director of the Fusion Center and the Captain of the criminal intelligence section.8/ In sum, Mr. Fewless’s service with OCSO was exemplary, and he was never the subject of any disciplinary actions. Mr. Fewless entered the DROP program on June 1, 2011. As a result, he was scheduled to complete his DROP tenure and retire on May 31, 2016. On June 1, 2011, Mr. Fewless signed a standardized FRS document entitled “Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment.” That document contained the following provisions: I elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with s. 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.), as indicated below, and resign my employment on the date I terminate from the DROP. I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach normal retirement date as determined by law and that my DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I reach my normal retirement date, although I may elect to participate for less than 60 months. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee my employment for the DROP period. I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a monthly retirement benefit and my DROP benefit under Chapter 121, F.S. Termination requirements for elected officers are different as specified in s. 121.091(13)(b)(4), F.S. I cannot add service, change options, change my type of retirement or elect the Investment Plan after my DROP begin date. I have read and understand the DROP Accrual and Distribution information provided with this form. Mr. Fewless realized by 2015 that he was not ready to leave law enforcement. However, he was scheduled to retire from OCSO by May 31, 2016. Mr. Fewless had several friends who left OCSO as captains and took police chief positions with municipalities in Florida. Therefore, in anticipation of a lengthy job search, he began looking for such a position in approximately March of 2015. Mr. Fewless applied to become Fruitland Park’s police chief on March 26, 2015, and was offered the job in June of 2015 by Fruitland Park’s city manager, Gary LaVenia. Mr. Fewless learned from Mr. LaVenia that Fruitland Park had joined FRS and told him that he could not work within the FRS system. Mr. LaVenia then erroneously told Mr. Fewless that he would not be violating any FRS conditions (and thus forfeiting his DROP payout) because Fruitland Park had a separate city pension plan into which Mr. Fewless could be enrolled. As noted above, Fruitland Park had passed a resolution mandating that “[a]ll General Employees and police officers shall be compulsory members of the Florida Retirement System as of the effective date of participation in the Florida Retirement System. ” While Mr. Fewless was pleased with what Mr. LaVenia told him, he called an FRS hotline on July 9, 2015, in order to verify that he would not be endangering his retirement benefits by accepting the police chief position with Fruitland Park. Mr. Fewless’s question was routed to David Kent, and Mr. Fewless described how he was going to work for Fruitland Park and that Fruitland Park was an FRS employer. Mr. Kent told Mr. Fewless that he could go to work for Fruitland Park immediately without violating any FRS requirements so long as he was not enrolled into the FRS system. Instead of being an FRS enrollee, Mr. Kent stated that Mr. Fewless could enroll into Fruitland Park’s pension plan or enter a third-party contract.9/ Mr. Fewless assumed that Mr. Kent was an FRS expert and remembers that Mr. Kent sounded very confident in the information he relayed over the telephone. On July 14, 2015, Mr. Fewless filled out and signed a form entitled “Florida Retirement Systems Pension Plan Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) Termination Notification.” The form indicates that Mr. Fewless would be ending his employment with OCSO on August 1, 2015. In addition, the form notified Mr. Fewless of the requirements associated with receiving his accumulated DROP and monthly benefits: According to our records, your DROP termination date is 08/01/2015. You must terminate all Florida Retirement System (FRS) employment to receive your accumulated DROP benefits and begin your monthly retirement benefits. You and your employer’s authorized representative must complete this form certifying your DROP employment termination. Termination Requirement: In order to satisfy your employment termination requirement, you must terminate all employment relationships with all participating FRS employers for the first 6 calendar months after your DROP termination date. Termination requirement means you cannot remain employed or become employed with any FRS covered employer in a position covered or noncovered by retirement for the first 6 calendar months following your DROP termination date. This includes but is not limited to: part-time work, temporary work, other personal services (OPS), substitute teaching, adjunct professor or non-Division approved contractual services. Reemployment Limitation: You may return to work for a participating FRS employer during the 7th – 12th calendar months following your DROP termination date, but your monthly retirement benefit will be suspended for those months you are employed. There are no reemployment limitations after the 12th calendar month following your DROP termination date. If you fail to meet the termination requirement, you will void (cancel) your retirement and DROP participation and you must repay all retirement benefits received (including accumulated DROP benefits). If you void your retirement, your employer will be responsible for making retroactive retirement contributions and you will be awarded service credit for the period during which you were in DROP through your new employment termination date. You must apply to establish a future retirement date. Your eligibility for DROP participation will be determined by your future retirement date and you may lose your eligibility to participate in DROP.[10/] (emphasis in original). Mr. Fewless’s Reliance on the Representations Made to Him Mr. Fewless placed complete trust in the representations made during his July 9, 2015, phone call to the FRS hotline and during his discussions with Fruitland Park’s city manager. When he left OCSO and accepted the police chief position with Fruitland Park, Mr. Fewless took a $33,000.00 annual pay cut and stood to receive $70,000.00 less from his DROP payout. It is highly unlikely he would have accepted those circumstances if he did not have a good faith basis for believing he was utilizing an exception to the termination requirement. In the months preceding his departure from OCSO, Mr. Fewless’s wife was being treated for a brain tumor. Following her surgery in May of 2015 and subsequent radiation treatment, Ms. Fewless returned to work for a month or two. However, given that the retirement checks Mr. Fewless had begun to receive were roughly equivalent to what Ms. Fewless had been earning, she decided to retire in order to spend more time with their grandchildren. During this timeframe, Mr. and Ms. Fewless decided to build their “dream home,” and Ms. Fewless designed it. They used a $318,000.00 lump sum payment from FRS to significantly lower their monthly house payment. Those actions would not have been taken if Mr. Fewless had suspected that there was any uncertainty pertaining to his retirement benefits. The Department Discovers the Termination Violation In November of 2017, the Department’s Office of the Inspector General conducted an audit to assess Fruitland Park’s compliance with FRS requirements. This audit was conducted in the regular course of the Department’s business and was not initiated because of any suspicion of noncompliance. The resulting audit report contained the following findings: (a) Fruitland Park had failed to report part-time employees since joining FRS; (b) Fruitland Park had failed to report Mr. Fewless as an employee covered by FRS; (c) Mr. Fewless’s employment with Fruitland Park amounted to a violation of FRS’s reemployment provisions; and (d) Fruitland Park failed to correctly report retirees filling regularly established positions. Because he had failed to satisfy the termination requirement, the Department notified Mr. Fewless via a letter issued on August 15, 2018, that: (a) his DROP retirement had been voided; (b) his membership in FRS would be retroactively reestablished11/; and (c) he was required to repay $541,780.03 of benefits. Mr. Fewless’s Reaction to Learning That He Had Violated the Termination Requirement Mr. Fewless learned on June 25, 2018, of the Department’s determination that he was in violation of the termination requirement. He responded on July 5, 2018, by writing the following letter to the Department: On the evening of, June 25, 2018, I was notified by Mr. Gary LaVenia, the City Manager for Fruitland Park, that he was contacted by members of the State of Florida’s DMS Inspector General’s office regarding a problem with my current retirement plan. No additional information was shared during this initial telephone conversation and we scheduled a meeting for the following day. On June 26, 2018, I met with Mr. Gary LaVenia, Ms. Diane Kolcan, Human Resource Director and Ms. Jeannine Racine, the Finance Director regarding this matter. I was advised that members of the Department of the Florida Retirement System told them that I was in violation of receiving my current retirement benefits because I failed to take a six month break between my retirement with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and joining the City of Fruitland Park. I explained to them that there must be some mistake because I am not currently enrolled in the Florida Retirement System through the City of Fruitland Park. The City enrolled me in their “City” pension plan. Mr. LaVenia agreed with me and we closed the meeting with me advising them I would do some additional research on the matter. * * * I then reached out to Mr. Chris Carmody, an attorney with the Gray/Robinson Firm, whom I worked with on legislative issues in the past. . . . I explained to him that according to the Inspector General’s report, I needed to have a six month separation between the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and the City of Fruitland Park, because both agencies participated in the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Carmody still did not feel that was a violation because I was not enrolled in the FRS Plan with the City of Fruitland Park, but rather their independent City pension plan. I felt the same way; however he wanted to continue to research the issue. A few hours later I received a telephone call from Mr. Carmody indicating the problem appears to be that the “City” participates in the FRS Pension Plan and even though I do not, I would be prohibited from working there for the six month period. After hearing this news, I immediately contacted Ms. Amy Mercer, the Executive Director of the Florida Police Chief’s Association. I explained the dilemma to her and just like the previously mentioned individuals she said “so what did you do wrong, that sounds ok to me. ” Ms. Mercer said she would reach out to the two attorneys that support the Florida Police Chief’s Association to get their opinion of the situation. The following morning, Ms. Mercer advised me that according to Attorney Leonard Dietzen my actions were in violation of the Florida Retirement Pension Plan Rules. Mr. Dietzen explained to her that I needed a six month separation from my employment with the Florida Retirement System and the City of Fruitland Park, because the City participated in the FRS Pension plan. Therefore, based on the above information [and] the realization that an innocent mistake had been made, please let me explain my actions: * * * In either June or July of 2015, I officially interviewed for the position of Police Chief for the City of Fruitland Park. . . . Approximately one week after the interviews, I was offered the position of Police Chief for the City of Fruitland Park. In July of 2015, I contacted the official FRS Hotline regarding my potential decision to join the Fruitland Park Police Department. I informed them that I was currently employed with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and enrolled in DROP. I advised them that I was considering accepting the position of police chief with the City of Fruitland Park; however I wanted to confirm with them that I would have no issues with my retirement. I explained that the City of Fruitland Park was currently an FRS department; however they also had a separate “City” pension plan which I was going to be placed in. I wanted to confirm that this would not negatively impact my retirement benefits. I was advised that as long as I was enrolled in the “City” pension plan, I would be fine. The FRS employee also added that he heard other “new chiefs” were doing an “independent contract” with the City for a one year period, but he assured me either way would be fine. I concluded my telephone conversation and proceeded forward. I then began the employee benefits negotiations process with Mr. LaVenia. At the time of the negotiations, I realized I would be receiving my Florida Retirement check on a monthly basis and my wife was also employed as the vice-president of the Orlando Union Rescue Mission in Orlando, Florida. Therefore money was not my primary concern for this position and I surrendered my much larger salary with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office to become the Chief of Police for Fruitland Park for $70,000 per year. I officially accepted the position with the City of Fruitland Park, and informed Mr. LaVenia that I could not participate in the Florida Retirement System; however according to the FRS Hotline employee I could be placed in the city pension plan or sign a contract for a one year period. Mr. LaVenia recommended that I be placed in the city pension plan and had the appropriate paperwork completed. * * * It is important to recognize that I felt I took all the necessary steps to act within the guidelines of the Florida Retirement System. After all, I had worked for over thirty years with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office with an impeccable record and with the intent of securing a retirement package that would protect my wife and family for life. In conclusion, I feel I have been let down by the system in two very key areas regarding this matter: In July 2015, not only was I preparing for retirement and a new job; but my wife was experiencing serious medical issues that required surgery and radiation treatments for months at Shands Hospital. Although my mind was focused on her condition, I still felt it was extremely important to contact the FRS Hotline regarding my potential new position. My desire was to make sure I did not do anything that would jeopardize the retirement plan I worked for my entire career. The advice I was given by the FRS Hotline employee/professional apparently was terrible. Not only did he indicate I could go under the “City” pension plan, he further recommended that other chiefs have decided to do a “contract” with the city for a one year period to account for the separation from the FRS system. Clearly had this employee indicated by any means that the position with Fruitland Park would or possibly could jeopardize my retirement, I would have run away from this opportunity . . . * * * In July and August of 2015, while I was completing the hiring process with the City of Fruitland Park, management and/or staff should have cautioned me about the potential risk to my Florida Retirement Pension if I proceeded with the process. * * * Clearly, whoever made the decision to proceed with processing me was unaware of two things. (1) I would be violating the six month separation rule if I stopped my employment with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office on August 1, 2015 and began employment with Fruitland Park one day later on August 2, 2015. (2) The only pension plan available to new employees with the City of Fruitland Park had to be the Florida Retirement System. * * * I now understand from going through this procedure that there [was] an unintended error in how I officially retired from the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and began my employment with the Fruitland Park Police Department. It is important to mention that Sheriff Kevin Beary and Sheriff Jerry Demings chose me to command their Professional Standards Division on two separate occasions because they knew I was a man of integrity and would always “do the right thing.” I had no intent to skirt the system and/or do anything unethical. I can assure you nobody raised a red flag over this position prior to this incident; and I would have immediately stopped my efforts had I been aware of this rule. Mr. Fewless’s Current Situation While working as Fruitland Park’s police chief, Mr. Fewless’s salary and retirement benefits totaled $12,000.00 a month. In order to avoid accumulating more penalties, Mr. Fewless retired from his police chief position with Fruitland Park on August 31, 2018. Mr. Fewless has not received any FRS benefits since September 1, 2018. There was a three-month period when he was receiving no money. Mr. Fewless has been employed by the Groveland Police Department since March 4, 2019. Mr. Fewless describes his current financial situation as “dire” and says he and his wife are “wiped out.” They may need to sell their “dream house,” and they borrowed $30,000.00 from their daughter in order to litigate the instant case. In addition, the contractor who built the Fewless’s dream home failed to pay subcontractors for $93,000.00 of work. While the Department notes that Mr. Fewless stands to receive a higher monthly benefit, he disputes that he is somehow in a better position: No, I am not in a better position. The $542,000 that will be taken away from me because of what clearly could have been handled with one phone call from a representative of FRS – the difference in pay between my former retirement salary and my new retirement salary based on the recalculations will go from $6,000 to $7,000 a month. That means in order for me to recoup the $542,000 that the state was referring to, I would have to work 542 months. I don’t think I’ll live that much longer, No. 1. And No. 2, that doesn’t take into consideration interest and everything else that was part of that, if that makes sense. Mr. Fewless has filed a lawsuit against Fruitland Park. Ultimate Findings of Fact12/ Mr. Fewless’s testimony about his July 9, 2015, phone call to the FRS hotline is more credible than Mr. Kent’s. Mr. Fewless’s descriptions of that phone call are very consistent, and the Department has not directed the undersigned to any instances in which an account of that phone call by Mr. Fewless differed from his testimony or his July 5, 2018, letter to the Department.13/ This finding is also based on Mr. Fewless’s demeanor during the final hearing. Moreover, Mr. Fewless was not attempting to “game the system.” Given Mr. Fewless’s exceptional record of public service, it is very unlikely that he would knowingly and intentionally attempt to engage in “double dipping” by violating the termination requirement. It is equally unlikely that Mr. Kent can accurately remember what he told Mr. Fewless during a single phone call on July 9, 2015. Rather than questioning Mr. Kent’s veracity, the undersigned is simply questioning his ability to recall the content of a single phone call that appears to have been unremarkable.14/ It is also difficult to believe that Mr. Fewless would accept the police chief position with Fruitland Park and build an expensive “dream house” after being told by Mr. Kent that he would be violating the termination requirement.15/ Mr. Fewless’s reliance on Mr. Kent’s statement was entirely reasonable given that the arrangement described by Mr. LaVenia sounded like an imminently plausible exception to the termination requirement. Mr. Fewless’s subsequent actions in reliance of that statement were extremely detrimental to himself and his family. Finally, the circumstances of the instant case are analogous to other cases in which appellate courts have held that the enhanced requirements for estopping the government had been satisfied. In other words, Mr. Kent’s misrepresentation amounted to more than mere negligence, the Department’s proposed action would result in a serious injustice, and the public interest would not be unduly harmed by Mr. Fewless retaining the retirement benefits he earned through his public service with OCSO.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Ryan Joshua Andrews, Esquire Brian O. Finnerty, Esquire Johana E. Nieves, Esquire The Law Offices of Steven R. Andrews, P.A. 822 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Sean W. Gillis, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order rescinding its proposed action that Michael A. Fewless’s FRS DROP retirement be voided and that he be required to repay all retirement benefits as provided in Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 4.012. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2019.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68121.021121.091 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-4.012 DOAH Case (1) 18-5787
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MARTHA A. CROSSON vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 76-001456 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001456 Latest Update: Jan. 07, 1977

Findings Of Fact Petitioner enrolled in "Plan A" of the Teachers Retirement System on August 13, 1954 as a teacher in the Orange County Florida school System. Petitioner transferred to Jacksonville, Florida and began teaching in Duval County on August 18, 1959 and continued hem membership in the Teachers' Retirement System "Plan A". Petitioner requested a change from the Teachers' Retirement System "Plan A" to Teachers' Retirement System "Plan E" by letter dated April 5, 1965. Petitioner was approved on March 26, 1966 for Teachers' Retirement System benefits and received disability retirement benefits for a period of time until she re-entered the teaching profession on November 27, 1970 in Duval County, Florida. She subsequently repaid an overpayment of these disability benefits which been paid for a period of time when she had returned to work in Duval County without notice to the Division of Retirement. Petitioner transferred from the Teachers Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System on October 15, 1970 when she signed a ballot entitled "Social Security Referendum and Application for Florida Retirement System Membership". Petitioner complains that she did not know when she signed the ballot that she was in fact changing her retirement from the Teachers' Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System contending that the statements of the person conducting the meeting at which the ballots were distributed informed the group the ballots were for an election for social security coverage. The ballot, however, clearly reflects that if social security benefits are desired, a change in the retirement system is necessary. Petitioner applied for Florida Retirement System disability benefits on October 20, 1971 and was approved. This benefit is $26.07 per month greater than the benefits she would have received had she remained in the Teachers' Retirement System. On October 3, 1975, Petitioner was supplied with the various documents concerning her actions in regard to her retirement benefits and was informed that her election to transfer into the Florida Retirement System was irrevocable and there was no method by which she could be transferred back into the Teachers' Retirement System. She requested a hearing on the transfer.

Recommendation Dismiss the Petition of Petitioner Martha A. Crosson. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of November, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Martha A. Crosson 801 West Myrtle Independence, Kansas 67301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT MARTHA A. CARSON, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1456 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /

Florida Laws (3) 120.57121.011121.091
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GERALDINE GAPINSKI vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 01-003898RU (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 05, 2001 Number: 01-003898RU Latest Update: May 31, 2002

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to purchase leave of absence retirement credit on behalf of James Gapinski, Petitioner's ex- husband and a deceased member of the Florida Retirement System.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Geraldine Gapinski, is the former spouse of James Gapinski, deceased. At the time of his death, Mr. Gapinski was an employee of Florida State University and a "vested" Florida Retirement Service (FRS) member. Petitioner is an employee of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and an active member of FRS. Mr. Gapinski was continuously employed by Florida's Univeristy System from approximately 1970, until his death on November 20, 2000, with the exception of a period from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, during which period he took an approved leave of absence. During the period September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, no contributions were made by Mr. Gapinski or on Mr. Gapinski's behalf to FRS toward his accruing retirement benefits and he earned no creditable service in FRS for this eight month period he was on his leave of absence. On May 4, 2000, Mr. Gapinski requested an audit and estimate of retirement benefits from Respondent. At the time of his request for an audit and estimate, Mr. Gapinski and Petitioner had begun a dissolution of marriage proceeding (divorce). At all times material, each litigant had independent legal counsel, and each lawyer was aware that Mr. Gapinski's FRS benefits were "on the table" for division of the marital estate in the course of the divorce proceedings. At all times material, Mr. Gapinski was terminally ill with cancer. On September 14, 2000, Mr. Gapinski applied for participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). His application (DROP Form DP11) requested a DROP "begin date" of September 1, 2000, and designated each of Mr. Gapinski's two adult daughters as 50 percent primary beneficiaries. Petitioner, who at that time was still married to Mr. Gapinski, was not even designated a secondary beneficiary. The application, which Mr. Gapinski signed, stated in pertinent part, I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach my normal retirement date as determined by law . . . I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement after my DROP begin date (emphasis in original). The application also specified eight required acts before Mr. Gapinski could retire and become a DROP participant, including, but not limited to, 4. A check payable to FRS for any amount you owe, or a written statement that you do not wish to claim the service . . . . On September 15, 2000, Respondent provided James Gapinski with two estimates of benefits. Estimate No. 1 showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose to purchase the one year leave of absence for $6,820.52, providing for a DROP beginning date of September 1, 2000. This estimate further advised that 6.5 percent per annum would be posted on June 30, 2001. It also stated, Comments: The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. This amount must be paid for a DROP begin date of September 1, 2000. Mr. Gapinski was also notified of the need to purchase his leave of absence credit in a letter from Respondent dated September 15, 2001, stating, in pertinent part, as follows: The following items are pending. The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. If you do not elect to pay the above amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notification of your intent. * * * Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, . . . AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. * * * Estimate No. 2 sent to Mr. Gapinski on September 15, 2000, showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose not to purchase his leave of absence and waited until March 1, 2001, to participate in DROP, when he would accrue 30 years of service without counting the gap left by his 1976-1977 leave of absence. This estimate also stated: Comments: This estimate does not include the purchase of your leave of absence and is provided for comparison purposes. It is provided for DROP purposes with a March 1, 2001, DROP begin date (see the enclosed DROP brochure). If you do not elect to pay the amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notice of your intent. Apparently, neither attorney ever saw any of the foregoing papers. The thrust of Petitioner's attorney's actions and advice was to obtain survivorship retirement benefits, not necessarily DROP benefits, for Petitioner. On October 23, 2000, Petitioner's attorney was told by telephone by Ms. Ferguson, a representative of Respondent, that Petitioner must make a non-party request to release Mr. Gapinski's retirement information to her. So far as this record shows, no third party request was ever made, but that day, Petitioner's attorney and Ferguson also generally discussed retirement pay-out options that Mr. Gapinski could elect, and Petitioner's attorney was generally aware that the DROP process was not complete. On October 24, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed by telephone, retirement, divorce, and survivorship benefit issues and life insurance payment options with Ms. Hudson, a representative of Respondent. On October 26, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed, by telephone, retirement options and steps to be taken, with both Ms. Ferguson and Mr. Helms, another of Respondent's representatives. Mr. Helms told her the DROP application was not complete but if the couple were still married, Option No. 3 would give the most benefit for survivorship benefits. During the October 2000, conversations, Petitioner's attorney made each of Respondent's representatives aware of the impending divorce and of Mr. Gapinski's impending death, but the attorney did not specifically inquire how soon the lapsed time payment must be made and none of Respondent's representatives volunteered information on that issue. At Mr. Gapinski's request, the divorce proceeding was bifurcated. Prior to the divorce, Petitioner's attorney had done independent research and was aware that Mr. Gapinski had to pay the $6,820.52, in order to perfect the DROP program and in order to complete 30 years of creditable service in order to be eligible for survivorship benefits on his retirement. This information was communicated to Petitioner by her attorney and whether or not Petitioner would be willing to pay half the amount was discussed. Petitioner stated she would be willing to pay half the amount owed. As a condition to her agreement to bifurcate the divorce proceeding, that is, as a condition to letting Mr. Gapinski out of the marriage but reserving jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to resolve certain disputes concerning assets and entitlements, Petitioner required that the couple enter into an "Agreement" on October 27, 2000, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: BIFURCATION: The Husband shall be entitled to bifurcation of the dissolution action. The marriage of the parties shall be dissolved with the Court reserving on all remaining unresolved issues not addressed in this agreement. In light of the Husband's health, the Wife shall schedule and appear at an ex parte hearing to dissolve the marriage, to obtain Court-ordered approval of this agreement, and to ensure the Court's reservation of jurisdiction to hear any and all issues pertinent to support and the division of property not yet settled by the parties. * * * B. The Wife further agrees that all marital assets awarded to her in this cause (including proceeds from the Husband's retirement and life insurance in the event the Husband predeceases her), shall be placed in an inter vivos trust, from which she may draw living, personal, and medical expenses, during her life, with the parties' adult daughters named as the irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of such trust. C. The Husband agrees to bequeath sufficient marital assets, awarded to him in this cause, to the parties' adult daughters to aid in their comfort and support. HUSBAND'S RETIREMENT: The Husband shall elect an option on his retirement with the State of Florida that provides for survivorship benefits for the benefit of the Wife. The wife shall be entitled to all such retirement survivorship benefits which, like the other assets she receives in this bifurcated action, shall be placed in an inter vivos trust for her living, personal and medical expenses, during her life, with the adult daughters as irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of the trust. The Husband shall, simultaneously with the signing of the agreement, execute such documents as are necessary to create retirement survivorship benefits in accordance with this term. Should the Husband fail to execute the survivorship option on his retirement or should he ever change such option in contravention of this term, the Husband agrees that the obligation of this term is binding upon his estate, which estate shall be responsible for paying such retirement survivorship benefits to the Wife. The Agreement could have, but did not, specifically require that the leave of absence be purchased by either Mr. Gapinski or Petitioner. Petitioner's and Mr. Gapinski's Agreement does not bind the Respondent, which was in no way privy to that Agreement. Petitioner and Mr. Gapinski's marriage was dissolved on November 1, 2000. Petitioner's attorney provided Mr. Gapinski, through his counsel, with DROP forms (FST-12 and FRS-11o). On November 1, 2000, Mr. Gapinski executed Option 2 for his DROP retirement on these forms, naming Petitioner as his sole primary beneficiary and negating his prior designation of his adult daughters as beneficiaries. Option No. 2 provides for a reduced monthly benefit payable for the FRS member's (Mr. Gapinski's) lifetime. If the member dies before receiving 120 monthly payments, his designated beneficiary (Petitioner) would receive a monthly benefit in the same amount until the monthly benefit payments to both of them equaled 120 monthly payments, when payments would terminate. Option No. 2 is available for regular service retirements as well as DROP retirements. Option No. 3 is also available for regular service retirements and DROP retirements. Option No. 3 would have provided a reduced monthly benefit payable for Mr. Gapinski's lifetime, and upon his death, his joint annuitant, if living, would receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount as Mr. Gapinski was receiving. Then, no further benefits would be payable after both he and his joint annuitant were deceased. There are exceptions to the foregoing general description, none of which matter to the case at bar. Option No. 3 would clearly provide more money to Petitioner if she were eligible. On November 2, 2000, Petitioner's attorney had three short telephone conversations with Mr. Helms, who opined that since Mr. Gapinski had signed up for DROP while the couple were still married, Petitioner could still get Option No. 3, with DROP retroactive to September 1, 2000, but that the leave of absence must be paid for. Apparently, Petitioner's attorney did not ask what would happen if the gap was not paid for before Mr. Gapinski died and no representative of Respondent volunteered that information. The thrust of Petitioner's case continued to be to persuade Mr. Gapinski to pay the whole amount due and to change his Option election to No. 3. On or about November 3, 2000, Mr. Helms sent an estimate letter based on selecting a September 1, 2000, retirement date with Option No. 1, to Mr. Gapinski. This estimate letter stated Mr. Gapinski had 30.11 years of creditable service. It did not mention DROP or any pay back. It did state that no lump sum retirement or cash value payments were available. (Second page of attachment to Exhibit P-11). On November 3, 2000, Petitioner's attorney wrote Mr. Gapinski's attorney that Mr. Gapinski was considered by Respondent to be in the DROP program as of September 1, 2000, not March 1, 2001, as supposed before the divorce, but he had not bought back his leave by paying $6,820.52, and requested that Mr. Gapinski change his Option Election Form to Option No. 3 and authorize the payment of the $6,820.52 to Respondent. On or about November 9, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent the already-executed FST-12 (Beneficiary Designation Form) and FRS-11o (Option Selection for FRS Members) showing Option No. 2 to Respondent. Mr. Helms acknowledged receipt. On or about November 9, 2000, Mr. Helms told Petitioner's attorney that the forms were correct and anyone could pay the $6,820.52. The attorney felt Mr. Gapinski was enrolled in DROP but that the $6,820.52 was still needed. On November 15, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent Mr. Helms a letter memorializing their conversation, in which Mr. Helms had indicated it was not necessary for Petitioner to sign below the Option No. 2 selection paragraph on FRS 11o as long as she was aware of the option Mr. Gapinski had selected. On November 20, 2000, Mr. Gapinski passed away without anyone having purchased his leave of absence credit. Mr. Gapinski was only 57 years of age when he died. DROP retirement or regular service retirement with full benefits is possible at 62 years of age or upon attaining 30 years of creditable service. Mr. Gapinski remained in regular employment until his death. Because he had not purchased the leave of absence credit, Mr. Gapinski died with only 29 years and 9 months of creditable service for purposes of retirement. In other words, he was 3 months and ten days short of the 30-year retirement mark necessary to activate DROP or regular service retirement. Petitioner never communicated directly with Respondent until after Mr. Gapinski's death. Mr. Gapinski's will provided for the effective disinheritance of Petitioner to the extent provided by law. On December 14, 2000, Petitioner's attorney spoke by telephone with Mr. Helms, who told her he thought Petitioner could still pay the leave of absence money but he would call her back. On December 15, 2000, Stanley Colvin, another of Respondent's representatives, telephoned Petitioner's attorney to say Petitioner could not pay the amount after Mr. Gapinski's death. At no time prior to Mr. Gapinski's death did any representative of Respondent affirmatively represent to anyone that Petitioner could pay the money after Mr. Gapinski's death or the conditions under which no benefits would be paid or specifically what would happen if Mr. Gapinski died before the money was paid by someone. By a December 15, 2000, letter, Respondent notified Petitioner that since Mr. Gapinski had elected not to purchase the leave of absence, he could not have reached the required 30 years of service necessary to participate in the DROP program until March 1, 2001. It further stated that since Mr. Gapinski's death occurred before completion of the required months necessary to participate in DROP, his DROP application was cancelled and his choice of Option No. 2 was nullified. Moreover, Mr. Gapinski was viewed as an active FRS member on the date of his death, and because Petitioner, though designated as his beneficiary was not also a joint annuitant, she could only receive a refund of Mr. Gapinski's retirement contributions in the amount of $4,719.19,and was not eligible to receive Option No. 3. Respondent did not send a similar letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. Petitioner requested a review, and on February 2, 2001, Respondent issued its proposed final agency action letter, to the same effect as the December 15, 2000, letter. Respondent did not send a similar proposed final agency action letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. However, the undersigned notes that Mr. Gapinski's adult daughters, who also were his joint personal representatives, were present in the courtroom on September 24, 2001, the first day of hearing. As of the second day of hearing on October 21, 2001, the estate had been closed and the personal representatives had been discharged. Mr. Larry Hunnicutt, Benefits Administrator for the Bureau of Retirement Calculations, Division of Retirement, testified by deposition. He indicated that Respondent Division of Retirement has no rules in place specifically addressing DROP. Therefore, in DROP cases, Respondent interprets and applies Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and the existing rules addressing regular service retirement. In practice, Respondent gives DROP applicants a 90-day grace period from the date of application in which to finalize all the outstanding documents or other requirements for DROP eligibility, including payments of amounts due, even though there are no provisions in place authorizing a grace period for DROP applicants. If there are money amounts due, the member must pay up during this period. If the member fails to pay up during this period, the DROP application and the option selected for DROP is cancelled by a certified letter, but the designated beneficiary remains intact. Herein, because the amounts were not paid before Mr. Gapinski died, and because it would serve no purpose to notify the decedent, who could no longer complete his DROP requirements, Respondent did not send the deceased member a cancellation of his DROP application and Option No. 2 selection. Rather, it treated the DROP application and option selection as null and void and notified his ex-wife, the designated beneficiary, of what Respondent understood to be her rights. In this notification, Respondent applied the statutes as its personnel understood them to apply to a member who dies in active service prior to reaching either 62 years of age or 30 years of creditable service. Respondent would have permitted Petitioner to pay the money on Mr. Gapinski's behalf only during his lifetime. If the amount due had been paid, and Petitioner were qualified for Option No. 2, she would receive approximately $500,000 plus cost of living increases as opposed to $4,719.19. She would receive considerably more if she qualified for Option No. 3.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit on the account of James Gapinski. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.

Florida Laws (8) 120.54120.56120.57120.68121.021121.091121.12190.304
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JOHN R. NELSON vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 11-004343 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 24, 2011 Number: 11-004343 Latest Update: Jun. 07, 2012

The Issue Whether Petitioner must forfeit and repay distributions he received from the Deferred Retirement Option Program and subsequent monthly retirement benefits received as a consequence of his election to the position of County Commissioner of Jefferson County within six months of terminating state employment.

Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement (Division) is, and was at the times material to this case, the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner, John Nelson, was employed by the Department of Financial Services (DFS) from October 1977 through July 31, 2010. For the last five years of his employment with DFS, Petitioner participated in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). Prior to ending his DROP participation, Petitioner completed a DROP Termination Notification Form (DP-TERM Rev. 06/06) on April 23, 2010, confirming he would terminate employment on July 31, 2010. The DROP Termination Notification was also signed by a representative from FRS confirming Petitioner's employment termination date and reads in pertinent part: I understand that I cannot work for any Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered employer during the calendar month following my DROP termination date or my DROP participation will be null and void. If I fail to meet this requirement, I will forfeit my accumulated DROP benefit including interest. I also understand that I may not be reemployed by any FRS employer in any capacity including part-time, temporary, other personal services (OPS) or non-Division approved contractual services during the calendar month immediately following my DROP termination date. If I fail to meet this requirement, I will forfeit my accumulated DROP benefit, including interest retroactive to me enrollment date in the DROP. The above-referenced version of the DP-TERM (Revised 6/06) has been incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-9.001(ee). Due to significant statutory changes made by the Legislature, the Division sent to Petitioner a second DROP Termination Notification, (Form DP-TERM revised 04/10) which he signed on June 9, 2010. The wording in the revised form reflected statutory changes which would take effect July 1, 2010. The revised form states in pertinent part: If your DROP termination date is on or after July 1, 2010: Your termination requirement means you cannot remain employed or become re-employed with any Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered employer during the FIRST SIX calendar months following your DROP termination date. This includes but is not limited to: Part-time work, temporary work, other personal services (OPS), substitute teaching or non-Division approved contractual services. During the 7th-12th calendar months following your DROP termination date, you may return to work for a participating FRS employer but must suspend your retirement benefit for any of these months your[sic] are employed. There are no reemployment exceptions during the reemployment limitation period. After the 12th calendar month following your DROP termination date, there are no employment restrictions. If you fail to meet the termination requirements noted above, you will void (cancel) your retirement and DROP participation, you must repay all retirement benefits received including your DROP accumulation, and you must apply to establish a future retirement date. If you void your retirement your employer will be responsible for making retroactive retirement contributions and you will be awarded service credit for the period during which you were in DROP through your new termination date. Your eligibility for DROP participation will be determined by your future retirement date and you may lose your eligibility to participate in DROP. (emphasis added). The revised form DP-TERM (Revised 04/10) has not yet been adopted as a rule. At the time of hearing, rulemaking had been initiated. Petitioner terminated his employment with DFS on the agreed termination date of July 31, 2010, and was no longer an employee of DFS after that date. Sometime between July 31, 2010, and November 2010, Petitioner was paid his accumulated DROP monies in the amount of $181,635.09, in the form of a direct rollover into an eligible retirement account. Petitioner was also paid monthly retirement benefits for the months of August through November 2010, in the total amount of $11,286.76. The Division deactivated Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits in December 2011. The total amount of retirement benefits paid to Petitioner after terminating employment with DFS is $191,921.85, which the Division seeks to recover. In April of 2010, at the urging of community members, Petitioner registered to run for public office in Jefferson County, Florida. He won the election and was sworn into office as a Jefferson County Commissioner on November 16, 2010. Tyler McNeill is the Chief Deputy Clerk and Human Resources Officer for Jefferson County. Following Petitioner's election as a County Commissioner, Mr. McNeill began to process a small packet of employment-related documents which he provides to elected officials. Mr. McNeill went to Petitioner's home on a Sunday evening to get the necessary papers signed. Prior to this meeting, Petitioner was unaware that Jefferson County participates in the FRS. Petitioner described his reaction to learning this as "shocking." When Mr. McNeill and Petitioner got to the FRS form, Petitioner did not want to sign it and informed Mr. McNeill of that. Mr. McNeill described Petitioner as appearing physically ill, shocked, and "so upset" upon learning that the County was an FRS participating employer. On November 22, 2010, Petitioner and Mr. McNeill called Ira Gaines, FRS Benefits Administrator, using a speakerphone. At the time they placed this call, Petitioner had not yet signed the employment documents supplied to him by Mr. McNeill, and Petitioner informed Mr. Gaines of this. During this conversation, Petitioner expressed his willingness to resign from office and refuse to accept payment from the County for his newly elected position. According to Mr. McNeill, Petitioner was not yet eligible to receive compensation from the County because the employment papers had not yet been processed. Mr. McNeill testified that he would have been able to discard the documents. During this telephone conversation, Mr. Gaines advised that Petitioner was legally a person employed by the County by virtue of his being sworn into office on November 16, 2010. Mr. Gaines equated bring sworn into office as being an employee. At hearing, Mr. Gaines reiterated his position: that he did not know any way Petitioner could not be enrolled in FRS when occupying an elected position. As a result of this telephone conversation with Mr. Gaines and in reliance on Mr. Gaines' advice, Mr. McNeill processed Petitioner's employment papers including the FRS reenrollment form. Mr. Gaines then began receiving salary payments for being a county commissioner. On December 6, 2010, Mr. Gaines sent a letter to Petitioner stating that his election to the position of County Commissioner had voided his DROP participation, and consequently, Petitioner would have to repay $181,635.09 for the DROP payment, and $11,286.76 in monthly retirement benefits. The letter further informed that Petitioner will continue to earn credit as an elected official in the Elected Officer's Class of FRS membership and that Petitioner's retirement account would be adjusted to reflect service from August 2005 through July 2010 (his DROP period) which he estimated would increase Petitioner's retirement benefits by $1,200 per month. In response to the December 6, 2010 letter, Petitioner appealed the voiding of his DROP participation. By letter dated February 1, 2011, the Division denied the request. The February 1, 2011 letter also informed Petitioner of his right to request a hearing, which gave rise to this proceeding.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement enter a final order rescinding the February 1, 2011, notification letter requiring reimbursement of Petitioner's DROP distribution and reimbursement of Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits from August 2010 through December 2010 when those benefits were discontinued; reinstating those monthly benefits beginning six months following the completion of Petitioner's DROP period, and nullifying Petitioner's reenrollment in the Elected Officers' Class of FRS membership. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2012.

Florida Laws (11) 100.041112.3173120.569120.57120.68121.011121.021121.031121.053121.091121.122 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-6.001
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VERNA M. JOHNSON vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 05-003287 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Sep. 12, 2005 Number: 05-003287 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2008

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Verna M. Johnson, terminated all employment with a Florida Retirement System employer, or employers, as defined in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes, when she concluded or terminated her "DROP" participation and therefore whether she actually, finally retired.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the Alachua County School Board in 1998 and 1999 and prior to that time. She was a regular class member of the FRS who begin participating in the DROP program on August 1, 1998. Thereafter, on July 9, 1999, the Petitioner terminated her employment with Alachua County Schools to begin receiving her DROP accumulation and her monthly FRS retirement benefits. The Petitioner and her husband had founded the Caring and Sharing Learning School (Charter School) back on January 28, 1998, while the Petitioner was employed by the Alachua County School District and had not yet retired or entered the DROP program. She was a full-time FRS employee with the Alachua County School system. The Charter School was not then an FRS employer, nor were retirement contributions made on the Petitioner's behalf by the Charter School. She worked most of the ensuing year after entering the DROP program, and on June 9, 1999, ended her employment relationship by exercising her resignation from the Alachua County School District employment, at which point she began receiving FRS benefits and her DROP accumulation. Thereafter, on July 16, 1999, the Director of State Retirement for the FRS, and the Charter School, entered into an agreement for admission of the Charter School to the FRS as an FRS employer. It had not been an FRS-enrolled employer before July 16, 1999, slightly over a month after the Petitioner had terminated her employment with the school district and began receiving her DROP accumulation and retirement benefits. That agreement provided that the effective date of admission of the Charter School into the status of an FRS employer (with attendant compulsory FRS membership by all employees) was related back with an effective date of August 24, 1998. The record does not reflect the reason for this earlier effective date. The Petitioner continued to work as an administrator with the Charter School even through the date of hearing in 2005. The Division performed an external audit of the Charter School during the week of March 15, 2004. In the process of that audit the Division received some sort of verification from the school's accountant to the effect that the Petitioner was employed as an administrator and had been so employed since August 24, 1998. Because of this information, the Division requested that the Charter School and the Petitioner complete "employment relationship questionnaires." The Petitioner completed and submitted these forms to the Division. On both questionnaires she indicated that the income she receives from the school was reported by an IRS form W-2 and thus that the employer and employee-required contributions for employees had been made. She further indicated that she was covered by the school's workers' compensation policy. On both forms the Petitioner stated that her pay was "more of a stipend than salary." On the second form she added, however, "when it started, at this time it is salary." She testified that she was paid a regular percentage of her total income from the Charter School before her DROP termination and the stipend after. She added that she just wrote what she "thought they wanted to hear" (meaning on the forms). The check registers provided to the Division by the Petitioner also indicate "salary" payments for "administrators" in September 1999. It is also true that the Petitioner from the inception of the Charter School in January 1998, and was on the board of directors of the Charter School corporation. According to the Division, the Petitioner was provided at least "three written alerts" by the Division that she was required to terminate all employment relationships with all FRS employers for at least one calendar month after resignation, or her retirement would be deemed null and not to have occurred, requiring refund of any retirement benefits received, including DROP accumulations. The Division maintains that based on the material provided it by the Petitioner, that the Petitioner was an employee of the Charter School from August 24, 1998 (the date the "related-back agreement" entered into on July 16, 1999, purportedly took effect) through at least May 12, 2005. It is necessary that a member of the FRS earning retirement service credits, or after retirement or resignation, receiving retirement benefits have been an "employee," as that is defined in the authority cited below, in order for the various provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and related rules to apply to that person's status. This status is determinative of such things as retirement service credit contributions and benefits, including DROP benefits, entitlement, and accumulations and the disposition made of them. In any event, the Division determined that the Petitioner had been an employee of the Charter School, as referenced above, and took its agency action determining that the Petitioner failed to terminate all employment relationships with all FRS employers (that is she kept working for the Charter School) before and during the month after resignation from the Alachua County School Board and continuing through May 12, 2005, as an employee in the Division's view of things. Therefore, because she was still employed by an FRS employer during the calendar month of July 1999 (only because of the agreement entered into between the Charter School and the division director on July 16, 1999,) her retirement (which had ended her employment with the Alachua County School System) was deemed null and void. The Division thus has demanded that she refund all retirement benefits and DROP accumulations earned or accrued between the date of entry into DROP which was August 1, 1998, through approximately May 12, 2005. This apparently totals approximately $169,000.00.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, determining that the Petitioner's retirement was effective and lawful, that she was entitled to the retirement benefits accrued and paid from June 9, 1999, forward, including the DROP accumulations that accrued up from August 1, 1998, until that date. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Verna M. Johnson 3432 Northwest 52nd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32605 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57121.021121.091
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DELORIS WILLIAMS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 19-005499 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Oct. 14, 2019 Number: 19-005499 Latest Update: Mar. 04, 2020

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, a surviving beneficiary, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits 1 All references to chapter 120 are to the 2019 version. payment option selected by her now-deceased spouse, a member of the Florida Retirement System.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2002),2 with administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner is the spouse of James L. Williams, now deceased, who was employed by the School District of Palm Beach ("District) for 38 years, and was a member of the FRS. Williams retired from his employment with the District on August 23, 2002. At that time, he executed the Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement Form, Form FR-11. On Form FR-11, he designated Petitioner as his primary beneficiary and Jones as his contingent beneficiary. Williams signed this form, and his signature was notarized. Also on August 23, 2002, Williams executed the Florida Retirement System Option Selection for FRS Members Form, Form FRS-11o. On that form, he selected FRS retirement benefits payment Option 2, and designated that choice by writing an "X" on the line next to Option 2. Option 2 was described on Form FRS-11o as: A reduced monthly payment for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. 2 All references to chapter 121 are to the 2002 version of the Florida Statutes, which was in effect at the time that the retirement benefits application and option selection forms that have given rise to this proceeding were executed. Form FRS-11o contained a section, immediately below the description of Option 2, that was required to be completed by the spouse of a married FRS member who had selected Option 1 or Option 2. On August 23, 2002, Petitioner completed, signed, and dated that section, confirming that she was the legal spouse of Williams and acknowledging that she was informed that Williams had selected either Option 1 or Option 2. The purpose of that section on Form FRS-11o is to inform the spouse of the FRS member that, by the member's selection of either Option 1 or Option 2, the surviving spouse is not entitled to receive a continuing benefit for the rest of his or her life. The last sentence on Form FRS-11o, immediately above the space for the FRS member's signature, states in pertinent part: "[m]y retirement becomes final when any payment is cashed . . . [or] deposited." DeVonnia Jones was present with Williams at the time he was given Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o to execute. Jones testified that when Williams arrived at the District office on August 23, 2002, Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o already had been filled out by District staff, and were presented to him by his supervisor, who informed him that he needed to retire or he would be terminated. According to Jones, Williams did not wish to retire at that time. Jones asked District staff how much more Williams' monthly benefits would be if he did not retire for another year or two, and was told that Williams' benefits would be between $25 and $30 more per month. According to Jones, "my dad basically shed a couple tears. He was not comfortable, but he went ahead and signed it because I told him to, because they made it seem like he wasn't going to be eligible to get what he was supposed to get." Williams signed and dated Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002, and his signature was notarized. On August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application." This document stated, among other things, that Williams had selected FRS Option 2, and that his retirement was effective September 2002. At the bottom of this document was a standalone paragraph, in bold face type, that read: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED!" Also on August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Florida Division of Retirement Estimate of Retirement Benefit (Estimate only, subject to final verification of all factors)." This document provided information regarding the amount of the monthly benefits Williams would receive for the four options offered under the FRS. A statement in bold face type at the bottom of the document read: "Comments: You have chosen Option 2. Your option selection cannot be changed after you cash or deposit any benefit payment." Had Williams wished to change his retirement benefits payment option, he could have done so up to the time he cashed or deposited a retirement benefits payment. Williams began receiving his monthly FRS retirement benefits payments from Respondent on October 4, 2002. He cashed or deposited the first FRS benefits warrant (Warrant #0618275) that he received. Thereafter, Williams received monthly FRS retirement benefits payments until his death on April 26, 2010. Williams received a total of 92 monthly benefits payments before his death. All of the FRS retirement benefits payment warrants issued to Williams were deposited or cashed. On May 17, 2010, Respondent contacted Petitioner to inform her that she needed to complete a Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Beneficiary of Monthly Retirement Benefits Form, Form FST- 11b, in order for her to receive monthly FRS retirement benefits payments as Williams' beneficiary. In the contact letter, Respondent informed Petitioner that "you will receive the same gross monthly benefits to which the member was entitled through August 31, 2012." Petitioner completed Form FST-11b on June 25, 2010, and began receiving FRS monthly benefits payments on June 30, 2010. Petitioner received a total of 28 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments. The last warrant issued to Petitioner (Warrant #0375196) was issued on August 31, 2012. All of the warrants issued to Petitioner were cashed or deposited. In sum, Williams and Petitioner collectively received a total of 120 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments, pursuant to Option 2. All of the warrants issued to Williams, and then to Petitioner, as his beneficiary, were deposited or cashed. Petitioner testified that beginning in 2003, she made numerous attempts, over a period of years, to contact the District and Respondent regarding changing the FRS retirement benefits payment option that Williams had selected on August 23, 2002. During this time, Williams and Petitioner continued to cash or deposit the benefits payment warrants they received from Respondent. In this proceeding, Petitioner does not claim that Williams accidentally selected Option 2, or that he intended to select another option, when he signed Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002. Rather, she asserts that at the time Williams retired, he suffered from confusion and memory loss such that he did not understand the option he chose—effectively, that he lacked the mental capacity to have chosen Option 2 as his retirement benefits payment option. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that because Williams was forced to retire under threat of termination from his employment, he was under duress when he chose Option 2 on Form FRS-11o. On these grounds, Petitioner asserts that she should be permitted to change Williams' choice of retirement benefits payment option.3 3 Here, Petitioner, has requested that she be allowed to "change" Williams' choice of Option 2 on the FRS retirement option selection forms. She did not identify, or present evidence, Petitioner's impassioned testimony at the final hearing shows that she fervently believes her husband was wrongly treated by the District when it required him to retire in 2002, against his desire to continue to work.4 However, as was explained to Petitioner at the final hearing, the purpose of this proceeding was not to determine whether the District wrongly forced Williams out of his employment; rather, it is to determine whether there is any factual or legal basis for changing the retirement benefits option that Williams selected when he executed Form FRS-11o nearly 18 years ago. The evidence does not support Petitioner's argument that Williams lacked the mental capacity to adequately understand the option that he chose on Form FRS-11o. Although Petitioner testified that Williams had been treated by a neurologist, no direct medical evidence was presented establishing that Williams was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed Form FRS-11o. Additionally, at the time Williams signed the form, he was accompanied by his daughter, who, after speaking to District staff regarding his options, advised him to sign the form. Petitioner herself also was present at the District office and signed Form FRS-11o, expressly acknowledging that she understood Williams had chosen Option 2. Thus, to the extent that Williams may not, on his own, have fully appreciated his choice of options on Form FRS-11o—and there is no competent direct evidence showing that to be the case—both his daughter and wife were present with him when he executed Form FRS-11o, his daughter told him to sign the form, and his wife expressly acknowledged that she understood his choice of Option 2. These circumstances do not support a finding that Williams lacked the mental capacity to understand, or did not adequately regarding which specific option she would choose, if permitted to change Williams' selected FRS benefits option. 4 The evidence indicates that the District required Williams to retire because he began having difficulty with his job as a mail carrier. According to Petitioner, Williams had an accident in a District vehicle and did not report the accident to the District, and that when he was transferred to the mail room, he had difficulty remembering to do certain required tasks. understand, the consequence of choosing Option 2 when he executed Form FRS-11o. The evidence also does not support a finding that Williams' choice of Option 2 should be changed, due to duress. There is no direct evidence establishing that Williams was under duress when he chose Option 2. Although Jones testified, credibly, that her father was upset about being forced to retire when he wanted to continue working, her testimony that he was under duress was based on her subjective conclusion. Furthermore, even if Williams was emotionally distressed when he signed the FRS benefits options forms, there is no evidence showing that as result of such distress, he chose Option 2 instead of a different option. It also is noted that Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o both expressly informed Williams that once his retirement became final—which would occur when any benefit payment was cashed or deposited—his retirement benefits option selection would become final and could not be changed. Further, Williams received two more pieces of correspondence from Respondent—both containing statements in bold face type—expressly informing him that once any FRS retirement benefits payments were cashed or deposited, his retirement benefits option choice could not be changed. As noted above, Williams could have changed his FRS benefits option at any time before he cashed or deposited a benefits payment; however, he did not do so. Thus, pursuant to the express terms of Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o, when Williams cashed or deposited the first benefits payment, his selection of Option 2 became final and could not be changed. In sum, the evidence does not establish any factual basis for permitting Petitioner to change Williams' selection of Option 2 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to change the FRS retirement benefits payment option selected by her husband, an FRS member, when he retired. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Deloris Williams 1219 West Ninth Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Mangement Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Mangement Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.66120.68121.021121.091 DOAH Case (5) 01-161810-000116-042917-142419-5499
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BARBARA BOONE vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 07-000890 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Feb. 20, 2007 Number: 07-000890 Latest Update: Dec. 10, 2008

The Issue Whether Petitioner, by pleading no contest to four counts of petit theft, in violation of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes, despite steadfastly maintaining her innocence, must forfeit her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Division of Retirement is charged with the responsibility of managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on behalf of the Department of Management Services. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 1.) FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. As such, Respondent had deemed its action regarding the forfeiture of Petitioner's rights and benefits under FRS subject to administrative review. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 2.) Petitioner is a senior management service class member of FRS. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 3.) At all times material to the allegations of this case, Petitioner was employed by the Town of Callahan as a planning and zoning administrator. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 4.) On or about August 23, 2005, the State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, through an assistant, filed a Third Amended Information charging Petitioner with (a) one (1) count of grand theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes; (b) two (2) counts of grand theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes; (c) nineteen (19) counts of official misconduct, contrary to the provisions of Section 839.25(1), Florida Statutes; and (d) one (1) count of petit theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 5.) The events that formed the basis for the Third Amended Information occurred during Petitioner's tenure as an employee of the Town of Callahan. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 6.) The Third Amended Information outlines the violations to which Petitioner pled no contest and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: COUNT 1: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between May 10, 2001 and January 31, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency or gasoline, the value of $300.00 or more but less than $20,000.00, the property of the TOWN OF CALLAHAN, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefits therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . COUNT 2: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 1999 and September 30, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency, the value of $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN received in accordance with El Nino Community Development Block Grant 00DB-6M- 04-55-02-G16, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . COUNT 3: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 1999 and September 30, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency, the value of $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN received in accordance with Housing Rehabilitation Community Development Block Grant 00DB-6B-04-055-02-H09, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . * * * COUNT 23: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 2000 and January 31, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use, or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency or cellular phone service, valued at One-Hundred Dollars ($100.00) or more but less than Three- Hundred Dollars ($300.00), the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN, with intent to, either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . (Joint Stipulation of Fact 9.) Count 1 related to alleged misuse of a City gasoline credit card. Count 2 related to alleged dual billing of hours for the El Nino Block Grant. Count 3 related to alleged dual billing of hours for the HUD Block Grant. Count 23 related to alleged misuse of a City cell phone. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 10-12.) Petitioner had filed a civil action against the City concerning all these issues before she was charged with them as crimes. (Exhibit 9: Informal Hearing Transcript, page 13.) On or about March 7, 2006, Petitioner entered a plea agreement with the State of Florida, wherein she acknowledged she would plead no contest (nolo contendere), while maintaining her innocence, to the "lesser included" offense of petit theft contained in Counts 1, 2, 3 and 23 of the Third Amended Information. The agreement provided, however, that Counts 1, 2, and 3 would be reduced to the lesser-included misdemeanor counts of petit theft, in violation of the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes, and Counts 4 through 22 would be dismissed. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 7.) The first sentence of the plea agreement reads as follows: I hereby enter my plea of no contest for the reason it is in my best interest although I maintain my innocence. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 8.) On or about March 7, 2006, Petitioner pled no contest in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 10.) During the plea dialogue, which included inquiry by the circuit judge taking the plea to ascertain if the accused understood the charges and was entering the plea voluntarily, Petitioner articulated that she was innocent of all charges. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 5-13.) In accepting a nolo contendere plea and its concomitant plea agreement, a circuit judge is required to inquire and determine if there is a "factual basis" for the charges. To those types of questions at Petitioner’s plea dialogue Petitioner's counsel replied: . . . just for our purposes we do not agree that any of those facts are true, but we do agree, if they were true they would constitute a sufficient factual basis. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 12-13.) The circuit judge then stated on the record: The Court finds that there is sufficient factual basis to support the pleas, and that the pleas have been entered into freely, willingly, and voluntarily. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Transcript, page 13.) Judge Robert Foster, Circuit Court Judge in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Nassau County, Florida, ordered that adjudication of guilt be withheld for good cause shown. Petitioner was ordered to pay $8,260 in restitution to the Town of Callahan and $386.00 in court costs. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 11.) The state attorney then entered a Code 30 nolle prosequi in accordance with the plea agreement. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, page 13.) On or about August 17, 2006, Respondent received from its legal counsel a report recommending that Petitioner's FRS rights and benefits be forfeited pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 12.) On August 21, 2006, Respondent approved the forfeiture of Petitioner's FRS rights and benefits pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 13.) On August 28, 2006, Respondent notified Petitioner, by agency action letter, of the forfeiture of her FRS rights and benefits and afforded Petitioner a point of entry to challenge its decision and to request an administrative review of the issues. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 14.) The Agency conducted an informal proceeding on or about February 19, 2007. At that hearing, Petitioner maintained, under oath, her innocence with regard to all criminal charges that had been alleged against her, including those to which she had pled "no contest." She further testified that she was not guilty on all counts and had pled "no contest" to some of the criminal charges because the stress of the criminal process had been taking a toll on her and her family. The stress on Petitioner was exacerbated by a mastectomy and her subsequent treatment for breast cancer conducted during the pendency of the criminal proceeding, the plea bargaining, and the plea itself. (Exhibit 9: Informal Hearing Transcript, pages 10-14.) After the informal proceeding, the cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for proceedings consistent with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Herein, Respondent presented no evidence refuting Petitioner's testimony and no evidence of her guilt in relation to the charges to which she had pled nolo contendere.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order determining that Petitioner’s rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System have not been forfeited and reinstituting those benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2007.

Florida Laws (8) 112.3173120.57121.011458.331475.25489.129812.014943.13
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DEBORAH BARRINGTON vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 21-000108 (2021)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Crawfordville, Florida Jan. 12, 2021 Number: 21-000108 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024

The Issue Whether Petitioner Deborah Barrington, the surviving spouse of Ronald Mitchell Barrington, is entitled to a monthly benefit from Mr. Barrington’s Florida Retirement System (FRS) pension plan.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with administering the FRS. In 1986, Mr. Barrington began employment with the Department of Revenue (DOR). Mr. Barrington was a member of the FRS pension plan based on his employment with DOR. Ms. Barrington was the spouse of Mr. Barrington. Ms. Barrington testified that she was married to Mr. Barrington for 43 years. On June 6, 2007, Mr. Barrington contacted Respondent, via email, to inquire as to when he could enter the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) administered by Respondent. Respondent requested some additional information from Mr. Barrington, which he provided, including the identity of his spouse, Ms. Barrington. Respondent received, on January 11, 2011, a form entitled “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment,” from Mr. Barrington. This form shows that Mr. Barrington intended to enter the DROP program on April 1, 2011, and that his termination and resignation date would be March 31, 2016. Mr. Barrington also completed a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP)” form, which Respondent also received on January 11, 2011. This form, similar to the form described in paragraph 5 above, listed Mr. Barrington’s intended dates to enter the DROP program, and his intended termination and resignation dates, but also listed Ms. Barrington as his primary beneficiary. Respondent also received Form FRS-11o, entitled “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Option Selection for FRS Members” (Option Selection Form), on January 14, 2011 (according to the facsimile header on this form). The Option Selection Form required Mr. Barrington to select one of four retirement benefit payment options. The Option Selection Form provided an explanation for each of the four options. The Option Selection Form reflects that Mr. Barrington initially selected to receive an Option 3 retirement benefit by checking the line next to the Option 3 benefit payment option. However, the Option Selection Form also reflects that Mr. Barrington struck through the checkmark next to the Option 3 benefit payment option, wrote his initials “RB,” and then checked the line next to the Option 1 benefit payment option, indicating he selected to receive the Option 1 retirement benefit. A significant difference exists between Options 1 and 3: Option 3 provides for a “reduced monthly benefit” during the member’s lifetime, and after death, the member’s joint annuitant would receive a lifetime monthly benefit in that same amount; while under Option 1, the member would receive the maximum benefit for the member’s life, with no continuing benefit to a joint annuitant after the member’s death. The Option Selection Form reflects that Deborah Holley notarized the signature of Mr. Barrington. Along with the Option Selection Form, Respondent received a form entitled “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Spousal Acknowledgement Form,” (Spousal Acknowledgment Form) on January 14, 2011 (according to the facsimile header on this form). The Spousal Acknowledgment Form provides that if the member is married and has selected Option 1 or 2 on the Option Selection Form, the member’s spouse must complete “Box 2” on the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. The Spousal Acknowledgment Form reflects that Ms. Barrington completed “Box 2,” but in the portion that states that she “acknowledge[s] that the member has selected Option 1 or 2[,]” the Spousal Acknowledgment Form reflects that “1 or 2” is stricken through, and instead, the number “3” is hand written nearby. The Spousal Acknowledgment Form further reflects the signature of Ms. Barrington, dated September 10, 2010, and that Deborah Holley notarized the signatures of both Mr. and Ms. Barrington. Respondent introduced into evidence Ms. Holley’s public commission as a notary in the State of Florida, indicating that Ms. Holley was a duly licensed notary, and which was effective when Mr. and Ms. Barrington executed the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. On February 1, 2011, Respondent mailed Mr. Barrington an “Acknowledgment of DROP Application,” acknowledging: (a) receipt of Mr. Barrington’s Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP); (b) his selection of Option 1 as the benefit payment option; and (c) his DROP begin date of April 1, 2011, and this DROP end date of March 31, 2016. The Acknowledgment of DROP application expressly states, in bold, all-caps letters, the following: AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION (OR 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS LETTER IS MAILED, IF LATER) RETIREMENT IS FINAL. YOU CANNOT ADD SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE, CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT OR ELECT THE INVESTMENT PLAN. On May 10, 2011, Respondent mailed Mr. Barrington a “Final Notice of DROP Benefit,” which included his final benefit accrual calculation based on Option 1. Respondent received (according to the facsimile header on this form) on December 14, 2015, a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) Termination Notification,” from Mr. Barrington, which reflected that he would terminate his employment with an FRS employer on March 31, 2016. On January 11, 2017, Mr. Barrington passed away. On February 23, 2017, Respondent sent a survivor letter to Ms. Barrington informing her that “[t]he option selected by the member does not provide a continuing benefit beyond the month of death.” After Ms. Barrington contacted Respondent to inquire about receiving a monthly benefit, Respondent sent Ms. Barrington a letter, dated November 30, 2020, which constituted final agency action, and which informed Ms. Barrington that Respondent paid Mr. Barrington’s retirement benefits according to his retirement option selection—Option 1—and that denied Ms. Barrington’s request to receive a monthly benefit. Testimony of Ms. Barrington and Mr. Halley Ms. Barrington testified that she never signed the Spousal Acknowledgment Form, that Mr. Barrington mistakenly selected Option 1 on the Option Selection Form, and that Ms. Holley failed to properly notarize these documents. Ms. Barrington further testified that Mr. Barrington was ill and, according to her, must have been confused when he selected Option 1. Ms. Barrington testified that she was not with Mr. Barrington when he completed the Option Selection Form. Ms. Barrington did not present any medical or other evidence to establish that Mr. Barrington lacked mental capacity at the time he executed the Option Selection Form or the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. Ms. Barrington did not present any additional evidence, other than her own testimony, to establish that Ms. Holley failed to properly notarize the Option Selection Form or the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. Mr. Halley testified that when Respondent receives the forms for processing a FRS member’s application to enter the DROP program, it reviews the forms “to make sure they are not blank or any information that is necessary is not omitted[,]” and “for any irregularities on the forms and things of that nature[.]” He testified that at any given time, there are more than one million members in FRS. He testified that it is an “impossibility” for Respondent to reach out to each FRS member to confirm that their signature is authentic, or to call and confirm with each FRS member that they intended the particular option that they selected. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at the final hearing, Ms. Barrington failed to establish that Mr. Barrington lacked the mental capacity to select a retirement option at the time he completed the Option Selection Form. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at the final hearing, Ms. Barrington failed to establish that Ms. Holley improperly notarized the Option Section Form or the Spousal Acknowledgment Form.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for a continuing monthly benefit from Mr. Barrington’s FRS pension plan. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2021. Deborah Barrington 44 Parkside Circle Crawfordville, Florida 32327-7413 William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Gayla Grant, Esquire Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57121.011 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-4.010 DOAH Case (2) 19-549921-0108
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MALBA LANIER vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-000128 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000128 Latest Update: Jun. 13, 1980

The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent's (Division of Retirement) denial of Petitioner's claim to buy for retirement credit purposes, service while she was a student nurse during the period August, 1941 through December, 1944 was proper.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The facts herein are virtually undisputed. From August, 1941, through December, 1944, Petitioner was a student nurse at Florida State Hospital (Hospital) at Chattahoochee, Florida. As a student nurse, Petitioner worked twelve (12) hours a day, six and one-half (6-1/2) days per week with one full day off each month. During the weekdays, Petitioner spent time in class, with the remainder of time spent in the wards at the Hospital. Petitioner averaged between thirty-nine (39) and forty-seven (47) hours of work per week at the Hospital. As a student nurse, Petitioner received a salary of $15.00 per month in addition to her room, board, uniform and various fringe benefits such as medical care and leave, much like other Hospital employees. Personnel problems were resolved through the personnel office as with other employees. Petitioner returned to work at the Hospital as a Registered Nurse in October, 1954, and has worked almost continually to the present time. During the period 1970 through early 1972, employees of Florida State Hospital were given the opportunity to participate in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). Petitioner participated in that retirement system. During the period 1970 through 1972, various state retirement systems, including SCOERS, merged and formed the present Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner was given the option to transfer to FRS and in fact exercised that option by designating that election on a ballot provided by the personnel office at Florida State Hospital (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The effective date of that transfer to FRS is December 1, 1970. During the period 1970 through early 1972, Respondent permitted transferees of the SCOERS retirement system to transfer student nurse credits as part of the retirement credits in the same manner as "full-time work" for retirement credit purposes. In early 1972, Respondent changed its policy of allowing work as a student nurse to be credited toward retirement benefits. C. J. Brock has been the personnel manager at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee since approximately 1968. He was initially hired at the Hospital in 1955. As personnel manager, Mr. Brock is in charge of submitting employee claims for retirement credits for various types of employment service to FRS for retirement benefits.' Mr. Brock recalled Petitioner visiting his office pan various occasions between the periods 1963 through 1972 inquiring as to the manner for purchasing student time for retirement credit purposes. Mr. Brock advised Petitioner that he would research the wage statements to determine the exact amount of student time she had earned and would refer the matter to FRS for a decision, Mr. Brock is not authorized to act for or on behalf of Respondent. The interaction between the Hospital's personnel officer and Respondent is limited to the referral of claims and certification of wage and employment statements. As such, there is no agency relationship between the Hospital and Respondent. This referral was made by Mr. Brock on Petitioner's behalf on December 20, 1972, and the request was denied. Former student nurses who were members of SCOERS and transferred to FRS during the periods 1970 through early 1972 had been allowed to purchase retirement credit for their student nurse service. This practice ended in early 1972. In this regard, Mr. Brock has certified the payroll records for student nurses who purchased retirement credit for their student nurse time, Ruth Sampson, Assistant Bureau Chief for the Division of Retireent, has primarily been involved in reviewing retirement benefit calculations since approximately 1969. Mrs. Sampson is familiar with the merger of SCOERS and FRS. Mrs. Sampson affirmed that Respondent had a policy which allowed members of SCOERS who transferred to FRS to purchase retirement credit for student employment time and that such policy was followed from December 1, 1970 (the inception of FRS) to early 1972. This policy was also followed by the SCOERS administrator prior to December 1, 1970. This unwritten policy was changed, according to Mrs. Sampson for two primary reasons. First, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, did not permit the purchase of student time. Secondly, with the combination of SCOERS and the Teacher Retirement System (TRS) into the combined FRS system, an inequity existed since TRS members, unlike student nurses, were not allowed to purchase student time. As stated, the letter from Mr. Brock certifying Petitioner's employment and wage statements for the period in question was dated December 20, 1972. Mrs. Sampson, by letter dated March 30, 1973, requested additional information respecting the salary paid Petitioner and the amount of time she actually spent working at the Hospital during the period in question. Mr. Brock replied by letter dated April 4, 1973, advising that during the period in question, Petitioner was a student nurse at the Hospital which paid a full-time salary of $15.00 per month. By letter dated May 14, 1973, Mrs. Sampson denied Petitioner's claim since Petitioner was primarily a student during the period that the prior service claim was submitted (Joint Exhibit No. 1). Mr. Robert L. Kennedy, Jr. , the former Director of FRS, appeared and related that the policy decision was made to discontinue the practice of allowing student time to be credited for retirement purposes since that practice was not contemplated by pertinent statutes. Former Director Kennedy disagreed with the Comptroller's policy decision which had previously allowed this practice.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's appeal of the State Retirement Director's decision denying her request to purchase prior service credit for her service as a student nurse be DENIED. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the State Retirement Director be SUSTAINED. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire PATTERSON and TRAYNHAN Division of Retirement 1215 Thomasville Road Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32302 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box .81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================

Florida Laws (8) 1.04120.57121.011121.021121.051121.091216.011216.262
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