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MARY JANE WILLIAMS vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 14-003895 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Aug. 19, 2014 Number: 14-003895 Latest Update: Dec. 10, 2014

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was overpaid in the amount of $1,022.45 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department of Health.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was a career-service employee of Respondent and was initially employed with the Department from October 14, 2005, until January 20, 2007. In February 2007 Petitioner received a cash payout for her annual leave balance of 3.25 hours in the amount of $67.18. In January 2007 when Petitioner terminated her employment with the Department, the state’s timekeeping system, People’s First, was not set up to automatically zero out leave balances for employees. The Department’s human resource office was responsible to manually adjust the leave balance to zero each time an employee left employment with the Department. The Department’s human resource office failed to zero out Petitioner’s leave when she left. On March 6, 2009, Petitioner became re-employed with the Department at a remote high school as a nurse. The People’s First system credited Petitioner leave balances she was not entitled to upon re-employment with the Department because her previous leave balances had not been adjusted to zero. Upon Petitioner’s re-employment, the People’s First system reflected incorrect leave balances in the amount of 3.25 hours accrued annual leave, and 107.75 hours of accrued sick leave. Petitioner noticed a leave balance when she returned to work for the Department and asked her supervisor about the hours. Petitioner’s supervisor provided her with incorrect information, which was, because she returned to the State within five years Petitioner was able to keep the time she had accumulated. Petitioner followed up with the Department’s personnel officer, Karen Cayson (“Cayson”), to see if the policy was true and Cayson confirmed that it was correct. During Petitioner’s last two pay periods prior to her second separation from employment with the Department, Petitioner took leave and used the unearned leave amount People’s First indicated she had. Petitioner was paid salary for 34.50 hours of leave for the May 30, 2014, warrant date and 37.50 hours of leave for the June 13, 2014, warrant date. When Petitioner took the 34.50 and 37.50 hours of leave, it should have been leave without pay had the Department’s Human Resource section properly accounted for her leave to ensure it was at a zero balance when she left the Department in 2007. Petitioner worked for the Department until May 30, 2014. After Petitioner left, the Department conducted a payroll and leave audit. Katie Williams (“Williams”) did an official attendance audit by pulling all of Petitioner’s leave and historical data. Williams completed the audit and discovered Petitioner had been overpaid $509.61 for the warrant date May 30, 2014, and overpaid $566.65 for the warrant date June 13, 2014. The Petitioner did not become aware of the overpayment until the Department requested repayment by letter. On July 3, 2014, the Department sent Petitioner a certified letter requesting the overpaid amount of $1,022.45, in which the Petitioner timely contested the letter. Petitioner did her best to determine and verify that she was entitled to the leave money and was assured the amount was correct by Department employees. Petitioner took leave relying upon the assurance that her leave balance credit was correct. Petitioner’s sole income is from her monthly $1,195.00 social security check. She does not have the money to pay the overpayment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner repay $10.00 to the Department of Health monthly and continue each month thereafter until the $1,022.45 overpayment amount is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark John Henderson, Esquire Florida Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Mary Jane Williams 1922 Northwest 113th Drive Gainesville, Florida 32606 (eServed) Jaime Briggs, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 (eServed) Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed) John H. Armstrong, M.D., F.A.C.S. State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)

Florida Laws (4) 110.1165120.569120.57120.68
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JAMES L. LOWERY, JR. vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 09-003441 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Jun. 23, 2009 Number: 09-003441 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 2009

The Issue The issue to be resolved concerns whether the Petitioner received, and should be compelled to repay, an alleged salary overpayment of $1,306.09.

Findings Of Fact James L. Lowery, the Petitioner, was employed by the Respondent Department, at all times pertinent. The Department employees are paid bi-weekly, with pay warrants being issued eight days after the end of a pay period. This is based on employee timesheets submitted to the Peoples’ First leave and payroll system. The payroll system will issue an employee a paycheck for the full pay period hours, if his or her timesheet is not timely submitted or if no timesheet is submitted (until a correction and re-calculation is done). That is the default posture. An employee is only paid less or a different amount than his regular salary if a timesheet is timely submitted and reflects less than a full-time number of hours of work or leave- time. Upon an employee’s separation from employment, an audit is conducted of his leave and attendance, to ensure that his final pay is correct. During the audit, the Department reviews the employee’s timesheets to determine what leave codes were used. It generates a cumulative pay report to ensure that the employee was paid correctly for each pay period. Upon conclusion of the audit, the Department sends the employee payment for any leave to which he is entitled, or, if it is determined that he was overpaid, the employee is notified of the hours and amount of the overpayment and repayment is demanded. Mr. Lowery was injured and therefore, had to be absent from work on workers’ compensation leave, starting in May of 2008, for approximately six weeks. He recovered from that injury, but did not return to work because his medication regimen for another condition interfered with his work schedule. Mr. Lowery thereupon began to use his accrued sick and annual leave. He exhausted his sick and annual leave by August 2008. He thereupon began using sick leave that he believed had been donated to him from the sick leave pool. Although he believed he was using sick leave pool leave, he actually had received donated sick leave for the period August 8, 2008 through October 30, 2008. The total amount of leave donated to him was 470 hours. Sick leave donations are not a pre-determined amount, but rather the amount an employee can receive depends strictly on how much leave is actually donated to that individual by other employees. Mr. Lowry used all the leave which had been donated to him as of November 14, 2008. Therefore, for the November 14 through November 27, 2008, pay period he had no leave left to his credit, but did not return to work. His timesheets for that pay period show that he was on “Authorized Leave Without Pay.” When the pay warrants were issued for that pay period, the system did not recognize that the Petitioner was on “Authorized Leave Without Pay” and on December 5, 2008, he was paid for 80 hours, in a gross amount of $1,162.00. Since he only had 4.75 hours of sick leave available for that pay period, he was, thus, overpaid for 75.25 hours. Between November 28, 2008, and December 25, 2008, the Petitioner did not work and had no annual, sick or other type of leave to his credit. Nonetheless, a pay warrant was issued to him on January 2, 2009, for payment for 30.75 hours. He was, thus, overpaid for that number of hours. The Petitioner’s timesheet for the period January 9 through January 22, 2009, shows that his hours were coded or entered as follows: 1.50 hours of annual leave, 1.00 hour of sick leave and 77.50 hours of unauthorized leave without pay. Although he had no annual, sick or other leave available to him, a pay warrant was issued to him on January 30, 2009, for the 2.50 hours. He was, thus, overpaid for that amount of hours. The Petitioner did not question the amounts he was paid on December 5, 2008, January 2, 2009, or January 30, 2009, because he believed he was drawing sick leave credit from the sick leave pool and that his timesheets were being taken care of by a supervisor, Otis Ray, in the Tallahassee office. After January 30, 2009, he received no more pay warrants. Upon the Petitioner’s separation from employment, the Respondent conducted the leave audit referenced above, as delineated in the Department of Financial Services’ Payroll Preparation Manual. It was thus determined that the Petitioner had been overpaid for a total of 108.50 hours for the above- referenced pay periods, due to the fact that he had used leave to which he was not entitled and because his timesheet was not timely submitted. In accordance with the Payroll Preparation Manual (in evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit 7), the amount of salary overpaid, and to be repaid, was calculated as follows: $1,013.56 for the warrant issued on December 5, 2008, $267.71 for the warrant issued on January 2, 2009, and $24.82 for the warrant issued on January 30, 2009. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. The Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case. On May 29, 2009, the Respondent notified Petitioner of its position that he owed repayment of $1306.09, the total amount of the three erroneously paid warrants.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Juvenile Justice requiring the Petitioner to repay erroneously paid salary in the amount of $1,306.09, pursuant to a reasonable installment arrangement to be agreed upon by the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James L. Lowery, Jr. 3875 Old Cottondale Road Marianna, Florida 32448-492 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100

Florida Laws (3) 110.1165120.569120.57
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HENRY G. GOHLKE vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 03-003103 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 26, 2003 Number: 03-003103 Latest Update: Jun. 08, 2004

The Issue Whether the Petitioner may withdraw from participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP)?

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Henry Gohlke, is a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS), which is governed by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2003). The Petitioner is employed by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. The Petitioner divorced his former spouse, Joanne Marie Gohlke, on October 29, 1997, and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) was entered which provided that Joanne Marie Gohlke was the alternate payee of the Petitioner's retirement benefits. See Exhibit J-10. Under the terms of the QDRO, when the Petitioner retired, his future retirement benefits would be incorporated into alimony payable to Joanne Marie Gohlke, beginning with the first monthly retirement benefit payment made to the Petitioner. The payment was fixed based upon the value of the Petitioner's pension at the time, and Joanne Marie Gohlke would receive $552.05 per month. DROP is a program which permits an employee, who has qualified for retirement, to retire; draw his retirement benefit based upon the retirement option he selected; and have the money paid into a non-taxed, interest-drawing account for up to five years while the employee continues to work. At the end of the five years or such other shorter time the employee elects, the employee may cease working and receive all or a part of the money in a lump payment paying the income taxes due on the amount, or roll the money over into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) or similar program without paying income taxes until the money is withdrawn from that account. The Petitioner testified that he queried Eddie Tanner, who at that time was a paralegal working with the Division of Retirement, about the effect of the QDRO on his DROP deposits. There is conflicting testimony about what the Petitioner was told; however, Tanner testified concerning his customary advice to persons subject to QDROs. The Petitioner was advised to seek clarification from the domestic relations court to be certain. The Petitioner elected to participate in the DROP program in March of 2003. He may continue to participate in DROP until March 28, 2008. See Exhibit J-7. When he began to receive retirement benefits, a letter was sent to him on June 25, 1998, advising him that Joanne Marie Gohlke would qualify for a $552.05 per month share of the Petitioner's accrued DROP benefit as provided in the QDRO. The letter also advised that, upon the Petitioner's ceasing to work, the moneys due Joanne Marie Gohlke would be paid to her together with the accrued interest. This letter was sent to the Petitioner's old address, and he did not receive the letter. Eventually, the Petitioner learned that his DROP payments would be subject to the allocation of $552.05 each month to his ex-wife pursuant to the QDRO. This money would be payable to his ex-wife at the same time the Petitioner accessed his DROP money. The Petitioner questioned this payment to his ex-wife. The status of DROP benefits has been litigated, and the courts have determined that DROP benefits are retirement benefits and subject to QDROs. See Ganzel v. Ganzel, 770 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla 4th DCA 2000). Based upon this precedent, the Respondent denied the Petitioner's request not to pay the proceeds from DROP to Joanne Marie Gohlke. Upon learning that his ex-wife would receive a portion of his DROP account, the Petitioner sought to withdraw from his participation in the DROP. Although an employee may elect to continue to work at the end of five years with the permission and written concurrence of his employer, he or she would automatically lose his or her DROP moneys by continuing to work past the five-year mark.1/ There is no administrative mechanism for withdrawing from DROP which would be analogous to "un-retiring." The Respondent properly denied the Petitioner's request to withdraw from DROP.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner's Petition be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2004.

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SCHOOL BOARD OF MADISON COUNTY vs. RANDALL CHOICE, 89-002022 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-002022 Latest Update: Jan. 02, 1990

The Issue Whether or not the School Board of Madison County, Florida may terminate Respondent as one convicted of a crime of mortal turpitude in 1988 or 1989:, pursuant to Section 231.36(4)(c) F.S. [The Petition for Discharge also alleges that a "pattern" of issuing worthless checks over a period of years has been engaged in by Respondent but the "prayer" or charging portion of the Petition is silent as to whether the Petitioner intends this allegation to constitute a specific, separate charge.] Whether or not the School Board of Madison County, Florida may, pursuant to Section 231.44 F.S., terminate Respondent for absence without leave during the period he was incarcerated for passing worthless bank checks.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Gene Stokes, is the duly elected Superintendent of Schools of Madison County, Florida. Respondent, Doctor Randall Choice, III, is a member of the instructional staff of the district School Board of Madison County, Florida, employed by the Board under a continuing contract entered into on May 7, 1981. The Respondent was charged in an information filed by the State Attorney of the Third Judicial Circuit on June 27, 1988 with passing a worthless check, the payee being the Madison Inn, drawn upon The North Florida Education Credit Union, Tallahassee, Florida, in the sum of $106.00. There were not sufficient funds in the account to cover the payment of this check, and it was dishonored when presented to The North Florida Education Credit Union for payment. The Respondent was charged in an information filed by the state attorney of the Third Judicial Circuit on September 12, 1988 with passing a worthless check, the payee being Perry Coca Cola, drawn upon The North Florida Education Credit Union, Tallahassee, Florida, in the sum of $61.60. There were not sufficient funds in the account of the Respondent to cover the payment of this check, and it was dishonored when presented to The North Florida Education Credit Union for payment. The check given to the Madison Inn was for lodging and the check to Perry Coca Cola was for products which the Respondent had received. Neither transaction had anything to do with Respondent's professional activities as a school teacher. The Respondent appeared before the Honorable Wetzel Blair, County Judge of Madison County, Florida, on November 2, 1988 and entered a plea of "guilty" to the two informations noted above. The court at that time gave the Respondent the opportunity to make restitution on the two checks and to pay court costs of $46.00 within 30 days. If the Respondent made the restitution and paid the court costs within the prescribed time, the court agreed to withhold adjudication. The Respondent executed the offer of a plea of "guilty", but nonetheless, the court set the matter for trial on December 2, 1988 upon a plea of "not guilty." This "Order Setting Trial" was signed by the judge on November 2, 1988, and stated: Order setting trial date upon the above and foregoing plea of not guilty, trial of this case is set for non-jury trial, on `Friday, December 2, 1988 at 9:00 a.m. [Tr-51-72]. The Respondent did not pay the restitution or court costs within the 30-day period as directed by the Court, and, accordingly, the Respondent was ordered to appear before the Court on January 4, 1989. At that time, the court entered another order reciting that the Respondent had entered a plea of "guilty" on November 2, 1988 and had been directed to pay restitution for the checks in the cases within 30 days. The latter order further recited the fact that the Respondent had paid the restitution, but not within the stipulated time, and that Respondent was therefore sentenced to 30 days in the Madison County Jail. Upon the testimony of Madison County Judge Wetzel Blair, it is found that as of the date of formal administrative hearing, September 20, 1989, Respondent had not been adjudicated guilty of the crime of passing a worthless bank check, even though he was incarcerated in the Madison County Jail from January 4, 1989 until about 4:00 p.m. on January 23, 1989. (TR- 78) On January 4, 1989, the Respondent teacher immediately notified his principal, Mrs. Colleen Campbell, by telephone that he was in jail and that he needed to be granted leave for the period he would be incarcerated, predicted at 30 days. She informed Respondent that he had six days of accrued leave due him and agreed to sign she form requesting/approving that period of leave. She also informed Superintendent Stokes that Respondent was in jail, but she provided no written request for leave for Respondent beyond tee six days to which he was entitled. The superintendent did not know of Respondent's oral request for additional leave until Respondent was released from jail. The principal and superintendent have the authority to approve personal leave up to a teacher's accrued limit, but if insufficient personal leave time has been accumulated, the school board must approve the overage. It is unclear from the record whether preprinted forms are provided for this purpose, but apparently such requests must be made in writing. It is also unclear whether such requests are always submitted directly to the school board or if principals and the superintendent act as conduits for such requests to the school board. However, such written leave requests are usually taken up at each monthly school board meeting, which is often "after the fact" of the requesting teacher's physical absence. Sometimes, the applicant appears at the school board meeting in person. Respondent was released from jail or January 23, 1989 at 4:00 p.m.. On January 24, 1989, the Respondent reported personally to the superintendent, reported his release from jail, and sought to determine his leave status, At that time, the superintendent informed the Respondent that the superintendent was suspending the Respondent with pay until the next school board meeting. Also, the superintendent then informed the Respondent that the superintendent was reporting Respondent's conduct to the Education Practices Commission. The superintendent did then specifically inform the Respondent that he had been absent without leave, as it was presumed the Respondent had been incarcerated for passing worthless bank checks, and that was the thrust of their conversation. At all times during his incarceration of 19 days, the Respondent believed that he had taken the necessary steps to obtain authorized leave, and he assumed, without any affirmative action by the principal, superintendent, or school board that he had been approved for leave with pay up to his accrued six days and for leave without pay for the remainder of the incarceration period. Respondent was incarcerated January 5-23, 1989, inclusive. Resort to a calendar reveals that only 12 of Respondent's 19-day incarceration were week days or work days (One was Martin Luther King's Birthday Holiday.) Respondent was, in fact, approved for his six accrued leave days. Therefore, the balance that Respondent was actually absent without leave amounted to only six days. Neither Superintendent Stokes nor the school board, as a collegiate body, approved Respondent's oral request for leave without pay during the six days in question. Indeed, the school board did not convene until February, when, at the superintendent's request, it altered his suspension of Respondent with pay to a suspension without play. Respondent did not file any after-the-fact written request for leave without pay and present it to the school board when it met in February 1989 to consider the suspension request, although it may be inferred that the school board's suspension of Respondent had the retroactive effect of denying his oral leave request. The citizens of Madison County believe that the passing of a worthless check is morally wrong. The incarceration of the Respondent was not reported in any of the newspapers in the circulation area. There is evidence in the record that Respondent's absence created administrative problems for the superintendent and school board and interfered with the orderly education of students, although most of this disorder relates to the period after the Respondent's suspension, not during his short incarceration period.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that: The school Board of Madison County enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has not violated Section 231.36(4)(c) F.S., in that he has not been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, and that Respondent has violated Section 231.44 F.S., by being willfully absent from duty without leave, and suspending him without pay from the first day of his absence without leave until the conclusion of the current school year. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of January 1990 at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearing this 2nd day of January, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-1445 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 2, 6 and 7 are accepted as modified to more closely conform to the record evidence as a whole and to eliminate subordinate and/or unnecessary-material. is rejected as a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Further, this has not been established as set forth in FOF 17- 19. is rejected as mostly legal argument. Otherwise the record differs as set out in FOF 6-10. is rejected as a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Further, this has not been established as set forth in FOF 6-10 and COL 4. 8 is rejected as a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Respondent's PFOF: 1-16 and 18-24 are accepted as modified to more closely conform to the record evidence as a whole and to eliminate subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative material. 17 is rejected because it is contrary to the record as stated. COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin B. Browning, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 652 Madison, Florida 32340 John R. Weed, P.A. 605 South Jefferson Street Perry, Florida 32347 Gene Stokes, Superintendent Madison County Schools 213 North Duval Madison, Florida 32340

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ALBERT T. SMITH vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 87-000450 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-000450 Latest Update: May 12, 1987

The Issue Whether the Petitioner abandoned his position with the Respondent and resigned from Career Service pursuant to the personnel rules of the Career Service System?

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent for more than five years. At all times relevant hereto, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent. During the month of December, 1986, and the portion of January, 1987, prior to the date the Petitioner was removed from his position, the Petitioner was assigned to the Blountstown, Florida, road maintenance office. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Mr. Gustavev Goodwin. Mr. Goodwin was an HMT-3 with the Respondent and supervised a maintenance crew of three men, including the Petitioner. Mr. Goodwin was the Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Mr. Lloyd Blackburn, a Highway Maintenance Supervisor with the Respondent, was Mr. Goodwin's immediate supervisor. Mr. Blackburn supervises all crews operating out of the Blountstown office. The Petitioner and his crew worked a 10-hour day, 4 days a week. Mr. Goodwin prepares a weekly crew report on a daily basis. Mr. Goodwin records the hours a crew member worked or, if a crew member was not present, Mr. Goodwin notes the absence and the reason for the absence. Mr. Blackburn transfers the information recorded on the weekly crew reports to timesheets which are used for payroll purposes. If approval of a request for leave is required, employees are required to report to their crew supervisor or Mr. Blackburn. The Petitioner would have been required to obtain approval of leave from Mr. Goodwin or Mr. Blackburn, if prior approval had been required. In cases of sick leave, employees were expected to call by telephone on the day of the illness or injury and inform Mr. Blackburn. Mr. Blackburn was at the office each work day in the morning before the crews completed fueling their trucks and departed for the day. Mr. Blackburn was then out of the office during most of the remainder of the day. During the last week of December, 1986, Mr. Goodwin, the Petitioner and the other members of Mr. Goodwin's crew were "bull skating" (joking and talking). The Petitioner told Mr. Goodwin in response to some comment, probably pertaining to the work that would be done the first week of January, 1987, that "I won't be here next week anyway. I be in the hospital." Although Mr. Goodwin did not remember the Petitioner having made these comments, the Petitioner and one of the crew members, Mr. Arthur Jackson, both testified that the comments were made. Neither Mr. Goodwin or Mr. Blackburn told the Petitioner that he could be absent from work during the first week of January, 1987. The Petitioner was absent from work during the first week of January, 1987 -- January 5, 6, 7 and 8, 1987. Neither Mr. Goodwin nor Mr. Blackburn were contacted on January 5-8, 1987, by the Petitioner or anyone on behalf of the Petitioner, about the Petitioner's absence. Neither Mr. Goodwin or Mr. Blackburn told the Petitioner that his absence on January 5-8, 1937, was approved. The Petitioner had obtained approval of annual leave prior to the period at issue in this case. The Petitioner had planned to go to the hospital on January 5, 1987, because of problems he has had with his legs, and to remain in the hospital for the remainder of the week. Because of the problems with his legs and his automobile, the Petitioner did not go to the hospital or see a doctor on January 5, 1987. On January 8, 1987, the Petitioner had a friend drive him to Panama City, Florida, where he remained under the care of Dr. Ernest G. Haslam, M.D., in the hospital, until January 12, 1987. Although the Petitioner does not have a telephone at his residence, Mr. Goodwin or Mr. Blackburn could have been contacted by Petitioner's wife, who works at Hardees, or by a friend. The Petitioner acknowledged receipt on April 14, 1983, of the Florida Department of Transportation Employee Handbook and his responsibility to review the handbook in detail and to request clarification, if necessary. On page 43 of the handbook it is provided that "[a]fter an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from Career Service ..." On page 22 of the handbook it is provided that "[i]f a medical appointment is necessary during work hours, you should obtain `approval, in advance, to use your earned sick leave." By certified letter from Allen Potter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department, dated January 8, 1976, the Petitioner was informed that he was deemed to have abandoned his position with the Respondent and to have resigned from the Career Service because of his absence from work during the first week of January, 1987.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration rule that the Petitioner, Albert T. Smith, has not abandoned his position with the Respondent, the Department of Transportation, and has not resigned from the Career Service. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0450 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s), if any, in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RD ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner has filed a letter dated April 10, 1987. The only proposed finding of fact contained in this letter concerns the question of whether the Petitioner told his supervisor, Mr. Goodwin, that he would not be at work during the period of time at issue in this case. The proposed finding of fact has been accepted in RD 10. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding RD Number of Acceptance of Fact Number or Reason for Rejection 1 RD 1-4 and 8. 2 RD 5-7 and 9. 3 RD 10-11. 4 RD 11 and 13. The evidence did not prove that the Petitioner had obtained prior approval for sick leave subsequent to the period of time involved in this case. The evidence only proved that the Petitioner had on other occasions received prior approval of annual leave. 5 RD 19-20. RD 16 and 18. The evidence does not prove that the Petitioner got into a car and drove to town. RD 21. The Petitioner was not, however, "absent from his position without authorized leave ..." COPIES FURNISHED: Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Kay N. Henderson, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, MS 58 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Mr. Albert T. Smith Route 1, Box 135, B 69A Blountstown, Florida 32424 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.68
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DAN B. GLASS vs. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, 84-003162 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003162 Latest Update: May 05, 1991

Findings Of Fact From July 1946 until his retirement from the state career service system on June 30, 1983, Petitioner was an employee of the Department of Labor and Employment Security or its predecessor agencies (the Florida Industrial Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the War Manpower Commission), hereinafter collectively referred to as the Department. The Department, at the time of Petitioner's initial employment, established and administered its own leave policies. Subsequently, the Florida Merit System was expanded to cover all state agencies, including the Department, and uniform personnel policies and practices, including the accumulation of annual leave, were established. Effective July 1, 1957 the accumulation of annual leave for employees of the Department, as with employees of all state agencies, was limited to 240 hours. Initially, Merit System leave regulations provided that leave accumulated by employees of agencies with existing leave regulations, such as the Department, would be credited to their accounts as of July 1, 1957, but any accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours would become void after December 31, 1959. At the behest of the Department, the deadline within which excess accumulated leave had to be utilized was extended to December 31, 1961. Essentially employees were afforded four and one-half years within which to utilize their excess accumulated annual leave or forfeit it. Upon his retirement June 30, 1983, Petitioner was paid for, and had computed as part of his Average Final compensation; the annual leave he had accumulated up to a maximum of 240 hours in accordance with Rule 22A-8.10, F.A.C. That rule, or its predecessor, has contained the same 240-hour limitation since December 31, 1961. Petitioner asserts that he had accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours on December 31, 1961. While the evidence does establish Petitioner had excess leave on that date, there was no competent evidence presented from which his actual leave balance could be established. The actual amount of Petitioner's excess leave is not, however, significant since any annual leave he had in excess of 240 hours was void after December 31, 1961. Notwithstanding the voiding of his excess annual leave, Petitioner asserts that his entitlement to such leave still exists because of certain assurances he received from his supervisors. According to Petitioner, he was unable to utilize his excess leave between July 1, 1957 and December 31, 1961, because he was on "special assignments" for the Department which precluded his absence from work. Consequently, Petitioner says, `his supervisors "assured" him that they would see to it that he "got his excess leave." It is worthy of note that the supervisors who purportedly gave such assurances have been dead for over a decade, that there exists no corroborating evidence of Petitioner's assertions, and that at no time during the ensuing 23 years did Petitioner raise any issue concerning, or attempt to use, the leave which had been forfeited. It is further worthy of note that while purportedly assured he would "get his excess leave," Petitioner received no assurance he would be paid for it upon retirement. It is unnecessary to decide whether such assurances were in fact given. The evidence is clear that the supervisors in question had no authority, real or apparent, to bind the State by such assurances. Further, any reliance Petitioner may have placed on such assurances would not have been reasonable, since such assurances were contrary to existing regulations.

Florida Laws (3) 120.565120.57120.68
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JOHN C. SCOTT vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 87-002750 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002750 Latest Update: Oct. 16, 1987

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, John C. Scott, has been a Career Service employee with the Department of Transportation for approximately ten years, assigned to the Centerline Maintenance Office in Pompano Beach, Florida. During all times material to these proceedings, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Allen Thomas. Robert Lucas, Highway Maintenance Supervisor in charge of the District III Centerline Crew, is the Petitioner's second-level supervisor. Thomas and Lucas are the only individuals at the Centerline Maintenance Office authorized to approve leave for Petitioner. On May 23, 1987, the Petitioner was arrested for D.U.I. and placed in jail for fifteen days. After the Petitioner was arrested, he called his mother and asked her to inform his supervisor at work that he had some personal business to attend to and would need annual leave. On May 26, 1987, the Petitioner failed to report to work and had not previously requested leave from any of his supervisors. On the morning of May 26, 1987, Ms. Scott, the Petitioner's mother, called Mr. Lucas and told him that her son would need a couple of days off from work because of personal business. Mr. Lucas informed Mrs. Scott that annual leave could not be authorized over the telephone for personal business but that leave could be granted for an emergency situation. Ms. Scott reiterated that the Petitioner had some personal business to take care of. Mr. Lucas advised her that annual leave could not be authorized over the telephone under those circumstances. On June 1, 1987, Mr. Lucas was informed by Mr. Oshesky, the District Personnel Supervisor, that Petitioner's attorney had called and told him that Petitioner was in jail. The Petitioner was absent from work on May 26, 27, 28, and June 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1987. May 29, 30 and 31, 1987 were non-work days for Petitioner. At the time, the Petitioner's work week consisted of four ten hour days from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. The last day that Petitioner actually reported for work was Wednesday, May 20, 1987. However, on Thursday, May 21, 1987, the Petitioner was absent from work on authorized annual leave, May 22-24, 1987, were non-work days and on Monday, May 25, 1987, the Petitioner was absent from work due to an official holiday (8 hours) and authorized annual leave (2 hours). On June 5, 1987, the Respondent advised Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested, that he was being terminated effective May 20, 1987, (Petitioner's last day at work) for abandonment of his position. The Petitioner's absence from work and involvement with civilian authorities were related to an admitted alcohol problem. Since the Petitioner was released from jail, he has participated in a twenty-day in-patient substance abuse program at John F. Kennedy Hospital and is presently involved with a Fort Lauderdale after-care program. The Petitioner had been provided with a Department of Transportation Employee Handbook by his employers. The Handbook outlined the requirements for annual leave and leave of absences without pay. The Handbook provides in part as follows: Annual Leave - Get your supervisor's approval before taking leave. If an emergency develops, tell your supervisor of the emergency and ask verbal approval to use annual leave. When you return to work complete the leave request form, as appropriate. Leaves of Absence Without Pay - Upon request, you may be granted leave without pay ... for a period not to exceed twelve calendar months.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, John C. Scott, has abandoned his Career Service position with the Department of Transportation. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2750 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Partially adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5 and 6. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument and/or subordinate. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3, 5, and 6. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Hon. Kaye N. Henderson Department of Transportation Secretary Room 562 Burns Building Department of Transportation Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Patrick J. Curry, Esquire Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, 200 Southeast Sixth Street M.S. 58 Suite 200 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 32301 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire 435 Carlton Building General Counsel Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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SHIRLEY B. WALKER vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-005813 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Winter Haven, Florida Oct. 26, 1989 Number: 89-005813 Latest Update: Mar. 01, 1990

Findings Of Fact In September, 1989, Shirley B. Walker (Walker), was a clerk-typist in the Bartow office of the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), District 6, Subdistrict B, Children, Youth and Families, Child Protection Services. Walker was absent on Tuesday, September 5, 1989, and had a friend call her supervisor to say that Walker would not be at work until Friday, September 8, 1989, due to a medical condition. Walker reportedly had been in an altercation with her husband over the Labor Day weekend and had been injured to the extent that her neck was in a brace. The supervisor, Patricia Lawler, asked that the friend give Walker the message that she would need to bring a doctor's excuse with her on her return to work. Walker did not return to work on Friday, September 8, 1989. Walker did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work that day. Since Walker had no home telephone, and the telephone number of a relative that had been given to her supervisor as a means of contacting her at home was obsolete by September 8, Lawler asked office friends of Walker to go to Walker's home during the lunch hour to check on her well-being and find out why she was not at work. When they did, they found no one at home. Walker also did not go to work on Monday through Friday, September 11 through 15, 1989. Again, she did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work. No one at the office knew anything further about Walker or why she was not at work from Friday, September 8 through Friday, September 15, 1989. When Walker began her work at HRS, she was given an employee handbook, part of which clearly states: "If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned." At approximately 4:45 p.m. on Friday, September 15, 1989, Lawler hand- delivered to Walker at Walker's home a letter notifying Walker that she was being terminated from her employment with HRS for the consecutive unexcused and unauthorized absences, which were viewed as an abandonment of her employment and a resignation from the State Career Service. Although Walker asked for a formal administrative hearing on the question whether she had abandoned her position, neither she nor anyone on her behalf appeared at the hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, Shirley B. Walker, abandoned her position and resigned from the State Career Service. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley B. Walker 1050 Golfview Avenue Apartment 803 Bartow, FL 33830 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550

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ROBERT J. RICHMOND vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 00-004215 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Oct. 11, 2000 Number: 00-004215 Latest Update: Feb. 15, 2001

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Children and Family Services (the "Department"), was overpaid in the amount of $826.82 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On June 5, 1995, Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with Respondent to resolve certain disciplinary matters not directly relevant to this case. For purposes of this proceeding, the key element of the settlement agreement was that Petitioner would accept a voluntary demotion. The terms of the settlement agreement provided that Petitioner would retain his current salary status for a period not to exceed five years, though it would exceed the maximum for his new pay grade. On June 7, 1995, the Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") entered a final order approving the settlement agreement in disposition of Petitioner's complaint. Petitioner did not appeal the final order. Rule 60K-2.004(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a demoted state employee's base rate of pay may exceed the maximum of the salary range to which the employee has been demoted for a maximum of five years. Petitioner's base rate of pay was allowed to exceed the maximum of his new pay grade for the full five years. During this period, Petitioner benefited from pay grade increases, received a reclassification of his position, and was not promoted. The five-year period ended in June 2000. Respondent's main office in Tallahassee twice per year issues a computer-generated list of employees receiving pay over the maximum of their pay grades. Human resources employees in Respondent's branch offices then examine the list to determine whether these employees' base rate of pay should continue to exceed the maximum. Respondent issued an "Employees Over Maximum" list in September 2000. Rex Duley of the District 8 human resources office examined the approximately 15 listed names of persons working in District 8. Mr. Duley determined that the applicable five-year period for Petitioner's receipt of pay above his grade had expired in June 2000. Mr. Duley prepared a letter, dated September 11, 2000, notifying Petitioner of the overpayments. The letter stated that Petitioner had received $1,316.11 in gross overpayments since June 2000. Respondent subsequently completed the full computation through the Bureau of State Payroll's automated system, and determined that the net overpayment to Petitioner was $826.82. At the hearing, Petitioner did not dispute the amount of the net overpayment. Petitioner testified that he would be able to repay the money at a rate of $25 to $50 per pay period. Instead, Petitioner sought to introduce evidence calling into question the validity of the 1995 settlement agreement. This evidence was deemed irrelevant and was not admitted. The evidence established that Petitioner voluntarily entered the settlement agreement, did not appeal from the PERC final order adopting the settlement agreement, and accepted the benefits of the settlement agreement for a period of five years. The time for contesting that agreement has long passed. Petitioner also questioned Respondent's diligence in discovering the overpayments. Petitioner was well aware of the five-year limitation on the salary arrangement established by the settlement agreement, and was in at least as good a position as Respondent to know that he was being overpaid between June and September 2000. Petitioner accepted the overpayments without questioning them or calling Respondent's attention to them. Petitioner's contention that he is being penalized for Respondent's lax bookkeeping is thus without merit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent repay $50 per pay period to the Department of Children and Family Services beginning with the pay period immediately following entry of a final order in this case and continuing each pay period thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Eugenie Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-0085 Robert J. Richmond 5411 Loyloa Lane Southwest Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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STEPHEN S. POOLE vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 92-007401 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Monticello, Florida Dec. 15, 1992 Number: 92-007401 Latest Update: Aug. 25, 1994

Findings Of Fact There are no disputed issues of material fact which would preclude entry of this summary recommended order of dismissal based on the undisputed facts and law involved. Petitioner was dismissed from his career service position with Respondent state agency. On appeal, the dismissal was reversed. Petitioner was off the state agency payroll and did not work for seven months. In backpay proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), Petitioner was awarded backpay for only one month. Petitioner was paid for the one month that pay was awarded, but not for the other six months. Petitioner received retirement credit, annual leave credit, and sick leave credit for that one month awarded and paid, but not for the other six months.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services enter a final order denying all claims of Petitioner and dismissing the Petition. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of April, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1993.

Florida Laws (4) 110.219120.57121.021447.208
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