The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether state and local option taxes may be imposed upon Petitioner, Co-Op Oil Company, Inc. (“Co-Op Oil”), based upon the gallons of fuel sold at retail stations that were not owned or operated by Co-Op Oil, and to which Co-Op Oil did not consign fuel, but that were voluntarily “linked” to Co-Op Oil for reporting purposes via Department of Revenue (“DOR”) Form DR-120.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: During the audit period, Co-Op Oil was a domestic corporation engaged in the business of wholesale and retail petroleum distribution, and held Florida motor fuel tax license No. 09000447. Since the audit period, Co-Op Oil has exited the retail portion of the petroleum distribution business. DOR is an executive agency of the State of Florida. Among other duties, DOR is charged with administration and enforcement of Florida’s fuel tax laws, pursuant to Chapter 206, Florida Statutes. During the audit period, Co-Op Oil was a wholesale petroleum distributor to marinas, commercial fishermen, construction companies, and other businesses not served by retail facilities. Jim Smith, President of Co-Op Oil, testified that beginning in August, 1989, and continuing through December, 1994, Co-Op Oil requested that certain independent retailers to which Co-Op Oil supplied petroleum be “linked” to Co-Op Oil for retail tax reporting purposes. Mr. Smith testified that he made the decision to request linkage for those retail dealers that he believed incapable of correctly reporting the taxes on their own. His purpose was to ensure that all taxes owed to the state were actually reported and paid. Mr. Smith testified that he understood “linkage” to require Co-Op Oil to report and remit all the fuel taxes that Co-Op Oil actually collected on the gallons of fuel it sold to the linked dealers. Essentially, Co-Op Oil collected and remitted taxes on the net gallons of fuel it delivered to the dealers. DOR does not dispute that Co-Op Oil remitted all the taxes that it actually collected on the net gallons delivered to the linked dealers. However, in reporting taxes for the linked facilities, Co-Op Oil did not report “gains” for those facilities. The concept of “gains” is based on the principle that the volume of a volatile substance such as gasoline changes with the temperature. In the petroleum industry, a “net gallon” is based on the volume of a gallon of fuel at 60 degrees. The industry has developed a formula to account for the difference in volume caused by temperatures above or below 60 degrees. Under the adjustments made pursuant to the formula, a “gallon” of gasoline stored at a temperature below 60 degrees is worth more than a gallon stored at a temperature higher than 60 degrees because of its greater compression. The linked facilities in question were located in and around Pinellas County, where the year-round temperature in their underground tanks is significantly greater than 60 degrees, meaning that gasoline stored therein would reasonably be expected to expand after delivery by Co-Op Oil. This expansion would result in the retail facilities being able to sell marginally more gallons of fuel to the ultimate consumers than the net gallons purchased from Co-Op Oil at the wholesale level. This phenomenon of “gains” at the retail level, along with alleged abuses by dealers, led DOR to successfully persuade the Legislature in 1992 to adopt a statutory requirement that retailers who were not also wholesalers or refiners must collect and remit tax on the additional gallons of fuel sold at the retail level. Section 206.41(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), imposing the constitutional gas tax, contained the typical language: If any licensee owns or operates retail stations or has fuel on consignment at retail stations and has sold more fuel than was purchased tax-paid when the fuel was removed from the rack or than was reported to the state when first purchased or removed from storage tax-free, the licensee must report the additional gallons sold and pay the additional tax, due for the month, on his or her local option gasoline tax return or a return designated by the department. The “rack” is that part of a terminal facility by which petroleum products are loaded into tanker trucks or rail cars. Section 206.01(16), Florida Statutes (1995). In practice, the “rack” also refers to bulk plant facilities operated by wholesalers such as Co-Op Oil. Similar language requiring the reporting and payment of “gains” was included in Section 206.60(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)(county gas tax); Section 206.605(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)(municipal gas tax); Section 336.021(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)(county nine cent gas tax); Section 336.025(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)(local option gas tax); and 336.026(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)(State Comprehensive Enhanced Transportation System Tax). The cited sections from Chapter 336, Florida Statutes (1995) also provided that refiners, importers, wholesalers, and jobbers were to be considered as retail dealers when electing to remit the subject taxes on behalf of retail stations they owned or operated, or where they had fuel on consignment. Administratively, DOR accomplished the collection of the tax on “gains” by requiring dealers to base their tax returns on “metered gallons,” i.e., the reading of gallons at the gas pumps used by retail customers. Petitioner conceded at hearing that retail facilities, when filing their own tax returns, were required to calculate the taxes based on metered gallons. A Florida form DR-120 is the form upon which a motor fuel dealer reports the amount of motor fuel sold and the amount of local county option taxes due. On a monthly basis during the audit period, the Petitioner filed form DR-120 with the Respondent. All taxes reported by Co-Op Oil on these forms during the audit period were calculated based on net gallons sold by Co-Op Oil to the linked dealers. A Florida form DR-119 is the form upon which a motor fuel dealer reports the amount of fuel sold and the amount of state taxes due. On a monthly basis during the audit period, the Petitioner filed form DR-119 with the Respondent. All taxes reported by Co-Op Oil on these forms during the audit period were calculated based on net gallons sold by Co-Op Oil to the linked dealers. During the audit period, DOR had in place no formal mechanism by which a wholesaler such as Co-Op Oil could “link” its tax return to that of a retailer that it neither owned nor operated nor to which it consigned fuel. Mr. Smith credibly testified that in 1989 he was instructed by a DOR employee named Mary Ann Moye that such linkage could be accomplished by written notification to DOR and the actual reporting and collection of taxes by the wholesaler on behalf of the retailer. Peter Steffens, a 22-year DOR employee intimately familiar with the evolution and application of the fuel taxes at issue in this proceeding, testified that while “linkage” did not formally exist in statute or rule, DOR in fact treated “linked” retailers as consigned retailers. In other words, when a wholesaler such as Co-Op Oil linked a retailer’s return to its DR-120, the wholesaler would be treated as if it were consigning fuel to that retailer, whether it was collecting tax at the time of delivery or at the time of retail sale. DOR took the position that a wholesaler such as Co-Op Oil steps into the shoes of its linked retailers, and remains in those shoes after it delivers fuel to the retailers. To avoid the loss of taxes that are unquestionably owed, DOR places upon linked wholesalers a continuing responsibility to see that all taxes are reported and paid even after the fuel is physically delivered to the retailers. Given that DOR did not impose linkage on the wholesalers, but only allowed it at the written request of the wholesalers, this was a reasonable requirement. Because the statutes provided that a consignor must pay tax on “gains,” DOR took the position in its audit that Co-Op Oil was also required to pay “gains” for the stations it linked on its DR-119 and DR-120 tax returns for the audit period. Mr. Smith took the position that Co-Op Oil was required to pay tax only on those net gallons it sold to its retailers because, unlike a consignor, Co-Op Oil itself realized no profit from the “gains” of its retail dealer. Mr. Smith questioned the validity of the entire concept of “gains,” but was well aware of DOR’s position on the issue, having litigated an administrative tax assessment proceeding against DOR in 1993 in which “gains” was a central issue. See Co-Op Oil Company, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 93-2019 (Recommended Order, Sept. 22, 1993). Mr. Smith acknowledged that the tax on “gains” might be owed by the retail dealers, but took the position that DOR should seek payment of that tax directly from the retailers. Mr. Smith testified that he assumed that once the dealers were linked to Co-Op Oil, they would be treated as ultimate consumers for his reporting purposes. Mr. Smith admitted that his assumption was based on his reading of the statutes, not on any guidance he had received from DOR. DOR made initial inquiry to Mr. Smith as to the taxes being reported and paid by Co-Op Oil during telephone conversations in December, 1995. By follow-up letter dated January 4, 1996, Charles E. Pate, Senior Tax Specialist with DOR, wrote to Mr. Smith as follows, in pertinent part: It is not intended that the method of reporting you have chosen should reduce the tax liability that would result if each retail dealer were reporting individually on form DR-121. It is necessary that each dealer you are selling to reconstruct the difference between net and gross gallons for the period 7/92 through the present. All applicable state and local taxes will be assessed on the calculated adjustment. Mr. Pate testified that he made several subsequent requests to Mr. Smith for the information regarding the unreported “gains” of the retailers in question. Mr. Pate stated that, despite Mr. Smith's promises, the requested information was never provided by Co-Op Oil. It was undisputed that sales agreements with its retailers gave Co-Op Oil a contractual right to collect from the retailers any additional fuel tax that might become due. Mr. Smith acknowledged that he never supplied the “gains” information to Mr. Pate, but could not recall ever promising to do so, stating that his understanding of Mr. Pate’s letter was that DOR needed to require each dealer to reconstruct their sales for the audit period. Mr. Smith stated that all but three of the retailers in question were out of business, and that he did not attempt to obtain the information from the others. Mr. Smith’s testimony established that he is very knowledgeable as to fuel tax law. In addition to calculating and paying the taxes for his business since at least 1989, he has attended seminars on the subject, served on a task force made up of DOR and industry representatives that drafted changes to the fuel tax laws, and has acted as a legislative lobbyist on tax issues on behalf of his company and the Florida Petroleum Marketers Association. Given his knowledge, it was unreasonable for him to assume that a tax on “gains” otherwise owed by his retailers need not be paid simply because their tax returns were administratively linked with those of Co-Op Oil. DOR did not attempt directly to force the retailers to reconstruct their records. Mr. Pate did inform Mr. Smith that if Co-Op Oil would produce the records, then DOR would pursue the individual dealers. However, no dealer records were ever produced by Co-Op Oil. Mr. Pate was thus forced to assess the tax based on an estimate. He arrived at this estimate by assuming a one percent “gain” on the net gallons reported by Co-Op Oil for the linked retailers. This was a reasonable and conservative assumption, consistent with the industry standards for calculation of “gains.”
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the assessment of additional tax, penalties, and interest against Co-Op Oil. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Smith, President, Co-Op Oil Company, Inc. 4911 8th Avenue South Gulfport, Florida 33707 John N. Upchurch, Esquire Nicholas Bykowsky, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General Tax Section The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, the State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, is an agency of state government charged, among other responsibilities, with establishing and enforcing standards related to quality of motor fuels, as pertinent hereto, the standard for volatility contained in Rule 5F-2.01(1)(c) 2, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner has charged that the Respondent has technically not met this standard with fuel sold at the two stores, one in Tampa and one in Winter Haven, Florida, because the subject product (which contained ethanol) does not comply with that standard which states that the fuel should be 50 percent evaporated at a temperature of not less that 1700. There is no dispute that the fuel involved did not meet this standard because it was ethanol enriched and was intended to be sold as such by the Respondent. The notice of stop sale was filed herein because this product, which did not comply with the standard for regular or unleaded gasoline, was not labeled to disclose that it was other than unleaded gasoline, that is gasoline containing ethanol. The Petitioner however withdrew its allegation that "super unleaded gasoline" enriched with ethanol was sold in an unlabeled fashion. The Respondent is a corporation authorized to do business in Florida, headquartered in Dallas, Texas. It recently elected to convert many of its gasoline outlets to sell ethanol enriched gasoline, which is characterized by a higher per gallon profit-margin and a higher octane than regular unleaded gasoline. Thus, a memorandum was sent from the Respondent's home office in Dallas, Texas, to all the Respondent's district managers and zone managers providing them with detailed instructions for conversion of stations from selling non-enriched unleaded gasoline to ethanol enriched gasoline, including detailed instructions on preventing adulteration by water in underground tanks, as well as detailed instructions regarding proper labeling and disclosure of the contents of the new type fuel to consumers. Some 130 retail outlets in Florida were converted to sell the ethanol product and booklets were published and distributed to be provided to customers to explain the characteristics of the ethanol fuel to customers. There is no dispute that a good faith effort was consistently followed to adequately disclose the characteristics of the fuel to customers and to properly label the pumps. The Respondent's Tampa store converted to ethanol product on March 26, 1983, and received its first load of ethanol enriched gasoline that day. It was cited or notified to stop sale by the Petitioner on March 29, 1983, because the pumps through which the product was dispensed were mislabeled. The parties agree that this was due to a communication failure between the regional office in Orlando and that station and that the clerk at that Tampa store simply did not get notified to change the labeling on the pumps before the Petitioner observed the violation some two days later and ordered sale of the product stopped. A similar situation is true of the Winter Haven retail outlet which sold ethanol enriched products without disclosure labeling on the pumps. In this instance the labeling had been placed on the pumps, but had been torn off by person unknown and the notice to stop sale was issued against the Respondent with regard to that store before new labeling could be properly placed on the pumps. There is no question, and indeed the parties have stipulated, that the two violations which occurred were inadvertent, and due, with regard to the Tampa instance, to a lack of communication between the Respondent's regional management office and the retail outlet involved, such that proper labeling did not get placed on the pumps timely. With regard to the Winter Haven facility, there is no dispute that the labeling was timely and properly done when the first load of fuel was placed in the underground tanks for sale, but that persons unknown wrongfully removed the labeling. There is no evidence to establish that any such violations have been committed by the Respondent in the past. There is no question that enough of the product was sold to the public to exceed the $1,000 bond posted in lieu of confiscation. It was also established that the violations were inadvertent and were not perpetrated through any intent or scheme to defraud the consuming public.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be required to forfeit $250 of the $1,000 bond posted and that the remaining $750 be returned to the Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Graham, Esquire Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Debbie Hunn, Esquire 5500 Diplomat Circle Suite 105 Orlando, Florida 32810 The Honorable Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable to Respondent for fuel taxes, and, if so, whether Respondent's levy on Petitioner's bank deposits is warranted and proper.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was at all times relevant to this proceeding an active corporation in the State of Florida. Petitioner operated as a motor fuel dealer from its inception in 1984, but in 1996, its application for licensure as a motor fuel dealer was not renewed by Respondent due to the existence of fuel tax delinquencies. Respondent is the state agency responsible for collecting taxes paid by motor fuel dealers. On July 3, 1996, Respondent issued a Notice of Final Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $74,423.25; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On July 3, 1996, Respondent issued another Notice of Final Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $12,625.64; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On July 3, 1996, Respondent issued another Notice of Final Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $15,245.84; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On June 28, 1996, Respondent issued a Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $90,317.87; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On June 28, 1996, Respondent issued another Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $57,864.24; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On November 27, 1996, Respondent issued a Notice of Final Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $81,094.54; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. Another Warrant was filed in the Pasco County Clerk's Office on May 24, 1996, reflecting delinquent taxes, penalties, and interest owed Respondent due to failure of an electronic transfer by Petitioner because of insufficient funds. The amount of that Warrant was $9,918.92. (A filing fee of $32.00 was assessed for each of the filed Warrants.) The time for challenging the assessments set forth in the notices and Warrants has passed. No credible evidence was presented at final hearing to suggest the assessed amounts were incorrect. Petitioner made some payments on the assessed amounts from time to time. Payments were applied to the outstanding balance in accordance with governing statutes: Filing fees, then accrued interest, then penalties, and then the tax liabilities. After applying the payments and taking into account accruing interest, Petitioner owes Respondent $377,074.29 as of the date of the final hearing. On September 13, 1996, Petitioner wrote a letter to Respondent asking that all penalties and interest on the outstanding balance be waived. The basis of the request was that only one officer of the corporation had actual knowledge of the unpaid fuel taxes. Once the other two officers were made aware, they immediately paid the current taxes and discontinued operation of the business. All assets of the business were sold, and the proceeds provided to Respondent to apply against the outstanding balance. Some revenue was being held by the corporation to provide for orderly termination of the business and upkeep of the real property owned by the corporation. Respondent denied Petitioner's request for compromise of the outstanding debt by letter dated December 19, 1996. Respondent requested from Petitioner evidence that Petitioner had exercised "ordinary care and prudence" in complying with state revenue laws. No evidence of a response by Petitioner was identified at final hearing. On August 27, 2009, Respondent, in recognition that the Warrants would expire after a period of time, notified Petitioner of the need to satisfy all the Warrants immediately. Upon Petitioner's failure to pay, Respondent issued a Notice of Freeze on October 8, 2009, to Synovus Bank where Petitioner's funds were being held. At that time there was $52,990.21 being held by the bank for Petitioner. On November 3, 2009, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Levy, advising Petitioner of its intent to seize the money being held at Synovus Bank. Petitioner timely filed a contest to the Notice of Intent to Levy. Respondent notified Synovus Bank of the contest. Petitioner was formed by three individuals: Earl Radcliff, president; Robert Spence; and R. Michal Marston. Spence and Marston were merely investors; Radcliff operated and controlled the business. Neither Spence, nor Marston was involved in the payment of fuel taxes during the period the business was operating. That duty was left entirely up to Radcliff. Upon Radcliff's failure to pay the taxes that were due, Respondent began issuing notices. Finally, in 1996, Respondent refused to renew Petitioner's motor fuel dealer's license, effectively terminating the business. Spence and Marston were not immediately made aware of this fact, but upon learning that the license had not been renewed, they began attempting to make the appropriate tax payments. When it became obvious there was not enough money available to pay the tax liabilities, Spence began taking steps to protect the real estate owned by Petitioner so that it could be sold to meet the tax liabilities. The funds held by Synovus Bank are being used solely to protect the existing real property. Neither Spence, nor Marston, was ever repaid for their initial investment to the corporation. The real property has not been sold due to many reasons, including the downturn in the economy, the existence of environmental problems on the site, and general deterioration of the property. The property is in two parcels: one is an empty lot and the other is being used as an automobile dealership.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Revenue, upholding the Notice of Intent to Levy issued by Respondent as to property owned by Petitioner, Fuel Mart, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Echeverri, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Robert Spence Fuel Mart, Inc. 250 North Belcher Road, No. 100 Clearwater, Florida 33765-2622
The Issue The issue here presented concerns an alleged violation of Rule Subsection 5F-2.01(1)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code, related to the permissible ten percent (10 percent) evaporated temperature for which gasoline shall not exceed 140F, and penalties to be imposed for such violations, in keeping with Section 525.06, Florida Statutes (1980), and Rule Subsection 5F-2.01(1)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, is an agency of State government which has the obligation to inspect petroleum products in keeping with the provisions of Chapter 525, Florida Statutes (1980). The Respondent is a corporation which sells petroleum products in the State of Florida at an outlet located at 3411 U.S. 19 North, Pasco County, Tarpon Springs, Florida. On November 23, 1981, a sample of the petroleum product, super unleaded gasoline (which was offered for sale) was taken from the Respondent's facility as indicated above. A subsequent analysis of that product by Petitioner's mobile laboratory revealed that the ten percent (10 percent) evaporated temperature was 153F. This reading exceeded the ten percent (10 percent) evaporated temperature of 140F as set forth in Rule Subsection 5F-2.01(1)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's inspector, Jamie Gillespie, advised Respondent's agent that the premium unleaded gasoline was illegal due to its "stale" condition and the Respondent was given an option of either confiscation of the product or posting of a bond. The product is presently under a Stop Sale Notice and is under seal. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1.) A subsequent analysis by Petitioner's laboratory in Tallahassee revealed that the evaporation level of the product was found to be approximately 163F. Ben Bowen, Petitioner's Assistant Bureau Chief in charge of petroleum inspection, indicates that the discrepancy in the evaporation levels as analyzed by the two laboratories was most probably due to the seal which was on the product and the approximate seven (7) day delay in the transfer of the product from Tarpon Springs to the laboratory in Tallahassee. Respondent's supervisor, Mark Ordway, 1/ was shown how the product could possibly become stale due to a "venting" problem from the roof of the storage tank where the product was stored. Sam Puleo, a lab technologist employed in Petitioner's mobile laboratory, analyzed the sample of the product taken from Respondent's facility. According to Mr. Puleo, "stale" products such as that taken from Respondent's tanks would make it difficult to start an automobile engine.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. On September 15, 1960, Earman Oil Company, Inc., was granted License Number 1748 (the "Special Fuels Dealer's License") authorizing it to operate as a User-Dealer of special fuels in the State of Florida. On the face of that License was the following notation: This license is NOT TRANSFERRABLE but will continue in full force and effect until cancelled or revoked as provided by law. The Special Fuels Dealer's License also contained a notation that provided as follows: This license must be returned to RAY F. GREEN, Comptroller, when a licensee terminates his operation as a User-Dealer. On April 1, 1967, Earman Oil Company, Inc., was issued State License Number 375 (the "Motor Fuels Distributor's License") by the Florida Revenue Commission, authorizing Earman to engage in the business of distributing motor fuels in the State of Florida. On the face of that License was the following notation: This license is not transferrable or assignable, and must be displayed conspicuously at all times at the Distributor's office or principle place of business. A Special Fuels Dealer's License and a Motor Fuels Distributor's License entitle a holder to purchase diesel fuel and gasoline for distribution without paying local option taxes pursuant to Chapter 336, Florida Statutes, motor fuel retail sales tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Part II, Florida Statutes and motor fuels tax pursuant to Chapter 206, Part I, Florida Statutes. A holder of such licenses is obligated to collect the taxes upon resale to customers and to remit those taxes to the state. If the resale is to another distributor who holds a valid license, the sale can be made tax free provided the seller follows the procedures set forth in the statutes and applicable DOR rules. In order to obtain either of the licenses during all times pertinent to this case, a company was required to have been in operation for at least one year and had to meet certain other requirements, including the posting of a bond. Sometime in 1983, Barkett, a licensed dealer of special and motor fuels in the state of Florida, purchased Florida Coast Oil Company, Inc. ("Florida Coast"), another licensed dealer of special and motor fuels in the State of Florida. The evidence did not establish the specific terms and details of that acquisition. The licenses held by Florida Coast which enabled it to purchase motor fuels on a tax exempt basis were not cancelled or revoked following Barkett's acquisition of the company. Barkett apparently acquired all of the stock of Florida Coast and Florida Coast continued in operation under that same name. Many, if not all, of the officers and directors of Barkett at this time also became officers and directors in Florida Coast. The evidence was conflicting and confusing as to the status of Earman Oil during 1980-1984. After review of all the evidence, it is concluded that Florida Coast acquired Earman Oil Company in 1980. The evidence did not establish the specific terms and details of that transaction. Apparently, this acquisition was also a stock purchase arrangement and Earman Oil Company initially remained in existence following its acquistion by Florida Coast. However, on August 31, 1981, Earman Oil Company was officially merged into Florida Coast. Harry Barkett, the president of Barkett and Florida Coast (after its acquisition by Barkett in 1983,) testified that the Department was advised of Florida Coast's acquisition of Earman Oil Company and Florida Coast was told by DOR that it could continue to use the licenses issued to Earman Oil Company in order to purchase motor fuels on a tax exempt basis. However, it does not appear that Mr. Barkett had any interest in Florida Coast at the time of the acquisition of Earman and no explanation was provided as to how he learned of DOR's alleged approval of the continued use of Earman's licenses. This contention is discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 24 below. On September 10, 1984, Florida Coast sold certain assets to Alfred Vittorino. Vittorino had previously worked as a manager for Barkett. The sales agreement provided that the assets being sold included ll rights to operate as Earman Oil Company including but not limited to all rights to the stock, licenses, permits or trademarks that are titled to Earman Oil Company that are required to operate the business. The parties have stipulated that on September 12, 1984, a Certificate of Incorporation for a new Earman Oil Company, Inc., was filed with the Office of the Secretary of State for Florida and that Alfred Vittorino was the president and sole stock holder for that company. The licenses issued to the original Earman Oil Company could not legally be transferred or assigned to the new company. Moreover, the new company could not qualify for new licenses on its own since it had not been in operation for at least one year. There is no dispute that at the time Vittorino acquired the assets from Florida Coast and began operating under the name Earman Oil Company, the Special Fuel Dealer's License and the Motor Fuel Distributor's License previously issued in the name of Earman Oil Company were delivered to Vittorino by Florida Coast. Harry Barkett, who was the president of both Barkett and Florida Coast at the time of the sale to Vittorino, testified that Vittorino told him that he would take whatever steps were necessary to get the licenses reissued and/or obtain new licenses so that Earman could continue to purchase fuel on a tax exempt basis. Earman Oil Company never applied for new licenses after its acquisition by Vittorino. Instead, the company merely obtained and used the old licenses. Since the Special Fuel Dealer's License and the Motor Fuel Distributor's Licenses issued to the original Earman Oil Company has never been cancelled, "Earman Oil Company" was still registered with DOR as a distributor of motor fuel and a dealer of special fuels and it remained registered during the entire period in question, September 1984 to April 1985. Although Harry Barkett testified that he believes DOR was notified of Florida Coast's sale of Earman's assets to Vittorino, DOR has no record of the sale and/or the transfer of the licenses of Earman Oil Company to Vittorino. No persuasive evidence was presented to establish that DOR was fully advised as to the terms of the sale and the status of the companies at the time of the sale. The contention that DOR approved the transfer of the licenses to the new company established by Vittorino is rejected. After Vittorino purchased the above described assets from Florida Coast, Earman Oil Company began engaging in the business of selling motor fuel and special fuels to its customers. During the period from September 1984 through April 1985, Earman Oil Company purchased gasoline and diesel fuel from Barkett and other companies and sold that fuel to, among others, Miami Petroleum Oil Company, Inc., an unlicensed distributor of gasoline and diesel fuel. During that period, the invoices for the sales by Barkett to Earman Oil Company indicated that the sales were tax exempt and there is no indication that taxes were being collected from Earman. Barkett did not obtain an affidavit or "resale" certificate from Earman Oil Co. prior to selling tax exempt. However, Barkett filed tax returns with DOR indicating that the sales were tax exempt. Barkett contends that its typical procedure for selling tax exempt to a customer is to obtain the customer's license number and verbally confirm the validity of that number with the Department. Petitioner contends that it followed this procedure prior to selling tax exempt to Earman Oil Company and that the Department confirmed that the license numbers provided by Earman Oil Company were valid. While Petitioner contends that it contacted the Respondent in order to verify that Earman Oil Company was in possession of a valid license, there is no written evidence of any such communication. The applicable statutes and regulations require a distributor to obtain an affidavit or a "resale certificate" in order to sell fuel tax exempt. There is no provision in the rules or the statutes for verbal confirmation of licensure status. From September 1984 through April 1985, Earman Oil collected motor fuel taxes under Chapters 206 and 212, Florida Statutes, from its customers, but never remitted those taxes to the state. There is no evidence that any of the taxes collected by Earman Oil were transferred to Barkett. Earman Oil Company filed tax returns with DOR indicating that it had not collected any taxes. Criminal charges were subsequently brought against Vittorino for failure to remit collected motor fuel taxes for the period September 1984 through April 1985. Vittorino was found guilty by a jury of failure to remit collected motor fuel taxes and was initially sentenced to nine years in prison, which was subsequently reduced to six years on appeal. As of the date of the hearing in this administrative proceeding, the state has not collected any of the outstanding taxes from Vittorino or Earman Oil. Petitioner contends that during the trial of Vittorino, the State of Florida maintained that Earman Oil Company held valid licenses as a distributor of motor fuel and as a dealer of special fuels during the period September 1984 through May 1985. The transcript of that criminal proceeding confirms that this was one theory advanced by the prosecution during that case. However, there was considerable confusion during that trial as to the licensure status of Earman. Ultimately, Vittorino was convicted of failure to remit collected motor fuel taxes. It was not an essential element of this offense for Earman to be a valid license holder. DOR conducted an audit of Barkett (Audit Number 86-17412886) for the period September 1984 through April 1985. The Department's audit indicated that Barkett sold 9,548,414 gallons of motor fuel on a tax free basis to Earman Oil Company during the period from September 1, 1984 through April 30, 1985. During the audit, the auditor requested Barkett to provide resale certificates or affidavits from Earman Oil Company to substantiate the basis for the tax exempt sales. Barkett was unable to produce any such resale certificates or affidavits. As a result, DOR concluded that Barkett was responsible for collecting and remitting to the state taxes on all the sales made during this period by Barkett to Earman. Barkett contested the results of the audit and the Department's Notice of Decision issued on August 4, 1988. Barkett timely petitioned for reconsideration of that decision on September 2, 1988. The Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration on January 19, 1989. In its Notice of Reconsideration, the Department determined that the balance due for the Local Option Tax pursuant to Chapter 336, Florida Statutes, was $540,173.68, which consisted of $381,936.56 tax, $95,484.14 penalty and $62,752.98 interest (with interest accruing at the rate of $125.50 per day from June 6, 1986, until date of payment.) The Department also determined that the balance due for motor fuel retail sales tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Part II, Florida Statutes, was $769,747.50, which consisted of $544,259.60 tax, $136,064.90 penalty and $89,423.00 interest (with interest accruing at the rate of $178.93 per day from June 6, 1988 until date of payment.) Finally, the Department determined that the balance due for motor fuels tax pursuant to Chapter 206, Part I, Florida Statutes, was $540,173.68, which consisted of $381,936.56 tax, $95,484.14 penalty, and $62,752.98 interest (with interest accruing at the rate of $125.57 per day from June 6, 1986 until date of payment.) 1/ As part of its reconsideration, the Department deleted the fraud penalties that had previously been assessed against Barkett. Barkett timely filed a challenge to the Department's conclusions in the Notice of Reconsideration. 2/ During the late 70's and early 1980's, Barkett Oil acquired a number of different oil companies (including Florida Coast, which had previously acquired Earman). Several of the companies that were acquired by Barkett held licenses from the Department that enabled them to purchase motor fuels on a tax exempt basis for resale. Barkett contends that it notified the Department of each of those acquisitions and was never instructed that it had to reapply for a license to purchase tax exempt. Barkett suggests that these prior experiences justified its conclusion that Earman Oil Company could continue to purchase tax exempt following the sale and transfer of licenses to Vittorino. However, the circumstances and terms of the prior acquisitions by Barkett were not established in this case. It is not clear whether those transactions were stock purchase agreements or simply the acquisition of assets. Furthermore, the evidence regarding the notification supposedly given to the Department was vague and unconvincing. Although Petitioner contends that it notified the Department that Earman Oil Company had been sold to Vittorino, there is no written evidence of any such communication. It is not clear who at the Department was notified of the sale nor is it clear what information was provided regarding the sale. In sum, Petitioner's contention that Respondent should be estopped from claiming that Earman Oil Company did not hold a valid Distributor's License and/or Special Fuel License is rejected. There was insufficient persuasive evidence to establish that an authorized representative of the Department who was provided with full disclosure of the facts surrounding the transfer to Vittorino advised Petitioner that it could sell tax exempt to Earman Oil Company.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered upholding the assessments set forth in the Notice of Reconsideration. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of February, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings: Respondent, Hudson Oil Company, is the owner of a retail gasoline outlet located at 1000 Ninth Street North, St. Petersburg, Florida. John H. Newburn is the manager of Respondent's retail station. On August 25, 1989, Petitioner, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services' inspector, Henry J. Crafa, made a routine inspection of Respondent's retail gasoline station and took a sample of the unleaded, regular and premium unleaded gasolines. Inspector Crafa submitted the samples taken from Respondent's facility to Petitioner's laboratory for analysis. The results of Petitioner's laboratory analysis revealed that the unleaded and premium gasoline contained ethanol. Additionally, the lab analysis revealed that Respondent's regular gasoline contained water. The lab analysis revealed that Respondent's premium unleaded had an Antiknock Index of 91.6, whereas the posted Antiknock Index was 93.0. This indicates that the Antiknock Index of the premium unleaded fuel was 1.4% less than the Antiknock Index which was displayed on the dispensing tank. The lab analysis also revealed that the Respondent's unleaded gasoline contained 10.5% ethanol and the premium unleaded gasoline contained 8.8% ethanol. At the time of Petitioner's inspection on August 25, 1989, there were approximately 8,000 gallons of unleaded gasoline and approximately 2,000 gallons of premium unleaded gasoline in Respondent's dispensing tanks, and for both grades of gasoline, the retail price per gallon was in excess of $1.00. More than 2,000 gallons of gasoline was sold to retail customers at a price in excess of $1.00 per gallon. At the time of Inspector Crafa's inspection, Respondent's fuel tanks failed to display on the upper one-half of the front panel, in a position clear and conspicuous from the driver's position, that its unleaded and premium unleaded gasoline contained ethanol. On August 31, 1989, Petitioner issued a "Stop Sale Notice" for Respondent's unleaded and premium unleaded gasoline. In lieu of confiscation, and in order to gain release and possession of its unleaded and premium unleaded gasoline, Respondent entered into a release notice and/or agreement with Petitioner whereby Respondent posted a $1,000.00 bond in lieu of confiscation of its gasoline.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order denying Respondent's request for a refund of the $1,000.00 bond that it posted in lieu of confiscation or its fuel products.1 DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1990. Copies furnished: Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 John H. Newburn 1000 Ninth Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 Mary Hudson Hudson Energy Corporation Post Office Box B Kansas City, Kansas 66103 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Mallory Horne, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of License & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a dealer in liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), duly licensed in Florida. Petitioner buys LPG in Florida and resells it to dealers who in turn sell most of it at retail, but use part of it as fuel for their trucks. During the period July 1, 1975, through February 28, 1977, neither petitioner nor any of its customers paid any tax on account of petitioner's sales of LPG, other than LPG used by its customers to propel trucks. Petitioner's customers kept records as to how much LPG was sold by them for home cooking or heating use by their customers, the ultimate consumers. Until the summer of 1977, petitioner's customers who used LPG as truck fuel kept records of how far the trucks so fueled were driven. Using the resulting mileage figure, they calculated the amount of LPG that had been used as truck fuel. Until the summer of 1977, petitioner collected from its customers a tax of eight cents ($.08) per gallon on LPG used as truck fuel. During the period from July 1, 1975, through February 28, 1977, none of petitioner's Florida customers held Florida dealer's licenses, except Gene Lewis Auto Brokers, which obtained a license as a special fuel dealer in August of 1976. Also in August of 1976, Gene Lewis Auto Brokers purchased 2,052 gallons of LPG from petitioner, on which no tax was paid. Thereafter, the same customer bought 41,011 gallons from petitioner in the period ending February, 1977, on which no tax was paid. Petitioner made tax returns monthly, using forms furnished by respondent. With respect to respondent's Form DR-115-F, styled "Special Fuel Sold . . . Within the State to Licensed Dealers Tax-Free," general instructions furnished to petitioner by respondent provided: To be used in support of claims for exemp- tion ... for sales ... to other licensed dealers. Signed resale certificates ... which bear the name and address of the pur- chaser and the number of his dealer's license are required to be retained in the seller's permanent file .... Petitioner's exhibit No. 2. (emphasis supplied) Monthly, petitioner listed on Form DR-115-F the amounts of LPG sold to its Florida customers, less amounts its Florida customers advised had been used to propel trucks. On another form furnished by respondent, Form DR-115-J, petitioner listed monthly, by county, the LPG used by its Florida customers to propel motor vehicles and on which petitioner had collected tax at the rate of eight cents ($.08) per gallon. At the time petitioner filed its monthly tax return, it forwarded to respondent the taxes it had collected from its Florida customers. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which appears as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's assessment be upheld with respect to petitioner's tax deficiency, except for the portion attributable to sales by petitioner to Gene Lewis Auto Brokers after August of 1976, being three thousand two hundred eighty and eighty-eight hundredths dollars ($3,280.88). That interest and penalty be adjusted accordingly. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John Radey, Esquire Holland & Knight Post Office Drawer 810 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 APPENDIX Paragraph one of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not show that petitioner's customers used LPG for home heating or cooking, only that persons to whom petitioner's customers sold used the LPG in this fashion. Paragraph two of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted in substance. Paragraph three of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted in large part. The gist of the information supplied to petitioner by its dealers was that LPG not used by them would be resold to domestic users. Although respondent did not undertake to determine whether petitioner listed the same LPG as taxable and as tax-exempt on the same tax return, there is no reason to believe that petitioner did so. Paragraph four of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, except that petitioner's tax returns were inaccurate as to its customers' status as dealers. The final three paragraphs of petitioner's proposed findings of fact accurately reflect evidence adduced at the hearing, but are not relevant to a decision of this controversy.
Findings Of Fact Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc., #214 is a service station in the business of selling regular leaded, regular unleaded, and unleaded premium gasoline to the public. Store # 214's place of business is located at the intersection of East Avenue and U.S. Highway 98 in Panama City, Florida. On August 6, 1990, James Wood, the Department's inspector, visited the station to conduct an inspection of the gasoline Respondent was offering for sale to the consuming public from its tanks and related gasoline pumps. Mr. Wood took samples of all three types of gasoline offered for sale by Respondent. The samples were forwarded to the Department's laboratory in Tallahassee and were tested to determine whether they met departmental standards for each type of gasoline. The Departmental testing revealed that the regular-leaded gasoline did not contain any lead. The pumps had been mislabeled at the station and the station was in fact selling regular leaded gasoline as regular-unleaded gasoline. Since the leaded gasoline did not contain any lead, it fell below Departmental standards for leaded gasoline. The store had sold 2467 gallons of the mislabeled product. In light of the above facts, the Department elected to allow the Sunshine-Jr. Store, #214, to post a $1,000 bond in lieu of confiscation of the gasoline. The bond was posted on August 9, 1990. The Department assessed Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., #214 the retail value of the product sold, which is equal to the posted bond. The assessment is reasonable and conforms to the amount of assessments imposed by the Department in similar cases.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the request of Sunshine Jr. Food Stores, #214 for refund of the bond posted be DENIED and that the assessment by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services in the amount of $1,000 be sustained. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Milton Lawrence P. O. Box 2498 Panama City, Florida 32402 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 =================================================================
The Issue Petitioner's alleged liability for motor fuel and special fuel tax, interest, and penalties, pursuant to Chapter 206, F.S., as set forth in Notice of Proposed Assessments, dated April 1, 1977.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Walker Oil Company is located in Pensacola, Florida and is licensed by the State of Florida under Chapter 206, Florida Statutes, as a dealer in special fuels. The firm is also licensed in the State of Alabama with respect to the sale of both special fuels and motor fuel. The company was formed in 1955 and during ensuing years operated service stations and sold motor fuel and special fuels in the Pensacola and south Alabama area. Its operations were audited yearly during the period 1955 to 1961 by Respondent. In 1972 an audit for the period October 1970 to March 1972 revealed underpayments of special fuel tax in the approximate amount of $600 during the audit period. (Testimony of Walker, Exhibit 5) In July 1975, Respondent's auditor, Clyde Whitehead, commenced an audit of Petitioner's records to determine whether any motor fuel or special fuel taxes were delinquent for the period July 1, 1972 through June 30, 1975. Although Petitioner's records were available to the auditor for the period January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, no records were available for the initial 18 month period of the audit from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1973. Petitioner had filed monthly tax reports with Respondent as to special fuels, but had not submitted any such reports during the audit period for motor fuel. (Testimony of Whitehead, Walker) As a result of the audit, an assessment of $43,356.11, including interest and penalty, for motor fuel taxes incurred during the period January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, was asserted against Petitioner. The assessment was based on audit findings that Petitioner had sold 430,866 taxable gallons, but had not remitted the tax to Respondent. Petitioner paid the assessment. C. C. Walker, Petitioner's former president, testified at the hearing that such payment was made in order to secure the dismissal of then pending state criminal charges alleging that Petitioner had "bootlegged" gasoline during the period in question. (Testimony of Walker, Exhibit 2) Pursuant to the audit findings, a Notice of Proposed Assessment for delinquent motor fuel taxes during the period July 1, 1972 through December 1, 1973, in the amount of $20,076.43, including penalty and interest through March 31, 1977, was issued by Respondent on April 6, 1977. On the same date, a Notice of Proposed Assessment for special fuel tax in the amount of $51,022.96, including penalty and interest through March 31, 1977, was also issued to Petitioner. A revised assessment, dated September 19, 1978, deleted certain portions of interest charged on the original proposed assessments. These deletions resulted in the reduction of motor fuel assessment to $12,396.52, and the special fuel assessment to $38,052.90. After the hearing, under date of February 27, 1979, Respondent further reduced the motor fuel assessment to $6,732.22. (Exhibit 1, Hearing Officer Exhibit 1) Due to the absence of Petitioner's records for the first 18 month period of the audit, Respondent based liability for motor fuel and special fuel taxes for that period on an estimate, using audit findings of the second 18 month period of the audit for which Petitioner's records were available. This was the first instance in at least 13 years in which an estimated assessment of fuel tax had been made by Respondent. Respondent had no regulations or established policy for arriving at such an estimate, but its officials testified that they simply tried to be "fair and equitable" in making the determination. (Testimony of Williamson, Thomas, Deposition of Whitehead, Exhibit 3) Respondent's method of estimating Petitioner's motor fuel tax liability was predicated upon relating the known 1974-75 figures on purchases and sales of gasoline and the amount of tax found delinquent during that period, to known purchases of gasoline by Petitioner during the period of the estimated assessment. The audit for the period 1974-75 showed that 60 1/2 percent of Petitioner's gasoline purchases from known suppliers in Florida and Alabama had been sold in Florida. Respondent therefore determined from the sales records of Petitioner's known gasoline suppliers and from tax reports it had submitted to Alabama, that the firm had purchased 4,221,454 gallons of motor fuel during the 1972-73 period. Applying the 60 1/2 percent factor, Respondent's auditor determined that 2,554,259 gallons had been sold in Florida during that period. Since it had been found that Petitioner had sold 430,866 taxable gallons during the 1974-75 period for which tax had not been remitted to the state, which was 7 1/2 percent of its total Florida sales for that period, Respondent applied the same factor to the estimated amount of Florida sales during the 1972-73 period. This resulted in an estimated 191,569 gallons on which Respondent assumed Petitioner had collected but not remitted the motor fuel tax. By multiplying this figure by the 8 cents tax per gallon, it was estimated that Petitioner owed $15,325.52 to the state. This figure was later revised by the February 27th Notice of Adjusted Final Assessment to $10,176.15 plus a 10 percent penalty of $1,017.62. This reduction was based on the fact that approximately 1/3 of Petitioner's total sales of motor fuel during the 1974-75 period was made to one company named Pac-a-Sak, which did not do business with the firm during the first 18 month period of the audit. After deducting the sum of $4,461.55 representing overpayment of interest in the 1974-75 assessment payment, Respondent determined that $6,732.22 was due for motor fuel tax during the 1972- 73 audit period. The original estimated assessment reflects Respondent's acknowledgment that only the lesser amount reflected therein is due. (Testimony of Whitehead, Thomas, Deposition of Whitehead, (Exhibit 3), Exhibits 2, 4B, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1) Respondent's proposed assessment against Petitioner for special fuel tax and penalty in the total amount of $38,052.90 is derived from audit findings based on availability of Petitioner's records for the 1974-75 portion of the audit period, and on an estimated assessment for the 1972-73 period. Additionally, Petitioner's Florida tax reports for the entire period were used in making the audit. It was determined that Petitioner had purchased 1,510,073 gallons of special fuel in Florida during the 1974-75 period and had sold 1,590,587 gallons in Florida during the same period. The auditor found that Petitioner had sold 156,150 gallons of special fuel for which Petitioner should have collected tax, but did not. The bulk of the untaxed gallonage was sold to Hinesway Trucking Company and Polar Ice Cream Company, neither of which were licensed as special fuel dealers in Florida. Therefore, all of the sales to these two companies were treated as taxable sales, because no resale certificates were obtained by Petitioner when it sold special fuel tax free to those companies. The principal of Hinesway Trucking Company had mistakenly informed Petitioner's office employee that it was licensed as a special fuel dealer when in fact it was not. The audit findings showed that Petitioner had sold a total of 841,855 taxable gallons during the 1974-75 period, for which tax was due in the amount of $67,348.40, but that tax had only been remitted by Petitioner in the amount of $46,809.60, leaving a total tax due of $20,538.80. The total due and payable by Petitioner to Respondent for this period was therefore computed to be $24,443.05, including penalty and interest through June 30, 1975. It is found that the audit correctly reflects Petitioner's special fuel tax liability for the 1974-75 period. (Deposition of Whitehead (Exhibit 3), Exhibit 2, 4A) The estimated special fuel tax for the 1972-73 period was calculated in a manner similar to that of the estimated motor fuel tax assessment. Respondent's auditor determined that Petitioner's taxable sales during the 1974- 75 period were approximately 53 percent of its total sales. He also determined that Petitioner had experienced a 15 percent increase in business in the latter period. It was therefore determined to estimate the sales for the 1972-73 period as being 85 percent of the total sales of 1,590,587 gallons during the later period which resulted in an estimated 1,351,999 gallons sold in Florida during 1972-73. Applying the taxable percentage of approximately 53 percent to this figure led to a finding that 715,577 taxable gallons had been sold by Petitioner. Petitioner had reported the sale of 539,893 taxable gallons; and accordingly, the audit found that additional tax was due on the difference of 175,684 gallons at 8 cents per gallon, resulting in estimated tax due of $14,054.72. Thus, this figure added to the 1974-75 deficiency of $20,538.80 resulted in an alleged special fuel tax deficiency for the audit period in the amount of $34,593.52, plus a 10 percent penalty in the amount of $3,459.38 for a total amount due of $38,052.90. Respondent, in formulating the above estimated assessment for the 1972-73 period, assumed that Petitioner had the same percentage of taxable sales as that for the 1974-75 period. However, approximately 150,000 taxable gallons on which tax had not been collected during the 1974-75 period were sold by Petitioner to Hinesway Trucking Company from about June 1974 through June 1975, under a misapprehension as to its nonlicensed status. Hinesway had not been a customer of Petitioner prior to 1974. Respondent's auditors made no allowances for this unusual situation, nor did it consider the low deficiencies accrued by Petitioner as a result of its 1970-72 audit. (Testimony of Walker, Deposition of Whitehead (Exhibit 3) Exhibit 1-2, 4A) Petitioner's president, C. C. Walker, testified at the hearing that as a result of the "personal vendetta" of an employee of Respondent in harassing Petitioner's customers and releasing unfounded information to the press, plus the instigation of criminal charges against the firm, a great loss of business was caused and severe damage to its reputation in the community. He denied any intentional wrongful acts on the part of the company or any of its personnel and claimed that any Florida sales of fuel for which tax was not paid was due to "human error." (Testimony of Walker)
Recommendation That the proposed assessment of motor fuel tax and penalty, as set forth in Respondent's Notice of Adjusted Final Assessment, dated February 27, 1979, be withdrawn. That Respondent's Notice of Proposed Assessment (adjusted) for special fuel tax and penalty, dated September 19, 1978, be revised to delete inclusion of Petitioner's sales to Hinesway Company as a factor in determining an estimated assessment, and that such revised assessment be asserted against Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 16 day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Davis, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol LL05 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James R. Green, Esquire Seville Tower 226 South Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ACTION NOTICE =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On February 27, 1980, Respondent converted one of its service station fuel tanks from gasoline to diesel. The tank was cleaned by Garrison Petroleum Equipment Company at Pinellas Park. Respondent paid $67.08 for this service. That same day, Respondent received 5,176 gallons of No. 2 diesel fuel from Jack Russell Oil Company, Inc., of Clearwater, a Union 76 dealer. On March 18, 1980, a standards inspector employed by Petitioner took samples from the Respondent's gasoline and diesel pumps. These samples were delivered to Petitioner's portable laboratory in Clearwater where they were analyzed. The gasoline was found to be satisfactory, but the diesel sample showed fuel contamination. The tests were conducted in accordance with the methods and standards established by Rule 5F-2.01(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the "flash point" of the diesel sample was 88 degrees F, but must be 125 degrees F or above to meet the established standard. Petitioner's inspector then returned to the Pronto Car Wash station where he issued a stop-sale order to Respondent. Subsequently, the inspector accepted Respondent's cash bond in lieu of fuel confiscation. This procedure, agreed to by both parties, allowed Respondent to pay $865.36 to the State of Florida and retain the contaminated fuel. Respondent originally paid $5,286.25 for 5,176 gallons of diesel fuel. He had sold 736 gallons of this amount at the time of the stop-sale order on March 18, 1980. Total sales of this diesel fuel amounted to $865.36, which was the amount of bond demanded by Petitioner. Respondent paid $200 to Patriot Oil, Inc., to remove the contaminated fuel, but received a $3,225 credit for this fuel. Respondent does not deny that the fuel was contaminated, but seeks to establish that he acted in good faith. Respondent had the tank cleaned prior to the diesel changeover and dealt with established tank cleaning and fuel wholesaling companies. In addition, he kept the tank locked at all times after delivery of the fuel. Respondent does not contest forfeiture of his bond, but seeks refunds of state and federal taxes paid on the unsold fuel. However, Respondent was correctly informed that refund of tax payments will require him to communicate with agencies which are not parties to this proceeding.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter its order declaring forfeiture of Respondent's $865.36 bond posted in lieu of confiscation of contaminated diesel fuel. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of August, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephenson Anderson Pronto Car Wash 220 34th Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 Robert A. Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Whitton, Chief Gasoline and Oil Section Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-8584