Conclusions Having reviewed the Notice of Intent to Deem Application Incomplete And Withdrawn From Further Review dated February 3, 2011, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1), and being advised that the Petitioner has voluntarily withdrawn its application for a health care clinic licensure (Ex.2), and being advised of all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”), finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: 1. The Petitioner’s initial application for health care clinic licensure is withdrawn. 2. The Agency’s Notice of Intent to Deem Application Incomplete And Withdrawn From Further Review is moot and thus is withdrawn. DONE and ORDERED this 20 day of Prva tot” 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Av fer , Elizabeth aL Agency for Health Care Administration 1 Filed September 1, 2011 9:15 AM Division of Administrative Hearings A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: [ William E. Doyle, Esquire "| Warren J. Bird 2121 Corporate Square Blvd., Suite #124 Jacksonville, Florida 32216, Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) (U.S. Mail) (Interoffice Mail) Jan Mills Roger Bell Facilities Intake Unit Health Care Clinic Unit Manager Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Barbara J. Staros Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Heraings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (U. S. Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this the o/Saay of Lag ak , 2011. Richard Shoop, Agency Agency for Health Care Administration 02/25/2811 12:55 9847200 WILLIAM E. DOYLE ES! PAGE 07 7ib0 390) 5844 233% OF5p RICK SCOTT I EK GOVERNOR Bettor Health Care for all Floridians EE RBETH DUDEK February 3, 201] CERTIFIED MAIL / RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED Biolife Medical Inc File Number: 9580 11250 Alumni Way Case #: 2011001278 Jacksonville, FL 32246 Your application for license is deemed incomplete and withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Plorida Statutes, which states that “Requested information omitted from an application for licensure, license renewal, or change of ownership, other than an inspection, must be filed with the agency within 21 days after the agency's tequest for omitted information or the application shall be deemed incomplete and shall be withdrawn from further consideration and the fees shall be forfeited’ ’, You were notified by correspondence dated 01/06/2011 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days from the receipt of the Agency’s Correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by- certified mail on 01/10/11. As this requested information did not meet the requirements detailed in the lewer by the Agency, your application {s deemed incomplete and withdrawn from further consideration. The outstanding issues remaining for licensure are: : Subsection 8.1. Proof of Financial Ability - Conclusion; The applicant has not met the following Rule and Stamtory filing requirements for proof of financial ability to opsrate: © The applicant failed to provide independent evidence that the funds necessary for startup costs, Working oapital, and contingency financirig exist and will be available as needed as required under Section 408.8065(1), Florida Statutes. Analysis: We reviewed the documents submitted by the applicant to demonstrate proof of financial ability to operate, The overall funding necessary as calculated on Schedule } by the applicant cannot be relied upon based on the below errors and omissions. Proof-of Funding The inter-office memo dated November 17, 2010, raised the following issue: Schedule | list Total Source of Funds as $98,500; however, the applicant did nat provide any documentation as proof of funding. Pursuant to Section 408.8065(1), Florida Statutes, please provide independent, certifiable documentation of the existence and. availability of the funds nacessary for start- up costs, working capital, and contingency financing. Examples of documents that support funding includes copies of current bank statements for accounts owned by the proposed agency, a lenter of commitment from a bank or other independent lending source, or a copy of a line of credit agreement. All proof of funding shoidd be as of the same date, Please note, regardless of the amount of total start-up ., S0sts, working capital, and contingency financing, the applicant must submit proof of funding at a "minimum of three months average operating expense for the first year of operations. Schedule 1 list Total Source of Funds as $87,900, The applicant provided proof of funding of $82,446.18 as of 7/20/10. This proof of funding is over six months old, Even if we were to accept the outdated proof rr ype’ : Visit AHCA online at ‘ a4 § | ahca.myflorida.com « : ~ 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 EXHIBIT 1 92/25/2811 12:55 9847280 WILLIAM E. DOYLE E* ‘ PAGE 28 Biolife Medical Inc Page 2 February 3, 2011 of funding, it does not cover three months average operating expense of $166,498 ($665,990/ 12*3), Therefore, the applicant failed to provide independent evidence that the funds necessary for startup costs, — working capital, and contingency financing exist and will be available as needed as required under Section 408,8065(1), Florida Statutes, EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain’a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. SEE APPACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. FOR QUESTIONS OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PLEASE CALL cc: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 LINDA COLVIN AT 850.412.4411 ; Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 Bird, Warren From: williamdoyleatty@aol.com Sent: Friday, August 26, 2011 2:14 PM To: Bird, Warren Ce: shawn@biolifesavannah.com Subject: DOH Case No. 11-1122; AHCA Case No. 2011001278/BioLife Medical, Inc. Dear Mr. Bird: Pursuant to our telephone conference this morning, and as you requested, I am writing this on behalf of the Petitioner BioLife Medical, Inc. to notify your office that BioLife Medical, Inc. is formally withdrawing its application for health care clinic licensure, and no further action is required. It is my understanding that you will now close your file regarding this matter. If you have any questions, or if I may be of any further assistance, please call. Your cooperation and assistance in this matter is appreciated. William E. Doyle, Esquire William E. Doyle, P.A. 2121 Corporate Square Boulevard, Suite 124 Jacksonville, Florida 32216 (904) 720-0506 (904) 720-0344 facsimile CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: The information contained in this transmission may be privileged and confidential information, and is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please immediately reply to the sender that you have received this communication in error and then delete it. Thank you. CIRCULAR 230 NOTICE: To comply with U.S. Treasury Department and IRS regulations, we are required to advise you that, unless expressly stated otherwise, any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this transmittal, is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any person for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed in this e-mail or attachment. 1 EXHIBIT 2
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations of the parties, the testimony of the witness, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapter 455, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is, and has been at all times material to this case, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, license no. ME 0045691. The Respondent was born in the U.S.S.R. in 1926 and graduated with honors from the Moscow Medical Institute in 1951. She also received a PhD degree in medical science and obtained the equivalent of board certification as a surgeon oncologist in that country. While employed in the U.S.S.R., Respondent worked for the state. In 1976, Respondent, who is Jewish, immigrated to Israel where she received that country's board certification in surgery. During her residence in Israel, the Respondent was employed as a surgeon in a state-sponsored clinic. From Israel, the Respondent came to the United States in 1983. Respondent passed the ECFMG and the FLEX examinations in 1984. Subsequently, she became licensed in Florida. Currently, Respondent is neither board certified nor board eligible. Respondent attributes her foreign education and age as the primary reasons she has not achieved certification in this country. Because she is not board certified or eligible for certification, Respondent has sought employment where those criteria are not mandatory. Consequently, since becoming licensed in Florida, she has worked almost exclusively at clinics practicing general medicine. In November, 1987, Respondent began employment with Doctor's Diagnostic and Medical Centers (DDMC). Respondent was one of several doctors employed by DDMC. At all times material to this case, DDMC operated walk-in clinics in New Port Richey and Clearwater, Florida. At the outset of her employment with DDMC, Respondent worked only part-time for approximately 16 to 18 hours per week. Her hours increased over time, and, in July or August of 1988, Respondent went to a full-time schedule. Her initial agreement with DDMC provided that Respondent would be paid based upon the rate of $30.00 per hour worked. At that time, DDMC was involved in a program of providing free Doppler examinations for persons requesting that evaluation. Respondent was aware that DDMC engaged in advertisements to solicit patients. All management or administrative decisions such as advertising, billing, or scheduling employees at DDMC were made by a Dr. Neese, the owner of the facilities, or his designee. Respondent did not participate in management decisions. At some early point in her employment at DDMC, Respondent agreed to provide additional services for the company which had formerly been performed by a technician. More specifically, Respondent agreed to interpret Doppler test results. DDMC provided Doppler testing as part of its preventative medicine program. The purpose of the program was to screen patients for potential further treatment or testing. Doppler, cholesterol, and triglyceride testing are all appropriate preventative medicine approaches to determine a patient's potential need for services. According to Respondent, preventative medicine assists in early detection of potentially harmful illnesses. Doppler tests measure or indicate circulation and cardiac function. In the event a Doppler test evidences some abnormality, further testing such as ultrasound or echocardiogram may be suggested as appropriate follow up. While assigned to the New Port Richey clinic, Respondent provided many Doppler interpretations. For each Doppler test interpreted where the patient returned to DDMC for additional testing, Respondent was to receive $60.00. After reviewing the Doppler, some patients would be examined by Respondent. Respondent would perform a limited examination and take a medical history. If the testing and examination suggested some abnormality, Respondent would advise the patient as to the options available. In the event the Doppler showed no problem, Respondent would not recommend additional testing. Where the patient's Doppler results and additional information suggested a medical basis for additional testing, Respondent advised patients that they could confer with their regular physician, have the testing elsewhere if they would like, or could have the testing done at DDMC. At Dr. Neese's direction Respondent kept a list of the patients for whom she had interpreted the Doppler results and for whom additional testing was to be performed at DDMC. Respondent did not confer with all of the patients on the list. According to Respondent some patients on her list did receive additional testing at DDMC. She had presumed she would be compensated in accordance with her agreement; however, Respondent did not receive compensation for that work. For the period November 11, 1987 to December 31, 1987, Respondent received $5,685.00 in compensation from DDMC.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes, placing the Respondent on probation for a period of two years, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2500.00. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-6331 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 5, it is accepted that an individual known to Respondent as Dr. Neese hired her for work at the DDMC and controlled the administration or management of that facility. Otherwise, rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 6 is accepted as to clinics at New Port Richey and Clearwater which would be the only locations material to this case. With regard to paragraph 7, with the deletion of the words "independent contractor" which are rejected as a conclusion of law, it is accepted. Paragraphs 8 and 9 are accepted. With the deletion of the word "scheme" which is rejected as argumentative, paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraph 11 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. With the deletion of the word "scheme" (see comment above), paragraph 12 is accepted. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraphs 16 and 17 are rejected as argumentative or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraphs 19 through 21 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraphs 22 and 23 are accepted. Paragraphs 24 through 30 are rejected as irrelevant, speculative, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 31 is accepted. Paragraphs 32 and 33 are rejected as argumentative or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. With regard to paragraphs 6 and 7, it is accepted that those paragraphs state Respondent's perception of her situation. This record does not establish, in fact, the basis for her failure to obtain certification, eligibility or hospital privileges. Paragraphs 8 through 10 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 11 is rejected as a conclusion of law or irrelevant. The balance of the paragraph is accepted. Paragraphs 12 through 15 are accepted. With the deletion of the last sentence which is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence, paragraph 16 is accepted. Respondent was, in fact, aware that some of the patients for whom she had interpreted the Doppler did return to the clinic for additional testing. The first sentence of paragraph 17 is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as comment, argument, or contrary to the weight of the evidence. It is accepted that no patient records were admitted into evidence. COPIES TO: Richard A. Grumberg Sr. Medical Atty. DPR 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Grover C. Freeman 4600 West Cypress, Ste. 500 Tampa, FL 33607 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director DPR 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay General Counsel DPR 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondents violated Sections 458.331(1)(k), (m), (n), and (t), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.42 and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Alan K. Roberts, M.D. (Roberts), is and has been at all times material to this proceeding a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME 0030398 in 1977. He is a Board Certified family practice physician. Respondent, Peter R. Genovese, M.D. (Genovese) is and has been at all times material to this proceeding a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME 0013626. He is a Board Certified family practice physician. Roberts and Genovese are the co-owners of Sunshine Medical Center (SMC) which operates three separate offices located in the Miami area at Sunset Drive, Port of Miami, and Port Everglades. Jose R. Menendez, M.D. (Menendez) has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida since 1973. Menendez began working for SMC in 1992 and worked there for approximately six months. Menendez worked at the Sunset Drive and Port of Miami locations. Aside from his salary, Menendez received no other remuneration and had no financial interest in SMC. PATIENT C.W. In 1985, SMC had a contract with the Public Employees Service Company (PESCO) whereunder SMC would perform routine screening physicals on Dade County teachers and administrators. The physicals were called VISTA examinations. Patient C.W., a clerk with the Dade County School System, went to SMC for a VISTA examination on October 16, 1985. She filled out a patient information form indicating her home address, home telephone number, name of employer, and her work telephone number. C.W.'s examination consisted of blood tests, urinalyses, chest x-rays, EKG, hearing function tests and a spirometry. All of the tests were administered by a female employee of SMC. After completion of the tests, C.W. met with a man whom she believed was a doctor, who in her presence, looked at the x-rays. C.W. did not see the x-rays herself. She was advised that "everything looked fine." She was not told that she had a problem with her lungs or that the x-rays showed that she had any suspicious tumors or masses on her lungs. In reality, the x-rays indicated abnormalities in her chest. C.W.'s spirometry test results were abnormal and her white blood cell count was low, but she was not informed of these abnormalities. C.W.'s charts show that she was seen at SMC on October 16, 1985, but do not indicate what doctor was responsible for supervising and administering the tests and what doctor met with C.W. after the tests were completed. There are no physical findings recorded in the clinical data portion of C.W.'s chart and no notes are in the chart as to the results of the tests performed. Neither Dr. Genovese nor Dr. Roberts examined C.W. on October 16, 1985. SMC used a pre-printed form letter to notify its patients of the results of the VISTA examination. The form letter contained the stamped signatures of the Respondents. On October 21, 1985, an undated form letter was sent to C.W. advising her that the results of the VISTA examination were normal and satisfactory and that no medical follow-up was necessary. A handwritten notation on the form letter stated, "Please increase the iron intake. Your blood work show (sic) decrease iron. Also, stop smoking." C.W. received the letter. The form letter contained stamped signatures of the Respondents. On November 4, 1985, the Respondents were conducting a routine review of patients' charts and x-rays, including those of C.W. The Respondents noted the abnormality on C.W.'s x-ray. C.W.'s charts did not mention the abnormality. On November 4, 1985, Respondents sent a second preprinted and presigned form letter to C.W. which advised C.W. that the results of the VISTA examination required a follow up visit. The form letter contained the following handwritten note: Review of our records reveals that your lab reports were omitted from our report of 10-21-85. A copy is enclosed for your family doctor. Also, your chest x-ray is abnormal and you should see your family doctor immediately for a second x-ray and follow-up care. The second letter was sent by first class U.S. mail. C.W. did not receive the second letter informing her of the abnormal x-ray. On November 12, 1985, the laboratory supervisor for SMC placed a telephone call to C.W. at her home but did not get an answer. On November 14, 1985, Genovese placed a telephone call to C.W.'s home but did not receive an answer. On November 19, 1985, Roberts called C.W. at home and received no answer. On November 19, 1985, Roberts called PESCO and advised a PESCO staff member that C.W. had an abnormal chest x-ray. No further attempt was made by Respondents to contact C.W. The purpose of the telephone calls to C.W. was to make certain that she got follow-up treatment for the mass in her lung. After the examination at SMC, C.W. began having a fever and generally felt ill. In February, 1986, C.W. consulted with a doctor and was advised that she had a tumor in her lung. The lower lobe of her right lung was surgically removed; however, the cancer spread to other parts of her body. C.W. died as a result of lung cancer. When the October 21 and November 4, 1985 letters were sent under the Respondents' preprinted signatures, the Respondents became involved in the care of Patient C.W. Patient C.W. was advised by a form letter from Respondents that her examination was satisfactory, when a review of C.W.'s x-ray showed a gross abnormality. To so advise the patient gave the patient a false reassurance that she was physically well except for her anemia. The document did not accurately reflect the test results of the patient. Respondents again involved themselves in the care of Patient C.W. when they reviewed her x-rays and discovered the abnormality in her lung and sent a second letter to notify her that the x-ray was abnormal and that she should see her family doctor. Although the letter was sent first class U.S. mail and was not returned to Respondents, Respondents should have either sent the letter by certified mail or made personal contact with C.W. Failure to do so constituted a level of care and treatment which fell below that level which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. INSURANCE BILLINGS In order to start the billing process for services provided at SMC, each doctor generates a "super bill" which reflects the services provided such as office visit, x-rays, laboratory work and electrocardiograms. The charges are placed on the super bill by clerical staff and returned to the doctor at the end of the day to be checked for accuracy. The super bill is then transmitted to the billing department at SMC where it is encoded by a clerk and an insurance claim form is generated. As part of the encoding process, either a doctor's name or SMC's name is placed on the form. As part of SMC's quality assurance program, the insurance claims are reviewed in batches to check that the diagnoses, procedures and charges are appropriate. It is common for the insurance claims to be backed up for 7 to 10 days in the billing department. The money collected for the insurance billings goes directly to SMC. SMC submitted insurance claims for treatment of the following five patients during March 1993 through May 1993: J.V., R.L., L.W., P.Z., and D.W. SMC submitted a claim form dated March 31, 1993 to Metropolitan for services rendered to patient J.V. on March 25 and 29, 1993. The claim form stated that the physician was J.R. Menendez. Part of the services rendered to on March 25, 1993 was an injection of terramycin. Menendez did not work on March 25, 1993. He has never administered any Terramycin intramuscularly or intravenously to a patient in his professional career. Menendez did not provide any services to patient J.V. on March 25, 1993. The services listed on the claim form were provided to patient J.V. on March 25, 1993, by staff at SMC; however it was by someone other than Menendez. Menendez did provide follow-up services for J.V. on March 29, 1993. SMC submitted an insurance claim form dated March 31, 1993, for services provided to patient R.L. on March 30, 1993. The claim form stated that the physician was J.R. Menendez. Menendez did not work on March 30, 1993 and did not provide any services to patient R.L. on that date. However, the services listed on the insurance claim form were provided to patient R.L. by someone at SMC on March 30, 1993. SMC submitted an insurance claim form dated March 31, 1993, for services provided to patient D.W. on March 31, 1993. The claim form stated the physician was J.R. Menendez. Menendez did not work on March 31, 1993, and did not provide any services to patient D.W. on that date. Someone at SMC, other than Menendez, provided the services to patient D.W. on March 31, 1993. SMC submitted an insurance claim form dated March 31, 1993, for services provided to patient P.Z. on March 31, 1993. The claim form stated the physician was J.R. Menendez. Menendez did not work on March 31, 1993, and did not provide any services to patient P.Z. on that date. P.Z. was provided the services on March 31, 1993, by someone at SMC other than Menendez. SMC submitted an insurance claim form dated March 31, 1993, for services provided to patient L.W. on March 30, 1993. Part of the services rendered to L.W. was an injection of terramycin. Menendez did not work on March 30, 1993, and did not provide any services to patient L.W. on that date. Someone else at SMC provided the services to patient L.W. on March 30, 1993. SMC submitted an insurance claim to Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund for services provided to patient P.W. on February 3, 1993. The claim form stated that the physician was Jose M. Menendez and contained the purported signature of J. Menendez, MD. Menendez did not provide services to P.W. on February 3, 1993, and did not sign the insurance claim form. P.W. was a regular patient of Roberts. Roberts examined and treated on February 3, 1993. As of August 12, 1993, SMC had not received payment from Central States for services provided to P.W. on February 3, 1993. SMC submitted a second claim for the February 3 services, but this time the physician was listed as Dr. Modesto Ordoqui. Some time in April, 1993, one of the Respondents gave Menendez a folder containing some insurance claim forms to review to make sure the services correlated with the diagnoses. After reviewing the files, Menendez concluded that he had not provided services to patients J.V., R.L., L.W., P.Z. and D.W. listed on the insurance claim forms given to him by Roberts. On April 15, 1993, at a dinner meeting with Respondents, Menendez told them that he had not provided the services to the patients on the insurance claims that Roberts had given him to review. The Respondents told him that they did not know what he was talking about. Menendez resigned that evening.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaints in Case Nos. 94-3430 and 94-3757; finding Respondent Dr. Kenneth Alan Roberts guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes in Counts One and Two of Case No. 94-3759, finding Respondent Dr. Peter R. Genovese guilty of violating Counts One and Two in Case No. 94-2142; and imposing the following penalty as to each Respondent: (1) one year probation with terms and conditions to be set by the Board, (2) an administrative fine in the amount of $3,000, and (3) a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2142 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted. Paragraphs 3-4: Accepted. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: The first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 12: The first and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 13: Rejected as unnecessary based on the finding that Menendez did not work on March 25, 30, and 31, 1993. Paragraph 14: Accepted that Menendez did not work on March 25, 30, and 31, 1993. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 15: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 16: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The third and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the record. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 18: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second and third sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 19: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The third sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 20: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The third sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 21-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 23: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 25: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 26: Sentences 1-8, 10, and 11 are accepted in substance. Sentences 9 and 12 are rejected as unnecessary. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 27: The second and third sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 28: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 29: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The billing practices may not have been proper in that the correct treating physician's name was not listed on some of the insurance claims but the evidence does not support a finding that the incorrect billing was anything other than a clerical mistake. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 31: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The third and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 32: Accepted in substance that the second billing was a rebilling. The documentary evidence established that the second billing was in Dr. Ordoqui's name. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 33: The last sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 34: The first through the fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The last two sentences are rejected as not supported by the evidence. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 35-38: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 39: The second sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 40: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: Accepted in substance that Respondents met on November 4, 1985 and discovered the abnormality in the x-ray. Paragraph 43: The last phrase of the last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 44: Accepted. Paragraph 45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: The evidence did not establish that Rene Bravo saw Patient C.W. The remainder is irrelevant based on the findings of fact. Paragraphs 47-49: Accepted in substance. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted. Paragraphs 4-6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: The last sentence is accepted. The first sentence is rejected to the extent that the evidence does not establish that either Respondent gave either claim form for P.W. to Menendez. Given that one of the claim forms was not generated until after Menendez resigned, at least one of the forms could not have been given to Menendez. It is accepted that Menendez did not recognize the signature on one of the claims as his. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The last sentence is rejected as not necessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 10-11: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 12: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 13: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted that the second billing was a rebilling for services for which no payment had been received. Based on the bill under Dr. Ordoqui's name, it appears that the first bill was under Menenedez's name and the second bill was under Dr. Ordoqui's name. Paragraphs 16-23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: Accepted in substance that neither Respondent examined C.W. on October 16, 1985. Paragraph 25: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 26: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that the use of a form per se does not constitute notification below the prevailing standard of care. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: Rejected as irrelevant since the Respondents adopted that method to inform the patients and by sending it out under their signature became responsible for the care of the patient. Paragraph 29: Accepted in substance that it was customary for the Respondents. Paragraphs 30-31: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 32: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 33: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 34: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The second sentence is accepted in substance except as to treated. Paragraphs 35-36: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Garwood, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth J. Metzger, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street allahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Harold M. Braxton, P.A. Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jerome W. Hoffman, Esquire General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32309
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are whether Respondent committed the violations charged in four Administrative Complaints and, if so, what is the appropriate discipline.
Findings Of Fact The Department has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed chiropractic physicians pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 460, Florida Statutes. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a chiropractic physician after a probable cause panel (PCP) of the Board determines there is probable cause to suspect a licensee has committed a disciplinable offense, and provides direction to the Department on the filing of an administrative complaint. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaints, Dr. Aderholdt has been licensed to practice chiropractic medicine in Florida, having been issued license number CH 7814. He was first licensed on January 6, 2000. He practices in an office in Bradenton, Florida. Vax-D Therapy Three of the four Administrative Complaints involve patients of Dr. Aderholdt who received Vax-D therapy. The complaints are not directed to the provision of Vax-D therapy itself, or to any other treatments provided by Dr. Aderholdt. In all four cases, the patients generally spoke well of the chiropractic care they received from Dr. Aderholdt and the manner in which they were treated by him and his office staff. Vax-D therapy is a modality using the Vax-D model for decompression of the spinal discs and spinal structure. It is used to treat a range of issues associated with low back pain, including herniated, degenerated, and bulging discs. The Vax-D model is the originator of this technology; it was the first spinal decompression device. It is a large computerized moving table. It can be programmed to provide specific axial or distractive loading. The table moves in and out, pumping nutrients at the discs. Some research shows that it can actually pull discs away from where they are causing irritation on nerves and the spinal cord. The Vax-D model is FDA-cleared for use, and the literature supports its efficacy. The Vax-D model is an expensive piece of equipment. The price range for the initial purchase is between $100,000 and $150,000, with ongoing expense thereafter for maintenance and updates. Vax-D therapy is one of the most expensive forms of therapy, if not the most expensive, in the chiropractic profession. Other models coming out after Vax-D, as well as other tools, arguably can be used for similar purposes. However, as Petitioner’s expert readily acknowledged, Vax-D is the “Rolls Royce. It’s a really nice tool.” Vax-D spinal decompression is not covered by Medicare. In fact, when it comes to chiropractic care, Medicare has never covered anything besides spinal adjustments. Coverage for Vax-D treatment by private insurance companies is rare. In 2012, Dr. Salvatore LaRusso presented a study on spinal decompression to the profession, before the Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards, to inform state regulators of issues associated with Vax-D therapy. The one regulatory concern he reported was that some physicians were improperly billing Vax-D as a surgical decompression procedure, when it is plainly not surgery; it is an alternative to surgery, properly billed as a non-surgical decompressive tool or traction device. Dr. LaRusso’s study also made findings on the common methods of packaging and selling the service, and the range of charges observed. He found that most practitioners providing Vax-D therapy were selling the service as a cash item in their practice, with payment up front often required. The common model was to sell a package with a certain number of visits, with or without additional services included. Dr. LaRusso found that the per-visit charges ranged from $150 to $450, depending on the ancillary services added to the decompression. Dr. Shreeve does not have any issue with the use of or charges for Vax-D therapy. Dr. Aderholdt offers Vax-D therapy pursuant to a Vax-D Therapy Payment Plan agreement (Vax-D Agreement), which is comparable to the multi-visit packages that Dr. LaRusso’s study found to be common. After initial consultation, with intake forms, patient history, x-rays, evaluation, and examination, if a patient is determined to be appropriate for Vax-D therapy, Dr. Aderholdt will give his treatment recommendations and then turn the patient over to his office staff to address the financial aspects. If the patient wants to proceed with Vax-D therapy, the Vax-D Agreement will be reviewed and signed. Patients A.M., R.O., and P.D. each received Vax-D therapy, pursuant to signed Vax-D Agreements. The terms of the Vax-D Agreements for the three patients were the same. Patient B.O. wanted Vax-D therapy, but she was determined to not be an appropriate candidate for it. The Vax-D Agreements in evidence for Patients A.M., R.O., and P.D. provided that the named patient committed to 25 to 28 Vax-D therapy sessions, for $250.00 per session. The total amount that the named patient agreed to pay Dr. Aderholdt for 25 to 28 sessions was $5,500.00, which computes to an actual per-session cost of between $196.43 (for 28 sessions) and $220.00 (for 25 sessions). For the agreed price for 25 to 28 sessions, the Vax-D Agreement provided the following treatment package: at each session, the patient would receive 30 minutes of Vax-D therapy, 30 minutes of full range interferential electrical muscle stimulation (EMS), 15 minutes of hydro-massage therapy, and manipulation (adjustments) by the doctor if needed. The first set of x-rays was also included. Dr. Aderholdt requires an up-front payment for the Vax-D therapy package. For patients who want Vax-D therapy but need help coming up with the funds, Respondent’s office staff has put the patients in touch with Care Credit, which is a medical credit program. If a patient applies and is accepted, Care Credit will finance the cost without charging interest to the patient if the loan is repaid within one year. Care Credit apparently charges a fee to Respondent when credit is extended, similar to the fees charged to merchants by credit card companies for credit card purchases. No evidence was presented regarding Care Credit’s approval criteria or how widely this method is used. All that is known about Care Credit from the record evidence is that two patients who received Vax-D therapy applied for Care Credit and were approved. The other Vax-D patient charged half of the agreed price on a Visa credit card the first day of treatment, and charged the other half after 15 treatment sessions. Patient A.M. From the end of July 2013 to early February 2014, Dr. Aderholdt treated Patient A.M., then a 66-year-old female, for lower back pain and hip pain. Patient A.M. had tried other treatments and had seen chiropractors before, but reported that her pain kept getting worse. As shown by A.M.’s medical records, A.M. was first seen by Respondent on July 29, 2013. That day, A.M.’s intake form, patient history, and x-rays were taken and evaluated, and A.M. was examined by Respondent. Respondent then formulated A.M.’s initial treatment plan. Respondent recommended Vax-D therapy, along with chiropractic adjustments, EMS, and hydrotherapy. The initial treatment plan specified a two- session per day protocol for the first two to three weeks. On July 30, 2013, A.M.’s husband, J.M., signed the Vax-D Agreement (in the space for Patient Signature). J.M. did not remember signing the Vax-D Agreement, but both he and A.M. identified his signature on the Vax-D Agreement. A.M. was named in the agreement as the patient who committed to 25 to 28 Vax-D therapy sessions and agreed to pay $5,500.00 for those sessions. Respondent did not require full payment of the agreed price prior to treatment. Instead, he accepted payment of one- half ($2,750.00) of the Vax-D therapy package price, which was charged on A.M.’s or J.M.’s Visa credit card on July 30, 2013. In accordance with the initial treatment plan, Patient A.M. received two treatment sessions per day beginning July 30, 2013, in the morning and afternoon, for nearly three weeks. After 15 treatment sessions--more than half of the 25 to 28 sessions covered for $5,500.00--the balance of $2,750.00 was charged on A.M.’s or J.M’s Visa credit card. Between July 30, 2013, and February 3, 2014, Patient A.M. had more than 60 Vax-D therapy sessions--approximately 64 total sessions. A.M. initially testified with a fair degree of confidence that she thought she had about 30 treatment sessions, until she reviewed her prior statement made to Petitioner. A.M. testified that at every session, she received Vax-D decompression therapy, hydrotherapy, adjustments “up and down” her spine, and ice packs. She left every session feeling better, with relief from her pain. The relief was temporary, however; she said the pain would come back after a few hours. After 29 sessions, having received all of the treatment sessions covered by the Vax-D Agreement, A.M. started paying additional amounts for more Vax-D therapy and the other ancillary services that she continued to receive. For approximately 35 additional treatment sessions beyond those covered by the Vax-D Agreement, A.M. made seven additional payments in the total amount of $2,226.00. In all, A.M. paid $7,726.00 for approximately 64 Vax-D therapy sessions. Rounding down to an even 60 sessions, she paid an average of $128.77 per session. A.M. was covered by Medicare at the time of her treatment. She did not have any private “Medicare supplement” health insurance. At some point, the subject of Medicare coverage came up. The details of what was said, when, and to whom were not clearly established. The only fact clearly established was that Dr. Aderholdt did not bring up the subject. Patient A.M. testified that Dr. Aderholdt did not talk to her about payment when she first visited, but that she and J.M. asked him, “Does Medicare cover this,” and he said, “Yes.” J.M. said that Dr. Aderholdt did talk to them about payment, saying “we need to do so many treatments and we should pay so much money.” J.M. said that they asked, “Will Medicare take care of it?” Dr. Aderholdt answered, “Yes, we will bill Medicare.” J.M could not say whether he asked about billing Medicare before or after he signed the Vax-D Agreement, since J.M. did not remember signing the Vax-D Agreement. When Dr. Aderholdt was asked if he told A.M. her treatments would be covered by Medicare, he answered, “No, I don’t believe I did, no.” As an interesting contrast, Patient R.O. testified that Dr. Aderholdt told him Medicare would not cover treatment under the same Vax-D Agreement; Dr. Aderholdt does not believe he made that statement, either. In the middle of the spectrum, Patient P.D. testified that Respondent never said anything to her about insurance coverage or financial arrangements. He would only talk about treatment, turning P.D. over to the office manager or billing person to address the financial issues. This version is consistent with Respondent’s testimony that he does not address “the money thing” with patients. Instead, he said he assesses x-rays, takes patient histories, performs the evaluation and examination, and ultimately formulates the recommended treatment plans, whether Vax-D or something else. Then he turns the treatment plans over to his staff to address the financial issues with the patients. A.M. and J.M. did not demonstrate a clear and certain recollection of what they asked Dr. Aderholdt or exactly what he answered. Indeed, both J.M. and A.M. could not remember most every other detail about A.M.’s treatments, often confidently stating details that were shown to be wrong by more than a little, including how many treatment sessions, and how much was paid. For example, Patient A.M. initially reported that she had paid $13,179.00 to Dr. Aderholdt, when the total was $7,726.00. The undersigned cannot find--without hesitancy--that Dr. Aderholdt made any representation to J.M. and A.M. regarding Medicare coverage before J.M. signed the Vax-D Agreement by which A.M. committed to the Vax-D therapy package. Dr. Shreeve made the point well that it is difficult to resolve this kind of he said-she said conflict, although he made the point while confusing Patient A.M. (who claimed Respondent said there would be Medicare coverage) with Patient R.O. (who claimed Respondent said there would not be Medicare coverage), in the following exchange: Q: With Patient RO, what’s your understanding of what Dr. Aderholdt told him regarding Medicare reimbursements? A: Counselor, I’m going to tell you that the investigative record shows that the patient stated that Aderholdt told him that they would be paid, is what my recollection is. And, yet, that’s not something that weighs heavily on my mind because I wasn’t there. This becomes a “he said, she said.” He said he didn’t; he said he did. I can’t get into that fight. That’s not an issue for me. (Jt. Ex. 12 at 35). (emphasis added). Respondent (or his staff) may have told A.M. and J.M., when they asked about Medicare, that the office would complete and submit the Medicare claim forms. Respondent (or his staff) may have told A.M. and J.M., when they asked, that Medicare proceeds paid on the Vax-D therapy package would be refunded. But it would be unreasonable, on this record, to find that Respondent misrepresented that Medicare would provide full coverage, or that Respondent schemed to induce A.M. and J.M. to sign up for Vax-D by guaranteeing that Medicare would pay back everything, when Respondent did not even bring up the subject.8/ The Administrative Complaint alleges that on one or more occasions, Respondent did not submit Medicare claims for Patient A.M.’s treatment. Petitioner has apparently abandoned this allegation; its PRO has no proposed finding identifying any dates of service for which claims were not submitted. The Medicare claim forms for Patient A.M. were compiled by Petitioner’s counsel for use in taking Respondent’s deposition, and are attached as deposition exhibit 2. The evidence is difficult to cull through, as there are 84 separate pages of claims and they are not in chronological order; they start out in chronological order, but then jump forward two months, then continue jumping around on dates, back and forth and back again. As best can be determined, all service dates shown in Patient A.M.’s medical records appear to be accounted for by corresponding claim forms. It appears that one claim form may have a clerical mistake, identifying the date of service as August 3, 2013, when there was no treatment session that day; the actual service date may instead be September 4, 2013, which is the date the claim form was submitted. The Medicare claim forms in evidence demonstrate that claim forms for A.M.’s treatments were regularly submitted, either on or very shortly after the dates of service. The evidence is insufficient to prove that Respondent did not submit Medicare claims for Patient A.M.’s treatment.9/ The Administrative Complaint contains no allegations regarding the disposition of the Medicare claims, although it does allege that Patient A.M. received no reimbursement from Respondent for Medicare payments. Petitioner’s expert seemed to be under the impression that Respondent received Medicare payments, because he criticized Respondent for not providing reimbursement to Patient A.M. Respondent testified that he has received no payments from Medicare for A.M.’s treatments, and Petitioner acknowledges in its PRO that Medicare has not made payments to Respondent. Acknowledging that the Administrative Complaint allegation has not been established, Petitioner instead proposed a finding (not alleged in the Administrative Complaint) that all of A.M.’s Medicare claims submitted by Respondent were rejected and payment was denied. No evidence was offered to prove the actual disposition of the 84 pages of Medicare claims submitted for A.M.’s treatments. Instead, the only record evidence of Medicare adjudications on any claims for A.M. is a group of explanation of benefits forms (EOBs) attached to a March 6, 2014, letter from Patient A.M. to Petitioner’s investigator, which is a deposition exhibit. Patient A.M. identified the small handful of EOBs attached to the March 6, 2014, letter as EOBs she had at that time, reporting on the disposition of Medicare claims submitted by other providers during the same time period as her treatments with Respondent. The EOBs reported, as to each claim, whether the claim was covered in whole or in part; and, if covered, what amount was paid, or, if not, why not. There were no EOBs for claims submitted by Respondent’s office. Patient A.M. was not asked for, and did not offer, any additional EOBs at her deposition. If, in fact, all of the Medicare claims submitted by Respondent were rejected and payment denied, then there would be a stack of EOBs explaining why each claim was denied. On this record, the evidence is insufficient to make any finding as to the outcome of the Medicare claims submitted for Patient A.M.’s treatment. There is no evidence proving whether the claims were denied, approved, or simply never acted on by Medicare. A separate allegation in the Administrative Complaint is that Patient A.M. requested copies of the Medicare claim forms submitted by Respondent’s office for her treatment. Patient A.M. said that she made verbal requests to Respondent’s office staff for the Medicare claims on more than one occasion, and the parties stipulated that Patient A.M. made these requests. Respondent’s office should have responded by giving Patient A.M. copies of the Medicare claims. Dr. Aderholdt said that he was not aware that Patient A.M. had requested copies of her Medicare claim. But it is his responsibility to ensure that his staff promptly responds to requests by patients for insurance claim forms. In the course of Petitioner’s investigation, the Medicare claim forms for Patient A.M. were provided to Petitioner (according to the investigator’s report, on May 16, 2014). It is unknown whether a set of the claim forms was provided to A.M. at that time. She is entitled to a copy of the claim forms if she has not already been given a set. Respondent should have verified that Patient A.M. has received the claim forms she requested, or, if not, provided them to her. Finally, the Administrative Complaint alleges that on the Medicare claim forms for A.M.’s treatments on August 6, 2013, and December 11, 2013, Respondent utilized Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code 98941, which is the code for adjustments to three or four regions of the spine. However, Respondent’s Subjective, Objective, Assessment and Plan notes (referred to as SOAP notes) for those dates identify spinal adjustments to L3, L4, and L5, which are in a single region--the lumbar region. Beyond the SOAP notes, however, Dr. Aderholdt’s notes for Patient A.M.’s morning session on August 6, 2013 (there were two sessions that day), show multiple adjustments, not only to the lumbar region, but also, to the sacrum and ilium. Dr. Aderholdt’s notes for December 11, 2013, show multiple adjustments to the thoracic, lumbar, and sacrum regions. At hearing, Dr. Shreeve identified the five spinal regions as follows: “a region would be considered cervical, thoracic, lumbar, sacrum, ilium.” (Tr. 106, lines 21-22). Based on his testimony, and considering all of Patient A.M.’s medical records, there were multiple adjustments to three spinal regions on both days identified in the Administrative Complaint.10/ The Administrative Complaint has no other factual allegations regarding CPT code issues in connection with Patient A.M.’s treatment. The complaint pointedly identified one specific CPT code that was used on two specific dates, but was allegedly not supported by SOAP notes for either date. At hearing, Dr. Shreeve attempted to expand the factual allegations regarding CPT coding issues by questioning other CPT codes shown on A.M.’s patient ledger. Dr. Shreeve’s criticism was improper, not only because he strayed beyond the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, but also, because the criticism was based on his misunderstanding of what Dr. Aderholdt’s patient ledgers portray. In particular, Dr. Shreeve was critical of CPT code 99212 entries (for focused patient examinations) on A.M.’s patient ledger, without use of modifier code -25. He said that these repeated entries of CPT code 99212 were inappropriate without use of modifier code –25, to indicate they should not be considered for payment, because they are redundant with other CPT treatment codes that include examination. Dr. Shreeve should have reviewed the actual Medicare claim forms to look for the modifier codes, because the CPT code 99212 entries do, in fact, add a modifier of -25. The modifier code conveys information to the third-party payor, as Dr. Shreeve acknowledged, regarding whether or how payment should be made. The modifier codes need to be used, when appropriate, on the Medicare claim forms, and they were used just as Dr. Shreeve said was appropriate. The modifier codes do not appear on Dr. Aderholdt’s patient ledgers because they are not claim forms sent to third- party payors, nor are they bills sent to patients. Instead, a patient ledger, as used in Respondent’s practice, is an internal practice management tool to account for and track everything associated with treating patients: how many examinations, how many adjustments, how many Vax-D treatments, how many ice packs, and so on. Dr. LaRusso explained that this is a perfectly reasonable use of patient ledgers, and is a common practice among physicians. The usage statistics are analyzed for practice management, for such purposes as making changes in the services or treatments and stocking supplies. Dr. Shreeve admitted that he assumed Respondent’s patient ledgers reflected the exact CPT coding used on insurance claims and bills sent to patients. The evidence refuted that assumption. Modifier codes were used on the Medicare claims. And Dr. Shreeve admitted he saw no evidence that Respondent’s patient ledger for A.M. was ever sent to her as a bill, or that any patient ledgers were ever sent to any patients as bills. Dr. Shreeve also admitted that there is no standard for patient ledgers, much less a regulation mandating the contents and use of patient ledgers. As he put it, he could go to 1,000 chiropractic offices and find 1,000 different variations in what is called a patient ledger. Dr. Shreeve would like to see a standard adopted for “patient ledgers,” but his aspiration simply underscores that there is no standard now; Respondent’s practices cannot be judged against or held to conform to a non-standard, non-regulation.11/ In somewhat stream-of-consciousness fashion, untethered from the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Shreeve interjected a number of other comments about Dr. Aderholdt’s practices related to Patient A.M., such as the adequacy and legibility of his medical records and the quality of x-rays. He raised questions about Dr. Aderholdt’s compliance with trust accounting requirements in connection with payments for A.M.’s Vax-D therapy, and Dr. Aderholdt’s compliance with obligations in connection with Petitioner’s investigation. None of these factual matters were alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and none of the corresponding statutory or rule provisions implicated by Dr. Shreeve’s open-ended commentary were charged in the Administrative Complaint. No findings can be made on matters not alleged, and violations not charged, in the Administrative Complaint. Moreover, there is no competent evidence fleshing out any of these matters, because they were not alleged, charged, or identified in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation as issues of fact or law to be litigated. Patient B.O. Between April and June 2013, Respondent treated B.O., then a 78-year-old female, for back and neck pain. B.O. is married to R.O. They both went to Respondent’s office on the same day for their initial consultation. B.O. completed intake forms, had x-rays and patient history taken, and was examined by Respondent, similar to R.O. Whereas R.O. was determined to be a candidate for Vax-D therapy, B.O. was not. Unlike for the Vax-D therapy plan, there was no protocol calling for a certain range of sessions needed and no set payment correlated to a planned number of sessions for B.O.’s recommended treatment plan that called for adjustments, hydrotherapy, and ice packs. At the time of her treatment, B.O. had Medicare coverage and a “Medicare supplement” insurance policy through Horizon Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey (Horizon). As was his practice, Respondent had B.O. address the financial aspects of the treatment he recommended with his office staff. Upon review of B.O.’s insurance coverage, B.O. was informed by Respondent’s staff that Horizon would probably cover the cost of her treatment that exceeded her copay. The staff determined that, although it was possible Horizon would apply its lower in-network copay of $15.00 per visit, there was no guarantee that Horizon would not consider Respondent out-of- network, with a copay of $25.00 per visit. Therefore, B.O. was charged $25.00 per visit. She paid that amount per visit, although sometimes she did not pay at all on one or more visits, and would catch up at a subsequent visit. B.O. received treatments on 23 occasions. B.O. experienced some relief from her pain as a result of those treatments.12/ For those 23 visits, B.O. paid a total of $575.00 in copays. After B.O. had stopped going to Dr. Aderholdt for treatment, Horizon determined that its lower in-network copay of $15.00 per visit applied. The total copay amount should have been $345.00 for 23 visits. The difference is $230.00. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent “overcharged” B.O., misrepresenting that her copay was the out- of-network charge, to exploit her for financial gain. This allegation was not proven. Respondent made no representation. The representations of his staff, as described by B.O., were not shown to be the product of anything other than a good faith attempt to determine the undeterminable details of insurance coverage. There is no evidence to support the allegation that B.O. was intentionally charged more than she should have been charged, based on the information available at the time. On this point, the expert testimony was in lockstep: figuring out insurance coverage details is a “nightmare.” It is virtually impossible, according to both experts, to obtain sufficient information to make a correct determination for a new patient on such issues as in-network versus out-of-network, because, as they agreed, the insurance coverage details keep changing. “Now, you can be in network today and they can decide you’re out of network tomorrow. And then you can be out of network and then they decide you’re in network, and they don’t tell you.” That’s--that makes no sense.” (Dr. Shreeve, Tr. 131). In fact, when asked how he determines if a patient is out-of-network, Dr. Shreeve responded: “Counselor, I don’t. I leave that to the patient. I run a cash practice. I give them a bill. We’ll help them fill out a health insurance claim form, if they need it. But they pay us when they receive the service.” (Tr. 130). The Administrative Complaint also alleges that Respondent billed Horizon for medical visits by Patient B.O. that did not occur. There is no credible evidence of this allegation; the evidence is to the contrary. Petitioner contends in its PRO that Respondent billed B.O. for treatments received on June 3, 7, 11, and 14, 2013, when B.O.’s appointments were cancelled on those days. The record citations offered by Petitioner fail to support this proposed finding. Instead, B.O.’s bank records directly refute the proposed finding, and corroborate Dr. Aderholdt’s treatment notes and the SOAP notes that detail B.O.’s treatment on those four days.13/ In addition to B.O.’s bank records, B.O.’s patient records include the “merchant copy” receipt for a debit card payment on June 14, 2013. The receipt shows that a $50.00 payment was made at Dr. Aderholdt’s office on June 14, 2013, and it bears the clear signature of B.O. B.O.’s accusation that she did not go to Respondent’s office for treatment on these four days is belied by the documentation that she personally went there and paid the copay charges for her treatments on those four days ($50.00 check on June 7 for two copays; $50.00 debit card payment on June 14 for two copays). Petitioner’s own expert, Dr. Shreeve, conceded that this evidence refutes B.O.’s accusation that her insurer was billed for treatment on four days when she did not go to Respondent’s office for treatment. A separate problem proving this allegation (besides B.O.’s false accusation) is that there is no evidence to prove what was billed to Horizon for B.O.’s treatments. There is no evidence in the record of claims submitted by Respondent’s office to bill Horizon for B.O.’s treatment. In pre-hearing discovery proceedings, shortly before hearing, Petitioner sought to compel production of Medicare claim forms or Horizon claim forms submitted by Respondent’s office. However, Petitioner declined an Order compelling production that was offered along with additional time to pursue this evidence. Instead, Petitioner chose to go forward with the hearing on the basis that there were no such records (as Respondent represented). Another allegation in the Administrative Complaint is that B.O. was not given a copy of her medical records upon request. B.O. testified that she made several verbal requests to two staff persons at Respondent’s office, Lisa14/ and Amanda, for her medical records. She said she was given a copy of her patient ledger, but nothing more. B.O. and R.O. then mailed a letter addressed to Respondent that they jointly wrote on December 31, 2013, requesting their medical records and updated patient ledgers. Respondent said that he was never informed of any verbal requests for records, nor did he believe he ever saw the letter that was mailed to him. Indeed, B.O. handwrote on her file copy of the letter, provided to Petitioner’s investigator: “Letter to Dr. who probably didn’t see – no response to date.” The evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent has failed in his obligation to promptly respond to B.O.’s requests for medical records. However, there is no evidence that Respondent was aware of the requests before the investigation and intentionally refused to comply, or that he ever instructed his office staff to ignore such requests. But even though the evidence only establishes that Dr. Aderholdt’s staff failed to promptly respond to requests for medical records, the obligation to ensure these patient requests are promptly addressed remains Dr. Aderholt’s responsibility. It is clear that his office procedures require serious overhauling, as both Dr. Aderholdt and his expert acknowledged. It is unknown if B.O.’s medical records were provided to her when they were produced by Respondent’s counsel during the investigation.15/ In her deposition, when B.O. was asked if she had gotten the records from Respondent’s office yet, she said “not from them.” Among other remedial steps in the aftermath of this proceeding, if B.O. and R.O. do not already have copies of their medical records and updated patient ledgers as they requested long ago, Respondent must provide them. It is concerning that he did not come to this hearing with proof that he had provided B.O. and R.O. with the records they had requested or confirmed that they already had a copy. Lastly, the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent received payment from Horizon for B.O.’s treatment, but has not provided a refund. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether B.O. is entitled to a refund. The only information regarding the extent to which Horizon covered B.O.’s treatment is the information in the EOBs issued by Horizon after B.O.’s treatment ended, identifying amounts that would be covered and reporting payments to Respondent. For B.O.’s treatments, Horizon paid $1,770.00 to Respondent. What is unknown is whether B.O. owed more for her treatments than what Horizon paid. Dr. LaRusso reasonably opined that the receipt of an insurance payment would not generate an obligation for a patient refund if the payment is applied to a balance due by the patient. No evidence, methodology, or calculation was offered to prove that after Horizon’s payment was applied, a refund was owed to B.O. As noted previously, Respondent’s “patient ledger” is an internal practice management tool that does not function as an accounting of what a patient or insurance company owes. However, the patient ledger for B.O. reflects a total amount of $5,575.00 in services provided to B.O. Application of the Horizon payments of $1,770.00 and B.O.’s payments of $575.00 would reduce the patient ledger amount by less than half. Again, this is not to say that Patient B.O. owes the remaining patient ledger amount, but it is at least a point of reference suggesting the possibility that the Horizon payment did not cover all of B.O.’s treatment costs. Viewed another way, all B.O. paid for 23 treatment sessions was $25.00 per visit. B.O. was informed at the outset that she would not be charged for the full treatments she would be getting, because Horizon would “probably” cover her treatment except for the copay. Although she paid $230.00 more than the amount Horizon ultimately applied as copays, if B.O. owed $230.00 or more for treatment provided that was not covered by Horizon’s payment, then no refund would be due. Patient R.O. As noted previously, Patient R.O. is Patient B.O.’s husband. Like B.O., R.O. was treated by Respondent from April through June 2013. R.O., then a 64-year-old male, sought treatment for severe back pain. R.O. completed the intake form, had x-rays and patient history taken, provided detailed records of recent treatments and surgeries (including back surgery), and was evaluated and examined by Dr. Aderholdt. Dr. Aderholdt determined that R.O. was a candidate for Vax-D therapy. Respondent’s then-office manager, Lisa, took over to address the financial aspects of the recommended treatment. R.O. informed Respondent’s staff that he could not afford to pay $5,500.00 up front. R.O. was given contact information for Care Credit. He called Care Credit, then submitted an application. R.O.’s application was approved, and Care Credit agreed to finance the cost of Vax-D therapy without charging interest if the amount was paid off within one year. R.O. accepted the loan, and the result was that Care Credit paid Respondent $5,500.00 minus a fee absorbed by Respondent, similar to fees by credit card companies charged to merchants for sales using their credit cards. R.O. testified that he has paid off the Care Credit loan. R.O. signed the Vax-D Agreement, by which he committed to 25 to 28 Vax-D therapy sessions at $250.00 per session, for a total payment amount of $5,500.00. His Vax-D Agreement included the treatment package detailed in paragraph 13 above. R.O. testified that during the time of his treatment by Respondent, he had health insurance coverage with Medicare and Horizon (the private Medicare supplement insurance coverage that B.O. also had). He also had Tricare for Life, but said that that coverage would not have been applicable. R.O. recalled that Respondent told him that none of his insurance plans would cover the Vax-D therapy. As previously noted, Respondent does not believe he discussed insurance coverage with R.O., as that is not his standard practice. Regardless, R.O. had no expectation of insurance coverage. R.O. found the Vax-D therapy helpful in relieving his pain. He felt better after every treatment and wanted to continue. Rather than stopping after the 25 to 28 sessions included in the Vax-D Agreement, R.O. had a total of 40 treatment sessions. However, at some point, Respondent’s office manager informed R.O. that he needed to pay for additional sessions. R.O. said he could not afford to pay more, and discontinued treatment. After R.O. discontinued his treatments, he received an EOB from Horizon, stating that Horizon had paid a total of $5,465.84 in claims for both R.O. and B.O. According to the EOB summary, as noted above, $1,770.00 was paid to Respondent for treatments to B.O. The rest--$3,335.84--was paid to two providers for services to R.O. (A minor discrepancy is noted, in that Petitioner’s PRO stated that $3,335.00 was paid to Respondent for treatments to R.O.; however, the EOB reports that $10.84 was paid to a different provider (“Ga Emergency Phys”) for services provided to R.O. Thus, the actual total payment to Respondent for R.O.’s treatment was $3,325.00). The total amount paid to Dr. Aderholdt for R.O.’s 40 Vax-D therapy sessions, including Horizon’s payments, was $8,825.00, an average of $220.63 per session. R.O. believes the insurance payment should be paid to him as reimbursement for part of the $5,500.00 he paid. But that payment was for 25 to 28 sessions. The insurance payment was reasonably applied to the additional amounts due for R.O.’s sessions that were not covered by the $5,500.00 payment. No reason was offered as to why Dr. Aderholdt should not have applied the insurance payment to charges owed for the 12 sessions that were not covered by the Vax-D Agreement. Chiropractic physicians are not required to provide free care. Dr. Shreeve admitted that he does not provide chiropractic care to patients for free. As found above with respect to Patient B.O., R.O. joined B.O. in submitting a written request to Respondent for their medical records and updated patient ledgers by letter dated December 31, 2013, although Respondent said that he did not see the letter that was mailed to him. The findings above with respect to B.O., as one party to the joint written request, apply with equal force to R.O. as the other party to the joint written request. The Administrative Complaint also included an allegation that Respondent failed to practice chiropractic medicine at an acceptable level of skill, care, and treatment, charged as a violation under section 460.413(1)(r). This was the only charge in any of the Administrative Complaints that was based on the care provided by Dr. Aderholdt. The allegation was that adjustments indicated as having been performed on R.O. were physically impossible. However, at hearing, Petitioner’s expert retreated from the allegation, agreeing that the procedure in question was plausible. As a result of his concession, Petitioner’s PRO abandoned the charge, stating, “Petitioner is no longer pursuing discipline for the alleged violation of section 460.413(1)(r).” Pet. PRO at 4. Patient P.D. In March and April 2013, Respondent treated Patient P.D., then a 62-year-old female, for back pain. After completing intake forms and patient history, Patient P.D. was x-rayed, then examined and evaluated by Dr. Aderholdt, who determined that P.D. was a candidate for Vax-D therapy. Dr. Aderholdt turned P.D. over to his then-office manager, Lisa, to address the financial aspects of his recommended treatment plan. P.D. confirmed that Dr. Aderholdt never discussed financial issues or insurance with her. P.D. signed the Vax-D Agreement on March 8, 2013, the same day that she completed a Care Credit application that was approved for $5,500.00. P.D. paid off the Care Credit loan in 11 months, at $500.00 per month, so the loan was interest-free. At the time of the treatments, P.D. was not yet eligible for Medicare. She had insurance coverage through Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (Blue Cross). P.D. said that Lisa, the office manager, told her that she would file claims with Blue Cross. Thereafter, P.D. had 33 Vax-D therapy sessions. P.D. was pleased with the Vax-D therapy. She found it effective in relieving her pain. P.D. learned at some point from Blue Cross that several months after her treatment ended, Blue Cross paid Respondent for a portion of P.D.’s treatment. No evidence was offered to prove the details of the Blue Cross coverage, such as EOBs explaining what was covered and what was not. P.D. said that she contacted Respondent’s office and spoke with staff multiple times before Respondent provided her reimbursement in the full amount of the Blue Cross payment. Respondent refunded $946.45 on April 8, 2015, and $1,046.45 on April 10, 2015, for a total of $1,992.90. P.D. acknowledged that she has been fully reimbursed and is owed nothing further. The Administrative Complaint includes an allegation that Respondent improperly utilized CPT “billing codes” 99204 and 99212 for P.D.’s first session on March 6, 2013. Dr. Aderholdt admitted that for March 6, 2013, P.D.’s patient ledger incorrectly lists both CPT code 99204 (for a comprehensive examination for a new patient), and CPT code 99212 (for a focused examination for an established patient). The first CPT code should have been the only one entered on this day. The second code was entered by mistake. Although Dr. Aderholdt admitted the error made in the patient ledger, there is no evidence that the erroneous CPT code was “utilized” for billing purposes. No evidence was presented that both CPT codes were submitted by Respondent in a claim for payment to Blue Cross (and Petitioner did not charge Respondent with having submitted a claim to P.D.’s insurer for a service or treatment not provided). No evidence was presented of the actual claims submitted to Blue Cross. No evidence was presented to show that P.D. was ever sent a bill utilizing the referenced CPT codes. The error recording an extra CPT code on P.D.’s patient ledger might throw off Respondent’s internal practice management statistics, but there is no evidence that the admitted CPT coding mistake on the patient ledger was repeated in any claim or bill submitted to anyone. Expert Opinions Considering All Four Cases Both Dr. Shreeve and Dr. LaRusso offered their overall opinions, taking the four cases as a whole. Dr. Shreeve’s Oinions Dr. Shreeve testified that, while he might be more understanding of issues he saw in each individual case, “I’ve got four cases that I reviewed together. I received them all at once. So my view on each individual case might be seen as a little more tolerant of something I saw. But when it becomes repeated, it becomes less understanding [sic].” (Tr. 109). In forming his opinions, Dr. Shreeve relied on allegations that have not been proven, his own extension of the Administrative Complaint allegations to add other concerns about use of CPT codes (which were also shown not to be valid concerns), and his observations about a litany of matters nowhere mentioned or charged in the Administrative Complaints. Dr. Shreeve made clear that he elevated his opinion from concerns about sloppy office practices to fraud, misrepresentation, and patient exploitation, because of matters that were either unproven, not alleged or charged, or both. For example, he injected the concern, shown to be based solely on patient ledgers, that CPT code 99212 appeared many times without the -25 modifier when used in conjunction with an adjustment CPT code. Starting with A.M.’s case, he complained of the repeated use of CPT code 99212 without a -25 modifier, when CPT code 98941 (adjustments) was used for the same office visit. He said, “If we were going to bill 99212, an E/M code with that, we would use a modifier of -25.” (Tr. 110). As previously found, however, Dr. Aderholdt did use the -25 modifier with every entry of CPT code 99212 in the Medicare claim forms. In explaining how his opinion was affected by his misimpression from the patient ledgers that CPT code 99212 was not used with the -25 modifier, he said: This is repeated over and over during the record. If it were one off, it occurred in one place in the ledger or on a form, you know, everybody is human. They can make a mistake. If it is the trend, that becomes not a mistake. That becomes, I’m doing the wrong thing. And if I’m doing it over and over again, and I’m then billing for one service two times, two different ways, and I’m – I hope to get paid for it. Then that’s where I start to see the trend of exploiting the patient for financial gain. (Tr. 111). Dr. Shreeve further elevated the significance of not seeing modifiers with the evaluation codes in the patient ledgers, when he spoke about R.O.’s case: If [Dr. Aderholdt] did both codes [for evaluation and adjustments] every visit, if he did, which is not normal, we would have to have a modifier, the -25, to tell us it’s a reduced service because it’s duplicative. A modifier was never present in any record I saw on this patient or any other patient of the records of Dr. Aderholdt. So misusing the codes. This is not standard of care that we expect, and this appears to me exercising influence on the patient to exploit them for financial gain. That’s what it looks like to me. By the time we’re through with the third case that’s what I see. (Tr. 148). Not only was this CPT coding issue not alleged in any of the four Administrative Complaints, but it is a false accusation. If Dr. Shreeve did not see a single use of CPT code 99212 with the -25 modifier in any record he saw, then he did not look at the records very carefully. As found above, the only evidence of actual claims submitted to any third-party payor--the Medicare claim forms for Patient A.M.--shows that CPT code 99212 was never used without the -25 modifier. But Dr. Shreeve only looked at the patient ledgers for modifiers. As also found above, the only two CPT coding issues that were alleged (improper use on two specified dates of CPT code 98941 for adjusting three or four spinal regions for Patient A.M.; and improper use on Patient P.D.’s first day of service of two patient examination CPT codes for billing purposes) were not proven. Dr. Shreeve also relied on the allegation that Patient B.O.’s insurance carrier was billed for treatment that was not provided. He pointed to “notes” written (by B.O.) on the patient ledger stating that the patient cancelled, but CPT codes were entered for treatments that day. He concluded: That’s blatant. I don’t have a way to explain that away. To me that absolutely says, I billed for something that I didn’t do. That’s fraud. Because that’s with intent. That’s not an accident. (Tr. 137). When Dr. Shreeve was shown the $50.00 debit card receipt signed by Patient B.O. on June 14, 2014, he quickly retreated: “That would indicate that they were there, even though they said they were not. So my apologies for that. It’s good to clear that up.” (Tr. 183). Later, he added that the June 14, 2013, payment of $50.00 was for that visit and the prior visit on June 11, 2013. He explained that this was consistent with Respondent’s daily notes, which identified treatments for each visit and also logged the copay charges by visit and B.O.’s periodic payments. Dr. Shreeve did not explain how he would alter his overall opinion after conceding that what he characterized as blatant fraud by Dr. Aderholdt was actually a false accusation by the patient. In formulating his overall opinion that what otherwise might be viewed as mistakes or sloppy office practice were elevated in his mind to fraud and exploitation, Dr. Shreeve also relied heavily on matters that were neither alleged nor charged in the Administrative Complaints, and, as a result, were not fleshed out with competent evidence in the record. Dr. Shreeve repeatedly alluded to issues regarding trust accounting requirements in statute and rule. The four Administrative Complaints that were issued as directed by the PCP on June 19, 2018 (as noted on the Administrative Complaints), contain no allegations related to trust accounting practices. The PCP-authorized Administrative Complaints do not charge Dr. Aderholdt under the trust accounting statute, section 460.413(1)(y), or the trust accounting rule, Board rule 64B2- 14.001. To the extent Dr. Shreeve’s perception of trust accounting issues contributed to his opinion that these four cases rise to the level of fraud and patient exploitation, that was error, and his opinion must be discounted accordingly. Likewise, Dr. Shreeve gratuitously offered critiques of Dr. Aderholdt’s medical records, including complaints about the handwriting, complaints about x-ray quality, questions about the adequacy of justifications for the course of treatment, and suggestions regarding how he would rewrite SOAP notes. Again, the Administrative Complaints are devoid of allegations directed to the quality or adequacy of Respondent’s medical records, and they are devoid of charges under the medical records provision in section 460.413(1)(m) and the corresponding medical records rule, Board rule 64B2-17.0065. To the extent these critiques contributed to Dr. Shreeve’s opinion that these four cases rise to the level of fraud and patient exploitation, that, too, was error, and his opinion must be discounted accordingly. Dr. Shreeve also relied on what he characterized as Respondent’s failure to respond, or failure to respond quickly enough, to investigative subpoenas. He made it clear that his opinion was greatly influenced by his perception that Respondent intentionally failed to meet his obligations in responding to the investigations: I think this is absolute fraud. The doctor is not wanting to do the right thing, has flagrant disregard for the law, and the statutes and the rules for the profession, for the Department of Health by not responding. (Tr. 153). Despite Dr. Shreeve’s view that he thinks it is “very clear” that Dr. Aderholdt did not respond timely during the investigation, the timeline and details of the investigation were not established by competent evidence; there is only hearsay evidence addressing bits and pieces of that history, with huge gaps and many questions about the reasons for those gaps (if the reasons why investigations were so protracted was relevant). But the details of the investigations are not laid out in the evidentiary record because the Administrative Complaints do not contain factual allegations related to Dr. Aderholdt’s actions or inactions during the investigation process, nor are there any charges predicated on what was or was not done during the investigation process. Either these matters were not presented to the PCP in June 2018 for inclusion in the Administrative Complaints, or they were presented and not included. Either way, Dr. Shreeve’s perception regarding whether Dr. Aderholdt met his legal obligations in responding to the investigations cannot be injected now. It was improper for Dr. Shreeve to consider, and give great weight to, circumstances that were neither alleged nor charged in the PCP-authorized Administrative Complaints. As found above, the proven allegations are that Respondent failed to provide Patient A.M. copies of the claims submitted to Medicare for her treatment (although she may have them now); and Respondent failed to provide copies of the medical records of Patients R.O. and B.O. upon their joint written request (although they may have them now). Only by considering allegations that were not proven and by injecting matters not alleged or charged was Dr. Shreeve able to characterize these four cases as involving the same problems again and again. In terms of the proven allegations, however, the only duplicative finding is with respect to the husband and wife team, in that Respondent did not meet his obligation to promptly respond to their joint request for medical records and updated patient ledgers. The matters considered by Dr. Shreeve beyond the allegations and charges in the Administrative Complaints were also improperly used by Dr. Shreeve to buttress his view that two disciplinary actions against Dr. Aderholdt based on facts arising in 2005 and 2006, raised “the same or similar” issues. Dr. Shreeve’s attempt to draw parallels between the prior actions and these four cases was unpersuasive. Dr. LaRusso disagreed with the characterization of the two prior actions as similar to the issues presented here. Dr. LaRusso’s opinion is credited. A comparison of the allegations, ultimately resolved by stipulated agreement in two 2008 Final Orders, confirms Dr. LaRusso’s view in this regard. The first disciplinary action was based on Respondent’s treatment of one patient in February 2005. An administrative complaint alleged that Respondent failed to complete intake forms, take the patient’s history, and conduct a sufficient examination to support the diagnosis. Respondent was charged with violating section 460.413(1)(m) by not having adequate medical records. The same facts gave rise to a second count of violating section 460.413(1)(ff) (violating any provision of chapters 456 or 460, or any rules adopted pursuant to those chapters), through a violation of rule 64B2-17.0065, which elaborates on the requirements for adequate medical records. There is no repetition of these statutory and rule violations charged in any of the four Administrative Complaints at issue here. The prior administrative complaint also alleged that Respondent billed the patient he saw in 2005 for neuromuscular reeducation and therapeutic exercises, when neither Respondent’s notes nor the SOAP notes reflected those services. In these cases, the only allegation regarding discrepancies between billing records and physician/SOAP notes is the allegation as to Patient A.M. that on two dates, Respondent used the CPT code for adjustments to three or four spinal regions, whereas the SOAP notes reflected adjustments to only one region. The prior disciplinary action supports the findings above that Respondent’s notes must also be considered, in addition to the SOAP notes, to determine what services A.M. received on those two days. A different kind of billing discrepancy allegation in Case No. 18-4485 is the claim that Respondent billed B.O.’s insurer for treatment on days on which services were allegedly never provided. This allegation was not proven, as found above. B.O.’s accusation that Respondent falsely charged for treatment on several days when no treatment was provided was itself proven to be a false charge. Perhaps Dr. Shreeve was thinking of this allegation, based on B.O.’s false charge, when he characterized the 2005 incident as involving the same or similar problems that he saw here. The allegation in the prior complaint was that the patient was actually billed for services not provided, and a refunded was ordered. At first, Dr. Shreeve believed the same was true in B.O.’s case. However, he later retreated and acknowledged that B.O. had not been truthful in her accusation. The only other allegation of a billing discrepancy in any of the four cases at issue was not a billing discrepancy at all, but rather, a CPT coding error on P.D.’s patient ledger that was not billed to anyone. As Dr. Shreeve noted, in the prior disciplinary action, Respondent agreed to be put on probation with a requirement that he practice with a monitor. Dr. Shreeve explained that the monitor would have worked with Respondent “to help this doctor not do the same behaviors that got them into trouble.” In his view, these four cases show that Dr. Aderholdt did not learn his lesson from the monitor “not to do the same problems again.” As he put it, “That really flips me rather quickly to think there’s a question of fraud.” (Tr. 152-153). To the contrary, whereas Respondent was faulted for not having intake records, patient histories, and appropriate examinations to support his diagnosis and recommended treatment plan in February 2005, no such issues were raised in these Administrative Complaints. Dr. Aderholdt did learn his lesson. The medical records for the four patients at issue include patient intake forms, patient histories, evaluations, and examinations that were not alleged to be inadequate. Nor was there any repetition of the problem with billing a patient for treatment or services that were not documented in the medical records taken as a whole, including Dr. Aderholt’s notes. The other disciplinary action resolved by settlement in a 2008 Final Order involved an advertising issue. The Department alleged that Respondent improperly advertised as a specialist in Vax-D disc therapy when the Board does not recognize any such specialty. The Department also found fault in the failure of the advertising to disclose the usual fee. The Department also critiqued an advertisement for identifying a different practice location than Respondent’s practice address of record. The charges were under section 460.413(1)(d), (cc), and (ff); rule 64B2-15.001(2)(e) and (i); and rule 64B2-10.0055. Quite plainly, this prior action bears no similarity to the four Administrative Complaints at issue here. No such allegations or charges were raised here. Dr. Shreeve did not contend that this prior action bears any similarity to the four cases here. Dr. Shreeve was never asked for his opinion as to the type or level of discipline he believes is warranted in these cases. However, his “flip” to “fraud,” due to the perceived repetitive nature of the issues in the four cases (whether charged or not)--which he characterized as the “same problems” in 2005 that resulted in discipline--was the basis for Petitioner proposing the most severe penalty available: license revocation, plus substantial fines and assessments of fees and costs. Dr. LaRusso’s Opinions Dr. LaRusso served as a Board member for multiple terms, and is a past-chair. After leaving the Board, he continued to serve on probable cause panels as recently as 2017. Having reviewed and been involved in thousands of disciplinary matters, he was of the strong opinion that nothing in the four Administrative Complaints warrant discipline at the level being sought here. Imposing a severe penalty in these four cases would be out of line with the Board’s prior practice in disciplinary matters. Dr. LaRusso’s studied review of all of the depositions and records in this case led him to opine that there is no evidence that Dr. Aderholdt deceived his patients, committed fraud, or engaged in double-billing or overbilling. Instead, Dr. LaRusso saw evidence of sloppy office practices, which he attributed to Dr. Aderholdt’s poor management skills. He has seen many doctors like Dr. Aderholdt over the years who just want to deal with taking care of patients. They do not want to have anything to do with administrative and clerical responsibilities. Instead, they leave everything besides patient care to their office manager and staff. In Dr. LaRusso’s view, Dr. Aderholdt’s office protocols and procedures require serious fine-tuning. He believes that Dr. Aderholdt would benefit from re-education in billing and collection practices, as well as laws and rules. He needs to ensure that procedures are in place, and followed, for prompt responses to patient requests for medical records or for claims sent to third-party payors. At the same time, however, Dr. LaRusso reasonably characterized the four cases as involving billing, clerical, communication, and correspondence issues. It bears emphasis that Dr. Aderholdt’s patient care is not in question. There are no issues of endangering the public, where a doctor is doing things that will hurt people, doing something dangerous or sexually inappropriate. Those are the cases where it is appropriate to go after someone’s livelihood, when the person does not belong in the profession. Dr. LaRusso observed that, rather than endangering the public, Dr. Aderholdt was helping his patients by relieving their pain, according to their own testimony. Dr. LaRusso agreed to become involved in this case because he found it so incongruous that the Department would be pursuing this action apparently to try to take Dr. Aderholdt’s license. Dr. LaRusso noted that the four investigations against Dr. Aderholdt were originally being spearheaded by a prior prosecutor for the Department (to whom Respondent’s counsel mailed CDs of patient records in 2014), and that the cases were assigned to Dr. Willis, who was a favored expert witness for the Department. Dr. LaRusso alluded to “inappropriate issues” with the prosecutor and expert that led to the Board having to pay a large award of attorneys’ fees and costs for pursuing discipline against Dr. Christian. According to Dr. LaRusso, those issues ultimately led to the prosecutor and expert being discharged from these cases. There is no evidence as to when or why Dr. Willis was replaced with Dr. Shreeve. Dr. Willis apparently was involved long enough to prepare an expert report. But then, according to Dr. LaRusso, the cases went dormant for a long period of time. The bits and pieces of hearsay evidence in the file comport with this understanding: there were four investigations that began upon complaints in 2014 by the four patients about billing and records issues; documents were collected from Respondent and from the patients; and Investigative Reports were issued, all before 2014 was over. It is unknown when Dr. Willis was involved, when he prepared his expert report, or when he was discharged from the cases. It is unknown when Dr. Shreeve was retained, but there was plainly some duplication of work, in that Dr. Shreeve prepared his own expert report. Neither expert report is in evidence. There is no evidence of any additional investigation or follow-up documentation from the patients or otherwise. There is no evidence of what was presented to the PCP--just that the panel met on June 19, 2018, and authorized the four Administrative Complaints issued on June 20, 2018. While this background is a bit of a curiosity, without impermissible speculation, the most that can be said about this history is that the protracted period of time from investigation to the PCP submission that resulted in issuance of the Administrative Complaints is apparently due, at least in large part, to the turnover in the prosecution-expert witness team assignments. Dr. LaRusso did not persuasively demonstrate grounds to cast nefarious aspersions on the Department for continuing forward with its investigation. One might reasonably question whether the Department dropped the ball, so to speak, in not updating its investigation, given the extended period of dormancy. For example, the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 18-4487 incorrectly alleged that P.D. was not reimbursed, when any cursory check with P.D. would have revealed the “news” that she had been repaid in April 2015, more than three years before the Administrative Complaint was authorized by the PCP. Dr. LaRusso may reasonably debate, as he did, whether the charges lodged against Respondent are inappropriate. And Dr. LaRusso may certainly question, as he did in convincing fashion, whether the discipline apparently being sought is unduly harsh, uncalled for, and way out of line with Board practice. But there is no basis in this record for attributing bad motives to the Department for prosecuting the Administrative Complaints. Dr. LaRusso’s opinions regarding the nature of the violations proven and the appropriate discipline in scale with those violations were more persuasive that Dr. Shreeve’s opinions. Dr. LaRusso’s opinions are credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Chiropractic Medicine: In Case No. 18-4484PL: Dismissing Counts I, II, and IV; and Finding that Respondent violated section 460.413(1)(aa), as charged in Count III; In Case No. 18-4485PL: Dismissing Counts I, III, and IV; and Finding that Respondent violated section 460.413(1)(i), through a violation of rule 64B2-17.0055(1), as charged in Count II; In Case No. 18-4486PL: Dismissing Counts II, III, and IV; and Finding that Respondent violated section 460.413(1)(i), through a violation of rule 64B2-17.0055(1), as charged in Count II; In Case No. 18-4487PL, dismissing Counts I and II; Placing Respondent on probation for a period of three years, with conditions deemed appropriate by the Board; Imposing a fine of $3,000.00; Requiring continuing education deemed appropriate by the Board; and Requiring payment of the costs of investigation and prosecution of the charges on which violations were found. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2018.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Notice of Intent to Deem Application Incomplete and Withdrawn from Further Review, dated May 12, 2009, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration ("Agency") has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 2) with the other party to these proceedings, and being otherwise well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's fees. The above-styled case is hereby closed. 1 Filed July 10, 2009 2:23 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE and ORDERED this _f_day of _ ,,_of""""--"'"""'"-l""""A-'-t_f , 2cf.i inTallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Holly Benson, ecretary Agency for He th Care Administration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Stephen T. Maher Shutts & Bowen LLP 201 $outh Biscayne Boulevard Suite 1500, Miami Center Miami, Florida 33131 Jamie L. Jackson Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Jan Mills Karen Rivera Agency for Health Care Administration Laboratory Unit Manager 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Agency for Health Care Administration Tallahassee, Florida 32308 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #28 (Interoffice Mail) Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this the _._8:,.._P_day of-=:......-.--=-""-7-·....,,,. '-----' 20 g:- -- Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 922-5873 To:RS09210158 CHARLIE CRIST GOVERNOR Mi,y 1l, 2009 ADMTNTSTR.ATOR B1HMf HHlth care for.,,Flor'ltlltms MOU.Y BEN50N SECReTARY CEKTlPIBD MAll. / RETURN R.ECEW'r Rl?Q STED 'PETER M WALLACH AND ST·TART F TOP.PER MOS PA 1480 N UNIVERSllY DRIVE COP.AL SPR.INGS, E'L 3307 l LlC:f.NSE NUMBER: 800004917 CAS£ #: 200900.5482 !i()J'JC& a,ViUNT TO pEEM Al'fUCA:rJmr,,lX,COM1"1.V.Il., 'ND wrrlJDBAl»'ll fRQM FURTHER gvur.w or Your tappJIClltlan for license is d.:cmod lncompleto and wlthdrnwn ftom further consideration punnuu,t 10 SQQllon 408,806(3)(b), Plorida St11-Mea, wJii\;b i1litll¢8 that "Tteque vd informition omiHod from an 11ppllc•tk,n for Uccnsure, license renewal, or obnn1io ownership, other than an lnspectjon, must be.fll•d wilh the a cncy within 21 do.y, after the llSCDcy'1 rcqu fi:il' Qmltted inform11tion or tho oppllcadon shall be deemed incomplete and shitll be withdrawn from further oon,idonition llnd the f,ot sh•ll bo forfoi d' '. You were notified by c:orrcq,o"d11m:111 dntod Fobruar)' 28, 2009 to provide furthar infonnat1o11 nddrol\ ing identified appt1rcnt c1Tnr11 or ,'lmlsslont within twenty-one da.)'I trc,m &he rcoelpt of the Agency's correspondence, Our rec:ordl lndlc1110 you received this cornr11pondcncc: by certified mllfl on Murch 09, 2009. A11 this requested Information wa. not timcl)' received by tho Agency, your application is dc:c:mcd Incomplete and withdmwn C'l'oTTI further uonsidcnuion, TI1e ou'tt)IAl\dll\Q h1sue1 rornalnlng for liconsure are: Corrected LIit ofTU!lts Performed: Tbe Pl'Clflclcney TtJstlng Comp ¦11)' Ji11red I• not CLIA approved, ·-·· .. EXPLANAJJOJ! OF RlGWl'S l'ursuant to Section 120.S69, F.S., you h1n1c the rlgt11 to rcquost ,in 1.1dn1iuilllfAtfvc bc:arins, .(n or(J¢r to obtidn a formal proc;aodina before tho Di'lision of Admlnlstrn\.lvo 'Htorin under Section 120.57(1)1 P.S., your rcq1,1 1t for on administrative hearin11 musr i.:onronn to·m requfre1no11t.li in Seotlon 28-106.%0 I, FlorldA MminlNtr'o1tiYC Code (F.A.C), nnd must state tho material fru;ts you dispula. ION AND EXPLANATION OF RICRTS IORMS. Katen Rivera, Manaa r r :.bomtory LicL.'JldUrt: U11it l.)C: Agit,1.;y Cl\lrk, MBil Stop j Legal Lnt ¢ Unit. Mnll Stop '.l T:u1an11111, Plorida 32305 Z7:z7 M11han Oriv,,MS#U Certified Adidti Nun1bcr SENDERS RECORD 111111· 1/lhCI.myflcirld•. i:cim • Vi:rn Ai'iCA !lrtllno II\ EXHIBIT I ( JUN-05-2009 16:40 From: To:9509210158 STATE OF FLOlUl)A AGENCY FOR HEALm CARE ADMlNlSTRATION RE: Pc,tor M Wall11c:h And Shari F Topper Mds P11 CASE NO: 2009005482 El,.RCTION OF RIGHTS Thill Jlh;:cti9n of Rishta form Is attaohed to II proposed Noti of lntont to Dcein Inc:omploio Rlld Withdraw fl-0111 Purther Rt!Vlew of the Agency for Hoslth Care Admi11istration (AHCA). Tua lltlc may be Nottcc ot lnlenc fO Dc:orn Incompluto and Withdraw from P'arthor Rcwlow or ,nmo otbcr notice vr •ntondcd adlon by AJiCA. An £1,sdpp oflUc,ltM muu be rclyrnecl hyJDBll or by fqr \Y.i!Jlln 21 de:m or the dg YOU rn:eh,e lhJ iHtaehefl rfgtlt:e o( Jntent to peom Tnenm111.11,s ¦qd WltLdraw,,.ftpm fynher Reylm or pny nrJ,sr PDIURl d gctJon h,y ARCA. If' an Rleclkn1 g{ Rigg with )'OUI' IClecmtd optJon i, not nctlvccl by ,'\HCA within twenty.one (21) dn)'S from the dato you rocoivcd d1i1 notice of propo_.d ac;t(Qn, you will havo given up your right to t1on1.esr rhe Agenc)''III proposed agtlon amd w ti1111l ordorwfll b,:1,.ued. (PlciU$a n::J)Jy using thi, B)ccti,:1n qf Rjght, fnnn unless you.)'Our attorney er your roprosentBtiv prc:rcr io reply ncc:ordlna to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2006) lllld .Rul, :28, Florida Administrative Cod ¦.) Plcase return your EL6C',CIQN 9.FRIQHTS to: Agency for HCA!th Administration AL1QnUon: Agency Clt::rk 2727 Mahnn Drive, Mail Slup N3 T•llahusao, Florida 32308 Phon,:: (8SO) 9ll-:B73 Fax: (850) 921·01S8 'PLM S.W...F-.c:r QNLY 1 op TI:JESE 3 OPTIONS, Ol''l"lON ONE (I.) I admit to tbe aJltptlons of facts and law contutned 11- tbo Notlee ofintcnt to DCIClm lncontpleta abd Withdraw from Furth•.- Rovti!W. o, other notice ot lnte•dod acdun by ABCA aad I waive my rli:bt to object and bavi, a hcnrln1, I 1.tndermnd that by Jiving up my rigbt lO A h•ring, a tlnal order will be 1,,cued that adopts tbc prop0scd agency nction and impoao11 the: proposed pcn11lty, fine= or nction. OP'flON TWO (2) I 11dmit to tha allcuation1 or taotl tOJ1C1ln111d In tbc N1,1Uce ur lnt.:Pt to 0111-,sn lnaompl"to 11.,d.Wllhdraw rrom 11'ut111or Rovlew, or olbcr propoKd aetfoa by AHCA, but I w,,h to be bcurtl at 011 Informal prooeeclln1 (pursuant to Se<:tion 120.57(2), f'luridA Statute:1) where I mtiy submit testimony and wtincn cvld nce to tbc Agency tu shuw t..hat the proposed administrative llC: ion i, too 11cverc or that Lhc floe sbou Id bv roduccd. OPTION 1".l-lltf:E (3) _ - I cU11p11te the ancsatloo» uffatt contained In tho Notice otlntont fo Ocam I11completo •nd Wlthdnn, fmrn Further luview or other proposed acdoo by AHCA, And I r1:q11est a tormal hearing (pursuant to Sc:ctiun 120.57(1). Floridn Statuto1) before an . Adminis1ntlvc Law Judge l\J)pointed by the Divlsil)n of Administrative Hc11rin1:s, fl.,lliASE,.NOTE: Choo11in1 OPTIOii THREE (3), by i oit, l» u9-I tufflclcnt to obtain n f1mr..aJ hcarlni;. Yuu ahm mu t nte II writtan petition in order to obtnin a formal hc11ring before tho ...,... ., · - _,.. -' .. ,- = ••n?:. ,_ U.nr:... ......,4,.,. c:.. 1-..,..,.tfn" 1')0 <i7f1' f.'lnl'l.-fn L'\tUtell. It must be JUN-05-2009 16:41 From: To:8509210158 P.17,,.17 recelv(:d b)' the Agency Clerk ut tha address above within 21 clllys o( receipt or lhls proposed adminislrutivc aotlon. The roqut:u1L for rorrnal h rlng m1Jsl. cottform tc;, thi: requirements of Rule lR- 106.201. Florida Administrntivc Code, which willim lhat it contnin: l. The T!M1\: and addre'5 of coch agi;noy llfl'ect(:d ond each agency's 1tfe or ldi,ntJfielldon nurnbor. If known: Your numc, addn1111, and telephone numoor, 111td th nimc, uddrcs!I, and telephone number of )'Our rcpti,acntativo or l1twyor, If any: An 9pJanation of how yoUl' sub1tantl11I Interests will be affected by Ihc Agency's proposed action; A statement of when and how you rccoivod notice ot'tho Agency's proposed action: A statement of tlll disputed issues of nmwria1 fact, If there arc nunc, you must s111tc that thon:t arc none; _ A concise statement of me ultimate f111:1:S allc9cd. including the specific facts you contend wnmint rav rsJl or modi.flcatlon of the Aaency's proposed nclion; · A 6tati:nient of the spc:oific rules or su.tu.tcs )'OU c;lnlm require ri:,vorsal or modlflcAtion of the Agcn )"I proposed aotlon; and A 1tfttcment of the r¢lli=f yo1,1 are sceklns, stating ex.,ctly what uc.tion you wi1h th Agcnt:-y to take with respeet to It., proposed 11otion. (Medl11tlon under Section 120.S73, Florida. Statutes. may bo avaUablci in thill matter If the Agen y agrees,) License type: clinical laborntocy T..iccr.is= number: 800004917 Lfccn cc Nnme: Peter M Wallach And Shari F Topper Meis Pn Contact l)crson: ·------ Name 'i'itle Ad Ms:. _ Streot and numb(tt' -··· ··clty Zip Code Telephone No. Fax No•. Email (optional). _ 1 hereby eortify that J. pm duly authQTl d ro submit this Notice of Election of Righis to the Agency for Meahh Caro Adrninhitmtlon on behalf of th lictn$eo referred to 11bova. Signed; Dat9; Print Namo:. 'rittc: ·------- USPS -Track & Confirm Page 1 of 1 Hl2trul I t.il.lJI I SlgnJn Track & Confirm Search 'Results Label/Receipt Number: 7180 390198481045 5162 Service(s): Certified Mall"' Status: Delivered Your item was delivered at 12:27 PM on May 18, 2009 in MIAMI, FL 33144. Detailed Results: Delivered, May 18, 2009, 12:27 pm, MIAMI, FL 33144 Notice Left, May 15, 2009, 11:22 am, MIAMI, FL 33144 Jrack & Confirm •!!i_ o.nQp i ..._ _ Track & Confirm by email _ _ _ Get current event information or updates for your Item sent to you or others by email. (oii> ) Return Receipt (Electronic) Verify who signed for your item by email. (iii) ,..,,.,. f.;f<" I:lll!!!ll. Pdyat:y Polk:y Terms of Us uslness customer GatewllV Copyright© 2009 USPS. All Rights Reserved. No FEAH Act EEO Data FOIA { 1\i t1! f. •"ti(:1•:: 1\: "1·'<'• -1 t'. h••'.J. • http://trkcnfrml.smi.usps.com/PTSinternetWeb/InterLabelinquiry.do 05/19/2009 STATE OF FLORIDA