Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a hospital licensed by the State of Florida and is located in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent, the affected state agency, as defined in Subsection 120.52(1), Florida Statutes, is responsible for the regulation of health care facilities, to include Petitioner. The Department also considers the question of provision of additional health care in the community through its certificate of need program. Intervenor has made application to provide ambulatory surgery in Duval County, Florida, through a freestanding surgery center. Jacksonville, Florida, is in Duval County. This case is part of a consolidated hearing process and is the companion matter to Saint Vincent's Medical Center, Petitioner v. State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Ambulatory Care - Duval Development Corp., d/b/a Jacksonville Surgical Center - Ambulatory Surgical Center, Respondents, D.O.A.H. Case No. 83-337 and Riverside Hospital, Petitioner v. State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Ambulatory Care - Duval Development Corp. d/b/a Jacksonville Surgical Center - Ambulatory Surgical Center, Respondents, D.O.A.H. Case No. 83-482. The first three days of the hearing were conducted on the dates alluded to in this order. That presentation was transcribed. In addition, deposition testimony was presented and accepted as part of the record in this matter. The campanion cases concern the propriety of the grant of a certificate of need to the Intervenor in this cause to allow construction and operation of a freestanding ambulatory surgery center which would be used for performing outpatient surgeries. At all times relevant to this case, Saint Vincent's had a department in which outpatient surgical procedures were performed and are expected to be performed in the future. With the advent of the establishment of the Intervenor's facility, that health care unit will be in competition with Petitioner in the realm of providing surgical procedures. As recently as 1975, Respondent knew that ambulatory surgery centers, such as that proposed by the Intervenor, would need permission to construct such a facility. This permission relates to the need to apply and receive a certificate of need from the Department. The authority for such regulation was pursuant to applicable provisions of Chapter 381, Florida Statutes. Notwithstanding this regulatory role to be fulfilled, Respondent did not undertake a program for enacting rules to consider the question of need for ambulatory surgical centers. This lack of rulemaking was primarily due to inactivity of applicants seeking ambulatory surgical center certificates of need. This circumstance changed in late 1982. In December, 1982, Respondent received approximately thirteen applications for ambulatory surgical center certificates of need, as contrasted with approximately ten applications over the prior three years. At the same time Respondent was in the throes of having to revamp its certificate of need review process related to the overall health industry, brought about by statutory changes which abolished health system agencies and created local health councils. In 1983, at the time of the hearings, Respondent had received 27 applications for ambulatory surgery centers. This glut of applications by would-be ambulatory surgical centers and the 1982 applications were examined without formal rules defining the need question, related to expected numbers of surgical procedures that might be conducted on an outpatient or ambulatory basis. The determination of this ratio of outpatient surgical procedures to inpatient surgical procedures is a vital part of the need question. 1/ Absent promulgated rules, Department officials began their attempt to ascertain the percentage comparison between outpatient and inpatient surgeries, as that item was involved in the establishment of a methodology for considering the need question. Based upon information provided by applicants for ambulatory surgery centers and its own research, Respondent concluded that anywhere from 18 to 40 percent of total surgeries could be expected to be outpatient surgeries. Having utilized a median projection related to population expectations in the certificate of need process, the Department decided to use a median projection for the expected percentage of outpatient surgery. Thus, 29 percent was selected as the percentage of outpatient surgeries in the total number of surgical procedures and that percentage was utilized in the computation of the number of expected outpatient surgical procedures. Utilization of this 29 percent factor in the computation of the number of procedures to be expected on an outpatient basis may be seen in Petitioner's Exhibit 2 and Respondent's Exhibit 1, application reviews. Once the Department decided to employ the 29 percent factor, it has consistently, on a statewide basis, utilized that factor in evaluating the question of the grant of certificates of need for ambulatory surgical center applicants. This has been done in more than one batch or cycle and was done in the instance of Intervenor's application which is at issue. Although the 29 percent factor is not the only determining element of the certificate of need process, it is an integral part of that process and can affect the outcome of the grant of the certificate, as has been the case in two instances alluded to in the course of the hearing. This policy choice by the agency is not emerging. It is not one of a series of approaches that have been experimented with in trying to arrive at a concluding agency position, prior to the formal adoption of a rule. This percentage factor has been the only number utilized in the review of all ambulatory surgery center applications commencing late 1982 to the time of final hearing in this action. This choice has not stood the test or scrutiny of the rulemaking process set forth in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Notwithstanding the stated willingness of the agency to modify its position when presented with a more credible method, that contingency or eventuality has not occurred and every applicant for ambulatory surgery center certificate of need has had its application measured against the 29 percent factor commencing December 1982, to the exclusion of other techniques suggested by applicants. In the face of the facts reported above and the record considered, and recognizing that the agency should be afforded an opportunity to establish a record basis for the utilization of the 29 percent factor, even if it were found to be an invalid rule, a decision was reached at the time of hearing on the question of the utilization of the 29 percent factor and whether it was a rule not duly promulgated. It was found that the 29 percent factor is an unpromulgated rule and could not stand as law without first being subject to an assessment of the quality of the record basis for the agency's policy choice. The argument related to this case may be found at pages 798 through 829 of the transcript. The ruling is announced at pages 829 through 832. Respondent subsequently presented additional evidence in support of its policy choice and that may be found in succeeding sections within the transcript. This written order memorializes the ruling announced at hearing.
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(f) and (m), Florida Statutes (1997), by assisting an unlicensed person to practice medicine contrary to Chapter 458 and by failing to maintain adequate medical records; and, if so, what discipline, if any, should be imposed against Respondent's license. (All references to chapters and statutes are to those promulgated in Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of medicine in Florida. Respondent is licensed to practice medicine in Florida pursuant to license number ME 0015824. Respondent owns and operates an ambulatory surgical center doing business as the Dermatologic & Cosmetic Surgery Center (Surgery Center). The Surgery Center is located at 2666 Swamp Cabbage Court, Fort Myers, Florida 33901. Respondent is a Board-certified Dermatologist and also performs cosmetic surgery that includes breast augmentation. Dermatology and cosmetic surgery involve similar procedures. The procedures used to remove skin cancers from the face are similar to those used in face-lifts and eyelid surgery. Respondent performs approximately a thousand skin cancer surgeries a year, has been doing cosmetic surgery since 1986, and has practiced breast surgery since 1989. Respondent is a member of the American Board of Cosmetic Surgery. That board is not approved by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the Florida Board of Medicine. Respondent has attended numerous seminars and satisfied relevant continuing education requirements throughout his career. Respondent has never been sued by a patient and has no prior discipline against his license. Prior to August 12, 1997, Respondent performed breast augmentations through the patient's nipple. Respondent made a small incision in the lower part of the binary nipple. He used his fingers to separate the overlying breast tissue from the muscle and create a pocket in which to place an implant. The incision left a scar at the nipple, and Respondent sought to develop competency in a different procedure identified in the record as the axillary method of breast augmentation. The axillary method allows the surgeon to access the breast from the patient's armpit. The surgeon makes a 1.5 inch incision under the armpit, uses an instrument to create a pocket in the breast, inserts a partially inflated implant into the pocket, and repeats the same procedure in the other breast. The surgeon then checks the breasts for symmetry, fills the implants, closes the pockets, and concludes the procedure. In the axillary method, a surgeon must use instruments rather than his fingers to create a pocket for the implant. The initial incision and placement of the implant do not require great skill. The greater skill is required in reaching the proper plane in the breast tissue and in creating the pocket. The brachial plexis is just below the incision in the armpit and contains all of the nerves that make the arm work. From the armpit, the surgeon must proceed over the sternum. If the surgeon applies too much pressure, the surgeon can cross the center of the chest and create a condition known as a unibreast. Respondent developed a basic understanding of the axillary method by watching video tapes for several years and by attending seminars approved for professional education credit in the State of Florida. In May of 1997, Dr. Daniel Metcalf taught one of those seminars in Orlando, Florida. Dr. Metcalf is licensed to practice medicine in Oklahoma. He is qualified by training and experience to perform the axillary method and to teach the method to other physicians. For approximately 25 years, Dr. Metcalf has limited his medical practice to breast surgery and performs approximately 650 surgeries each year. At the time that Dr. Metcalf taught the accredited seminar in Orlando, his license to practice medicine in Oklahoma was suspended. On November 13, 1995, Dr. Metcalf pled guilty to a felony charge that he violated federal interstate commerce law by selling silicon implants during a moratorium on their sale. The federal court fined Dr. Metcalf $5,000 and sentenced him to six months in federal prison beginning on April 5, 1996. The State of Oklahoma suspended Dr. Metcalf's medical license for one year beginning on the date of his release from prison. The suspension expired on or about October 5, 1997. In May of 1997, Respondent discussed the axillary method with Dr. Metcalf during the seminar in Orlando. Respondent and Dr. Metcalf had known each other since the early 1980s, and Dr. Metcalf agreed to come to the Surgery Center and teach the axillary method to Respondent. Respondent scheduled the teaching session at the Surgery Center for August 12 and 13, 1997. Five of Respondent's patients agreed to participate. The patients are identified in the record as B.D., T.R., R.K., M.P., and D.C. Each patient acknowledged in writing that it would be the first time Respondent would perform the axillary method. Neither Respondent nor Dr. Metcalf charged the patients for a surgeon's fee, and Dr. Metcalf did not charge Respondent. However, the patients paid the costs of the implant, the operating room, and the blood work. Respondent conducted a preoperative interview with each patient. He advised the patient that Dr. Metcalf would be in the operating room teaching Respondent. On August 12 and 13, 1997, Respondent introduced Dr. Metcalf to each patient. Respondent and Dr. Metcalf then scrubbed, gloved, and proceeded with the teaching session. Dr. Metcalf performed approximately 60 to 70 percent of the first surgery. Respondent performed progressively more of each successive surgery until Respondent performed the vast majority of the surgery. The surgery that Dr. Metcalf performed included at least one incision and pocket, insertion of an implant, use of the appropriate surgical instruments, and closure of an incision on at least one patient. Neither Respondent nor Dr. Metcalf caused any harm to a patient. The results of all five procedures were positive and without complication. No patients complained about their treatment. Two of Respondent's former employees are the complaining witnesses in this case. The first issue is whether Dr. Metcalf practiced medicine within the meaning of Section 458.305(3). Section 458.305(3) defines the "practice of medicine" as: [T]he diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or other physical or mental condition. Dr. Metcalf did not diagnose, treat, or prescribe medicine for any human disease, pain, injury, or deformity, or mental condition. The breast augmentations that he participated in were elective and cosmetic and did not treat any disease, pain, injury, or deformity. Dr. Metcalf must have performed an "operation" for some "other physical . . . condition" in order to practice medicine within the meaning of Section 458.305(3). Respondent's counsel argued during the hearing that the issue of whether Dr. Metcalf practiced medicine was an issue of law, rather than fact. Counsel argued that expert testimony would invade the province of the ALJ. If Respondent's counsel were correct, the result could be problematic for Section 90.702. Although a physician would be qualified by training and experience to opine that a peer's activities satisfy the standard of care applicable to the practice of medicine, the physician would not be qualified to know whether he or his peer practiced medicine. In an abundance of caution, the ALJ requested the parties to cite relevant legal authority in their respective PROs. Neither party cited any direct or analogous legal authority that resolves the issue raised by Respondent's counsel or construes the statutory definition of the practice of medicine in Section 458.305(3). Each party submitted expert testimony concerning the issue of whether Dr. Metcalf practiced medicine. As the trier of fact and arbiter of credibility, the ALJ must resolve the evidential conflicts between the experts. Accordingly, the fact finder has carefully considered the substance of the testimony of the two experts and determined the appropriate weight to be accorded the testimony of each. Respondent's expert based his opinion on a custom within the medical profession in which unlicensed persons, such as members of an emergency medical team, medical students, and first year residents, train under a physician. Respondent's expert opined that an unlicensed person does not practice medicine because the person is learning under the auspices of a physician who has responsibility for the unlicensed person. Respondent's expert relied on facts not in evidence. Unlike the custom described by Respondent's expert, the evidence shows that the person teaching was not licensed to practice medicine in the state where the teaching occurred. The person learning was the only person so licensed. While Respondent had ultimate responsibility, Respondent was not teaching Dr. Metcalf. Dr. Metcalf was teaching Respondent. The custom described by Respondent's expert operates within a framework of laws and rules that are inapposite to this case. Residents who are not licensed to practice medicine in Florida may practice under the supervision of a physician only if the residents, and the hospitals in which they work, comply with registration and reporting requirements in Section 458.345 and Florida Administrative Code Rules 648-6.008 and 6.009. None of those provisions apply to the facts in this case. (All references to rules are to those promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code on the date of this Recommended Order.) Respondent's expert also testified that doctors customarily teach other doctors in states where the teaching doctor is not licensed. In Florida, however, that custom is limited by Section 458.303(1)(b) to activities that satisfy the definition of a consultation. A consultation is defined in Rule 64B8-2.001(8) to include the taking of a medical history, the examination of a patient, the review of laboratory tests and x-rays, and the making of recommendations to a person licensed to practice medicine in Florida. A consultation is not a set of activities separate and apart from the practice of medicine. It is a subset of the "practice of medicine" in Section 458.305(3). The opinion of Respondent's expert is limited, by operation of law, to that part of the practice of medicine that is a consultation within the meaning of Section 458.303(1)(b) and Rule 64B8-2.001(8). That part of the practice of medicine that is not a consultation is the practice of medicine that is at issue in Section 458.331(1)(f). Further references in this Recommended Order to the "practice of medicine" refer to those activities described in Section 458.305(3) that are not a consultation within the meaning of Section 458.303(1)(b) and Rule 64B8-2.001(8). Some of the activities engaged in by Dr. Metcalf at the Surgery Center satisfied the definition of a consultation. Other activities comprised the practice of medicine. The proportion of each is not material in this case. Dr. Metcalf performed at least 60 percent of the first "operation" for some "other physical . . . condition" within the meaning of Section 458.305(3). Dr. Metcalf practiced medicine progressively less with each successive operation and performed progressively more consultation. One purpose of the teaching session was for Dr. Metcalf to first demonstrate the axillary method and then to assist Respondent in the practice of that medicine. As it turned out, this purpose was more qualitative than quantitative because Respondent quickly demonstrated competency. However, if it were unnecessary for Dr. Metcalf to first demonstrate the axillary method, Respondent could have gained the competency he sought by reviewing video tapes, attending seminars, and consulting with Dr. Metcalf. Respondent aided, assisted, procured, or advised Dr. Metcalf to engage in the practice of medicine for at least 60 percent the first surgery performed on August 12, 1997. The next issue is whether Dr. Metcalf was an "unlicensed person" within the meaning of Section 458.331(1)(f). Chapter 458 commonly uses the term "licensed" to refer to persons licensed outside of Florida. For example, Section 458.303(1)(b) refers to physicians "licensed" in another state. Section 458.3115(1) authorizes restricted licenses for "foreign- licensed" persons. Section 458.313(1)(c) authorizes licensure by endorsement for those "licensed" in another jurisdiction, and Section 458.315 authorizes a temporary certificate for persons "licensed" in any other state. Dr. Metcalf was a licensed person in Oklahoma when he practiced medicine at the Surgery Center in August of 1997. A person licensed to practice medicine is not an "unlicensed person" while the person's license is suspended. A contrary finding could be problematic under Florida law. If a person with a suspended Florida license were an unlicensed person during the suspension and the person violated the terms of the suspension, the person would have no professional license against which the Board of Medicine could take further disciplinary action, including revocation of the license. Rather, the Board would be required to seek criminal prosecution pursuant to Section 458.327(1)(a). During the period of suspension, Dr. Metcalf was a licensed person in Oklahoma. However, Dr. Metcalf was not authorized to exercise any privileges under the license or to enjoy the benefits of his license until the suspension expired. Section 458.331(1)(f) does not prohibit Respondent from aiding, assisting, procuring, or advising an unauthorized person to practice medicine. Such a statutory prohibition would have been broad enough to proscribe the practice of medicine by a licensed person whose authority to practice was temporarily suspended. Rather, Section 458.331(1)(f) prohibits Respondent from "aiding, assisting, procuring, or advising any unlicensed person" to practice medicine. (emphasis supplied) Relevant terms in Section 458.331(1)(f) must be construed strictly in favor of the licensee because this is a license disciplinary proceeding that is penal in nature. A finding that Dr. Metcalf was a licensed person in Oklahoma does not resolve the issue of whether Dr. Metcalf was an unlicensed person for the purposes of Section 458.331(1)(f). An "unlicensed person" in Section 458.331(1)(f) is properly defined by reference to Section 458.327(1)(a). Section 458.331(1)(f) prohibits Respondent from "aiding, assisting, procuring, or advising an unlicensed person to practice medicine contrary to this chapter " (emphasis supplied). Section 458.327(1)(a) prohibits the practice of medicine without "a license to practice in Florida." When the term "unlicensed person" in Section 458.331(1)(f) is harmonized with Section 458.327(1)(a), an "unlicensed person" means a person not licensed in Florida. 44. Sections 458.327(1)(a) and 458.331(1)(f) operate in concert. The former proscribes the practice of medicine inside this state without a Florida license. The latter prohibits a person licensed inside the state from assisting in the violation of the former. In August of 1997, Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(f) by assisting an unlicensed person to practice medicine contrary to Section 458.327(1)(a). Respondent did not intentionally violate Section 458.331(1)(f) and had no prior knowledge of the violation. The cause of the violation is rooted in multiple instances of miscommunication, confusing circumstances, and statutory ambiguity that Respondent did not create. Respondent undertook reasonable efforts to comply with Florida law. Prior to the surgeries, Respondent contacted Ms. Anne Dean. Ms. Dean is the licensed risk manager for the Surgery Center and is qualified by training and experience to advise Respondent in matters of regulatory compliance. Ms. Dean owns and operates a risk management company in Deland, Florida. She is the certified risk manager for over 450 domestic and foreign ambulatory surgery centers. Ms. Dean provides a wide range of services including financial feasibility analysis and the processing of certificates of need. She also provides services to ensure that architectural design, equipment lists, inventories, and policies and procedures comply with applicable state and federal regulatory requirements. Ms. Dean also assists ambulatory surgical centers with other license certification, accreditation, and regulatory matters. Since 1988, Ms. Dean has been the risk manager required under state law for the Surgery Center. Ms. Dean was responsible for the Surgery Center's state licensure and Medicare certification. She has been present during each license and risk management survey conducted by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). AHCA has never cited the Surgery Center for a violation. Ms. Dean has assisted Respondent in ensuring that renovations to the Surgery Center complied with applicable regulations and, except for the calendar year 2000, has advised Respondent in all matters of regulatory compliance and accreditation. Respondent asked Ms. Dean to ensure that the teaching session to be conducted by Dr. Metcalf complied with applicable state law and any accreditation requirements. Ms. Dean spoke by telephone with unidentified representatives of both AHCA and Petitioner. The advice from those representatives was consistent for two areas of concern. The first area of concern involved the accreditation needed for Respondent to be certified to perform the axillary method. Pursuant to the advice of the agency representatives, Ms. Dean created a surgical proctor report and gave the form to Respondent. After the teaching session, Dr. Metcalf completed a report for each patient and provided the reports to Ms. Dean. Ms. Dean reviewed the reports and met with a three-member committee for the Surgery Center. The committee certified Respondent as qualified to perform the axillary method. The second area of concern involved the status of Dr. Metcalf's license to practice medicine. Respondent was specifically concerned that Dr. Metcalf was not licensed to practice medicine in Florida and that Dr. Metcalf's Oklahoma license was suspended. Respondent requested Ms. Dean to ensure that the teaching session complied with Florida law. Ms. Dean conferred with representatives for Petitioner and AHCA. Ms. Dean advised Respondent that if the person teaching were licensed in another state, the person would be entitled to practice medicine in Florida during the teaching session under the auspices of Respondent, a licensed person in Florida. However, if the person teaching were not licensed in another state, the person could not perform any function that required licensure. Ms. Dean conveyed the advice of the agency representatives to Respondent. The advice from those qualified by training and experience in regulatory compliance is consistent with an educational custom among practitioners. It is common for doctors to practice medicine for educational purposes in states where they are not licensed. Before Respondent began cosmetic surgery, Respondent spent four one-week periods with two different cosmetic surgeons in Texas and Virginia. Respondent was not licensed to practice in Virginia. Respondent obtained similar experience in California where he is not licensed. Respondent is 66 years old and did not attempt to become board certified in plastic surgery. That certification would have required two or three years of general surgery and plastic surgery. Respondent would have spent his time learning complex reconstructive procedures, including cleft lips and pallets, rather than simpler cosmetic surgery. The advice from Ms. Dean and representatives for Petitioner and AHCA was incorrect and based on a mistake of law. The statement that a person licensed in another state can do more than consult in Florida purports to amend or modify the limited authority in Section 458.303(1)(b) as well as the prohibitions in Sections 458.331(1)(f) and 458.327(1)(a). An agency cannot amend, enlarge, or deviate from a statute. The mistake of law arose from ambiguity in Chapter 458. Chapter 458 does not define the term "unlicensed person." An "unlicensed physician" is defined in Rule 64B8-6.001 to mean a medical doctor not licensed by the Board of Medicine. However, the term "unlicensed physician" applies only to Section 458.345 and does not apply to Section 458.331(1)(f). The law implemented in Rule 64B8-6.001 is limited to Section 458.345. The rule refers only to interns, residents, and fellows in a hospital setting. Rule 64B8-6.001 does not define an "unlicensed physician" for any purpose in Chapter 458 except Section 458.345. A broader reading of Rule 64B8-6.001 would conflict with the definition of a "physician" in Section 458.305(4). Section 458.305(4) defines a "physician" to mean a person licensed by the Board of Medicine. The rule defines an "unlicensed physician" as a medical doctor not licensed by the Board. Even if the rule were construed to imply that a medical doctor is not a person, for purposes of Section 458.305(4), the implication would not avoid the apparent oxymoron. Any ambiguity between Section 458.305(4) and Rule 64B8-6.001 must be resolved in a manner that effectuates the statute. Section 458.305(4) defines a physician "as used in this chapter. . . ." (emphasis supplied) Neither the definition of an "unlicensed physician" in Rule 64B8-6.001 nor the definition of a "physician" in Section 458.305(4) defines the term "unlicensed person" in Section 458.331(1)(f). Chapter 458 does not expressly state that a person licensed to practice medicine in another state is an "unlicensed person." Moreover, Chapter 458 uses the term "licensed" interchangeably to mean persons licensed inside and outside of Florida. The correct meaning of the term "unlicensed person" is not found in a single provision in Chapter 458. A licensee must glean the meaning from reading Sections 458.427(1)(a) and 458.331(1)(f) in a manner that harmonizes the two provisions. The following hypothetical further illustrates the unintended ambiguity in Chapter 458. If Dr. Metcalf were licensed in Florida in August of 1997, Section 458.331(1)(f) would not have prohibited Respondent from assisting Dr. Metcalf to practice medicine contrary to Chapter 458, including gross and repeated malpractice. Section 458.331(1)(f) does not prohibit Respondent from helping a licensed person to violate Chapter 458. Statutory ambiguity also exists in the distinction between a consultation and other activities defined as the practice of medicine. Although Chapter 458 recognizes a legal distinction between the two kinds of activity, the practical distinctions evidently ebb and flow on a daily basis through a custom in which practitioners teach others in states where the practitioners are not licensed. The ambiguity in Chapter 458 gave rise to, confusion, mistakes of law by individuals qualified by training and experience in regulatory compliance and miscommunications to Respondent. Respondent reasonably relied on the advice of those qualified by training and experience to advise him in his attempt at regulatory compliance. Respondent did not intend to violate Section 458.331(1)(f). The remaining issue for determination is whether Respondent maintained adequate records for the teaching session at the Surgery Center. The statutory requirement for adequate medical records is set forth in Section 458.331(1)(m). In relevant part, Section 458.331(1)(m) provides that Respondent's license is subject to discipline if Respondent fails: [T]o keep . . . medical records that identify the licensed physician or the physician extender and supervising physician by name and professional title who is or are responsible for rendering . . . supervising, or billing for each . . . treatment procedure and that justify the course of treatment of the patient. (emphasis supplied) The parties do not dispute that the medical records adequately identify Respondent. The contested issue is whether the medical records justify the course of treatment by adequately identifying Dr. Metcalf by name and title. The medical records include operative reports that identify Respondent by name but do not identify Dr. Metcalf. Petitioner argues that Section 458.331(1)(m) requires the operative reports to identify both Respondent and Dr. Metcalf. Petitioner argues that Respondent was the "licensed physician" and Dr. Metcalf was the "physician extender and supervising physician." Dr. Metcalf was neither the "physician extender" nor the "supervising physician" during the teaching session. Section 458.305(4) defines a physician as a person who is licensed by the Board of Medicine. Dr. Metcalf was not licensed by the Board and was not a physician under Florida law. Respondent was the "licensed physician." Petitioner admits that the medical records adequately identify the "licensed physician" in accordance with Section 458.331(1)(m). If the definition of a physician in Section 458.305(4) were disregarded, the ALJ agrees with Petitioner that Section 458.331(1)(m) implicitly distinguishes a "licensed physician" from a "physician extender and supervising physician." However, the implicit distinction does not serve the ends that Petitioner seeks. Rather, the implicit distinction suggests that the physician extender and supervising physician may be someone other than a licensed physician. If the implied distinction in Section 458.331(1)(m) were correct, it would need to be construed in pari materia with Section 458.331(1)(f) in a manner that gives force and effect to both subsections. The prohibition in Section 458.331(1)(f) could not prohibit Respondent from assisting an unlicensed person who is "physician extender and supervising physician" without nullifying the implied distinction in Section 458.331(1)(m). The interplay between Subsections 458.331(1)(f) and (m) does not alter the outcome of this case. However, it further elucidates the statutory ambiguity that Respondent, his risk manager, and two different agency representatives faced in attempting to ascertain whether the teaching session complied with Florida law. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner's view of Dr. Metcalf as the physician extender and the supervising physician were correct, Petitioner's statutory interpretation conflicts with the literal terms of Section 458.331(1)(m). Section 458.331(1)(m) requires the medical records to identify either the licensed physician or the physician extender and supervising physician. The statute does not require the medical records to identify the licensed physician and the physician extender and supervising physician. Relevant terms in Section 458.331(1)(m) must be construed strictly in favor of the licensee because this is a license disciplinary proceeding that is penal in nature. If it were determined that Dr. Metcalf could be a physician extender without being a physician defined in Section 458.305(4), no statute or rule cited by the parties defines a "physician extender." Although the term may be a term of art within the medical profession, Petitioner failed to adequately explicate that form of art. The evidence was less than clear and convincing that Dr. Metcalf was a physician extender. If it were determined that Dr. Metcalf could be a supervising physician without being a physician defined in Section 458.305(4), the definitions of "direct supervision and control" and "direct responsibility" in Rule 64B8-2.001(1) and (6) and Rule 64B8-4.026(1) aren't probative. The rules merely define the quoted terms by reference to physical proximity. Both Respondent and Dr. Metcalf were physically proximate. The evidence shows that Respondent was ultimately responsible for the surgeries. Respondent had actual control of each surgery, could have stopped each surgery at any time, and was responsible for billing each patient. Unlike the operative reports, the anesthetist reports identify Respondent and Dr. Metcalf by name and title. The parties agree that the anesthetist reports are part of the medical records. Petitioner argues that the identification of Dr. Metcalf solely in the anesthetist reports is inadequate. Petitioner claims the operative reports must also identify Dr. Metcalf. Each party submitted expert testimony concerning the issue of whether the identification of Dr. Metcalf solely in the nurse anesthetist reports was adequate. Petitioner's expert was tendered and accepted "as a physician, in general, and as a plastic surgeon." Respondent's expert practices emergency medicine, rather than cosmetic or plastic surgery, but is an expert in quality assurance. Respondent's expert is better qualified by training and experience, within the meaning of Section 90.702, to assist the trier of fact in a determination of whether the medical records are adequate. The testimony of Respondent's expert is consistent with the record-keeping requirements in Section 458.331(1)(m) and Rule 64B8-9.003. Neither the statute nor the rule requires medical records to identify Dr. Metcalf in multiple parts of the medical records or to identify Dr. Metcalf in any specific document. The anesthetist reports comprise adequate medical records that identify both Respondent and Dr. Metcalf. Petitioner argues that the patient consent forms do not identify Dr. Metcalf; and that Respondent did not tell his patients that Dr. Metcalf would be operating on them or that Dr. Metcalf's license to practice medicine was suspended. No finding is made concerning these issues because they are not relevant to any allegation contained in the Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint does not allege that Respondent failed to obtain informed consent from his patients. If it were determined that Section 458.331(1)(m) requires the operative reports to identify Dr. Metcalf when the anesthetist reports already do so, Respondent did not cause the omission of Dr. Metcalf's name from the operative reports. Respondent instructed his circulating nurse and surgical supervisor (circulating nurse) to identify Dr. Metcalf in the operative reports that Respondent signed but did not read. The regular duties of the circulating nurse included the identification of surgeons in the operative reports. Respondent reasonably relied on the circulating nurse to perform her assigned duties correctly. The Administrative Complaint does not charge Respondent with failure to supervise his employee or with failure to review the operative reports he signed. The circulating nurse failed to identify Dr. Metcalf in the operative reports she prepared for Respondent. Sometime after the teaching session in August of 1997, the circulating nurse abruptly terminated her employment at the Surgery Center following several employment problems. When Respondent hired the circulating nurse in July of 1996, she was in an impaired physician or nurses (IPN) program for treatment of a previous addiction to Xanex and Demerol that she developed during her divorce. However, representatives of the IPN program assured Respondent that the circulating nurse was successfully completing the program. After the circulating nurse terminated her employment, Respondent discovered that drugs were missing from the Surgery Center. Respondent also learned that the circulating nurse had stopped going to the IPN program in August of 1997 and had stopped taking her urine tests. In October, 1997, the IPN program dismissed the circulating nurse. Sometime between August 13 and September 11, 1997, the circulating nurse told Respondent that she suspected the anesthetist of being addicted to drugs because he was falling asleep during surgeries. The circulating nurse also thought some drugs were missing from the Surgery Center. Respondent barred the anesthetist from further surgeries and asked the circulating nurse to conduct a drug count. Respondent left the next day with his wife on a previously scheduled vacation but stayed in communication with the circulating nurse. The circulating nurse conferred with the risk manager and conducted a drug count but did not comply with prescribed procedures. The circulating nurse entered her drug count on a form but did not make any written findings. The circulating nurse told Respondent that she thought some drugs were missing. Respondent requested the circulating nurse to fax him the portion of the Surgery Center manual that prescribed drug audit procedures. The circulating nurse faxed the material and then terminated her employment. When Respondent returned from his vacation, the office keys used by the circulating nurse were in Respondent's mailbox. The circulating nurse quit her job because she felt Respondent expected too much of her. Prior to January 1998, Respondent requested a pharmacy consultant to assist Respondent and his wife in a second narcotic count. The pharmacy consultant confirmed that some drugs were missing from the Surgery Center. The missing drugs included Versed, Demerol, Tylox, and Valium. Respondent reported the missing drugs to the risk manager, and the risk manager reported the incident to the state. The appropriate state agency began an investigation in January of 1998 that included the potential involvement of the anesthetist and the circulating nurse. The anesthetist died shortly after January 1998, and the agency concluded the investigation without charging the circulating nurse. The circulating nurse and Respondent's former insurance secretary are the complaining witnesses in this case. On September 11, 1997, the insurance secretary altered the computer entrees for the employee manual so that the number of hours needed to be eligible for insurance benefits conformed to the number of hours that the insurance secretary worked. Respondent's wife is the office administrator. She discovered the changes and corrected them. She then instructed the insurance secretary not to come into the Surgery Center while Respondent was on vacation. When Respondent and his wife returned from their vacation, they discovered that the insurance secretary had copied all of the patient charts for August 12 and 13, 1997, and had resigned from her job. Neither Respondent nor his wife could locate any of the copied charts. The proctor forms that had been completed by Dr. Metcalf and reviewed by the risk manager and accreditation committee were missing from their files. Whole parts of the surgery manual were missing. The risk manager conducted an independent search for the missing records without success. The risk manager had helped compile the compliance files, was familiar with the records, and would have recognized any misfiled records.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Subsection 458.331(1)(m), guilty of violating Subsection 458.331(1)(f), and imposing no penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 John E. Terrel, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 H. Roger Lutz, Esquire Lutz, Webb & BoBo One Sarasota Tower Two North Tamiami Trail, Fifth Floor Sarasota, Florida 34236
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent's proposed Rule 64B18-23.001, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Florida Medical Association is a statewide organization of approximately 16,000 physicians and osteopathic physicians licensed in Florida pursuant to Chapters 458 and 459, Florida Statutes, respectively. Petitioner assists Florida physicians in improving the health and welfare of the citizens of the State of Florida by representing the physicians in regulatory, legislative, and educational venues. Respondent Department of Health, Board of Podiatric Medicine, is the regulatory body responsible for regulating podiatrists licensed pursuant to Chapter 461, Florida Statutes. Section 461.003(5), Florida Statutes, provides that: 'Practice of podiatric medicine' means the diagnosis or medical, surgical, palliative, and mechanical treatment of ailments of the human foot and leg. The surgical treatment of ailments of the human foot and leg shall be limited anatomically to that part below the anterior tibial tubercle. The practice of podiatric medicine shall include the amputation of the toes or other parts of the foot but shall not include the amputation of the foot or leg in its entirety. A podiatrist may prescribe drugs that relate specifically to the scope of practice authorized herein. Medically and anatomically, the term "leg" means that part of the lower extremity below the anterior tibial tubercle, i.e., below the knee. The region above the knee is referred to as the "thigh." These are basic anatomy terms and definitions used by healthcare professionals, including podiatrists. These basic terms are found in the textbooks used to teach podiatric students, and podiatric schools use these definitions when requesting body parts from the State Anatomical Board. In response to an insurance carrier denying a claim on the basis that a podiatrist had treated a patient beyond the scope of the practice of podiatry, the Board considered the statutory definition of the practice of podiatric medicine. It discovered that some textbooks include a secondary definition for the term "leg" as being the entire lower extremity. The Board determined, therefore, that it would promulgate a rule using the secondary definition of leg rather than the medical or anatomical definition. It also determined it would define the term "surgical treatment," which appears in the statute. The Board's Proposed Rule 64B18-23.001, Florida Administrative Code, contains the following definitions: The term "human leg," as used in s.461.003(5), Florida Statutes, means the entire lower extremity, extending from the head of the femur to the foot, but does not include the hip joint. The term "surgical treatment," as used in s.461.003(5), Florida Statutes, means a distinctly operative kind of treatment, such as a cutting operation. As such, injections, x-rays, and other medical, palliative, and mechanical diagnostic techniques and treatments are not surgery. Specific Authority 461.005 FS. Law Implemented 461.003(5) FS. History -- New. The definition of leg in the proposed rule expands the scope of practice authorized by the statute. The definition of surgical treatment in the proposed rule expands the scope of practice authorized by the statute and creates confusion in that certain diagnostic techniques do fall under the medical definition of surgical treatment. The proposed rule substantially affects orthopedic physicians, vascular surgeons, physical medicine rehabilitation physicians, plastic surgeons, family practitioners, and other physicians in Florida, including those represented by Petitioner, in that under the proposed rule the practice of podiatry is expanded to include areas of the body treated by physicians and not by podiatrists and to allow podiatrists to perform procedures not previously authorized. Petitioner has an interest in assuring that patients are treated by appropriately trained personnel practicing within their authorized scope of practice. The proposed rule substantially affects the general healthcare of patients in the State of Florida. This is a concern for the physicians represented by Petitioner since these physicians are often involved in treating patients who have been inappropriately treated by other professionals. The proposed rule allows podiatrists to practice beyond their areas of training and expertise.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's license as a physician in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Board of Medicine, through the Agency For Health Care Administration, and formerly the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, has been the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of the practice of medicine and the licensing of physicians in this state. Respondent has been a physician licensed in Florida under license number ME 003824. Starting on January 12, 1988 and continuing thereafter until on or about March 16, 1988, Respondent treated Patient #1 for a condition known as Dupuytren's Contracture of the left hand. This conditions results in the thickening of scar tissues and contracture of fibrous bands in the palm and fingers which pulls the fingers into the palm and constricts their ability to flex or straighten out. Patient #1 had suffered from this condition since 1982. In 1984, a surgeon in New Jersey performed Dupuytren's Contracture release surgery on the patient's right hand, but the results were not altogether satisfactory. Respondent first saw Patient #1 on January 12, 1988. At this initial visit, Respondent discussed the implications of the proposed surgical procedure and advised the patient of the possible adverse consequences thereof. He noted that because the patient had delayed seeking treatment for the left hand, there was a strong possibility of complications as a result of surgery which could involve nerve damage and infection in addition to a possibility of vascular damage and necrosis of the tissue of the hand. On February 10, 1988, Respondent performed a Dupuytren's Contracture release on the patient's left hand at the Gulf Coast Orthopedic Center, (GCOC). This surgery is a complicated, delicate and difficult procedure which in the instant case, was made even more difficult by the extent of the existing contracture of the patient's hand. After the completion of the surgery, Respondent placed Patient #1 on Keflex, an antibiotic, and also prescribed Darvocet for pain. Respondent saw Patient #1 again on February 11, 1988. At this time, the patient was complaining of pain in the hand and of the tightness of the bandage. Respondent examined the wound at this time, cleaned it, placed a plastic platform splint on the hand and re-bandaged it. The patient was also prescribed Percodan for pain and advised to continue the Keflex at a 1,500 mg/day dosage. Patient #1 returned to Respondent again on February 12, 1988, still complaining of pain and that the bandage was too tight. After again examining the hand, Respondent re-bandaged it, placing gauze between the patient's fingers and the splint. He also gave the patient another prescription for Percodan for the pain. On February 17, 1988, the patient again came to the Respondent's office for his third postoperative checkup. When Respondent removed the bandage, he noticed a small greenish area on the palm which was exuding what appeared to be white pus. Respondent thoroughly cleaned the wound by placing the hand in a whirlpool bath of water and Betadine solution for approximately 45 minutes. He did not culture the green area or the white exudation. When he released the patient that day, however, he increased the Keflex dosage to 2,000 mg/day but refused to give him a prescription for additional Percodan for the pain. Instead, he told him to take extra strength Tylenol. He also told the patient to keep the hand elevated but did not suggest the patient call in the event of pain. Respondent did not see Patient #1 again until February 24, 1988 even though the pain had increased during that period. The patient, however, did not call the Respondent to complain, believing the increase in pain was the result of the removal of the prescription for Percodan and the substitution of a lesser strength substance, Tylenol, therefor. The patient assumed, from the Respondent's prior comments, that the pain was normal and to be expected. When Respondent saw Patient #1's hand again on February 24, 1988, he became excited because it appeared there was infection in the left palm which had spread to the PIP joint of the middle finger at which point there was some necrosis. Respondent appeared upset because the Patient had not called him when the pain continued or increased. Patient #1's wife had asked that the patient do so, but the patient decided to wait until the next scheduled appointment on February 24, 1988. At this time, Respondent removed the sutures from the patient's hand and irrigated the wound with a mixture of saline solution and an antibiotic, Kepsol. A culture was also taken at this time. Since Respondent did not have hospital admitting privileges in the area, he arranged through Dr. Alea, an associate in his clinic who did have such privileges, to have Patient #1 admitted to Bayonet Point Hospital for treatment of the infection. The treating physician there was Dr. K. Sundaresh, an infectious disease specialist. The admission was on February 24, 1988. Dr. Sundaresh placed Patient #1 on prolonged antibiotic treatment, obtained a bone scan to document any infection, and directed debridement, incision and drainage of the wound. The bone scan report indicated that Patient #1 "most likely" had developed osteomyelitis, a bone infection, at the base of the middle finger on the left hand. X-rays taken around the same time, on March 1, 1988, revealed findings consistent with osteomyelitis. Following the hospital admission, Respondent departed for Arizona for three days to attend a previously scheduled medical seminar, returning on February 27, 1988. While he was gone, however, Respondent spoke daily with Patient #1 by telephone and consulted with the physicians who were treating him. Dr. Alea suggested that Patient #1 be examined by another orthopedic physician, Dr. Moss, but when Dr. Moss came to see Patient #1 in the hospital, he was told the patient had already seen Respondent. The consult report prepared by Dr. Moss reflects no consult was had because the patient "wants treatment as now arranged under Dr. Bonati." Records of GCOC indicate that on March 1, 1988, Respondent spoke with patient #1's daughter by telephone indicating that if the patient did not come to the clinic that day, he would be released from Respondent's care. In fact, the patient did go to see Respondent on March 1 and 2, 1988 on pass from the hospital, but claims he did not refuse treatment by Dr. Moss. When Respondent saw Patient #1 in his office on March 1, 1988, after noticing a greenish material on the patient's left palm which he thought might be pseudomonas, he elected to continue the antibiotic treatment that was initiated in the hospital. When the patient was released from the hospital on March 4, 1988, the wound was healing well. Dr. Sundaresh arranged for the patient to continue the intravenous antibiotic treatments through a home nursing services. The final diagnosis at the time of discharge was osteomeleyitis of the middle finger of the PIP joint on the left hand due to pseudomonas aeruginosa infection. Respondent saw Patient #1 in his office on March 7, 9, and 16, 1988, after the patient's discharge from the hospital. The patient was scheduled for another visit on March 22, 1988, but cancelled that appointment and also elected to discontinue the physical therapy Respondent had prescribed for him at GCOC. The hospital records show that while there, Patient #1 received daily physical therapy treatments consisting of whirlpool treatments to the hand and sterile dressings, starting on his admission on February 24, 1988, but no range of motion exercises. The physical therapy prescribed at GCOC by Respondent starting on March 8, 1988 included range of motion exercises which he continued until March 15, 1988. At the time of the last visit, on March 16, 1988, Respondent noted that the patient's wounds were healing well, but there was some limited range of motion. One of Petitioner's experts, Dr. Nadler, a board certified orthopedic surgeon with over 17 years experience, who is in practice with Dr. Angelides, to whom he refers all his hand surgery cases, opined that the standard of care for orthopedic surgery such as performed here by Respondent would be for the surgeon to have the ability to admit and follow the patient in a hospital if complications should arise. At very least, the surgeon should have the ability to make arrangements for another orthopedic surgeon to follow the patient in his absence. According to Dr. Nadler, it is not at all unusual for infection to occur in Dupuytren's Contracture release surgery. He concluded that Respondent fell below the standard of care when he performed a complicated surgical procedure on Patient #1 without having the personal ability to admit his patient to a hospital or to follow his patient's progress in the hospital in the event complications, such as an infection, should occur. He also concluded that Respondent's failure to have another orthopedic surgeon available to follow the patient while in the hospital was below standards as well. This opinion was shared by Petitioner's other expert, Dr. Visconti, a board certified orthopedic surgeon who, by his own admission, however, is not a hand surgeon specialist. Respondent's expert, Dr. Angelides, a board certified orthopedic surgeon who specializes exclusively in surgery to the hand and upper extremity, indicated that the presence of a green wound which exudes pus is consistent with infection. The standard of care for treating such an infection consists of cleaning the wound, obtaining cultures of the suspected infection, and seeing the patient again within a day or two for follow-up examination. In Angelides' opinion, Respondent's leaving the bandage on Patient #1's hand from the time of surgery on February 17 through February 24, without taking it off to check on the course of infection was not the way he would have handled the situation. However, he did not go so far as to state the Respondent's failure to do so was inappropriate, and he could find no impropriety in the way Respondent managed this case. Recognizing that the case presented here was about as severe an example of Dupuytren's Contracture as can be seen, Dr. Angiledes opined that the result achieved by Respondent was quite good considering the severity of the problem. He was not put off by the development of necrosis here, accepting that as a common complication in cases of this nature. He was satisfied by Respondent's calling in an infectious disease specialist and with the continuation of antibiotics administration after discharge through home health care. In his opinion, the surgery was appropriate and the ensuing complications common. The admission of the patient through an intermediary was not, to him, inappropriate so long as, as here, the patient continued to be seen by an infectious disease specialist. In substance, Dr. Angelides could see no problems with this case that were not properly handled and nothing that could have been done that was not done.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case finding Respondent not guilty of the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and ordering it dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted and incorporated herein. - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8. - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11. - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. & 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. 26. & 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. 28. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. 30. & 31. Accepted. 32. - 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. 36. - 38. Accepted and incorporated herein. 39. & 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. & 42. Accepted. 43. Accepted and incorporated herein. 44. & 45. No more than recitations of evidence. & 47. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as a classification of Respondent's treatment as "inappropriate." The deposition cited as authority for that comment does not support it. However, the action described and the time frame in question are accurately noted. Accepted. Accepted as a recitation of the witness' testimony. Rejected as to the description "well supported." & 52. Accepted as restatements of testimony. Accepted. See "50" above. Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not an evidentiary Finding of Fact. - 14. Accepted as restatements of testimony. 15. - 18. Accepted as restatements of testimony. 19. & 20. Accepted as restatements of testimony. 21A. - O. Not proper Findings of Fact. These are more Proposed Conclusions of Law which are drawn by the Hearing Officer independently in that portion of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Steven A. Rothenberg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 9325 Bay Plaza Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33610 Paul B. Johnson, Esquire Johnson & Johnson, Post Office Box 3416 Tampa, Florida 33601 Sam Power Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency for Health care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Manatee Eye Clinic owns land adjacent to its existing offices and in close proximity to Manatee Memorial Hospital, on which it proposes to construct a freestanding ambulatory surgery center for ophthalmic surgery. On December 13, 1983, Manatee Eye Clinic filed an application for a certificate of need with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) for approval of a capital expenditure in the amount of $627,640 for construction of a freestanding ambulatory surgery center for ophthalmic surgery. On April 27, 1984, Petitioner received written notice that the Department had denied the application. Manatee Eye Clinic consists of five practicing ophthalmologists in Manatee County, each of whom are [sic] duly licensed and provide quality ophthalmic care in the area. Manatee Eye Clinic, and the members thereof, have available sufficient resources, including health manpower, management personnel, as well as funds for the capital and operating expenditures for the project. Petitioner's proposed medical facility would be constructed in a sufficiently cost-effective manner and makes adequate provision for conservation of energy resources and incorporates efficient and effective methods of construction. Should this certificate of need be granted, Manatee Eye Clinic will accept Medicaid, Medicare, third-party pay, private pay, and charity care. The relevant service area for the proposed facility is Manatee County. The five ophthalmologists at MEC perform approximately 1,200 eye surgeries per year involving cataract removal and lens implant. At present all of these surgeries are performed at Manatee Memorial Hospital. The founder of MEC, Dr. Robert E. King, has twice served as chief of surgery at Manatee Memorial. He is presently a director on the board of directors of the company that recently purchased Manatee Memorial Hospital and removed it from its former status of a not-for-profit hospital to its current status as a for-profit hospital. If this application is granted, Manatee Memorial Hospital will lose all of these patients. Cataract eye surgery, as it is performed today, is ideally performed in an outpatient surgery setting. The five ophthalmologists currently perform an additional 600 outpatient surgical procedures per year in the existing clinic. These procedures would be performed in the freestanding surgery facility if this application is approved. Manatee Memorial Hospital is located one city block from MEC. L. W. Blake Memorial Hospital, some seven miles from MEC, has five operating rooms available for outpatient surgery but is not currently used by any of the doctors at MEC. Additionally, Ambulatory Surgical Center/Bradenton was licensed in December, 1982. This facility has not been used by MEC doctors. During the latest reporting period, 1983/1984, Manatee County and the Ambulatory Surgery Center performed the following procedures; Hospital Inpatient Outpatient Total L. W. Blake Memorial Hospital 8,800 2,752 11,552 Manatee Memorial Hospital 6,766 1,654 8,420 Ambulatory Surgery Center -- 1,525 1,525 TOTALS 15,566 5,931 21,497 (Exhibit 19) There is no shortage of operating rooms in Manatee County available for outpatient surgery. Petitioner's primary argument against using the operating rooms at Manatee Memorial Hospital are: operating room nurses are rotated and this results in nurses not being as well qualified as they would be if their duties were limited to ophthalmic surgery; eye surgery is generally elective and such surgery may be bumped from a scheduled operation by emergency general surgery; the patients are generally older than 65 and are less comfortable in hospital surroundings than they would be at an outpatient surgical facility; access to the ambulatory surgical center would be easier for these elderly patients than is access to the existing hospitals for the same outpatient surgery; the hospital charges for the outpatient surgery are approximately twice the charges proposed by Petitioner; and Medicare will pay 100 percent of the charges in a freestanding surgical facility (up to a maximum) but only pays 80 percent in a hospital setting, thereby making the use of a freestanding facility cheaper for the patient and for Medicare. MEC doctors currently use their own scrub nurses during eye surgeries performed at Manatee Memorial Hospital leaving only the circulating nurse to be provided by the hospital. No incident was cited wherein one of Petitioner's patients was "bumped" from a scheduled operation. The complication rate for cataract surgery has dropped from 10 percent to 0.1 percent in recent years as surgical procedures have improved. As proposed, the partnership owning MEC will erect and own the surgery center, will lease the equipment, most of which is presently owned by MEC, to the Petitioner; and the rent for the building will be a fixed amount per month plus 50 percent of the net operating profits of Petitioner. Proposed charges by the freestanding surgery center will be $904 per patient (for cataract removal and lens implant) This does not include the surgeon's fee. There are no methodology rules to determine need for a freestanding outpatient surgery facility. DHRS has consistently determined need for ambulatory surgery centers by taking the most recent number of surgical procedures performed in all inpatient and outpatient facilities in the county and dividing it by the county's base population for the latest year, here 1983. This gives the rate of surgeries per 1,000 population for the latest year for which statistics are available and is projected forward to the second year of operation (here 1987). The same is done for outpatient surgeries. DHRS uses the figure of 29 as the percentage of surgeries that can be performed in an outpatient setting to determine the need for outpatient surgery facilities in 1987. From this is subtracted the number expected to be performed in existing hospital and freestanding outpatient facilities to determine net need through 1987 for freestanding outpatient facilities. Applying this procedure, to which Petitioner generally concurs, except for the 29 percent factor, the following need is shown. The 1983 population of Manatee County is 162,997. 21,497 surgeries performed in 1983 x 1000 4 162,997 131.9 surgeries per 1000 population. The 1987 projected population of Manatee County is 182, 120. Multiplying this population by 131.9 per 1000 equals 24,061 surgeries expected to be performed in Manatee County in 1987. HRS estimates that 29 percent of these surgeries could be performed in an outpatient setting in 1987. Multiplying 24,051 by .29 equals 6,978 outpatient procedures possible. In 1983 there were 4,406 outpatient surgeries performed in a hospital setting in Manatee for a rate per thousand of 27. Multiplying this rate by the projected population for 1987 yields 4,931 outpatient surgeries that can be performed in a hospital setting in 1987. Subtracting from this number the projected outpatient surgeries to be performed in a hospital setting in 1987 (6,978 - 4,931) shows 2,047 to be performed in a freestanding facility. Ambulatory Surgery Center performed 1,525 procedures from June, 1983, to May, 1984. When this is projected to 1987, Ambulatory Surgery Center is expected to perform 1,715 surgical procedures. Substracting this from 2,047 leaves 332 procedures as a net need through 1987. This is below the pro forma break-even point of Petitioner and indicates the project is not financially possible. The 29 percent factor was obtained from American Hospital Association report of 1981. In 1981, 18 percent of the total surgeries were done on an outpatient basis while it was estimated that 20 to 40 percent of all surgeries could be performed on an outpatient basis. DHRS averaged the 18 percent and the maximum of 40 percent to arrive a mean of 29 percent to project need for outpatient surgery facilities. The latest figures from the American Hospital Association report is for 1982 and this shows the latest percentage of surgeries performed on an outpatient basis to be 20.8 percent. If this figure is averaged with 40 percent, the mean would rise to 30.4 percent. This is the percentage Petitioner contends should be used. Using this figure, the outpatient surgeries possible in 1987 would rise to 7,315 and a need for 669 procedures would exist in 1987. This would meet the higher break-even number presented by Respondent of 556 procedures for the second year of operation. It is noted that the experts' estimated surgical procedures that could be performed in an outpatient setting varied from 20 to 40 percent. In arriving at the 29 percent used DHRS averaged the latest actual percentages available in 1981 with 40 percent to obtain an arbitrary figure of 29 percent to use in calculating need for outpatient facilities. It is further noted that between June of 1983 and May Of 1984 Manatee Memorial Hospital performed 1,654 outpatient surgery procedures and 6,766 inpatient surgery procedures (Exhibit 14) and Blake Memorial Hospital performed 2,752 outpatient surgery procedures and 8,800 inpatient surgery procedures (Exhibit 15). Accordingly, 23.8 percent of Blake's surgery procedures are done as outpatient surgery and 19.6 percent of the surgeries performed at Manatee Memorial Hospital are done as outpatient surgeries. If the 1,200 outpatient surgeries per year performed at Manatee Memorial Hospital by MEC had been removed during this period, the percentage of outpatient surgery would have been reduced to 6.3 percent for Manatee Memorial Hospital. No evidence was presented regarding the number of ophthalmic surgeries that were performed at Blake Memorial Hospital during this period. Regardless of the potential loss of outpatient surgery cases at Blake if this application is granted, the percentage of outpatient surgeries performed in a hospital setting in Manatee County is, according to the latest data available, 22.1 percent (combining Blake and Manatee Memorial). Using 29 percent of the total surgeries projected for 1987 in Manatee County to obtain an estimate of the outpatient surgery that can be expected to be performed in a hospital setting in 1987 results in a much higher figure than the current growth rate in outpatient surgeries would suggest. Accordingly, I find a 29 percent factor more credible than a higher percentage would be in forecasting need for outpatient surgical facilities in 1987. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that most ophthalmic surgery today is performed in an outpatient setting. This was not true only a few years ago. Accordingly, there can be little additional growth resulting from ophthalmic surgery procedures going from inpatient to outpatient procedures. As a consequence, future growth in outpatient surgery must come from other surgical procedures.
Findings Of Fact The Department hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the findings of fact set forth in the Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order directly Children's Medical Services for District VII to authorize coverage for the reconstructive surgery recommended and proposed by J. Barry Boyd, M.D. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of November, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerry L. Clark, Esquire HRS District Seven Assistant Legal Counsel 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Ms. Cynthia Thibeault 1415 Overdale Street Orlando, Florida 32817 David Pingree Secretary 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================ =
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Central Florida Surgical Ambulatory Center be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown, is a graduate of the University of Queensland Medical School in Brisbane, Australia. He holds the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery. Doctorates of Medicine, under the British system, are reserved for specialists. Nonetheless, the medical training Petitioner received equates to that leading up to the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine in the United States, and he is a physician and licensed as such in several states. He has completed residencies in general and thoracic surgery in Australia and the United States and has taken advanced training in cardiovascular and thoracic surgery at Emory University. Immediately before coming to the University of South Florida, (USF), Dr. McKeown was an Assistant Professor of Surgery at the University of Washington. In mid to late 1988, Dr. McKeown responded to an advertisement USF had placed in the Journal of the American Medical Association seeking applicants qualified for appointment at the Associate Professor level "... to join the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida College of Medicine as the Chief of Cardiothoracic Surgery." He was selected for the position and joined the faculty effective May 1, 1989. All the correspondence leading up to Petitioner's joining the University faculty referred not only to his appointment as Associate Professor but also his assignment as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Only the actual state employment contract described his employment exclusively as Associate Professor and made no mention of the Chief position. Under these circumstances, Petitioner did not gain any proprietory interest in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Dr. McKeown held the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division until April, 1994, when, as a result of a decision made by the Chairman of the school's Department of Surgery, he was replaced as Chief and that position was filled, on a temporary basis, by the Department Chair. Petitioner claims that when he arrived at USF to assume the directorship, an administrative position, he saw an opportunity to develop the position into something significant. He contends he would not have come to USF unless he was to be the Chief of the Division as there was no appeal to him in a position as a general faculty member. He wanted an opportunity to budget, hire people, and develop plans and programs, and in order to advance in academic medicine, one must, at some point, hold an administrative position. Apparently the Department of Surgery had experienced a rapid turnover in faculty. It is not clear whether this caused or was the result of a dispute with administrators and medical staff at Tampa General Hospital, (TGH), where much of the clinical medical school activity is carried on. However, the program was recognized as being weak in cardiothoracic surgery, and this condition offered Petitioner the challenge he wanted. In his five years as Chief, Petitioner increased both the number and quality of personnel and revenues considerably. He developed affiliations with several foreign universities and recruited qualified people, built up the laboratory, secured more grants, developed a program of continuing medical education and raised the examination scores of the school's graduates. He opened new clinical programs and built up both billings and collections to the point where the program revenues were increased at least 2 to 5 times. By 1992- 1993, the Division was making money and generating a surplus and still used clinic funds to support research. During his tenure as Chief of the Division, Petitioner served under two Department of Surgery chairmen. The first was Dr. Connar, the individual who recruited him; and the incumbent is Dr. Carey, the individual who removed him. Petitioner asserts that at no time during his tenure in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division was he ever told, by either Department Chairman, that his performance was unsatisfactory. All Division heads within the Department were, from time to time, counseled about personnel costs, and Petitioner admits he had some differences with Dr. Carey about that subject and some other financial aspects of the job, but nothing different than anywhere else in academia. Petitioner was removed by Dr. Carey based in part upon his alleged inability to get along with people. Though he claims this is not true, he admits to three areas of conflict. The first related to his objection to transplants being accomplished by unqualified surgeons which, he alleges, Dr. Carey permitted to further his own ends. The second related to the pediatric heart transplant program for which Petitioner supported one candidate as chair and Dr. Carey supported another. The third related to Petitioner's reluctance to hire a physician whom Dr. Carey wanted to hire but to whom Petitioner purportedly objected. Of the three areas of dispute, only the first two came before his removal, but he contends at no time was he advised his position was a problem for the Department. By the same token, none of Petitioner's annual performance ratings reflected any University dissatisfaction with his performance. At no time was he ever rated unsatisfactory in any performance area; and prior to his removal, he had no indication his position as Chief of the Division was in jeopardy. Dr. Carey indicates he did counsel with Petitioner often regarding his attitude but did not rate him down because he hoped the situation would improve. Dr. McKeown was called to meet with Dr. Carey in his office on April 12, 1994. At that meeting, Dr. Carey was very agitated. He brought up the "Norman" incident and indicated he was going to remove Petitioner as Chief of the Division. Dr. McKeown admits to having made an inappropriate comment regarding Dr. Norman, another physician, to a resident in the operating room while performing an operation. He also admits that it was wrong to do this and apologized to Dr. Norman both orally and in writing shortly thereafter. Dr. Norman accepted his apology and Petitioner asserts that after his removal, Dr. Norman called him and assured him he, Norman, had not prompted the removal action. Dr. Norman did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Carey removed Petitioner from his position as Chief because of the comments he had made regarding Dr. Norman. Almost immediately after the meeting was concluded, Dr. Carey announced in writing his assumption of the Chief's position, in which position he remained until he hired Dr. Robinson as Chief in April, 1995. Petitioner found out that Carey's threat to remove him had been carried out the following day when his nurse told him his removal had been announced at the Moffett Cancer Center. He thereafter heard other reports of his removal from other sources, and based on what had happened, concluded his removal was intended to be and constituted a disciplinary action for his comment regarding Dr. Norman. He was not advised in advance of Carey's intention to impose discipline nor given an opportunity to defend himself before the action was taken. He claims he was not given any reason for his removal before or at the time of his dismissal. It is found, however, that the removal was not disciplinary action but an administrative change in Division leadership. Dr. McKeown at first did nothing about his removal, believing it would blow over. However, after he heard his removal had been publicized, he called several University officials, including a Vice-President, the General Counsel and the Provost, to see how the matter could be handled. He claims he either got no response to his inquiries or was told it was a Medical College problem. He then met with the Dean of the College of Medicine who indicated he could do nothing. After he was removed as Division Chief, Petitioner's salary remained the same as did his supplement from his practice. He claims, however, his removal has had an adverse effect on his reputation in the medical and academic communities. It is his belief that people now feel something is wrong with him. Dr. Carey's blunt announcement of his assumption of the Chief's position, without any reasons being given for that move or credit being given to Petitioner for his past accomplishments has had an impact on his ability to work effectively. After his removal, he received calls from all over the world from people wanting to know what had happened. The removal has, he claims, also made it more difficult for him to get grants and has, thereby, adversely impacted his ability to do productive research. In addition, his removal made it difficult for him to carry out his academic duties. His specialty is still presented in student rotations, only in a different place in the medical curriculum. Dr. McKeown has sought reinstatement to the administrative position of Chief of the Division. He is of the opinion that Dr. Carey's action in removing him from his position as Division Chief was capricious and damaging to the University as well as to his career. Petitioner admits he could have been less confrontational in the performance of his duties as Division Chief, but he knows of no complaints about him from TGH, All Children's Hospital or the VA Hospital. There are, however, letters in the files of the Department Chairman which indicate some dissatisfaction with Petitioner's relationships in some quarters and, as seen below, there were signs of dissatisfaction from both TGH and All Children's Hospitals. Petitioner admits he may have been somewhat overbearing or abrasive, but neither his alleged inability to properly steward finances nor his alleged inability to get along with people were mentioned to him at the time of dismissal or before. After Dr. Carey assumed the Chairmanship of the Department of Surgery in July, 1990, he saw Dr. McKeown frequently on an official basis at first. A Chief, as Petitioner was, has many and varied functions such as administration, teaching, fiscal, research, clinic administration and the like. People skills are important because of the necessary interface with colleagues, faculty, administrators and the public. When Dr. Carey came to USF, Dr. McKeown had not been in place very long, and the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery was not doing well financially. There were contract negotiations going on with the VA Hospital which were not going well, at least partly because, Dr. Carey asserts, Dr. McKeown had made some major unacceptable demands. As a result, Dr. Carey stepped in, along with Dr. Benke, who was very effective in dealing with the VA, and as a result, an agreement was reached which resulted in somewhere between $275,000 and $300,000 per year coming in which put the Division in the black. Dr. Carey recalls other instances indicating Dr. McKeown's inability to get along with others. One related to the relationship with TGH previously mentioned. TGH had made a decision to use a particular physician as head of its transplant program because, allegedly, Dr. McKeown had so angered private heart patients they would not let him be appointed even though Dr. McKeown was Dr. Carey's choice. As it turned out, Dr. Carey convinced the TGH Director and another physician to agree to a plan whereby Dr. McKeown would be head of the program 50 percent of the time. This would have been good for the University, but Dr. McKeown refused indicating that if he could not be in charge all of the time, he would not be in charge at all. Another incident relates to All Children's Hospital. That institution wanted to initiate a pediatric heart transplant program and a meeting was set up to which Dr. McKeown was invited. Petitioner so infuriated the community surgeons attending that meeting they would not work with him, and without his, Carey's, efforts, Dr. Carey claims the program was doomed to failure. As a result, Carey asked Dr. Nevitsky to help get the program started. This gave the USF an opportunity to participate in the program, but when Nevitsky left, they lost it. Still another example, according to Dr. Carey, is the fact that some surgeons on staff have called to complain about Dr. McKeown's attitude and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate and about his demands for service and staff, all of which creates friction among the hospital staff. A few days before Dr. Carey removed Petitioner as Chief, he spoke with the Dean of the College of Medicine, a Vice-president of the University, and others who would be impacted, about his concern regarding the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division and, in fact, he had had discussions with other officials even before that time. Long before making his decision to remove Petitioner, Carey spoke of his consideration of possibly shifting the emphasis within the Division to non-cardiac thoracic surgery in place of the cardiac program which Dr. Carey felt was not very successful. He believed the program did not do enough procedures to support the medical school affiliation. Dr. Carey chose to dismiss Dr. McKeown as Chief of the Division on April 12, 1994, after learning of McKeown's destructive attack on another surgeon before a junior physician in a public place, an operating room, (the Norman incident). He notes that over the years there was a building concern regarding Dr. McKeown's abilities as an administrator, and this incident with Dr. Norman was the last straw. Dr. Carey had received complaints about Petitioner from other physicians, all of which he discussed with Dr. McKeown. Finally, with the Norman incident, it became abundantly clear that Dr. McKeown's capabilities as a leader had diminished to the point where a change was necessary. Before he dismissed Petitioner, and during the investigation which led up to the dismissal, Dr. Carey admits, he did not give Dr. McKeown any opportunity to give any input to the decision. By the time Carey met with McKeown on April 12, 1994, his mind was made up. The Norman incident was demonstrative of what Carey perceived as McKeown's lack of supervisory ability, and it was that factor which led Carey to the ultimate decision to remove McKeown. He felt it necessary to act then and not leave Dr. McKeown in place during the search for a replacement. Petitioner cites alleged comments made by Carey to others that he would have relieved anyone for doing what Petitioner did in the Norman incident. Dr. Carey cannot recall having made such a statement. He claims he considered disciplinary action against Petitioner for the Norman comments but decided against it. However, it was the last in a series of incidents which caused him to question the propriety of McKeown's placement in the Chief's position, and which ultimately cemented his decision to replace him. Dr. Carey met with Dr. McKeown several times before the dismissal and counseled him about administrative deficiencies in his performance, but he never told Dr. McKeown that unless he improved, he would be dismissed. This is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that he was not warned of his shortcomings or of the administration's dissatisfaction with his performance. Disagreements in conversations between superior and subordinate, meant by the former to be corrective in nature, are not always taken as such by the latter. Dr. Carey did not document any of this in Dr. McKeown's personnel files but put some of the information he received by way of communications from others in the files. These are the letters submitted by the University, pursuant to agreement of the parties, subsequent to the hearing. They contributed to Carey's increasing concern about Dr. McKeown's ability to lead the Division. At no time, however, though he questioned Dr. McKeown's leadership, did Dr. Carey ever question his good faith and sincerity, nor does he do so now. When he finally decided action was necessary, on April 12, 1994, Dr. Carey wrote a memorandum to the Medical College faculty concerning his assumption of the position as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. He also advised Dr. McKeown of his removal. Dr. Carey remained in the Chief's position, holding that title in an administrative capacity and not from a clinical standpoint, for approximately one year, intending to stay in the position only until he could find a fully qualified thoracic surgeon to take the job. After Carey removed Petitioner, he was contacted by the Medical College Dean who asked that he get with McKeown and try to work something out. He thereafter offered Dr. McKeown the position of Chief of the cardiac section of the Division but McKeown declined. Dr. Carey also, on April 26, 1994, wrote to TGH recommending that Dr. McKeown be allowed to have more impact on the hospital's transplant program, pointing out that the change in McKeown's position at the University was occasioned by a need for a change in leadership. According to Dr. Tennyson J. Wright, Associate Provost of the University, disciplinary action against nonunion faculty members is governed by Rule 6C4-10.009, F.A.C., and requires notice of proposed action be given before such disciplinary action is taken. The contract which Dr. McKeown holds and has held since the inception of his tenure at the University, is a standard USF/State University System contract. It reflects Petitioner was hired as an Associate Professor, which is one of the three types of personnel classifications used within the system. These are faculty, administration and support. Petitioner's contract does not refer to his holding the Division Chief position and it is not supposed to. Such a position is an administrative appointment within a Department and a working title used to define the holder's duties, and service in such a position is at the pleasure of the Department Chair. Appointment to or removal from a Chief position is an administrative assignment. The position of Department Chairperson, on the other hand is a separate position and subclassification within the University classification system and is different.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown's, grievance against the University of South Florida School of Medicine arising from his removal as Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery Division in the Department of Surgery be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1832 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Though the documents in question refer to appointment, in actuality the personnel action was an appointment to the faculty with an administrative assignment to the position of Director of the Division. & 10. Accepted. 11. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporate herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. & 27. Accepted. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 32. - 34. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. 35. - 37. Accepted. 38. Rejected as argument. 39. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin H. Hill, III, Esquire William C. Guerrant, Jr., Esquire Danelle Dykes, Esquire Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Tampa, Florida 33601 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Olga J. Joanow, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Noreen Segrest, Esquire General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250
