The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact The facts, as stipulated to by the parties and as set forth above, are hereby adopted.
The Issue Whether certain employees of Respondent, who provided services to Medicaid recipients, met the prior work experience requirement to be certified as targeted case managers ("TCMs").1/ The nine disputed employees are identified in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation as Arian Melgarejo, Isis Lopez, Sadaiky Morejon, Karen Cuellar, Elisa Alonso Knapp, Ilineis Gonzalez Torres, Andres Gutierrez, Ana Sarai Llanes, and Berto Mirabal Lopez.
Findings Of Fact This case involves a Medicaid audit by AHCA of Access, which relates to dates of service from January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014 ("audit period"). During the audit period, Access was an enrolled Medicaid provider and had a valid Medicaid provider agreement with AHCA, Medicaid Provider No. 004073400. As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Access was subject to the duly-enacted federal and state statutes, regulations, rules, policy guidelines, and Medicaid handbooks incorporated by reference into rule, which were in effect during the audit period. The AHCA Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity ("MPI"), pursuant to its statutory authority, conducted an audit of Medicaid claims paid to Access for services to Medicaid recipients. AHCA issued an FAR dated January 4, 2017, MPI Case ID No. 2016-0006148, alleging that Access was overpaid $738,890.52 for certain services that in whole or in part are not covered by Medicaid. In addition, the FAR informed Access that AHCA was seeking to impose a fine of $147,778.11 as a sanction for violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e) and costs pursuant to section 409.913(23), Florida Statutes. The overpayment and sanction amounts sought by AHCA were amended post-FAR to $526,500.11 and $105,300.02. AHCA is designated as the single state agency authorized to make payments for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. This program of medical assistance is designated the "Medicaid Program." See § 409.902, Fla. Stat. AHCA has the responsibility for overseeing and administering the Medicaid program for the State of Florida, pursuant to section 409.913. The Handbook requires that, in order to be certified as a TCM, an applicant must "have a minimum of one year of full time or equivalent experience working with adults experiencing serious mental illness." The Handbook also requires, via the completion and retention of Appendix H, that the provider certify that all of the requirements to be a TCM have been met. Appendix H must be signed by the provider administrator, the case manager, and the case manager's supervisor. There are no AHCA rules or any agency guidance as to exactly what type of work experience with these individuals is required. TCM services include things like coordinating transportation services, obtaining medical records to give to a provider or locating a new provider that may be closer to a recipient's home, things that are not clinical in nature, but which are beyond a recipient's ability to do or his family's ability to assist them with. In fact, Medicaid will not reimburse mental health TCM services for the provision of direct therapeutic, medical, or clinical services. Significantly, the Handbook does not require a provider to secure or maintain an applicant's resume, reference letters, or any particular documentation reflecting work history, nor does it specify who must be contacted to verify prior employment or indicate references need to be contacted at all. The one year of experience does not have to come from an applicant's most recent employer, or even one individual employer. AHCA provides no webinars or training for providers on how to check the work history of an applicant. However, AHCA contends that a provider cannot, in good faith, certify a case manager without verifying that the employee possessed the necessary experience with the target population. AHCA's Audit Procedure Robi Olmstead, an Agency Administrator over the Practitioner Unit at the Bureau of MPI, testified regarding her experience and her supervisory role in the audit of Access. Ms. Olmstead explained that the instant case against Access was opened based on "an analysis . . . from our data detection unit identifying a high number of services billed and high utilization by this provider of targeted mental health . . . case management services." Ms. Olmstead opened the audit, and assigned the matter to Stephanie Gregie, a Medicaid program health care analyst, who obtained a list of claims for 35 random recipients from AHCA's cluster sample program. After the sample was obtained, AHCA then requested the records of the sample recipients from Access. Ms. Gregie requested detailed documentation from Respondent via a Request for Records. The Request for Records included Document Organizational Guidelines. The guidelines requested that Access provide, inter alia, employment applications and/or resumes and evidence of employment background checks. Ms. Gregie determined that the employees at issue all met the regulatory educational requirement. However, she was concerned that the TCMs in dispute lacked the prerequisite experience working with the target population. Upon review of the records provided by Access, Ms. Gregie was disturbed that some job titles listed on the applications or resumes seemed inconsistent with listed job duties. According to Ms. Gregie, the prior work history of the TCMs was not thoroughly "certified" because the reference forms completed by Access' owner, Marieta Garcia de Porto, did not identify the dates of employment, the name of the employer which she contacted, the job title of the individual who verified past employment, or additional details of the conversation. Further, the reference checks generally seemed insufficient to Ms. Gregie because of her belief that the best reference check is through a former employers' human resources department rather than from past supervisors or co-workers. Ms. Gregie was also suspicious of the veracity of the reported work histories because several employees had reference letters signed by different people but which were notarized by the same individual. Some of the reference letters had similar, if not identical, language. Also, many of the employees purportedly had their references checked the day before or the day of hiring. Due to her concerns regarding the certifications provided by Access, Ms. Gregie "did something we typically wouldn't normally do, and that is I developed a verification process in [an] attempt to determine whether the employees were, in fact--did, in fact, have the required experience, and I began to document my own verifications of the employees' work experience with their prior employers." Tr. 48/5-13. Ms. Gregie created a worksheet to document her attempts at employment verification for the TCMs. Ms. Gregie requested additional documentation from Access, which was provided, and she attempted to verify those documents as well. Access' Response Ms. Garcia, as the owner of Access, is also the clinical director and the supervisor of its TCMs. Ms. Garcia, who is a Cuban immigrant, obtained her degree in psychology in Cuba and her master's degree in the United States. She is a licensed mental health counselor. Ms. Garcia had a five-year course of study in Cuba, which included a practicum every semester working with a targeted mental health population and required a thesis. However, her degree was equated to a bachelor's degree in the United States. In Cuba, to begin working as a psychologist, a new graduate does not provide a resume. They only provide a transcript and complete an interview. Ms. Garcia hired the TCMs for Access, whose work histories are in dispute. Ms. Garcia explained that the Handbook does not provide any direction as to how to verify or document the verification of prior work experience for TCMs. She used the process used when she was first hired as a TCM in 2005. She asked each applicant for a resume or job application and three letters of reference, which she maintained in their employment files. Although the Handbook does not require reference letters or notarization, she chose to ask that these letters be notarized because when she immigrated to the United States, all of her documents were required to be notarized. Ms. Garcia then contacted the individuals who signed the letters to verify employment. The TCMs hired by Ms. Garcia were primarily doctors and nurses from Cuba. It did not surprise her that their resumes looked similar because these people worked together in Cuba and likely worked on crafting their resumes together because the use of resumes is not common in the medical profession in Cuba. Further, Ms. Garcia is not a lawyer or a notary, and it did not cause her any concern that the same notary was used for reference letters from different employers. Additionally, three of the TCMs (Arain Melgarejo, Sadaiky Morejon, and Andres Gutierrez) were referred to Ms. Garcia by Yoandes Fuentes, a medical doctor who was employed by Access as a TCM. Dr. Fuentes previously supervised these TCMs at a medical mission in Venezuela as part of a Cuban/Venezuelan program that exchanged the services of Cuban medical professionals for Venezuelan oil. Dr. Fuentes, who was a trusted Access employee, personally verified the one year or more employment of these three TCMS with the adult mental health population in Venezuela. Both Ms. Morejon and Mr. Gutierrez were medical doctors in Cuba. Ms. Morejon is also married to Dr. Fuentes. Based upon the applications/resumes and reference letters submitted and verified by Ms. Garcia, she believed the TCMs all had the requisite work experience and both the TCMs and she certified this on Appendix H for each of the nine TCMs in dispute. The Experience of the Disputed TCMs Arian Melgarejo As discussed above, Arian Melgarejo was referred to Ms. Garcia by Dr. Fuentes. Mr. Melgarejo obtained a doctoral degree in dental surgery in Cuba in 2007. He is not licensed in the United States as a dentist. This makes him subject to the three-year work requirement applicable to TCM applicants without a degree in a "human services" field. Dr. Fuentes supervised Mr. Melgarejo at the Venezuelan medical mission, Comprehensive Diagnostic Center ("Comprehensive"), from October 2009 through May 2011. Comprehensive provided medical and mental health services to poor people in rural areas of Venezuela. Denia Lazo-Santalla, who is employed by Access as a TCM supervisor, also testified regarding the work at Comprehensive. As a medical doctor from Cuba, Ms. Lazo-Santalla also worked at the mission and is familiar with its workload. Comprehensive has locations in rural areas all over Venezuela. They are generally the sole providers of health care in these areas, so any of the physicians or, in Mr. Melgarejo's case, a dentist, working there would see a significant population of adults with serious mental illnesses. Mr. Melgarejo's employment records include a reference letter from Katia Avila Garcia, who acknowledged working with Mr. Melgarejo at the mission. Mr. Melgarejo's resume also lists two employment stints at Isidro de Armas Psychiatric Hospital in Cuba from January 2000 through September 2002, and from September 2007 through September 2009. A printout of Isidro de Armas Psychiatric Hospital on the InfoMED website shows that its mission is providing specialized medical care (treatment and rehabilitation) to chronic psychotic patients. Ms. Lazo-Santalla testified that, as a medical doctor in Havana, Cuba, she was familiar with Isidro de Armas Psychiatric Hospital and that it is a huge facility that provides all kinds of services, including dental care, to psychiatric patients. Ms. Gregie disputes that Mr. Melgarejo meets the three- year experience requirement based upon her own "verification" process. According to Ms. Gregie, dentists do not typically provide mental health services. She contacted the practice administrator at SOMA Medical Center ("SOMA"), which was identified on Mr. Melgarejo's resume as his last place of employment. Mr. Melgarejo claims to have worked there as a social worker, "[a]ssisting chronic patients who were diagnosed with psychiatric illnesses to receive the proper treatment and link them with outside recommended services." According to Ms. Gregie, she was told that SOMA does not employ social workers and that Mr. Melgarejo never worked there. However, even discounting the time alleged worked at SOMA, Mr. Melgarejo's experience with adult mental health patients was verified by Dr. Fuentes. Further, Ms. Gregie made no effort to independently verify his employment at Comprehensive or Isidro de Armas Psychiatric Hospital. Sadaiky Morejon Sadaiky Morejon was a medical doctor in Cuba. Ms. Morejon and Dr. Fuentes are husband and wife, and they worked together in almost every place. This accounts for the similarity in resumes. According to her resume, Ms. Morejon worked at the mission in Venezuela, Comprehensive, from August 2007 through May 2011. As discussed herein, she worked with and was supervised during part of this time by Dr. Fuentes, who referred her to Ms. Garcia for employment. A reference letter from Dr. Fuentes, dated February 22, 2017, provides extensive detail of Ms. Morejon's work during her time at the mission in Venezuela. According to her resume, Ms. Morejon also worked at Psychiatric Clinic of Cinefuegos in Cuba from April 2007 to August 2007. A printout of the profile for Psychiatric Clinic of Cienfuegos from the InfoMED website states that the hospital has a mission of providing specialized medical care (treatment and rehabilitation) for chronic psychotic patients. Ms. Morejon's resume lists her most recent employment at Miami Community Health Center. Ms. Gregie was unable to locate a business by that name. In case Ms. Morejon confused the name with Miami Behavioral Health Center, now known as Banyan Health Center ("Banyan"), Ms. Gregie contacted Banyan but was told that Ms. Morejon was not employed there. However, Ms. Morejon's file includes a 2013 reference letter from her former supervisor, Dr. Ernesto Fernandez, which reflects that she worked for him at the address she listed as "Miami Community Health Center." Ms. Gregie discounted this reference because it did not include the specific dates of employment or a detailed description of job duties. Further, Ms. Gregie noted that Ms. Morejon's resume is "highly similar" to that of Dr. Fuentes. She found it improbable that they would have the same career path with the same employers. Apparently, she did not account for the fact that they are husband and wife. Nor did Ms. Gregie attempt to verify Ms. Morejon's employment in Cuba or Venezuela. Berto Mirabal Lopez Berto Mirabal Lopez obtained a bachelor's degree in nursing from the University of Havana, Cuba, in 2009. Mr. Lopez worked as a charge nurse in the crisis stabilization unit at Hospital Miguel Enriquez in Havana, Cuba, from December 2009 through April 2011. One of his reference letters was from Marleny Almeida dated October 12, 2013. After the FAR was issued, Ms. Garcia contacted Ms. Almeida and told her that Mr. Lopez was not approved in the Medicaid audit. Ms. Almeida authored a second reference letter dated February 14, 2017, that provided more specific detail of the work that Mr. Lopez did as a nurse in the crisis stabilization unit at Miguel Enriquez Hospital with the mentally ill. Miguel Enriquez Hospital is a large hospital in Havana with multi-specialties, including psychiatric and mental health services. Mr. Lopez' employment there satisfies the one-year work requirement. Mr. Lopez' resume also states that he worked as a mental health technician at Citrus Health Network from 2011 until the time of his application. However, the Citrus Human Resources Department told Ms. Gregie they had no record of him working there. She also found the three reference letters provided not credible because they do not specify where these individuals worked with Mr. Lopez, are similar in format, and, although written on different dates, were all signed by the same notary on the same date. Ms. Gregie did not attempt to verify Mr. Lopez' employment in Cuba. Isis Lopez Isis Lopez was personally known to Ms. Garcia prior to Ms. Lopez' hiring because they studied psychology together in Cuba. They are also family friends. Ms. Lopez' application reflects that she worked at Centro de Orientacion y Atencion Psicologica ("COAP") at the University of Havana, Cuba from 2000 to 2008. COAP is a center for psychological counseling. Ms. Garcia was personally familiar with Ms. Lopez' work experience at COAP. One of the reference letters is from Alain Abreau, verifying that Ms. Lopez worked as a counselor under his supervision at COAP from January 2000 through March 2001. Her resume indicates she worked there from 2000 to 2008, and Mr. Abreau acknowledged that she continued to work there, but no longer under his supervision. Ms. Gregie attempted to speak with Mr. Abreau but Mr. Abreau hung up on her after she announced herself, and despite immediately calling back, she was only able to leave a voicemail requesting a return call, which did not occur. Ms. Garcia knows Mr. Abreau personally because she used to work with him at Miami Behavioral Health Center (now called "Banyan") when she was employed as a TCM in 2005. In February 2017, Ms. Garcia called Mr. Abreau and told him that Ms. Lopez was not approved by Medicaid, and that is why Mr. Abreau wrote the detailed reference letter. Mr. Abreau was told by Ms. Garcia that he would receive a call from AHCA to verify, and he did. Mr. Abreau told Ms. Garcia that the call broke off and, when Mr. Abreau called the same number back, it was a general line for AHCA and he did not know who to ask for. Mr. Abreau did not get a voicemail from Ms. Gregie. According to Ms. Lopez' resume, she worked from August 2011 until August 2012 as a TCM at Miami Behavioral Health Center. Ms. Gregie contacted Ana Marie Rodriguez in the Human Resources Department at Banyan and was told that Ms. Lopez actually only worked there for two months. Ms. Rodriguez signed and returned a form confirming this. Ms. Gregie questions why Ms. Lopez would make a misrepresentation about her employment at Banyan if she in fact already had the requisite experience from her employment in Cuba. Although it is understandable that these interactions with Mr. Abreau and Banyan would raise Ms. Gregie's suspicion, it does not invalidate either Ms. Garcia's personal knowledge of Ms. Lopez' course of study and her work at COAP, or the letter provided by Mr. Abreau, verifying more than a year of experience working with the target population. Elisa Alonso Knapp Elisa Alonso Knapp has a bachelor's degree in psychology and a master's degree in human resource management. Her course of study in Cuba to obtain her psychology degree would have included work experience with the target population. Ms. Knapp's resume listed her most recent place of employment as New Life Staffing, Inc. The resume recites her work there as including "case management assistance to adults and elderly with chronic mental disorders." Staffing agencies generally do not provide direct mental health services. The other positions on her resume are all human resource positions. Access' Employment Reference Check dated May 12, 2014, listed only three names, three telephone numbers, and three different years of experience. Ms. Knapp listed Oscar Villegas Flores as a reference. When Ms. Gregie spoke with Mr. Villegas Flores, he admitted that Ms. Knapp was not a case manager and did not provide TCM services. Post-FAR, Access also offered a letter from Reinaldo Carnota in support of Ms. Knapp's experience. The letter stated that Ms. Knapp worked as a psychotherapist at Sanatorio Los Cocos, Santiago de las Vegas, Cuba, from July 1995 to December 1997. When Ms. Gregie spoke with Mr. Carnota, he was unable to remember the name of the place of employment where he worked with Ms. Knapp and was "evasive." Ms. Knapp also provided reference letters from Emeterio Santovenia, Lissett Nardo, and Ana-Elvy Hernandez Cordero. According to Ms. Cordero, Ms. Knapp worked as a volunteer psychologist from 2009 to 2010 at Docent Polyclinic in Havana, Cuba, working with elderly patients suffering psychiatric disorders. Ms. Nardo stated that Ms. Knapp worked as a volunteer at the Psychology College of Havana University assisting elderly mental health patients in accessing services. Ms. Gregie did not contact these three additional references. Ms. Knapp attested to her one year of required experience on the Appendix H form. Although it is clear that Ms. Knapp did not have recent psychology experience, her training and letters of reference reflect that she had worked with the target population for at least one year. Karen Cuellar Karen Cuellar obtained a bachelor's degree in psychology in Cuba. Her resume states that she worked at Community House in Havana as a mental health counselor from June 2006 through September 2008. This is supported by a notarized reference letter from Lissette Gallardo which states that Ms. Cuellar worked with adults with severe mental disorders. Ms. Cuellar's resume lists her most recent employment as the Chrysalis Center as a "targeted case manager." However when Ms. Gregie contacted Chrysalis Center she was told that they do not employ case managers, they do not provide mental health services, and that Ms. Cuellar was never employed by them. Although this deception places the validity of Ms. Cuellar's resume in doubt, Ms. Gregie did not attempt to verify Ms. Cuellar's employment with Community House which, standing alone, meets the experience requirement. Ana Sarai Llanes Ana Sarai Llanes holds a master's degree in psychology from Cuba. According to Ms. Garcia, Ms. Llanes' course of study required a practicum that meets the requirements of working with the target population. Ms. Garcia also indicated she personally knew Ms. Llanes. Ms. Llanes' resume listed her last "Experience" as volunteer community work for Sion Baptist Church. The resume further cited this as case management work, including "[a]ssisting elderly and adults to access community resources." Ms. Gregie determined Ms. Llanes was ineligible as she was unable to locate the Sion Baptist Church in her research. She also testified that in her experience, she never heard of voluntary case management services or professional mental health services being provided at a church. She further stated that the services listed on the resume, such as "DCF, LIHEAP, Logisticare, and housing applications" are the exact services Respondent provides to all recipients which led her to conclude this experience was fabricated. Post-FAR, Access offered a letter of reference from Moriama Alfonso. Ms. Garcia personally knows Ms. Alfonso, who was Ms. Llanes' supervisor at COAP in Havana. Ms. Gregie spoke with Ms. Alfonso via an interpreter and determined the letter was non-credible because Ms. Alfonso could not remember the name of the employer where she worked with Ms. Llanes. Ms. Gregie also determined, based upon her own experience in the mental health field, that Ms. Alfonso's statement that Ms. Llanes provided eight hours per day of direct mental health counseling was not plausible. Ms. Gregie also assumed that COAP was a "cultural center" and did not provide mental health services. However, Ms. Gregie did not attempt to contact COAP or the other references provided by Ms. Llanes regarding her volunteer work with the mentally ill for the "ZunZun" project in Cuba which would provide more than a year of working with the targeted population. Ilineis Gonzalez Torres Ilineis Gonzalez Torres has a doctor of medicine degree from Cuba. In order to obtain her degree, Mr. Torres would have completed a six-month work training program in psychiatry. Ms. Garcia believed Ms. Torres was qualified based on her work as a general doctor at Policlinic "Victoria de Giron" in Havana, Cuba, from 2007 to 2010. "Policlinics" in Cuba are multidisciplinary facilities that include mental health services. A web-profile of Policlinic Victoria de Giron from the InfoMed confirms that mental health services are included. Ms. Garcia also reached out to Dr. Soto for a letter of reference. Dr. Soto verified that she worked with Ms. Gonzalez part-time for a year on a clinical trial regarding patients taking anti-depressants. Ms. Torres also worked from 2004 to 2006 at the COAP center as evidenced by her resume and the reference letter from Idania Garcia Barrios. This is the same facility that Ms. Lopez worked at. Ms. Gregie contacted Ms. Torres' most recently listed employer, Med-Care. Ms. Gregie was told that Ms. Torres worked there as a medical assistant rather than as a "social worker," which is listed on her resume. Ms. Gregie researched Med-Care on-line and determined it provided medical services to the general public, not mental health or TCM services. Ms. Gregie did not attempt to verify Ms. Torres' work in Cuba. i. Andres Gutierrez Andres Gutierrez is a medical doctor from Cuba who was referred to Access by Dr. Fuentes. His medical training would have included a six-month work program in psychiatry with the target population. From 2006 through 2012, Mr. Gutierrez worked at Comprehensive. According to Ms. Gregie, there is nothing to verify this employment or that it complies with the one year of full-time or equivalent experience working with adults experiencing serious mental illness. However, his employment in Venezuela working with patients with mental illness was verified by Dr. Fuentes. Dr. DeLeon is listed as Mr. Gutierrez' supervisor at Miami Beach Medical Group. He provided a letter of reference for Mr. Gutierrez. Ms. Gregie contacted the Human Resources Department at Miami Beach Medical Group and was told that Mr. Gutierrez was not a "case worker" but rather in Quality Assurance where he reviewed medical records. Also, the dates of employment were different than listed on the resume. On this basis, Ms. Gregie decided Mr. Gutierrez' resume was fraudulent. Ms. Gregie did not contact Dr. DeLeon or the other individuals who provided Mr. Gutierrez with a letter of reference.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order incorporating the terms of this Recommended Order as follows: All of the disputed employees shall be allowed, and no Medicaid overpayments shall be based on their failure to have the requisite work experience. Petitioner will not apply an administrative sanction against Respondent. Because AHCA is not the prevailing party in this action, it shall not be entitled to recover any of its costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 2018.
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the£ day of 1=4f=-----·' 2009, m Tallahassee, Florida. r Agency for Health Care Administration 1 Filed July 7, 2009 1:19 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: L. William Porter II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration (Laserfiche) Lewis W. Fishman, Esquire 2 Datran Center 9130 S. Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1121 Miami, Florida 33156-7848 (U.S. Mail) June C. McKinney Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Ken Yon, Bureau Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Diana Coumbe, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance and Accounting 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 922-5873 3
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged by statute with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 455 and 459, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is and at all times material to this case was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, license #OS 0004352, last known address identified as 1232 S.W. 8th Place, Cape Coral, Florida 33991. From 1985 until 1992, the Respondent had a private general medical practice in Fort Myers. In 1991, the Respondent began to exhibit signs of emotional instability. In April 1991, the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) received a report that the Respondent was attempting to locate injectible Demerol allegedly for his own use. This information was forwarded to the Physician's Recovery Network (PRN), but remained unverified. The PRN is a program operated by the health care professions to assist practitioners impaired by mental illness, physical or mental disability or chemical dependence. Demerol is a Schedule II Controlled Substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On July 8, 1991, the DPR again received a report that the Respondent was writing inappropriate prescriptions for patients and obtaining the medication for personal use. This information was again forwarded to the Physician's Recovery Network (PRN), but remained unverified. The PRN contacted the Respondent about the allegation. The Respondent denied the report. In 1992, the Respondent began to exhibit profuse sweating, involuntary muscle jerks, and inattentiveness to his work. Some patients expressed concern to office staff about the Respondent's condition. In 1992, a DPR investigator visited pharmacies in the Fort Myers area. She learned that the Respondent had been contacting area pharmacies in an attempt to locate injectible Demerol. She further learned that the Respondent would arrive at a pharmacy with a Demerol prescription made out to a patient and which he would obtain supposedly on the patient's behalf. She collected a number of such prescriptions which had been filled by pharmacies. Many of the prescriptions were made out for patients at Meadowbrook Manor, a nursing home at which the Respondent had patients. A review of the patient records indicated that none of the patients had been prescribed Demerol. On March 27, 1992, an member of his office staff contacted the Respondent by telephone and determined him to be incoherent. She went to the Respondent's house to ascertain his condition. After gaining entry to the home, she found a number of Demerol bottles in an open dresser drawer, at least one of which was empty. She also discovered syringes in the drawer. The Respondent's eye was blackened. Blood was visible about the bathroom in the house. The staff member determined that although the Respondent had fallen during the night, he was reluctant to seek medical attention. Several hours after the staff member had arrived at the Respondent's house, he was incoherent. She called for an ambulance. The Respondent was subsequently transported to the hospital. Examination of the Respondent clearly indicated that he had suffered a head injury. While in the hospital, the Respondent was examined by a board certified psychiatrist. According to the psychiatrist, the Respondent exhibited substantially impaired memory, was very guarded with his communication and, notwithstanding the injury, indicated his intent to leave the hospital quickly. He was unable to recall the current month and date. He denied prior consumption of alcohol despite lab tests to the contrary. He also denied having previously been chemically dependent, although he had been involved in the intervention of said problem in 1981. The psychiatrist diagnosed the Respondent as having residual organic brain syndrome as a result of his chemical intake. Based on the diagnosis, the psychiatrist recommended that the Respondent begin an inpatient drug rehabilitation program. The psychiatrist also referred the Respondent's impairment to the DPR. In March of 1992, the DPR alerted the PRN about the Respondent's condition. The PRN assigned a local representative to encourage the Respondent to seek treatment. On March 31, 1992, the Respondent entered a treatment program at Palmview Hospital. While in the program, he admitted to having self-injected Demerol. The Respondent was resistant to treatment while at Palmview Hospital. Although he acknowledged having previously received inpatient treatment at another facility, he alternately admitted and denied abusing Demerol. On April 10, 1992, the Respondent discharged himself from Palmview Hospital. The discharge was against the advise of the treating physician at Palmview. At the time of the discharge, PRN representatives discussed the matter with the Respondent. The Respondent stated that he was leaving the inpatient treatment program and was going to being outpatient treatment from the Palmview facility. The treating physician at Palmview told the PRN that the Respondent required three to four weeks of inpatient treatment. It was the opinion of the treating physician that the Respondent was not capable of safely providing medical care to patients at that time. Based on the Palmview information, the PRN instructed the Respondent that he must complete inpatient treatment and that he could not practice medicine until it was decided that he could do so safely. In April 13-16, 1992, the Respondent obtained a second opinion from another physician affiliated with the Addiction Treatment Program at Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami Beach, Florida, where he was examined by a board certified addictionologist. According to the Mount Sinai addictionologist, the Respondent is addicted to Demerol and requires treatment. Based on the Mount Sinai information, the PRN instructed the Respondent not to practice and to seek immediate treatment for his addiction. On April 22, 1992, the Respondent reentered Palmview Hospital. Upon reentry, the Respondent denied using Demerol, but eventually acknowledged using the drug and being chemically dependent. It was determined during the second Palmview admission, that the Respondent was in need of approximately four months in a long term inpatient care treatment facility. On May 22, 1992, the Respondent was admitted to the Talbott-Marsh recovery program. He was diagnosed as having a personality disorder with antisocial, paranoid and narcissistic traits, and to being opiate dependent, On August 3, 1992, the Respondent left the Talbott-Marsh center without completing the program. The records and reports of the Respondent's condition were reviewed by Dr. Roger Goetz, M.D., the director of the PRN. Dr. Goetz, who also has personal knowledge of the Respondent's condition, is certified by the American Association of Addiction Medicine and has extensive experience as a medical doctor and in treating impaired physicians. Dr. Goetz asserted that the Respondent is suffering from a dangerous condition, that he is mentally ill and that he poses a threat to himself and to the public. Dr. Goetz opined that the Respondent is unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients and that his continued practice constitutes an immediate and serious danger to the public health, safety and welfare.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a Final Order determining that Benjamin D. Goldberg, D.O., has violated Section 459.015(1)(w), Florida Statutes, and revoking his license (#OS 0004352) to practice as a physician in the State of Florida. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1553 The Respondent did not file a proposed recommended order. To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 22, 37. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Francesca Plendl, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Benjamin Goldberg, D.O. 1232 South West 8th Place Cape Coral, Florida 33991
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for reenrollment in the Medicaid program should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), is the executive agency with the responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid Program pursuant to Section 409.902, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Rodolfo Alonso (Alonso), provided optical services to Medicaid recipients on behalf of the Agency pursuant to a Medicaid provider contract and Medicaid provider number 0864550100. AHCA determined that Alonso had a felony criminal record. Alonso pled no contest to a felony charge of practicing optometry without a license. Adjudication was withheld, and Alonso was placed on probation. On March 17, 1997, AHCA sent Alonso a letter stating that AHCA was denying Alonso's request to reenroll in the Florida Medicaid Program because of a criminal record of possession of narcotics. The March 17 letter was amended by a letter dated April 8, 1997, stating that the felony referenced was incorrect and the felony record related to carrying a concealed weapon and practicing optometry without a license. Both the March 17 and the April 8 letters stated: Your Medicaid provider number, 086450100, will be canceled on April 16, 1997, pursuant to the terms of Section 409.907(9)(f) and your Medicaid Provider Agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting Petitioner's application for reenrollment in the Medicaid program DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1998.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent HealthSouth Corporation engaged in an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner Mary A. King, and, if so, what relief should be granted to Petitioner, if any.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Mary A. King is a black female born on April 5, 1952. Respondent HealthSouth Corporation operates HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Tallahassee, located in Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner was initially employed by HealthSouth in 1995 as a nurse tech or certified nursing assistant (CNA) in the nursing department. In 1998 she suffered a back injury while performing her regular CNA duties. She received treatment for the injury and returned to work with lifting limitations placed on her by her doctor. The limitations were inconsistent with her duties as a CNA and are still in effect. In 1999 Petitioner requested a transfer to the position of patient transporter aide due to her lifting limitations and concerns over her back injury. Her transfer request was granted, and she began to work as a patient transporter in the physical therapy department. She was pleased with the transfer. As a patient transporter, Petitioner was responsible for transporting patients to and from the locations in the hospital where they received treatment. She was not directly involved in the administration of treatment to patients. Subsequently, Petitioner was transferred from the physical therapy department to the occupational therapy department. Her position and job duties remained the same; the only change was in the types of patients Petitioner transported. On September 1, 2004, new federal regulations went into effect. These regulations directly impacted all in-patient rehabilitation hospitals, limiting the types of patients that HealthSouth could accept. The new regulations had a severe impact on HealthSouth, causing a dramatic drop in the patient census. The 76-bed facility had an average daily census of 65, and occasionally up to 76, prior to the effective date, but only a patient census in the 30s and 40s after the effective date of the new regulations. With the dramatic drop in patient census, HealthSouth had to dramatically reduce costs. Lynn Streetman, Administrator of HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Tallahassee, looked at a variety of ways in which costs could be reduced, including re- structuring contracts with outside vendors, reducing orders of medical supplies, reducing or substituting pharmaceutical orders, discontinuing the use of P.R.N. or as-needed staff, and, ultimately, reducing the workforce at the hospital. Streetman began reducing the workforce through attrition. As positions at the hospital became vacant, they were not filled if they were not critical to the functioning of the hospital and if there would not be a negative impact on patient care. Although reducing the workforce through attrition helped, more workforce reductions were necessary to respond to the hospital's declining patient census. In order to determine what positions to eliminate, Streetman preliminarily reviewed all positions throughout the facility and developed a list of positions she thought could be eliminated with minimal impact on the hospital's operations. The criteria she used included whether the position was a clinical or non-clinical position, whether the position was essential to the operation of the hospital or merely a luxury position, whether the duties of the position could be effectively absorbed by other positions in the hospital, and what impact the elimination of the position would have on patient care. Streetman next met individually with members of the hospital's senior management team to discuss the positions in their respective departments that she had preliminarily identified as appropriate for elimination. She obtained input from the team members as to whether it would be appropriate to eliminate those positions and what impact their elimination would have on the functioning of their respective departments. After she met with the team members to discuss the reduction in force and consider their input, Streetman made the decision to eliminate 13 positions at the hospital in December 2004 and January 2005. Three positions were eliminated in December, and ten were eliminated in January. Streetman was the person responsible for making the final decision about which positions to eliminate. Of those employees affected by the reduction in force, 6 were black and 7 were white. Of those employees affected by the reduction in force, 6 were over 40 years of age, and 7 were under 40 years of age. Each employee whose position was eliminated as a part of the reduction in force was informed that he or she would be eligible to purchase insurance benefits through COBRA for up to 18 months after his or her employment with the hospital ended, each was paid for any accrued paid time off, and each eligible employee received severance benefits in accordance with an identical formula: one week of pay for every year of service up to a maximum of ten years. With the exception of a part-time employee who was not eligible, all employees affected by the reduction in force received benefits, paid time off payments, or severance payments in accordance with these policies. One of the positions selected for elimination was that of patient transporter. When Streetman was employed by HealthSouth, there had been three patient transporters. Two of the three positions had already been eliminated through attrition, and Petitioner was the only remaining patient transporter. Since Petitioner's position was eliminated, HealthSouth has not hired anyone as a patient transporter. Petitioner's position was selected for elimination because it was not essential to the operation of the hospital, was not responsible for any direct patient care, and was a luxury position for the facility. As verification that the elimination of Petitioner's position would not have a negative impact on the level of patient care at the hospital, Streetman considered that therapists at the hospital had already been assisting in the transportation of patients to and from treatment and that the previous reduction of two patient transporters through attrition did not negatively impact patient care at the hospital. Petitioner's job duties were absorbed into the daily work routine of therapists in the outpatient therapy department. Therapists simply transported their own patients rather than have Petitioner (and the other transporters who had previously been phased out through attrition) perform this function for them. Petitioner was informed of the decision to eliminate her position on November 30, 2004, by Donna Crawford, Director of Clinical Services, and Cindy Cox, Occupational Therapy Team Leader. Crawford informed Petitioner that Petitioner's position was being eliminated, that Petitioner would receive severance pay in accordance with her years of service, that Petitioner would be paid for all of her accrued paid time off, and that Petitioner was welcome to apply for any other open position at the hospital for which she was qualified. Crawford also told her that Petitioner was welcome to discuss any open positions with Jackie Chaires, Human Resources Director at the hospital. Petitioner was paid 360 hours of severance pay (nine weeks pay for nine years of service), was compensated for all accrued paid time off, and was sent a letter informing her of her right to purchase insurance under COBRA for up to 18 months after her employment with Respondent had ended. Petitioner also applied for and received unemployment benefits as a result of her job being eliminated. After Crawford advised her that her position had been eliminated, Petitioner went to talk with Jackie Chaires, a black female. Petitioner told Chaires that she did not understand why she had been laid off and asked about any available positions. During that conversation, in an attempt to console Petitioner according to Chaires' affidavit but as an act of discrimination according to Petitioner's testimony, Chaires suggested that Petitioner could also retire and let Petitioner's husband take care of her. At no time did Chaires suggest that Petitioner's husband's situation, his income, or Petitioner's age were factors in HealthSouth's decision to eliminate her position as part of its reduction in force. Moreover, Chaires was not involved in any way in the selection of Petitioner's position for elimination. At some point after being informed that their positions were eliminated, Petitioner, along with Kim Spencer, another employee affected by the reduction in workforce, inquired as to whether there were positions available in the nursing department. However, there were no positions available in that department, and both Petitioner and Spencer were informed that their requests could not be accommodated. Spencer is a white female. HealthSouth has a written policy prohibiting employees from giving letters of recommendation. At some point after being informed that her position was eliminated, Petitioner asked Cynthia Cox, her direct supervisor, for a letter of recommendation. Cox agreed to give her one even though she was uncertain as to the correct procedure, but after ascertaining from the human resources department that a recommendation would be against corporate policy, Cox told Petitioner she could not give her the letter and told Petitioner that it was against corporate policy. That policy is clearly stated in the hospital's employee handbook, which Petitioner had been given. At no time prior to her filing her charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations did Petitioner inform any of her supervisors that she felt she was being discriminated against in any way based on either her race or her age. Patsy Kitchens is a white female who is the same age as Petitioner. HealthSouth terminated her employment at the same time as it terminated Petitioner's employment as part of the same reduction in force.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner failed in her burden of proof and dismissing the petition filed in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary King 1039 Idlewild Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32311 L. Traywick Duffie, Esquire Wesley E. Stockard, Esquire Hunton & Williams, LLP Suite 4100 600 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2216
