Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections as a full-time career service employee. On July 13, 1984, he was ranked as a Correctional Officer I at Florida State Prison (FSP). On March 2, 1990, Petitioner had been placed on workers' compensation due to a back injury. On Thursday, April 5, 1990, Dr. W. David Sikes of the Bradford Chiropractic Center signed a medical release permitting Petitioner to return to light duty on Monday, April 9, 1990. Dr. Sikes was apparently the authorized treating physician to whom the agency had currently obligated itself pursuant to Chapter 440 F.S. [The Florida Workers' Compensation Act]. A previous physician had released Petitioner for full-duty work on April 3, 1990. Petitioner was present in the office of Personnel Manager Marion Bronson on Friday, April 6, 1990. At that time, Mr. Bronson told Petitioner to report for work on the first shift (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) on Monday, April 9, 1990. This meant Petitioner would be doing mail room duty during the day instead of his regular duties on his regular shift of midnight to 8:00 a.m. Petitioner told Mr. Bronson he could not work the first shift due to his needing to be home to take of his invalid wife. To this, Mr. Bronson replied that the first shift was the only light duty available. On Friday, April 6, 1990 Petitioner did not refuse to come in to work the first shift on Monday, April 9, and he did not tell Mr. Bronson that he was already signed out on annual leave for that date. Nonetheless, Mr. Bronson was left with the impression at the end of their meeting that Petitioner would not come back to light-duty work on Monday. Petitioner did not report for work on the first shift on April 9, 10, or 11, 1990 (Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday). On Wednesday, April 11, 1990, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: You have been carried in unauthorized leave without pay status since April 9, 1990. You were also carried on unauthorized leave without pay on April 3, 1990. You are hereby instructed to return to duty at 8:00 a.m. the day after you receive this letter. If you do not return to duty on that date it will be deemed that you have abandoned your position at Florida State Prison and you will be dismissed. In the past, the FSP personnel office usually made further efforts to contact missing employees after such a letter had been sent, but no such attempts were made in this instance. Normally, FSP gives employees an opportunity to call in and rectify absentee problems but deems it abandonment if the employee does not respond. At no time subsequent to April 6, 1990 did Petitioner contact anyone at FSP regarding his absence. Petitioner did not actually receive the April 11 letter until Friday, April 13. Petitioner did not report for work on Saturday, April 14, Sunday, April 15, or Monday, April 16. Saturday would have been a regular workday for Petitioner. However, Petitioner's usual days off were Sunday and Monday, and nothing had been said by Mr. Bronson about altering Petitioner's workdays. On Monday, April 16, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: This is to inform you that in accordance with Section 22A-7.010(2), F.A.C., you have been deemed to have abandoned your position as Correctional Officer I and resigned from the Career Service System effective April 14, 1990. A copy of Section 22A-7.010(2) is enclosed for your information. You have been absent from duty for at least three consecutive workdays without authorized leave as follows: April 10, 11, and 12, 1990. Please be advised that you have been dropped from the payroll effective the close of business April 14, 1990. Unbeknownst to Mr. Bronson, Petitioner had exercised preapproved annual leave for the period of April 10-14, 1990. None of Petitioner's superiors advised Mr. Bronson of this fact. There was no notation to this effect in Petitioner's personnel file in Mr. Bronson's office. It was Mr. Bronson's testimony that it was better personnel management and he would have preferred to have Petitioner drawing annual leave during this period than to be paying him full pay for makeshift light duty. If Petitioner had requested annual leave on April 6, 1990, Mr. Bronson would have granted it. As of April 14, 1990, Petitioner had "banked" 119.75 hours of annual leave time which would have been sufficient to cover his April 10-14, 1990 vacation or "no show" days. Additionally, he also had available 26.5 hours of sick leave but this sick leave was subject to certain deductions and adjustments which had allowed the agency to keep Petitioner on at full pay the previous week while technically he was only eligible for a reduced amount based on workers' compensation. In accord with standard FSP policy, Petitioner had previously submitted an annual leave request form on October 16, 1989 to request leave for the week of April 10 through April 14, 1990. This form had been approved by his immediate superior, who at that time was his shift supervisor, Officer Gaskin. Officer Gaskin was the correct superior to make such approval. Mr. Bronson has nothing to do with the approval of leave under such circumstances. Harry Tison, who became Petitioner's shift supervisor in April 1990 while Petitioner was still out on workers' compensation leave, was not aware of Petitioner's preapproved annual leave until Mr. Bronson's office began making inquiries after the April 16 letter, but at that time, Tison was able to refer to a leave calendar posted in his area which showed that Petitioner was expected to be out on annual leave on those days. From that information, Officer Tison, by reason of his familiarity with the FSP system and hierarchy, could infer that Petitioner's leave had been approved by FSP's highest command figure, "the Colonel." Some witnesses alluded to FSP policy that even preapproved annual leave requests constituted only tentative approval unless the employee checked with his supervisor a week before actually exercising his leave so as to be sure that the preapproved leave had not been revoked due to an employee crunch, but there is no such rule or printed policy of the Department of Corrections or FSP, and the evidence is insufficient to establish such a vague policy as uniform or binding on Petitioner. Also, in this instance, the week before, Petitioner was away from work most of that week on workers' compensation disability, and there is no evidence of any employee crunch which would have altered the prior annual leave approval.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner has not abandoned his position and returning him to the appropriate position with back pay and emoluments, subject to any appropriate setoffs under the Workers' Compensation Act and any mitigation from other employment. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Petitioner has filed only a "Final Argument" and that is essentially legal argument and proposed conclusions of law as opposed to proposed findings of fact which are entitled to a ruling pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. Moreover, the format does not lend itself to intelligible rulings since no sentence is numbered. Respondent's PFOF: 1-6 Accepted. Accepted except for the last sentence, which does not comport with the testimony heard. Accepted. Rejected in FOF 13, which reflects the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accepted but subordinate. - 15 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Perri M. King Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Gloria W. Fletcher, Esquire 515 North Main Street, Suite 300 Post Office Box 1208 Gainesville, Florida 32602 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner was employed by Respondent beginning in 1985 and, at all times material hereto, was supervised by Dr. Frank A. Coliazzi. Petitioner had been made aware of the rules and policy of the Respondent in regard to unauthorized leave of absence. Specifically, Petitioner was counselled in this regard on March 26, 1986, by Dr. Frank A. Colliazzi for his unauthorized leave of absence on March 25, 1986. Petitioner knew, or should have known, that un-authorized leave of absences could result in disciplinary action or the loss of employment through abandonment. Prior to April 14, 1986, Petitioner had a history of unauthorized leave of absences. In fact, Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on April 9 & 11, 1986, after being counselled as late as March 26, 1986 in this regard. Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on April 14, 15 & 16, 1986. Petitioner appeared briefly at the work place on April 15, 1986 but did not go to work and left immediately when requested to work by Dr. Colliazzi, with a promise to return to work the next morning, April 16; 1986, at 8:00 a.m. The Petitioner did not request a leave of absence at this time and did not return to work on April 16, 1986 as promised. Respondent's certified letter of April 16, 1986, informing Petitioner that Respondent considered him to have abandoned his position because of his three (3) consecutive days of unauthorized leave was not received by Petitioner until April 24, 1986 due to Petitioner's failure to notify Respondent of his change of address. However, Petitioner was made aware of the letter and its contents by Maxine Fields on April 21, 1986. Petitioner's failure to return to work on April 17 & 18, 1986, lends support to Respondent's contention that Petitioner had abandoned his job since Petitioner was not aware of Respondent's position on his abandonment until April 21, 1986. At no time relevant to this proceeding was leave requested by Petitioner or granted by Respondent. Although Petitioner received notice of the hearings, he failed to appear at either one and present evidence in rebuttal to Respondent's position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the action of the Respondent in deeming the Petitioner to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service was correct and affirming such action. RESPECTFULLY ENTERED and SUBMITTED this 25th day of November, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2604 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(1), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner: Petitioner did not submit any Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 & 8. 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 & 7. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Judy Waldman, Esquire General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 Barbara Wingo, Esquire Associate General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 James H. Foster 3216 Lancastor Lane Tampa, Florida 33619 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated "for being absent without approved leave," as recommended in the Superintendent of Schools of the School District of Palm Beach County's Petition for Involuntary Resignation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) and support facilities within the jurisdictional boundaries of the School District. Systemwide testing programs in the School District are coordinated by the School District's Department of Research, Evaluation, and Accountability (DREA). At all times material to the instant case, Marc Baron headed DREA. DREA operates a test distribution center. Cherie Boone is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, in charge of the DREA test distribution center. Ms. Boone supervises four employees. As their supervisor, she is "responsible for [among other things, their] time and attendance." Respondent is employed as a materials handling technician with the School District. At all times material to the instant case, he was assigned to work in the DREA test distribution center under the direct supervision of Ms. Boone. As a materials handling technician employed by the School District, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 1227 (NCF&O) and, at all times material to the instant case, has been covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School District and NCF&O (NCF&O Contract). Article 7 of the NCF&O Contract discusses "employees['] contractual rights." It provides as follows: SECTION 1. Probationary Employees All newly hired or rehired employees may be subject to a probationary period of ninety (90) workdays. Employees who have not completed such period of employment may be discharged without recourse. Probationary employees shall not be eligible for any type of leave except accrued sick leave, annual leave, or short term unpaid leave (due to illness) not to exceed five (5) days. SECTION 2. Permanent Employees Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee status shall be continuous unless the Superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). In the event the Superintendent seeks termination of a continuous employee, the School Board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination. The appeals process shall be determined in accordance with Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). Article 8 of the NFC&O Contract addresses the subject of "[m]anagement [r]ights." It provides as follows: NCF&O and its members recognize the responsibility of the District to operate and manage its affairs in all respects in accordance with its responsibilities as established by law and as delegated by the State Board of Education; and the powers of authority which the District has not officially agreed to share by this agreement, are retained by the District. It is the right of the District to determine unilaterally the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organization and operations. It is also the right of the District to manage and direct its employees, establish reasonable rules and procedures, take disciplinary action for proper cause, and relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, provided, however, that the exercise of such rights shall not preclude employees or their representatives from raising grievances, should decisions on the above matters have the practical consequences of violating the terms and conditions of this agreement in force. The District has the sole authority to determine the purpose and mission and the amount of the budget to be adopted by the School Board. The District and NCF&O agree that the District has and retains unaltered, its legal right to select, assign, reassign, or relocate any of its employees, and to carry out its mission under the law and State Board of Education Regulations, unless otherwise specifically enumerated herein. Except to the extent it has been done prior to May 26, 1998, no bargaining unit work which would result in the loss of jobs by members of the bargaining unit, shall be contracted out without prior consultation with the Union. It is understood that changes under this Article may not be arbitrary and capricious, and it is agreed that the District has those rights which are enumerated within Florida Statute 447; however, nothing herein shall relieve the parties of their ability to request impact bargaining. Among the "rules and procedures" that the School District, through the School Board, has established in exercising its "[m]anagement [r]ights" are School Board Directive 3.27 and School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80, which provide, in pertinent part, as follows: School Board Directive 3.27 * * * Resignations. If employees desire to be released from their employment contract the following procedures are to be followed: * * * c. When employees do not report for duty for three (3) consecutive days without notifying their supervisor, the principal/department head will initiate a certified letter to the employee stating that their resignations will be recommended to the School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. * * * Suspension/Termination. The Principal/Department Head may recommend to the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Relations disciplinary action against an employee if the employee commits one or more of the following offenses, including but not limited to: * * * b. Willful absence from duty without leave in violation of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes.[2] * * * Employees included in a bargaining unit are subject to suspension/dismissal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. * * * 6. When a recommendation for suspension and termination is made, the procedures listed in School Board Policy 3.27 shall be followed. * * * School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80 A leave of absence is permission granted by the Board, or allowed under its adopted policies, for an employee to be absent from duty for specified periods of time with the right of returning to employment on the expiration of the leave. All absences of School Board employees from duty shall be covered by leave duly authorized and granted. Leave shall be officially granted in advance by the School Board and shall be used for the purposes set forth in the leave application. Leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. No leave except military leave shall be granted for a period greater than one (1) year. A new leave application may be filed and granted at the expiration of leave, but automatic renewals of leave shall not be allowed. Leave may be with or without pay and provided by law, rules of the State Board of Education, School Board policy, and negotiated contracts. If the terms of the collective bargaining agreement differ from this Policy, the language of the employee's agreement will take precedence. The following types of leave are available for School District employees: Leave for personal reasons Annual leave for 12-month personnel Sick leave Catastrophic leave Injury or illness in-line-of-duty leave Sabbatical leave Temporary military leave Regular military service leave Professional leave and extended professional leave Charter school leave Voluntary/extended military leave Leave of absence for the purpose of campaigning for political office Personal leave including maternity/ recovery and child care Paid Leaves * * * c. Sick Leave * * * iv. An employee requiring more than thirty (30) working days of paid leave for recovery may be required to submit medical evidence at reasonable intervals supporting the need for additional leave. * * * Sick leave claims shall be honored as submitted by the employee for personal illness, as well as illness or death of father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, child or other close relative or member of the employee's own household. Sick leave without pay may be granted for employees who have used all accumulated sick leave, but who would otherwise qualify for sick leave. The Superintendent may require a doctor's statement of verification of illness. A request to the Superintendent for a verification of claim may be initiated by the principal or supervisor. * * * Unpaid Leaves * * * e. Personal Leave -- An employee requesting short-term or long-term personal leave shall make written application to the supervisor, stating reasons for such leave. The Board shall satisfy itself in terms of the need of the requested leave. Personal leave may be used to extend a leave of absence due to sickness when that sickness has extended beyond all compensable leave for the duration of up to one (1) calendar year when supported by doctor's statements verifying the necessity of the extended leave. An employee requesting return to duty who has served efficiently and exhibited those qualities called for in the position held prior to such leave will be given every consideration for reemployment provided the conditions of employment have been met and the request is supported by a doctor's statement certifying that his physical condition is satisfactory to return to normal duties. * * * Article 17 of the NCF&O Contract, as noted in Article 7 of the contract, deals with the "[d]iscipline of [e]mployees." It provides as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Union, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. All disciplinary action shall be governed by applicable statutes and provisions of the Agreement. Further, an employee shall be provided with a written charge of wrongdoing, setting forth the specific charges against that employee as soon as possible after the investigation has begun. Any information which may be relied upon to take action against an employee will be shared promptly with said employee and his/her Union representative as soon as possible. Copies of any written information/correspondence that is related to the action of the employee or the investigating administrator(s) will be provided promptly to the employee and his/her Union representative. An employee against whom action is to be taken under this Article and his/her Union representative shall have the right to review and refute any and all of the information relied upon to support any proposed disciplinary action prior to taking such action. To this end, the employee and the Union representative shall be afforded a reasonable amount of time to prepare and present responses/refutations concerning the pending disciplinary action and concerning the appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action. This amount of time is to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Only previous disciplinary actions which are a part of the employee’s personnel file or which are a matter of record as provided in paragraph #7 below may be cited if these previous actions are reasonably related to the existing charge. Where just cause warrants such disciplinary action(s) and in keeping with provisions of this Article, an employee may be reprimanded verbally, reprimanded in writing, suspended without pay, or dismissed upon the recommendation of the immediate supervisor to the Superintendent and final action taken by the District. Other disciplinary action(s) may be taken with the mutual agreement of the parties. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable School Board rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With A Written Notation. Such written notation shall be placed in the employee’s personnel file and shall not be used to the further detriment of the employee, unless there is another reasonably related act by that same employee within a twenty-four (24) month period. Written Reprimand. A written reprimand may be issued to an employee when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article. Such written reprimand shall be dated and signed by the giver of the reprimand and shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file upon a receipt of a copy to the employee by certified mail. Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay by the School Board may be issued to an employee, when appropriate, in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. The length of the suspension also shall be determined by just cause as set forth in this Article. The notice and specifics of the suspension without pay shall be placed in writing, dated, and signed by the giver of the suspension and a copy provided to the employee by certified mail. The specific days of suspension will be clearly set forth in the written suspension notice which shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file in keeping with provisions of Chapter 119 and 231.291 of the Florida Statutes. An employee may be dismissed when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. An employee against whom disciplinary action(s) has/have been taken may appeal through the grievance procedure. However, if the disciplinary action(s) is/are to be taken by the District, then the employee shall have a choice of appeal between either the Department [sic] of Administrative Hearings in accordance with Florida Statutes or the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. Such choice must be exercised within fifteen (15) days of receipt of written notification of disciplinary action being taken, and the District notified accordingly. If the grievance procedure is selected, the grievance shall be initiated at Step Three. Article 18 of the NCF&O Contract describes the grievance procedure available to bargaining unit members who allege a "misapplication or misinterpretation of the agreement." The described procedure consists of an "informal level" and four formal "levels," the final one being "arbitration before an impartial arbitrator, using the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services." Pursuant to Section 4B. of Article 18, "if NCF&O decides to withdraw its support of an alleged grievance, the individual may continue to process the claim on his/her own, so long as all costs are borne by that individual"; however, according to Section 4E. of Article 18, "[a]grievance, once [actually] withdrawn, may not be reopened without the mutual written agreement between the [School District] and [the] NCF&O." "[L]eave [w]ithout [p]ay" is the subject of Article 25 of the NCF&O Contract, which provides as follows: SECTION 1. Personal Leave of Absence Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent. An employee granted an unpaid leave of absence shall be returned to his/her former classification if the leave is less than ninety (90) days, notwithstanding the layoff provisions contained in this agreement. An employee granted a leave of absence and who wishes to return before the leave period has expired, may submit a request to return to the principal/department head. An employee granted a leave of absence in excess of ninety (90) days will be permitted to return to work provided there is an opening in the same job classification in the work unit. If the former position is not available, the employee, upon written request, shall be listed as an eligible applicant for a period of six (6) months. Group Life and Hospitalization Insurance coverage may be continued for a period equal to the authorized leave of absence, provided full premium payments, including the Board's payment, are kept current by the employee. SECTION 2. Return from Leave Failure to return to work at the expiration of approved leave shall be considered as absence without leave and grounds for dismissal.[3] This section should be subject to extenuating circumstances preventing timely return, as determined by the Superintendent.4 Section 2 of Article 35 of NCF&O Contract protects employees from "[h]arassment." It provides as follows: No employee shall be subjected to or be part of: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, offensive, lewd or suggestive comments. Also includes the creation of a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work environment. Verbal or physical abuse is submitted to by an employee. An adverse decision is made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. Verbal or physical abuse. An adverse decision shall not be made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. There came a time when Respondent claimed, in a Level One grievance filed under the NCF&O Contract, that he was a victim, at the hands of Ms. Boone, of the "[h]arassment" proscribed by Section 2 of Article 35 of the contract. The grievance was filed (with the support of NCF&O) on or about April 8, 2004, several weeks following an incident in which Ms. Boone "yell[ed]" at Respondent for returning "a little bit late[]" from a delivery run. It contained the following "[g]rievance [s]tatement" and description of the "[r]elief [s]ought": Grievance Statement: (Include Date of Occurrence) Mr. Ellis fe[e]ls that he is working in a hostile work environment. He had meeting with the Dept. Head to express his feelings. On March 31, the employee was issued a written reprimand when there has never been any discipline for the employee. Relief Sought: The reprimand is withdrawn from all personnel files. All intimidation of the employee to cease immediately. Ms. Boone, on behalf of the School District, responded to the grievance by providing Respondent with the following written "disposition": After careful consideration of all available information, it has been determined that there has not been a violation, misapplication, or misinterpretation of the collective bargaining procedures. The grievance was not pursued beyond Level One. Since March 16, 2004, Respondent had not been reporting to work, notwithstanding that he had not received authorization to be absent. On or about April 5, 2004, Respondent submitted a request for leave of absence without pay for the period from April 5, 2004, to July 5, 2004. The type of leave without pay he requested was personal leave. By letter dated April 8, 2004, Mr. Baron advised Respondent that Respondent's request was being denied. In his letter, Mr. Baron wrote: You were absent without approved leave on April 5, 2004, April 6, 2004, and April 8, 2004. On Monday, April 5, 2004, you reported your intended absences and requested personal leave of absence starting April 5, 2004 through July 5, 2004. Pursuant to Article 25, Section 1, of the Agreement between The School District of Palm Beach County and National Conference of Firem[e]n & Oilers, "Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent." Your request for personal unpaid leave is denied. You are directed to return to work on Monday, April 12, 2004. Continued unapproved absences will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Respondent did not return to work on April 12, 2004, as directed. The matter of Respondent's unauthorized absences was then "turn[ed] . . . over to [the School District's] personnel [office]" to "deal with." The personnel office decided to ask the School Board to terminate Respondent's employment for his having been absent without authorization. Before the School Board took any action, Respondent submitted another request for leave of absence without pay. The type of leave without pay he requested this time was sick leave. On the request form, Respondent indicated that he wanted the leave period to begin on April 16, 2004, "but there was no end date" written in anywhere on the form. Without an "end date," the form could not be processed. Sherry Kleinman, a School District analyst assigned to the personnel office (whose job duties include processing "all the leaves of absence for School [District] employees"), telephoned Respondent and "asked him what end date he wanted" her to place on the form for him. During their telephone conversation, Ms. Kleinman and Respondent "agreed upon" a May 17, 2004, "end date." Ms. Kleinman inserted this "end date" in the appropriate space on the form and then completed processing Respondent's leave request. Respondent was granted leave without pay for the period starting April 16, 2004, and ending May 17, 2004. Moreover, the personnel office "pulled" its recommendation that the School Board terminate Respondent for his having been absent without authorization. Respondent did not report to work at any time following the expiration of his authorized leave on May 17, 2004, nor did he seek an extension of this leave. There has been no showing made that there were extenuating circumstances present preventing Respondent's timely return to work; nor has it been shown that the issue of whether such extenuating circumstances existed has ever been presented to the Superintendent for determination. Personnel office staff attempted to reach Respondent by telephone to encourage him to seek an extension of the authorized leave that had expired. These efforts were unsuccessful. Upon being advised of the situation by Ms. Kleinman, NCF&O business agent Carolyn Killings, who had helped Respondent in filing his "[h]arassment" grievance, offered to try to contact Respondent, but she too was unable to "reach him." By letter dated June 14, 2004, Ernie Camerino, the assistant director of the personnel office, advised Respondent of the following: You were recently notified by your supervisor of your failure to return to work. As a result of such action, Personnel is currently processing your involuntary resignation from employment with the School District. Please be advised that I will recommend at the July 21, 2004 meeting of the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, your involuntary resignation. Subsequent to the July 21, 2004 Board meeting you will have fifteen (15) days to file an appeal under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. Unless a timely request for an administrative hearing (DOAH) is made within fifteen (15) days stated herein pursuant to Section 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes the District will consider this matter closed. This action is taken in accordance with Section 1001.42 and 1001.51, Florida Statutes. Failure to timely request an administrative hearing shall waive all rights to request a DOAH hearing on such matters and shall be subject only to appeal rights under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. You have a choice of filing a grievance or requesting a hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). Questions regarding the appeals process should be referred to the District's Legal Department. If you find this letter inconsistent with the action taken above, you may contact Mr. Camerino immediately at . . . to resolve this matter prior to School Board Action. By letter dated July 8, 2004, Respondent informed the School District's legal department that he was "requesting an appeal" of Mr. Camerino's "involuntary resignation" recommendation. On August 23, 2004, the same day the Superintendent filed his Petition for Involuntary Resignation recommending that the School Board terminate Respondent's employment, the School District referred Respondent's appeal to DOAH.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order terminating Respondent's employment based on his failure to return to work following the expiration of his leave without pay on May 17, 2004. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2005.
The Issue Whether the petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service System under the circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a permanent full-time employee in the Bureau of Workers' Compensation within the Division of Risk Management in the Department of Insurance. Her job title was Secretary Specialist. Her immediate supervisor was Lawrence Sharp, Chief of the Bureau. However, on February 6, 1985, Mr. Sharp was on annual leave, and Ms. Peggy Veigas was the acting supervisor. On February 6, 1985, Petitioner took two hours of authorized leave from work from 8 a.m. to 10 a.m., in order to attend a Leon County Court hearing on charges of cashing bad checks. The checks had been repaid in advance of the hearing: however, petitioner was immediately adjudicated guilty of writing bad checks, sentenced to 12 days in jail, and taken into custody. Petitioner was due to return to work at 10:00 a.m., but was unable to do so because of circumstances beyond her control. She was taken directly from her court appearance to the Leon County Jail. However, prior to being transported to the jail, she was able to ask her husband, who had accompanied her to court, to call her employer and ask for emergency leave to cover the 12 days she would be serving her sentence. Mr. Penney called petitioner's office at about 2 p.m. on February 6, 1985, and in the absence of Mr. Sharp the call was referred to Ms. Veigas, the acting supervisor. Mr. Penney explained that Mrs. Penney would not be at work for the next eight to ten days and requested emergency leave for that period of time. Mr. Penney was very vague about the nature of the emergency and Mrs. Penney's whereabouts. He did not explain that Mrs. Penney was in jail because he felt it would be embarrassing to Mrs. Penney. Ms. Veigas stated that emergency leave could be granted but she would have to talk to Mrs. Penney. She told Mr. Penney to have Mrs. Penney call her. Mr. Penney stated that Mrs. Penney could not call in and implied that Mrs. Penney was out of town. Ms. Veigas explained that Mrs. Penney needed to call her as soon as she could get to a phone and, if necessary, for her to call collect. Mr. Penney interpreted Mrs. Veigas' statement, that she could grant the leave but Mrs. Penney would have to call as soon as possible, as meaning that the leave was approved and that Mrs. Penney had to call work as soon as she was able to do so. However, in making the statement, Mrs. Veigas meant only that there was a possibility that leave would be granted and Mrs. Penney needed to call and explain the nature of the emergency. The subsequent actions of both Mr. Penney and Mrs. Veigas were consistent with their respective conceptions of the conversation. That afternoon, after the telephone call, Ms. Veigas went to the personnel office and discussed the matter with Ms. Cooper. Ms. Veigas wanted to find out how she should handle the request for leave and whether she should wait for Mr. Sharp to return from his vacation. Mr. Yohner, the Chief of Personnel Management, was consulted, and he stated that when Mrs. Penney called, Ms. Veigas would have to determine whether she would approve the leave or not. Ms. Veigas was told by Ms. Cooper to wait until Ms. Veigas heard from Mrs. Penney "so we would know whether it was an illness or whatever it was." (T-47) However, the nature of the emergency was determined without the necessity of a call from Mrs. Penney. Within a short period of time after the call from Mr. Penney, Ms. Veigas mentioned the request for emergency leave to Ms. Benefield. Ms. Benefield told Ms. Grissom about the call from Mr. Penney, and the two speculated that Mrs. Penney might be in jail. They were aware that Mrs. Penney had financial problems. While Ms. Grissom stood by, Ms. Benefield telephoned the jail and was told that Mrs. Penney was in jail for passing bad checks. They immediately communicated the information to Ms. Veigas, and the three of them, along with a woman named Edna, discussed the situation for about five or ten minutes. Ms. Veigas then conveyed the information to Mr. Yohner, Ms. Cooper and Mr. Beardon, the Director of the Division of Risk Management, who had previously been informed of the call from Mr. Penney. The following day Mr. Sharp returned to work and was informed of the entire situation. Mr. Sharp discussed the matter with Mr. Beardon. Mr. Beardon had his assistant call the State Attorney's Office to verify that Mrs. Penney was in jail. Thus, by the end of the workday on February 7, 1985, Mrs. Penney's co-workers, her immediate supervisor, the Chief of Personnel Management, and the Director of the Division of Risk Management were all aware that Mrs. Penney, through her husband, had requested emergency leave, and they were all aware that the emergency leave had been requested due to Mrs. Penney's incarceration. On either February 6th or 7th, Mr. Yohner notified Mr. Gresham, the Director of the Division of Administration and Mr. Yohner's supervisor, that a possible abandonment of position situation existed. Mr. Gresham was not informed that petitioner had requested emergency leave. On Friday, February 8th, or on the following Monday, Mr. Sharp called a friend of his in the Department of Administration, Don Bradley, to gain advice on application of the rule relating to abandonment of position. He was told that when someone missed three days of work without having authorization, it was the same thing as resigning and required termination. Mr. Sharp relayed the information to Mr. Beardon. Mr. Sharp did not consider petitioner's leave request and did not know whether he had the authority to approve the leave since at least a portion of the leave requested would have been without pay.2 After three days expired and Mrs. Penney had neither reported for work nor called the office, Mr. Beardon contacted Mr. Yohner to discuss the situation. He also discussed the situation with his superior in the Department. Though Mr. Beardon was aware that Mrs. Penney had requested leave through her husband and was aware that she was absent from work only because she had no choice, Mr. Beardon did not consider her request for leave. His reason was that Mrs. Penney did not personally request the leave. He did not consider the possibility that Mrs. Penney was not able to call in person. Mr. Beardon felt that a call from Mrs. Penney was necessary to find out "all of the pertinent facts and why the request was needed." However, it is apparent that Mr. Beardon already knew why the requested leave was needed and had already discovered the pertinent facts. Nevertheless, Mr. Beardon determined that, under the abandonment rule,3 petitioner had abandoned her job and her employment should be terminated. He recommended that the personnel office proceed with the action in accordance with the rule. Mr. Yohner informed Mr. Gresham of Mr. Bearden's recommendation that petitioner be terminated from the Career Service via the abandonment rule. A letter was prepared for Mr. Gresham's signature, notifying Petitioner of her termination from the Career Service. Mr. Gresham signed the letter and mailed it to petitioner at her home address. By the letter dated February 11, 1985, and then by an amended letter dated February 12, 1985, petitioner was notified that she had been absent without authorized leave for three consecutive days, and therefore she was deemed to have abandoned her position pursuant to Rule 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, and to have resigned from the Career Service. Meanwhile, Mr. Penney was under the impression that the emergency leave had been granted. He was able to speak with his wife for the first time on February 9, 1985, and the first question petitioner asked her husband was whether the leave had been granted. He told her that it had been, and she displayed visible signs of relief at the knowledge. Petitioner's husband also told her that she should call Ms. Veigas at her earliest opportunity. Mrs. Penney made diligent attempts to contact her employer both before and after she spoke with her husband on February 9, 1985. On each day of her incarceration she made written requests to the Captain at the jail for permission to use the telephone to call her employer. However, she received no response. In accordance with jail policy, which allowed one phone call per week at a set time, she was permitted use of the telephone on only one occasion, on February 11, 1985 at about 11 p.m. in the evening. Mrs. Penney's sentence was reduced by Judge McClamma and she was released from jail on February 14, 1985. She received the termination letter that evening when she got home. The next morning she called Mr. Yohner and stated that she wanted to return to work. Mr. Yohner informed her that she was no longer an employee of the Department. Mrs. Penney's position was advertised on February 19th and readvertised on March 4, 1985. Sometime after March 4, 1985, a replacement was hired. Although the workers compensation bureau had a very heavy case load, Mrs. Penney's work performance had been satisfactory. Indeed, she had been promoted to the position of Secretary Specialist from her previous position of Clerk-Typist III with the bureau. Petitioner had no intent to abandon her position in the Career Service, and she had no intent to resign her position. The Department had actual knowledge of the petitioner's whereabouts during her absence from work, and had actual knowledge that she intended to return to work as soon as she could. Further, the Department was aware that petitioner had requested leave to cover the period of time she would be gone. However, instead of taking action on the request, one way or the other, the Department left the request in limbo. A decision was never made to approve or disapprove the request. The only explanation given for not considering the request was that Mrs. Penney had not made it personally. However, it is quite clear that at the time of Mr. Penney's call the Department considered the call a legitimate request for leave from Mrs. Penney even though the call was not made by her. Ms. Veigas did not tell Mr. Penney that the leave could not be granted because Mrs. Penney had not called in person. Indeed, the first thing Ms. Veigas did after the telephone call was go to the personnel office to find out how she should "process the request". The only reason that the Department wanted to talk to Mrs. Penney personally, prior to determining whether leave should be granted, was to discover the nature of the emergency. Although Mr. Penney explained that there was an emergency, that Mrs. Penney was unable to call, and that leave was being requested to cover the period of time that Mrs. Penney would be unable to work, he was very vague about the nature of the emergency. The Department understandably wanted to know the reason for the request before deciding to grant leave. However, once the Department discovered Mrs. Penney's circumstances, it was in a position to make an informed decision on the leave request, and there was no rational basis for its failure to do so. Although the granting of leave is discretionary, the discretion must be exercised. Apparently, the Department officials believed that Mrs. Penney's absence from work for three consecutive days mandated termination notwithstanding the pending request for leave. Because the Department failed to take any action on the leave request, Mrs. Penney was never notified that her request for leave had been denied. Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, it must be concluded that Mrs. Penney did not abandon her position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered ruling that the circumstances presented by this case do not constitute abandonment of position as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.10(2)(a) and directing that the petitioner be reinstated to her former position as of February 15, 1985. DONE and ENTERED this ;26th of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 1985.
The Issue Whether the Department of Juvenile Justice overpaid Christopher Stokes for pay periods ending May 25, 2000, for 34.5 hours amounting to $274.91; June 8, 2000, for 9.25 hours amounting to $73.81; and June 30, 2000, for 8.0 hours amounting to $63.71.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Christopher Stokes, was employed by the Department of Juvenile Justice (Respondent) as a painter at the Dozier School for Boys in Marianna during the period at issue, May 12, 2000, through June 30, 2000. Petitioner continues to be employed by Respondent in the same capacity. Respondent's Policy and Procedure 3.26 (FDJJ 3.26), which is available in hard copy at the workplace and via the internet, delineates the agency's Sick Leave Transfer Policy.1 FDJJ 3.26 is based upon the requirements and provisions of Rule 60L-5.030(3), Florida Administrative Code. FDJJ 3.26, Procedure A provides that in order to donate sick leave, the donor must complete the Interagency Sick Leave Transfer (Request to Donate) form and submit it to the Bureau of Personnel. FDJJ 3.26, Procedure B provides that in order to receive donated sick leave, the employee must complete the Interagency Sick Leave Transfer (Request to Use) form and submit it to the Bureau of Personnel.2 The Department of Juvenile Justice is a centralized agency and the Bureau of Personnel is located in Tallahassee. A request to donate or to use donated sick leave may be made directly to the Bureau of Personnel via U.S. Mail, courier, or fax. FDJJ 3.26, Procedure C provides that sick leave credits donated to the receiving employee shall be credited on the last day of the pay period. Transferred leave must be processed by the last day of the pay period in order to be credited to the employee. This includes checking to see if the donor has leave to transfer and is permitted to transfer it by the donor's employer. The Department of Juvenile Justice has 26 pay periods per year. Requests to donate leave to use donated sick leave that are timely submitted to the Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Personnel, located in Tallahassee, will be accepted by the Department of Juvenile Justice even when the request may be incomplete or incorrectly submitted. Requests to donate leave or to use donated sick leave will be processed by the Department when the error or delay is attributable to the Bureau of Personnel. During the pay period ending May 25, 2000, Petitioner had a medical emergency requiring him to miss several days of work during that period and those that followed. Lynn R. Price, a Department of Children and Families employee, completed a request to donate 25.5 hours of sick leave to Christopher Stokes on May 24, 2000. Christopher Stokes submitted the Lynn Price Request to Donate Sick Leave Hours to the personnel office at Dozier School on May 25, 2000, the last day of the pay period. The Department of Children and Family Services, donator's agency, approved the donation of the leave on June 29, 2000, seven days after the last day of the three pay periods in question. The leave donated by Lynn Price was "not approved per criteria" by the Department of Juvenile Justice on September 12, 2000. This leave could not be credited to the employee's leave account for the next pay period. Earma J. Hendrix, Department of Children and Family Services employee, completed a request to donate 8 hours of sick leave to Christopher Stokes on June 8, 2000, the last day of the period. The Department of Children and Family Services, Donator's Agency, approved the donation of the leave on June 9, 2000, the day after the last of the second pay period at issue. The leave donated by Earma Hendrix was "not approved per criteria" by the Department of Juvenile Justice on September 11, 2000. This leave could not be credited to the employee's leave account for the next pay period. The Department of Juvenile Justice paid Christopher Stokes for 34.5 hours of donated sick leave during the pay period of May 12 through May 24, 2000. Because the attempt to donate sick leave by Earma Hendrix during that pay period was not approved as untimely submitted, Mr. Stokes should not have been paid for the 34.5 hours of donated sick leave, totaling $274.91, on the June 2, 2000, warrant. The Department of Juvenile Justice paid Christopher Stokes for 9.25 hours of donated sick leave during the pay period of May 26 through June 8, 2000. Because the attempt to donate sick leave by Earma Hendrix and Lynn Price was not approved as untimely submitted, Mr. Stokes should not have been paid for the 9.25 hours donated sick leave hours of donated sick leave, totaling $73.81, on the June 16, 2000, warrant. DJJ paid Christopher Stokes for 8 hours of donated sick leave during the pay period of June 9 through June 22, 2000. Because the attempt to donate sick leave by Earma Hendrix and Lynn Price was not approved as untimely submitted, Mr. Stokes should not have been paid for the 8 hours of donated sick leave, totaling $63.71, on the June 30, 2000, warrant.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order upholding the Agency's determination of a salary overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2001.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has just cause to terminate the employment of the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the School Board of Lake County, Florida (Board)(Petitioner). It is charged with operating and managing the public school system in Lake County, Florida, otherwise known as the Lake County School District. The Respondent, at times pertinent hereto, was employed by the Board as a school guidance counselor at Sawgrass Elementary School. Her principal was Rhonda Hunt. During the 2005-2006 school year, the Respondent missed 71 days from her job. In the 2006-2007 year, she missed 97 days. In the 2007-2008 school year, the Respondent missed 87 days from work. The contract for a guidance counselor requires that they work for 221 days per school year. During these times, especially in the 2007-2008 school year, the Respondent had been making repeated requests for leave. Ms. Hunt, her principal, became concerned and in May of 2008 reported the situation about extensive absences, and leave requests, to Ms. Rebecca Nelsen, the Board's Supervisor of Compensation, Benefits and Employee Relations. In the 2007-2008 school year, when Ms. Hunt brought the issue to Ms. Nelsen's attention, the Respondent had missed work the number of days found above, which represented all the days in the school year from February 13th through the end of the school year. In the previous year, she had missed work from the middle of January through the end of the school year. Ms. Nelsen prepared a memo to Deke DeLoach, the Board's Chief of Human Resources, apprising him of the situation regarding the Respondent's absences. She explained to him the situation involving the excessive absences over a 5-year period. She explained to Mr. DeLoach that when an employee has been on extended unpaid leave that, according to Board policy 6.50, her return to employment is dependant upon a position being available. Therefore, while an individual is on extended leave, which is approved, their position becomes available to be filled at the decision of an individual school administrator. Moreover, unpaid leave, the status applicable to the Respondent's situation, must be approved in advance. An employee may not go off-duty on unpaid leave and then get approval for it at a later time. Approval must be requested in advance. A formal request must be made to the Superintendent, for the Superintendent's recommendation to the Board. Extended Illness Leave is a leave category that is required to be approved by the Board as well. Ms. Nelsen therefore explained to Mr. DeLoach that the Respondent had been on extended unpaid leave and, according to the above-referenced Board policy, her return to employment was dependent upon a position being available. Employees are required to have approval for some form of leave before they take leave or miss time from work. If an employee does not have approval for some form of leave and does not come to work, then under Board policy they are deemed to be absent without leave. If that is the situation, the employee can be terminated under Board policy. The School Board must have a recommendation from the Superintendent in order to be able to act on any sort of leave request. Under Board policies, an Extended Illness Leave is required to be approved by the Board. The school fiscal year ends June 30th. July 1, 2008, therefore, was the beginning of the new fiscal year for the 2008-2009 school year. The regular school session then began near the end of August 2008. Ms. Nelsen wrote to Ms. Chavous on August 19, 2008, explaining to her that she had been on unpaid sick leave numerous days, and giving her options to consider. Ms. Nelsen informed her that she must report to work or be considered absent without approved leave, that she could explain to her supervisor any accommodations that she may need, or that she could request Extended Illness Leave. That communication, from Ms. Nelsen to Ms. Chavous, references a July 29, 2008, request for sick leave. Ms. Chavous completed the July 29, 2008, request for sick leave on a Request for Leave of Absence form, which is the form required to be completed by employees who are requesting any kind of leave from the School Board. The July 29, 2008, leave form depicted a request for leave from August 4, 2008, through August 19, 2008. The reason for the leave requested was indicated as "Illness of self.” The Respondent did not have any sick leave available to her at that time. In the 2008-2009, school year, the Respondent was not eligible for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. This was because she had not worked enough days in order to trigger eligibility under that law. This leave request was denied because the Respondent was on unpaid sick leave the prior year, had missed 87 days, and had never offered an explanation for her need to use sick leave. Therefore, the Board had no basis on which to approve the additional leave request and the Respondent's approved leave ended June 30, 2008. Any leave that the Respondent would have received for any extended illness would have been for the previous school year which was over at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 2008. Ms. Nelsen gave the Respondent two options in her August 19, 2008, letter: To report to work or be considered absent without approved leave, or To submit a leave request form asking for extended illness leave for the remainder of the year. On August 28, 2008, a request was faxed from the Respondent seeking extended illness leave. The attached doctor's note did not explain the nature of the medical situation or condition, in terms of providing justification for the leave requested. The Respondent submitted a leave request form with that August 28, 2008, request. It did not confirm that she was asking for extended illness leave for the school year. Instead she requested leave from August 4, 2008, until October 30, 2008. Since School Board policy required the Respondent, in this situation, to request leave for the remainder of the school year, Ms. Nelsen sent an e-mail to the Respondent telling her that she had no available sick leave to use and again telling her that she had the option to either report to work or to request an extended illness leave for the remainder of the year. That communication was sent on August 29, 2008, the day after the Respondent faxed the form requesting leave through October. The Respondent then sent Ms. Nelsen another leave request form in response to the August 29, 2008, e-mail. It again requested leave from August 4, 2008, through October 30, 2008. On September 9, 2008, a letter was sent from the Superintendent to the Respondent, explaining that the Respondent had not reported to work and that she had not requested extended illness leave. Consequently she was informed that she was now considered “absent without approved leave” and would be recommended to the School Board for termination of employment. When the Superintendent sent the letter to the Respondent, on September 9, 2008, the Respondent was not on approved leave. She was absent without leave under the terms of the School Board policy. Pursuant to that policy she was therefore subject to being terminated. Ms. Nelsen received three leave request forms from the Respondent, none of which requested leave for the remainder of the school year, and none of which gave an explanation for the basis of the medical condition. The Respondent's response to these facts was her statement to the effect that "[I]t was just always told to me that you can't request for more leave than what your doctor has put on the form. So, therefore, that's why I put the dates there." She also acknowledged that sometimes she does not remember some things or doesn't respond as fast as she should. Therefore she simply stated that she believed, in effect, that she had submitted everything that she could and had explained her situation to the best of her ability at the time. The collective bargaining agreement between the Lake County School District and the Lake County Education Association includes the position of guidance counselor. That contract references the Board policy which makes it a terminable offense to be absent without leave. The recommendation to the Board, prior to the Respondent making a Request for Hearing, was that she be terminated for being absent without leave. The Respondent's prior leave had expired at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. When the first day of school started in the current school year of 2008-2009, the Respondent did not report to work. The Respondent probably would have been unable to work because of her illness before January 2009. She would therefore have missed all of August, September, October, November, and December.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Lake County School Board finding that the employment of the Respondent, Latonya Chavous, be terminated for just cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen W. Johnson, Esquire McLin & Burnsed Post Office Box 491357 Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357 Latonya Chavous 136 Desiree Aurora Street Winter Garden, Florida 34787 Dr. Susan Moxley, Superintendent Lake County Schools 201 West Burleigh Boulevard Tavares, Florida 32778-2496 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner was overpaid for the pay period ending July 5, 2001, warrant date July 13, 2001, for 40 hours, equaling $378.74.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, as a Senior Juvenile Detention Officer during the pay period of June 22, 2001 through July 5, 2001. Prior to June 22, 2001, Petitioner exhausted her accrued sick leave. During the referenced pay period, Petitioner claimed 40 hours of sick leave relying on leave that a fellow employee, Marc Gulley, attempted to donate to her. On June 24, 2001, Marc Gulley submitted an Interagency Sick Leave Transfer Request to Donate form to Respondent. On June 27, 2001, Petitioner submitted a Sick Leave Transfer Request to Use form to Respondent. Petitioner was paid, by salary warrant on July 13, 2001, for 40 hours of credited sick leave for the pay period of June 22, 2001 through July 5, 2001. On August 13, 2001, Respondent notified Marc Gulley that his request to donate sick leave to Petitioner was denied because he did not possess the requisite amount remaining of sick leave. On August 15, 2001, Respondent notified Petitioner of the salary overpayment of $378.74 and requested repayment. Respondent presented a salary refund calculation showing the amount Petitioner was paid, the amount she should have been paid when the sick leave transfer was denied, and the amount of the refund she owed to Respondent. Petitioner owed Respondent $378.74 as a result of an overpayment which occurred due to the improper crediting of 40 hours of sick leave transferred from another employee, Marc Gulley. Petitioner left the employ of Respondent on August 27, 2001; on August 24, 2001, Respondent appropriately withheld $378.74 from a warrant issued to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby Recommended that the determination of Respondent, Department of Juvenile Justice, that Petitioner, Janet Bing, was overpaid in the amount of $378.74 be upheld, that withholding $378.74 from Petitioner's pay was appropriate, that Petitioner's claim be denied, and the file be closed. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___ JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Janet Bing 719 Waxwing Court Kissimmee, Florida 34759 Richard D. Davison, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue Whether Respondent resigned his position of employment with Petitioner and, if not, whether Respondent's position of employment with Petitioner should be terminated for cause, specifically, the Respondent's alleged absence without leave, his alleged abuse of sick leave, and his alleged theft of school property.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a painter pursuant to an annual contract from January 17, 1983, until January 29, 1993. Respondent was not a member of the instructional staff, a principal, or a supervisor. Respondent did not submit to the Petitioner a formal resignation of his employment, nor did he ever intend to do so. A School Board employee with an annual contract may be dismissed during the term of his contract for cause. Respondent had frequently taken leave during his term of employment with the Petitioner and he was aware of the School Board's policies pertaining to leave. Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 1277, AFL-CIO (IBFO). The collective bargaining agreement between the IBFO and the School Board contains terms and conditions of employment pertinent to this proceeding. Article IV, Section F pertains to "Return from Leave" and provides as follows: Failure to return to work at the expiration of approved leave shall be considered as absence without leave and grounds for dismissal. This section should be subject to extenuating circumstances preventing timely return, as determined by the Superintendent. Article IV, Section A of the collective bargaining agreement pertains to sick leave and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 3. Sick Leave Charged -- Sick leave shall be charged in no less than half-day segments. Each school or Department shall record absences on an hourly basis. When the appropriate half-day increment is reached, based upon the assigned employee workday, the employee shall have 1/2 day of accumulated sick leave deducted. . . . * * * 10. False Claim -- False claim for sick leave shall be grounds for dismissal by the School Board. Petitioner's Administrative Directive D-3.47(3) is a rule of the School Board and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (3) District employees shall not convert School Board property, including any equipment and supplies, for personal business or activity. CONVERSION OF SCHOOL BOARD PROPERTY In November 1992, Warren Haan, the paint supervisor for the Petitioner's Department of Maintenance and Operations, was told by Jacques Brisson, Respondent's foreman, that it appeared to him that Respondent was taking school property for his own use. Mr. Haan investigated the allegations and went to the area in the maintenance department where the employees parked their vehicles. Mr. Haan looked into Respondent's personal vehicle and discovered that Respondent had placed inside of his vehicle property of the School Board. The evidence established that Respondent intended to convert this property to his own use. The property, which was taken from the Respondent before he could remove it from school grounds, consisted of an empty paint bucket, painter's rags, a small quantity of caulk, and a caulking gun. Mr. Haan referred this matter to the school security department on January 4, 1993. Respondent had not been disciplined at the time of his alleged resignation because the matter was still under investigation at that time. Respondent testified that other painters regularly took items such as empty paint buckets and paint rags. This self-serving testimony does not establish that Petitioner routinely permitted painters to violate the clear school policies pertaining to unauthorized use of school property. To the contrary, the testimony of Mr. Brisson established that theft had been a problem that he had tried to stop. ABUSE OF SICK LEAVE The Respondent occasionally was employed as a painter by individuals and entities other than the Petitioner. Such employment was permissible, but an employee was not permitted to perform services for private individuals while out on sick leave. The Respondent reported to work on December 3, 1992, and left his employment in the late morning using sick leave for the remainder of the day. That same day, Mr. Haan received information that led him to believe that Respondent had taken sick leave, but that he was working as a painter at a house under construction in an area referred to as Boca Grove in Boca Raton, Florida. Mr. Haan went with Dave Traill, another school board employee, to this private residence at approximately 2:30 p.m. on December 3, 1992, where he observed Respondent's automobile. He went to the residence under construction and asked to see the Respondent. The Respondent thereafter came out of the house and talked with Mr. Haan and Mr. Traill. Mr. Haan and Mr. Traill did not see what Respondent had been doing inside the residence. Respondent testified that he had seen his doctor for a brief appointment earlier that day and had gone from his doctor's office to the residence at Boca Grove. Respondent admitted at the formal hearing that he had agreed to paint the house for the owner, but asserted that he had gone to the house to tell the owner that he would not be working that day. Respondent testified that he had taken vacation leave when he actually worked on the private residence. Respondent admitted that he had spent approximately two hours on December 3, 1992, while on sick leave going over with the owner items of work that he was to perform. This meeting was a necessary part of the painting job he was to do for the owner. From the evidence presented, it is found that on December 3, 1992, the Respondent performed services unrelated to his duties as a school board employee for his personal gain at this house in Boca Grove while absent from his employment with the Petitioner pursuant to sick leave. Respondent abused Petitioner's sick leave policy. ABSENCES WITHOUT LEAVE In January 1993, Petitioner took time off from his work to attend to his wife, who continued to experience physical problems resulting from a heel fracture on August 28, 1992. Respondent contacted his foreman, Jacques Brisson, at approximately 7:30 a.m. on Monday, January 25, 1993, to request that he be allowed to take that week off as vacation time. Mr. Brisson approved that leave, but he informed Respondent that he would have to contact Warren Haan, the painting supervisor, if he wanted to take any additional time off. Respondent was absent from his employment without approved leave on Monday, February 1, 1993; Tuesday, February 2, 1993; Wednesday, February 3, 1993; and Thursday, February 4, 1993. Friday, February 5, 1993, was not a scheduled work day since the paint department was on a four day work week. Respondent testified that he contacted Mr. Haan during the last week of January 1993 and told him he may need to be off work for a week or longer. Respondent also testified that Mr. Haan authorized his leave during the last week of January 1993. Mr. Haan testified at the formal hearing, but he was not questioned about this conversation or whether he authorized leave for the Respondent during any part of February 1993. Mr. Haan testifed that Respondent's employment was terminated because he was absent without authorization for the days in February and that Respondent would have contacted Mr. Brisson to obtain authorization for leave. Respondent later testified that he did not know why he had not contacted anyone prior to being absent on February 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1993. The apparent conflicts in Respondent's testimony are resolved by finding that while Respondent may have told Mr. Haan at some time during January 1993 that he needed to take some time off, he did not seek and he was not given authorization to be absent from his employment on February 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1993. On February 5, 1993, Warren Page, Coordinator of Petitioner's Department of Maintenance and Plant Operations, sent to Respondent by certified mailing a letter which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: This is to confirm that you have not reported to work since January 29, 1993. You have not contacted this office as required to report your intended absences. You have not requested or received approval for a short term leave of absence. Therefore, you are currently absent without approved leave. In the absence of any correspondence from you, I can only assume that you have decided not to continue working as a Painter for the Palm Beach County School Board. Please be advised that your name will be submitted to the Palm Beach County School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting for acceptance of your resignation from employment. Should you have any questions, feel free to contact this office. Respondent received the certified mailing on Saturday, February 6, 1993. On Monday, February 8, 1993, Respondent contacted Lawrence G. Zabik, the Petitioner's Assistant Superintendent for Support Services, and asked him what he should do about the certified mailing that he had received. Mr. Zabik told Respondent that he should meet with Mr. Page to see if he could work things out. Respondent did not contact Mr. Page, and he did not report to work. During a regularly scheduled meeting in February, 1993, the School Board voted to accept his resignation with an effective date of January 29, 1993. January 29, 1993, was the effective date of the acceptance of Respondent's "resignation" and the date his employment with the School Board was terminated because it was the last day Respondent was out on authorized leave. This action was taken pursuant to Petitioner's Administrative Directive D- 3.27(2)(c), which provides as follows: (c) When employees do not report for duty for three (3) consecutive days without notifying their supervisor, the principal/department head will initiate a certified letter to the employees stating that their resignations will be recommended to the School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. By notice dated March 2, 1993, Respondent was notified that the School Board had accepted his resignation as a painter with an effective date of January 29, 1993. The notice dated March 2, 1993, contained an old address for the Respondent. Consequently, he did not receive a copy of the notice until May 24, 1993, when he was officially informed that his employment had been terminated effective January 29, 1993, the last day on which Respondent had been on approved leave. Respondent thereafter requested a formal hearing to contest his termination, and this proceeding followed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order which terminates the employment of the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4233 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The greater weight of the evidence established that the incident involving conversion of school board property occurred in November 1992, but that it was reported to Mr. Sapyta on January 4, 1993. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, and 15 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2, 3, and 10 are rejected as being unnecessary as findings of fact, but the proposed findings are adopted either as preliminary matters or as conclusions of law. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent they are contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are adopted by the Recommended Order or are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in the first sentence of paragraph 11 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached since there is no contention that Respondent had exhausted his sick leave. The proposed findings in the second sentence of paragraph 11 are rejected. Specifically, Mr. Haan's credibility was not eroded as asserted by Respondent. The other findings of fact in paragraph 11 are adopted by the Recommended Order or are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12 and 14 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached since this is a de novo proceeding. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 17 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are subordinate to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Hazel Lucas, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board Office of the General Counsel 381 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813 Glen J. Torcivia, Esquire One Clearlake Centre 250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1504 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Isidro M. Garcia, Esquire 3501 South Congress Avenue Lake Worth, Florida 33461 Dr. C. Monica Uhlhorn, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869
The Issue The issues raised in this case are those set forth in a petition of May 18, 1987, in which the Petitioner, Richard Herring, challenged former Rule 22SM- 3.007, Florida Administrative Code, which became effective on May 29, 1986, and the amendment to that rule which had an effective date of February 1, 1987. In particular, Petitioner believes that the rule in its prior and existing forms exceeded the authority of the enabling legislation which is stated to underlie the promulgation. Petitioner contends that the rule in the prior and present form is arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner claims that the rule in its terms establishes penalties not authorized by the legislature. Petitioner believes that material changes were made to the rule following public hearing which were not supported or noticed or required by statute. Finally, Petitioner argues that the economic impact statements associated with the prior version of the rule and the February 1, 1987, version are not adequate, in that they do not apprise the Petitioner or others similarly situated of the negative implications of the rule. Exhibits and witnesses Richard Herring testified in his own behalf and called as witnesses Pam Hill and Vivian Pyle. In furtherance of his claims he submitted Petitioner's Exhibits 1-29, 32-39 and 42-45 which were received into evidence. Respondent offered Don Bradley as a witness in defense of this action.
Findings Of Fact On July 30, 1984, Richard Herring became a member of the Senior Management Service Personnel System within the State of Florida. He was recognized as a member of Senior Management from that day until March 2, 1987, the date he voluntarily left that system. During that time he served as Deputy Director of Developmental Services within the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). In confirmation of his elevation to the status of Senior Management employee, correspondence of August 3, 1984, was sent to the Petitioner over signature of Vivian Pyle, Central Personnel Officer for HRS. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 2 admitted into evidence. As had been explained in his recruitment, the letter reminded the Petitioner that any future annual leave which he accumulated in excess of 480 hours effective as of the anniversary date of his employment would be converted to sick leave on an hour for hour basis. It further stated that at the point of separation from Senior Management Service, Herring, as an appointee to that system, would be paid for unused annual leave, not to exceed 480 hours. The rule provision pertaining to annual leave in effect at the time of Petitioner's acceptance into Senior Management Service was Rule 22SM-1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code. That rule became effective on March 16, 1981. A copy of the rule may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The rule in the aforementioned subpart stated: (3) A Senior Management appointee shall be paid for unused annual leave upon separation, not to exceed 480 hours; all other Senior Management benefits shall cease. Payment for sick leave may be made when permitted by Section 110.122, Florida Statutes. The Department of Administration determined to revise the existing rules pertaining to Senior Management Service. To this end, on February 21, 1986, Respondent gave notice of its proposed rule changes. This notification was given in the Florida Administrative Weekly. A copy of the notice, together with the full text of the proposed rule as contemplated in the notice, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 5 submitted into evidence. The notification states that the change calls for the repeal of existing Rules 22SM- 1.01 through 22SM-1.14, Florida Administrative Code, and the contemporaneous adoption of Rules 22SM-3.001 through 3.011, Florida Administrative Code. This meant that the Respondent had in mind the repeal of the aforementioned Rule 22SM-1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code. The stated purpose of these changes was ". . . to provide a more clearly defined rule structure for the Senior Management Service and to allow for 1985 statutory revisions." The statement of economic impact of the rule was that it would be limited only to the administrative cost of promulgation of the new rules. As noticed, the proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 at Section (6) stated: Upon appointment to a Senior Management position of a person moving from a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, any leave accrued and unused by the person in the prior position shall be subject to the following: Special compensatory leave credits shall be paid for in cash prior to appointment to the Senior Management Service. Regular compensatory leave shall not be transferred into the Senior Management Service. Annual leave shall be retained and be credited to the employee's account for use by the employee with approval of the agency head pursuant to Section 22SM-3.007(3) or paid for on termination from state government. Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. Sick leave not paid for shall be retained and be used or be subject to terminal payment in accordance with Subsection (4) above. Subsection (6)(c) to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 as it speaks to the payment previously earned for annual leave upon termination from state government pertains to new employees who would be appointed to Senior Management positions following the effective date of the rule. It does not contemplate the question of payment of annual leave for those persons who had been appointed to Senior Management Service prior to the effective date of the proposed rule. In fact, the overall Chapter 22SM-3 as proposed did not speak to the question of payment of unused annual leave accrued by those existing employees when they left Senior Management. Conversely, Subsection (4) to this proposed rule spoke to the matter of payment for sick leave for employees who were in Senior Management before the effective date of the proposal, a counterpart to Subsection (6)(d) dealing with employees who would come after the effective date of the proposed rule. The statement of the summary of the rule changes contemplated by the notice of February 21, 1986, may be found in a copy of the summary, Petitioner's Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence. In that summary it indicated: . . . The rule sets certain requirements agencies must conform to in the areas of appointments, performance evaluations, attendance and leave for employees appointed to positions in the Service. Agencies are required to maintain personnel files and records which shall be subject to post audit review by the Department of Administration. Under the statement of economic impact in the summary dealing with cost or benefits to persons directly affected, it was stated: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service employees, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. . . . A public hearing was held on the proposed Chapter 22SM-3. The hearing date was March 7, 1986. In the summary of the hearing and changes, a copy of which may be found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, it is noted that the State of Florida, Department of Insurance, recommended that the payment be made for excess annual leave when an employee leaves Senior Management Service and moves to another service. That change was not adopted. The executive summary of the proposed Rules 22SM-3, found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence identified the fact of the replacement of Chapter 22SM-1 with proposed Chapter 22SM-3 and the fact that any changes to the noticed version of the rule of February 21, 1986, were said to represent only minor technical changes recommended by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. It was stated that no changes were made as a result of the public hearing held on March 7, 1986. This is taken to mean that there were no substantive changes made in that the summary of the public hearing and changes did identify certain modifications to the proposal that were recommended and adopted following the public hearing session. None of those changes that resulted from the public hearing spoke to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007. On May 6, 1986, Glenn W. Robertson, Jr., Secretary to the Administration Commission, wrote to Gilda H. Lambert, Secretary, Department of Administration, to advise her that on that date the Administration Commission had approved with amendment the request to repeal existing Rules 22SM-1.01 through 1.14, Florida Administrative Code, and to adopt proposed Rules 22SM- 3.001 through 3.011. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8, together with the statement of the executive summary identifying the proposed permanent rule amendments which were contemplated by the Administration Commission. Within the statement of amendments promoted by the Administration Commission was an amendment to proposed Rule 22SM- 3.007(6)(c), which stated: (6)(c) Annual leave shall be retained and credited to the employee's account for use by the employee with approval of the agency head pursuant to Section 22SM-3.007 or if the employee is transferring to Career Service, up to 240 hours of Annual leave will be transferred. Any Annual leave balance after the 240 transfer will be paid for except that the amount accrued (sic) since the employee's last anniversary will be paid for on a prorated basis in accordance with the appropriate accrual rate for Career Service. Annual leave will be paid for on termination from state government. Termination from state government --. This change to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c) was at the instigation of the Commissioner of Agriculture in the language. . . . or if the employee is transferring to Career Service, up to 240 hours of Annual leave will be transferred. Any Annual leave balance after the 240 transfer will be paid for except that the amount accrued (sic) since the employee's last anniversary will be paid for on a prorated basis in accordance Service. Annual leave will be paid for on termination from state government. This was not the choice of the Department of Administration in terms of the substance or placement of this language. Ultimately, the language set forth in the amendments to the proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c) as found in Petitioner's Exhibit 8 made their way into the final version of the rule. The language prompted by the Agriculture Commissioner had not been contemplated by the language noticed when the rule was proposed on February 21, 1986, nor was it the product of public comment in the public hearing of March 6, 1986, or based upon remarks received from the APA committee or material received by the proposing agency within 21 days of notice of the proposed rule. The language was never noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly. In May 1986, upon an unspecified date, certification was given from the Department of Administration to the Secretary of State confirming the adoption of Rules 22SM-3.001 through 22SM-3.011, Florida Administrative Code. The effective date of this adoption was May 29, 1986. A copy of that certification to the Department of State may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 9. A copy of the summary of changes by the Administration Commission in its May 6, 1986 meeting setting out the suggested language of the Agriculture Commissioner on the topic of Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c), Florida Administrative Code, may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit 10. This item, as well as the language from Subsection (6)(c) and which was sent to the Secretary of State's office and became the final version of that rule subsection, included an additional sentence which stated, "Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from Senior Management Service," and which had not been set out completely in the executive summary sent to Secretary Lambert on May 6, 1986, found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8 admitted into evidence. This most recently quoted language is, however, the same language as found in the last sentence of Subsection (6)(c) to the notice of that matter given on February 21, 1986. In the final analysis, the changes suggested by the Commissioner of Agriculture were a part of the Administration Commission's deliberations. The final summary of the rules amendments which was filed with the Secretary of State on May 9, 1986, did not depart from the initial summary of the rules amendments pertaining to the replacement of Rules 22SM-1.01 through 22SM-1.14 with Rules 22SM-3.001 through 22SM-3.011. The statement of economic impact remained the same as well. A copy of the summary of the rules amendments and the final statement of economic impact may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 11 admitted into evidence. The final version of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c), which was enacted, was no more specific on the subject of payment of annual leave credits upon termination of an employee who had been appointed to Senior Management Service prior to the effective date of the rule than was the version of that provision noticed on February 21, 1986. When Subsection (6)(c) is read in the context of the overall Section (6), the language describes that experience pertaining to persons appointed to Senior Management following the effective date of the rule and their leave credits brought with them. It does not describe those who were already employees in the Senior Management system before the effective date of the rule and their annual leave credits or annual leave credits earned by new employees upon admission to the Senior Management Service. This circumstance, taken together with the repeal of the previous Rule 22SM- 1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code, means that the question of the payment for annual leave hours upon the termination from Senior Management Service after May 29, 1986, for those who had been appointed to Senior Management Service before that date was unresolved by rules of the Department of Administration beyond May 29, 1986, as was the matter of how to deal with hours earned by the new members who came into the Senior Management Service. This circumstance would remain until the passage of an amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987. Petitioner challenged Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, by petition of May 18, 1987. In that same petition, he challenged Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987. All accumulated annual leave for which Petitioner claims entitlement to payment had been accumulated prior to February 1, 1987. As forecast, Respondent determined to amend certain rules within Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, to include Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code. To this end, on October 17, 1986, Respondent gave notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intention. The summary given by the notice of October 17, 1986, stated: The rule amendments provide for clarification of the designation of positions to be included in the Senior Management Service, provide for the transfer of leave between services, provide for the accrual of 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave each year, and provide for membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The comments on economic impact found in the notice were to the effect: The executive agencies will be required to expend approximately $11,628 in the aggregate to implement the provisions of this rule. The overall purpose and effect of the rules changes was explained as being implementation of provisions made by the 1986 Legislature, as to Part IV, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes. See Petitioner's Exhibit 13/14 admitted into evidence. In this amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Section (6) in existing language becomes Section (10) in the new language. Subsection (6)(c) in the existing language is modified at Subsection (10)(c) by referring to employees as members and deleting the language beginning with " . . or if the employee is transferring . . ." to the end of that Subsection (6)(c). There are added Sections (5) and (6) in the proposed rule which address the circumstance of annual leave credit for persons who were in Senior Management Service at the point the prospective effective date of the rule noticed on October 17, 1986, as well as annual leave credits earned by employees who became members after the effective date of the amendment to the rule. This is a new addition not found in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, which was silent on the treatment of annual leave credits for persons who had been in Senior Management Service before May 29, 1986, and the leave credits yet to be earned by those who became members after that date. For Petitioner's purposes, in this challenge, the proposal to add Sections (5) and (6) was tacit recognition of the fact that in the provisions set forth in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, the question of payment for annual leave upon termination of employees who had been hired before the effective date of that rule was not addressed. The language of the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM- 3.007 at Section as noticed on October 17, 1986, indicated: Upon transfer of a Senior Management Service member to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, annual leave credits shall be retained and shall be calculated and credit as follows: All annual leave credits accrued on the member's last anniversary date shall be prorated at the rate of 20 hours monthly or 9.230 hours biweekly for each period worked thereafter. If the member is transferring to the Career Service, up to 240 hours of annual leave will be transferred and any annual leave balance in excess of 240 hours shall be paid for in cash. Subsection (5)(b) in the proposed amendment spoke to the transfer of 240 if the employee transferred to Career Service, and payment for excess balance over 240 hours earned while Senior Management employees for all that class of employees regardless of their point of employment in the same way Subsection (6)(c) of the May 29, 1986, rule spoke to those matters of payment for annual leave brought with them related to employees who would become members of the Senior Management Service on May 29, 1986, and subsequently. A second category of payment for annual leave was described in the proposed rule noticed on October 17, 1986, Rule 22SM-3.007(6), which stated: Annual leave will be paid for upon termination from state government. Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. This statement pertained to those employees who were members of the Senior Management Service prior to the enactment of the proposed rule and those who would become members and earn credits after the enactment. None of the provisions in the proposed amendments advertised on October 17, 1986, dealt specifically with transfer of or payment for annual leave credits for persons who were not leaving state government, not going to Career Service, but leaving the Senior Management Service to go into other positions within state government over which the Department of Administration had no control as to personnel matters. Effective March 3, 1987, Petitioner transferred to such an organization, namely, the State Legislature. The proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007 noticed October 17, 1986, at Section (3) increased the credit for annual leave and sick leave from 176 hours to 240 hours and 104 hours to 120 hours, respectively. It is couched in terms of giving these benefits upon the appointment and on the anniversary date of appointment to the Senior Management Service. At the commencement of the steps taken to amend Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, the overall summary of the amendments spoke in terms of the provision for transfer of leave between the personnel services, and the increase in accrued leave to 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave and the provision of membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The statement of the economic impact indicated that the executive agencies would be required to expend approximately $11,628 in the aggregate to implement this rule. The statement of costs or benefits to persons directly affected was said to be: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service members, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. This comprehensive statement of the summary of rules and the economic impact statement may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 15 admitted into evidence. A public hearing was scheduled for November 7, 1986, and was held in the Larson Building auditorium, Tallahassee, Florida. This was the sole public hearing held to consider the amendments contemplated by the October 17, 1986, notice. By letter of November 5, 1986, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 16 admitted into evidence, James J. Parry, Director of the Office of Human Resources, State University System of Florida, made mention of his concerns about the proposed amendments. In particular, he was concerned that the higher annual leave and sick leave credits provided in the Senior Management Service and the ability to convert those to sick leave presented potential liability to the State University System when hiring individuals who had been members of the Senior Management Service. He urged change in the language of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(5) which would make it clear that the annual leave credits had to be transferred from Senior Management Service to the receiving employer according to that governmental body's personnel plan, if unaffiliated with the Department of Administration. Furthermore, he suggested that if the annual leave had been converted to sick leave while the employee was with Senior Management Service, upon the affiliation of the employee with the State University System there was a potential of passing along the cost of payment of that unused sick leave upon the termination of that employee's affiliation with the State University System or other governmental employer. He pointed out his belief that the economic impact statement in the proposed rule amendment only spoke to the increase in annual leave credit when in fact there would be an increase in sick leave credit as well. This references the economic impact statement at paragraph 1 to Petitioner's Exhibit 15 where mention is made of the cost incurred to an agency for annual leave accrual rates without mention of concomitant increases in cost for sick leave credits. Parry, by his November 5, 1986, remarks set out in the Petitioner's Exhibit 16, did not reference any specific concern about whether the agency for whom a Senior Manager had worked prior to transfer to the State University System would be liable for payment of annual leave hours accrued prior to transfer. Don Bradley, Chief of the Bureau of Classification and Pay, Department of Administration, received the November 5, 1986, Parry letter on November 6, 1986, a day before the public hearing. (Bradley is the principal author of the version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, under consideration.) That letter was introduced into the record of the public hearing. Bradley recalls that Parry's concern as expressed in the letter and at the point of the public hearing revolved around the fact that the State University System would not allow accumulation of annual leave credit as high in total hours as was allowed by the Senior Management Service. Parry, according to Bradley, wanted to see a revision to the rule amendment which specifically stated that any transferred hours from Senior Management Service to the State University System be in accordance with the personnel rules on annual leave credits utilized by the State University System. Parry is not reported to have expressed an interest at the public hearing on the question of the employing agency of an employee within the Senior Management Service needing to pay for unused annual leave credits prior to transfer of the employee into the State University System, per se. Bradley recalls that there was a related discussion on who would pay for annual leave the State University System did not accept in an effort by Parry to clarify that his organization would not be responsible for payment. The proposed amendments to existing Rule 22SM-3.007 were presented to the Administration Commission. This was done by transmittal to the Office of Planning and Budget of the Governor's Office and from there to the Cabinet Aides to members of the Administration Commission. This submission occurred a week prior to the Cabinet meeting at which the Administration Commission considered the question of the amendments. As set out in Petitioner's Exhibit 17 containing a memorandum from the Department of Administration Secretary, Gilda H. Lambert, dated November 25, 1986, reference is made to the Cabinet Aides' consideration of proposed amendments to 22SM-3.007, described in that document as 22SM-1.007 and changes brought about in this session. That meeting of Cabinet Aides took place on the morning of November 25, 1986, causing certain revisions to be made to the proposed rules on Senior Management Service. It is unclear how the notice was given of the Cabinet Aides' meeting at which point Mr. Bradley and Mr. Parry discussed changes to the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code. In any event, it does not appear that Petitioner would have been apprised of this session. Among those items addressed by Secretary Lambert was a description of what was referred to there as 22SM-1.007 on attendance and leave at Section (5) on page 8 wherein she says that the revision was made to: Clarify that upon transfer to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, unused annual leave credits shall not be paid for and may be transferred subject to the rules governing the system into which the member is transferring. Within Petitioner's Exhibit 17 is the exact nature of Section (5) with the revision being employed. The new language is underlined in this rendition of the version of Section (5) after the Cabinet Aides' meeting. Upon transfer of a Senior Management Service member to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, annual leave credits shall not be paid for and may be transferred subject to the rules governing the system into which the member is transferring. All annual leave credits accrued on the member's last anniversary date shall be prorated at the rate of 20 hours monthly or 9.230 hours biweekly for each pay period or portion thereof, worked subsequent to the member's last anniversary date. As can be seen by this action, Subsection (5)(b) was deleted. These changes were not noticed by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Mr. Bradley describes the underlined changes alluded to in the preceding paragraph as a product of ongoing negotiations between him and Mr. Parry which took place at the point of the Cabinet Aides' meeting dealing with the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code. In the response to the Parry concerns, Mr. Bradley did not feel that it was necessary to change the proposed language put out in the notice of October 17, 1986, pertaining to Rule 22SM-3.007(5) dealing with transfer of hours to a personnel system not administered by the Department of Administration, in that the receiving employers outside DOA controls were not obligated to receive annual credits above what was called for in their personnel systems. Nonetheless, he acquiesced in the inclusion of language in Section (5) arrived at in the Cabinet Aides meeting which made this point abundantly clear. It is that aspect of the change dealing with the transfer of annual leave credit subject to the rules of the governing system into which the member would be transferring that is seen to address Parry's concerns. The portion of the changes that deal with the unwillingness to pay for annual leave credits unless the employee is leaving Senior Management Service to go out of state government as contemplated by Section (6) may be seen as a related matter, in that the nonpayment of annual leave could cause the entire amount of those credits to be transferred over to the State University System or the Legislature to which Petitioner made his transfer. Nevertheless, Parry's emphasis was to make certain that the State University System not have to accept more annual leave credit than it would allow its employees to carry at any given point in time. The fact of nonpayment increases the potential liability for payment of unused annual leave on the part of a receiving agency. This reality does not comport with Parry's contribution before and at the point of public hearing in protecting his organization. His secondary concern expressed at the public hearing about not paying for excess annual leave his agency would not accept coincides with the idea that he wished to minimize the financial exposure of the State University System. This auxiliary position is not tantamount to advocacy which called for the abolishment of all payment for annual leave upon transfer. Finally, this last expression on the topic of payment for unused annual leave left at point of transfer does not give rise to the notion that it was sufficiently debated to notice interested parties that a rule would be enacted that disallowed payment for annual leave upon transfer to any state agency from Senior Management Service. The changes that came about in Section (5) by the Bradley/Parry discussion at the Cabinet Aides' meeting brought forth the additional penalty to the employee in Senior Management Service that annual leave credit would not be paid for in the future. This expression was contrary to the repealed Rule 22SM- 1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code, in effect prior to May 29, 1986, which allowed payment for annual leave upon any transfer, overturned the silence on this point in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and set aside the less restrictive statement on payment for annual leave in Section (5) as advertised on October 17, 1986. On balance, the addition of the language following the Cabinet Aides' meeting in which it is stated that annual leave credits shall not be paid for in transfer to other state government employment is seen to be a product of the thinking of the Department of Administration, not sufficiently foreseen by actions in the public hearing on November 7, 1986, not duly noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly and not based upon remarks received from the APA committee or material received by the proposing agency within 21 days of the October 17, 1986 notice. The summary of the hearing on November 7, 1986, pertaining to the proposed amendment to the rule describes the participation on the question of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 of other agencies in state government, as well as Mr. Parry from the State University System. A copy of that summary of hearing and changes may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 20 admitted into evidence. The statement of changes found within that exhibit included the elimination of the payment of annual leave in excess of 240 hours if an employee transfers to another position in state government outside of the Selected Exempt Service. This is taken to mean transfer of a Senior Management Service employee to Career Service as described in Subsection (5)(c) noticed on October 17, 1986. It does not speak to the absolute prohibition of payment for annual leave hours accrued prior to transfer from Senior Management Service to any receiving governmental agency. On December 30, 1986, the amendments to Rule 22SM- 3.007 were filed with the Secretary of State. A copy of that filing may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 19 admitted into evidence. Those amendments to Rule 22SM-3.007, to include the changes at Section (5) disallowing payment for annual leave credits upon transfer to another state government agency from Senior Management Service are included. In accordance with the final language of the rule, there is set forth a summary of the rule amendments which may be found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 21. It states: The rule amendments provide for clarification of the designation of positions to be included in the Senior Management Service, provide for the transfer of leave between services, provide for the accrual of 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave each year, and provide for membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The statement of justification for the amendments was that the changes were made to implement 1986 legislation of Part IV, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes. The economic impact statement found within Petitioner's Exhibit 21 said that the aggregate cost to the executive agencies was $11,628. It stated that the number of position descriptions that were involved would be approximately four hundred. On January 31, 1987, there were 1370+ positions in Senior Management Service before the new rule provisions were placed in effect. On February 1, 1987, as a result of the implementation of the 1986 amendment to Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, there were left approximately three hundred fifty Senior Managers. Within the economic impact statement as finally established for the amendments effective February 1, 1987, it is said: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service members, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. Mr. Bradley, author of Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and the amendment to those provisions as printed out on February 1, 1987, said that the Department of Administration had in mind the creation of a Senior Management Service system to try to retain Senior Managers. This included the idea of the discontinuation of payment to Senior Managers except under circumstances where they left state government. He had in mind limiting the idea of automatic payment when a Senior Management Service employee went to the Legislature or the State University System or the court system. To his way of thinking, this would encourage the senior management to remain with the employing agency. As described before, his desired outcome is not achieved until such point as the last version of Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987, came into effect. This was an arrangement without due notice and without regard for the hardship created by the imposition of the nonpayment for transfer rule, unless it can be said that the increase in annual leave credit and sick leave credit contemplated by the February 1, 1987, version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, is seen as an offset. It cannot be so regarded for persons such as the Petitioner who gained very little profit from the increase in annual leave and sick leave hours while losing a substantial number of annual leave credits when he left HRS to go to the Legislature. Petitioner had been made aware sometime in December 1986, of the language of the proposed amendment noticed on October 17, 1986, pertaining to Rule 22SM-3.007. The language discussing the purpose and impact of the proposed amendments would not have given rise to any concerns on his part about the changes that were eventually brought forth in the final version of the rule effective February 1, 1987. On December 10, 1986, Petitioner had an annual leave balance of approximately 536 hours. He used some leave around the Christmas holidays and reduced that, having in mind his belief that only 480 hours could be carried forward into the new year. He felt that he was being threatened in his position as a Senior Manager at HRS, given the fact that a number of Senior Managers were being replaced in that organization in late 1986. By cashing in an amount approaching 500 hours of annual leave, he expected to be paid an amount approximating $10,000, which might assist him in his change in job positions. On April 23, 1987, having not received word on his request for payment of annual leave for Senior Management Service, Petitioner wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Administration to ascertain the outcome of his request for payment. The Secretary was and is Adis Vila. At the same time he wrote to Vivian Pyle, HRS personnel official, making the same request. He expressed concern in his correspondence on the subject of an excessive amount of leave balance being shown by his present employer, the Florida Legislature. Copies of the correspondence to those two individuals may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits 26 and 27 admitted into evidence. By way of response, as noted in Petitioner's Exhibit 28 admitted into evidence, Ms. Pyle answers his inquiry and cites to the fact that Rule 22SM- 3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 5, 1987, does not allow for the payment of annual leave upon transfer into the State Legislature system. In correspondence of that same date from Secretary Vila, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 29 admitted into evidence, the Department of Administration makes reference to the fact that the May 29, 1986, Sections 22SM- 3.007(5) and (6), Florida Administrative Code, indicated that the annual leave should be transferred subject to the rules governing the system where the employee was transferred and that accrued annual leave would be paid only upon termination from state government. The rule referred to in the correspondence does not contemplate persons who had been employed before the rule became effective transferring annual leave to the State Legislature from Senior Management or being paid for that annual leave. Moreover, at the time of his transfer, the applicable version of the rule was the February 1, 1987, statement which specifically disallowed payment for annual leave in any circumstance other than leaving state government. Although an interpretation may be given that the Department of Administration believes that the version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, controls the question of the entitlement of Petitioner to payment for annual leave upon his termination from Senior Management Service on March 2, 1987, that interpretation is not an appropriate one. That version of the rule was amended on February 1, 1987, and by such amendment the language of the May 29, 1986, rule was superseded, regardless of the construction given the May 29, 1986, version of the rule. Consequently, the resolution of the Petitioner's claim to entitlement for payment for annual leave credits accrued must necessarily be resolved under the terms of the rule effective February 1, 1987, if controlled by rule. Based upon computer printout information about Senior Management Service employees who were in the program as of February 1, 1987, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 32 admitted into evidence, Petitioner made calculations as to the value of accumulated annual leave for those employees if they were paid by the Department of Administration at that juncture. That value was in excess of $1.9 million. The calculation made by the Petitioner concerning the amount of potential money Senior Managers would have been entitled to upon transfer does not take into account the possibility of reduced payments in transfer to Career Service under the terms of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986. Obviously, under that version of the rule and the version of February 1, 1987, termination from state government would allow for the payment of all outstanding annual leave. Petitioner's Exhibit 34 admitted into evidence is a copy of the employee handbook in effect at the time that Petitioner took his position with the Florida Legislature. It establishes that the employee may only carry 360 hours of annual leave forward into January 1 of an ensuing year. Hours above that are converted into sick leave. The sick leave credits are not paid in full if the Petitioner leaves state government after working in the Florida House of Representatives. The value of those sick leave hours would be 1/4 of all hours not to exceed 480 hours. When Petitioner left HRS, he asked to be paid for all but approximately 24 hours accumulated annual leave. It was determined subsequently that this meant that 432 hours were being requested for payment. Instead, HRS transferred 432 hours of annual leave to the Florida House of Representatives. The beginning balance of annual leave hours with the Florida House of Representatives was limited to 360 hours with the balance of 72 hours being subject to conversion to sick leave. The conversion of 72 hours of annual leave to sick leave upon the date of employment with the Florida House of Representatives was further exacerbated by the fact that 476.15 hours of sick leave was also sent over. The significance of this was that with the addition of 3.85 sick leave hours, he would reach the maximum number of allowable sick leave hours to be maintained at any given point by an employee of the Legislature. That amount of hours would have been added in the first month in that 8 hours and 40 minutes of sick are obtained for each month of employment by an employee of the Florida House of Representatives. Consequently, not only had 72 of his hours been disallowed as annual leave credit hours but also 68.15 hours within that 72 hours would have no value, in that 476.15 hours had been transferred as sick leave hours, leaving only 3.85 hours to be converted to sick leave from the 72 annual leave hours. Finally, throughout the 1987 year, Petitioner would earn annual leave credits and compensatory leave credits with the Florida House of Representatives, creating a potential loss in annual leave hours at the conclusion of the calendar year 1987 based upon the maximum number of hours having been transferred into the Florida House of Representatives personnel system upon his hiring and the influence of additional hours added to that total. In the payment for sick leave and annual leave as a member of the Legislature, Petitioner would receive a reduced hourly rate compared to the Senior Management position which Petitioner held with HRS, evidencing further economic disadvantage imposed by disallowing the Petitioner's request for payment for the annual leave upon transfer from HRS to the Florida House of Representatives. To further explain, when Petitioner transferred to the Florida House of Representatives, he took an $8,640 pay cut. Again, payment for the claimed hours of annual leave would have been somewhere approximating $10,000, which would have offset the dire consequences of the salary reduction when changing from HRS to the Florida House of Representatives. Petitioner never sought to present evidence or argument concerning Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and the amendment to that rule effective February 1, 1987. Prior to this case, he did not participate in the public hearing which was conducted concerning those matters.
