The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of premiums paid for life insurance coverage during the 2013 plan year.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state employee with over 30 years of public employment. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance (Division), is the state agency charged with administering the state group insurance program. Pursuant to section 110.123(5), Florida Statutes, its duties include determining the benefits to be provided to state employees and the contributions to be required for the state group insurance program. The Department of Management Services is also authorized, pursuant to section 110.161, to administer a pre-tax benefits program that allows employees’ contributions to premiums be paid on a pre-tax basis, and to provide for the payment of such premiums through a pre-tax payroll procedure. Among the insurance products available to state employees are group health insurance, basic group term life insurance, and optional group term life insurance. At the crux of this case is the premium to be paid for group term life insurance. Basic insurance is noncontributory insurance (meaning the employer pays the premium) for full-time employees and is contributory insurance (meaning the employee pays the premium) for part-time employees. Optional insurance is contributory insurance for all employees. At the time relevant to this proceeding, career service, university system support staff, senior management, and select exempt service employees, as well as active state senators and representatives, were entitled to a basic group term life insurance benefit of $25,000. For retired vested legislators, the basic group term life benefit was $150,000, and for retirees who were not vested legislators, the benefit was either $2,500 or $10,000. Optional group term life insurance was also available to active employees enrolled in basic term life. This insurance coverage was available for purchase up to seven times an employee’s annual earnings, to a maximum of $1,000,000. Both basic and optional life insurance are provided through Minnesota Life. The opportunity to enroll in or make changes to insurance coverage occurs during open enrollment each year. During open enrollment in 2012, Petitioner made selections for the 2013 plan year, which corresponds with the calendar year. Among his selections, Petitioner opted to continue his optional life insurance coverage at four times his annual salary. To make his selection, Petitioner used the People First System. The Minnesota Life screen shot for determining the premium for coverage contains the following information: Determining the cost To determine the new monthly cost of changing your Optional Life coverage, please follow the example below: How is your monthly premium calculated? Your annual earnings = Basic amount Choose the salary multiple of one = to seven times your annual Optional multiple earnings Multiply your basic amount by your = optional multiple and round to the Coverage amount next higher thousand Divide your coverage amount by = 1,000 $1,000 increments Of coverage From the table on the right, find = the rate that corresponds with Rate from table your age X Answer from #4 = Your monthly Insurance premium The table referenced above provides the premium rates based on age bands, such as under age 30, 30-34, 35-39, etc. For ages 55-59, the rate is $0.335. From 60-64, the rate is $0.613. Below the rate/age table is the statement, “[r]ates increase with age and all rates subject to change.” However, nothing in the worksheet indicates that the rate changes during a plan year if the insured has a birthday that puts the employee in a different age band. Based upon his completion of the worksheet in People First, the monthly premium for the optional life insurance selected by Petitioner was $81.08. Petitioner received a document entitled “State of Florida Confirmation of Benefits for 2013 Plan Year.” The Confirmation of Benefits document confirmed that for the 2013 plan year, Petitioner’s monthly cost for optional life insurance would be $81.08. For the first two months of 2013, the expected amount of $81.08 was deducted from Petitioner’s salary. However, beginning in March 2013, for the coverage beginning in April 2013, the premium increased from $81.08 to $148.36, a difference of $67.28 per month.1/ Petitioner did not receive any specific notice regarding the change in policy premiums. He did not notice the difference in his net pay immediately because his salary is subject to additives, and it was not unusual for the net pay to vary from month to month. Employees do not automatically receive a copy of their pay stubs. They must affirmatively retrieve them electronically from a Department of Financial Services website. Petitioner first called the People First information line on August 27, 2013, to inquire regarding the increase in premiums. He followed up with a letter dated September 10, 2013, asking for a refund of the amount deducted from his salary in excess of $81.08 a month. On September 12, 2013, the People First Service Center responded to his request by stating that the increase was a “Significant Cost Increase Qualifying Status Change (QSC) event,” and that inasmuch as Petitioner did not request a decrease in coverage level within 60 days of the QSC event, any change to his benefits would have to wait until open enrollment. The letter referenced Florida Administrative Code Rule 60P-2.003, stating, We are charged with the responsibility of administering the State Group Insurance Program pursuant to these state regulations, as well as the federal regulations. The rules pertaining to changes in health plans are found in Chapter 60P-2.003 which states: “An employee may elect, change or cancel coverage within thirty-one (31) days of a Qualified Status Change (QSC) event if the change is consistent with the event pursuant to subsection 60P-2.003(7), F.A.C. or during the open enrollment period.” While the letter purports to quote the rule, rule 60P- 2.003, the language above does not actually appear as quoted in the rule. Rule 60P-2.003 states in relevant part: An employee enrolled in the Health Program may apply for a change to family coverage or individual coverage within thirty-one (31) calendar days of a QSC event if the change is consistent with the event or during the open enrollment period. * * * All applications for coverage changes must be approved by the Department, subject to the following: The Department shall approve a coverage change if the completed application is submitted to the employing agency within thirty-one (31) calendar days of and is consistent with the QSC event. Documentation substantiating a QSC event is as follows: If changing to family coverage, proof of family status change or proof of loss of other group coverage is required. If changing to individual coverage, proof of family status change or proof of change of employment status is required. If adding an eligible dependent to family coverage, proof of family status change is required. If terminating coverage, proof of family status change or proof of employment change is required. On September 23, 2013, Petitioner sought a Level-II appeal, forwarding all of his correspondence to the Division. On October 11, 2013, Barbara Crosier, Director of the Division, wrote to Petitioner and advised that his Level-II appeal was denied. The letter cited rule 60P-2, and stated that Petitioner needed to have acted within 31 days of the QSC event if the change was consistent with the event, or wait until the open enrollment period. The letter provided Petitioner with notice of his right to a hearing pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and on November 6, 2013, Petitioner filed a request for hearing that resulted in these proceedings. Both the correspondence from People First and the letter from Ms. Crosier refer to a qualifying status change. However, the definition of a QSC event in rule 60P-1.003(17) does not include a change in age band. The events identified in the rule are “the change in employment status, for subscriber or spouse, family status or significant change in health coverage of the employee or spouse attributable to the spouse’s employment.” There is a table available somewhere through People First2/ entitled “State of Florida Qualifying Status Change Event Matrix.” The matrix identifies changes in status, the type of documentation required, and the options available to the employee. There was no evidence presented indicating that the matrix has been adopted by rule and in some instances, the matrix is inconsistent with both section 110.123 and rule 60P-1.003. Petitioner did not see this matrix when making his insurance selections during open enrollment. Included in the matrix as a category of QSC events is a category entitled “Significant Cost Changes.” Under this category, the grid identifies “[p]remium increase or decrease to subscriber of at least $20 per month as a result of a change in pay plan (e.g., Career Service to SES), FTE (e.g., part-time to full-time), LWOP, FMLA, legislative premium mandates, Optional Life age banding, etc.” The category “significant cost changes” is not identified as a QSC event in rule 60P-1.003(17). Footnote four of the matrix states, “[t]he period of time to make allowable changes to benefits, as defined by the IRS. All QSC windows are 60 days unless otherwise specified.” Footnote four is appended to text within the cell for information related to a change in marital status, which states “60-day QSC window4.” Petitioner credibly testified that he was not experiencing any change to marital status, so did not believe that the information identified in footnote four would necessarily relate to his circumstances. On December 19, 2008, the Division published the State of Florida Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan with a Premium Payment Feature, a Medical Reimbursement Component, and a Dependent Care Component (Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan), which Petitioner submitted without objection as Petitioner’s Exhibit 10. This document is available on the DMS website but has not been identified as a rule. However, it is consistent with the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 125, which authorizes cafeteria plans, and 26 C.F.R. § 125-4, which identifies permitted election changes in cafeteria plans. The Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan states: Establishment of Plan The Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance established the State of Florida Flexible Benefits Plan effective July 1, 1989. The Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance hereby amends, restates and continues the State of Florida Flexible Benefits Plan, hereafter known as the State of Florida Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan (“the Plan”), effective December 19, 2008. This plan is designed to permit an Eligible Employee to pay on a pre-tax basis for his or her share of premiums under the Health Insurance Plan, the Life Insurance Plan and the Supplemental Insurance Plan, and to contribute to an account for pre-tax reimbursement of certain medical care expenses and dependent care expenses. Legal Status This Plan is intended to qualify as a “cafeteria plan” under Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code 1986, as amended (“the Code”), and regulations issued there under. The Medical Reimbursement Component of this Plan is also intended to qualify as a “self- insured medical reimbursement plan” under Code 105(h), and the Medical Care Expenses reimbursed under that component are intended to be eligible for exclusion from participating Employees’ gross income under Code 105(b). The Dependent Care Component of the Plan is intended to meet the requirements of Code 129. The Life Insurance Plan is intended to meet the requirements of Code 79. The Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan contained definitions for a change in status. Those definitions are consistent with the definitions in rule 60P-1.003(17), although more detailed in terms of description. The definition does not include a change in cost due to age banding. Section 4.3 of the Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan provides: Each eligible Employee’s Salary Reduction Agreement shall remain in effect for the entire Plan Year to which it applies, shall be irrevocable (except as provided in Sections 5.6, 6.4, and 7.4) and shall set forth the amount of the Participant’s Compensation to be used to purchase or provide benefits and the benefits to be purchased or provided. Sections 6.4 and 7.4 deal with a participant’s election to participate in the medical reimbursement component and the dependent care components of the plan and have no bearing on this proceeding. Section 5.6 deals with the irrevocability of the election under the premium component of the plan. The section states in pertinent part: In other words, unless one of the exceptions applies, the Participant may not change any elections for the duration of the Plan Year regarding: Participation in this Plan; Salary Reduction Amounts; or Election of particular component plan benefits. The exceptions to the irrevocability requirement, which would permit a Participant to make a mid-year election change in benefits and/or Salary Reduction amounts for this Premium Payment Component, are as follows: Change in Status: A Participant may change or terminate his actual or deemed election under the Plan upon the occurrence of a change in status, but only if such change or termination is made on account of, and is consistent with, the change in status. The Administrator (in its sole discretion) shall determine whether a requested change is on account of, and is consistent with, a change in status. Special HIPAA Enrollment rights. . . . Certain judgments, decrees and orders. . . . Medicare and Medicaid. . . . Significant Change in Cost or Coverage. A Participant may revoke a prior election with respect to pre-tax contributions and, in lieu thereof, may receive, on a prospective basis, coverage under another plan with similar coverage if any independent, third-party provider of medical benefits previously elected by the Participant either significantly increases the premium for such coverage, or significantly curtails the coverage available under such plans, during the plan year coverage period. (Note: if any mid- year premium increase by the third-party provider is insignificant, the Participant’s Salary Reduction election will be automatically adjusted by the Administrator or its agent. Significant Change in Coverage Attributable to Spouse’s Employment. . . . (emphasis added). None of the exceptions to irrevocability identified above apply in this instance. Section 5.2 of the Agreement addresses the Participant’s contributions and is the provision upon which Petitioner relies. It states in pertinent part: If an employee elects to participate in the Premium Payment Component the Participant’s share (as determined by the employer) of the premium for the plan benefits elected by the Participant will be financed by salary reductions. The salary reduction for each pay period is an amount equal to the annual premium divided by the number of pay periods in the plan year, or an amount otherwise agreed upon. . . . (emphasis added). Petitioner did not experience a QSC event. The Confirmation of Benefits received by Petitioner identifies the amount of premium Petitioner has agreed to pay and the benefit he was to receive for that premium. He elected optional life insurance coverage in accordance with the information provided to him on the People First screen. The statement “rates increase with age” can be construed, as Petitioner did, to explain the differences in rates reflected in the table described in paragraph 10. Nothing placed Petitioner on notice that upon achieving his 60th birthday, his premium would automatically increase to the next premium category. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the method of premium calculation described in paragraph 5.2 of the Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a Final Order authorizing the refund of excess premiums in the amount of $605.52. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2014.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Michael Grasso (“Mr. Grasso”), should recover any costs after successfully demonstrating that Respondent, St. Marks Stone Crab Festival (“the Festival”), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act by conditioning Mr. Grasso’s entry on the production of documentation substantiating that his dog was a “service animal.”
Findings Of Fact Mr. Grasso represented himself during the underlying proceeding and did not incur any attorney’s fees.2 Mr. Grasso asserted during the March 8, 2021, telephonic status conference that he was seeking to recover no costs other than the cost of traveling to and from Tallahassee for the final hearing on August 27 and September 17, 2020, in the underlying case. During the March 9, 2021, status conference, the undersigned inquired about any costs Mr. Grasso incurred in copying documents filed with DOAH. Mr. Grasso responded that he was not seeking to recover the costs associated with making copies of the exhibits he moved into evidence during the underlying proceeding. The undersigned also inquired during the March 9, 2021, status conference about any costs Mr. Grasso incurred with regard to presenting the testimony of Deputy Robert Standeford and Sergeant Jeffrey Yarbrough. Mr. Grasso responded that he incurred no appearance fees and no costs for serving subpoenas. After consulting Appendix II to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure containing the Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions (“the Guidelines”), the undersigned finds that Mr. Grasso should not be awarded any costs related to the underlying proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order declining to award Michael Grasso any costs in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Ronald A. Mowrey, Esquire Mowrey Law Firm, P.A. 515 North Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Grasso 2017 Gardenbrook Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Whether the amount awarded Petitioner for relocation was a sufficient and proper award.
Findings Of Fact Prior to the acquisition of a highway right of way for project 57050- 2515 in Okaloosa County, Florida the appellant operated a small business on parcel 103, which was needed for the highway. The business was known as Koolie of West Florida, Inc., and among other things sold bottle drinks, blue luster products and large round cakes of soybean meal used for fish bait. On August 23, 1976 the Respondent, Department of Transportation, informed Mr. Dick Carter, the President and Owner of the business of the different options available for reimbursing him for moving expenses. It was explained that if he hired a licensed mover the Florida Department of Transportation could pay the mover on an actual cost basis. It was further explained that if he wished to move the business, using his own personnel, he would be reimbursed up to the amount of the lowest of two commercial bids. One commercial bid was obtained but the requirement of two commercial bids was waived for the reason that Crestview, Florida is a small town and has only one licensed mover. On September 29, 1976, Mr. Carter was informed of the amount of the bid and Mr. Carter chose to move his business himself, although Mr. Carter made known his dissatisfaction with the amount of the low bid. Upon learning of the dissatisfaction with the estimate, the Respondent Department requested Mr. Carter to notify it of the time and date of the move so that any additional moving expenses could be documented. The Department was not informed and the Petitioner moved to its new location. Thereafter, a claim was made for additional moving expenses and a supplemental move cost claim in the amount of $347.25 was offered to the Petitioner and he was notified that if the amount was not satisfactory, an administrative hearing would be arranged. The additional amount was refused and Petitioner requested the subject hearing. The supplemental move cost claim and the supplemental amount allowed, $347.25 was based on the certified inventory sent by the Petitioner to the Respondent. The move took place some four months after the inventory was sent to the Respondent and the Petitioner had expressed its dissatisfaction with the moving reimbursement, but although requested by the Respondent, did not notify the Respondent of the time and date of moving so that a representative of the Respondent could be present to assess the additional cost of moving, if any. Petitioner contends that the inventory sent the Respondent was incorrect and that instead of 200 soybean cakes that had to be moved it was in fact 1000 soybean cakes. Petitioner contends that he should have received $625.00 for 250 cakes of soybean meal which he said were destroyed in moving plus a sum of $97.50 which was in addition to the original estimate by the moving company. Respondent contends that there are provisions for a self move providing the cost is less than a $1000.00 on the lowest of two estimates; that in the City of Crestview there is only one certified mover so a special dispensation was allowed so that the one certified mover would submit an estimate of moving cost; the Petitioner provided an inventory, and an estimate of moving cost was submitted by Shaw, a certified mover. The Petitioner chose to move himself and was offered reimbursement in the amount of the estimate by the certified mover as revised and was also offered reimbursement for one-third loss of 200 cakes of soybean meal inasmuch as this was an uninsurable item. Respondent further shows that all of the inventory except the soybean cakes would have been insured by the mover in the event of breakage or damage and that Petitioner had the choice of being moved by a certified mover or moving himself. Respondent further contends that it properly followed the requirements of law and the Petitioner has been offered payment in accordance with law.
Recommendation Deny the petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: C. Thomas Holland, Esquire 440 North Main Street Crestview, Florida 32536 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact On or about January 26, 1990, the Respondent sought competitive bids through Invitation to Bid Number 590:2123 for the lease of certain office space in Plant City, Florida. The bid opening occurred on March 1, 1990, and Intervenor was determined to have submitted the lowest responsive bid. In addition to Intervenor's bid, bids were received from Petitioner and Walden Investment Company, which is not a party in this case. On or about May 8, 1990, the Respondent notified all bidders of its intent to award this lease to Intervenor, and on May 10, 1990, the Petitioner filed its notice of protest concerning this award claiming that Intervenor's bid was not responsive to the parking requirements in the Invitation to Bid. Section 15 of the Invitation to Bid requires that a minimum of 65 parking spaces be provided, and that a minimum of 15 of these spaces must be full size and a minimum of 5 must meet ANSI standards for handicapped parking spaces. No definition or specification for full size parking spaces is provided in the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner did not establish that there is a commonly accepted standard for full size parking spaces in the construction or development industry, or that the Respondent uniformly requires all full size parking spaces to be of certain dimensions. The Intervenor certified in its bid that it would meet the parking space requirement of the Invitation to Bid. The Respondent does not require detailed site plans which would depict actual dimensions for each parking space to be submitted with each bid. Rather, Section 10(d) of the Invitation to Bid requires only a line drawing "drawn roughly to scale", and specifies that final site layout will be a "joint effort between the department and the lessor so as to best meet the needs of the department". The Intervenor did submit a rough line drawing with its bid which depicts 71 parking spaces. The Respondent routinely accepts a bidder's certification that it will meet the parking requirements in an Invitation to Bid, and if those requirements ultimately are not met, the Respondent may proceed against the performance bond which the successful bidder is required to post. The Petitioner presented evidence that there is not enough room on Intervenor's site to provide 15 full size parking spaces measuring 10 feet wide by 20 feet long. However, there is nothing in the Invitation to Bid, or in the City of Plant City's Code which requires full size parking spaces of this dimension. Based upon its certification and the inclusion of a rough line drawing showing space for parking in excess of the requirements in the Invitation to Bid on this site,, it is found that Intervenor was responsive to the parking requirements in this Invitation to Bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's protest and awarding Lease Number 590:2123 to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Farley, Esquire District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Blvd. 5th Floor, Room 520 Tampa, FL 33614-9990 Alan Taylor P. O. Box 7077 Winter Haven, FL 33883-7077 Richard C. Langford, Esquire P. O. Box 3706 St. Petersburg, FL 33731-3706 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an "in lieu" payment under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4622) as implemented by I. M. 80-1-71 and amended by P. M. 81-1.2.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Florida department of Transportation, because of the proposed widening of State Road 61, Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Florida, notified Petitioner in the spring of 1974 that the property on which the business was located was to be taken by the Respondent for road purposes. Petitioner was offered, but did not accept, relocation assistance to move his business to another location or to reimburse him in the amount that a never would charge. Other relocation assistance by the Respondent to find sites which would be appropriate for Petitioner's business was offered and four such sites were presented to Petitioner. Petitioner found the sites undesirable and has located a site at which he intends to move his business. Petitioner contends that the location on Thomasville Road is a good location; that he acquires "walk-in" business from time to time; that the sign on the building is of a type consistent with the limited type of advertising available to members of his profession and is beneficial to him; that the building he rents on Thomasville Road has additional space in which he at one time did rent to other interests, but which rental possibilities were foreclosed upon the general public knowledge that the Respondent would widen Thomasville Road and in the process remove the rental building. Petitioner operates his business from the location and shows that the operation of his consultant service is his sole business. The Petitioner filed for in lieu payments after refusing to accept relocation assistance for the moving of his business Petitioner contends: that nothing in the Act states or implies that a displaced person is required to accept relocation assistance if it is economically unsound; that the Respondent failed to sustain the burden of proof that Petitioner is not entitled to "in lieu" payment under the Act. Respondent contends: that the Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to "in lieu" payments under the Act; that the losses such as production costs, rental income, and advertising possibilities are not within the contemplation of the Act.
The Issue Did Respondent, LGI Homes-Florida, LLC (LGI), discriminate in housing against Petitioners, Bridget and Tonny Walker, on account of their race in violation of section 760.23 Florida Statutes (2018)?1 1 All references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2018 compilation unless noted otherwise.
Findings Of Fact Mr. and Ms. Walker are African-American. Their claim in this matter arises out of their inquiry into buying a house from LGI in its Hill 'N Dale community. LGI is a national homebuilder. It develops residential communities consisting of homes that it built. It offers financing for those homes. LGI follows a specific, multi-step process for home sales. The process includes maintaining a log of contacts with potential buyers. The log includes the name of the sales representative who spoke to the potential buyers, the date of the contact, and the outcome of the contact. The process also includes a loan pre-qualification step. Using a Pre-Qualification Worksheet, a sales representative gathers basic financial information from a prospective buyer including employment, compensation, and bank account balances. In addition, LGI obtains a credit report for the prospective buyer. A determination that a buyer is qualified is effective for 30 days at any LGI property. After 30 days, a buyer who wishes to tour a home must undergo the pre-qualification process again. LGI does not give home tours to individuals unless they pre-qualify for financing. It follows this policy to conserve sales representative time by avoiding wasting time showing homes to individuals who are unlikely to be able to purchase them. LGI also says the policy avoids raising unrealistic expectations in would-be buyers who will not be able to finance a home. LGI's policies require every sales representative to first take each pre- qualified prospective buyer to a target home, identified as the lowest price home available, before viewing any other available homes on the property. On March 17, 2018, Mr. and Ms. Walker visited LGI's Ballentrae community. There they completed the pre-qualification process. An LGI representative advised them that they were pre-approved for a home valued around $150,000. The Walkers did not tour a home in the Ballentrae community. On June 16, 2018, the Walkers visited LGI's Hill 'N Dale community. They had scheduled an appointment with Danine Stratton, an LGI sales representative. After the Walkers arrived and seated themselves in the waiting area, a Caucasian couple arrived and sat down. When Ms. Stratton entered the waiting area she spoke to the Caucasian couple before acknowledging the Walkers. Ms. Stratton consulted with the Walkers and obtained the information needed for pre-qualification from them. This was necessary because more than 30 days had passed since they had pre-qualified at the Ballentrae property. She also asked for some demographic information. The Walkers inquired about purchasing a four-bedroom house. Ms. Stratton expressed skepticism that they could afford a four-bedroom home. During the consultation Ms. Stratton learned that Mr. Walker's name was spelled "Tonny," with two "n"s. She noted that the spelling was unusual. She went on to say, "It's either three things, your mother could not spell, your mother was on drugs, or just unique." The Walkers were justly offended and understandably perceived the comment as invoking racial stereotypes. Ms. Stratton maintains that this was just good natured, light-hearted, teasing meant to build rapport with the Walkers. She testified that she was "completely shocked" that they were offended. Ms. Stratton is not credible. It is not plausible that a sales person would expect insulting a customer's mother to build rapport with the customer. Ms. Stratton's comments are inexplicable. Nonetheless, Ms. Stratton gave the Walkers a tour of the community.2 She offered to show the Walkers a three-bedroom home, consistent with LGI's "target home" strategy. They asked about a four-bedroom home. Ms. Stratton said that a four-bedroom home was not available for showing. There is no persuasive evidence that one was available at that time or that a four- bedroom home was shown during that time period to non-minority persons. Ms. Stratton was willing to sell a three-bedroom home to the Walkers. By then they had decided they would not purchase a home from LGI. In 2 The testimony of Ms. Walker and Ms. Stratton differed on this point and others. Based on the demeanor of the witnesses, consistency with other evidence, and the implausibility of some of Ms. Stratton's testimony, the undersigned finds Ms. Walker more credible and persuasive. Ms. Walker's words, "I declined her offer to purchase any home with LGI." (Tr. p. 39). Upset by Ms. Stratton's comments about the spelling of Mr. Walker's name, the Walkers decided that they just wanted to leave. In order to do this peacefully they said they needed to check with an uncle to obtain funds for the required earnest money. They also refused to sign the pre-qualification form. On June 17, 2018, Ms. Stratton texted the Walkers saying, "Hey there, just touching base. Were you able to talk with your uncle about helping out?" This text demonstrated that Ms. Stratton wanted to sell the Walkers a home. On June 18, 2018, Ms. Walker replied that because of the comment about the spelling of Mr. Walker's name, "We will not be purchasing with LGI." Ms. Stratton replied: Oh my goodness, I'm so sorry that I offended you. I certainly didn't mean to. I was just making a joke and in hindsight was in poor taste. Again, I'm so sorry and best of luck to you guys." Ms. Walker went to an LGI property in Ruskin and spoke to a supervisor there named Joe Boyd. He assured her that LGI would take care of the problem and someone would call her. Ms. Walker also called LGI's home office in Texas. She was connected to the area director for Florida. He emailed Ms. Walker and said that he would have someone named Todd Fitzgerald contact her. Mr. Fitzgerald did not contact the Walkers. On Friday, June 22, 2018, at 12:52 p.m., Ms. Walker sent Mr. Boyd an email. It stated, "Myself and my husband recently visited one of your properties and received poor customer service and rude racist remarks from one of your employees. I have spoken to one of you[r] managers locally but I do not [know] if anything was done. There was no follow up. Please contact me at [phone number]." On Friday, June 22, 2018, at 10:13 p.m., Mr. Boyd replied: It is my understanding that our division president Todd Fitzgerald called you to discuss this. Please let me know if he hasn't and I will be happy to call. Please be assured that in no way was the intent of our representative to offend in any way. We apologize for you feeling that you received comments that were rude and even racist, that is definitely not like us, so from the bottom of my heart I am sorry on behalf of our company. I'll be available to discuss tomorrow if Todd has not already spoke with you. Have a nice evening! The next day Ms. Walker replied: "Thank you for your quick response. But I have not spoken to Todd Fitzgerald." There is no evidence of further communications between LGI and the Walkers. The Walkers did not offer to purchase a home from LGI. They would not purchase a home from LGI. From March 2018 through March 2019, LGI closed on the sale of 15 homes at Hill 'N Dale for which Ms. Stratton was the responsible sales representative. African-Americans purchased seven of those houses. On May 20, 2018, Ms. Stratton sold a four-bedroom home Hill 'N Dale to Alfreeda Harrington, an African-American, for $175,000.00. This was before her June meeting with the Walkers. Ms. Stratton sold a three-bedroom home in Hill 'N Dale to Tawanda Boyd, for $160,000.00. Ms. Boyd is an African-American. On August 11, 2018, Beverly Easton, an African-American, purchased a four-bedroom home in Hill 'N Dale for $175,000.00. Ms. Stratton was the sales representative for the transaction. On June 9, 2018, Ms. Stratton sold a home in Hill 'N Dale to the Samuels family, who were African-Americans. On April 12, 2019, Ms. Stratton sold a home in Hill 'N Dale to an African-American buyer whose last name is Wheeler. On March 25, 2019, Ms. Stratton sold a home in Hill 'N Dale to an African-American buyer whose last name is Bacon. On January 28, 2019, Ms. Stratton sold a home in Hill 'N Dale to an African-American buyer whose last name is Swanson.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Brett Purcell Owens, Esquire Fisher & Phillips, LLP Suite 2350 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Bridget Trinettea Walker Tonny Walker 1144 Barclay Woods Drive Ruskin, Florida 33570 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Dennis Lamar Flint (Petitioner) should be assessed a penalty for an alleged failure to obtain workers' compensation insurance as charged in a Stop Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact On October 24, 2007, an investigator employed by the Respondent observed two men and a truck parked at a shopping center located at 3704 Cleveland Avenue in Fort Myers, Florida. According to a permit posted at the shopping center, a general contractor identified as "Sams Property Investment" was apparently responsible for a construction project at the shopping center. The investigator determined that one of the men was the Petitioner. The other man was initially identified as "Steve Nolan," but was subsequently identified as "Steve Miller." At the time the investigator arrived at the shopping center, she observed a ladder leaning against the building. The ladder belonged to the Petitioner. The truck contained equipment that the investigator asserted was utilized in construction or carpentry trades. The Petitioner and Mr. Miller were at the shopping center location to determine the condition of the stucco surface on the building. The shopping center's owner was apparently interested in improving the appearance of the property. The owner's son, Geoffrey Hatter, familiar with the Petitioner through work the Petitioner had done at the personal residence of the owner's son, contacted the Petitioner and asked him to evaluate the condition of the structure. The Petitioner and Mr. Miller traveled together to the shopping center on the morning of October 24, 2007. Mr. Miller was the boyfriend of the Petitioner's daughter. The Petitioner testified that the truck belonged to Mr. Miller. The investigator who spoke to the Petitioner at the site testified that the vehicle tag was registered to the Petitioner. The Petitioner testified that Mr. Miller removed a plywood board to reveal the structure below. Neither inspector observed either the Petitioner or Mr. Miller handling or removing any material from the structure. The investigator who initially arrived at the scene testified that she had "asked them to come down from the ladder," but then testified that Mr. Miller was standing on the ladder and that the Petitioner was standing on the ground nearby the truck and ladder. A second inspector who traveled to the location separately from the first initially testified that she observed two men on the building, but as she was questioned about the observation, the testimony became less than convincing, lacked sufficient clarity to be reliable, and conflicted with the other inspector's testimony that the Petitioner was standing on the ground near the truck. The Respondent's lead investigator testified that when she asked the men how they were to be compensated, they responded that there was no agreement between them or with any contractor and that they did not know how much they would be paid or by whom. The Respondent's investigator also testified that the Petitioner told her that he thought he would be paid and that he usually received about $2,000 for similar work. The evidence fails to establish that there was any commitment by anyone to pay $2,000 to the Petitioner for his activities at the shopping center location on October 24, 2007. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was compensated in any manner for any task performed at the shopping center location on October 24, 2007. There is no evidence that the Petitioner directed Mr. Miller to remove the plywood board from the structure. There is no evidence that there was any agreement between the Petitioner and Mr. Miller under which Miller would receive any compensation for any tasks performed at the shopping center on October 24, 2007. There is no evidence that the Petitioner ever employed Mr. Miller in any capacity or provided any compensation of any kind to Mr. Miller. Sams Property Investment did not have workers' compensation coverage for the two men on October 24, 2007. The Respondent's investigator testified without contradiction that neither the Petitioner nor Mr. Miller had workers' compensation coverage on October 24, 2007, and that there was no statutory exemption or exclusion applicable to this case. The investigator requested the Petitioner to provide certain business records to facilitate computation of a proposed penalty. The Petitioner earns his living as a laborer, taking whatever work comes to him. In a letter to the Respondent, counsel for the Petitioner asserted that the Petitioner does not have any banking accounts, has not filed a tax return in many years, and was unable to provide business records because there were none. Because the Petitioner provided no business records in response to the Respondent's request, the Respondent determined an imputed penalty as provided by statute, reflecting a determination that the Petitioner was Mr. Miller's employer. On December 6, 2007, the Respondent issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment setting forth an imputed penalty of $175,199.16. There is no evidence that the mathematical calculation of the imputed penalty was performed incorrectly. The Petitioner and Mr. Miller became employed by Sams Property Investments in November 2007, which provided workers' compensation coverage during the period of employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued against Dennis Lamar Flint. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony B. Miller, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 John Kyle Shoemaker, Esquire Post Office Box 1601 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue Whether the decision to reject all bids for Lease No. 800:0187 is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent under the provisions of Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, or violates the terms of the Request for Proposal.
Findings Of Fact Prior to May 17, 1999, the Department issued a RFP for office space seeking to lease approximately 14,420 contiguous square feet of space located in Broward County, Florida. This lease, designated 800:0187 in this record, was to run for a basic term of seven years with three two-year renewal options. The RFP specified the lessor was to provide full services and 60 parking spaces. In response to the RFP, the Petitioner, Sunrise, and Intervenor timely submitted proposals. The space proposed by Petitioner complied with the requirements of the RFP. Additionally, the Petitioner's submittal was well within the Department's acceptable rate range. On May 17, 1999, the Department issued an intended award to Sunrise for lease 800:0187. Sunrise was deemed the lowest responsive bidder. All objections to the award to Sunrise were resolved or withdrawn. For reasons not clearly documented in this record, the Department withdrew its decision to award the lease to Sunrise. The agency action, posted on June 12, 2000, some 13 months after the initial posting, stated Sunrise had not performed and recommended Lauderdale as the second-ranked entity that had responded to the RFP. Both Sunrise and the Intervenor timely filed protests to the proposed award to Lauderdale. The Petitioner filed motions with the Department to dismiss and intervene in those protests. As of the date of the final hearing in the instant case, the Department had not resolved or referred those protests to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Instead, on July 24, 2000, the Department issued a notice stating it would reject all bids for lease 800:0187 and rescind the award to Lauderdale. In reaching this decision, the Department stated it "cannot determine its space needs until after the pending Department reorganization is complete." If the Department was being "reorganized" such reorganization would have been known to the Department on June 12, 2000. No legislative or administrative action was taken to require reorganization between June 12, 2000 and July 24, 2000. The Department determined that its decision of July 24, 2000, rendered the June 12 award to Lauderdale moot. The Petitioner, Sunrise, and Intervenor challenged the agency's decision to reject all bids. Section M of the RFP provides, in pertinent part: The Department reserves the right to reject any and all proposals when such rejection is in the best interest of the State of Florida. Such rejection shall not be arbitrary, but be based on strong justification. (Emphasis in original omitted.) Subsequent to the protests of the rejection of all proposals, Perry Anderson, a regional administrator for the Department whose region encompasses Broward County, drafted a memorandum dated September 22, 2000, to address the number of leases and unit requirements for service areas of Broward County. The proposals set forth in the memorandum have not been resolved. As of the date of the hearing, the Department did not present any definitive statement as to its leasing needs for Broward County or how and why the submittals for lease 800:0187 could not address the agency's need. The Department has not presented documentation for any agency plan or statutory mandate to reorganize or decentralize the office space encompassed by lease 800:0187. If decentralization is required, the Department has presented no studies to determine the location, service areas, or numbers of clients for such offices. Studies for demographics, travel times, accessibility to public transportation, client case loads, or how reorganization would better address such issues have not been presented. Moreover, the Department has not demonstrated how decentralization would be inconsistent with the award of lease space as designated by lease 800:0187. The only justification for the rejection of all proposals for lease 800:0187 was the alleged reorganization of the Department. The Department presented no factual information as to how the "reorganization" related to an emerging philosophy supporting decentralization or improved services to the client population.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order rescinding its decision to reject all proposals for lease 800:0187. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian D. Berkowitz, Esquire Scott Wright, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert A. Sweetapple, Esquire Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas 165 East Boca Raton Road Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire Berger, Davis & Singerman 215 South Monroe Street Suite 705 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. Margaret Hesford, Esquire 5648 West Atlantic Boulevard Margate, Florida 33063 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner was the victim of a discriminatory employment practice perpetrated by the Respondent by the alleged discharge of the Petitioner on account of her handicap.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc., is a Florida corporation, with the principal offices located in Panama City, Florida. The Respondent operates convenience stores in Marianna and Alford, Florida, along with numerous other locations. On December 14, 1990, the Petitioner, Jo-Ann Duffy, was hired as a sales associate and placed in the Marianna store. She indicated in her job application that she was willing to work in Chipley, Bonifay, Marianna and Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner received her employee training in the policies and procedures under which the Respondent operates. She received training in policy no. 030-040, the robbery/theft policy. She signed a "statement of understanding" to that effect, acknowledging that she had received such training. That statement of understanding acknowledges that if the Petitioner violated company policies, such as the robbery and theft policy, her employment was subject to termination by the Respondent. The Petitioner was described as a good worker, initially; and she had a good working relationship with her supervisor, Mr. George Susanka. Mr. Susanka was the store manager and ultimately received some complaints regarding the Petitioner's attitude toward customers. He verbally counselled her regarding this matter. On April 25, 1991, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for failure to perform assigned duties, specifically, noncompliance with policies and procedures, including with regard to inventory shortages. The reprimand was placed in her personnel file. All of the employees at that store, Store No. 190, were also given written reprimands concerning these matters. On May 2, 1991, the Petitioner suffered an injury due to slipping and falling on a wet floor at the Alford Store No. 190. The Petitioner was taken to the emergency room and treated for her injuries. The physicians determined that the Petitioner had suffered a cervical spondylosis, with no evidence of acute injury. After a two-week leave of absence, the Petitioner received permission to return to work from her doctor, Dr. Laubauah, an orthopedist. On June 14, 1991, he released her to return to work with restrictions on her bending and lifting of weight. The Respondent was aware of the Petitioner's work restrictions and that she was receiving worker's compensation benefits from the Respondent as a result of her injury. The Petitioner returned to work at Store No. 190 in Alford, Florida, under the supervision of Renate Ovaldson, who was then store manager. The Petitioner was placed on light duty which is generally defined as merely operating the cash register. She was allowed to sit on a stool behind the counter while she worked, in view of her condition. The Petitioner was later transferred to Store No. 226 in Marianna, Florida. That store was under the supervision of George Susanka, the Marianna store manager. The basis for transferring the Petitioner to that store was that Mr. Susanka was shorthanded and needed another sales associate. Mr. Susanka had previously maintained a positive working relationship with the Petitioner at Store No. 190, and the decision to transfer the Petitioner to Store No. 226 was deemed to be beneficial to the store and to Mr. Susanka. The Petitioner was given light duty at Store No. 226, also, and was given a stool to sit on while she worked. Mr. Susanka was aware that she was taking medication for her back injury. Mr. Susanka's supervisor, Keith Shipman, was not aware that the Petitioner was taking medication. Store No. 226 was considered a less busy store in terms of sales volume; however, the neighborhood was considered to be less desirable. Mr. Susanka soon began receiving verbal complaints regarding the Petitioner's attitude toward customers at Store No. 226. He received a verbal complaint from a Ms. Virginia Smith stating that the Petitioner had been flirting with several men one evening at the counter and had permitted them to go into the store cooler and leave the store with beer without paying for it. A written statement signed by Virginia Smith regarding this incident was later received by the Respondent and placed in the Petitioner's personnel file. Mr. Susanka confronted the Petitioner concerning this incident and asked her if she had been afraid to report the theft, and she indicated that she was not. Mr. Susanka and the assistant store manager, Mr. Coley, conducted a "night ride", whereby they parked their car across the street from the store to observe activities at the store while the Petitioner was on duty. Mr. Susanka witnessed a customer walk in the store and walk out with a small item without paying for it. The only door in which to enter and exit the store was a few feet directly in front of the cash register counter. Mr. Susanka submitted a written statement on the incident, which was placed in the Petitioner's personnel file by the Respondent. Mr. Susanka discussed the various complaints he had received concerning the Petitioner's attitude, performance, and the incident he observed with Mr. Coley with his district manager, Keith Shipman. Mr. Shipman had been aware of prior complaints which the Respondent had received about the Petitioner's attitude with customers, as well. Based upon the documents contained in the personnel file, customer complaints and the fact of customers leaving the store without paying for merchandise while the Petitioner was on duty, and Mr. Susanka's relation of the various incidents, Mr. Susanka and Mr. Shipman made a decision to terminate the Petitioner. The stated reason for Petitioner's termination was violation of company policy and poor customer relations. Mr. Susanka completed an employee status report terminating the Petitioner on July 24, 1991. That report stated that the reason for termination was "on Saturday, July 20, 1991, the clerk, Jo- Ann Duffy, was talking and laughing with six guys at the counter and at that time there was three to four guys in the cooler and walked out with beer and did pay for it and also has a bad attitude with customers". Mr. Susanka testified that the statement had been written in error and it should have read "did not pay for it". The employee status report was signed by Mr. Susanka and Mr. Shipman and placed in the Petitioner's personnel file. Mr. Shipman stated that due to the fact that inventory control was so important in the convenience store business, the Respondent simply could not afford to keep in its employee a sales associate who allowed merchandise to leave the store unpaid for. The Respondent's disciplinary and termination policy no. 040-003 generally states the procedures for discipline and termination. The robbery/theft Policy No. 030-040 states that an employee who violates the guidelines of the robbery and theft policy (as the Petitioner did) is subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5313 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fac A-C. Accepted. D. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. E-F. Accepted. G-H. Accepted, but not in itself materially dispositive. I-J. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive. Rejected, as not in accord with the greater weight of this witness' testimony which was that some violations, such as allowing theft to occur, are the proper subjects of first occurrence terminations. Accepted, but not itself material. Rejected, as immaterial. Rejected, as immaterial given the greater weight of the testimony and evidence, which the Hearing Officer has accepted and embodied in the above Findings of Fact. Rejected, as immaterial. Accepted. Accepted, but not materially dispositive. Accepted, but not materially dispositive in itself. S-T. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. The Respondent's position in this case does not depend upon all low inventory being the fault of the Petitioner. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-24. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Ms. Jo-Ann Duffy Route One, Box 221-X Chipley, FL 32428 Kelly Brewton Plante, Esq. TAYLOR, BRION, BUKER & GREENE 225 South Adams Street Suite 250 Tallahassee, FL 32301
