The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner, Carol J. Cargill, was properly removed from her position as Director of the University's International Language Institute and the related stipend therefore properly terminated.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Cargill, a graduate of Brown, New York University, and Georgetown University, was recruited by the University in 1977. She was hired as a professor in linguistics on a nine month contract. In 1978 she began to develop the ILI, and thereafter took the title of Director, receiving therefor a 20 percent overload to her salary, separate and apart from her academic salary for a full time load. She was never officially appointed as "Director" of the ILI. Her duties with the ILI were separate and apart from her duties as a faculty member. Her appointment to the faculty at the University was as a 1.0 Full Time Effort, (FTE) professor in Linguistics in the Division of Modern Languages and Linguistics, for which she was tendered and signed a standard State University System contract for each year of her employment as a professor, and for which she received a salary pursuant to the United Faculty of Florida Collective Bargaining Agreement, (CBA). The "Directorship" of the ILI is not within the legislative classification of Director. Faculty and other appointments at the University are made either to a "position" which is a creation of the legislature, or to "Other Personnel Services", (OPS), which is, by its nature, temporary. On or about May 5, 1992, Dr. Roger Cole, Professor and Director of the Division of Modern Languages, requested that Dr. Cargill tender her resignation as Director of the ILI. Dr. Cargill refused to do so. Thereafter, on August 10, 1992, Dean Richmond, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, recommended to Provost Meisels that Dr. Cargill be replaced as Director of the ILI. In response to that recommendation, Provost Meisels appointed a three- person review panel to review the material accumulated regarding Dr. Cargill's directorship of the ILI and to conduct such interviews as it deemed necessary. Provost Meisels, in his charge to the panel, directed it to advise him as to whether, in its opinion, Dean Richmond's recommendation, based on information submitted by Dr. Cole, that Cargill be removed, "might be reached by a reasonable individual." On October 5, 1992, the review panel notified Provost Meisels that it had concluded the recommendation met the "reasonableness" standard articulated, and on October 27, 1992, Provost Meisels, in a two page letter to Dr. Cargill, "immediately" removed her as Director of the ILI, and stopped payment of the salary overload she was receiving for those services, effective November 1, 1992. In this letter, Provost Meisels advise Dr. Cargill no additional responsibilities would be assigned to her for the balance of the semester, and she was provided with a "leave with pay for one semester and one summer at 1.0 FTE anytime before the end of the calendar year 1994. Though no specifics were provided either in the letter or at hearing regarding the basis for the apparent dissatisfaction with Dr. Cargill's performance at ILI, the underlying tenor of the letter clearly indicates such existed. Dr. Meisels characterized his action as a reassignment pursuant to Board of Regents Rule 6C-5.130, and though the University's decision to reassign her was discretionary and authorized by that rule, she had the right to file a grievance regarding the matter pursuant to USF Rule 6C4-10.010. The University neither followed nor attempted to follow the procedures for removal for just cause set forth in Rule 6C4-10.009, F.A.C. Dr. Cargill timely filed a Notice of Grievance and Request for Hearing pursuant to Rule 6C4-10.010 and, thereafter, the Step 1 hearing was conducted on June 3, 1993, by Dean Richmond. In his determination dated July 20, 1993, Dean Richmond found, "... there is no substantive basis for grievance on the issue of improper process in the termination of Dr. Cargill as Director of the International Language Institute." Dr. Cargill appealed this decision to then Assistant Provost Wright. In his Step 2 decision, Dr. Wright found the termination or reassignment of Dr. Cargill concerned a substantial interest of the grievant, but she had not met the burden of proof as required under the grievance procedure. He concluded that the recommendation for Dr. Cargill's removal from her position at ILI was consistent with the Board of Regent's rule and that no violation of that rule had occurred, which constituted a denial of her grievance. Dr. Cargill thereafter timely filed her Petition for Relief which forms the basis for this hearing. Ordinarily, a faculty member's assigned duties include a combination of both teaching and research, and, in addition, some faculty members are assigned administrative duties as a component part of their FTE. Though varying slightly from year to year, Dr. Cargill's assigned duties as FTE professor primarily consisted of teaching two courses and administering the graduate program within the Division of Language and Linguistics as "Director of Graduate Studies" which, though encompassing one third of her FTE, she considered an "administrative assignment." For this directorship, she received a one course release time. Over and above all that were her activities with the ILI. Dr. Cargill's assignments as a faculty member were recorded on periodic individual assignment of duties forms and activities reports. Her FTE directorship of graduate studies was listed thereon as "advisement." None of the ILI duties was ever included on either form. Up to 1992, the ILI was funded through the auxiliary budget of the School of Continuing Education and Dr. Cargill's ILI performance was evaluated by the head of the College for Continuing Education. Her FTE teaching and graduate student advisement performance was evaluated by the Director of the Division of Modern Languages and Linguistics. When she was first employed at the University, Dr. Gargill was tendered a standard one year State University System, (SUS), contract for each year of her employment as a professor. This covered her FTE activities only over the nine month regular school year. At no time was she offered or given a SUS contract for her ILI activities. Those activities were compensated for by the periodic issuance of an overload authorization which was signed by Dr. Cargill, the chairperson of the Division, and the Dean for the nine month regular school year. Notwithstanding Dr. Cargill understood the authorization form to be a contract for her services with the ILI, the overload form does not serve as an employment agreement. It merely serves to encumber the funds to be used to pay for the overload upon a showing that the work called for has been accomplished. Dr. Cargill was also given an OPS appointment for her summer term ILI duties when she was assigned no other duties. Overloads are instructional duties in an extension or continuing education activity which are in excess of a full appointment. They are not administered by the University's personnel department but, in this case, by the School of Continuing Education. They have never been considered as a position through which a person may attain tenure or any other right of continuing employment. To the contrary, the CBA requires overloads be offered "equitably". No notice is required before an individual performing overload duties can be denied further such assignments. By the same token, an OPS appointment is also temporary. An OPS appointment was used to compensate Dr. Cargill during the summer term because an overload is allowed only when the faculty member is carrying a full load. Since she had no assigned duties during the summer term except those involving the ILI, an overload would not have been the proper vehicle for compensating her for her summer term duties with the ILI. It must be noted here that OPS appointments, like overloads, carry no right of continuing employment and may be terminated without advance notice. While Dr. Cargill was serving in her FTE position and leading the ILI as well, her overload paid her an amount equal to 20 percent of her faculty salary, and the OPS summer appointment paid her sums in addition to that. During 1991, she was paid approximately $41,000.00 out of the University's Expense and General Funds for her services as an FTE faculty member. During the same period, she was also paid approximately $23,000.00 out of the University's Extension Incidental Trust Fund for her ILI activities. In his October 27, 1992 letter advising Dr. Cargill that her duties with the ILI were being terminated, Dr. Meisels specifically referred to the provisions of Rule 6C-5.130, F.A.C.. She was not given any new duties as a result of or subsequent to her removal from her position with the ILI. Instead, she continued her FTE teaching load and her FTE position as Director of graduate studies within the Division of Modern Language and Linguistics, but was not given an OPS appointment for the 1993 summer term. Dr. Cargill agrees she could have been relieved of her duties with the ILI for cause or from her FTE position as Director of Graduate Studies without notice or cause. However, she contends, the position with the ILI was an administrative assignment from which she could not be removed except for cause or consistent with the provisions of the other pertinent rules. The University does not assert she was removed from her position with the ILI for cause. It is not disputed that Dr. Cargill's duties, title, and pay in her ILI position gave her added prestige both on and off the University campus. Her removal from that position meant she would no longer have the prestige or receive the pay and as a result, she experienced an immediate substantial pay reduction and claims she was humiliated in front of her students and the community.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Dr. Carol J. Cargill's Petition for Relief be denied. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR DR. CARGILL: Accepted and incorporated herein. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 19. Accepted except for use of term, "appointed" which has a special meaning in the law. Correct word should be, "assigned." 20. - 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23. Accepted. 24. - 26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27. & 28. Accepted. 29. - 32. Accepted. 33. & 34. Accepted and incorporated herein. 35. - 36. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE UNIVERSITY: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 14. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. - 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23. & 24. Accepted. - 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of party position. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Tampa, Florida 33602 Henry W. Lavandera, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250 Richard E. Fee, Esquire Glenn, Rasmussen & Fogarty 100 S. Ashley Drive, Suite 1300 Tampa, Florida 33601-3333 Noreen Segrest, Esquire Acting General Counsel University of South Florida ADM 250 4202 East Fowler Avenue Tampa, Florida 33620-6250
The Issue Whether Petitioner has defaulted on student loans and, if so, the principal amounts due on the loans, as well as accrued interest, and collection costs. Whether Petitioner's employer should be required to withhold payments from Petitioner's pay pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Johnny Martin. Petitioner's mailing address is 11431 Quailhollow Drive, Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent is the Florida Department of Education. The Department's business address is 325 West Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The Department is a guarantee agency which holds the loan account in question after paying the claim of the lender on July 28, 1994. All loans in this proceeding are Supplemental Loan(s) for Students (SLS), also known as Florida Auxiliary Loans. SLS loans are not subsidized by the federal government. Therefore, the federal government has no responsibility for payment of interest during periods of deferment or forbearance and there is no grace period for SLS loans. During any period of deferment or forbearance, such as when a borrower is unemployed, the borrower's repayment obligation may be suspended; however, interest accrues to the account for which the borrower is responsible. When the deferment or forbearance ends, the outstanding interest is capitalized on the loan. SLS loans accrue interest at the rate of 12 percent per year from the date of disbursement. Persons eligible to receive SLS loans include parents of dependent undergraduate students. As set forth below, Petitioner, as parent of an eligible dependent undergraduate student, received four SLS loans. Loan 1: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000000442 in 1983. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 1. Although the Department is the guarantor of Loan 1, the lender never declared the loan in default or sold it to the Department. Therefore, Loan 1 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 2: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000001064 in 1984. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 2. The lender declared Petitioner in default and sold Loan 2 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 2 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 2 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 2 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 3: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000003767 in 1985. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 3. The lender declared Petitioner in default and transferred Loan 3 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 3 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 3 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 3 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 4: On or about August 5, 1986, Petitioner executed an Auxiliary (SLS) Loan application on behalf of his daughter, Kelly Aleta Martin, an eligible dependent undergraduate student. On or about September 8, 1986, Petitioner executed the promissory note for this loan. This SLS Loan was in the amount of $3,000.00. This loan was disbursed on or about October 9, 1986. The Department guaranteed this loan. Throughout exhibits presented by the Department, the loan number for this SLS Loan is A000007005; however, for convenience, herein this loan will be referred to as Loan 4. Loan 4 is the only loan at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner's first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. The payment due date later changed to the 20th of each month. Petitioner's last payment to the lender was made on July 17, 1990. However, as Petitioner was behind in his payments, this payment was applied to the payment due May 20, 1990. The Petitioner is considered in repayment status for 44 months, from October 1986 through May 1990. A borrower is not considered in repayment status during any suspension of the repayment period, including any period of forbearance or deferment. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on September 18, 1990. This deferment was for the period from July 21, 1990 through December 28, 1990. Because Petitioner was not current in his payments, he requested and received a forbearance from the lender for the payments due on June 20 and July 20, 1990, in order to qualify for the unemployment deferment. The forbearance together with the unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 for seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment period ending December 28, 1990. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on April 23, 1991. This deferment was for the period from February 24 through July 23, 1991. Because Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment ending December 28, 1990, he again requested and received a forbearance for the payments due January 20 and February 20, 1991. The forbearance and unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they again suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 by another seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Following Petitioner's unemployment deferment ending July 1991, he failed to resume payment to the lender beginning August 20, 1990. Thereafter, the lender declared Petitioner in default and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. However, the Department refused to pay the lender's claim citing due diligence violations, and as a result, Petitioner is considered in repayment status from August 20, 1991 through April 20, 1992, or nine months, even though no payments were actually received by virtue of his Fresh Start Application. Petitioner submitted a Fresh Start Application to the lender dated May 13, 1992. This document reaffirmed the student loan obligation and, when received by the lender on May 19, 1992, reinstated the Department's guarantee of Loan 4. In an application dated May 24, 1992, Petitioner requested another unemployment deferment. The lender refused Petitioner's request for an unemployment deferment due to the fact that Petitioner was working at the time. However, the lender granted Petitioner a forbearance. This forbearance covered payments due from May 20 through December 20, 1992. Thereafter, Petitioner again requested and was granted forbearance of payments due through June 20, 1993. These forbearances, from May 20, 1992 through June 20, 1993, suspended the period Loan 4 is in repayment status by 14 months. Petitioner failed to resume payments beginning July 20, 1993, the final due date at default. In 1994, the lender declared Petitioner in default on Loan 4 and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. The Department paid the default claim on Loan 4 on July 28, 1994. Although no payments were received from July 20, 1993 through July 20, 1994, or 13 months, Petitioner is considered in repayment status for that time because there was no forbearance or deferment in place. When the Department acquired Loan 4, Petitioner owed $2,195.68 in principal and $290.19 in accrued (claim) interest. These figures were capitalized by the Department and yield the figure of $2,484.18 in capitalized principal which is subject to interest at the rate of 12 percent per year. Beginning in 1995, Petitioner entered into a voluntary wage garnishment agreement with the Department. Under this agreement and through the period Petitioner was under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, a total of $383.95 was received by the Department and applied to Petitioner's account in accordance with Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.404(f), relating to how borrower payments will be applied. The entire amount received was applied to outstanding interest. Prior to filing bankruptcy, Petitioner's Loan 4 was considered in repayment status from July 29, 1994 through January 5, 1995, during the time it was held by the Department. The Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for five months, even though he made no payments. Additionally, Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for 12 months in 1995, whether or not regular payments were received under Petitioner's voluntary wage garnishment agreement. Because Petitioner filed for bankruptcy prior to the January 20, 1996, the payment due date, the month of January 1996 cannot be counted as being in repayment status. Petitioner filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on January 11, 1996. The Department filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court for Loans 2, 3, and 4 in the principal amount of $5,571.91, the amount of capitalized principal due on the accounts. The Department filed with the court the claim of $5,647.02 due on the accounts through date of filing the case. See item 5 on page 2 of Department's Exhibit 5. This amount was the capitalized principal and interest due. On February 4, 1999, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, issued an "Order Discharging Debtor After Completion of Chapter 13 Plan" in Petitioner's case, number 96-00175-3F3. That order provides in pertinent part, "The debtor is discharged for all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under 11 U.S.C. [Section] 502, except any debt . . . for a student loan or educational benefit overpayment as specified in 11 U.S.C.[Section]523(a)(8)." In 1996, Title 11 United States Code Section 523(a) provided in pertinent part: A discharge under . . . this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an education benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless-- such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became due more than 7 years (exclusive of an applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition . . . Pursuant to this order, Petitioner's debt to the Department for Loans 2 and 3 was discharged. The first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. Petitioner filed for bankruptcy on January 11, 1996, nine days prior to the payment due date of January 20, 1996. There were 111 months from the month the first payment of Loan 4 was due through the month prior to the filing of bankruptcy (the month that bankruptcy was filed cannot be counted if the payment due date was after the date Petitioner filed for bankruptcy). Petitioner was in forbearance or deferment status for 28 months which suspends the period Loan 4 is considered in repayment status. Petitioner was in repayment status on Loan 4 for 83 months regardless of whether he actually made payments on the account. Therefore, Loan 4 was not discharged. Section 682.410(b)(2) of Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations, provides that the Department shall impose collection costs as follows: Collection charges. Whether or not provided for in the borrower's promissory note and subject to any limitation on the amount of those costs in that note, the guarantee agency shall charge a borrower an amount equal to reasonable costs incurred by the agency in collecting a loan on which the agency has paid a default or bankruptcy claim. These cost may include, but are not limited to, all attorneys fees, collection agency charges, and court costs. Except as provided in [Sections] 682.401(b)(27) and 682.405(b)(1)(iv), the amount charged borrower must equal the lesser of -- The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection under the formula in 34 CRF 30.60; or The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection in the loan was held by the U.S. Department of Education. The Department established that the amount of the annual collection cost mandated by Title 34 Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.410(b)(2) for the loan at issue in this proceeding should be calculated at least annually at the rate of 25 percent of the outstanding principal and accrued interest. Petitioner agreed to pay these costs in the application and promissory note he executed. Petitioner is employed by the Duval County School Board, a political subdivision of the State of Florida. As an employee of a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner is subject to the provisions of Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. These provisions pertain to employees of the State of Florida or its political subdivisions who have defaulted on an education loan made or guaranteed by the State of Florida. The Department notified Petitioner by letter dated August 13, 1999, that he had one or more student loans in default and offered him the opportunity to make voluntary payments on the loans. The letter also advised Petitioner that the Department would seek to make involuntary withholdings if he did not make voluntary payments. Petitioner elected to request the formal hearing which triggered this proceeding. As stated above, the capitalized principal due the Department for Loan 4 is $2,485.87. This amount reflects the principal due and the outstanding interest accrued on the account at the time the Department acquired the loan from the lender. All payments received by the Department were applied to outstanding interest which accrued on the account after the loan was bought by the Department, and no payment was applied to the capitalized principal. The capitalized principal accrues interest at the rate of 12 percent per year of $.82 per day. As of February 4, 1999, after taking into consideration the $383.95 received by the Department, the unpaid accrued interest for Loan 4 was $881.74. Pursuant to federal regulations collection costs assessed at the rate of 25 percent of principal and interest due as of February 4, 1999, were $867.08. Therefore, as of February 4, 1999, the total principal, interest, and collection costs due for Loan 4 totaled $4,234.69. Interest continues to accrue to the account as provided by law and collection costs may be reassessed as provided by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein, finds that Petitioner, as of February 4, 1999, owes the sum of $4,234.69, and orders the involuntary wage withholding of Petitioner's pay through his employer, Duval County School Board, pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Johnny Martin 11431 Quailhollow Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32218-3621 Ronald G. Stowers Assistant General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent, Momma G’s, Inc. (“Momma G’s”), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01 through and 509.092, Florida Statutes(2015),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner (“Scarlett Evans” or “Ms. Evans”) or by retaliating against her for participating in a protected activity.
Findings Of Fact Momma G’s is a sandwich-shop franchise consisting of franchisees and company-owned stores. Ms. Evans is a female who began working at a Momma G’s franchise located in Panama City, Florida (“the restaurant”), in October of 2013. Ms. Evans started as a cashier, and her good performance led to her being promoted to shift leader in May of 2014. A few months later, the franchise owners asked Ms. Evans to become the restaurant’s general manager because the current general manager was doing a poor job. While employed as the restaurant’s general manager, Ms. Evans typically worked Monday through Friday for 35 to 40 hours a week. Ms. Evans occasionally worked weekends in order to account for inventory, and she asserts that she had no problem with working weekends. In approximately December of 2014, the restaurant’s three owners notified Momma G’s corporate headquarters that the restaurant was struggling. The restaurant was six months behind on its rent, and the landlord was threatening eviction. In addition, the owners had accumulated over $300,000 in bank debt. Because closings damage a restaurant chain’s image, Momma G’s corporate headquarters negotiated a deal in which the franchisor acquired the restaurant and would operate it as a company-owned store. Accordingly, Momma G’s assumed control of the restaurant on May 1, 2015. Momma G’s did not fire any of the restaurant’s employees, but it did require all of them to re- apply for positions at the restaurant. Mike Davis is the vice president of Operations for Momma G’s. At the times relevant to the instant case, he oversaw 30 restaurants. Once Momma G’s corporate headquarters completed the negotiations to acquire the restaurant, Mr. Davis immediately drove to Panama City in order to oversee the transition. Mr. Davis contacted another Momma G’s employee (Sam Ferminella) and asked him to assist with the transition. Mr. Ferminella was a general manager who had proven to be proficient in turning around troubled stores. After the May 1, 2015, acquisition, Mr. Davis remained in Panama City for approximately three days to oversee the transition. Mr. Ferminella was more involved with improving the restaurant’s day-to-day operations, and he spent approximately to 11 days in Panama City during the first three weeks after the acquisition. At some point during the 10 to 11 days following the acquisition, Ms. Evans talked to Mr. Davis and/or Mr. Ferminella about continuing as the restaurant’s general manager. It is unclear what Ms. Evans was told, but there is no dispute that she was essentially in charge of the restaurant after Mr. Ferminella left Panama City following his initial 10-to- day visit. Rather than being a salaried employee, Ms. Evans was paid by the hour before and after the acquisition. On May 11, 2015, Ms. Evans learned that the restaurant’s general manager position was being advertised on- line. She texted Mr. Ferminella to inquire about the situation, and he promptly called her. Ms. Evans alleges that Mr. Ferminella told her during that conversation that Momma G’s cannot have a single mother working as a general manager because the restaurant needs someone who can work long hours, be available any day of the week, and respond on a moment’s notice if there is a problem at the restaurant. That conversation prompted Ms. Evans to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“the EEOC”) on May 20, 2015. Momma G’s learned of Ms. Evans’ complaint on approximately May 25, 2015. On May 26, 2015, Sandy Gnad (who was responsible for Human Resources at Momma G’s) contacted Ms. Evans via telephone and e-mail. Ms. Gnad wanted to know if there was something she could do to help. Mr. Davis learned of the complaint at some point in June of 2015. After Momma G’s learned of her complaint, Sam Moore began working as the restaurant’s general manager, and Ms. Evans claims that her work hours were reduced. According to Ms. Evans, she typically worked 35 to 40 hours a week. However, her hours were allegedly reduced to 20 to 30 a week in late May. In addition, there were occasions when she would be released after two to two and one-half hours of work when she had been scheduled to work six hours. Ms. Evans was the restaurant’s highest paid hourly worker. Ms. Evans alleges that the restaurant was having trouble keeping up with demand at some point that summer. According to Ms. Evans, Mr. Davis dealt with the problem by increasing Ms. Evans’ hours and splitting the general manager duties between Ms. Evans and Mr. Moore. At that point, Ms. Evans asserts that the only difference between her and Mr. Moore was that he was a salaried employee, while Ms. Evans was still paid by the hour. Mr. Moore resigned from the restaurant at the end of June, and Ms. Evans had been acting as a de facto general manager. Ms. Evans filed a complaint of discrimination with the FCHR on July 8, 2015, alleging that she was not hired for the restaurant’s general manager position because she is a single mother. On August 7, 2015, Ms. Evans and a co-worker named Sierra Kennedy were at the restaurant prior to 10:00 a.m. and were preparing to open the store at 10:30 a.m. Mr. Davis had made an appointment to interview Stefanie Flaugher at the restaurant for the vacant general manager position, and Ms. Flaugher arrived at approximately 9:45 a.m. on August 7, 2015, for her 10:00 a.m. interview. However, Mr. Davis had not arrived, and Ms. Flaugher was standing outside the restaurant waiting for him. Ms. Evans had to make a bank deposit, and she encountered Ms. Flaugher on her way out of the restaurant. Ms. Flaugher told Ms. Evans that she was there to interview with Mr. Davis for the general manager position. Ms. Evans expressed frustration and told Ms. Flaugher that the general manager position was her job, and proceeded to the bank. When Ms. Evans returned to the restaurant, Mr. Davis was interviewing Ms. Flaugher in a booth. At some point during the interview or soon thereafter, Mr. Davis approached Ms. Kennedy and said something to the effect that, “So Scarlett quit.” When Ms. Kennedy reported that Ms. Evans had not resigned, Mr. Davis turned back to the booth where Ms. Flaugher was still sitting and stated, “No, she did not quit.” According to Ms. Kennedy, Mr. Davis appeared to be excited when he thought that Ms. Evans had resigned. However, his excitement reportedly turned to disappointment after Ms. Kennedy corrected him. Mr. Davis remained at the restaurant for approximately two hours after the interview concluded. During that time, he worked on his laptop, walked around the store, and did paperwork. He never seemed excited or upset. Mr. Davis said nothing of any significance to Ms. Evans. On August 11, 2015, Ms. Evans received a message that Ms. Gnad wanted to speak with her. After she and Ms. Kennedy finished serving the restaurant’s lunchtime customers, Ms. Evans returned Ms. Gnad’s call. Upon reaching Ms. Gnad, Ms. Evans learned that the call was being recorded and that Mr. Davis was joining the call. Upon joining the call, Mr. Davis stated that Ms. Flaugher had reported to him that Ms. Evans had used the “f- word” when they conversed outside the restaurant on August 7, 2015. Mr. Davis had hired Ms. Flaugher to be the restaurant’s general manager, and he wanted Ms. Evans to sign a letter stating that she would respect Ms. Flaugher’s authority. In addition, the letter noted that Ms. Evans had “rudely spoke[n] to a manager candidate who was waiting outside for an interview, addressing her disrespectfully and using the ‘f’ word multiple times.” Mr. Davis told Ms. Evans that she could either sign the letter or resign. Ms. Evans vehemently denied using any profanity during her conversation with Ms. Flaugher. Prior to this phone conversation, Ms. Evans had not been given a copy of the letter Mr. Davis wanted her to sign. When Ms. Evans refused to sign the letter after hearing a description of its contents, Mr. Davis fired her. Ms. Kennedy resigned that day. Testimony Adduced at the Final Hearing Ms. Evans testified that Mr. Ferminella told her in May of 2015 that Momma G’s could not have a single mother as a general manager because the position essentially requires one to be available at all times. Mr. Ferminella testified that Momma G’s has hired single mothers to fill general manager positions, and he denied ever telling Ms. Evans that she was ineligible for the general manager position. He testified that Ms. Evans had been hired as a “supervisor” in May of 2015 and that he never told anyone to reduce Ms. Evans’ hours. Mr. Ferminella testified that the highest paid hourly worker in a restaurant is typically released early on days when business is slow. Mr. Davis testified that he had agreed to hire Ms. Evans as an hourly supervisor. Her responsibilities included management of the restaurant’s daily operations, managing other employees, and purchasing. Mr. Davis denied telling anyone to reduce Ms. Evans’ hours. He also testified that the restaurant industry has a practice of releasing the highest paid hourly worker early when business is slow on a particular day. That helps keep costs down. Mr. Davis testified that Momma G’s has hired single mothers to fill general manager positions in the past. Mr. Davis testified that Ms. Flaugher told him during her interview about her conversation with Ms. Evans. According to Mr. Davis, Ms. Flaugher told him that Ms. Evans had used the “f-word” during that conversation. Mr. Davis testified that use of the “f-word” by a Momma G’s employee results in immediate termination. Nevertheless, Mr. Davis did not take immediate action. Instead, he testified that he had to “listen and investigate and take time, and then report to my direct report2/ the conversation. And, you know, that’s the way things work. Things were very – move very slowly in this business, making decisions.” Mr. Davis also testified that he hired Ms. Flaugher to be the general manager of the restaurant in Panama City. According to Mr. Davis, Ms. Flaugher accepted the offer and reported for training at a Momma G’s restaurant in Auburn, Alabama. Momma G’s even reserved a hotel room for her while she was training in Auburn. However, Ms. Flaugher supposedly left the week-long training after a few days without giving notice of any kind to Mr. Davis or anyone else associated with Momma G’s. During the final hearing, Mr. Davis attributed Ms. Flaugher’s sudden and unexplained disappearance to her being “traumatized” by her conversation with Ms. Evans on August 7, 2015. As noted above, Ms. Gnad performed human relations work for Momma G’s, and she testified that Mr. Davis “has complete authority to hire or fire whoever he wants” at a Momma G’s owned store without needing anyone else’s approval. However, her statement only applied to certain Momma G’s stores, and it is unclear whether Mr. Davis had such authority at the Panama City restaurant. Ultimate Findings of Fact Ms. Evans failed to establish that Momma G’s discriminated against her when she was not hired for the general manager’s position. Ms. Evans also failed to prove that Momma G’s retaliated against her by reducing her hours during the summer of 2015. However, Ms. Evans did prove that Momma G’s effort to discipline her, and ultimately terminate her, based on the conversation with Ms. Flaugher, was retaliation for filing complaints with the EEOC and the FCHR. The testimony of Ms. Evans and Ms. Kennedy was far more credible than Mr. Davis’s. In particular, the undersigned credits Ms. Kennedy’s testimony that Mr. Davis approached her and excitedly said something to the effect that, “So Scarlett quit.” After Ms. Kennedy corrected him, Mr. Davis appeared to be disappointed, turned back to the booth where Ms. Flaugher was still sitting, and stated, “No, she did not quit.” That testimony indicates Mr. Davis was hoping that Ms. Evans’ employment at the restaurant would come to an end. During his testimony, Mr. Davis was adamant that a Momma G’s employee would be immediately terminated for using profanity. However, when he supposedly learned from Ms. Flaugher on August 7, 2015, that Ms. Evans had used the “f-word,” he took no action whatsoever despite being at the restaurant with Ms. Evans and Ms. Kennedy for approximately two hours after the interview had concluded. His lack of prompt action belies Mr. Davis’s assertion that he needed to conduct an investigation. Any such investigation would have included a prompt discussion with the accused (i.e., Ms. Evans). In addition, Mr. Davis simply accepted a statement made by a complete stranger without conferring with an employee who was regularly in charge of the restaurant. In short, there was no true investigation and no intent to conduct one. The undersigned also has a difficult time reconciling Mr. Davis’s assertion that Ms. Flaugher was “traumatized” by her encounter with Ms. Evans when Ms. Flaugher: (a) agreed to be the general manager at the restaurant; (b) traveled to Auburn, Alabama, for one week of training; and (c) attended a few days of that training prior to leaving with no explanation. If Ms. Flaugher was so traumatized, it seems very unlikely that she would have accepted Mr. Davis’s job offer. It is even more unlikely that one so traumatized would travel from her home for a week-long training session and suddenly realize after a few days of training that she could not accept the general manager position. By attributing Ms. Flaugher’s unexplained disappearance to being traumatized by her conversation with Ms. Evans, Mr. Davis demonstrates a pretextual basis for his desire to have Ms. Evans’ employment at the restaurant end. Finally, Mr. Davis’s credibility was also undermined by his demeanor on the witness stand. He appeared to be very nervous or uncomfortable when cross-examined by Ms. Evans’ attorney, and he appeared even more nervous or uncomfortable when the undersigned questioned him about certain aspects of his testimony. In sum, Mr. Davis’s failure to obtain Ms. Evans’ version of what happened outside the restaurant on August 7, 2015, demonstrates that the effort to discipline her on August 11, 2015, was a pretext for retaliating against her for filing complaints with the EEOC and the FCHR. In other words, Mr. Davis had no interest in conducting an actual investigation and giving Ms. Evans an opportunity to rebut Ms. Flaugher’s assertion. Rather than being motivated by a desire to ascertain what actually happened outside the restaurant on August 7, 2015, Mr. Davis was motivated by a desire to take some sort of adverse action against Ms. Evans. There is no other reasonable conclusion because all of the evidence indicates that Ms. Evans was a good employee. Mr. Ferminella testified that Ms. Evans would have been considered for the general manager position if she had been willing to work the required hours and be a salaried employee. Also, even after Momma G’s acquired the restaurant, Ms. Evans continued in a leadership role, even though she was never officially designated as the restaurant’s general manager. The evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing demonstrates that there was a causal connection between the filing of Ms. Evans’ complaints and the adverse employment action at issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order awarding Scarlett Evans back pay, a reasonable attorney’s fee, and any other relief she is entitled to under section 760.11, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed by Petitioner from December, 1982 to December, 1987 as a tariff clerk, a permanent career service position. On September 23, 1987 Respondent became ill and left work without informing her supervisor, Jill Hurd, or her co-workers. Hurd was available on September 23 and 24, 1987 if Respondent had tried to explain her absence or request leave authorization. Respondent presented Health Status Certificates to Petitioner signed by M. R. Grate, Jr., M.D., dated October 30, November 11 and 18, 1987 which certified her inability to return to work from October 27 through November 30, 1987, during which time she was under his care. On the basis of these certificates, Petitioner authorized her sick leave from October 27 to November 30, 1987. Respondent did return to work on December 2, 1987, but was again absent on consecutive work days of December 3, 4 and 7, 1987. On December 3, 1987, Respondent sent a note to Hurd, via her husband, stating she did not feel well and would not be in to work. On December 4, 1987 her husband again brought Hurd a note stating Respondent would not be in because her baby was ill. Respondent's husband called Hurd on December 7, 1987 to state that she was still ill and would not be in to work. Hurd stated that Respondent needed to get back to work. At no time did Respondent request leave for December 3, 4 and 7, 1987, nor was she approved for leave. She simply informed her supervisor, Hurd, through her husband that she was not coming to work each day. Prior to these unauthorized absences in December, 1987, Respondent had received a memorandum from Hurd on January 14, 1987 setting forth specific instructions for calling in sick following a number of unauthorized absences. Respondent was specifically instructed to call her supervisor, Hurd, each morning by 8:30 a.m. when she wanted to take sick leave. Despite this instruction, Respondent never called Hurd on December 3, 4 and 7, 1987, but simply had her husband deliver notes and messages to Hurd on her behalf. This prevented Hurd from discussing with Respondent the extent of her illness and when she expected to return to work. On November 25, 1987 Respondent had an appointment with Dr. Grate, who signed another Health Status Certificate for the period November 30 to December 11, 1987 indicating she remained under his care and was still unable to return to work. However, despite the fact she did report to work on December 2, 1987 and had been given specific instructions about how to apply for sick leave, she never presented Dr. Grate's Health Status Certificate dated November 25, 1987 to Hurd, or anyone else associated with Petitioner, until the hearing in this case. Therefore, Respondent did not present proper medical certification of illness for December 3, 4 and 7, 1987, and instead simply failed to report to work, or to in any way attempt to personally contact her supervisor. A letter dated December 7, 1987 notifying Respondent of her abandonment of position and of her right to a hearing was sent to Respondent from Petitioner's Executive Director by certified mail, return receipt requested. Respondent's husband signed for this letter on December 9, 1987, and Respondent acknowledges receipt.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter Final Order concluding that Respondent has abandoned her position with Petitioner in the career service due to her failure to report to work, or request leave, for December 3, 4 and 7, 1987. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 88-0161) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 6, 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 8, 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact cannot be made since her post-hearing submission shows no indication that a copy was provided to counsel for Petitioner, despite specific instruction at hearing, and the narrative contained in her letter consists of serial unnumbered paragraphs which primarily present argument on the evidence rather than true proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Adis Vila Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 William S. Bilenky, Esquire Public Service Commission 212 Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 Harold McLean, Esquire Public Service Commission Office of General Counsel 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Norma D. Saabir P. O. Box 5802 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-5802 =================================================================
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is entitled to creditable service in the Florida Retirement System for service in the Florida Virtual School from September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a regular class member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). On October 23, 2003, Petitioner entered the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and left her employment on June 30, 2004. Petitioner worked most of her career as a teacher and an administrator for the Pasco County School Board (School Board). The School Board is a local education association (LEA) and a local agency employer within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(42)(a), Florida Statutes (2001). Beginning with the 2001-2002 school year, Petitioner undertook additional employment by working in the Florida Virtual School (FVS) in accordance with former Section 228.082, Florida Statutes (2000).1 Petitioner undertook additional employment to increase the average final compensation (AFC) that Respondent uses to calculate her retirement benefits. From September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2004, Petitioner worked for the LEA and served in the FVS. During the 2001-2002 school year, Petitioner was a full-time employee for the LEA and also served part-time in the FVS. Beginning with the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner served full-time in the FVS and also worked for the LEA during the summer. The LEA paid Petitioner annual salaries as a full-time employee for all relevant school years and made the necessary contributions to the FRS. The AFC includes compensation Petitioner received from the LEA, and that compensation is not at issue in this proceeding. With one exception, the AFC includes the compensation Petitioner received for service in the FVS. The AFC does not include $6,150 (the contested amount) that Petitioner earned during her first year of service in the FVS from September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2002 (the contested period).2 Sometime prior to April 2004, Petitioner requested that Respondent include the contested amount in her AFC. In a one- page letter dated April 6, 2004 (the preliminary denial letter), Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent proposed to deny the request. The grounds for denial stated that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position and that FVS did not join the FRS until December 1, 2001. In relevant part, the preliminary denial letter states: . . . you filled a temporary instructional position as an adjunct instructor whose employment was contingent on enrollment and funding pursuant to Section 60S- 1.004(5)(d)3, F.A.C., copy enclosed. As such, you are ineligible for . . . FRS . . . participation for the time period in question. The School joined the FRS on December 1, 2001 and past service was not purchased for you since you filled a temporary position. Effective July 1, 2002, you began filling a regularly established position with the Florida Virtual High School and were correctly enrolled in FRS. The School has reported your earnings from July 1, 2002, to the present to the FRS. Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R-2). A two-page letter dated June 23, 2004 (the denial letter), notified Petitioner of proposed final agency action excluding the contested amount from her AFC. The only ground for denial stated that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position. The denial omits any statement that FVS did not join the FRS until December 1, 2001. However, the denial letter includes a copy of the preliminary denial letter and is deemed to include, by reference, the stated grounds in the preliminary denial letter. In relevant part, the denial letter states: By letter dated April 6, 2004 (copy enclosed). . . [Respondent] advised you filled a temporary instructional position as an adjunct instructor from September 15, 2001 through June 30, 2002. We have reviewed the information submitted in your recent letter and maintain our position that you were an adjunct instructor from September 2001 through June 2002, pursuant to Section 60S-1.004(5)(d)3, F.A.C. (copy enclosed). Your employment with the Florida Virtual School during the time period in question was contingent on enrollment and funding. Since you filled a temporary position, the School was correct in excluding you from the [FRS]. This notification constitutes final agency action. . . . R-3 at 1. The legal definition of a temporary position varies depending on whether the employer is a state agency or a local agency. If the employer is a state agency, a position is temporary if the employer compensates the position from an account defined as "an other personal services (OPS) account" in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001) (OPS account). If the employer is a local agency, a position is temporary if the position will exist for less than six consecutive months; or as otherwise provided by rule. § 121.021(53), Fla. Stat. (2001). The distinction is based, in relevant part, on the practical reality that local agencies do not maintain OPS accounts for "the fiscal affairs of the state." § 216.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). The employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount was not an LEA. Three different employers may have been responsible for payment of the contested amount. Some evidence supports a finding that the employer was the Board of Trustees of FVS (the Board). Contracts of employment for service in FVS identify the employer as the Board.3 The Board has statutory authority over personnel serving FVS and has statutory authority to govern FVS. Other evidence supports a finding that the employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount was FVS. The record evidence identifies the employer that enrolled in FRS and made contributions on behalf of Petitioner as FVS. Finally, there is evidence that the Orange County School Board, acting as the statutorily designated fiscal agent for FVS (the fiscal agent), was the employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount. The contested amount was paid from funds administered by the fiscal agent in the name of FVS. The Board, FVS, and the fiscal agent each exemplify distinct characteristics of a state agency defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(qq), Florida Statutes (2001). The Board consists of seven members appointed by the Governor for four-year staggered terms. The Board is a public agency entitled to sovereign immunity and has authority to promulgate rules concerning FVS. Board members are public officers and bear fiduciary responsibility for FVS. The Board has statutory authority to approve FVS franchises in each local school district. §§ 228.082, Fla. Stat. (2000) and 1002.37, Fla. Stat. (2001). FVS is administratively housed within an office4 of the Commissioner of Education, as the Head of the Department of Education (Commissioner). The fiscal year of FVS is the state fiscal year. Local school districts cannot limit student access to courses offered statewide through FVS.5 The fiscal agent of FVS is a state agency. The fiscal agent receives state funds for FVS and administers those funds to operate FVS for students throughout the state. The Board, FVS, and the fiscal agent each satisfy judicial definitions of a state agency pursuant to "territorial" and "functional" tests discussed in the Conclusions of Law. Each agency operates statewide in accordance with a statutory mandate to serve any student in the state. Each serves students in public and private schools; in charter schools; in home school programs; and in juvenile detention programs. Unlike an LEA, the scope of authority and function of the employer that paid the contested amount to Petitioner was not circumscribed by county or other local boundaries; regardless of whether the employer was the Board, FVS, or the fiscal agent (collectively referred to hereinafter as the employer). The employer did not pay the contested amount from an OPS account. The fiscal agent for FVS is the presumptive repository of funds appropriated for FVS. The fiscal agent is organically structured as a local agency even though it functions as a state agency in its capacity as fiscal agent. Unlike a state agency, an organic local agency does not maintain an OPS account, defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001), for the "fiscal affairs of the state." The legislature funded FVS during the contested period in lump sum as a state grant-in-aid provided in a line item appropriation pursuant to Subsection 228.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2000). The legislature subsequently began funding of FVS through the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP). Each FVS student with six-credit hours required for high school graduation is included as a full-time equivalent student for state funding. Each student with less than six-credit hours counts as a fraction of a full-time equivalent student. A local LEA cannot report full-time equivalent student membership for courses that students take through FVS unless the LEA is an approved franchise of FVS and operates a virtual school. As student enrollment in FVS increased, the legislature changed the funding formula to avoid paying twice for students in FVS; once to fund FVS and again to fund local LEAs that were authorized to earn FTE funding for students enrolled in FVS. The employer that paid the contested amount to Petitioner was a state agency that did not compensate Petitioner from an OPS account defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001). Petitioner did not earn the contested amount in a temporary position within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(53)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(62). Respondent argues that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position in a local agency defined in Subsection 221.021(42), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(36). A temporary position in a local agency is generally defined to mean a position that will last less than six months, except as otherwise provided by rule. By rule, Respondent defines a temporary position to include temporary instructional positions that are established with no expectation of continuation beyond one semester. Fla. Admin. Code R. 60S-1.004(5)(d)3. Respondent supports its argument with limited documentary evidence (the documents). The documents consist of several items. An undated FVS Information Sheet indicates the employer started Petitioner as an adjunct instructor on September 15, 2001. An FVS memorandum dated several years later on March 16, 2004, indicates Petitioner started an adjunct position on September 6, 2001, and includes a parenthetical statement that it was seasonal employment.6 The employer paid Petitioner $3,150 during 2002 as miscellaneous income and reported it to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a "Form 1099-Misc." An undated letter of intent for the 2002-2003 school year, which requests submission before March 8, 2002, indicates that Petitioner intended to continue her adjunct employment status and requested a full-time position if one became available.7 Use of labels such as "adjunct" to describe employment status during the contested period would be more probative if the duties Petitioner performed were limited to the duties of a part-time, on-line instructor. As discussed hereinafter, Petitioner earned the contested amount while occupying a dual- purpose position in which she performed both the duties of an instructor and significant other duties unrelated to those of an instructor. The trier of fact would be required to disregard a substantial body of evidence to find that Petitioner's position was limited to that of a part-time, on-line instructor. The IRS requires taxpayers to report miscellaneous income paid to independent contractors on Form 1099-Misc. Neither the denial letter nor the preliminary denial letter includes a statement that Petitioner occupied a non-employee position as an independent contractor. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law give little weight to the use of IRS Form 1099-Misc in cases such as this one where there is little other evidence of independent contractor status or where the evidence establishes an employer-employee relationship. The record evidence discussed hereinafter shows that Petitioner and her employer enjoyed a continuing employment relationship within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(32)(f). Respondent was not a party to the employment contract and did not witness the employment relationship between Petitioner and her employer. Nor did Respondent call a witness from FVS who was competent to testify about events that occurred during the contested period. The testimony of Petitioner is supported by the totality of evidence. In relevant part, Petitioner disclosed to her supervisors at FVS at the time of her employment that she sought employment to enhance her retirement benefits. The proposed exclusion of the contested amount from the AFC is inconsistent with a material condition of employment. Respondent asserts that the documents satisfy requirements for notice and documentation of a temporary position in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6.1004(5). The rule requires an employer to notify an employee at the time of employment that the employee is filling a temporary position and cannot participate in the FRS; and to document the intended length of the temporary position. However, the terms of the documents from Respondent are ambiguous and insufficient to provide the required notice and documentation. The documents did not expressly notify Petitioner she was filling a temporary position that did not qualify as a regularly established position in the FRS. None of the documents use the term "temporary" or "temporary position." The notice and documentation requirements of the rule must be satisfied, if at all, by implication from terms on the face of the documents such as "adjunct," "adjunct position," and "adjunct employment status." Unlike the term "temporary position," neither the legislature nor Respondent defines the term "adjunct." One of the several common and ordinary uses of the term "adjunct" can mean, "Attached to a faculty or staff in a temporary . . . capacity." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, at 21-22 (4th ed. Houghton Mifflin Company 2000). The employer used an undefined term such as "adjunct" as an ambiguous euphemism for a temporary position. The ambiguity of the term "adjunct" is underscored when each document from Respondent is considered in its entirety. The letter of intent form requested Petitioner to indicate whether she intended to continue her "adjunct employment status" and whether she would be interested in "a full-time position." The form did not refer to either a "temporary position," or a "part-time position." Petitioner reasonably inferred that "adjunct employment status" was the part-time alternative to "a full-time position." The inference was consistent with the announced purpose for serving in FVS and the evidence as a whole. Respondent also does not define part- time employment to exclude a regularly established position. The FVS utilized different contracts for adjunct and part-time instructors. The contracts of record pertaining to Petitioner are not contracts for adjunct instructors (adjunct contracts). The contracts are annual contracts. Even if Petitioner were to have signed a contract for adjunct instructors, the contract used for adjunct instructors was ambiguous. In relevant part, the adjunct contract included a caption in the upper right corner labeled, "Terms of Agreement for Part-Time Instructional Employment." (emphasis supplied) As previously found, a part-time position may be a regularly established position. Use of the term "part-time employment" on a contract for an adjunct instructor supported a reasonable inference that the employer was using the terms "adjunct" and "part-time" synonymously to differentiate part-time employment from full-time employment. The employer required Petitioner, unlike adjunct instructors, to sign in on an instructor log sheet and to attend training sessions and staff meetings. Petitioner attended training sessions on September 8 and 22, and October 24, 2001. Petitioner attended other training sessions on February 26 and 27, 2002, and on March 27 and April 10, 2002. The employer also issued office equipment to Petitioner that the employer did not issue to adjunct instructors. Petitioner performed significant duties in addition to those required of a part-time instructor. Petitioner wrote grant applications and assisted in writing a procedures manual for FVS. By November 30, 2001, Petitioner had completed and submitted a federal "Smaller Learning Communities Grant" for $230,000. On December 27, 2001, Petitioner began working on the procedures manual, finalized the work on January 3, 2002, and was listed in the credits in the manual. The additional duties assigned to Petitioner continued through the second semester of the contested period. On February 26 and 27, 2002, FVS asked Petitioner to develop their "FCAT" course for the eighth grade. Petitioner wrote and developed the course. By May 30, 2002, Petitioner had written and submitted three more grant applications and was a member of a team that developed strategies for additional fundraising. For the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner entered into an annual contract for a full-time non-instructional position, as Grants Manager, and a separate contract for employment in a part-time instructor position. Each contract was terminable only for "good cause" within the meaning of Subsection 1002.33(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). The expectation of continued employment is further evidenced by the general business experience of FVS leading up to the contested period. In the 1997-1998 school year, approximately 25 students were enrolled statewide in FVS. In the next three years, enrollment grew to 5,564. Professional staff grew from 27 teachers to 54 full-time teachers. Legislative funding was adequate for the growth FVS experienced, and the legal contingency of enrollment and funding was not a realistic condition of continued employment. There was nothing temporary in the expectations of the employer and Petitioner during the contested period. FVS staff had legitimate business reasons to expect continued student enrollment and legislative funding during the contested period. The employer also had legitimate reasons to expect continued employment of Petitioner based on the individual experience the employer enjoyed with Petitioner, the ongoing and continuous nature of Petitioner's work, and the significant additional duties assigned to Petitioner. The employer, in fact, employed Petitioner continuously after the contested period. When FVS enrolled in the FRS on December 1, 2001, some employees purchased past credit. Petitioner was not on the list of employees for whom past credit was purchased. That omission is consistent with Petitioner's understanding that she was already receiving FRS credit. By rule, Respondent required the employer to make an affirmative disclosure that Petitioner did not occupy a position qualifying for FRS credit. After FVS enrolled in the FRS on December 1, 2001, FVS was required to make contributions to the FRS on behalf of Petitioner for approximately 208 days during the remainder of the contested period. FVS did not make the required contributions to the FRS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order including in the AFC that portion of the contested amount earned on and after December 1, 2001, and excluding the remainder of the contested amount from the AFC. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2005.
The Issue Whether Petitioner can transfer service from the State University Optional Retirement Program to the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is currently employed as a professor of philosophy and religion at Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University (FAMU). He was first employed as an Assistant Professor at FAMU in 1971. During Petitioner's employment with FAMU, he became an associate professor and was given years toward tenure in 1980, after filing an action with the Office of Civil Rights.2/ Petitioner has published a dozen books, has been awarded the Teacher Incentive Program Award and the Professorial Excellence Program Award, and has been a National Endowment for the Humanities Scholar at Boston University, New York University, and the University of Chicago. By stipulation, the parties agreed that Petitioner accrued retirement benefits under FRS and the Division of Retirement has credited Petitioner's service as a participant in FRS during the academic years 1971-72, 1972-73, 1974-75, 1975- 76, 1978-79, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83, and 1983-84. Note that this stipulation is silent as to the academic years 1973-74, 1976-77, 1977-78, and 1979-80. During the period from August 1984 through the present, Petitioner has been considered by the Division of Retirement to be a participant in ORP, and ORP has been credited with employer contributions for Petitioner's service at FAMU accordingly. The Division of Retirement stipulated that if Petitioner had not undertaken acts which, in its opinion, constituted an election to participate in ORP, Petitioner's service, which has been credited in ORP, would have qualified for the continued accrual of benefits under FRS. In 1984, Petitioner became aware that he could make an election to join ORP, a retirement option created that year by the legislature, and that he must make his election to join that program by June 1, 1984, or he would be forever barred from utilizing ORP. The effective date of salary contributions was July 1, 1984. In 1984, it was necessary for a state employee to work 10 years in a FRS position in order for his or her retirement to vest. Effective July 1, 2001, the requirement changed to six years of creditable service for those members actively employed on that date.3/ Other Personal Services (OPS) is a category of temporary employee which does not accrue creditable time toward FRS retirement benefits. Petitioner's pre-1980 employment contracts with FAMU had not indicated whether he was in FRS, as opposed to being an OPS employee, but there is no evidence to suggest this information was provided on anyone else's contract, either. There is no direct evidence whether Petitioner's FAMU salary warrants and/or pay-stubs, throughout all the years, indicated withholding for social security, although that is probable (See Finding of Fact 52). If they did, it would go to show that Petitioner always had monthly or bi-weekly notice of whether or not he was a regular employee. It is also probable that his FAMU warrants throughout all the years, as they do now, showed a fund code, a class code, and his type of retirement contributions. At all times material, Petitioner at least knew he had been in FRS his first two years at FAMU. This would seem to be academic years 1971-72 and 1972-73. Petitioner was "laid off" for the 1973-74 academic year. Petitioner was refunded all his FRS accruals up to that date. This meant that those FRS accruals would have to be paid back to FRS in order for Petitioner to be able to count those academic years toward retirement in FRS, but it is not clear when Petitioner knew this was the result of his withdrawal of the accruals. The record is unclear as to whether he has paid back these accruals.4/ Under FRS, he would have had the option to pay them back anytime before retirement. When Petitioner applied for promotion at FAMU in 1978, he had been told by FAMU officials that he could not be promoted because he was in the OPS category. However, after settling his civil rights action in 1980, he knew he was put in a permanent position, as associate professor with the promotion he had been denied, and had been given years towards tenure since 1978. Apparently, he did not comprehend that this adjustment also resulted in his receiving FRS credit for all those years. In 1984, Petitioner somehow believed that he had only been credited with FRS membership for 1980 through 1984. In June 1984, Petitioner already had a tenured contract for the following year, which, per the parties' stipulation, would have been his tenth year in FRS, with vesting. Cf. the collective endnotes. Petitioner found out about the option to join ORP in the spring of 1984. Petitioner testified that he had not wanted to elect ORP in 1984 unless he could find out how many years of credited service he had in FRS. This was because he understood the illustrations provided with the ORP election literature to indicate that if an employee had only one, two, or three years of credit in FRS, making the election to participate in ORP might be advisable, whereas the election should not be made by one who had eight or nine years of FRS credit. The ORP election literature itself was not offered in evidence. Petitioner first testified that he had sought clarification of his number of years in FRS from both the FAMU Personnel Office and the Division of Retirement prior to the June 1, 1984, deadline for making an ORP election. However, the attempts he related amounted to filling out a form in the payroll section of the FAMU Personnel Office requesting his work history, which form he thought would be forwarded to the Division of Retirement; and filling out a form to make an appointment with a FAMU Personnel Officer to discuss his situation. His testimony is confused and contradictory as to whether he personally made direct contact with the Division of Retirement during this period, and upon the evidence as a whole, it is concluded that he did not. Nonetheless, Petitioner completed a Division of Retirement Ballot/Enrollment Form, also known as an ORP-16 Form, to participate in ORP. The instructions attached to the form read, in pertinent part: As an employee eligible to participate in the ORP you have the option to reject or elect membership in the ORP. If you reject the ORP, you will be a member of the FRS. If you choose not to participate, so indicate in the space provided for rejecting the ORP and include the date. If you reject the ORP, it will not be necessary to complete the remainder of the Enrollment Form. If you elect to participate, please complete the following: Percent of salary to be contributed by your employer to each plan (the total must equal 6%). Percent of salary to be deducted from your salary as an employee contribution (the total cannot exceed 6%) and to which plan(s). Name of company or companies you have selected. Read the three statements carefully, sign and date the Enrollment Form. The form contains an admonition that ORP election is irrevocable. Also on this Ballot/Enrollment Form, under "I elect to become a member of the ORP and have signed necessary contracts as follows," Petitioner filled in the investment provider name of TIAA-CREF, the State employer's contribution percentage, and the date of May 15, 1984. He did not fill in an employee contribution percentage. He did not sign in either the "elect to participate" or the "elect not to participate" portion of the form. FAMU certified this form as described infra. Petitioner also completed an ORP Enrollment/Change Form, selecting, as his investment provider, TIAA-CREF. This form provided, "If you have elected participation in TIAA-CREF under the Florida Optional Retirement Program (ORP), please complete this form when enrolling in or making a change to TIAA- CREF noncashable Retirement Annuity or cashable Supplemental Retirement Annuity (SRA) contracts. This form applies only to TIAA-CREF contributions under the ORP." Petitioner checked "enrollment" under "Reason for submitting form." He filled out all parts of the form concerning the State's contributions, including inserting the effective date of "7/1/84." He signed the form and dated it "5/15/84." Petitioner also signed a contract with TIAA-CREF as his investment provider, dated "May 17, 1984." This document bears a certification by FAMU that his passport proved Petitioner's identity on that day. Petitioner left the foregoing three 1984 forms with a FAMU Personnel Office employee. Petitioner testified that he had an agreement with the unnamed FAMU Personnel Office employee to the effect that only if Petitioner came in and signed the unsigned documents was he electing ORP, and that if Petitioner did not come in to sign by June 1, 1984, the forms should be destroyed. However, this testimony is only Petitioner's understanding of the agreement. No one from the FAMU Personnel Office testified, and there is no evidence that there was ever a meeting of the minds on this "understanding." On May 17, 1984, a FAMU official dated and certified Petitioner's unsigned Ballot/Election form (see P-4 and Findings of Fact 18-20) and forwarded it to the Division of Retirement. The FAMU certification on this document was to the effect that Petitioner had executed a contract with a provider, which, in fact, Petitioner had. (See R-4 and Finding of Fact 22.) The FAMU certification read, in whole part, "I certify that this employee has signed a contract(s) with the ORP carrier(s) as shown above and is filling a fulltime position." The certifier checked the box for "enrollment." FAMU then forwarded the unsigned but certified Ballot/Enrollment Form to the Division of Retirement. The Enrollment/Change Form, signed by Petitioner, may or may not have gone to the Division, but the contract between Petitioner and TIAA-CREF was forwarded by FAMU to TIAA-CREF. In 1984, as now, if anyone in the Division of Retirement had noticed that Petitioner had not signed the Ballot/Election Form, it was Division policy to write the employee and ask him to completely fill out a new form and sign it. Then the Division would honor the employee's election of ORP, even if the correctly completed form were received after the election deadline or the first payroll deduction. Apparently, in 1984, due to the necessity of processing a huge quantity of ORP Ballot/Election forms between the June 1, 1984 election deadline and the dates of the electing employees' first July bi-weekly or monthly paycheck(s), no one in the Division of Retirement noticed the absence of Petitioner's signature on the Ballot/Election Form, and no letter was written to him. Instead, based upon the certified unsigned Ballot/Election Form, and probably the Enrollment/Change Form, the Division of Retirement treated Petitioner as enrolled in ORP as of the June 1, 1984 deadline. However, Both Ms. Smith, Administrator of the Enrollment Section of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions, and Mr. Henning, Administrator of the Optional Retirement Program and Optional Annuity Program Section, of the Division of Retirement, testified that if they had seen Petitioner's certified but unsigned Ballot/Enrollment Form in 1984 or today, they would have assumed the Petitioner had elected to be enrolled in ORP, because all the required information was there, including the certified information that he had signed a binding contract with the carrier/provider TIAA- CREF. In August 1984, the employer began paying the maximum allowable State contributions to TIAA-CREF for Petitioner's ORP retirement benefits. In August 1984, Petitioner received, from TIAA-CREF, a copy of the contract he had signed with that ORP provider. Although Petitioner claimed that he only asked to get out of ORP in 2002 when his number of years in FRS was finally revealed to him by a social security account calculation,5/ he simultaneously and inconsistently maintained that he went to the FAMU personnel office in August 1984 and orally complained that he did not want to be in ORP. However, Petitioner was consistent throughout his testimony that a FAMU personnel office employee told him in August 1984 that the FAMU employee had telephoned the Division of Retirement and that the Division of Retirement had "said" that Petitioner's decision to join ORP was irrevocable. Sometime in 1984, after being advised by FAMU's Personnel Office that his prior election to go into ORP was irrevocable, Petitioner sought the advice of an attorney, but he ultimately chose not to formally contest his membership in ORP. Petitioner testified that, based on his prior civil rights action, he was not anxious to jump into an expensive lawsuit without knowing what his damages were and that his damages depended upon the number of years of accrued service he had in FRS as of June 1, 1984, which accrued service he believed he had lost by the election of ORP. Then, as now, state employees frequently presented issues contesting their appropriate retirement fund or account to the Division of Retirement by phone or letter. Once an oral request for review of the account is presented in written form to the Division, it is reviewed and a decision made. The decision is reduced to a letter, which constitutes the (proposed) final agency action. Petitioner's testimony that he repeatedly from 1984 until 2003 tried to obtain his FRS history from FAMU strains credulity, but his claim that between 1984 and 1989 he had twice tried, without success, to secure information from the FAMU Personnel Office about how many years in FRS he had lost is credible. He claimed to have sent certified letters concerning his years of service, apparently to FAMU, but there is no documentation at the Division of Retirement that anyone telephoned or wrote the Division of Retirement at any time prior to 2002 with any information that could be linked to Petitioner by social security number or his personnel file. From 1984 to 1989, the employer's maximum contribution to TIAA-CREF was transmitted as requested by Petitioner's 1984 Ballot/Election and Ballot/Change Forms. A member of ORP is allowed to make supplemental employee contributions. 39. In 1989, 1993, 1998, and 1999, Petitioner made employee contributions to his ORP provider company TIAA-CREF, utilizing Division of Retirement Ballot/Enrollment forms, also known as ORP-16 forms. After the 1984 enrollment period, ORP-16 forms have been used for employees already in ORP to change their contribution amounts, as the respective maximum amounts the State and the employee were permitted to contribute were raised by statutory amendments. ORP-16 forms could also be used to request divisions of the maximum percentages of the employer's and the employee's contributions between several ORP investment providers or to change from one ORP investment provider to another. Changing providers or adding providers would require that the employee also execute a new contract with the new provider. After June 1, 1984, ORP-16 forms could not be used by anyone employed and eligible on that date to initially elect to be in ORP because their deadline to elect ORP had been June 1, 1984. However, other persons becoming employed later had later election deadlines for ORP membership and could use the same ORP-16 forms to meet their later election deadlines. Employer certifications to the Division that valid provider contracts had been executed to cover all funds transmitted were still required. On his 1989 ORP-16 Form, Petitioner signed under the words, "I elect not to participate in ORP," and inserted the date "1/9/89". He also signed under the words, "I elect to become a member of ORP and have signed necessary contracts…" He inserted "11%" for his employee contributions, the TIAA-CREF name, and the same date in this portion of the form. He did not indicate the new 11% employer contribution on this ORP-16 Form, because that percentage was statutorily defined. This ORP-16 Form was certified by FAMU to the Division of Retirement on 1/11/89, in the language set out above in Finding of Fact 24. The certifier could have checked the boxes for "enrollment" or "plan change," but he or she checked the box for "other". The Division of Retirement transmitted the employer's maximum contribution and Petitioner's requested employee contribution to TIAA-CREF as requested by Petitioner's 1989 ORP-16 Form until 1993. Ms. Smith and Mr. Henning testified that they would not have understood Petitioner's 1989 ORP-16 Form as a request to get out of ORP, because an employee could not change ORP contribution percentages unless he or she was already in ORP; because an employee in Petitioner's class could not elect for or against ORP after June 1, 1984; and because the form was certified by the employer. On September 18, 1989, Petitioner signed an Application for TIAA-CREF Supplemental Retirement Annuity (SRA) and an Enrollment Memo for an ORP and Tax Deferred Annuity Program (TDA). On this latter item, Petitioner marked "already participating" beside the printed words, "ORP employer contributions"; checked the box for "voluntary ORP employee contributions"; and checked the box for "new contract" under "Supplemental retirement annuity (SRA) contracts." These forms were sent to TIAA-CREF. On October 1, 1989, TIAA-CREF issued Petitioner his SRA and TDA. On the 1993 ORP-16 Form, Petitioner did not sign a new portion added to the form which allowed a certain class of employee to state, "In lieu of participating in the ORP, I elect to participate in FRS." Petitioner did not fall in this classification of employee, anyway. He did, however, increase his employee's contribution to ORP via TIAA-CREF, and signed and dated the ORP-16 Form "September 27, 1993," in the section under, "I elect to become a member of the ORP and have signed necessary contracts. . ." This ORP-16 Form also was certified by FAMU to the Division of Retirement in the usual language, and the box for "contributions change" was checked. The Division of Retirement transmitted the employer's maximum contribution and Petitioner's employee contribution to TIAA-CREF as requested by Petitioner's 1993 ORP-16 Form until 1998. On November 3, 1996, Petitioner signed a Request for a TIAA Traditional Transfer Payout Annuity to TIAA Real Estate and/or CREF. This document was sent to TIAA-CREF. On the 1998 ORP-16 Form, Petitioner again did not sign the portion which allowed a different class of employee to state, "In lieu of participating in the ORP, I elect to participate in FRS." He did, however, again increase his employee's contribution to ORP via TIAA-CREF, and signed and dated the ORP-16 Form, "Nov. 30, 1998," in the section under, "I elect to become a member of the ORP and have signed necessary contracts. . ." This ORP-16 Form also was certified by FAMU to the Division of Retirement, in the usual language, and the box for "contributions change" was checked. The Division of Retirement transmitted the employer's maximum contribution and Petitioner's employee contribution to TIAA-CREF as requested by Petitioner's 1998 ORP-16 Form until 1999. The 1999 ORP-16 Form states at one point that the employer's contribution must equal 10.14% of salary and the employee's contribution cannot exceed 10.14%, and then also states that if the employee chooses to have up to 11.57% of his adjusted gross taxable salary deducted, other issues including other investment funds must be considered. (See Finding of Fact 50.) On the 1999 ORP-16 Form, Petitioner did not sign the new portion which allowed a different class of employee to state, "In lieu of participating in the ORP, I elect to participate in FRS." He did, however, decrease his employee's contribution to ORP via TIAA-CREF, and signed and dated this ORP-16 Form "6/11/99" in the section under, "I elect to become a member of the ORP and have signed necessary contracts. . ." This ORP-16 Form also was certified by FAMU to the Division of Retirement in the usual language, and the box for "contributions change" was checked. Since that date, The Division of Retirement has continued transmitting the employer's maximum contribution and Petitioner's employee contribution to TIAA-CREF as requested by Petitioner's 1999 ORP-16 Form. Petitioner testified that he used the 1989-1999 ORP-16 forms and the TIAA-CREF contracts to set up supplemental accounts while protesting against being in ORP at all. The reason Petitioner gave for executing the four changes in contribution to ORP itself was that he had unilaterally concluded that he could not use any investment companies used in conjunction with FRS supplemental accounts. In fact, Petitioner could not purchase his TIAA-CREF ORP-SRA and ORP-TDA without already being in ORP. Therefore, logically, his execution of the SRA and TDA documents described at Finding of Fact 43, further signify or ratify Petitioner's earlier election of ORP. Also, Mr. Henning testified that at no time was there any impediment via ORP to Petitioner's setting up a regular 403b tax shelter annuity or a 457 tax-deferred compensation account outside ORP. Petitioner also could have set up such plans if he had remained in FRS, but if he had remained in FRS, he would not have been able to run these plans through the ORP process. Mr. Henning's testimony is competent, expert, and unrefuted. Moreover, information concerning a 457 plan is included on each ORP-16 Form, immediately above the signature line for the "I elect to become a member of the ORP and have signed necessary contracts. . ." portion, by way of cautioning the employee that it is the employee's responsibility to be sure that in listing/changing any amount to be deducted for ORP, the employee must take into consideration that all payroll deductions, including credit unions, the 457 plan, or other supplemental accounts are fully funded. From 1984 through the present, Petitioner has received quarterly statements from TIAA-CREF, reflecting his earnings in ORP. In 2002, Petitioner received a calculation from the Federal Social Security Administration, which showed that he had been employed and that some employer(s) (not necessarily FAMU) had paid deductions in every year from 1971 to the present, with the exception of 1977. Petitioner then interpreted this to mean that he was in OPS with FAMU that year and was in FRS every other year between 1971 and 1984.6/ Only in 2002 did he contact the Division of Retirement. Petitioner's calculations show that if he had stayed in FRS, he could expect approximately three times the annual retirement benefit that he can now expect via TIAA-CREF.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order, which determines Petitioner to have been a valid member of ORP since June 1, 1984, denies his request to retroactively transfer into FRS, and dismisses his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October 2003.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Bert, a white woman, has been employed 25-1/2 years by the Department of Education (hereinafter "DOE"). Dr. Bert earned a Bachelor's of Science (1950), a Master's of Science in home economics education (1963), and a Ph.D. in home economics (1967) from the College of Economics at Florida State University. Beginning in 1950, Dr. Bert was employed as a teacher of high school home economics first at Union County High School (3 years), and then at Havana High School until 1965, when she took leave to finish her Ph.D. courses and write her dissertation. Dr. Bert first went to work for DOE in 1967 as a Vocational Studies Assistant. In 1975, she was promoted to the position of Program Director and worked in the area of research and development. While there, she helped Florida bring in over $30 million in federal grants for various vocational education programs (including home economics). During the period 1980-1985, when the federal government cut back the funds available for educational research and development, the R & D program was phased out; however, Dr. Bert remained as a Program Director in the R & D position, writing grants and seeking funds from other sources. In 1985, DOE was reorganized. Dr. Bert was laterally reassigned and given the job of Program Director I in home economics education by the Division Director, Dr. Joe Mills. Dr. Mills knew that Dr. Bert had earned her Ph.D. in home economics and asked her to take the position. As Program Director for Home Economics Education, Dr. Bert supervised a staff of four other professionals (Program Specialist III's) and was responsible for monitoring and administering the Florida and Federal government programs in home economics education, occupational education and homemaking education in all of the 67 local school districts. The Federal government provides Florida and other states with most of the monies needed for the administration of these programs, collectively referred to as "consumer and homemaking education." DOE's function is to establish the minimum education standards and curricula required in each area and otherwise to carry out the intent of Federal and Florida Law. As Program Director, Dr. Bert voiced repeatedly her concerns in 1992 regarding expenditures of federal funds earmarked for the Consumer and Homemaking Education Program which she described as illegal to Jerry Barnett, DOE's Budget Officer. The June 1993 report of audit on federal financial assistance programs at DOE for fiscal year 1992 confirmed that DOE was mis-spending federal monies, as Dr. Bert had pointed out. Dr. Bouie is a black woman, who had worked for DOE 14 years. She earned a Bachelor's of Science from Florida A&M University in home economics education (1967), a Master's of Science in home economics education from Tuskeegee Institute (1974), and a Ph.D. from Florida State University College of Education in administration and supervision (1983). From 1970- 1979, Dr. Bouie was a home economics instructor in Volusia County, Florida. Dr. Bert and Dr. Bouie were employed in 1992 in the Bureau of Vocational Programs and Services, which is within the Division of Vocational, Adult, and Community Education (the Division's name has now changed to "Division of Applied Technology and Adult Education" but will be referenced by its former name herein, or called the "Division"). Pat Hall (hereinafter "Hall") is the Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Vocational Programs and Services within the Division, and Lanny Larson (hereinafter "Larson") is the Director of the Division. On July 20, 1992, Castor issued a memorandum to the "Policy Group." The subject matter of the memorandum concerned the possible loss by minority employees of their positions or opportunities for advancement due to attrition and downsizing. The memorandum closed by announcing that Herb Parker (hereinafter "Parker") would be meeting with managers to development strategies to reduce the effect of attrition and downsizing and to enhance the composition of the work force. Hall, who was not a member of the policy group, was not aware of the July 20th memorandum, and never met with Parker. Neither Parker, Castor, nor Larson suggested to Hall that she promote a Black. Larson, as a member of the policy group, had seen the July 20th memorandum. Larson was never pressured by Castor to hire a Black and had never met with Parker pursuant to the memorandum. Larson was the Division Director of Vocational Adult Community Education and a member of Commissioner Castor's "Policy Group." He was aware of Castor's policy guidance not to reduce the number of Blacks in the process of downsizing the Department and in promoting Blacks at DOE. In the first week of October of 1993, Hall learned that her Bureau might have to leave five vacant positions unfilled and subject to elimination because of a legislative mandate. Not filling positions vacated by resignations and retirements was the primary means used to achieve the new manning levels of the Departmental reorganization. Hall analyzed her Bureau as to work-load issues, functions required, and expertise areas of remaining staff to insure that the Bureau's work could be covered with available personnel without laying anyone off. Hall's bureau was tasked to search out, apply and complete for Federal, state, and private grants, and to research new and merging issues in vocational education. No new personnel would be available to perform these new resource development duties. Hall's personnel review showed that Dr. Bert had worked 16 years in and was ultimately the Program Director of Research and Evaluation, which included resource development for 16 years. Dr. Bert had an extensive background, broad experience and considerable expertise in this area; and she was the only person in the Bureau with such experience. Hall's review also showed that Dr. Bouie had worked as a home economist for the Agricultural Extension Service, was a Junior and Senior High School home economics teacher, and was Chairperson of her Home Economics Department of her high school in Volusia County, Florida. Dr. Bouie also had a solid background in programs designed for the disadvantaged and the limited English proficient, together with programs administered through the Community Based Organizations Delivery System. She had developed a reputation for being a team player. Hall was of the opinion that this experience would be invaluable to the Bureau's Home Economics Section. The economic development and demographic trends in Florida resulted in the need for extensive restructuring and changes to the program offerings in each vocational area, to include Home Economics. Hall, at Larson's request, previously had asked Dr. Bert to look into changing the Home Economics curriculum. Dr. Bert refused, and Hall asked Shirley Lee, one of Dr. Bert's subordinates, to review the curriculum for change. Dr. Bert refused to allow Lee to conduct the project during normal working hours. Dr. Bert's refusal to consider changing the curriculum was, in Hall's opinion, an example of Dr. Bert's lack of receptiveness to change. In Hall's opinion, Dr. Bert was not the best person to initiate and develop those changes because Dr. Bert had, in the past, not been receptive to new initiatives for Home Economics. Larson was of the same opinion. Hall recommended to Larson that Dr. Bert be transferred to the new position of Program Specialist IV in Resource Development and that Dr. Bouie be placed in the Program Director I position. The decision to transfer Dr. Bert and Dr. Bouie to their new positions was jointly made by Hall and Larson based on Hall's review and recommendation. Both transfers were at the same pay grade. Thirty (30) such lateral transfers have been made due to reorganization in the Division over the last two years. Hall met with Dr. Bert on October 21, 1992 to notify and explain to Dr. Bert her pending transfer. Dr. Bouie was notified of the transfer on or about the same date. Dr. Bouie had not asked for and did not want to make the transfer. The fund-raising position into which Dr. Bert was transferred was a newly created position, having no support staff. Unlike her previous R & D position at DOE, Dr. Bert was given little or no assistance, met infrequently with Larson, and was given no extraordinary resources to perform the duties of her new job. Her transfer was a demotion. Dr. Bouie would retain certain duties she was already performing, as well as assuming those previously performed by Dr. Bert. Louis Davidson, the Health Occupations Program Director, and Loretta Costin, the Marketing Program Director, were also required to take on additional duties within the Bureau. Both Davidson and Costin are white. In late October, 1992, Dr. Bert learned from Dr. Mae Clemons that a group of Blacks at DOE had been communicating with Betty Castor, the Commissioner of Education, regarding the lack of Blacks in administrative positions given the number of Blacks with doctorate degrees. Dr. Clemons showed Dr. Bert an anonymous letter written sometime in 1992 to Betty Castor, containing the name of Blacks seeking promotions at DOE. Dr. Connie Hicks-Evans' and Dr. Bouie's names were two of the names listed in the anonymous letter to Commissioner Castor as having doctorates. Commissioner Castor called Dr. Hicks-Evans about the letter, and then faxed a copy to her. Dr. Hicks-Evans then called the meeting of Blacks holding doctorate degrees at DOE to discuss the issues and decide how to respond to Castor's inquiry. A group of black employees met in the DOE cafeteria to discuss informally the situation in October, 1992. Dr. Hicks- Evans discussed at the meeting the fact that Blacks were being denied promotions. Although this had not happened to her, it had happened to Rufus Ellis, James Scruggs and Baxter Wright. Dr. Bouie attended this meeting. She had never seen the anonymous letter before that meeting. Dr. Bouie believed that Blacks had applied for various positions and were not considered. She and other black employees wanted to find out what was happening in the Department. The subject of Dr. Bouie's transfer into Dr. Bert's position was not discussed at the group meeting. Dr. Bouie had not been told about her transfer at the time of the meeting. On November 2, 1992, Betty Castor met with a group of Blacks within DOE to discuss their concerns regarding promotions and other issues. The nine Blacks listed as "present" at the November 2 meeting were: Dorothy Bouie; Rufus Ellis, Jr.,; Connie Hicks-Evans; James A. Scruggs; Baxter Wright; Mae Clemons, Adeniji Odutola; Herb Parker; and Jean Williams. Dr. Bouie asserts she did not attend the November 2nd meeting with Commissioner Castor because she was sick that day. Her statement is deemed credible. Almost a year after the transfer was effective (December 21, 1992), the Program Director I position was upgraded to Program Director II, and Dr. Bouie's pay grade was increased from pay grade 25 to 27. Dr. Hicks-Evans did not know if any of the Blacks other than Dr. Bouie had been promoted at DOE since the anonymous letter was written and the meetings were held. Dr. Larson is the division Director of Vocational Adult Community Education which has four bureau. Two of the bureau chiefs are black (Leatricia Williams and John Lawrence), one is hispanic (Glenn Thomas), and the fourth is white (Pat Hall). Larson acknowledged that the decision to reassign Dr. Bouie into Dr. Bert's position and, subsequently, upgrading the position to promote Dr. Bouie, met the guidance of Castor regarding promotions for Blacks holding doctorate degrees; Dr. Bouie was not reassigned and promoted because of the Blacks' efforts in October and November, 1992. Larson was also aware of the 1992 movement by Blacks holding doctorate degrees, who were seeking promotions, prior to his decision to reassign Dr. Bert and place Dr. Bouie in Dr. Bert's position. There was never any pressure by the Commissioner on Dr. Larson to promoted Blacks because he had already met his EEO goals. The promotion of minorities at DOE was discussed quarterly as an issue related to performance appraisal and performance appraisals of all Division Directors at DOE by Castor. In July, 1992, Larson promoted a Black (Leatricia Williams) to one of his Bureau Chief jobs to replace another Black (Jim Barg). Although Dr. Larson could have reassigned Ann Rushing, a qualified white female, to the resource development position, he felt that Dr. Bouie was a better candidate for that position. Paulette Mainwood, Charlotte Gore, and Nancy Phelps were other qualified whites in the division whom Dr. Larson did not consider for the resource development position. Dr. Parker, a black male, has been DOE's Director of Administration for three years. He was promoted to the position by Castor and replaced by Larson, who was reassigned. Parker's job includes running the DOE's affirmative action program, and he attended the November 2, 1992 meeting with the other Blacks and Castor. The first informal group meeting of Blacks occurred about two weeks prior to the November 2, 1992 meeting with Castor. The anonymous letter had to have been sent before then. Parker met with all Division Directors regarding promotion of Blacks within the Department because he was the Chairman of the EEO Committee, and Betty Castor was concerned about promotion of minorities within the Department. The Department had goals established, and progress was discussed quarterly at executive steering committee meetings. Attainment of departmental affirmative action and EEO goals were not required by any law, according to Parker.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations Commission enter its Final Order finding no cause regarding the Petitioner's complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 93-5812 Both Parties submitted proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted, and which were rejected, and why: Petitioner's Proposed Order: Findings: Paragraph 1 Subsumed in 1 Paragraphs 2-7 Paragraphs 3-7 Paragraphs 8,9 Irrelevant Paragraphs 10, Subsumed in 7,8,9 11,12 Paragraph 13 Paragraph 22 Paragraph 14 Paragraph 10 Paragraph 15 True, but Bert was qualified as the resource person, and Bouie was qualified as the Home Economics Director. Paragraphs 16,17 Subsumed in 21-24 Paragraphs 18,19 Paragraphs 25,26 Paragraphs 20,21 Paragraph 32 Paragraphs 22,23 Paragraph 10 Paragraphs 24-27 Paragraphs 27-31 Paragraphs 28,29 Paragraphs 33,34 Paragraphs 30,31 Paragraphs 27,28 Paragraphs 32,33 Paragraphs 11, 15-18 Paragraph 34 Irrelevant Paragraph 35 Subsumed in 15-18 Paragraphs 36-44 Paragraphs 35-41 Paragraphs 45-51 Paragraphs 42-46 Respondent's Proposed Order: Findings: Paragraph 1 Paragraph 1,2 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 11 Paragraph 3-6 Paragraph 15-18 Paragraph 7 Paragraph 24 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 19 Paragraphs 9-11 Paragraphs 20-22 Paragraphs 12,13 Subsumed in 25-28 Paragraph 14 Irrelevant Paragraph 15 Paragraph 12 Paragraph 16 Paragraph 13 Paragraph 17 Irrelevant COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. Minnick, Esquire 660 East Jefferson Street Post Office Box 11127 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3127 William H. Roberts, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113 Dana C. Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner should dismiss Respondent from her employment as a bus driver for an eight-day absence from work that was allegedly unauthorized.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner employed Respondent as a substitute bus driver on November 18, 2002. From February 10, 2003, through the date of the hearing, Petitioner employed Respondent as a bus driver. A bus driver is an educational support employee. Respondent was absent from work for eight days from February 2 through 11, 2005. The absence was not authorized. The unauthorized absence from February 2 through 4, 2005, comprised three days of unauthorized absence within one pay period. The unauthorized absence from February 7 through 11, 2005, comprised five days of unauthorized absence within one pay period. The eight-day unauthorized absence occurred during the regular school session. Respondent's supervisor scheduled a substitute bus driver to drive Respondent's assigned bus route. Respondent was absent from work for a vacation cruise in Chile. The unauthorized absence was not needed for medical or family reasons or for some other emergency. The terms of Respondent's employment are prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Petitioner and the Service Employee's International Union (SEIU). The terms of employment are further explained in a document identified in the record as the Bus Driver Handbook. Respondent had actual knowledge that she was entitled to only four personal days off from work with prior approval from Petitioner. Sometime in August or September 2004, an SEIU representative advised Respondent, in response to her inquiry, that the CBA authorized a maximum of four personal days off upon approval of Petitioner. Respondent did not disclose that she intended to be absent from work for a vacation while school was in session. On January 3, 2005, Respondent asked the dispatcher to approve eight personal days off for a vacation. The dispatcher explained that his authority to approve or disapprove leave requests was limited to requests for up to four personal days. Only the compound supervisor had authority to approve a request for authorized personal days in excess of four days. The compound supervisor denied Respondent's request before Respondent left for her vacation, and Respondent had actual notice of the denial. The denial was based in part on the ground that Respondent had no contractually authorized personal days in excess of four days during the regular school session. Even if she were to have authorized personal days in excess of four, the compound supervisor needed all of his bus drivers because school was in session. There was a shortage of bus drivers. February was a busy period in the school year. It was imperative that students have transportation to their schools. Absences in excess of authorized personal days must be requested on a form entitled Request for Leave of Absence, identified in the record as PCS Form 3-137. Respondent never requested a leave of absence on PCS Form 3-137. Rather, Respondent utilized the form authorized for requesting up to four personal days for the purpose of requesting a leave of absence of eight days. A request for a leave of absence on Form 3-137 would have been submitted to the director of transportation for Petitioner. The director never received such a request. Several aggravating circumstances are evidenced in the record. Respondent did not take the unauthorized absence for medical or family reasons or for some other emergency. Respondent took the unauthorized absence for her own leisure. Bus drivers, including Respondent, are nine-month employees. Respondent had other opportunities during the school year for vacations, including summer, a week at Thanksgiving, two weeks during Christmas, and a week during spring break. When school is in session, Respondent had no contractual right to more than four paid personal days. Respondent took the unauthorized absence with knowledge that her action would adversely affect her employer during a busy time of the school year. Respondent knew that the unauthorized absence would result in disciplinary action. Prior to her vacation, Respondent's supervisor suggested Respondent may want to remove her personal items from her bus before leaving for her vacation because she probably would face disciplinary action when she returned. Petitioner has imposed previous discipline against Respondent. Petitioner issued a letter of reprimand to Respondent for segregating black and white students on her bus.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of committing the alleged violation and dismissing Respondent from her employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Timberly S. McKenzie 446 Fifth Street, South Safety Harbor, Florida 34695 Laurie A. Dart, Esquire Pinellas County School Board 301 Fourth Street, Southwest Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 33779-2942 Timberly McKenzie 125 Rhonda Drive Clayton, Georgia 30525 Dr. Clayton M. Wilcox, Superintendent Pinellas County School Board Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 33779-2942 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable John Winn, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, John F. Morack, is a member of the Teachers Retirement System (TRS). The TRS is administered by respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement (Division). On April 18, 1988, petitioner began working for a new employer and concurrently filled out an application form to enroll in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), a plan also administered by the Division. By letter dated June 27, 1988, the Division, through its chief of bureau of enrollment and contributions, Tom F. Wooten, denied the request on the ground Morack failed to qualify for such a transfer. Dissatisfied with the agency's decision, Morack initiated this proceeding. Petitioner first enrolled in the TRS on September 18, 1970, when he began employment as a dean at Broward Community College. At that time, he had no option to enroll in any retirement program except the TRS. Under the TRS, an employee did not have to make contributions to social security and earned "points" for calculating retirement benefits at a rate of 2% for each year of creditable service. In contrast, under the FRS, which was established in late 1970, members earned benefits at a rate of only 1.6% per year but were participants in the social security program. Finally, a TRS member could not purchase credit for wartime military service unless he was an employee at the time he entered the military service and was merely on a leave of absence. On the other hand, an FRS member could purchase credit for military service after ten years of creditable service as long as such military service occurred during wartime. When the FRS was established in late 1970, members of the TRS were given the option of transferring to the newly created FRS or remaining on TRS. Morack executed a ballot on October 15, 1970 expressing his desire to remain on the TRS. In November 1974, the Division offered all TRS members an open enrollment period to change from TRS to FRS. Morack elected again to remain on the TRS. In the latter part of 1978, the Division offered TRS members a second open enrollment period to switch retirement systems. On November 21, 1978, Morack declined to accept this offer. On January 1, 1979 Morack accepted employment with the Department of Education (DOE) in Tallahassee but continued his membership in the TRS. He remained with the DOE until July 1981 when he accepted a position in the State of Texas. However, because Morack intended to eventually return to Florida, he left his contributions in the fund. Approximately two years later, petitioner returned to Florida and accepted a position at Florida Atlantic University (FAU) in Boca Raton as assistant vice president effective July 11, 1983. About the same time, he prepared the following letter on a FAU letterhead. To Whom it May Concern: This is to indicate that I elect remaining in TRS rather than FRS. (Signature) John F. Morack The letter was received by the Division on July 19, 1983, and the enrollment form was processed on November 2, 1983. Although Morack stated that he was told by an FAU official that he could not transfer plans at that time, there is no competent evidence of record to support this claim since the testimony is hearsay in nature. On November 18, 1985, Morack requested the Division to audit his account for the purpose of determining how much it would cost to purchase his Korean War military service. On January 24, 1986, the Division advised Morack by memorandum that because he had "no membership time prior to (his) military service, that service is not creditable under the provisions of the Teachers' Retirement System." During the next two years Morack requested two audits on his account to determine retirement benefits assuming a termination of employment on July 31, 1987 and June 30, 1988, respectively. On April 14, 1988, Morack ended his employment with FAU and began working on April 18, 1988, or four days later, at Palm Beach Junior College (PBJC) as construction manager for the performing arts center. When he began working at PBJC he executed Division Form M10 and reflected his desire to be enrolled in the FRS. As noted earlier, this request was denied, and Morack remains in the TRS. The denial was based on a Division rule that requires at least a thirty day break in service with the state in order to change retirement plans after returning to state employment. Because Morack's break in service was only four days, he did not meet the requirement of the rule. At hearing and on deposition, Morack acknowledged he had several earlier opportunities to transfer to the FRS but declined since he never had the benefits of the FRS explained by school personnel. As retirement age crept closer, petitioner began investigating the differences between the TRS and FRS and learned that the latter plan was more beneficial to him. This was because the FRS would allow him to purchase almost four years of military service, a higher base salary would be used to compute benefits, he could participate in social security, and there would be no social security offset against his retirement benefits. Also, petitioner complained that school personnel were not well versed in retirement plans and either were unaware of alternative options or failed to adequately explain them. As an example, Morack points out that when he returned from Texas in 1983 he was not told by FAU personnel about the change in the law now codified as subsection 121.051(1)(c). Finally he thinks it unfair that the Division counts four days employment in a month as a full month's creditable service for computing benefits but will not count his four days break in service in April 1988 as a full month for computing the time between jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's request to change retirement plans be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4183 Respondent: 1. Covered in finding of fact 6. 2-4. Covered in finding of fact 7. 5. Covered in finding of fact 10. 6-7. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in findings of fact 8 and 11. Covered in findings of fact 1 and 10. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John F. Morack 10474 Green Trail Drive Boynton Beach, Florida 33436 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Andrew J. McMullian, III State Retirement Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Adis Maria Vila Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire general Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
