Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), operates the Developmental Services Program for individuals in the State of Florida who are qualified, through its Diagnostic and Evaluation Services (DES) DES operates through a team of professionals who make appraisals of applicants for diagnostic services. In the operation of this program, an application is forwarded along with supporting documents to the DES office by the social worker who takes it in. Upon receipt, the package is scanned for a preliminary determination of eligibility. If not obviously ineligible, the applicant is then given a series of evaluations including nursing, educational, psychological, etc. Wherever possible, existing evaluations are utilized. When all the evaluations have been completed, the package is given to a team of experts to develop a treatment plan for the individual. However, if after review of the evaluation it is determined that the applicant is not eligible for the service for some reason, then that individual is notified and no plan is developed. That was the scenario in this case. Criteria applied in evaluating an individual for eligibility for service include: an IQ of 69 or below; defects in adaptive behavior; the condition had to exist prior to the applicant turning 18; and such conditions as cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or autism exist without retardation. Petitioner, Joseph Braxton, currently a resident of a foster home in Orlando, through the Legal Aid Society, applied for placement in Respondent's Developmental Services Program. He is an individual who withdrew from high school in January, 1961, after failing to successfully progress even in remedial classes as indicated in the records of his former school in West Virginia. At the hearing, petitioner indicated he did "pretty good" in school, a definite inconsistency with his record, and feels that, while he is a slow learner, he is not retarded. His IQ, however, when tested during the evaluation process, was determined to be 66. Petitioner quit school before the age of 16 to work at odd jobs and as a house painter for a lady who owned several houses, to help support his mother. Each time he got paid, he would give all but $20.00 to her. She would pay all his bills, do all his shopping, do all the cooking, and take care of his clothes and his room. He admits to being shy and tends to do whatever is asked of him by others. He is unmarried and has no family in this state. Petitioner came to Florida several years ago and thereafter held several unskilled jobs, the last of which was as a migrant farm worker which earned him between $50.00 and $60.00 per week. In March, 1983, while drinking with friends, he fell off the brick wall on which he was sitting and suffered a spinal cord injury for which he was hospitalized until September 10, 1983. At that time, he was transferred to the foster home where he now lives. As a result of the spinal cord injury he sustained, he cannot walk without a cane and has lost the full use of his hands--one more so than the other. He is unable to do more than care for his own basic personal needs, but is desirous of being productive and wants to be trained. Respondent produced nursing and academic assessments, psychosocial evaluations, and the medical records on Petitioner from the hospital where he had been treated. Upon review of all the information available, the committee determined Petitioner was ineligible because there was no proof his deficiency existed before age 18. To arrive at this conclusion, Respondent relied heavily on two sources: (1) the intellectual evaluation done by Dr. Robert T. Edelman, a clinical psychologist, done while Petitioner was in the hospital; and (2) the academic evaluation done by Bonnie Burke, a developmental disabilities consultant, done after he got out of the hospital. At the time of both evaluations, Petitioner was 39 years old. The academic evaluation by Ms. Burke, using the Peabody Individual Achievement Test among others, showed Petitioner was functioning at the sixth grade level overall. That evaluation is broken down as follows: Mathematics 3.8 Reading Recognition 4.7 Reading Comprehension 6.8 Spelling 8.0 General Information 7.5 Average 6.16 The Picture Vocabulary Test showed his Receptive Language Age to be 10.8,and his Visual-Motor Integration Age Equivalent was 5.7. This latter area, of course, may well be attributed to his injury, as Respondent claims, but is not, of itself, determinative. Respondent also claims that the test scores show that if Petitioner had been retarded while going to school, he would not have been able to achieve test scores this high. This position has merit, and it is so found. The previously mentioned high school record showing unsatisfactory performance up to withdrawal is also not persuasive to Respondent's witness, Mr. Carpenter. He contends there are many reasons, other than retardation, for doing poorly in school. Since the criteria cutoff for IQ is 69, and Petitioner's IQ tested at 66, this is a borderline case showing "mild" mental retardation. However, there are other criteria as well, as was seen before. Of equal importance is the question of whether Petitioner has any adaptive behavior defects. These would affect his ability to function in the environment in which he is placed. Respondent, while admitting current adaptive behavior defects, contends they came after, and as a result of, his injury. In support of that position Mr. Carpenter cites the fact that Petitioner survived for many years and was totally self-sufficient after leaving school and before his injury. Adaptive behavior defects can be mental as well as physical--in fact, usually are mental. Though Respondent contends Petitioner can adapt well and is not deficient in that area and cites Dr. Edelman's reference to the Lie Scale, which indicates generally that Petitioner would try to please or answer as he thought was wanted, Petitioner was not interviewed by the committee to see how he would react, nor is there any indication that his case worker got into the question of his ability to handle funds. Respondent contends that Petitioner does not fall within the criteria for enrollment because: Petitioner has a mild mental retardation at present; There is no evidence of retardation prior to age 18; and There is no evidence of severe adaptive behavior problems. It is Respondent's position that petitioner would not benefit from developmental services because: He needs a residential placement; If Petitioner were to be placed in a group home with mental retardeds, it would most likely make him very unhappy and could cause him to regress; and Petitioner needs the stimulation of normal people in his own age group to help him develop, and a residential setting in Respondent's program would not fulfill this need. Respondent contends, through Mr. Carpenter, that Petitioner should be in an Adult Congregate Living Facility and enrolled in vocational rehabilitative schooling with the potential for him to progress to a sole living situation in the future. In Petitioner's case, the factors other than the pre-18 year condition (the program's potential for benefiting Petitioner) did not enter into the original decision to deny Petitioner enrollment. It is quite conceivable that if Petitioner could prove retardation prior to age 18 and were to reapply, he might be accepted. Mr. Carpenter indicated he would be disposed to grant the eligibility under those circumstances, but he could not speak for the rest of the team. With that in mind and recognizing that Petitioner had the school records not available to the team at the time of the original evaluation, the Hearing Officer recessed the hearing to allow the team to reconsider in light of this additional evidence. On February 28, 1984, the original diagnostic and evaluation team which took the action complained of by Petitioner met and considered the evidence from Valley High School. It thereafter determined it could not retreat from its original position.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent Solutia, Inc., discriminated against the Petitioner Darlene Fitzgerald, by allegedly denying her employment because of her hearing impairment. Embodied within that general issue is the question of whether, under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and other relevant law, the Respondent is an "employer"; whether the Petitioner is handicapped or disabled; whether the Petitioner is qualified for the position for which she applied; whether the Petitioner requested a reasonable accommodation from the alleged employer; whether the Petitioner suffered an adverse employment decision because of a disability; and whether the Petitioner has damages, their extent, and whether the Petitioner properly mitigated any damages.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Darlene Fitzgerald, is a 34-year-old woman who alleges that she applied for a "carpet walker" position with either the Respondent or "AmStaff" in March 1998. The Respondent, Solutia, Inc. (Solutia), is a company which owned and operates a manufacturing plant that manufactures fibers and carpet in Escambia County, Florida. A number of independent contractors operate at the Solutia plant, performing certain phases of the manufacture and related services and operations there, including "AmStaff" and "Landrum." AmStaff is a contractor which operates a tire yarn plant and a Kraft plant at the Solutia facility. AmStaff hires its own employees to work in its operations at the Solutia plant. It is solely responsible for all hiring, counseling, disciplinary and termination decisions concerning its employees. AmStaff has its own payroll, does the Social Security withholdings for its employees, pays workers' compensation premiums on its employees and provides retirement benefits to its employees. Landrum is a staff leasing company which is responsible for certain jobs at the Solutia plant, including carpet walkers. Landrum is solely responsible for all of its hiring, counseling, disciplinary and termination decisions concerning its employees. Landrum has its own payroll, does its own Social Security withholdings for its employees and pays workers' compensation premiums on its employees. A carpet walker is a person who tests carpet for wear and tear. A carpet walker is required to work 40 hours per week and to walk approximately 18 miles a day testing carpet. Neither Solutia nor AmStaff employs carpet walkers. The Petitioner has never been to Solutia's facility or offices and has never gone out to the Solutia plant to apply for a job. She has had no contact with anyone representing or employed by Solutia concerning a job. All of the Petitioner's contacts concerning employment in March 1998, were with either AmStaff or Landrum. The Petitioner testified that she saw a newspaper ad that AmStaff was taking job applications, but never produced a copy of that ad. The Petitioner went to AmStaff to fill out an employment application. AmStaff's office is not at the Respondent Solutia's plant. The Petitioner gave conflicting testimony as to the date she allegedly applied with AmStaff for a carpet walker position. First, she testified that she applied for the position on March 15, 1998, which was a Sunday. After that was established by the Respondent, as well as the fact that AmStaff was closed on Sundays, the Petitioner then maintained that she applied for the carpet walker position on March 19, 1998. This date is incorrect, however, as evidenced by Respondent's Exhibit two in evidence, which is AmStaff's "notification of testing." According to the Petitioner the company name printed on the employment application she filled out was AmStaff. The Petitioner was then scheduled for testing by AmStaff on March 12, 1998, at Job Service of Florida (Job Service). The notification of testing clearly indicates that the Petitioner applied for a job with AmStaff. While at the Job Service, the Petitioner spoke with an individual named Martha Wyse. The Petitioner and Robin Steed (an interpreter who accompanied the Petitioner to the job service site), met Martha Wyse, who never identified her employer. Subsequent testimony established that Martha Wyse was AmStaff's recruiting coordinator. Martha Wyse has never been employed at Solutia nor did she ever identify herself as being employed by Solutia. All applicants with AmStaff must be able to meet certain physical requirements, including, but not limited to pushing and pulling buggies weighing 240 to 1,080 pounds; lifting 50 to 75 pound fiber bags, lifting 60 pound boxes, stacking and pouring 55 pound bags and working indoors in temperatures of up to 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The Petitioner admitted that she could not push or pull buggies weighing 240 pounds; could not lift 50 to 75 pound fiber bags, could not lift 60 pound boxes nor stack and pour 55 pound bags or work indoors in temperatures in the range of 100 degrees. Additionally, the Petitioner admitted that her obstetrician and gynecologist had restricted her, in March 1998, to no lifting or pushing. On September 24, 1998, the Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident. Her doctors restricted her to lifting no more than 25 to 30 pounds as a result of the injuries sustained in the automobile accident. Because of the injuries sustained in the automobile accident, the Petitioner was unable to work and applied for Social Security disability. Apparently she was granted Social Security disability with attendant benefits. AmStaff employees must work around very loud machinery. There is noise from the machines themselves, combined with that of the air conditioning equipment. Horns blow signaling that forklift trucks are moving through the employment area. The machinery also emits a series of beeps that are codes to let employees know to do different things at different times regarding the machinery. Although the Petitioner stated that she had no restrictions concerning her hearing and could hear everything with the help of her hearing aid, she also stated that she could not stand loud noises generated by machines. In addition to the physical requirements, AmStaff employees were required to work rotating shifts. The employees had to rotate between a 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., shift and a 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., shift. The Petitioner did not want to work from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Additionally, AmStaff's employees were required to work 36-hour weeks followed by 42-hour weeks on alternating week schedules. The Petitioner did not want to work more than 20-hours per week in 1998, and in particular the months of April through September 1998. She did not want to work more than 20-hours per week, as she did not want to endanger her Social Security income benefits or have them reduced. Landrum did not have an opening for a carpet walker position at the time the Petitioner allegedly applied for that position. The Petitioner did not ask AmStaff or Landrum for any disability accommodations. If an employee is not entirely aware of the sounds and signals emanating from a plant and the machinery within the plant, that employee cannot respond immediately or accurately to situations that may cause problems with the machinery and ultimately could cause injury to the employee or to other employees. If a bobbin is not seated properly on a machine, for example, the machine will begin to produce a clanking noise. If the noise is not heard by the operating employee and the bobbin is not re-seated properly it can become detached from the machine and be thrown by the force of the machine potentially striking either the operator or anyone who happens to be moving through the machine aisle nearby at the time. Further, there are over 300 alarm boxes throughout the plant. These alarms are used in emergency situations. The alarms indicate the type of emergency, the location of the emergency and its severity. There are different types of warnings for vapor clouds and evacuations. All warnings come through that alarm system. An employee must listen for the type of sound or blast, the number of sounds or blasts and the sequence of the sounds or blasts in order to determine the type of emergency and to know how to react to it. The Petitioner was unemployed from September 24, 1998 until April 2000, when she became employed at Walmart. She left her employment at Walmart in July of 2000. After leaving Walmart the Petitioner has not been employed and has not looked for work. She apparently worked at Popeye's Fried Chicken for an undetermined period of time after March 1998. From April to September of 1998, she voluntarily restricted her work to no more than 20-hours per week in order to keep from reducing her Social Security disability benefits.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Danny L. Kepner, Esquire Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge, P.A. 226 South Palafox Street, Ninth Floor Pensacola, Florida 32501 Erick M. Drlicka, Esquire Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon 30 South Spring Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Cavalier is in the business of providing various types of telephone services including landline communications, DSL, and Internet TV. They have as many as 150 employees in the Pensacola area and have offices in other locations. Cavalier acquired Talk America, Inc., a predecessor corporation, on April 20, 2006. Ms. Smith began working for Cavalier as a sales representative in December of 2006. As a sales representative for Cavalier, Ms. Smith called potential customers and attempted to sell them services and products provided by Cavalier. She was very successful at this work and was considered to be an excellent employee. Her sales were high, and she was awarded bonuses. On April 19, 2007, Ms. Smith suffered a mini-stroke and was absent from her work until May 2, 2007. At that time, she assumed that she had recovered and reported for work. Her supervisor, Floor Manager Cassandra Pressley, and fellow employees were happy to see her return. To celebrate her return, Ms. Pressley and other employees contributed money that was used to buy flowers for Ms. Smith. As the day progressed, Ms. Pressley noticed Ms. Smith slumped over in her chair and was concerned. Ms. Pressley offered her extra breaks, but Ms. Smith refused her entreaties. Eventually, Ms. Smith became clearly unwell, and with Ms. Pressley's encouragement, she departed with a co-worker who followed her home. On May 2, 2007, Ms. Smith learned from her doctor that she would have to take, or continue with, medical leave. When Ms. Pressley became aware of this, she caused Ms. Smith to communicate with Suzanne Altare, Cavalier's director of human relations for the southeast area. Ms. Altare explained Cavalier's company leave policy. Ms. Altare informed Ms. Smith that she was ineligible for leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act because she had been employed with the company for less than a year. Nevertheless, Ms. Altare told Ms. Smith that she could have eight weeks of unpaid discretionary leave. This leave became effective May 2, 2007. Ms. Altare's actions complied with Cavalier's Employee Handbook. The Employee Handbook requires equal treatment of all employees. Subsequent to May 2, 2007, Ms. Pressley and Ms. Altare both checked in with Ms. Smith by telephone on more than one occasion to see how she was doing and inquired if her doctor was going to provide her with a release so that she might return to work at the end of the eight-week leave. On or about July 5, 2007, in the ninth week of her absence, both Ms. Pressley and Ms. Altare communicated with Ms. Smith by telephone. Ms. Smith informed them that her doctor had not released her for return to employment. Since she could not provide an estimated time of return, she was terminated. Because Ms. Smith was an especially valued employee, Ms. Altare informed her that she would process her termination as voluntary so that when she was physically able, she could return to work at Cavalier. This coincided with what Cavalier had done with other employees who had to stop working temporarily due to an illness. At least one of those had in fact returned upon receiving a release from her doctor. No evidence was adduced by any witness that Ms. Smith either complained of discrimination or requested an accommodation. In September 2007, Ms. Pressley was asked by a person identified as Ms. Smith's husband to help Ms. Smith at a check- cashing facility that was located close to the Cavalier workplace. Ms. Pressley went with him to the check-cashing facility. Ms. Smith approached Ms. Pressley and hugged her. Ms. Pressley inquired as to when Ms. Smith would return. She told Ms. Pressley that she had not been released by her doctor. Ms. Smith testified that she received "disability payments" until December 16, 2007, when her doctor informed her that she could go back to work. Ms. Smith testified, "I figured they would rehire me, anyway, because of my good sales, yes, sir." However, at least up until the time of the hearing, Ms. Smith had not asked to return to her job.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief filed by Sarah L. Smith. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lori Y. Baggett, Esquire Carlton Fields 4221 West Bay Scout Boulevard Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33607 Sharon Glover, Esquire 2134 West Laburnum Richmond, Virginia 23227 Sarah L. Smith 513 North Reus Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner proved that Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of her race at Respondent's restaurant or place of public accommodation, and, if so, what the relief should be.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant facts: Scott is an African-American woman. On May 22, 2015, Scott visited the McDonald's in Marathon, Florida, with her husband in the afternoon. Scott ordered two meals, including a hamburger, and testified that the type of hamburgers she received at the inside counter were incorrect. Scott complained to the counter staff and was provided the correct hamburgers and ultimately received the food that she ordered. Scott then complained that the new burger she was given was cold. She insisted on getting another burger and also demanded to keep the first one. There were several customers inside the McDonald's on the afternoon in question, and Scott's actions and demeanor were visible to and done in the presence of the other customers. Scott became loud and started screaming at the employee(s) behind the counter. Scott's dissatisfaction and yelling caused a disturbance in the store in front of other patrons and also caused patrons in the drive-through line to ask what was going on inside. The disturbance Scott was creating escalated to the point that the counter employee could not handle Scott and had to turn the matter over to a supervisor, who tried to quell the problem. The supervisor was not successful either. One of the managers of McDonald's called the police in response to Scott's disruptive behavior. It was not until then that Scott left the service counter and sat back down.1/ Deputies Matthew O'Neill and Rose DiGiovanni of the Monroe County Sheriff's Department arrived. Upon their arrival, Scott was still yelling, protesting, and being disruptive, again, inside the restaurant, around other patrons. Because Respondent requested a trespass notice be issued, Deputy O'Neill reminded Scott that, if she did not leave the premises, she would be arrested. Instead of promptly departing, Scott demanded her money back. Deputy O'Neill advised Scott that the restaurant did not have to refund her the money, particularly if Scott was going to keep the food she was given. McDonald's staff nevertheless decided to refund Scott her money in an effort to accommodate her and resolve the matter. Scott testified that she did receive her money back. As they were being escorted out by Deputies O'Neill and DiGiovanni, Scott's husband told Deputy O'Neill to take off his uniform so that he could fight him. Deputies O'Neill and DiGiovanni escorted Scott and her husband out of the premises and advised them of the trespass warning that McDonald's had asked to be issued. Once outside, Scott continued to yell at the officers across the parking lot. Scott never mentioned to the staff or officers that her race (African-American) or race discrimination by McDonald's, or its staff, played any role in (1) the service or hamburger product or type delivered to Scott during the incident or (2) McDonald's response to the incident. Likewise, the undersigned heard no persuasive evidence to suggest or prove that race discrimination played any role in the incident that day. No action, inaction, or treatment of Scott was because of her race. Other than conclusory allegations, there were no facts, either direct or circumstantial, to prove that Scott's race played any role in what she was served or how she was treated by McDonald's.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice and find in Respondent's favor. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2016.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner because of his alleged disability.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Charles H. Miller, was employed by the Respondent, Department of Transportation, for approximately 15 years. In October 1999, Mr. Miller injured his ankle in a work-related accident. He experienced chronic pain and mobility limitations as a result of the accident and continually received medication and psychological and/or physical therapy to help relieve the symptoms of his condition. Mr. Miller wore a brace on his injured foot and took various narcotic pain relievers. On May 2, 2001, Petitioner began seeing Lewis Fabrick, Ph.D., a licensed clinical social worker. Dr. Fabrick determined that Mr. Miller was suffering from depression, anxiety and stress that resulted partly from the pain from the physical injury and partly from the side effects of the medication. However, the Department was not aware of the nature or extent of Mr. Miller's mental or emotional issues. Prior to December 2000, Mr. Miller reported directly to Thomas Malerk, the State Materials Engineer. At that time, Mr. Miller was acting as the data center manager and supervised several other employees. Around November 2000, Mr. Malerk assigned another employee to supervise Mr. Miller and eliminated Mr. Miller's supervisory responsibilities. Mr. Miller's pay and benefits were not affected by this change. Mr. Malerk took this action to correct problems with the data center that had resulted in complaints about Mr. Miller and the data center. Mr. Miller's physical condition was not a factor in Mr. Malerk's decision to change Mr. Miller's job. In December 2000, Mr. Miller complained to the Department's ombudsman that coworkers were making fun of his ankle brace and physical limitation. Mr. Miller alleged that Mr. Malerk had joked about Mr. Miller needing a boot on the other foot to match and that the personnel officer, John Cooper, would pretend to "draw like a cowboy" in a manner that ridiculed Mr. Miller's condition. Mr. Miller also alleged that another co-worker, Gale Page, was harassing him by making fun of his physical limitations. Neither Mr. Cooper or Mr. Page had any supervisory responsibility over Mr. Miller. After receiving Mr. Miller's complaint, the ombudsman contacted Mr. Cooper and Mr. Malerk to inform them of Mr. Miller's concern. At approximately the same time, Mr. Miller also told Mr. Cooper that he was being harassed by Mr. Page, Mr. Malerk, and Mr. Cooper. When Mr. Cooper asked Mr. Miller to specifically identify the harassment that had occurred, Mr. Miller only specifically reported that Mr. Page had made fun of his walk or his leg. Mr. Cooper then informed Mr. Malerk of Mr. Miller's complaint and approached Mr. Page. Mr. Cooper told Mr. Page that he should refrain from making comments about Mr. Miller's condition. When Mr. Malerk learned of Mr. Page's remark to Mr. Miller, he reprimanded Mr. Page and requested that he apologize or otherwise clear the matter. Mr. Malerk also discussed the matter with Mr. Miller. Mr. Malerk apologized to Mr. Miller for anything he might have said that was insensitive and asked Mr. Miller if he had made any inappropriate remarks. Mr. Miller told Mr. Malerk that they did not have a problem and that he considered the matter with Mr. Page closed. Other than the incident with Mr. Page, and the accompanying accusations involving Mr. Malerk and Mr. Cooper, neither Mr. Cooper or Mr. Malerk had any reason to believe that any Department employee might be harassing Mr. Miller or making jokes about his injury or condition. Contrary to Mr. Miller's claim, the evidence does not indicate that either Mr. Malerk or Mr. Cooper even made fun of Mr. Miller's condition. Mr. Miller and Mr. Malerk have known each other since 1997 and were friendly with each other. On May 22, 2001, the Department dismissed Mr. Miller. The decision to dismiss Mr. Miller was based upon a number of violations of the Department's conduct standards, including Mr. Miller's insubordination, absence without authorized leave, display of an uncooperative or antagonistic attitude, and a violent outburst by Mr. Miller on May 21, 2001, when he was advised of the Department's intention to dismiss him. The issues relating to Mr. Miller's dismissal were fully litigated in a proceeding before the Public Employees Relations Commission, which culminated in a Recommended Order and Final Order upholding the Department's decision to dismiss Mr. Miller for violation of the Department's conduct standards. Mr. Malerk was responsible for requesting Mr. Miller's dismissal. Mr. Malerk requested Mr. Miller's dismissal for the violations of the Department's conduct standards that were included in the dismissal letter and was not motivated to request his dismissal in any part by Mr. Miller's physical problems.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore,
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, Robin Carter Millan, is eligible for the Developmental Services Program of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Robin Carter Millan, requested developmental services from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in September 1997, when she was 26 years old. The Petitioner's mother, Ann Millan, met with an intake counselor and completed a Referral/Intake Information Questionnaire. Consistent with a long-standing preference not to label her child as autistic, Mrs. Millan listed her daughter's primary disability as mental retardation. After the Petitioner submitted additional information, DCFS psychologist specialist-coordinator Jane Schiereck sent the Petitioner a letter dated March 6, 1998, notifying the Petitioner that DCFS had determined her ineligible for developmental services because the information submitted included IQ test scores exceeding the maximum for mental retardation. At the hearing, the Petitioner's mother presented evidence that the Petitioner actually has autism--a pervasive, neurologically-based developmental disability which causes severe learning, communication, and behavior disorders with age of onset during childhood. Schiereck testified that the evidence proved the Petitioner is eligible for developmental services under the category of autism. According to Schiereck, the Petitioner did not apply for services under the category of autism and that the Petitioner had to reapply under autism. The Petitioner agreed to do so. However, Schiereck also testified that the intake procedures and eligibility determination preceded the filing of an application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DCFS enter a final order determining the Petitioner eligible for developmental services. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy V. Archibald, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Robin Carter Millan c/o Robert and Ann Millan 3963 Eagle Cove West Drive Palm Harbor, Florida 34685 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the intended contract award to Intervenor pursuant to Request for Proposals P2056 for a Community Based Intervention Services Program in Brevard County, Florida, is contrary to Respondent’s governing statutes, Respondent’s policies and rules, and the request for proposals.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida and is the procuring agency for the RFP at issue in this proceeding. Eckerd is a not-for-profit corporation duly-organized under the laws of the State of Florida. White is a not-for-profit corporation duly-organized under the laws of the State of Florida. On September 4, 2009, the Department issued the RFP to select a provider to operate a 44-slot Community Based Intervention Services Program for youth ages ten through 21 in Brevard County, Florida. Eckerd did not protest the specifications of the RFP nor the methodology that the Department had historically used in scoring proposals for similar services within 72 hours of the issuance of the RFP. Eckerd and White submitted timely responses to the RFP on or before October 14, 2009. Under the RFP, one of the categories that the Department evaluates is the “Evaluation of the Past Performance for Non-Residential Programs.” One of the three components of the past performance standard is: Part I—Evaluation for Past Performance in Florida. This includes, as a subcomponent, the provider’s “Combined Success Rate” (CSR), with an assigned value of 200 points. The RFP defines CSR as “Percentage of youth who do not recidivate,” and further provides, “Points are awarded based on the combination of successful youth program completions, and the percentage of youth who do not recidivate.” Each proposer was required to complete and submit with its proposal Attachment C to the RFP entitled “Data Sheet: Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs” (Data Sheet). The Data Sheet was to provide certain information for non-residential programs that the proposer had operated in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2007, including program name, contract number, number of completions during FY 2006-2007, and FY 2006-2007 Recidivism Rates. Some of the information, such as the completions and the recidivism rates, was to be based on information found in the Department’s 2008 Florida Comprehensive Accountability Report [CAR].1 The CAR is prepared by the Department and includes program outcomes, including total releases, number of completions, completion rates, and success rates for all types of probation and community intervention programs that released youth in FY 2006-2007. The information is reported by judicial circuit. The CAR may report information on different programs in a judicial circuit, and some of the programs may be included in one contract with a provider. For example, White has one contract in the Second Judicial Circuit, contract number P2028, but the CAR reports information for two programs under contract number P2028. In the Fourth Judicial Circuit, White has one contract, contract number D7102, under which services are provided in Duval and Nassau Counties. The CAR treats the counties as being separate programs and provides separate data for the services provided in Duval County and for the services provided in Nassau County. As set forth in the Data Sheet, the number of completions is defined as “[t]he number of youth completing the program during FY 2006/2007 documented in the Department’s 2008 Florida Comprehensive Accountability Report.” In the CAR, the column titled “N4” provides the number of youth who successfully completed a specific program. The recidivism rate is the percentage of youth who later offended. The Data Sheet provides that the recidivism rate is found in the “2006-2007 Recidivism Column as reported in the Department’s 2008 Florida Comprehensive Accountability Report.” The CAR does not report recidivism rates; it reports success rates. Instead of providing the percentage of youth who completed the program and reoffended, the CAR reports the percentage of youth who did not reoffend. Thus, the recidivism rate is calculated by subtracting the success rate from 100. The Department relies on data from the CAR in determining the percentage of recidivism because the success completion percentages that are reported in the CAR have been calculated already. Therefore, it is easy to calculate the recidivism percentages using the CAR success rates. Paul Hatcher, senior management analyst for the Department, is the individual responsible for determining the CSR for providers who have submitted proposals in response to requests for proposals issued by the Department. Mr. Hatcher is the only individual who performs this function for the Department and has been in this position, performing this task, for over nine years. Mr. Hatcher processes the proposals through a standard procedure. The RFP provides that the information submitted in the Data Sheet “will be verified by the Department [and] [a]ny inaccurate or omitted information will be corrected.” After receiving the proposals, Mr. Hatcher verifies the accuracy of the information provided, including the number of completions and the recidivism rate reported on the Data Sheets submitted with each proposal, against the information provided in the corresponding CAR. If the information regarding a program is reported incorrectly, Mr. Hatcher corrects it to conform to the information in the appropriate CAR. The information submitted on the Data Sheet is submitted by contract number. The contract number is how the Department identifies quality assurance reviews, as well as fiscal and other data sources. For example, for contract number P2028, White submitted the completions for both programs in the Second Judicial Circuit. One program had 19 completions and the other program had 29 completions, for a total of 48. White intended to combine the completions for placement under Column 9 of the Data Sheet but erroneously used the combined number of releases. Pursuant to the RFP, Mr. Hatcher corrected the data to reflect the combined completions as reported in the CAR.2 The CAR reported a success rate of one program as 63% and the success rate of the other program as 69%, which equated to recidivism rates of 37% and 31%. White recorded the recidivism rates for the contract on the Data Sheet as 37%/31%. The same approach was used for reporting the information on contract number D7102 for the services provided in Duval County and Nassau County in the Fourth Judicial Circuit. The services provided in Duval and Nassau Counties were considered by the Department to be one program; however, the CAR reported the information by county as if they were separate programs. The completions for both counties were intended to be combined for reporting on the Data Sheet, but White recorded the combined number of releases on the Data Sheet.3 Mr. Hatcher corrected the data to reflect the combined completions as reported in the CAR. The CAR reported the success rates for the Duval County program as 62% and the success rate of the Nassau County program as 100%. These success rates equated to recidivism rates of 38% and 0%. Because the Department is looking for the recidivism rate for each contract, and the CAR reports the success rates used to calculate recidivism rates by program as in the Second Judicial Circuit or by county as in the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Mr. Hatcher averages the combined recidivism rates to come up with one recidivism rate for each contract in the Second and Fourth Judicial Circuits. Thus, the recidivism rates for contract number P2028 for the Second Judicial Circuit were averaged, resulting in one recidivism rate of 21%. The same method was applied to the recidivism rates for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, resulting in one recidivism rate of 19%. After checking the reported numbers and making all necessary changes, including making corrections to the data to match the data reported in the CAR and averaging the recidivism rates for contracts encompassing more than one program or more than one county, Mr. Hatcher inputs the number of completions and the recidivism rate for each contract into a standardized Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (Spreadsheet), which performs the actual calculations and computes the total CSR for each individual proposal. The Spreadsheet uses fixed formulas to perform the mathematical calculations necessary to determine the CSR for each proposal. The last two columns on the right hand side of the Spreadsheet relate to the CSR, and the numbers shown therein are generated by the fixed formulas. The Spreadsheet performs several calculations. It multiplies the number of completions by the recidivism rate for each contract to obtain the number of youth recidivating. Then, from each contract, the number of youth recidivating was subtracted from the number of total completions to obtain the number of successful youth for each contract. It then adds each of these successful youth figures together and divides the total by the combined total number of completions, resulting in the total CSR. The Department awarded Eckerd a score of 129 points based on a 64.5% Combined Success Rate. The Department awarded White a score of 160 points based on an 80% Combined Success Rate. On December 11, 2009, the Department posted its Notice of Agency Action, which indicated its intent to award the contract to White. The Department awarded White the highest overall score of 1554.49 points. The Department awarded Eckerd the second highest overall score of 1544.49 points. On December 28, 2009, Eckerd filed the Petition pursuant to Subsection 120.57(3), Florida Statutes (2009),4 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-110.004. The same Spreadsheet had been used by the Department for several years in calculating the CSR for proposals submitted in response to requests for proposals. Additionally, the Department’s practice of averaging scores for single-contract programs with more than one set of data was not a new scoring concept for the procurement at issue. In 2007, Eckerd submitted a response to Request for Proposal P2303 (RFP P2303) issued by the Department and was awarded the contract by achieving the highest score that was calculated in the same manner as the scores for the procurement at issue.5 In the Data Sheet submitted by Eckerd for RFP P2303, under program name, it entered in one cell, a single-contract program (contract number P70444) operated by Eckerd in the Tenth and Twelfth Judicial Circuits as “Circuit 10, 12, West/EYDC.” In its Data Sheet for RFP P2303, Eckerd took the total number of completions from the 2006 CAR for the Tenth Judicial Circuit and the Twelfth Judicial Circuit for contract number P7044, 19 and 31, respectively, and added them together for a total of 50 completions, which it entered under the “Number of Completions” column. The 2006 CAR reported recidivism rates for the Tenth and Twelfth Judicial Circuits as 26% and 23%, respectively, for contract number 7044. Eckerd listed both recidivism rates in its Data Sheet for RFP P2303 under the “2004-2005 Recidivism Rate.” Mr. Hatcher averaged the recidivism rates for contract number 7044 resulting in a single recidivism rate of 25%. This figure was used in the Spreadsheet to calculate the CSR. The Data Sheet submitted by Eckerd for RFP P2303 also contains two boxes at the bottom of the page that contain statements indicating that each circuit was reported separately and that the cell contains both circuits. The boxes have arrows that point to the relevant combined data cells in the “Number of Completions” and “2004-2005 Recidivism Rate” columns. The information contained in the data cells was derived from the 2006 CAR, which listed separate data for the Tenth and Twelfth Judicial Circuits even though the services provided were through a single contract. Eckerd has also submitted responses for other requests for proposals, RFP P2028, RFP P2032, and RFP P2034, using the same data for each Data Sheet as it used for the Data Sheet submitted for RFP P2303. On February 15, 2010, the Department changed its policy on the scoring methodology to be used in procurements such as the one at issue. The change in policy was expressed in an addendum to RFP P2062. The addendum stated in part: If the 2008 CAR Report lists a program with more than one recidivism percent, list all of the percentages and the number of completions for the program on Attachment C [Data Sheet], and the Department will be treating a Provider’s program with more than one recidivism rate as separate programs for the purposes of calculating success rate and will not be averaging the programs. The Department verifies all program information from the CAR Report. This change in policy was in response to the anticipated changes to the 2009 CAR, which will report and identify multiple areas of information, including more programs with several separately reported recidivism rates. The change in policy was implemented upon evaluation of the 2009 CAR and in anticipation of the release of the 2009 CAR. Eckerd claims that the policy of averaging recidivism percentages for contracts in which the CAR lists more than one recidivism rate resulted in an inaccurate recidivism percentage for White’s contracts for the Second and Fourth Judicial Circuits. For example, in the Fourth Judicial Circuit, the recidivism rate for Duval County was 38%, and the recidivism rate for Nassau County was 0%. Eckerd contends that the multiple recidivism rates as calculated from the CAR should have been used in the Spreadsheet rather than an average of multiple recidivism rates for a single contract. When the recidivism rate that is calculated from the CAR report for Duval County is used, the number of youth reoffending is 87.4, and the number of youth reoffending in Nassau County is 0%. When the average recidivism rate of 19% is used for Duval and Nassau Counties, the number of youth reoffending drops to 44.08, which is not an accurate accounting of the actual number of youth who reoffended. When the recidivism rate is lowered, the success rate will rise. Therefore, if the method espoused by Eckerd was used, White would have received a 71.9 score for CSR, resulting in a decrease of the points awarded to White of 16 points for CSR and a corresponding decrease in the total points awarded to White. Using Eckerd’s methodology, Eckerd would have received the highest number of points.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Petition filed by Eckerd. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 2010.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is eligible to enroll in the Developmental Disabilities Program administered by the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with administering and determining eligibility for services to developmentally disabled individuals pursuant to Florida's Developmental Disabilities Prevention and Community Services Act, Chapter 393, Florida Statutes. Section 393.065, Florida Statutes. The program developed by the Department is known as the Developmental Disabilities Program. Mr. Davis is a resident of Miami, Florida, and is 20 years of age. Mr. Davis submitted an application to the Department requesting that it enroll him in its Developmental Disabilities Program and provide him services as a developmentally disabled individual. The Department evaluated Mr. Davis's application and determined that he was not eligible to receive services through the Developmental Disabilities Program. In making this determination, the Department considered a Psychiatric Evaluation Summary dated August 18, 1998, that was prepared by J.O. Pagan, M.D. Dr. Pagan stated in the summary that Mr. Davis was "diagnosed early in his life as a child with Autistic characteristics," and he noted that, throughout his life, Mr. Davis has "had symptoms associated to hyperactivity, Tics, and perseverance behaviors." According to Dr. Pagan, Mr. Davis "diagnostically belongs in the Autistic Spectrum and more specifically to the Asperger's Syndrome." In evaluating Mr. Davis's eligibility for enrollment in the Developmental Disabilities Program, the Department also considered a Multi-Disciplinary Team Report prepared by the Division of Student Services of the Miami-Dade County public school system. Mr. Davis was a student in the Miami-Dade County public school system's Exceptional Student Education program, which provides appropriate education for students with disabilities. The Multi-Disciplinary Team Report was part of a required re-evaluation performed by school personnel in order to determine Mr. Davis's psycho-educational status. The report is based on a re-evaluation of Mr. Davis conducted on March 25 and April 1, 1998, when he was 17 years of age and an 11th grade student at Coral Reef Senior High School. It is noted in the report that Mr. Davis "has been diagnosed with Aspergers Autism and Bipolar Disorder" and that he was first evaluated by the Dade County Public Schools in May 1987, at which time he had medical diagnoses "including Attention Deficit Disorder, Pervasive Developmental Disorder and Affective Disorder Bipolar Type." The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Third Edition was administered to Mr. Davis during the 1998 re-evaluation. Mr. Davis obtained a Full Scale IQ of 100 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, with a Verbal IQ of 110 and a Performance IQ of 89. The evaluator also noted in the Multi-Disciplinary Team Report that Mr. Davis "is capable of completing at least grade level academic work, yet his lack of attention and concentration often impede his progress. At present, his social skills remain underdeveloped." During his last two years in high school, Mr. Davis was classified as having the exceptionality of autism,2 and he was placed in a classroom for students with varying exceptionalities. The school system provided Mr. Davis with extensive and intensive services designed to assist him in making the transition from school to independent living and employment. The school system provided Mr. Davis with a one-on- one aide to work with him on his behavioral problems, and the school system's transition team worked with Mr. Davis to help him develop independent living skills. Mr. Davis has received training in computers and took courses at the Robert Morgan Vocation School in high-level computer programming. He graduated from Coral Reef Senior High School in June 1999. Although Mr. Davis was very successful in the program developed by the school system's transition team, he is now exhibiting some behavioral problems that he did not exhibit when he finished high school. He needs individualized support in order to live independently because his autistic tendencies are very strong, especially in the area of his behavior. Mr. Davis also needs services in the area of vocational training because his level of functioning is not yet high enough to permit him to seek employment. Mr. Davis has the potential to live independently and to be a productive member of society. He is, however, in need of community services in order to meet this potential. Mr. Davis applied to the state for vocational rehabilitation services but was denied these services because his IQ is too low.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying the application of Jeffrey Davis for enrollment in the Developmental Disabilities Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2001.
The Issue Whether the Respondent failed to make a reasonable accommodation in order to allow the Petitioner to perform his job functions and thereby committed an unlawful employment practice constituting discrimination that is prohibited by the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Miami-Dade County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The Respondent, Miami Dade County Consumer Service, is a department of Miami-Dade County. The Petitioner, Carlos A. Mangual, is an employee of Miami-Dade County, Florida (the County). He currently is employed as the security manager for the Port of Miami. The Petitioner has held his current position since April of 2001. Prior to his current position, the Petitioner was a Parks and Recreation Security Supervisor for the County. As a supervisor he was eligible to participate in seminars and training meetings that were geared toward making supervisors aware of personnel rules and regulations. During his employment with Parks and Recreation, the Petitioner attended a meeting regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Mr. Collins is the County's Employee Relations ADA specialist who was the guest instructor for the supervisor's certification program. Mr. Collins met the Petitioner at the ADA meeting and discussed with the Petitioner whether the Petitioner's weight (and size) would be considered a disability under the ADA provisions. Subsequently, while employed with the County, the Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident that resulted in a knee injury. The Petitioner has undergone two surgeries to correct the damaged knee. Because the knee has adversely affected the Petitioner's gait, he also suffers back pain from the incident. The knee injury, resultant back pain, and residual physical impairments have caused the Petitioner to receive a workers' compensation overall impairment rating of 8 percent. For purposes of this case, the Respondent does not challenge such impairment. Subsequent to the accident and knee injury, the Petitioner applied for a position with the Respondent. Such position, Consumer Protection Inspector/Officer, required the Petitioner to attend to office duties for approximately 1-2 hours per day and to "be on the road" the rest of the time. Consequently, while working as a Consumer Protection Inspector, the Petition logged anywhere from 100 to 200 miles per day in a County-owned vehicle. The Petitioner began his probationary status with the Respondent in January 2000. During the probationary period, the Petitioner received monthly job performance evaluations. After approximately 5 months and while still during his probationary status, the Petitioner was not retained as a Consumer Protection Inspector. Instead, he was returned to the Parks Department where he continued employment with the County until he began his current position with the Port. The Petitioner considered the return to Parks a "demotion" based upon his alleged disability. It is undisputed the Petitioner requested a larger vehicle during his tenure with the Respondent. The Petitioner maintained the mileage logged in small vehicles was damaging to his knee and uncomfortable. The Petitioner claims he was entitled to an accommodation under the ADA because of his alleged disability. During his time with the Respondent, the Petitioner did not make a formal request for an accommodation. In fact, the credible evidence supports a finding that the Petitioner obtained the form but did not file it with supporting medical documentation as advised by the County's ADA specialist. The Petitioner maintains that the small vehicle assigned for his use required him to frequently stop and stretch. Such stops were necessary because the interior of the vehicle did not allow for an extension of his leg. There is no evidence that the employer refused to allow the Petitioner to make such stops or that the Petitioner was adversely evaluated because of the stops. During the Petitioner's probationary period, the Respondent did not have a larger vehicle readily available to assign to the Petitioner. Vehicles that might have become available would have been assigned based upon seniority with the Respondent. The Petitioner went back to Parks prior to such vehicles becoming permanently available to the Respondent. The Petitioner's impairment rating has not affected his abilities to walk every day, to drive to and from his place of employment, to shop, to engage in leisure activities, or to go to a gym once a month for workouts. There is no evidence of any life activity that Petitioner cannot perform as a result of his knee impairment. The Petitioner was fully able to perform the functions of his job. The Petitioner performed his job with the Respondent even when using a small vehicle. The Respondent never refused a request for an accommodation from the Petitioner. The Petitioner's informal inquiry regarding how to seek an accommodation was never formally filed. The Petitioner's size as well as any knee impairment contributed to the uncomfortable nature of the small vehicle used by the Respondent. This was especially true when the Petitioner was required to share the vehicle with another employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos A. Mangual 1290 Northeast 135th Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Consumer Services Miami Dade County 140 West Flagler Street, Suite 901 Miami, Florida 33128 Eric A. Rodriquez, Esquire 111 Northwest 1st Street, Suite 2810 Miami, Florida 33128-1993 Ana M. Urrechaga, Esquire Urrechaga, P. A. 8603 South Dixie Highway, Suite 209 Miami, Florida 33143
