The Issue Whether the Petitioner, H.A.P. Partnership, has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. The Petitioner, H.A.P. is a general partnership. The partners of the Petitioner are Billy G. and Jeanette Smith, Earl and Marie Womble, Mr. W. H. Sharp, Larry and Hilda Strom and Charles and Margaret Fulton. The Petitioner's address is 5174 Maddox Road, Tallahassee, Florida. In May, 1985, the Petitioner purchased approximately 3.1 acres of land, Tax Identification No. 21-04-20-409 (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 1"). Parcel 1 is located at 4015 North Monroe Street, Leon County, Florida. At the time of purchase by the Petitioner, Parcel 1 was zoned R-3, single and two-family residential. Under R-3 zoning, a maximum of 7.2 units per acre of land could be constructed. Parcel 1 was purchased by the Petitioner from Billy Hatcher. In December, 1986, the Petitioner purchased an adjoining parcel of property consisting of approximately 3.5 acres, Tax Identification No. 21-04-20- 408 (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 2"). Parcel 2 is located at 3969 North Monroe Street, Leon County, Florida. Parcel 2 was zoned R-3 at the time of its purchase by the Petitioner. Parcel 2 was purchased by the Petitioner from Marie Bannerman. Development of the Property; Prior to the Petitioner's Purchase. The previous owner of Parcel 1, Billy Hatcher, had retained Poole Engineering to develop plans for site location on Parcel 1, of multi-family dwellings. A stormwater management permit, number 4241, was issued by Leon County to Mr. Hatcher on June 25, 1984. Mr. Hatcher also obtained a permit from the State of Florida Department of Transportation for a driveway onto Parcel 1 from North Monroe Street. The permit was approved June 12, 1984. No permits were obtained from Leon County or any other entity for Parcel 2 prior to the Petitioner's purchase of Parcel 2. The Petitioner relied upon the zoning on Parcel 1 and 2 and the permits that had been issued with regard to Parcel 1 at the time that the Petitioner purchased Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. Parcel 1 and 2 would not have been purchased otherwise. Development of the Property; Subsequent to the Petitioner's Purchase. In November, 1987, the Petitioner retained PVC Corporation to plan the development of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), and to provide project management services for the development of multi-family residences on the Property. Consistent with R-3 zoning, PVC Corporation proposed a development consisting of 42 units on the 6.6 acres of the Property. In the Summer of 1989, the Petitioner sought a change in zoning for the Property. The Petitioner's request to have the Property zoned commercial was denied by Leon County. No permits were obtained from Leon County or any other entity for the Property subsequent to the Petitioner's purchase of the Property. Except for the stormwater management permit, no other permits were obtained from Leon County by the Petitioner and no request for building permits, plots or site plans were submitted to Leon County. Development of the Property was not commenced by the Petitioner. Alleged Change in Position or Obligations and Expenses Incurred. The total purchase price for Parcel 1 was $156,000.00. The total purchase price for Parcel 2 was $110,000.00. The Petitioner paid a total of $106,572.87 in interest on the Property, $15,109.67 in real property taxes and $2,300.00 in engineering fees. Vadden Shadden, M.A.I., appraised the Property on January 18, 1988, prior to the effective date of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, at a value of $417,500.00. On November 3, 1990, Mr. Shadden appraised to value of the Property to be $41,750.00, taking into account compliance with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Development of the Property under the 2010 Plan. Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the Property is located in an area designated as Lake Protection Land Use. Property in the Lake Protection Land Use category may be developed by the construction of one dwelling unit for residential purposes per two acres, plus minor commercial uses (retail but not office uses) of up to 20,000 gross square feet. Site plan approval for all commercial property over five acres is required by the Leon County Subdivision Regulations. Procedure. On or about November 12, 1990, the Petitioner filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), with Leon County. By letter dated February 26, 1991, from Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, the Petitioner was informed that the staff of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department had recommended that the Application be denied. Mr. Gumula also informed the Petitioner that a hearing before a Staff Committee could be requested. Charles Fulton, general partner of the Petitioner, informed Leon County that the Petitioner waived its right to a hearing before the Staff Committee and requested a formal hearing before a Hearing Officer. By letter dated March 19, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to conduct a formal hearing in this case.
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding was acquired by the Applicant, Bear Run Development, Inc., in August, 1986. After rezoning the property, the Applicant began to develop the property in phases or units as "Bear Run". At issue in this proceedings is Unit 6 of Bear Run. Plat Book 23, page 49 and 50. Unit 6 of Bear Run consists of 100 subdivided lots. A total of 24 lots in Unit 6 have been developed. Six of the 24 developed lots of Unit 6 have been sold and have homes constructed on them. Government Action Relied Upon. By letter dated March 9, 1987, the Clay County Engineering Office notified the Applicant's engineers that the preliminary plans for the development of Unit 6 were conditionally approved. This notification was the equivalent of a "notice to proceed." The plat for the development of Unit 6 was approved by Clay County on or about August 22, 1989. On August 25, 1992, Clay County accepted Unit 6 for maintenance. Prior to accepting Unit 6 for maintenance, and prior to July 1, 1992, Clay County notified the Applicant that an easement which was being used for stormwater ultimate outfall for Unit 6 was a privately owned easement. The Applicant diligently pursued acquisition of title to the easement required for stormwater outfall from Unit 6. The easement problem was resolved to the satisfaction of Clay County in the fall of 1992. But for the easement, the development of Unit 6 would have been completed prior to the effective date of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan. The evidence failed to prove, however, that development would have been complete before the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan was adopted. The Applicant's Detrimental Reliance. In reliance on Clay County's actions in approving the Applicant's preliminary plans on March 9, 1987, approving the plat for Unit 6 on August 22, 1989 and requiring that the Applicant obtain the necessary easement to accept maintenance of Unit 6, the Applicant has expended funds in furtherance of the development of Unit 6. In total, the Applicant has spent less than $246,589.69 in reliance on the actions of Clay County described in findings of fact 5-9. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. The Applicant will, if required to comply with the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan, incur additional expenses to comply with transportation concurrency requirements of the Plan. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended by Clay County Ordinance 92-22 have been met.
Findings Of Fact One of some 10,000 American-born Sikhs, Harimandir Kaur Khalsa originally became involved with Sikhism, said to be one of the eight major religions of the world, in 1979. Several years ago she took vows to cover her hair, not to cut her hair, and to adhere to a daily spiritual practice called sadhana. An Armidary Sikh, she was ordained a Sikh minister Christmas Day 1991. The parties stipulated to the sincerity of petitioner's religious beliefs. In part, her religious beliefs find expression in her attire. Orthodox Sikhs wear turbans and churidars, a type of legging; and their clothing is white. This mode of dress has symbolic religious significance for Sikhs generally. Turbans are "mandatory." T.93. Dressed as an orthodox Sikh, petitioner Khalsa appeared for a job interview with Putnam County's sanitation director, Joseph Battillo, on or about August 23, 1990. The interview had been arranged after Mrs. Khalsa responded to a newspaper advertisement seeking a "Recycling Director for Putnam County." T.119. Even before she saw the advertisement, she had read about the job and telephoned to inquire. In the interview, Mrs. Khalsa did not tell Mr. Battillo that all the clothes she owned were white, but she did tell him that the way she was dressed was "always the way I dress." T.41. One of Ms. Khalsa's references told the young lady in the Putnam County personnel department who called to inquire about her that "Harimandir always dresses in white . . . because of her religion." T.22. Mr. Battillo understood that Mr. Khalsa wore a turban for religious reasons, although he originally testified that he did not understand (T.122) that the remainder of her outfit was also religiously compelled. (T.111) He eventually conceded that she indicated she wore mostly white "in the context of the conversation that she was a Sikh." T.132. Asked whether it was his "reasonable understanding that the reason she wore white is because she was a Sikh," he answered, "I guess you could assume that." Id. The day after the interview she was surprised to be told over the telephone that the job was hers. (Of six interviewees, she was Mr. Battillo's second choice for the position.) Her experience with graphic arts was an important qualification. Mr. Battillo felt there was some urgency in filling the position: certain deadlines had to be met if grant moneys available to Putnam County were not to be forfeited. Petitioner started working for respondent on August 30, 1990, at an annual salary of $14,400. On her first day on the job, Mr. Battillo summoned her to his office, asked her to shut the door, and told her she would "have to make a few changes" (T.45) in her appearance because "people would have a problem with the way," id., she looked. She told him she did not believe it would be a problem. In her job interview, she had suggested she "would have instant recognition and people would be reminded when they saw [her] to recycle." T.41. When she was hired, Mrs. Khalsa bought an off-white suit, which she wore the second day on the job. The following day, Mr. Battillo thanked her for not wearing all white, again after summoning her to his office and ordering the door closed. He told her she "look[ed] fine from the knees up . . . [but] that the leggins had to go." T.48. He said that she needed to wear colors and that "if you don't change the way you dress, you're not going to be allowed to do your job." T.49. She told him she planned to get new shoes. After leaving his office, she cried. Mrs. Khalsa worked closely with Diane Shoeman, a high school teacher who served as an educational consultant, for about ten hours, developing curriculum on recycling for the Putnam County schools. They enjoyed a good working relationship, which Mrs. Shoeman told Mr. Battillo at the time. On September 18, 1990, when she was in his office on business, Mr. Battillo told her she could not continue dressing as she had been, that it was the same "as if an employee didn't wear a bra to work and he had to tell her to wear a bra." T.52. He told her that, when he had worked in Sarasota, the Mennonite women dressed plainly "but that they wore pastel colors. And couldn't [petitioner] dress that way?" T.53. Mr. Battillo was adamant, and petitioner left his office in tears. He granted her request for a half day off to shop for clothes. The day after she acquired a new pair of shoes, white hose and a blue dress, Mrs. Khalsa wore them to work. When Mr. Battillo asked her if she was comfortable dressed like that, she said she "could live with it" (T.69) even though she felt she was compromising her practice as a Sikh. From then on, she wore white hose rather than churidars as long as she worked for Putnam County, afraid she would lose her job otherwise. The blue dress she wore every few days, even though her mother-in-law was shocked when she first saw it. Mrs. Khalsa met her September 30, 1990, deadline for purchasing certain audiovisual equipment, and for completing numerous other assignments. She drew on her experience as a graphic artist in designing or doing the layout for bookcovers for school children, an educational activities book on recycling, sun visors, bookmarks, decals, magnets, information posters and brochures for which she both wrote the text and "d[id] the art work." T.64. On October 2, 1990, the Monday after meeting the deadline (so avoiding forfeiture of the grant), she was fired by Mr. Battillo, who explained, "I don't like you and I don't like your turban." T.71 Mrs. Khalsa's manner of dress was an important motivating factor for her discharge. During calendar year 1991, Petitioner and her husband together earned approximately $6,000. When he terminated her employment, Mr. Battillo also mentioned friction with the printers with whom Mrs. Khalsa had been dealing. They supposedly resented her asking for proofs, apparently a departure from past practice under County contracts; and were perhaps embarrassed when she pointed out that they had billed for work never done. T.94 When she began work, she was told she "had six months to learn procedures." T.100. Mrs. Khalsa conscientiously sought to comply with County purchasing policies, despite some confusion about just what the policies were in certain particulars. The only "changes" she insisted on without processing change orders were to assure that the county received what the printer had originally agreed to supply, or the equivalent. T.105, 108-9. At hearing, Mr. Battillo testified to complaints about music Mrs. Khalsa listened to at work, but other employees listened to radios at work, and the only other employee in the building where Mrs. Khalsa worked told her at the time that he could not hear music from her office. Mr. Battillo once entered her office to find incense burning, which she extinguished at his request, never to rekindle on the premises. Once, she and her building mate disagreed on the thermostat's setting, she closed her door, shut the cooling vents and opened her windows, until told not to, when she promptly complied.
Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations order Putnam County to reinstate petitioner and pay her back wages, along with reasonable attorney's fees and costs. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1993. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of facts Nos. 1-11, 13, 15, 33 and 34 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 12, 14 and 35 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact were not numbered. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew P. Farmer, Esquire Farmer & Fitzgerald, P.A. 2910 Bay to Bay Boulevard Suite 214 Tampa, FL 33629 Ronald E. Clark, Esquire P.O. Box 2138 Palatka, FL 32178-2138 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F. Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Purchase of the Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately fifty-two acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"). The Subject Property was acquired by Charles L. Parham in 1988 from Forest Hills, Inc. The Subject Property is located in a rural, undeveloped portion of southern Clay County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"). The Subject Property was part of a larger tract of undeveloped, real property known as "Forest Hills." The southwestern corner of Forest Hills is bounded by State Road 100. At the time the Subject Property was purchased it was zoned Agriculture. This classification allowed use of the Subject Property for single-family residential development at a density of one unit per acre. The Subject Property was purchased by the Applicants for development as single-family sites which they intended to sell or rent and to use for their own residential purposes. Access to the Subject Property was obtained through easements (Forest Hills Road and Lone Pine Trail) from State Road 100. It is approximately one and three-quarters of a mile from State Road 100 to the Subject Property. At the time of purchase of the Subject Property by Mr. Parham, Mr. Parham was provided with a certified Boundary Survey map by Forest Hills, Inc. The Boundary Survey was certified by a land surveyor and was dated November 2, 1978. The Boundary Survey provided to Mr. Parham represented the Subject Property as consisting of forty-four tracts of approximately one acre each and four lots of approximately two acres each. Neither the Subject Property nor Forest Hills has ever been platted. That is, there is no plat of record in the Official Records of Clay County, Florida. The Applicants made the erroneous assumption that the Subject Property was platted. They made this assumption because of the Boundary Survey they were provided by Forest Hills, Inc., which depicted the division of the Subject Property into lots. The Applicants also believed that the Subject Property was platted because no one at County offices where they showed the Boundary Map told them differently. The evidence failed to prove, however, that any employee of the County told them that the Subject Property was in fact platted. The evidence also failed to prove that the County was responsible for the assumption of the Parhams that the Subject Property was platted. Development Activities on the Subject Property. The Applicants cleared and graded roads through the easements to the Subject Property. Applicants also maintained two other roads located in Forest Hills: Cactus Hill Road and Lone Pine Trail. The Applicants also cleared and graded two interior roads which dissect Forest Hills. Applicants named the interior roads "Viking Street" and "Valhalla Street". The clearing and grading of roads was performed by Applicants in order to gain access to the Subject Property for themselves and potential renters. The Applicants also cleared part of the Subject Property for their own use. Mr. Parham purchased a bulldozer prior to the purchase of the Subject Property. The bulldozer was purchased for use in developing the Subject Property for use by the Applicants as a residence, for use in developing the Subject Property for rental and for use in Mr. Parham's business. All labor in developing the roads to and on the Subject Property has been provided by Applicants. Expenses for maintenance, repair and use of the bulldozer were incurred by Applicants. Applicants purchased fill dirt and clay which was used in clearing and grading access and interior roads. Prior to the enactment of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"), Applicants sold two two-acre tracts to Inger Robertson and to Julian Wood. Although the deeds on the sale of these lots mentioned the tract numbers, they also described the property sold by metes and bounds. The property would not have been described in this manner if the property were part of a platted subdivision. Applicants were left with forty- eight tracts. Inger Robertson applied for and received a mobile home permit for her two-acre parcel in 1990. Applicants also applied for and received mobile home permits for two one-acre tracts. One mobile home was used as their residence. The three mobile home permits issued for part of the Subject Property were issued prior to enactment of the Plan. They were also issued consistent with then existing law allowing single family units on one acre parcels. Petitioners' Alleged Detrimental Reliance. At the time the Applicants obtained their two permits, the Boundary Survey showing the lot division of the Subject Property was shown to County staff and the Applicants' plans with regard to development of the Subject Property were disclosed. At the time of the acquisition of the permits from the County, the Applicants' intended use of, and development plans for, the Subject Property were consistent with County laws. No approval or other permits were required by County law in order for the Applicants to utilize and develope the Subject Property in the manner they intended. They were only required to comply with existing zoning requirements, which restricted residential use of property to one residence per acre. This the Applicants did with regard to their residence and two other tracts. They failed to obtain permits, however, for the other tracts on the Subject Property. The evidence failed to prove that the Applicants' were informed by the County that their proposed use and development of the Subject Property was "approved" or otherwise "authorized." The Applicants have not asserted that the County took any affirmative action which led them to believe that their planned development of the Subject Property was "approved". Instead, the Applicants have asserted that the County was under an obligation to tell them that the Subject Property was not, in fact, platted, and they were required to take certain actions to insure that they could develop the Subject Property as planned. The evidence failed to prove that the County was under any such obligation. The evidence also failed to prove that the Applicants asked County staff what steps they were required to take in order to insure the immediate development of the Subject Property. In 1988, the Applicants informed the County of the naming of the two roads created on the Subject Property and were given street addresses for each of the tracts identified on the Boundary Survey. The Boundary Survey was left with County staff to make a copy of for the County's records. Each of the tracts was identified for the County's 911 emergency telephone service. The assignment of names to the interior streets and street numbers to the lots was consistent with then existing law. These County actions are not the type of actions which would justify a conclusion that density limitations with regard to the Subject Property would not change. Rights That Allegedly Will Be Destroyed. On January 23, 1992, the County's Board of County Commissioners adopted the Plan. Included in the Plan is a Future Land Use Element, including Future Land Use Maps (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"). The Subject Property (and all of Forest Hills) is located in an area classified on the FLUM for "Agriculture/Residential Land Use". This designation allows the use of the Subject Property for single-family residential development. Density, however, is limited to one unit per ten acres. As a result of the Plan and the designated land use classification of the Subject Property, the Subject Property may not be developed as one-acre single-family residences. The result of this restricted land use, the number of individual, developable lots on the Subject Property has been reduced. This reduction in developable lots adversely impacts financing of the Subject Property. The Applicants learned of the adoption of the Plan and its impact on the Subject Property in November of 1992 when they attempted to obtain additional permits for the Subject Property.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a title insurance agent should be disciplined for the reasons cited in the administrative complaint filed on April 6, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: On November 30, 1992, respondent, John Samuel Soranno, signed and executed his application for licensure as a title insurance agent with petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). In section 6 of the application, respondent was asked to disclose his record of employment for the last five years. Respondent indicated that he had been employed by Land Title Insurance of Citrus County, Inc. (Land Title) since March 7, 1982. In section 8 of the application, respondent was required to sign a notarized statement declaring himself eligible to qualify by prior experience for licensure with the Department. Respondent signed the notarized statement indicating he had been a "substantially full-time bona fide employee" of Land Title from March 7, 1982, to the time he signed the application. The application and a resume were later hand-delivered to Tallahassee, and Department records indicate the application was stamped as received on December 31, 1992. Relying on the representations in the application, the Department issued respondent a title insurance agent license on an undisclosed date in January 1993. On January 13, 1993, the president of Land Title, William J. Hudson, wrote the Department a letter in which he stated that: At no time has . . . John Soranno been employed as a substantially full-time bona fide employee of Land Title Insurance of Citrus County, Inc., or of William J. "Skip" Hudson. To my certain knowledge, neither . . . (has) John Soranno devoted full time to title insurance during the last five (5) years. Further, John Soranno has (not) performed the functions of preparation of title insurance policies, preparing closing statements and conducting closings, handling of escrow or trust funds including the disbursement of trust funds, preparation of documents or gained knowledge of title insurance work and office management in a title insurance office in the past five years. Hudson went on to recommend that the Department investigate respondent "for possible criminal violations". Acting on this advice, the Department conducted an investigation and later suspended respondent's license on an emergency basis. It also issued an administrative complaint charging respondent with violating various statutes on the ground he had made a material misrepresentation on his application. The license remains suspended pending the outcome of this proceeding. Respondent has been involved in the title insurance business for the last twenty-one years. He first worked for Citrus Title Company, Inc. from March 15, 1973, through September 15, 1975, as a title researcher. Beginning in October 1975, he worked with Coastal Bonded Title Company, Inc., first as assistant manager and then as manager of the Crystal River office. His main responsibilities were performing title searches and examinations, issuing commitment letters, handling closings, and making escrow disbursements. From August 1, 1977, through January 22, 1982, respondent was employed by Crystal River Title Company in Inverness. In that job, he was responsible for conducting title searches and examinations. In early 1982, Hudson approached respondent and asked him to work for Land Title to perform title searches and examinations. Because Hudson did not want to incur the additional costs associated with hiring an "employee", he hired respondent as an independent contractor. Respondent was also required to execute a contract with Hudson whereby he agreed to work exclusively for Land Title. As compensation, respondent received a flat fee for a base title search and a larger fee for those cases requiring a full search. Respondent began employment with Land Title under this arrangement on March 7, 1982. For tax purposes, respondent created a Subchapter S corporation named JOKAR, Inc. and had his paychecks from Land Title made payable to his corporation. Respondent did not work in the offices of Land Title. Instead, he worked at the county courthouse in Inverness and in his home. Under a special arrangement with courthouse personnel, he typically began work each morning (Monday through Friday) at 7:30 a.m. in the courthouse (before it officially opened for business each day) searching through courthouse records. Depending on his workload, which averaged between five and seven files per day, respondent left the courthouse anywhere between 12:30 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. and returned to his home where he spent time on the telephone with underwriters, attorneys or Land Title employees regarding title and underwriting problems and language to be used in closing documents. He also prepared written reports for Land Title, and he spent several hours reviewing the files for the next day's work. At 6:00 p.m. each workday, a Land Title employee came by his house and picked up his day's work and dropped off new files. Based upon the amount of time respondent devoted to his job, which averaged more than eight hours each work day, it is found that respondent worked "full-time" for Land Title. As a part of respondent's job responsibilities, he was required to speak with underwriters on a recurring basis to resolve various underwriting problems which arose as a result of his research. It was generally accepted that respondent was the most experienced and competent Land Title employee with regard to title searches, examinations and underwriting. Indeed, respondent did the title search and underwriting on well over 10,000 files while employed with that firm. During his tenure with Land Title, respondent was covered under the same health insurance policy as other Land Title employees, and he made various claims under his policy. Although Hudson denied that respondent was an employee of his firm, it is found that from March 1982 until January 1993, respondent was a bona fide, full-time employee of Land Title. In late 1988, Scott Lyons was hired as an employee by Land Title. He was later elected a vice-president of the corporation by its board of directors and assumed the role of manager of the Crystal River office. Although Hudson denied Lyons had any authority as a corporate officer, it is found that Hudson did not place any limitation on Lyons' authority and he was a bona fide officer of the corporation. In the fall of 1992, Lyons began considering the possibility of opening his own title company in Citrus County and approached respondent about joining such a venture. Although respondent gave Lyons no assurance that he would work with him, respondent considered this possibility. On December 4, 1992, Lyons told Hudson of his plans to start a new title company named Nature Coast Title Company, Inc. Immensely displeasured at the thought of competition, Hudson immediately fired Lyons effective that date. Because Hudson thought that respondent might also be intending to leave the firm, he initially decided to terminate respondent. After learning that respondent had no firm commitment with Lyons, Hudson changed his mind. In early January 1993, Hudson made a new and more lucrative job offer to keep respondent on his payroll but withdrew it a short time later. On January 21, 1993, Hudson learned that respondent had accepted Lyons' offer to join the new title company and severed respondent's relationship with Land Title that day. It may be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Hudson's motivation in sending the complaint letter to the Department was his desire to eliminate competition rather than having the law enforced. In 1992, the legislature enacted Chapter 92-318, Laws of Florida, which provided, among other things, for the licensure by the Department of title insurance agents. The law stipulated that those "who had been actively engaged with responsible duties in the title insurance business in the state for 5 consecutive years before the date of application for examination" would not have to take an examination for a license if an application for licensure was filed with the Department no later than March 31, 1993. Respondent decided to "protect his career" and apply for licensure under the grandfather provisions of the law. Accordingly, on November 30, 1992, respondent had a friend type his application for licensure. The application form required those who sought to qualify for licensure by experience to have their employer verify that the applicant had been working as a "substantially full-time, bona fide employee" during the time indicated. Because no other officers of Land Title were in the office at the time respondent sought to obtain written verification of his employment history, respondent got Lyons, as a corporate officer of Land Title, to acknowledge that he was a "bona fide full-time employee" of Land Title from March 1982 until that date. Although Lyons had worked at Land Title only since late 1988, he had knowledge that respondent had been employed full-time by Land Title since March 1982 and he was aware of respondent's job responsibilities during that period of time. Respondent was described by the district manager of a large title insurance underwriter as being "very knowledgeable" in the area of underwriting. Also, based upon his dealings with respondent over the last eight years, he rated respondent as "very high" in the area of title searching and examination. A co-worker at Land Title since 1985 also considered respondent to be "very knowledgeable" in the business, pointed out that Hudson had given her instructions to call respondent on any questions regarding document preparation, and was under the impression respondent was a full-time employee of Land Title. Respondent's representation on the application regarding his employment history was not false. Rather, he worked full-time as a bona fide employee of Land Title from March 1982 to January 1993. By virtue of his experience over the last twenty-one years, he is qualified for licensure as a title insurance agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the administrative complaint with prejudice, vacating the emergency order of suspension, and reinstating respondent's license as a title insurance agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2244 Petitioner: 1-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 5-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. The last sentence has been rejected as being contrary to the evidence. Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 1a-b. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 1c. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 2a. Rejected as being unnecessary. 2b-c. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 2d. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 3a-b. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 5-6a. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Joseph D. Mandt, Esquire 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 James F. Spindler, Jr., Esquire 3858 North Citrus Avenue Crystal River, FL 34428
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's life and health insurance license should be disciplined for the reasons set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed on June 15, 1989. That Complaint alleges that Respondent has violated certain provisions of the Florida Insurance Code. Specifically, Petitioner alleges Respondent has violated Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes as a result of a demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance, Section 626.611(14), Florida Statutes as a result of having been found guilty of, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in this state which involves moral turpitude and/or Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes as a result of being guilty of, or having pleaded guilty, or nolo contendere to a felony in this state.
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, Respondent has been licensed by Petitioner as a life and health insurance agent. In October of 1987, Respondent was arrested and formally charged by the State Attorney of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit for the State of Florida with grand theft of over $20,000.00 and three counts of perjury in an official proceeding. The criminal charges against Respondent arose in connection with her relationship with an elderly woman who was stricken with cancer. The evidence provided only sketchy details of the circumstances that led to the criminal charges. From the evidence presented, it appears that Respondent befriended the woman a short time before she died. After the woman died, a controversy arose regarding certain transfers of property to Respondent and a will executed by the deceased woman naming Respondent as beneficiary. A civil law suit was filed contesting the will and the property transfers to Respondent. Ultimately, the will which left all of the elderly woman's property to Respondent was disallowed and certain transfers of property to Respondent were overturned. Criminal charges were initiated against Respondent by the prevailing heir. As part of a plea bargain arrangement, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to the charge of grand theft and the three perjury counts were dismissed. The Circuit Court for Broward County withheld adjudication on the grand theft count and placed Respondent on probation for ten years with a requirement that she make restitution to the victim, an heir of the estate. The restitution required as part of the criminal proceeding was intended to compensate the prevailing heir for attorney's fees incurred in connection with the civil action. While Respondent continues to deny any wrongdoing in her dealings with the deceased woman, she claims she had inadequate resources to fight the criminal matter further. In entering into the plea arrangement, Respondent anticipated that she would be able to continue in the insurance business. Her insurance business is the only source of income which Respondent can reasonably anticipate generating sufficient money to make the restitution payments. It is clear from the transcript of the sentencing proceeding that the circuit court judge withheld adjudication on the grand theft charge with the understanding that by doing so the Respondent would be able to continue to sell insurance. Respondent has been making the restitution payments required as part of her probation and she is dependent upon the continuation of her insurance business in order to make those payments in the future. As a result of the initiation of this proceeding against Respondent by Petitioner, Respondent has been cancelled by the various insurance companies for whom she used to write insurance. Thus, she has been effectively suspended from the insurance business since shortly after the initiation of this proceeding. No evidence was introduced that Respondent committed any other criminal offenses of any nature at any time, nor was any evidence produced of any other violations of the insurance code by Respondent since her initial licensure in 1981.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered suspending Respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure for six- months. DONE and ORDERED this 19 day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19 day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. Langford, Jr., Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Barbara Helen Askea 2315 Northeast 5th Avenue Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 Tom Gallagher Department of Insurance and Treasurer State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
