Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Review was filed on August 22, 1991. The Petition was signed by Donald Eugene Halpin and Jeffery Lynn Fowler. The Petition, which was purportedly also filed by Richard Edward Jackson, was not signed by Mr. Jackson. In the Petition Mr. Halpin and Mr. Fowler challenged Rule 33-3.04(9), Florida Administrative Code. The Challenged Rule provides, in pertinent part: . . . The return address of all outgoing mail must contain the inmate's committed name, identification number and institutional address. The institutional name in the return address must be spelled out completely with no abbreviations. It was alleged in the Petition that the Challenged Rule is "arbitrary or capricious in its application." The Petition also contained an allegation that the Challenged Rule provides "no legitimate or compelling purpose when weighed against its adverse effect on Petitioners and their family and friends." Throughout the Petition it was alleged that there are "less restrictive forms the Respondent could employ to accomplish [its] goal . . . ." In this regard, the Petition contains the following allegation: 11. Petitioners have no qualms with the Respondent informing those individuals they write that they are state correctional inmates. However, Petitioners do object to the manner in which Respondent implements this restrictive measure. There is a much less restrictive means to accomplish the same objective, i.e., letting individuals know they are receiving letters from state correctional inmates. As the rule stands now, it is arbitrary or capricious as applied to the Petitioners. No facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rule is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8)(d), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. Finally, the following relief was requested and the following statement was made in closing: WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully move the Division of Administrative Hearings to declare Chapter 33-3.04 to be arbitrary or capricious in its application. Furthermore, Petitioners reserve the right to proffer First and Fourteenth Amendment violations during any administrative hearings [sic] or motions for rehearing for appellate purposes. On November 1, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend was entered. On December 2, 1991, a pleading titled "Amended Petition for Administrative Review" was filed by Mr. Halpin and Blanche Moseley with the case number of this case identified as the case that the pleading was being filed in. Through the Amended Petition Mr. Halpin and Ms. Moseley attempted to initiate the following challenge: Petitioners, Donald E. Halpin and Blanche Moseley, file their Amended Petition for Administrative Review, pursuant to Chapter [sic] 120.52(8)(d)(e), 120.56 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, to challenge Rule 33-3.004, Florida Administrative Code . . . . . . . . 4. Petitioners file this action pursuant to Chapter [sic] 120.52(8)(d)(e), 120.56 (Halpin being a State Prisoner must utilize Section 120.56) and 120.57 (Ms. Moseley being a free citizen will utilize Section 120.57), Florida Statutes. Petitioners will allege Chapter [sic] 33-3.04, F.A.C., is vague, vest unbridled discretion in the agency, and is arbitrary or capricious in its application. Furthermore, Petitioner Moseley would allege Chapter [sic] 33-3.04, F.A.C., violates the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to the United States Constitution. It is further alleged under the "Conclusion" section of the Amended Petition that Ms. Moseley's challenge is based upon Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, although no proposed rule or rule amendment has been challenged in the Petition or Amended Petition. In support of the allegation that the Challenged Rule is vague, it is alleged in the Amended Petition that the Challenged Rule "does not set forth why the public must be protected, e.g., the types of crimes committed by inmates, the number of inmates who violated U.S. Mail regulations, and how other crimes were committed by inmates through U.S. Mail." In support of the allegation that the Challenged Rule vests unbridled discretion in the Respondent, it has been alleged in the Amended Petition that the Challenged Rule is only intended as punishment--by informing those who come in conduct with an inmate's mail that the mail is from someone who is in prison. Several allegations are also included in the Amended Petition concerning how Ms. Moseley's constitutional rights are being violated by the Challenged Rule. The Amended Petition is devoid of any alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rule is invalid under Sections 120.54 or 120.56, Florida Statutes. Mr. Jackson and Mr. Fowler did not file an amended petition.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's Petition Seeking an Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of an Existing Rule (Petition) should be dismissed on the ground that the "challenged rule in this proceeding has been effectively repealed by the Florida Legislature by Section 626.854(11), Florida Statutes, effective October 1, 2008," as requested by Respondent.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, should pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to Crudele under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, after Crudele appealed and reversed the Department's Emergency Order of Suspension.
Findings Of Fact On July 15, 1996, the Department issued an Emergency Order of Suspension of Crudele's eligibility for licensure and license as a Florida life insurance agent and life and health insurance agent. The Emergency Order of Suspension was based on alleged violations of the insurance code in connection with the surrender of insurance annuities for purchase of a startup company's unsecured promissory notes. It stated: Based on the foregoing specific facts and for the reasons of protecting the insurance-buying public and insurers from further harm, preventing further abuses of fiduciary relationships, and preventing further defrauding of insureds and insurance companies by the [Petitioner], the Insurance Commissioner finds that [Crudele] constitutes and is an immediate and serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare necessitating and justifying the Emergency Suspension of all licenses and eligibility for licensure and registrations heretofore issued to [Crudele] under the purview of the Department of Insurance. The danger, more specifically, is to the insurance-buying public which must place its trust in the honesty and competence of insurance agents. The trust involves the responsibility that insurance agents have for fiduciary funds accepted by them and insurance matters entrusted to them. The danger is clear and present that failure to properly handle such funds and matters may cause serious losses and damage to the insurance-buying public. Prior to issuance of the Emergency Order of Suspension, the Department received two verified complaints--one by the alleged victim, and the other by her adult daughter. The complaints alleged essentially: Crudele was introduced to Mary Clem, an 84 year-old widow of a tenant farmer, by Charles Perks, Clem's insurance agent, in 1992. In 1992, Crudele and Perks solicited and sold Clem two annuities for a total of $50,000, representing Clem's life savings from working in sick people's homes as a nurses aide. A year after selling the annuities, Crudele and Perks returned to Clem and convinced her to invest the money she had in her annuities into a new company called Zuma that was to recycle automobile tires into useful products. Crudele and Perks represented that Zuma was a "sure fire business." They said they were offering Clem the opportunity to get "in on the ground floor" and that the stock would then go on the open market and double in value. Clem did not have a great deal of education and had no experience investing in stocks or bonds. Her sole source of income was Social Security plus her modest savings. She conceded that when she was offered a 12% interest rate, she found the offer too irresistible to refuse. Neither Crudele nor Perks gave Clem a prospectus or any other descriptive brochure about Zuma. Clem purchased a total of three Zuma promissory notes at three separate times for a total of $60,000. This represented the bulk of her retirement savings. Clem acted based on her trust and confidence in Crudele and Perks. Clem later went to a lawyer to draft a will. The lawyer became very concerned about Clem's purchases of the Zuma promissory notes and her inability to understand the nature of the transaction. Clem was not getting any of her payments from Zuma as promised. Clem was "going out of her mind" with worry. She summoned her daughter, Roberta Anderson, to come down to Florida from Indiana to investigate the matter. Anderson was unable to contact Crudele, and he did not contact her. Anderson and Clem were not aware of any efforts on Crudele's part to recover the funds or otherwise remedy the situation. After a great deal of effort, Anderson was able to recover approximately $23,000 of her mother's money. Crudele apparently played no part in helping Anderson recover the $23,000. The Zuma notes went into default, and apparently the remainder of the money was lost. Clem suffered a very serious financial loss that, given her circumstances, she could ill afford. It may be inferred from the evidence that the Department based its Emergency Order of Suspension on the Clem and Anderson verified complaints. There was no evidence of any other basis for the Emergency Order of Suspension. There was no evidence as to whether the Department conducted any investigation of any kind prior to entry of the Emergency Order of Suspension. Nor is there any evidence as to the Department's decision-making process. The Emergency Order of Suspension stated: (1) that it was being issued pursuant to "sections 120.59(3) [and] 120.60(8) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997)], Florida Statutes [1995]; (2) that Crudele had "the right to request a hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.59(4), Florida Statutes [1995]"; and (3) that Crudele "was entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes [1995], and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." The Emergency Order of Suspension also stated that an Administrative Complaint seeking final disciplinary action would be filed within 20 days. On July 15, 1996, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint on essentially the same allegations as those in the Emergency Order of Suspension. Crudele sought judicial review of the Emergency Order of Suspension in the District Court of Appeal, First District. On August 19, 1997, the court issued an Opinion reversing the Emergency Order of Suspension because it did not "set forth particularized facts which demonstrate sufficient immediacy or likelihood of continuing harm to the public health, safety, and welfare to support a suspension of his license without notice and hearing." The court's Mandate issued on September 4, 1997; it referred to the court's Opinion and commanded that "further proceedings, if required, be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of Court, and the laws of the State of Florida." The Administrative Complaint filed against Crudele was given Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Case No. 97-2603. On February 17, 1998, a Final Order sustaining some of the charges and suspending Crudele's license and eligibility for licensure for six months was entered in Case No. 97-2603.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is rehabilitated from his disqualifying offense, and if so, whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 32-year-old male who seeks to qualify for employment in a position of trust having direct contact with children or developmentally disabled persons served in programs regulated by the Agency. The Agency is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust for which Petitioner seeks to qualify. In a letter dated February 20, 2015, the Agency's Director, Barbara Palmer, notified Petitioner that his request for exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust was denied. The letter advised Petitioner that this decision was based upon "the serious nature of the offense(s), the lack of sufficient evidence of rehabilitation, and [his] failure to sustain [his] burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that [he] should not be disqualified." Resp. Ex. C. Before Director Palmer made her decision, Petitioner's request for an exemption was reviewed by a Department of Children and Families (DCF) screener who compiled a 120-page report entitled "Exemption Review" dated November 17, 2014. See Resp. Ex. B. The Exemption Review did not make a recommendation one way or the other, but simply compiled all relevant information that would assist the Director in making her decision. The report was first given to the Agency Regional Operations Manager in Orlando, who reviewed it and then made a preliminary recommendation to the Director. The Agency decision was triggered after Petitioner applied for a position of special trust on October 24, 2014. To qualify for the position, Petitioner was required to undergo a level 2 background screening performed by the DCF. The screening revealed that Petitioner had six disqualifying offenses between 1995 and 2005. Those offenses are listed below: May 17, 1995 -- burglary of a dwelling; Petitioner pled guilty and adjudication was withheld; April 10, 1997 -- robbery; Petitioner pled guilty and adjudication was withheld; May 9, 1997 -- robbery; Petitioner pled guilty, adjudication was withheld, and he was placed on probation; June 17, 1997 -- battery by detainee in a detention facility; Petitioner pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated delinquent, and placed on probation; January 18, 2001 -- possession of cocaine with intent to sell; Petitioner pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation, and ordered to serve 86 days in the County Jail; and February 1, 2005 -- possession of cocaine; Petitioner pled guilty, was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation, and ordered to serve six months in the County Jail. Besides the disqualifying offenses, Petitioner has a number of arrests and/or convictions for non-disqualifying offenses beginning in 1995. Two offenses, disorderly conduct and trespass on a property or conveyance, occurred in July 2012, or seven years after his last disqualifying offense. For that offense, he pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty. He was also ordered to serve one day in the County Jail and required to complete a four-hour anger management class. The Exemption Review shows that in May 2000, Petitioner earned his high school diploma. In June 2009, he earned an associate's degree in Network Administration from the TESST College of Technology in Baltimore, Maryland. In May 2014, he earned a bachelor's degree in psychology from Morgan State University located in the same city. The Exemption Review also shows: from January 2008 through September 2008, Petitioner worked as a cashier and sales consultant at a retail store; from May 2009 through January 2010, he worked as an activities coordinator; from June 2011 through August 2013, he worked as a youth counselor; from February 2014 through May 2014, he worked as a records and registration clerk at the university from which he received his degree; and from June 2014 through August 2014 he worked as a behavior technician. At hearing, he testified that he is currently employed by Quest Diagnostics in the Orlando area. Most of Petitioner's disqualifying offenses occurred at a very early age. For example, in May 1995, while in middle school and just before he turned 12 years of age, he committed his first disqualifying offense, burglary of a dwelling. When he was arrested for his last disqualifying offense in February 2005, possession of cocaine, he was 21 years old. Petitioner attributes his criminal conduct to immaturity, peer pressure, and what he characterized as "environmental exposure." He expressed remorse, he takes full responsibility for his actions, and he acknowledges he could have handled his life better. He is currently in a committed relationship, has a new-born child, and serves as a mentor in the community. In short, Petitioner says he has changed his life for the better. Besides two witnesses who spoke highly of his recent volunteer work with children, an Orlando City Commissioner submitted a letter of recommendation. If his application is approved, Petitioner has a pending job offer with Lodestone Academy in Orlando, which works with Agency clients. An Agency representative testified that the Agency's clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve. They often have severe deficits in their abilities to complete self-tasks and communicate their wants and needs. For this reason, the Agency undertakes a heightened scrutiny of individuals seeking an exemption. In explaining the Agency's rationale for denying the application, the Regional Operations Manager listed the following factors that weighed against a favorable disposition of Petitioner's request: the frequency of the criminal offenses; criminal behavior that has consumed one-half of his life; the limited time (three years) since his last arrest, albeit for a non-disqualifying offense; and Petitioner's lack of specificity and accountability in his Exemption Questionnaire and testimony regarding the disqualifying offenses. As to the last factor, Petitioner could recall very few facts regarding his early arrests, saying they occurred at a very young age. He also denied that there were any injuries to his victims. However, one offense involved battery on a detainee in a juvenile facility, and in another, he ripped two gold chains from a victim's neck.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2015.
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on September 18, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. In the Petition Rule 33-3.018, Florida Administrative Code, and Policy and Procedural Directive No. 2.02.15 were challenged. The Challenged Rule is titled "Inmate Bank Trust Fund". The Challenged Rule is lengthy and provides for the "policies of the Department with respect to money received for the personal use or benefit of inmates . . . ." The Directive deals with the same general subject. The Petition is, to say the least, confusing. This confusion is caused by the Petitioners frequent use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 4, State of the Case and Facts, provides the following: 4. That the (Petitioner) seek to challenge D.O.C. Policy and Procedure Directive $2.02.15 entitled (Administration on Inmate Trust Funds) as being invalid, arbitrary, capricious, that goes beyond the powers, functions, duties, to exceed legislative authority. This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition. Although it contains some "legalize", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of three employees of the Respondent, J. L. Ward (see paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition), R. E. Davis (see paragraphs 14 and 23 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition), and B. E. Goss (see paragraph 24 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition). See also paragraphs 13-14 and 18 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition. The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rule and the Directive. See paragraphs 17, 22 and 25 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition and most of the portion of the Petition labeled "Affect the Petitioner [sic] Interest." The statements concerning constitutional issues consists of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rule or the Directive are unconstitutional. Finally, the following relief was requested in the Petition: The Petitioner demand [sic] relief of: That D.O.C. #2.02.15 et. seq. be declared invalid, arbitrary, capricious, to delegate outside the scope of Florida Statute and Constitution. Any and all other applicable authority that's statutory protected or judicial mandate under Federal mandate as [unreadable] v. Wainwright, TCA-75-3 (11/18/77). Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F. 2d 118 (2nd Cir. 1978) (Cite omitted). That the Respondents, be required to incorporate State Constitution and Federal Constitution protection as statutory mandated at 944.09 120.54 et. seq. (1991). Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rule and the Directive are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. On November 1, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. On November 21, 1991, a pleading titled "Amended Petition as Ordered November 1st 1991" was filed by the Petitioner. The First Amended Petition is very similar to the Petition and suffers from the same deficiencies. Additionally, it is more apparent in the First Amended Petition that the Petitioner is challenging alleged actions of certain employees of the Respondent and not the Challenged Rule or the Directive. The First Amended Petition is devoid of a sufficient statement of the alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the First Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rule and the Directive are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On December 9, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition was entered dismissing the First Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders. On December 13, 1991, the Petitioner filed a document titled "Amended Petition". This Second Amended Petition does nothing to correct the deficiencies of the Petition or the First Amended Petition.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Petitioner is eligible for an exemption from disqualification to work in a position of special trust pursuant to the terms of Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Since December 1997, Petitioner has been employed as a mental health technician at The Harbors, a mental health and behavioral facility in Pinellas County. Petitioner is disqualified from working in a position of special trust as a result of an adjudication regarding battery and improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon. In 1996, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to one count of battery on her spouse, a first degree misdemeanor under Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and to one count of improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon or firearm, a first degree misdemeanor under Section 790.10, Florida Statutes. Adjudication was withheld, and Petitioner received 12 months' probation on the battery charge, commencing August 21, 1996. George H. Seibert, a background screening specialist for the Department of Children and Family Services, testified that Petitioner’s disqualification was premised on her having committed an act of “domestic violence.” See Section 435.04(3)(b), Florida Statutes, authorizing disqualification for having "committed an act that constitutes domestic violence," without reference to having been formally charged with or convicted of "domestic violence." Petitioner testified that her disqualification has not to date affected her job status, but has resulted in her inability to care for children and for elderly or disabled patients. Unlike other mental health technicians, she is not allowed to care for certain patients, even on days when staff is short-handed and her help is needed. Petitioner is thus concerned that at some point her employer may decide to replace her with an employee who can be more flexibly assigned. Petitioner applied to Respondent for an exemption. A hearing was held by the Exemption Review Committee on December 16, 1997. The Exemption Review Committee recommended to the District Administrator that Petitioner be granted the requested exemption. After reviewing the record and the Exemption Review Committee’s recommendation, the District Administrator denied Petitioner’s request by letter dated February 18, 1998. In his letter, the District Administrator stated that the denial was due to the fact that Petitioner has not had sufficient opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation, given the serious nature of the charges and her recent release from probation, and due to the fact that she falsified her Affidavit of Good Moral Character. Mr. Seibert testified that other factors considered by the District Administrator in denying the exemption were that Petitioner’s children were present during the incident, and the fact that Petitioner attempted serious bodily harm to her husband. Petitioner’s undisputed testimony was that the incident leading to her arrest was the only time in her life she had run afoul of the law. Petitioner forthrightly described the circumstances. One of her two children was in the hospital. She had just learned she was pregnant with her third child. Then, she found out that her husband had been having an affair with her sister. She chased him with a wooden club, which he managed to wrest away from her. She punched him, then went after him armed with a brick. When she couldn’t get to him, she threw bricks at his truck. According to the arrest report, no one was injured during the incident. Petitioner testified that she and her husband have reconciled and currently live together, with their three children. They have received marriage counseling. Petitioner completed her 12-month probation period without incident. Without excusing the actions of Petitioner or minimizing the seriousness of the charges against her, it is found that the District Administrator took insufficient notice of the circumstances surrounding the criminal incident, particularly that this was the only such incident in which Petitioner has ever been involved, that the victim was not a minor, that Petitioner's children were too young to suffer any lasting effects from their presence during the incident, and that no one was injured in the incident. Mr. Seibert testified that the District Administrator applies a policy that one year should pass after completion of probation before an applicant can be said to have had a sufficient opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation. Respondent made no demonstration that there is a basis for this policy in statute or rule, or that Petitioner received notice of this policy prior to petitioning for exemption. However, even assuming the policy is valid, Petitioner’s probation had been completed for eleven months at the time of hearing in this matter, substantially complying with the District Administrator’s nonrule policy. The Affidavit of Good Moral Character, which Petitioner is alleged to have falsified, contains the following language: By signing this form, I am swearing that I have not been found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), regardless of the adjudication, to any of the following charges under the provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction. I also attest that I do not have a delinquency record that is similar to any of these offenses. I understand I must acknowledge the existence of any criminal records relating to the following list regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged. I understand that I am also obligated to notify my employer of any possible disqualifying offenses that may occur while employed in a position subject to background screening under Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. The affidavit goes on to list the offenses found in Section 435.04(2), Florida Statutes. Respondent contends that Petitioner failed to disclose her adjudication for battery, a violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes. However, both Section 435.04(2)(h), Florida Statutes, and the Affidavit of Good Character itself limit the consideration of battery to situations in which the victim of the offense was a minor. The victim of Respondent’s battery was her husband. The court records entered into evidence by Respondent do not indicate the age of Petitioner’s husband. However, the arrest report does indicate that Petitioner was 22 years old at the time of her arrest, and had been married to her husband for two years at the time of the incident. The couple had two small children at the time of Petitioner’s arrest. It is presumed that the victim of Petitioner’s offense was an adult. Respondent presented no evidence that would lead to a finding that the victim was a minor. Petitioner was under no obligation to acknowledge criminal records regarding violations of Section 741.28, Florida Statutes, relating to domestic violence, because Petitioner was never charged with or convicted of a violation of that statute. Petitioner testified that she thought she was not required to acknowledge her battery adjudication because of her mistaken belief that “adjudication withheld” was tantamount to expungement of her record. Petitioner was mistaken as to the legal effect of her adjudication, but is credited with having no intent to falsify her Affidavit of Good Character. In any event, Petitioner’s motive is irrelevant because the plain language of the statute and the affidavit relieved Petitioner of any duty to report the battery. It is found that Petitioner did not falsify her Affidavit of Good Character.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order granting Petitioner an exemption to work in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Johanna Burkes, pro se 9702 Eldridge Road Spring Hill, Florida 34608 Frank H. Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Two, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent engaged in conduct unbecoming a public servant in violation of Chapter 89-404, Section 8, Laws of Florida, as amended by Chapter 90-395, Section 8, Laws of Florida (the "Civil Service Act") and Rules 3-1.1 and 3-1.3 of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office ("Rules 3-1.1 and 3-1.3").
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida who is responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within Pinellas County, Florida. At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent was employed by Petitioner. On September 6, 1999, Respondent responded as backup deputy sheriff to the apartment of Mr. Cornell Cunningham and Ms. Karen Stewart. The purpose of the response was to arrest Mr. Cunningham on a civil warrant for failure to pay child support. Deputy Ward Snyder was the primary deputy on the call. Deputy Snyder is also employed by Respondent. It was raining outside when the two deputies arrived at Mr. Cunningham's residence. Mr. Cunningham invited both deputies inside. Once inside, Deputy Snyder talked to Mr. Cunningham and advised him of the civil arrest warrant. Deputy Snyder also contacted the Sheriff's Office to confirm that the warrant was still valid. While Deputy Snyder was talking to Mr. Cunningham and the Sheriff's Office, Respondent conducted a security search of the residence to confirm that no one else was present in Mr. Cunningham's apartment. By the time Respondent completed the security search, Deputy Snyder had finished his telephone call. Respondent concluded his search of the residence in the kitchen. While standing in the kitchen, Respondent stood adjacent to and viewed a countertop that separated the kitchen from the dining area. The kitchen and counter top were well lit with florescent lighting. Respondent observed a marijuana seed on the countertop. Respondent picked the seed up from the countertop and held it up for Deputy Snyder to see. Respondent said, "We got a problem here." Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham were standing in the dining room adjacent to the countertop that separated the kitchen from the dining room. Deputy Snyder had a clear and unobstructed view of the countertop. A Nike shoebox was on the countertop inside the kitchen. The shoebox contained a hinged top that opened from one side and also contained circular holes in the sides. Respondent, Deputy Snyder, and Mr. Cunningham were within two or three feet of the shoebox. The top on the shoebox was closed. There was no other access into the shoebox other than through the top of the shoebox. Respondent removed his flashlight from his belt, turned it on, shined the light into the holes in the side of the shoebox, and observed the contents of the shoebox. Respondent then opened the shoebox and looked inside the shoebox. Respondent observed a small bag of marijuana and a small scale inside the box. Respondent then told Deputy Snyder that there was "a problem." Respondent then showed Deputy Snyder the contents of the box. Mr. Cunningham denied ownership of the shoebox as well as any knowledge of its contents. The deputies arrested Mr. Cunningham based on the civil warrant for failure to pay child support. Mr. Cunningham protested his arrest and asserted that the matter had been taken care of. However, he did not physically resist, did not threaten either deputy, and did not display any intent to flee. Neither deputy charged or arrested Mr. Cunningham at the time with any offense related to the marijuana or the scale. Deputy Snyder transported Mr. Cunningham to the Pinellas County Jail on the original civil warrant. While Deputy Snyder was transporting Mr. Cunningham to jail, Respondent contacted Deputy Snyder by radio. Respondent told Deputy Snyder that Respondent was going to charge Ms. Stewart with criminal offenses related to the possession of marijuana and the scale. Mr. Cunningham overheard the radio conversation between the two deputies and stated that he would claim ownership of the marijuana and scale. Upon hearing this, Deputy Snyder advised Mr. Cunningham of his rights. Mr. Cunningham then denied ownership of the contraband. While Deputy Snyder transported Mr. Cunningham to jail, Respondent remained at Mr. Cunningham's residence and awaited the arrival of Ms. Stewart. With the consent of Ms. Stewart, Respondent conducted a further search of the residence. The further search revealed additional marijuana in a drawer located in the kitchen where the shoebox was located. Respondent combined the marijuana found in the drawer with the seed on the countertop and the marijuana previously found in the shoebox. Respondent then seized the contraband and proceeded to the jail where he charged Mr. Cunningham with felony possession of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Respondent prepared an arrest report stating that Respondent had observed marijuana "scattered" on top of the kitchen counter. Respondent also stated in the report that, "Laying next to the scattered marijuana in a partially opened Nike shoebox, was a clear plastic baggie filled with marijuana and also laying next to that baggie was a silver hand-held weight scale." Respondent’s supervisor, Sergeant Robert Helmick, approved the report on the same day that Respondent prepared the report. On the following day, September 7, 1999, Deputy Snyder prepared his supplemental report of the events occurring at the Cunningham residence. In his report, Deputy Snyder stated that Respondent "pointed out a seed on the kitchen countertop. There was a Nike shoebox also on the countertop. Deputy Broome used his flashlight to illuminate the inside of the box by shining the light through a hole in the box. Deputy Broome then opened the box and displayed a bag of what appeared to be marijuana and a small balance scale." Deputy Snyder’s report also recited the events occurring in his vehicle as he transported Mr. Cunningham to jail. Sergeant Helmick, who was off duty that day, did not review or approve Deputy Snyder's report. Rather, Corporal Larry Weiland approved Deputy Snyder's report. Sergeant Helmick did not see Deputy Snyder’s report until much later. Three days later, on September 10, 1999, Respondent participated in a pre-filing investigation conducted at the office of the State Attorney for Pinellas County. Assistant State Attorney Patricia Cope conducted the investigation. As part of the investigation, Ms. Cope took the sworn testimony of Respondent. In his testimony to Ms. Cope, Respondent repeated the same version of events found in his report. Respondent testified to Ms. Cope that he had observed marijuana scattered on the countertop and that the top of the shoebox on the countertop was ajar. Respondent further testified that he was able to see the marijuana and the scale inside the shoebox through the space created by the partially open top of the shoebox. Ms. Cope specifically asked Respondent whether the shoebox was open or closed in order to confirm that Respondent's search was within the scope of the plain view doctrine. Respondent testified that the shoebox was open. Ms. Cope did not speak with Deputy Snyder or review his report. As a result of the investigation and the information provided by Respondent, Mr. Cunningham was charged with felony possession of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Sometime after Ms. Cope's conversation with Respondent, Deputy Snyder spoke with Sergeant Helmick concerning the discrepancies between the two reports filed by Deputy Snyder and Respondent. Sergeant Helmick advised Deputy Snyder to allow the discrepancies to be worked out by the state attorney’s office and to allow the criminal process to run its course. Sergeant Helmick did not report the discrepancies to the state attorney’s office, to his supervisors, or to anyone else. At the time, Sergeant Helmick did not initiate any complaint or investigation against either Respondent or Deputy Snyder. In June 2000, depositions were set in the criminal prosecution of Mr. Cunningham. Ms. Cope contacted Deputy Snyder to inquire about the possibility of having the shoebox tested for fingerprints. At that time, Deputy Snyder directed Ms. Cope's attention to the discrepancies in the respective reports prepared by Deputy Snyder and Respondent. Ms. Cope reviewed the reports and the discrepancies between the two reports. Ms. Cope concluded that the discrepancies would create a problem in the criminal prosecution of Mr. Cunningham. The discrepancies between the accounts by Respondent and Deputy Snyder created the possibility that Respondent had conducted an illegal search of the shoebox that would render the evidence seized as a part of that search inadmissible. The plain view doctrine applicable to the law of search and seizure would allow the search of the shoebox if the top had been ajar and the contents of the shoebox could be observed. However, the search would not be lawful if the shoebox top was closed and observation of the contents could have only been accomplished by shining a light through the holes in the box. The differing statements in the reports of the two deputies placed the credibility of Respondent in question. No independent evidence was available, including the testimony of Mr. Cunningham, from which it could be ascertained which deputy was being truthful. The State Attorney’s Office deemed it unfair to the defendant, the court, and the witnesses to proceed on a case where the prosecution could not be certain if the evidence was properly seized. Ms. Cope referred the matter to Mr. Robert Lewis, her supervisor. Mr. Lewis reviewed the reports of the two deputies and agreed with Ms. Cope's assessment that the discrepancies precluded any further criminal prosecution of Mr. Cunningham. Ms. Cope cancelled the depositions set in the Cunningham case on the grounds that Respondent had been accused of lying and that the two investigating police officers recalled two inconsistent views of the events that occurred at Mr. Cunningham's residence. Mr. Lewis then instructed Ms. Cope to enter a nolle prosequi of the charges against Mr. Cunningham. After the State Attorney's Office filed the nolle prosequi, the State Attorney’s Office referred the matter to the Sheriff's Office. The matter was brought to the attention of Major Samuel F. Lynn, the commander of the road patrol division. Major Lynn prepared an administrative inquiry form that disclosed the allegations communicated to him by the State Attorney’s Office. Thereafter, the Administrative Investigation Division of the Sheriff’s Office ("AID") initiated an investigation. During the investigation, Respondent and Deputy Snyder each provided a sworn statement to the investigators. The investigators also obtained a sworn statement from Ms. Cope and a letter from Mr. Lewis. The investigators were unable to locate Mr. Cunningham and therefore did not interview him or ascertain his account of the matters at issue in this proceeding. During the investigation, Respondent had the opportunity to offer additional information or comments. Respondent’s attorney placed a statement on the record at the conclusion of Respondent’s sworn statement. Respondent did not offer any witnesses on his behalf or provide the investigators with any information pertaining to the location of Mr. Cunningham. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Board conducted a hearing concerning the charges against Respondent. The charges were: Violation of Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, subsection 4: violations of the provisions of law or the rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the office of the Sheriff; Violation of Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.1 (Level Five violation), 006, relating to untruthfulness by being untruthful in relation to the seizure of narcotics at the Cunningham residence. Violation of Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three violation), 060, relating to standards of conduct by bringing discredit upon the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office by being untruthful and by inaccurately documenting facts and circumstances submitted to the State Attorney’s Office. Respondent was present at the hearing, had an opportunity to offer a statement, responded to questions, and presented additional evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board determined that Respondent violated the Civil Service Act and Rules 3-1.1 and 3-1.3. The violations resulted in a cumulative point total of 65 points under the progressive discipline policy of the Sheriff's office. The 65 points were added to 23 discipline points that the Sheriff's Office had previously assessed against Respondent for a total of 88 progressive discipline points. When a deputy has 88 progressive discipline points, Petitioner's progressive discipline policy authorizes discipline that ranges from a ten-day suspension to termination. Petitioner terminated Respondent's employment. Respondent violated relevant portions of the Civil Service Act and Rule 3-1.1 by being untruthful in relation to the seizure of narcotics at the Cunningham residence. Respondent conducted an improper search at the residence of Mr. Cunningham. Respondent then charged Mr. Cunningham with a felony and misdemeanor offense related to the fruits of that search. Respondent then prepared a false report relating the events occurring at Mr. Cunningham's residence and then provided false testimony under oath to the State Attorney’s Office. Respondent violated relevant portions of the Civil Service Act Rule 3-1.3 and by bringing discredit upon the Sheriff's Office. Respondent was untruthful by inaccurately documenting facts and circumstances submitted to the State Attorney’s Office. Respondent's conduct discredited the Sheriff's Office by encouraging mistrust of law enforcement officers and by creating the appearance that persons in law enforcement engage in improper tactics to effectuate an arrest. Respondent's untruthfulness resulted in the improper arrest and prosecution of an individual. Truthfulness on the part of a deputy sheriff is an important part of the job. It is necessary in order to maintain discipline and to preserve the integrity of the agency and the functions performed. Respondent's untruthfulness violated those essential elements and exposed the Sheriff's Office to the potential for civil liability for an improper arrest. Although much of Respondent's testimony was credible and persuasive, there were significant parts of Respondent's testimony that were neither credible nor persuasive. The flawed part of Respondent's testimony was inconsistent with prior statements by Respondent and with the testimony of Deputy Snyder. For the most part, no one inconsistency in Respondent's testimony, standing alone, would be sufficient to adversely affect Respondent's credibility. However, the cumulative effect of all of the inconsistencies deprives Respondent's testimony of credibility and persuasiveness concerning material issues in this case. In an earlier sworn statement to AID, Respondent testified that he found marijuana on the countertop in Mr. Cunningham's apartment, showed the seed to Deputy Snyder, and then looked inside the shoebox. At the final hearing, however, Respondent testified that he found the marijuana seed on the countertop, saw the marijuana in the shoebox, and then walked over to Deputy Snyder to show him the marijuana seed. Respondent further testified at the final hearing that he could not recall whether he picked up the seed first or saw the marijuana in the shoebox first. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the location of Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham at the time that Respondent found the seed and searched the shoebox. At the final hearing, Respondent insisted that Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham never got within ten to fourteen feet of the shoebox. In an earlier sworn statement to AID, however, Respondent indicated that Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham were two to three feet from the shoebox. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the position of the top of the shoebox at the time that Respondent found the seed and searched the shoebox. Respondent testified at final hearing that the shoebox was open between 1.5 and 2.0 inches. In a sworn statement to AID, however, Respondent testified that the top of the shoebox was open less than one inch. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the manner in which he shined light from his flashlight into the shoebox. At final hearing, Respondent testified that he shined light into the holes on the side of the shoebox. In an earlier deposition, however, Respondent testified that he shined the light in the top of the shoebox where the top was open and could not remember if the shoebox had holes. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the location of the marijuana on the countertop. At the final hearing, Respondent indicated that the marijuana was spread out into the center of the dark countertop where there was a white paint spot, as shown in one of the photographs in evidence. However, the drawing provided during the course of Respondent's earlier deposition did not indicate that marijuana was spread into the center of the dark countertop where the white paint spot was located. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the location of the shoebox. Respondent placed the shoebox close to the wall where it may have been more difficult for Deputy Snyder to view the box. Deputy Snyder placed the shoebox in the middle of the countertop where it was more easily seen. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the vantage points of Respondent and Deputy Snyder. Respondent placed Deputy Snyder ten to fourteen feet from the shoebox and stated that Deputy Snyder could not see the shoebox or the marijuana from that vantage point. Deputy Snyder placed himself within two to three feet of the shoebox and stated that he had an unobstructed and clear view of the countertop and the shoebox. Deputy Snyder's testimony was consistent with an earlier sworn statement to AID by Respondent indicating that Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham were two to three feet from the shoebox. See Finding of Fact 43. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the amount of marijuana on the countertop. Respondent stated there was a considerable amount or marijuana on the countertop. Deputy Snyder stated there was no marijuana on the countertop except the seed displayed to him by Respondent. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the actions taken by Respondent in looking into the shoebox. Respondent testified that he identified the debris, saw the marijuana in the shoebox, showed the seed to Snyder, and then looked into the shoebox. Deputy Snyder testified that Respondent showed him a seed, shined his light into a hole in the shoebox, and then opened the shoebox. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the actions of Respondent after discovering the marijuana and the shoebox. Respondent claimed he walked from the kitchen into the living and dining area to display the seed to Deputy Snyder. Deputy Snyder testified that Respondent remained in the kitchen and displayed the seed across the countertop. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the issue of whether Respondent had his flashlight out before he looked into the shoebox or removed it in order to look inside the shoebox. Respondent testified he had the flashlight out the entire time he was in the residence. Deputy Snyder stated that Respondent removed the flashlight from his belt in order to look into the shoebox. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the issue of whether Deputy Snyder was on the telephone when Respondent observed the marijuana and shoebox and pointed these items out to Deputy Snyder. Respondent stated that Deputy Snyder was on the telephone when these events occurred. Deputy Snyder testified that he had completed his call by the time Respondent arrived in the kitchen. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the ability of Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham to be in the dining room and close to the countertop. Respondent claimed that the dining room table and chairs did not allow sufficient room for Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham to be within two or three feet of the countertop in the dining room. Deputy Snyder and other testimony by Respondent concerning the dimensions of the dining room and table and chairs indicated there was sufficient room for Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham to stand in the dining room within two or three feet of the shoebox. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding Respondent's testimony that he searched the shoebox, in part, because he was concerned over the existence of booby traps in the shoebox. Deputy Snyder saw no such concern indicated in Respondent’s actions. Respondent's testimony that he was concerned the shoebox contained booby traps is neither credible nor persuasive. Respondent testified that the room was sufficiently well lit to allow him to clearly see the marijuana inside the partially open shoebox without shining his flashlight into the shoebox before opening it. Respondent attempted to explain why he used his flashlight in a well-lit kitchen by expressing concern that the shoebox may have contained booby traps. Regarding the discrepancies between the testimony of Respondent and Deputy Snyder, there is no apparent motive for Deputy Snyder to fabricate his version of the events or to attempt to create any form of disciplinary problem for Respondent. Respondent had no prior experience with Deputy Snyder that would create a reason for Deputy Snyder to be untruthful. Respondent suggested that Deputy Snyder fabricated his report and testimony in exchange for a transfer to a position as a detective. That testimony is neither credible nor persuasive. Deputy Snyder’s transfer occurred months before any concerns arose pertaining to Respondent. There is no evidence that Deputy Snyder played any role in the initiation of the investigation. Deputy Snyder's initial disclosure to his supervisor did not result in any investigation or action against Respondent. The transfer to the detective unit was a lateral transfer without any increase in rank, pay, or benefits. The evaluation system in effect at the Sheriff's Office provided a specific component for self-initiated arrests. The arrest of Mr. Cunningham in this case falls into the category of self-initiated arrests and could have resulted in a positive evaluation component for Respondent, who already had 23 disciplinary points against him. Respondent has a prior disciplinary history. In June 1999, Respondent received a one-day suspension and five disciplinary points for violating rules that are not relevant to this proceeding. In January 2000, Respondent received a three- day suspension and 15 disciplinary points for violating rules that are not relevant to this proceeding. The two violations resulted in 20 progressive points with a range of discipline from reprimand to a three-day suspension. In August 2000, Respondent received a seven-day suspension for violating rules that are not relevant to this proceeding. The violations consisted of three level three violations resulting in the assignment of 40 disciplinary points. The 40 points were combined with ten "modified points" from the prior violations and resulted in a total of 50 progressive points with a range of discipline from a five-day suspension to termination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming a public servant and terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard C. Millian, Esquire Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire Tew, Zinober, & Barnes, L.L.P. 2655 McCormick Drive, Prestige Professional Park Clearwater, Florida 33759 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34756 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186
Findings Of Fact On April 29, 1999, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner for allegedly violating several statutes regulating his conduct as an insurance agent in the State of Florida. Pursuant to his request for an evidentiary hearing regarding those allegations, that matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 10, 1999, and assigned DOAH Case No. 99-2593. On July 12, 1999, Petitioner filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings the subject Petition to Determine Invalidity of Administrative Rules, and on July 15 he filed his Amended Petition to Determine Invalidity of Administrative Rules. Petitioner challenges Rules 4-211.031(21)(e), 4- 211.031(24) through (27), 4-231.150, and 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code. The Administrative Complaint charges Petitioner, inter alia, with violating Section 626.611(14), Florida Statutes. That Section provides for the mandatory revocation of licensure and appointment privileges based upon the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. The statute does not define the term "moral turpitude" or direct the Department to do so. The Department has done so, however, in Rule 4-211.031(21)(e). Petitioner alleges that the Rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in that it enlarges and modifies the statute, it exceeds the Department's rulemaking authority, it is vague and fails to establish adequate standards for the Department's decisions, and it vests unbridled discretion in the Department. In conjunction therewith, Rules 4-211.031(24) through (27), Florida Administrative Code, divide crimes into Classes "A" through "D" and contain lists of specific crimes. Those which the Department considers crimes involving moral turpitude based upon the definition contained in Rule 4-211.031(21)(e) are marked with an asterisk. Petitioner alleges these Rules are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority because the Rule upon which they are based is invalid, because they are arbitrary and capricious as demonstrated by their internal inconsistencies and irreconcilable conflict with court decisions in the State of Florida, and because they enlarge and modify the statute they presumably implement. Petitioner asserts he is substantially affected by Rules 4-211.031(21)(e) and 4-211.031(24) through (27) in that the Administrative Complaint filed against him in DOAH Case No. 99-2593 charges him with entering a plea to aggravated battery, a crime designated by those Rules as involving moral turpitude. Rule 4-211.031(25) includes aggravated battery in its list of crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner also contends that two Rules covering the penalty phase of the Department's disciplinary process are invalid. Rule 4-231.150, Florida Administrative Code, provides for mandatory suspension in the event a licensee is found guilty in an administrative proceeding of violating Sections 626.611(14) and/or 626.621(8), Florida Statutes, two statutes Petitioner is alleged to have violated. Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth specific aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered by the Department in assessing the penalty for violating statutes governing the conduct of insurance agents. As to Rule 4-231.150, Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner alleges that it is invalid because it requires mandatory suspension as the penalty for violating Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes, but the statute provides that suspension is discretionary. Petitioner argues, therefore, that the Rule modifies or limits the statute and is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. As to Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, Subsection (1) sets forth 12 factors to be considered in assessing a penalty where Rule 4-231.150 is not involved, and Subsection (2) sets forth 8 factors to be considered in assessing a penalty where Rule 4-231.150 is involved. Both Subsections do, however, provide that any other relevant factors may be considered. Petitioner argues that Rule 4-231.160 is invalid because Subsection (2), which applies when criminal conduct is involved, does not contain the factors in Subsection (1), which contains far-broader factors, and is, therefore, much more limited and unfair. Petitioner further argues that the penalty schemes contained in Rules 4-231.150 and 4-231.160, calling for a mandatory suspension and offering an arbitrary and limited number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances are neither implied nor described by the pertinent statutes. The Rules, therefore, according to Petitioner, are invalid in that they substantially modify or limit the statutes at issue and are also arbitrary and capricious in their application of how disciplinary decisions should be made and what factors are to be considered. Petitioner further argues that Rule 4-231.160 is impermissibly vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, and vests unbridled discretion in the Department by allowing for "other relevant factors" to be considered. The Department's Motion for Summary Final Order argues that Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Rules and that the Rules are not invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
