The Issue Whether Petitioner properly issued a Stop-Work Order and Penalty Assessment against Respondent for failing to obtain workers' compensation insurance that meets the requirements of chapter 440, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes, including those provisions that require employers to secure and maintain payment of workers? compensation insurance for their employees who may suffer work- related injuries. Respondent is an active Florida limited liability company, having been organized in 2006. Howard?s Famous Restaurant is a diner-style restaurant located at 488 South Yonge Street, Ormond Beach, Florida. It seats approximately 60 customers at a time, and is open for breakfast and lunch. In 2006, Edward Kraher and Thomas Baldwin jointly purchased Howard?s Famous Restaurant. They were equal partners. Mr. Baldwin generally handled the business aspects of the restaurant, while Mr. Kraher was responsible for the food. At the time the restaurant was purchased, Mr. Baldwin organized That?s Right Enterprises, LLC, to hold title to the restaurant and conduct the business of the restaurant. Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Kraher were both identified as managing members of the company.1/ On June 27, 2007, a 2007 Limited Liability Company Annual Report for That?s Right Enterprises, LLC, was filed with the Secretary of State. The Annual Report bore the signature of Mr. Kraher, and contained a strike-through of the letter that caused the misspelling of Mr. Kraher?s name. Mr. Kraher testified that the signature on the report appeared to be his, but he had no recollection of having seen the document, or of having signed it. He suggested that Mr. Baldwin may have forged his signature, but offered no explanation of why he might have done so. Although Mr. Kraher could not recall having signed the annual report, and may have had little understanding of its significance, the evidence supports a finding that Mr. Kraher did, in fact, sign the annual report for That?s Right Enterprises, LLC, as a managing member of the business entity. From March 9, 2009, through March of 2011, Mr. Kraher and Mr. Baldwin received salaries as officers, rather than employees, of That?s Right Enterprises, LLC. Their pay was substantially equivalent during that period. The paychecks were issued by the company?s accountant. Mr. Kraher denied having specific knowledge that he was receiving a salary as an officer of That?s Right Enterprises, LLC. Since Mr. Baldwin left the company, Mr. Kraher has continued to use the same accountant, and has continued to receive his salary as an officer of That?s Right Enterprises, LLC. On March 24, 2011, after having bought out Mr. Baldwin?s interest in the company by paying certain company- related debt owed by Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Kraher filed an annual report for That?s Right Enterprises, LLC. In the annual report, which was prepared and filed at his request, Mr. Kraher assumed control as the sole member and registered agent of the company. Mr. Baldwin was removed as a managing member and registered agent, and other changes were made consistent therewith. Mr. Kraher denied any understanding of the significance of his operating as the same corporate entity, but rather thought he was “buying a new LLC.” On March 8, 2012, Petitioner's investigator, Carolyn Martin, conducted an inspection of Howard?s Famous Restaurant. Ms. Martin introduced herself to one of the waitresses working at the restaurant. The waitress called Mr. Kraher from the kitchen to speak with Ms. Martin. Mr. Kraher identified himself as the owner of the restaurant for the past six years. Ms. Martin asked Mr. Kraher for evidence that Respondent?s employees were covered by workers? compensation insurance. Mr. Kraher retrieved a folder containing the restaurant?s insurance policies and information. Ms. Martin reviewed the folder, and determined that Respondent did not have workers? compensation insurance. Mr. Kraher, who was very cooperative with Ms. Martin throughout the inspection, was genuinely surprised that the restaurant employees were not covered by workers? compensation insurance. He had taken out “a million-dollar insurance policy” that he thought covered everything he needed to have. While Ms. Martin was at the restaurant, Mr. Kraher called his insurance agent who, after reviewing his file, confirmed that Respondent did not have workers? compensation insurance. Mr. Kraher immediately asked his agent to bind a policy, and paid his first six-month premium using a business credit card. A copy of the policy was quickly faxed by the agent to Ms. Martin. Ms. Martin took the names of Respondent?s employees, which included two kitchen staff and four wait staff. Some of the employees worked in excess of 30 hours per week, while others worked part-time. Ms. Martin went to her vehicle and completed a Field Interview Worksheet. Ms. Martin reviewed the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS), which is the statewide database for workers? compensation information, to confirm Respondent?s status in the workers? compensation system. Using the CCAS, Ms. Martin confirmed that Respondent had no workers? compensation coverage on file for any employee of the company. She also accessed the Florida Division of Corporations website to ascertain Respondent?s corporate status. After having gathered the information necessary to determine Respondent?s status, Ms. Martin contacted her supervisor and received authorization to issue a consolidated Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment. The Stop-Work Order required Respondent to cease all business operations statewide. The Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a penalty, pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d), equal to 1.5 times the amount the employer would have paid in premium when applying the approved manual rates to the employer's payroll for the preceding three-year period. The consolidated order was hand- delivered to Mr. Kraher on behalf of Respondent at 11:00 a.m. on March 8, 2012. At the time she delivered the consolidated Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, Ms. Martin also hand- delivered a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. The Request required that Respondent produce business records for the preceding three-year period, from March 9, 2009, through March 8, 2012. Respondent was given five days in which to provide the records. On or about March 12, 2012, Mr. Kraher produced three boxes of business records to Ms. Martin. Those records were forwarded by Ms. Martin, and placed in the queue for review by the penalty auditor. The records were reviewed by Petitioner?s penalty auditor, Lynne Murcia, and were found to be insufficient to establish the actual compensation paid to Respondent?s employees for the preceding three year period. Therefore, pursuant to section 440.107(7)(e), salaries were imputed for each of the six employees based on the statewide average weekly wage. Ms. Murcia used the “Scopes Manual” published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance to ascertain the classification of Respondent?s business, based upon the nature of the goods and services it provided. Class code 9082, titled “Restaurant NOC,” is described as “the „traditional? restaurant that provides wait service.” Ms. Murcia correctly determined that Howard?s Famous Restaurant fell within class code 9082. The salaries of Respondent?s six employees, as employees of a class code 9082 restaurant, were imputed as though they worked full-time for the full three-year period from March 9, 2009, to March 8, 2012, pursuant to section 440.107(7)(e). The total imputed gross payroll amounted to $1,130,921.64. The penalty for Respondent?s failure to maintain workers? compensation insurance for its employees is calculated as 1.5 times the amount Respondent would have paid in premium for the preceding three-year period. The National Council on Compensation Insurance periodically issues a schedule of workers? compensation rates per $100 in salary, which varies based on the Scopes Manual classification of the business. The workers? compensation insurance premium was calculated by multiplying one percent of the imputed gross payroll ($11,309.21) by the approved manual rate for each quarter (which varied from $2.20 to $2.65, depending on the quarterly rate), which resulted in a calculated premium of $26,562.06. The penalty was determined by multiplying the calculated premium by 1.5, resulting in the final penalty of $39,843.18. On March 28, 2012, Petitioner issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessing a monetary penalty amount of $39,843.18 against Respondent. Respondent subsequently provided Petitioner with additional payroll records regarding the six employees. The records had been in the possession of Respondent?s accountant. The records, which included Respondent?s bank statements and payroll records for the six employees, were determined to be adequate to calculate the actual employee salaries for the preceding three-year period. Ms. Murcia revised her penalty worksheet to reflect that payroll was now based on records, rather than being imputed.2/ Respondent?s total payroll for the three-year period in question was determined to be $154,079.82. Applying the same formula as that applied to determine the penalty amount reflected in the Amended Penalty Assessment, the premium was calculated to have been $3,624.33, with a resulting penalty of $5,436.64. On April 24, 2012, Petitioner issued a 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment reducing Respondent's penalty from $39,843.18 to $5,436.64.
Recommendation Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers? Compensation, enter a final order assessing a penalty of $5,436.64 against Respondent, That?s Right Enterprises, LLC, for its failure to secure and maintain required workers? compensation insurance for its employees. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation in violation of Sections 440.10(1), 440.38(1) and 440.107(2), Florida Statutes, by materially misrepresenting and concealing employee duties as to avoid proper classification for premium calculation, and if so, what is the appropriate penalty?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees. Respondent is a commercial welding corporation based in Putnam County, Florida. It has been in business as an active Florida corporation since the early 1950s. Its principal office is located at 1301 Madison Street, Palatka, Florida 32177. Petitioner is an “employer” for purposes of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Respondent is in the business of welding, fabrication and erection of structural steel, fabrication and installation of metal handrails and fire escapes to existing buildings, and various other metal fabrication and welding operations. Respondent is engaged in the construction industry. At all material times, Respondent maintained a policy of workers’ compensation insurance for all of its employees. Respondent’s workers’ compensation insurance at issue in this case was obtained through the Florida Retail Federation Insurance Fund, and was in place since February 1, 2002. Pursuant to the Department's statutory authority, after receiving a referral based on a fatal accident at a site where Respondent was providing work, Investigator Daniel Pfaff of the Department's Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Compliance, conducted an investigation into Respondent’s workers’ compensation coverage. The investigator reviewed payroll records as well as certificates of insurance. Respondent cooperated with the Department’s investigation, providing all requested documents and responding to the questions of Petitioner’s investigation. Investigator Pfaff determined that Respondent had not secured workers’ compensation coverage consistent with the job descriptions of its employees. At the final hearing it was shown that, indeed, the job classification code2/ listed on Respondent's workers' compensation policy for Respondent's non-clerical work used to determine premiums paid by Respondent was not appropriate for much of the work Respondent was performing. The job classification code on Respondent’s workers’ compensation policy for the non-clerical work performed by Respondent was 3822. Classification code 3822 encompasses manufacturing or assembling automobile, bus, truck, or trailer bodies made of die pressed steel. Classification code 3822 does not encompass fabrication of iron or steel outside of a welding shop, erection of iron or steel structures, fabrication and installation of metal handrails and fire escapes to existing buildings, or operation of machinery to lift materials used to erect buildings (collectively "off-site erection work"). Based upon contracts provided by Respondent to the Department, the Department determined that the proper classification codes for the off-site erection work performed by Respondent’s employees were 5040 and 5057. Classification code 5040 encompasses the erection of iron or steel frame structures, the assembly and fabrication of iron or steel frame structures at the erection site, welding operations incidental to steel erection work, and the installation of iron or steel balconies, fire escapes, and staircases to existing buildings. Classification code 5057 encompasses iron or steel erection not otherwise classified in the Scopes® Manual. After it was determined that Respondent did not have the proper workers’ compensation insurance, Investigator Pfaff issued a Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment against Respondent on behalf of the Department on February 12, 2010. The Stop-Work Order is on a form with supporting allegations that may be selected by checking the box next to the allegation. The boxes checked on the Stop-Work Order comprise the following allegation: “Failure to secure the payment of workers’ compensation in violation of sections 440.10(1), 440.38(1) and 440.107(2) Florida Statutes by: materially misrepresenting and concealing employee duties as to avoid proper classification for premium calculation.” The allegation selected in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment refines the allegation of the Stop-Work Order by alleging “Failure to secure the payment of workers’ compensation within the meaning of section 440.107(2), F.S., by: materially misrepresenting or concealing employee duties so as to avoid proper classification for premium calculations.” The Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment contains no separate allegation, but rather references the original Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. No other charging documents were provided by Petitioner in support of the proposed penalty. At the final hearing, Petitioner presented evidence demonstrating that the appropriate job classification code for the majority of Respondent’s work was 5040. It also provided evidence that $60,873.60 was the amount of penalty that would be due if a violation had occurred. The penalty amount was calculated by using payroll amounts provided by Respondent and the approved rates for the proper job classification codes to determine the amount of premium that should have been paid and then, after giving Respondent credit for previous premiums paid, multiplying the result by 1.5 in accordance with applicable rules. Petitioner, however, did not provide sufficient evidence that Respondent failed “to secure the payment of workers’ compensation in violation of sections 440.10(1), 440.38(1) and 440.107(2) Florida Statutes by materially misrepresenting and concealing employee duties as to avoid proper classification for premium calculation” as alleged in the Stop-Work Order. Rather than showing that Respondent misrepresented or concealed employee duties to avoid proper classification, the evidence indicated that Respondent believed that its company was compliant with Florida workers’ compensation coverage requirements. While the Scopes® Manual explains the various job classification codes, there was no evidence that the Scopes® Manual has ever been provided to Respondent or that Respondent was the one who selected the job classification codes that were on its workers’ compensation policy. The job classification description for classification code 3822 provided on premium summaries and statements from the insurance agent and carrier to Respondent were different at different times. One description was “auto, bus, truck body, MFG/steel” and another was “auto, bus, truck, trailer manufacturing, die press.” The self-audit reports abbreviate job classification 3822 as “Auto bus truck body mfg/steel.” These abbreviations do not give notice that Respondent’s job classification was wrong. In addition, the evidence showed that Respondent’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier conducted regular audits of Respondent's operations. Respondent cooperated with the audits. During the course of the audits, the insurance auditor would go to Respondent’s premises where the auditor was able to observe the types of machinery, equipment, and operations used by Respondent. Despite evidence on the premises indicating that Respondent was engaged in work beyond the scope of job classification code 3822 established at the final hearing, there is no evidence that the auditors, carriers, or agents ever questioned the workers’ compensation insurance job classification codes that were on Respondent’s policy, summaries, and audit forms that they transmitted to Respondent. Aside from cooperating with regular audits and allowing inspection of its premises, Respondent also provided additional information to its agent and carrier regarding its operations through Respondent’s requests for certificates of insurance for various off-site jobs. Investigator Pfaff has substantial experience in the insurance industry as an adjustor, special investigator and supervisor in property and casualty for over 30 years. As part of the investigation, investigator Pfaff obtained a number of Respondent’s certificates of insurance. The certificates of insurance were introduced as Petitioner’s Exhibit 21. Investigator Pfaff provided credible testimony that there was no real reason to send out a certificate of insurance unless a company was planning to perform work for another company. The certificates of insurance were issued by Respondent’s insurance agent at Respondent’s request for off- site erection work for a variety of different companies located in a variety of counties, and contain information showing that Respondent was performing work outside its premises. Respondent’s representative testified that Respondent informed its insurance agent of the location of the work each time a certificate of insurance was issued. The Department demonstrated that the off-site erection work being performed by Respondent was not consistent with the workers’ compensation classification code in place for Respondent. The certificates of insurance, however, were approved by the insurance agent or carrier, and neither expressed any concern that the workers’ compensation insurance coverage was insufficient in any respect. In addition, the carrier was made aware of the type of work performed by Respondent by prior claims. Respondent had previously reported two other workers’ compensation incidents which arose from work performed off of the premises. One previous off-site erection work incident involved an injury resulting from an employee falling from a crane, and the other involved an employee’s fall through a roof skylight. The insurance carrier was made aware that off-site erection and construction work was being performed by Respondent in each of these incidents. Even though it was established at the final hearing that job classification code 3822 utilized for Respondent’s workers’ compensations insurance for those incidents should not have covered the off-the-premises incidents, Respondent’s insurance carrier and insurance agent never suggested that Respondent’s workers’ compensation coverage was deficient or erroneous. In sum, Petitioner did not show that Respondent materially misrepresented or concealed employee duties in order to avoid proper classification for premium calculation of its workers’ compensation policy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Stop-Work Order, Order of Penalty Assessment, Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued against Respondent, and ordering the return of any penalty paid by Respondent under the Periodic Payment Agreement. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2010.
The Issue The ultimate issue for determination is whether the Petitioner's discharge by the Respondent constituted discrimination on the basis of handicap within the meaning of the Florida Human Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Having considered all of the evidence in the record, the Hearing Officer makes the following findings of fact: Petitioner was hired as a Mechanic II (Electrician) by Respondent on January 25, 1982 in the Plant Engineering Department. The term "Mechanic II" denoted Petitioner's pay grade. The term "Electrician" designated Petitioner's speciality. Petitioner's pay grade was changed to Electrician and the Mechanic II pay grade was eliminated by Respondent for all such employees on or about November 16, 1983. Petitioner's duties as an Electrician included ladder work, running conduit and wire, repairing laundry and laboratory equipment and appliances, changing ballasts, and repairing electrical beds and nurse-call equipment. Petitioner performed all of the duties of an electrician, including ladder work until approximately November 27, 1985. Three months after he was employed in 1982, Petitioner injured his back while repairing electrical beds. Repairing electrical beds required much bending and stooping. Petitioner filed for Worker's Compensation benefits for the injury he sustained in repairing electrical beds. Petitioner suffered an off-the-job injury in 1983. Respondent permitted Petitioner to go on medical leave for two months. Petitioner again injured his back while working at the Hospital on or about November 27, 1985. Due to his injury, Petitioner was on leave of absence from November 30, 1985, through December 11, 1985. Petitioner returned to work but again went on leave of absence from January 9, 1986, through February 17, 1986. Petitioner returned to work subject to a "light duty" restriction imposed by his physician. On or about June 10, 1986, Petitioner's physician released him for full duty subject to a 15 pound restriction on any lifting. In September, 1986, Petitioner's physician indicated that it was "probably best" for Petitioner to work only 4 hours per day. The Respondent again allowed Petitioner to work 4 hours per day even though he occupied a full-time, 8 hour per day position. In early October, 1986, Petitioner was released by his physician to perform full duty work, even though Petitioner was restricted to half days. Frank Kleese, Petitioner's foreman, asked Petitioner to investigate a problem with an overhead light. Petitioner refused Kleese's directive and stated that, even though he had been released for full duty work, he would not climb a ladder unless his doctor approved it. Petitioner argued with Kleese and used "strong language". Petitioner became belligerent. Petitioner received reprimands for insubordination. When Petitioner refused Kleese's second request to do ladder work, Petitioner received a reprimand for refusing to do the job assigned to him. Both reprimands were discussed with Petitioner. Petitioner later presented a doctor's note stating he could "return to full active duty," but could work only half days with no ladder work. As a result of Petitioner's half day schedule, other electricians were required to do more work. The department as a whole fell behind in its work. Furthermore, light duty work was not always available for Petitioner. While working half days in late 1986, Petitioner was late to work on three occasions. Petitioner's reason for being late, as explained to Frank Kleese, his foreman, was that Petitioner's injury made it difficult for him to get out of bed in the morning. In November, 1986, Clark, Kleese, and Kunz met with Petitioner and advised him that he could not remain on half days indefinitely. Petitioner was advised that unless his condition was found to have improved by his upcoming doctor's appointment on December 1, 1986, he would be placed on medical leave. On December 1, 1986, Petitioner visited his physician, Dr. Richard D. Strain, Jr. Dr. Strain stated that there was no reason to think that Petitioner's condition would change quickly. Dr. Strain was going to send Petitioner home and put him on physician therapy (i.e., not allow him to work at all). Petitioner asked Dr. Strain if he could work half days, and Dr. Strain agreed. Kleese, Kunz, and Clark met with Petitioner and informed him that he would be placed on medical leave as a result of the Petitioner's medical condition. Continuation of his half-day status without any foreseeable cutoff date was not acceptable to the Respondent. On December 4, 1986, Respondent Benefits Supervisor Ralph Rettig advised Dr. Strain that Petitioner had been placed on medical leave of absence because there were no part-time positions available in Petitioner's department. Rettig requested Dr. Strain to advise him as to whether Petitioner's condition was the result of his injury at work and whether Petitioner would ever improve to the level where he could work more than half day duty. Dr. Strain responded to Mr. Rettig in a letter dated December 22, 1986, which indicated that Petitioner's condition was partially caused by degenerative changes. Dr. Strain further stated: Mr. Cabany tells me he is unable to work more than a half day, and I think that is a reasonable thing for him to do. Certainly, a man of his elderly years with the degenerative changes that he has, with super imposed trauma, that would be a good way to go. Petitioner went on medical leave beginning December 17, 1986. Prior to the beginning of his leave, Petitioner failed to fill out the leave of absence request form. When this came to Rettig's attention, Rettig requested that Vernon Clark send Petitioner the form. Clark wrote to Petitioner and informed him that he must fill out the leave of absence request form Clark had enclosed. Clark further informed Petitioner that he would have to request renewal of his leave when it expired in mid-January, 1987, in accordance with Respondent policies. During a telephone conversation several days prior to the expiration of Petitioner's leave, Clark reminded Petitioner that he still had not sent in the original request form for the leave he was then under. Clark also reminded Petitioner that, if he wished to extend his leave, Petitioner would have to submit a written request for extension. Petitioner eventually sent in the signed request form for the leave of absence which he was then under. The signed form stated: "If I do not request an extension of my Leave prior to expiration . . . my employment at Memorial Respondent will be terminated. . . ." Petitioner never submitted a request for an extension of his leave, and Petitioner was terminated. In February, 1987, Ralph Rettig became aware of a part-time porter position in the Respondent's Dietary Department. Mr. Rettig contacted Petitioner and asked him to meet with Joseph Marino, Administrative Director of Food and Nutrition Services, with regard to a job in the Dietary Department. Marino offered Petitioner a porter position which required only half days and involved no bending or lifting of heavy objects. Marino explained the duties and responsibilities of the position to Petitioner and showed him the work area. Petitioner refused the position because he felt it was "beneath his dignity". Petitioner said virtually the same thing to Rettig. Hospital Benefits Supervisor Rettig, a quadriplegic, was involved throughout in dealing with Petitioner's medical situation. Rettig testified that he has never witnessed discrimination by the Respondent based upon handicap and felt that the Respondent reasonably accommodated Petitioner's back problem. Eighty percent of an Electrician's work at the Respondent involved the use of a ladder. Petitioner could not do ladder work. Petitioner also could not work on ceilings or do much bending or lifting. Petitioner cannot work at all now, still has pain, and has not worked since leaving the Respondent's employ. Petitioner did not know of any available half-day jobs he could have performed at the Hospital other than the porter position that was offered to Petitioner by Mr. Marino. Prior to his 1985 injury, Petitioner had repeatedly requested to work part time as an Electrician because his wife had arthritis and he needed to care for her. Petitioner was consistently turned down because no such part-time position existed in his department. During his employment with Respondent, a few half-day positions existed throughout the Hospital as PBX Operators, Cashiers, and Porters. No part-time Electrician positions in the Plant Engineering Department where Petitioner was employed were ever available. Petitioner occupied a full-time position even though he worked only part-time. Sandy McNeil, a former Electrician, is now a Systems Technician/Welder who works full days on a part-time basis. Mr. McNeil operates a lathe and works full weeks when needed. Petitioner is not a welder and could not perform the duties required of Mr. McNeil. Richmond Blatch is a painter who works a full week every other week. Petitioner is not a painter and could not perform Mr. Blatch's duties. Tom Nottage, another individual who had been working in the Engineering Department, obtained a courier position with the Hospital. For a brief period, Mr. Nottage worked 2 full days a week in the Engineering Department and 3 days week as a courier. Since mid-January, 1987, Mr. Nottage has worked full-time as a courier. His job requires driving over 25,000 miles per year, lifting mail tubs weighing between 20 and 50 pounds, often lifting heavier packages, and getting in and out of his car between 20 and 40 times per day. Petitioner could not perform the duties required of Mr. Nottage. A part-time position could not be created for an Electrician. Electricians are given jobs which frequently carry through from day to day. Permanently employing someone on a half-day, health-restricted basis presented scheduling and work load problems. Jobs that do not carry through from day to day are frequently comprised of so-called bench work. Some bench work requires an entire day to complete. There was not always a half-day's worth of bench work available. During his employment with the Respondent, Petitioner had been receiving Social Security pension benefits. In 1987, Petitioner would have been required to reimburse Social Security for a portion of his pension benefits if he earned more than $8,000,00. Half day employment would have afforded Petitioner the ability to earn the maximum allowed by Social Security. Because Petitioner refused to accept a job for which he was physically qualified, the worker's compensation benefits begun as a result of his injury on the job in 1982, were stopped. If Petitioner had accepted the porter position offered to him by Mr. Marino, his worker's compensation benefits would have compensated him for the wage loss resulting from the lower paying job. Petitioner's termination had no effect on the worker's compensation benefits Respondent was paying Petitioner. Respondent would have gained a financial benefit from retaining Petitioner as a part time Electrician because there would have been less of a wage loss to make up through worker's compensation benefits. Glen Mora and Luis Villanueva, two other Electricians, were injured while Petitioner was working half days. Both individuals were allowed to take medical leave, and return to work on light duty until they returned to full duty status. Both individuals in fact returned to full duty status. Petitioner received a merit pay check from Respondent in 1986 even though Petitioner had not achieved the requisite "fully proficient" rating in his evaluation. Vernon Clark, Director of Plant Engineering, intervened on behalf of Petitioner. Mr. Clark recommended that Petitioner receive the merit pay because Petitioner would have received a higher rating had it not been for Petitioner's injury.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Human Rights Commission issue a Final Order that Respondent is not guilty of discharging Petitioner in violation of the Human Rights Act. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of October, 1989. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner submitted no proposed findings of fact. Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection NONE The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in Findings 1, 2 2-3 Rejected as irrelevant 4-9 Included in Findings 3-10 Included in Finding 35 Included in Finding 11 Included in Finding 25 Included in Finding 26 Included in Finding 31 15-17 Included in Findings 27-30 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 36 Included in Finding 32 21-28 Included in Findings 12-21 29 Included in Finding 22 30-31 Included in Findings 33-34 Included in Finding 22 Included in Findings 15, 17 34-35 Included in Findings 23, 24 COPIES FURNISHED: George Cabany 3905 Garfield Street Hollywood, Florida 33021 James S. Bramnick Muller, Mintz, Kornreich, Caldwell, Casey, Crosland & Bramnick, P. A. Hollywood Memorial Respondent Suite 3600 Southeast Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2338 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent failed to abide by the coverage requirements of the Workers' Compensation Law, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2002), by not obtaining workers' compensation insurance for her employees; and whether Petitioner properly assessed a penalty against Respondent pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; stipulations by the parties; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the record evidence submitted, the following relevant and material finding of facts are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the Workers' Compensation Law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. (2002).1 On August 8, 2003, Respondent was a sole proprietor in the construction industry by framing single-family homes. On that day, Respondent was the sub-contractor under contract with Marco Raffaele, general contractor, providing workers on a single-family home(s) located on Navigation Drive in the Panther Trace subdivision, Riverview, Florida. It is the responsibility of the Respondent/employer to secure and maintain workers' compensation coverage for each employee. During the early morning hours of August 8, 2003, Donald Lott, the Department's workers' compensation compliance investigator, was in the Panther Trace subdivision checking on site workers for potential violations of the workers' compensation statute. While driving down Navigation Drive in the Panther Trace subdivision, Mr. Lott approached two houses under construction. There he checked the construction workers on site and found them in compliance with the workers' compensation statute. Mr. Lott recognized several of the six men working on the third house under construction next door and went over to investigate workers' compensation coverage for the workers.2 At the third house Mr. Lott interviewed Darren McCarty, Henry Keithler, and Mike Sabin, all of whom acknowledged that they worked for Respondent, d/b/a Riopelle Construction. Mr. Lott ascertained through Southeast Leasing Company (Southeast Leasing) that three of the six workers, Messrs. Keithler, Sabin, and McCarthy were listed on Southeast Leasing Company's payroll through a valid employee lease agreement with Respondent as of August 8, 2003. The completed employee lease agreement provided for Southeast Leasing Company to provide workers' compensation coverage for only those employees whose names, dates of birth, and social security numbers are contained in the contractual agreement by which Southeast Leasing leased those named employees to the employing entity, Respondent, d/b/a Riopelle Construction. Mr. Lott talked with the other three workers on site, Ramos Artistes, Ryan Willis, and Robert Stinchcomb. Each worker acknowledged working for (as an employee) Respondent on August 8, 2003, in the Panther Trace subdivision. In reply to his faxed inquiry to Southeast Leasing regarding the workers' compensation coverage status for Messrs. Artistes, Willis, and Stinchcomb, Southeast Leasing confirmed to Mr. Lott that on August 8, 2003, Southeast Leasing did not have a completed employee leasing contractual agreement with Respondent for Messrs. Artistes, Willis or Stinchcomb. Southeast Leasing did not provide workers' compensation coverage for Messrs. Artistes, Willis or Stinchcomb on August 8, 2003.3 Southeast Leasing is an "employee" leasing company and is the "employer" of "leased employees." As such, Southeast Leasing is responsible for providing workers' compensation coverage for its "leased employees" only. Southeast Leasing, through its account representative, Dianne Dunphy, input employment applications into their system on the day such application(s) are received from employers seeking to lease employees. Southeast Leasing did not have employment applications in their system nor did they have a completed contractual employment leasing agreement and, therefore, did not have workers' compensation coverage for Messrs. Artistes and Willis at or before 12:08 p.m. on August 8, 2003. After obtaining his supervisor's authorization, Mr. Lott served a Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order against Respondent on August 8, 2003, at 12:08 p.m., requiring the cessation of all business activities and assessing a penalty of $100, required by Subsection 440.107(5), Florida Statutes, and a penalty of $1,000, as required by Subsection 440.107(7), Florida Statutes, the minimum penalty under the statute. On August 12, 2003, the Department served a Corrected Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order containing one change, corrected federal identification number for Respondent's business, Riopelle Construction. Mr. Stinchcomb, the third worker on the construction job site when Mr. Lott made his initial inquiry, was cutting wood. On August 8, 2003, at or before 12:00 p.m., Mr. Stinchcomb was not on the Southeast Leasing payroll as a leased employee covered for workers' compensation; he did not have individual workers' compensation coverage; and he did not have a workers' compensation exemption. On that day and at that time, Mr. Stinchcomb worked as an employee of Riopelle Construction and was paid hourly by Riopelle Construction payroll check(s). Respondent's contention that Mr. Stinchcomb, when he was working on the construction job site between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. on August 8, 2003, was an independent contractor fails for the lack of substantial and competent evidence in support thereof. On August 8, 2003, the Department, through Mr. Lott, served an administrative request for business records on Respondent. Respondent failed and refused to respond to the business record request. An Order requiring Respondent to respond to Petitioner's discovery demands was entered on December 1, 2003, and Respondent failed to comply with the order. On December 8, 2003, Respondent responded that "every effort would be made to provide the requested documents by the end of the day" to Petitioner. Respondent provided no reliable evidence and Mr. Stinchcomb was not called to testify in support of Respondent's contention that Mr. Stinchcomb was an independent contractor as he worked on the site on August 8, 2003. Respondent's evidence, both testamentary and documentary, offered to prove that Mr. Stinchcomb was an independent contractor on the date in question failed to satisfy the elements required in Subsection 440.02(15)(d)1, Florida Statutes. Subsection 440.02(15)(c), Florida Statutes, in pertinent part provides that: "[f]or purposes of this chapter, an independent contractor is an employee unless he or she meets all of the conditions set forth in subparagraph(d)(1)." Subsection 440.02(15)(d)(1) provides that an "employee" does not include an independent contractor if: The independent contractor maintains a separate business with his or her own work facility, truck, equipment, materials, or similar accommodations; The independent contractor holds or has applied for a federal employer identification number, unless the independent contractor is a sole proprietor who is not required to obtain a federal employer identification number under state or federal requirements; The independent contractor performs or agrees to perform specific services or work for specific amounts of money and controls the means of performing the services or work; The independent contractor incurs the principal expenses related to the service or work that he or she performs or agrees to perform; The independent contractor is responsible for the satisfactory completion of work or services that he or she performs or agrees to perform and is or could be held liable for a failure to complete the work or services; The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services performed for a commission or on a per-job or competitive-bid basis and not on any other basis; The independent contractor may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing work or services; The independent contractor has continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations; and The success or failure of the independent contractor's business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures. The testimony of Respondent and the testimony of her husband, Edward Riopelle, was riddled with inconsistencies, contradictions, and incorrect dates and was so confusing as to render such testimony unreliable. Based upon this finding, Respondent failed to present evidence sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Subsection 440.02(15)(d)1, Florida Statutes, and failed to demonstrate that on August 8, 2003, Mr. Stinchcomb was an independent contractor. Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that on August 8, 2003, Mr. Stinchcomb, while working on the single-family construction site on Navigation Drive in the Panther Trace subdivision was an employee of Respondent and was not an independent contractor. Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Stinchcomb did not have workers' compensation coverage on August 8, 2003. On August 8, 2003, Mr. Willis was a laborer on the single-family construction site on Navigation Drive in the Panther Trace subdivision as an employee of Respondent, who paid him $7.00 per hour. Mr. Willis was not listed on the employee list maintained by Southeast Leasing, recording those employees leased to Respondent. Mr. Willis did not have independent workers' compensation coverage on August 8, 2003. Mr. Willis had neither workers' compensation coverage nor a workers' compensation exemption on August 8, 2003. Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Willis did not have workers' compensation coverage on August 8, 2003. On August 8, 2003, Mr. Artises was a laborer on the single-family construction site on Navigation Drive in the Panther Trace subdivision and was an employee of Respondent. Mr. Artises had been in the employment of Respondent for approximately one week before the stop work order. Mr. Artises did not have independent workers' compensation coverage on August 8, 2003. Mr. Artises did not have a workers' compensation coverage exemption on August 8, 2003. Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Aristes did not have workers' compensation coverage on August 8, 2003.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleading and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, affirming and adopting the Corrected Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order dated August 12, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2004.
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Paul F. Meloy (Meloy), is an employee of Petitioner, Alva Fire Protection and Rescue District (District), and is entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) pursuant to Section 121.051, Florida Statutes (2001). (All references to statutes are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Section 121.051 requires participation in the FRS by all employees hired after December 1, 1970. The District hired Meloy after 1970. Meloy has worked for the District as the fire chief and administrator since the District's inception in 1976. Meloy was instrumental in establishing the District. The other requirement imposed by Section 121.051 for participation in the FRS is that Meloy must be an employee. Section 121.021(11), in relevant part, defines an employee as any person receiving salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position. Respondent denies that the payments Meloy receives from the District are salary payments. Respondent asserts that the payments are reimbursement for expenses. Respondent denies that the payments to Meloy are compensation. Section 121.021(22) defines the term "compensation" to mean: . . . the monthly salary paid a member by his or her employer for work performed arising from that employment. The payments from the District to Meloy since October 1990 have been compensation. In October 1990, the District began paying Meloy a monthly salary "for work performed arising from his employment with the District." Before October 1990, the District reimbursed Meloy for expenses he incurred in housing fire trucks in the garage at Meloy's auto service business. The District also reimbursed Meloy for the maintenance and repair of District vehicles. In 1988, the District began reporting the payments made to Meloy as salary for purposes of the federal income tax. Each year from 1988 to the present, the District has reported the payments to Meloy on a W2 Wage and Tax Statement. Between 1988 and October 1990, the District stopped housing vehicles in Meloy's garage, and Meloy stopped servicing vehicles for the District. In October 1990, the amount of the monthly payment to Meloy increased substantially. Thereafter, the District provided annual cost of living increases to Meloy. The payments to Meloy from October 1990 to the present have been unrelated to expenses incurred by Meloy. Those payments have been regular monthly salary payments for work performed to implement the policy of the District and to administer the day-to-day operations of the District. Even if the payments are salary payments, Respondent argues that Meloy did not receive those payments for work performed in a regularly established position. Section 121.021(52)(b) defines a regularly established position as one that will be in existence for six months. Meloy's position has been in existence since 1976. It will be in existence for six months. Respondent asserts that the position occupied by Meloy is a temporary position defined in Section 121.021(53)(b). Section 121.021(53)(b) defines a temporary position as one that will exist for less than six months or as defined by rule, regardless of its duration. Respondent claims that the position occupied by Meloy is a temporary position because it is an "on call position" defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 1.004(5)(d)5. The rule defines an on call position as one filled by employees who are called to work unexpectedly for brief periods and whose employment ceases when the purpose for being called is satisfied. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.) Meloy performs some of his duties unexpectedly when called anytime 24 hours a day. He performs his other duties in the normal course of business. Meloy does not maintain any time sheets, and the District does not require Meloy to perform his duties within an established work schedule. Meloy does not occupy an "on call position" within the meaning of Rule 60S-1.004(5)(d)5. Meloy's employment does not cease when the purpose of his being called is satisfied. Meloy has been performing his on-call duties and his other duties for approximately 25 years. In 1994, Mr. William D. Wilkinson became the Chairman of the District (Wilkinson). Wilkinson is also the Court Administrator for the Circuit Court in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in which the District is located. After Wilkinson became Chairman, he determined that Meloy receives compensation in a regularly established position and is entitled to membership in the FRS. Wilkinson testified at the hearing. Meloy has sole responsibility for implementing the District's policy and administering the day-to-day operation of the District. Relevant portions of Wilkinson's testimony are instructive. Q. And whose job is it to carry out that policy? A. Mr. Meloy. Q. When you came on board in 1994, Mr. Meloy, was he employed by the district? A. That's correct. Q. How many other administrators does the district employ? A. None. Q. Who runs the day-to-day affairs of the fire district? A. Mr. Meloy. Q. He is required to work a certain work schedule? A. No, sir. Q. What is he required to do as far as hours go? A. Once we set the policy, then we expect, you know, the chief to carry that out. And for however many hours it takes during the week, you know, the month to see it is fulfilled. Q. Do you know if he is on call? A. He is on call 24/7. Q. And what does that mean? A. 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Q. Is that 365 days a year? A. That's correct. * * * Q. Let me ask you to put your other hat on as the court administrator for the 20th Judicial Circuit. Are you involved with the Florida Retirement System? A. Yes, I am. Q. And you are a participant? A. Yes, I am. Q. Your duties as the court administrator, how would you compare that to Mr. Meloy's duties as the fire chief administrator of the Alva Fire District? A. Well, with the exception that I certainly make a lot more than he does for the duties that he has, it is similar. You know, I'm paid an annual salary and expected to get the job done. If you have to work 60 hours, you have to work 60 hours. If you get through sooner, hopefully you do. But that never happens. The District requires Meloy to spend as much time as is needed to implement the policy of the District and to administer the day-to-day business of the District. The hours vary, and there are no set hours. Some days, Meloy's day begins at 6:00 a.m. Other days, Meloy does not get to work until 9:00 a.m. or noon. Some days, Meloy leaves work at 5:00 p.m. and then must return immediately to the office. "It is whatever is needed." The District employs four individuals. One is Meloy. Two are certified firefighters. The other is a part- time bookkeeper. The bookkeeper and the two certified firefighters are members of the FRS. The two full-time firefighters maintain time sheets, and the District pays them for overtime. The District compensation of its full-time firefighters is consistent with compensation on an hourly basis. Meloy is not a certified firefighter, and the District does not compensate Meloy on an hourly basis. Meloy does not maintain or submit time sheets. The District does not pay Meloy for overtime. Like the certified firefighters, Meloy performs some of his duties when called anytime, 24 hours a day. However, neither the certified firefighters nor Meloy has the option to refuse to work when called. The employment positions of the certified firefighters and Meloy do not cease when the purpose for being called is satisfied. Although the bookkeeper for the District is never on call, she maintains a schedule similar to that of Meloy. She works those hours necessary to perform her duties. Like Meloy, the bookkeeper's position does not cease when she completes her work. The District pays compensation to Meloy in accordance with an annual salary rather than an hourly rate. Meloy does not have an established schedule during which he must implement the board's policy and administer the day-to- day operations of the District. Meloy occupies a regularly established position within the meaning of Section 121.021(52)(b). Meloy is the District administrator. The position has been in existence since 1988 and is not a temporary position within the meaning of Section 121.021(53)(b) or Rule 60S-1.004(5). Respondent's final argument is that a determination of Petitioners' request to enroll Meloy in the FRS is barred by the judicial doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Respondent argues that final agency action determined that the payments received by Meloy through June 29, 1992, are reimbursement for expenses. Respondent argues that nothing has changed since that time, and Meloy cannot now revisit the issue of his compensation. Findings regarding Respondent's final argument require some historical perspective. The District joined the FRS in 1988. At that time, the District purchased past service credit for a number of employees, including Meloy. Meloy enrolled as a member of the Special Risk Class. When Meloy enrolled as a member of the Special Risk Class, a question in the enrollment form asked Meloy if the applicant was certified as a firefighter or required to be certified as a firefighter. Meloy answered in the affirmative. Meloy has always been required to be certified as a firefighter in order to receive retirement benefits as a member of the Special Risk Class. However, Meloy has never been certified as a firefighter pursuant to Section 633.35. Meloy has never completed an essential firefighting course that is a statutory prerequisite to certification. By letter dated June 29, 1992, Respondent notified Meloy that Respondent was terminating Meloy's membership in the FRS. The letter stated two grounds for termination. One ground was that Meloy had not completed the firefighting course required for membership in the Special Risk Class. The second ground was that the payments Meloy received from his employer are reimbursement for expenses rather than compensation. Meloy did not appeal either ground stated by Respondent on June 29, 1992, for the termination of benefits. Meloy does not contest the first ground and is not now seeking enrollment in the FRS as a member of the Special Risk Class. Rather, Meloy now seeks benefits as a member in a regularly established position defined in Section 121.021(52)(b). Meloy does contest the second ground stated by Respondent on June 29, 1992, for terminating Meloy's membership in the FRS. Respondent determined that Meloy did not receive compensation from 1988 through June 29, 1992. The time for appealing that determination has expired, and Meloy cannot now amend the scope of this proceeding to include any payments he received on or before June 29, 1992. Respondent asserts that its determination on June 29, 1992, also establishes that payments received by Meloy after June 29, 1992, are not compensation. Respondent argues that Meloy's duties have not changed, and the payments Meloy receives are reimbursement for expenses. On June 1, 1999, Respondent sent a letter to Wilkinson explaining Respondent's denial of Meloy's application for enrollment in the FRS. In relevant part, the letter stated: By certified letter dated June 29, 1992 (copy enclosed), the State Retirement Director, Mr. A.J. McMullian III, advised Mr. Meloy that he was inelligible for Florida Retirement System (FRS) participation since the monthly payments he received were for "expenses" and not compensation. Subsequent to Mr. McMullian's letter, a hearing was conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings and Mr. Meloy's payments were defined as expenses as a statement [sic] of fact (copy enclosed). In light of this, the Division has already made a determination that Mr. Meloy is ineligible for FRS participation from 1979 through 1992. Since your letter indicates that Mr. Meloy's duties and payments he has received have not changed since 1988, he remains ineligible for FRS participation. Respondent's Exhibit 10. The DOAH hearing referred to in the letter on June 1, 1999, involved allegations that Meloy had violated state ethics laws when he first attempted to enroll in the FRS in 1988. In 1992, the Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission) investigated Meloy's participation in the FRS. The Commission entered an order finding probable cause that Meloy violated Section 112.313(6) when he submitted his enrollment form for retirement benefits by corruptly using or attempting to use his official position to retain retirement benefits for himself and his assistant fire chief when neither was qualified to receive benefits. The findings concerning the assistant fire chief are neither relevant nor material to this proceeding. Meloy requested an administrative hearing, and the Commission referred the matter to DOAH to conduct the hearing. ALJ Susan B. Kirkland conducted the administrative hearing and entered a Recommended Order on July 8, 1994. The Recommended Order found that Meloy misrepresented his entitlement to membership in the Special Risk Class and did so with wrongful intent. The Order concluded that Meloy violated the relevant statute because Meloy attempted to use his position, or the property and resources entrusted to him, to secure a benefit. The Order recommended a civil penalty, public censure, and a reprimand. The Final Order of the Commission adopted the Recommended Order. The Recommended Order contains three paragraphs that discuss the payments received by Meloy. Those three paragraphs state: 3. In 1976, the . . . District was established. The firefighting equipment and vehicles were originally located in Meloy's garage, where he maintained an automotive repair shop. Meloy received a fixed reimbursement from the District each month for the use of his garage and for repair services which he rendered for the District. * * * 5. In 1988, the District joined the . . . (FRS). At that time the District employed four full-time firefighters and a part-time secretary. Meloy worked part-time as the administrator of the District but did not draw a salary and continued to receive remuneration in the form of the monthly reimbursement for expenses. . . . * * * 18. By letter dated June 29, 1992, [Respondent] notified Meloy that his membership in the FRS . . . was being terminated. The grounds for termination were that Meloy had been receiving payments for expenses and not compensation. . . . The Recommended Order does not operate under the judicial doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel to preclude a determination of whether the payments received by Meloy after 1988 are compensation. The Recommended Order limits the finding that Meloy received payments for expenses to those received in 1988. Paragraph 5 expressly states, "At that time. . . Meloy . . . continued to receive . . . reimbursement for expenses. . . ." The findings in paragraph 18 merely recite the grounds stated by Respondent but do not make findings on the merits of the stated grounds. The findings in paragraph 3 are not probative. The Recommended Order made no findings concerning the payments Meloy received after 1988. Respondent determined that the payments between 1988 and June 29, 1992, were payments for expenses rather than compensation. Irrespective of whether Respondent's determination was legally and factually correct, Meloy did not appeal Respondent's determination. The determination by Respondent on June 29, 1992, involved a separate and distinct application from the application at issue in this case. No determination has been made that the payments since June 29, 1992, either are or are not compensation. The application at issue in this case is a new application for different benefits. Meloy is not applying for benefits to which he would be entitled if he were a member of the Special Risk Class. Nor can Meloy apply for benefits related to the payments received on or before June 29, 1992. Respondent argues that nothing has changed in the course of Meloy's tenure with the District. Payments that were reimbursement for expenses before 1992 arguably have not now been transformed into compensation. Respondent is incorrect. Something has changed in the course of Meloy's tenure with the District. Sometime after September 1990, the payments to Meloy changed from reimbursement for expenses to monthly salary payments. The District no longer housed equipment at Meloy's garage, Meloy no longer serviced the equipment at the garage, and the amount of the monthly payments to Meloy increased from $540 to $833. Relevant portions of the transcript of the administrative hearing in the ethics case are instructive. Meloy asserted in the ethics case that in 1988, he was a volunteer fireman. As a volunteer, rather than a salaried employee, Meloy argued that he was not required to be certified as a firefighter. The attorney who represented the Commission sought to show that Meloy was not a volunteer after 1990 but was a salaried employee of the District. As long as I'm volunteering, I don't have to have it. Q. Okay. You are also the administrator for the full-time firemen, is that right? A. Yes. Q. You have the power to hire and fire them? A. Yes. Q. You set their hours? A. Yes. Q. The district also has a part-time secretary, is that right? A. Yes. Q. And currently that's Ms. Connie Bull? A. Correct. Q. She handles payroll matters? A. Yes. Q. She writes checks? A. Yes. Q. Pays bills? A. Yes. Q. She and you both answer questions that the full-time firemen might have about vacation or sick leave or retirement, is that right? A. To the best of our ability, yes. Q. Okay. Now, before 1990 you were not an employee of the fire district, is that right? A. According to how you define it, I guess. I was paid more as an expense type arrangement up until sometime around '90. I don't remember the exact date. Q. Okay, you received the expense reimbursement prior to 1990 for working on the fire equipment; is that right? A. It covered a lot of things. We worked on the fire equipment there in my business, we housed a lot of equipment there, used my facilities for -- well, we have used my facilities as a station for awhile. Q. When you say your facilities, you mean the Alva garage that you used to own? A. Right. Q. When you got the expense reimbursement, you would get the same amount every month, is that right? A. Yes. Q. It changed some over time, though, didn't it from '73 to 1990? A. Yes. Q. You got that same reimbursement amount regardless of the number of hours that you worked for the district? A. Yes. Q. And regardless of what any actual expenses might be? A. Correct. Q. Now, sometime in 1990 you became an employee of the district on a part-time basis; is that right? A. That's when they started taking out taxes and all and that reverted to more of a salary type reimbursement rather than expense. In other words, I was paying income tax and Social Security and everything and at that time it was considered more of a salary. Q. And they started doing that in 1990 sometime? A. I don't remember the date. It was approximately then. Q. When you started receiving a salary, you stopped getting the reimbursement; is that right? A. Right. Q. Isn't it true that when you first started getting the salary that the amount of the salary was several hundred dollars a month more than what the reimbursement had been? A. I couldn't tell you. Q. Isn't it a fact that the last-- A. I don't believe that would be right, though, because it didn't go up very much any one time, I don't think. I would have to see the figures to tell for sure. Q. All right. Isn't it a fact that the last time you received a monthly reimbursement you were receiving about $540 a month? A. I don't have those figures in front of me. Q. You don't remember? A. No. Q. Isn't it a fact that when you first got a salary in October 1990, you got $833 a month? A. I still couldn't tell you. I don't have those figures in front of me. I have them wrote down if I can get my papers. Q. All right. You don't know how much you get now? A. Yeah, but this ain't 1990. Respondent's Exhibit 3 at 29-32. The state argued in the ethics case that Meloy has been salaried since October 1990 and was required to be certified as a firefighter before enrolling in the FRS as a member of the Special Risk Class. The state now argues that Meloy has never been salaried and cannot enroll in the FRS as member of the regular class. The state cannot have it both ways. Meloy is entitled to membership in the FRS for the period after June 29, 1992. During that time, the District has paid a salary to Meloy that is compensation for duties performed in a regularly established position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioners' request for Meloy to participate in the FRS. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _________ ________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Frank Porter, Esquire Porter & Jessell, P.A. 1424 Dean Street Ft. Myers, Florida 33901 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Division of Retirement P.O. Box 3900 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-3900 Erin B. Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Mallory Harrell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2014),1/ by failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage as alleged in the Stop-work Order and 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and if so, the amount of the penalty that should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement in chapter 440 that employers in the state of Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance covering their employees. Respondent, Bargain Bob's Carpets, Inc., is a corporation registered to do business in Florida. Its principal business address is 3954 Byron Drive, Riviera Beach, Florida. The Compliance Investigation As the result of an anonymous referral, Petitioner's compliance investigator, Peter Sileo, investigated Respondent to determine whether it had secured workers' compensation coverage for its employees as required by chapter 440. Before Sileo visited Respondent's business location, he checked the State of Florida Coverage and Compliance Automated System ("CCAS") computer database, which contains information regarding workers' compensation insurance policies that have been obtained by employers. The CCAS database showed no record of any workers' compensation policies covering Respondent's employees having been issued. On Sileo's first visit to Respondent's business location, he observed a man loading carpeting into a van. Upon being questioned, the man identified himself as Gary Persad. He told Sileo that he was a carpet installation subcontractor for Respondent. Sileo checked CCAS and determined that Persad was covered by workers' compensation insurance. On January 23, 2015, Sileo again visited Respondent's business location, which is a warehouse housing large rolls of carpeting and other flooring materials. There, Sileo met John Charles, an owner and corporate officer of Respondent. Charles claimed that he did not know that Respondent was required to have workers' compensation coverage for its employees. Charles told Sileo that Respondent sold flooring but did not install it and that all installation was performed by subcontractors. At the time of the inspection, Sileo determined that Respondent employed five employees: Charles and Calideen, each of whom own more than ten percent of Respondent's business; Alex Stark; Peter Phelps; and Anthony Frenchak. Sileo served a Stop-work Order, ordering Respondent to cease all business operations in the state pending demonstrating compliance with the workers' compensation coverage requirement. Sileo also served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. Respondent subsequently demonstrated compliance with the workers' compensation coverage requirement, and Petitioner lifted the Stop-work Order.2/ Respondent also produced business records consisting of spreadsheets showing quarterly payroll, transaction listings, affidavits, insurance coverage documents, and other records. The Penalty Assessment Eric Ruzzo, a penalty auditor with Petitioner, used these records to calculate the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. The $31,061.68 penalty is reflected in the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, issued April 23, 2015, that is the subject of this proceeding. To calculate the applicable penalty, Petitioner determines the employer's gross payroll for the two-year period preceding the noncompliance determination——the so-called "penalty period"——from a review of the employer's business records. For days during the penalty period for which records are not provided, Petitioner imputes the gross payroll based on the average weekly wage for the state of Florida. Here, the penalty period commenced on January 24, 2013, and ended on January 23, 2015, the day on which the compliance inspection was conducted, and Respondent was determined to not be in compliance with the workers' compensation coverage requirement. Initially, Respondent produced payroll records that did not identify the subcontractors Respondent hired to install the carpeting. Ruzzo identified the subcontractors using Respondent's transaction records. Respondent subsequently provided information, including affidavits and certificates of exemption regarding the subcontractors it had hired during the penalty period. At all times during the penalty period, Respondent employed four or more non-construction employees, including Charles and Calideen.3/ Based on the business records produced, Ruzzo compiled a list of the persons, including the subcontractors and non-construction employees who were on Respondent's payroll, but not covered by workers' compensation insurance during the penalty period. This list of employees and the penalty computation for each is set forth on the Penalty Calculation Worksheet attached to the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. Using the National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") workers' compensation insurance occupation class codes set forth in the NCCI Scopes Manual, Ruzzo determined the occupation class code applicable to each employee listed on the Penalty Calculation Worksheet. Respondent's subcontractors were classified in NCCI class code 5478, which is the class code for the flooring installation industry. This is consistent with Florida's construction industry class code rule, Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021(2)(kk), which identifies the installation of carpet and other floor covering as NCCI class code 5478. Alex Stark, Amber Krembs, Jacquelyn Skwarek, and Monica Stahl were classified in NCCI class code 8018, which applies to workers engaged in selling merchandise, including carpeting and linoleum, at the wholesale level. Calideen, Frenchak, and Phelps were classified in NCCI class code 8742, which applies to outside salespersons primarily engaged in sales off of the employer's premises. Charles was classified in NCCI class code 8810, which applies to clerical office employees. Ruzzo then determined the period of Respondent's noncompliance for each employee listed on the Penalty Calculation Worksheet. For each of these employees, Ruzzo determined the gross payroll paid to that employee for the period during which Respondent was noncompliant, divided the employee's gross payroll by 100 pursuant to Petitioner's calculation methodology, then multiplied that amount by the numeric rate set by NCCI for that employee's specific occupation class code. This calculation yielded the workers' compensation coverage premium for that specific employee for which Respondent was noncompliant during the penalty period. The premium amount then was multiplied by two, as required by statute, to yield the penalty to be imposed for failure to provide workers' compensation coverage for that specific employee. Respondent did not provide records covering Charles, Calideen, Stark, Frenchak, or Phelps for the period between January 1, 2015, and January 23, 2015. For this period, Ruzzo imputed the gross payroll for each of these employees using the statewide average weekly wage as defined in section 440.12(2),4/ multiplied by two. Ruzzo then performed the same computations discussed above to determine the penalty amount to be imposed for Respondent's failure to provide workers' compensation for those employees during this time period. Ruzzo added the penalty determined for each employee using actual gross payroll and imputed payroll, as applicable, to arrive at the total penalty assessment amount of $31,061.68. Respondent's Defense Respondent is engaged in the retail sale of various types of flooring, such as carpeting, and hires subcontractors to install the flooring. The evidence did not establish that Respondent engaged in wholesale sales of flooring. Charles testified that Respondent had attempted to operate its business as a "cash and carry" operation in which Respondent would sell the flooring to retail customers, who would take the purchased flooring from Respondent's premises and would be solely responsible for securing their own installation services. In Charles' words, "[t]hat didn't work. The public demanded that we provide them, as part of the sale, installers—— I might be saying it wrong legally, but they demanded that it all be done in one shot." Thus, Respondent began hiring subcontractors to do the installation work. Charles explained that Respondent makes retail sales of flooring to customers, either on Respondent's premises or at the customer's premises through its outside sales people. The flooring is then cut from the roll on Respondent's premises and placed in the installer's vehicle. The installer transports the purchased flooring to, and installs it at, the customer's premises. Charles estimated that Respondent currently does approximately five percent of its business as "cash and carry" sales, and the remaining 95 percent consists of sales requiring installation. Charles testified that he and Calideen, as corporate officers of Respondent, previously had obtained exemptions from the workers' compensation coverage requirements for themselves; however, they were unaware that the exemptions had to be renewed, so their exemptions had expired. As of the date of the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, neither Charles nor Calideen possessed valid certificates of exemption from the workers' compensation coverage requirement. Charles testified that Respondent always had tried to operate in compliance with the law. He was of the view that because he and Calideen were exempt from the worker's compensation coverage requirement, Respondent effectively employed only three employees——one fewer than the workers' compensation coverage requirement threshold of four employees applicable to non-construction industry businesses. Charles and Calideen testified that when Respondent initially hired subcontractors, they required copies of their insurance policies, including proof of workers' compensation coverage or exemption therefrom. Calideen testified that thereafter, he and Charles assumed that the subcontractors were in compliance with the workers' compensation laws, and they did not know that they needed to obtain updated certificates of workers' compensation exemption or coverage from the subcontractors. On that basis, Charles asserted that Respondent should not be required to "babysit" its subcontractors to ensure that they are in compliance with the workers' compensation law. Respondent thus asserts that it should not be responsible for securing workers' compensation coverage for subcontractors whose workers' compensation policies or exemptions had expired during the penalty period. The undisputed evidence establishes that Charles' employment entails clerical work. Calideen testified, credibly, that Stark's employment duties entail selling flooring on Respondent's business premises, and that he does not engage in sales off the premises. Calideen testified, credibly, that Frenchak and Phelps primarily are engaged in outside sales off of Respondent's premises. Calideen testified, credibly, that he performs clerical duties rather than sales duties. Calideen and Charles both testified, credibly, that employees Krembs, Skwarek, and Stahl performed computer-related duties for Respondent, such as entering business information into Respondent's computer databases, and that they did not work on Respondent's business premises. Calideen testified, credibly, that subcontractor Mike Smith was hired on a one-time basis to paint parking place stripes at the newly-repaved parking lot behind Respondent's business premises. Findings of Ultimate Fact The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent is engaged in the retail sale of carpeting and other flooring materials and that Respondent itself does not install the flooring. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes, and the parties stipulated, that Respondent is not a member of the construction industry. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that at all times during the penalty period, Respondent employed more than four employees who were engaged in non-construction employment. Accordingly, Respondent was required to secure workers' compensation coverage for its employees, including Charles and Calideen, whose previously-issued certificates of exemption had expired and were not in effect during the penalty period. The undisputed evidence establishes that at certain times during the penalty period, Respondent employed subcontractors who performed floor installation. The evidence clearly establishes that the subcontractors, in installing the flooring, perform a service that is integral to Respondent's business and that they work specifically at Respondent's direction for each particular installation job. Even though Respondent is not classified as a member of the construction industry, it nonetheless is a "statutory employer" of its subcontractors, who are members of the construction industry. Thus, Respondent is responsible for securing workers' compensation coverage for its subcontractors who failed to secure an exemption or coverage for themselves.5/ The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Petitioner correctly calculated the penalty attributable to flooring installation subcontractors for which Respondent was noncompliant during the penalty period. However, the unrebutted evidence establishes that subcontractor Mike Smith was hired on a one-time basis to paint parking lot stripes in Respondent's parking lot. Thus, Petitioner's classification of Smith in NCCI class code 5478—— which is a construction industry code that applies to workers engaged in flooring installation——obviously is incorrect, and no evidence was presented showing the correct NCCI class code in which Smith should be classified. Accordingly, Smith should not be included in Petitioner's calculation of the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Petitioner correctly calculated the penalty attributable to Respondent's noncompliance with respect to Charles, Frenchak, and Phelps during the penalty period. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Stark is engaged in retail sales on Respondent's business premises. However, in calculating the penalty, Petitioner classified Stark in NCCI class code 8018, which applies to salespersons engaged in selling merchandise at the wholesale level, rather than at the retail level. Thus, Petitioner incorrectly classified Stark in NCCI class code 8018. There is no evidence in the record identifying the correct NCCI class code in which Stark should be classified. Accordingly, Stark should not be included in Petitioner's calculation of the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Calideen performs clerical employment duties and does not perform sales duties, so he should be classified in NCCI class code 8810, rather than in class code 8742. Accordingly, Petitioner should recalculate the portion of the penalty attributable to Respondent's noncompliance for Calideen using NCCI class code 8810. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Krembs, Skwarek, and Stahl are not employed as salespersons at the wholesale level. Thus, Petitioner incorrectly classified these employees in NCCI class code 8018. In its Proposed Recommended Order, Petitioner contends that because Respondent disputes the classification of these employees in class code 8018, Respondent is responsible for identifying the correct applicable class code, which it has not done. This position disregards that in this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, to show that its proposed penalty assessment against Respondent is accurate. Thus, Petitioner——not Respondent——is responsible for correctly identifying the NCCI class codes applicable to Respondent's employees. Here, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that in calculating the penalty, Petitioner incorrectly classified Krembs, Skwarek, and Stahl in class code 8018,6/ and no evidence was presented showing the correct NCCI class code applicable to these employees. Accordingly, Krembs, Skwarek, and Stahl should not be included in Petitioner's calculation of the penalty to be assessed against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, issue a final order amending the penalty to be assessed against Respondent as follows: Subtracting the penalty assessed for subcontractor Mike Smith, as shown on the Penalty Calculation Worksheet; and Subtracting the penalties assessed for Respondent's alleged noncompliance with respect to employees Amber Krembs, Jacquelyn Skwarek, and Monica Stahl, as shown on the Penalty Calculation Worksheet; and Reclassifying employee Andy Calideen in NCCI class code 8810 and recalculating the portion of the penalty attributable to Respondent's noncompliance for Calideen using this class code; and Reclassifying employee Alexander Stark in NCCI class code 5784 and recalculating the portion of the penalty attributable to Respondent's noncompliance for Stark using this class code. DONE AND ENTERED this 22 day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22 day of January, 2016.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these proceedings, the Petitioner has been employed as a firefighter with the City of Miami, Florida. He received his Certificate of Compliance with the Division of the State Fire Marshal on August 25, 1976. On August 25, 1988, Petitioner applied to the Respondent for Firefighter Supplemental Compensation pursuant to Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, at the bachelor's level. On September 21, 1988, Respondent notified Fire Chief C. H. Duke, City of Miami Fire Department, that Petitioner's application was accepted. This notification provided, in part that "... the firefighter will receive Supplemental Compensation for qualifying under the requirements of Section 633.382, Florida Statutes and Rule 4A-37.78 for possession of a/an [sic] Bachelor's degree of Business Administration." On November 20, 1989, Respondent asked Petitioner to provide a copy of his undergraduate transcript. In response to that request, Petitioner provided a copy of his transcripts from the University of Arkansas, Miami Dade Community College, and Barry University. On April 4, 1990, Petitioner was informed that he was being removed from the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program. This determination was based on a reevaluation of his transcripts which reflected that he did not possess an eligible Associate or Bachelor's Degree as required by Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, and by Rule 4A-37.085, Florida Administrative Code. [Formerly Rule 4A-37.076, Florida Administrative Code.] Petitioner received 8 credit hours at the University of Arkansas, 27 credit hours at Miami Dade Community College, and 36 credit hours from Barry University. Petitioner received a Master of Business Administration Degree from Barry University on May 6, 1988. Petitioner does not possess an Associate degree or Bachelor's Degree from an accredited college or university.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order which DENIES Petitioner's eligibility to participate in the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation program. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 90-2922 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-9 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 10 are rejected as being merely recitation of testimony in the form of excerpts from the affidavit of George J. Petrello, Ph.D., the former Dean of the Business Executive Program at Barry University. The statements in Paragraph 5 are overly broad and fail to consider the well recognized differences between a bachelor's program and a master's program, particularly as to subjects outside the major field of study. The statements in Paragraph 6 merely reflect Dr. Petrello's interpretation of the pertinent statute and rule. His interpretation is clearly not the only permissible interpretation. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. Copies furnished: Kathleen Phillips, Esquire KAPLAN & BLOOM, P.A. 1951 Northwest 17th Avenue P. O. Drawer 520337 Miami, Florida 33152 Lisa B. Santucci, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Professional Staffing and Payroll Services, LLC, failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for its employees in violation of chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2014), and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement that employers in the State of Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage for their employees, pursuant to chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Professional Staffing and Payroll Services, LLC, is a registered Florida limited liability company. At all times relevant to this proceeding, its business address was 1400 Colonial Boulevard, Suite 260, Fort Myers, Florida. Respondent actively engaged in business during the period from February 1, 2015, to June 17, 2015. On June 2, 2015, Petitioner's compliance investigator, Jack Gumph, conducted a workers' compensation compliance investigation at a worksite located at 8530 Palacio Terrace North, Lot 67, Hacienda Lakes, Naples, Florida. At the worksite, Gumph observed five workers nailing down plywood on the trusses of the roof of a house under construction. One of the workers, Fernando Fernandez, identified himself as the job foreman. Mr. Fernandez and the other four workers were employed by J.S. Valdez, Inc. ("JSV"). These workers were engaged in carpentry work installing plywood. This type of carpentry work is classified as National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") class code 5403 and is considered a type of construction activity under Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021(2)(cc). The evidence established that JSV was a client company of Global Staffing Services, LLC ("GSS"), and that GSS supplied the workers to JSV. The evidence further established that all five workers Gumph observed at the Palacio Terrace jobsite were employees of GSS. Using the State of Florida's Coverage and Compliance Automated System ("CCAS") computer database, Gumph determined that JSV did not have workers' compensation insurance covering any of its employees, and that GSS had workers' compensation coverage only for two secretarial/clerical employees. Through research in the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations Sunbiz database ("Sunbiz"), Gumph discovered that GSS was part of three related——as Gumph characterized it, "commingled"——business entities; these entities were GSS, Global Staffing Payroll, LLC ("GSP"), and Professional Staffing and Payroll Services, LLC, the named Respondent in this case. Ivan Hernandez was shown in Sunbiz as being the managing member of GSS and GSP. At that time, the managing member of Respondent was shown as being Martha Coloma. Gumph suspected that Respondent was leasing construction workers, who are engaged in hazardous work, through a staffing company that was characterized as a secretarial/clerical business (NCCI code 8810)——a substantially less hazardous occupation. The effect of classifying of these business as "secretarial/clerical" is that a much lower workers' compensation premium rate applies.2/ Gumph prepared requests for production of business records ("RPBR") for each of the related business entities and visited the business address listed in Sunbiz for GSS to personally serve them on Hernandez. The business was located in a strip mall that housed various types of businesses. As he was entering the business, he noted that the name shown at the entrance was "Professional Staffing." The business manager explained that GSS was opened in 2013, and that on February 1, 2015, the business name had been changed to Professional Staffing and Payroll Services——the named Respondent in this proceeding. Upon inquiry, Gumph was told that Hernandez was "out of state." Almost as soon as he left Respondent's business office, Gumph received a call from Hernandez, who confirmed that he was the owner and chief executive officer of both GSS and Respondent. Gumph scheduled an appointment with Hernandez for June 16, 2015. However, Hernandez did not keep that appointment or call Gumph back to reschedule the appointment. It was obvious to Gumph that Hernandez was avoiding him. In researching the Sunbiz records for Respondent, Gumph also noted that on June 16, 2015, the managing member's name had been changed from Martha Coloma to Ivan Hernandez. He also rechecked the CCAS and NCCI databases for Respondent and noted that only a few days before, a workers' compensation policy had been issued for Respondent. The policy listed the business as "secretarial/clerical" and had a total exposure of $143,000 to cover four secretarial/clerical employees. He also noted that GSS had a workers' compensation policy that was effective from August 15, 2014, to August 15, 2015, and that this policy did not cover any additional insured entities, so its coverage did not extend to Respondent or its employees. Gumph contacted Martha Coloma, who was employed by All Florida Financial Services, LLC, a payroll preparation and bookkeeping firm. Coloma told Gumph that in January 2015, Hernandez had asked her to amend the Sunbiz records for Respondent to be shown as Respondent's managing member. Coloma also told Gumph that Hernandez requested that she find a Professional Employer Organization ("PEO") leasing company that would secure workers' compensation coverage for approximately 40 to 50 of his employees who were engaged in construction work.3/ Coloma was unsuccessful, so Hernandez directed her to obtain another policy for secretarial/clerical employees. She obtained the policy covering the four secretarial/clerical employees. Thereafter, Gumph spoke directly with Hernandez, who confirmed that he employed 40 to 50 construction workers. He told Gumph that he had tried to obtain a policy but had been unable to do so. On June 17, 2015, Gumph issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent, and also served a RPBR on Respondent. In response, Respondent provided business records consisting of bank statements from a Regions Bank account covering the period from February 1, 2015, to February 28, 2015. Respondent did not provide any copies of checks written during this period. Respondent also provided business records consisting of bank statements and copies of checks from a Fifth Third Bank payroll account for Respondent for the period of March 1, 2015, through June 17, 2015. The evidence establishes that between February 1, 2015, and June 12, 2015, Respondent employed 437 employees—— the great majority of whom worked in construction jobs——for whom Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation insurance coverage. For the period between June 13, 2015, and June 17, 2015, Respondent secured workers' compensation coverage for four secretarial/clerical employees. Based on the business records provided, Lynne Murcia, Petitioner's penalty auditor, calculated the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. Pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d)1., the penalty for failing to secure workers' compensation is equal to two times the amount the employer would have paid in premium when applying approved manual rates to the employer's payroll during the period for which the employer failed to secure coverage during the two-year period preceding issuance of the Stop-Work Order. Here, because Respondent became a business entity on or about February 1, 2015, the penalty period applicable to this proceeding commenced on February 1, 2015, and ran through June 17, 2015, the date on which the Stop-Work Order and Penalty Assessment were served on Respondent.4/ Respondent did not obtain any exemptions from the workers' compensation coverage requirement for the period between February 1, 2015, and June 17, 2015. The business records Respondent provided in response to the RPBR were not sufficient to enable Petitioner to calculate Respondent's payroll for the period commencing on February 1, 2015, and ending on February 28, 2015. Accordingly, Petitioner imputed the gross payroll for Respondent's employees identified in the taxable wage report for the period covering February 1, 2015, through February 28, 2015, the statewide average weekly wage effective at the time of the Stop-Work Order, multiplied by two. The imputed wages for these employees over this period amounted to $2,544,907.68. For the period commencing on March 1, 2015, and ending on June 17, 2015, Respondent provided records sufficient to enable Petitioner to determine Respondent's actual gross payroll. For this period, Respondent's gross payroll amounted to $1,202,781.88. The evidence shows that for the period from February 1, 2015, through June 12, 2015, Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation coverage for any of its employees. On June 13, 2015, Respondent secured workers' compensation covering four secretarial/clerical employees. This coverage did not extend to Respondent's employees engaged in work other than secretarial/clerical work. For the period from June 13, 2015, to June 17, 2015, Respondent's gross payroll was calculated as $22,507.37. In calculating the applicable penalty, Respondent received a credit of $923.98 for the premium paid on the policy secured on June 12, 2015. This amount was deducted from the penalty owed. In calculating the penalty, Murcia determined the NCCI class code applicable to each employee according to his or her job, and applied the pertinent approved NCCI rates to determine the amount of the evaded premium for each employee. Pursuant to this method, Murcia calculated a total penalty of $645,019.36, which was reflected in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. In sum, Petitioner demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation coverage for its employees, in violation of chapter 440. The clear and convincing evidence further establishes that Petitioner correctly calculated a penalty of $645,019.36 to be assessed against Respondent pursuant to sections 440.107(7)(d)1. and 440.107(7)(e) and rule 69L-6.028.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order determining that Respondent Professional Staffing and Payroll Services, LLC, violated the requirement in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, to secure workers' compensation coverage and imposing a penalty of $645,019.36. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent was an employee engaged in the construction industry and required to obtain workers' compensation insurance while working on the roof of the Myakka Animal Clinic and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact On August 24, 1998, Petitioner's investigator observed Respondent working on the roof of the Myakka Animal Clinic in Venice, Florida. At the time, Respondent was regularly employed by Paradise Roofing, Inc., where he had an exemption from workers' compensation insurance coverage. He has never previously been guilty of a violation of the workers' compensation laws. The contract price was $800. However, the evidence is conflicting as to the identity of the party that entered into the contract with the Myakka Animal Clinic. The veterinarian testified that her understanding of the agreement was that Respondent was to do the work, but, if any problems arose, he was not alone, and she could go to Paradise Roofing, Inc., to ensure that the labor and materials were satisfactory. Although there are other indications in the record that Respondent may have been working on his own on this job, there is sufficient conflict in the evidence that Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent was doing the job as a self- employed person, rather than an exempt employee of Paradise Roofing, Inc. Respondent's understanding of the contractual relationship carries less weight than the veterinarian's understanding of this relationship.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Workers' Compensation enter a final order dismissing the Notice and Penalty Assessment Order and any related stop work order. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward A. Dion, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Mary Hooks, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Louise T. Sadler, Senior Attorney Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Eric Kristiansen 3750 Aba Lane North Port, Florida 34287
The Issue Whether Respondent owes $1,568,399.00 or $2,323,765.60 as a penalty for failing to secure workers' compensation insurance for its employees, as required by Florida law.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the sweeping factual stipulations set forth in the parties' June 1, 2005, Joint Stipulation3: Legislative History of the "Penalty Calculation" Provisions of Section 440.107(7), Florida Statutes Since October 1, 2003, the effective date of Chapter 2003-412, Laws of Florida, Section 440.107(7)(d)1., Florida Statutes, has provided as follows: In addition to any penalty, stop-work order, or injunction, the department shall assess against any employer who has failed to secure the payment of compensation as required by this chapter a penalty equal to 1.5 times the amount the employer would have paid in premium when applying approved manual rates to the employer's payroll during periods for which it failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation required by this chapter within the preceding 3-year period or $1,000, whichever is greater. Prior to its being amended by Chapter 2003-412, Laws of Florida, Section 440.107(7), Florida Statutes, read, in pertinent part, as follows: In addition to any penalty, stop-work order, or injunction, the department shall assess against any employer, who has failed to secure the payment of compensation as required by this chapter, a penalty in the following amount: An amount equal to at least the amount that the employer would have paid or up to twice the amount the employer would have paid during periods it illegally failed to secure payment of compensation in the preceding 3-year period based on the employer's payroll during the preceding 3- year period; or One thousand dollars, whichever is greater. The Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Analysis for the senate bill that ultimately became Chapter 2003-412, Laws of Florida, contained the following explanation of the "change" the bill would make to the foregoing "penalty calculation" provisions of Section 440.107(7), Florida Statutes4: The department is required to assess an employer that fails to secure the payment of compensation an amount equal to 1.5 times, rather than 2 times, the amount the employer would have paid in the preceding three years or $1,000, which is greater. There was no mention in the staff analysis of any other "change" to these provisions. The NCCI Basic Manual The National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI) is a licensed rating organization that makes rate filings in Florida on behalf of workers' compensation insurers (who are bound by these filings if the filings are approved by Florida's Office of Insurance Regulation, unless a "deviation" is permitted pursuant to Section 627.11, Florida Statutes). The NCCI publishes and submits to the Office of Insurance Regulation for approval a Basic Manual that contains standard workers' compensation premium rates for specified payroll code classifications, as well as a methodology for calculating the amount of workers' compensation insurance premiums employers may be charged. This methodology is referred to in the Basic Manual as the "Florida Workers Compensation Premium Algorithm" (Algorithm). According to the Algorithm, the first step in the premium calculating process is to determine the employer's "manual premium," which is accomplished by applying the rates set forth in the manual (or manual rates) to the employer's payroll as follows (for each payroll code classification): "(PAYROLL/100) x RATE)." Adjustments to the "manual premium" are then made, as appropriate, before a final premium is calculated. Among the factors taken into consideration in determining the extent of any such adjustments to the "manual premium" in a particular case are the employer's loss experience, deductible amounts, premium size (with employers who pay "larger premium[s]" entitled to a "Premium Discount"), and, in the case of a "policy that contains one or more contracting classifications," the wages the employer pays its employees in these classifications (with employers "paying their employees a better wage" entitled to a "Contracting Classification Premium Adjustment Program" credit). Petitioner's Construction of the "Penalty Calculation" Provisions of Section 440.107(7), Florida Statutes In discharging its responsibility under Section 440.107(7), Florida Statutes, to assess a penalty "against any employer who has failed to secure the payment of compensation as required," Petitioner has consistently construed the language in the statute, "the amount the employer would have paid," as meaning the aggregate of the "manual premiums" for each applicable payroll code classification, calculated as described in the NCCI Basic Manual. It has done so under both the pre- and post-Chapter 2003-412, Laws of Florida, versions of Section 440.107(7). This construction is incorporated in Petitioner's "Penalty Calculation Worksheet," which Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.027 provides Petitioner "shall use" when "calculating penalties to be assessed against employers pursuant to Section 440.107, F.S." (Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.027 first took effect on December 29, 2004.) Penalty Calculation in the Instant Case In the instant case, "1.5 times the amount the [Respondent] would have paid in premium when applying approved manual rates to [Respondent's] payroll during periods for which it failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation" equals $2,323,765.60.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner order Respondent to pay a $2,323,765.60 penalty for failing to secure workers' compensation insurance for its employees. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 2005.
