The Issue Whether the proposed amendment to Rule 40E-7.653, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact In July 1996, the Governing Board of the Respondent, South Florida Water Management District (District), adopted Chapter 40E-7, Part VI, Florida Administrative Code, which is called the Supplier Diversity & Outreach M/WBE Contracting Rule. Rule 40E-7.611(1), Florida Administrative Code sets forth the purpose of the rule as follows: The rules under this Part establish policies and procedures designed to remedy documented disparities in District contracting and the present effects of past marketplace discrimination. The rules under this Part implement specific recommendations of the District's Minority Business Availability and Utilization Study ('Study') as developed by MGT of America, Inc., dated August, 1995 and made a part of the District's Supplier Diversity & Outreach Program ('Program'). The rules under this Part shall apply to all competitive solicitations for commodities, construction, professional, and other contractual services, including change orders and amendments. The Supplier Diversity & Outreach M/WBE Contracting Rule became effective September 25, 1996. Prior to the effective date of the rule, the District had a minority and women business enterprise (M/WBE) program, but had no rules governing the program. Under the pre-rule policy governing the M/WBE program, the standards for determining eligibility for certification were less stringent than those adopted by rule in 1996. Beginning in October 1995, the District issued certification eligibility determinations for three-year periods. Prior to that time certifications were for a period of one year. The District maintains a database of firms which have been certified as M/WBE's and uses that database to generate lists of eligible firms for specific solicitations. The list for any particular solicitation is project-specific based on the opportunities for M/WBE participation afforded by the project. For example, if a contract calls for plumbing, but not electrical services, the list of eligible M/WBE firms would be limited to plumbing contractors. At the time that the Supplier Diversity & Outreach M/WBE Contracting Rule was adopted in July 1996, the District did not address in the rule how pre-rule certified M/WBE firms would be affected by the certification eligibility requirements in Rule 40E-7.653, Florida Administrative Code. Based on the District's database, there were approximately 370 to 380 firms which had been certified as M/WBE's prior to September 25, 1996, the effective date of Chapter 40E-7, Part VI, Florida Administrative Code. Some of the pre-rule certified firms are presently providing services to the District under existing contracts. On December 19, 1997, the District gave notice by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly of proposed amendments to Rule 40E-7.653, Florida Administrative Code. A Notice of Change was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 28, 1998. The proposed amendment to Rule 40E- 7.653, Florida Administrative Code, which is at issue states: For purposes of this rule, a firm shall be considered a District certified M/WBE only if the firm has applied for and been granted certification by the District after September 25, 1996. Firms certified prior to September 25, 1996, shall be counted toward the M/WBE goal attainment only if: the firm is either a prime contractor or subcontractor for a particular District contract executed prior to the effective date of this rule; or the firm is listed on the M/WBE vendor list for particular District solicitation issued prior to the effective date of this rule. In either case, the firm shall only be counted toward M/WBE goal attainment for that particular contract or solicitation. As part of the proposed rulemaking process, the District sent notice to all potentially affected firms recommending that the firms voluntarily apply for recertification prior to the effective date of the proposed rule. Carolyn Williams, the Director of the Office of Supplier Diversity and Outreach at the District, described the notification process as follows: We, when we initially entered into rule adoption, we sent a notice to all those interested and impacted firms and advised them that the District was undertaking this process and asked them to voluntarily submit their application for recertification, because at some point if the proposed rule was adopted, there would be an effective date and those firms then who had not come in to reapply for certification and did not fall within the exceptions under this proposed rule would no longer be considered certified by the District. The firms who fell within the two exceptions in the final rule language would be protected, and those firms who came back in to be recertified before the effective date of this rule would be protected, but anyone who did not would fall off the list. The rule initially had a May 1 effective date. We put a time, a series of dates in place to try to ensure that we notified all persons appropriately so they could get their certifications in, the application in. We had a March 30 deadline for all firms interested in recertifying prior to the effective date of the proposed rule, which was May 1. So again, if you didn't fall within the exceptions, the two exceptions, and you were certified prior to the rule, the original date of the rule, if you did not reapply by that May 1 date or we had not made a decision with regard to your status by that time, you would no longer be considered by the District. Gulf Construction, Inc. (Gulf), was sent notice but did not submit an application for recertification. During the final hearing, counsel for the District acknowledged that Gulf was a pre-rule certified M/WBE. (Transcript at 66 and 67).
The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation can reject all bids on State Project No. 37906-9007?
Findings Of Fact In response to an invitation to bid, petitioner C & S Chemical Company (C&S) submitted a bid, No. 9059-86, offering to undertake complete maintenance operations to ensure Rest Area facilities located on State Road 93 (1-75) in Suwannee and Hamilton Counties are maintained in a safe, attractive, clean and sanitary manner." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Invitations to bid were mailed in October of last year, (T.9), and bids were to have been opened on December 2, 1987. C&S's bid price was $14,860.76 monthly or $178,329.12 for the year. By letter dated December 9, 1986, however, the Department of Transportation (DOT) advised C&S that all bids had been rejected, stating that the "Department reserved the right to reject any/or all bids when it is determined to be in the best interest of the Department. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. C&S mailed notice of protest the same day it received the Department's advice that all bids had been rejected. C&S's formal written protest took the form of a letter, dated December 18, 1986, in which C&S inquired: [H]ow can the Department of Transportation offend and deprive legitimate contractors of this work by negotiating a Contract with a non-profit organization after the bid prices have been made public knowledge? Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. In this letter, C&S took the position that DOT should not reject all bids: We feel that if the non-profit organizations are going to get Department of Transportation contracts, they should either bid compet[i]tively with private enterprises, or that certain contracts should be set aside for them well advance of the bidding process. At hearing, Mr. Sperring narrowed or clarified the grounds of the protest when he stated, "I have no objection to the concept of the nonprofit organizations as long as they are set aside," (T.12) before bids are invited. The parties agree that, after bids were solicited, DOT decided to award the contract for Project No. 37906-9007 to intervenor Florida Association of Rehabilitative Facilities, Inc. (FARF), even though FARF never bid on the project. By agreement dated August 21, 1985, the Commission for Purchase for the Blind and other Severely Handicapped designated FARF "the central nonprofit agency of the Commission . . . [and its] sole agent." Intervenor's Exhibit No. 2. The day before, DOT Secretary Thomas E. Drawdy had signed a policy statement proclaiming DOT's intention "to procure commodities or services from qualified nonprofit agencies for the blind or other severely handicapped when feasible unless otherwise restricted by budgetary constraints." Intervenor's Exhibit No. 1.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Conval-Care, Inc., is entitled to the payment of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, from the Agency for Health Care Administration, the successor in interest to the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Findings Of Fact By letter dated November 4, 1991, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), notified Conval-Care, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Conval-Care"), that it intended to impose an administrative fine on Conval-Care pursuant to Section 409.913(9)(c), Florida Statutes. Conval-Care contested the proposed fine and requested a formal administrative hearing, including a request that it be awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The matter was designated case number 92-0126 and was assigned to the Honorable Judge Robert T. Benton, then Hearing Officer Benton. On June 30, 1993, following a formal hearing held on March 24, 1993, Hearing Officer Benton entered a Recommended Order recommending dismissal of the sanctions letter of November 4, 1991. The findings of fact made by Hearing Officer Benton, in Conval-Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 92-0126, are hereby adopted to the extent relevant to this proceeding. On September 19, 1993, the Department entered a Final Order. The Department accepted and incorporated into its Final Order the findings of fact made by Hearing Officer Benton. The Department, however, rejected Hearing Officer Benton's conclusions of law to the extent that he not had concluded that Conval-Care lacked authority to reject the demand for its records which was the subject of the proceedings. The Department concluded that, in light of the fact that Conval-Care had acted on the advice of counsel, it would reduce the fine from $25,000.00 to $5,000.00. The Department's decision was appealed by Conval-Care. On December 16, 1994, the District Court of Appeal, First District, filed an opinion reversing the Department's Final Order. Mandate from the First District was entered January 3, 1995. On February 14, 1995, Conval-Care filed a Petition for Attorneys Fees and Costs in this case. Conval-Care requested an award of $15,000.00 as a small business party pursuant to the provisions of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Attached to the Petition were the Final Order entered by the Department, the Recommended Order, the First District's Opinion and Mandate, an Attorney's Affidavit stating the nature, extent and monetary value of the services rendered and costs incurred in the proceedings, the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by Conval-Care in 1991 and the Department's November 4, 1991 sanctions letter. On March 2, 1995, the Agency for Health Care Administration, the successor in interest of the Department (hereinafter referred to as "AHCA"), filed a Response in Opposition to Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs. 10 In its Response, AHCA admitted all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 6 and 8 through 9 of the Petition. AHCA denied the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Petition. Paragraph 7 of the Petition alleged the following: 7. The action of DHRS, in filing the admini- strative complaint against CCI, was not sub- stantially justified because there was no reasonable basis in law or fact to support the issuance of its letter seeking to impose an administrative fine upon CCI. Attached to the Response was an Affidavit from John M. Whiddon in support of its position that its actions were substantially justified. The Affidavit does not add any alleged credible justification not presented to Hearing Officer Benton or the First District Court of Appeal. AHCA did not assert in it Response the following: that the costs and attorney's fees claimed in Conval-Care's affidavit were unreasonable; that Conval-Care is not a prevailing small business party; that circumstances exist that would make an award unjust; or that AHCA was a nominal party only. AHCA also did not "either admit to the reasonableness of the fees and costs claimed or file a counter affidavit [specifying each item of costs and fee in dispute] along with its response." Finally, AHCA did not request an evidentiary hearing in its Response. The only issue which AHCA asserted in its Response was at issue in this proceeding is whether AHCA's actions were substantially justified. On April 6, 1995, an Order to Provide Information was entered. Although the parties had not requested an evidentiary hearing, the undersigned entered the Order soliciting input from the parties before the undersigned decided whether a hearing was necessary on the one issue raised by the Department. In the Order, the parties were given an opportunity to provide input concerning the procedures they believed should be followed to resolve this matter. The parties were specifically requested to answer certain specified questions, including the following: 1. Do the parties believe that an [sic] hearing is necessary to resolve any factual disputes and/or for purposes of oral argument before a decision is rendered? * * * 5. Do the parties agree that the documents attached to the Petition and the Response should be considered in rendering a decision in this case? . . ." Conval-Care filed a response to the April 6, 1995 Order indicating that there was no need for a hearing. Conval-Care asserted that a hearing would be improper unless Conval-Care consents to one. Conval-Care also asserted that all of the documents attached to petition should be considered. AHCA filed a response to the April 6, 1995 Order indicating that "[t]he Respondent feels a hearing in this matter is essential." AHCA did not provide any explanation of why it believed a hearing was necessary or any discussion of whether a hearing was authorized under the applicable statutes and rules. AHCA also indicated in its response that it "agrees that the documents attached to the Petition and Response should be considered in this case " On May 19, 1995, an Order Concerning Final Order was entered. Based upon a review of the pleadings and the lack of explanation from either party to justify an evidentiary hearing, it was concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary. Therefore, the parties were informed in the May 19, 1995 Order that a hearing would not be held in this case. The parties were also informed that they could file proposed final orders on or before May 30, 1995. Conval-Care filed a proposed order. AHCA did not. Neither Conval-Care nor AHCA timely requested an evidentiary hearing in this case. Both parties agreed that the documentation filed with Conval- Care's Petition and AHCA's Response could be relied upon in reaching a decision in this case. Based upon AHCA's failure to contest most of the relevant issues in this proceeding, the only issue which requires a decision if whether the Department's actions against Conval-Care were substantially justified. The documents, including the Mr. Whiddon's Affidavit filed by AHCA with its Response, sufficiently explain why the Department took the actions it took against Conval-Care which led to this proceeding. No evidentiary hearing was, therefore, necessary. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions in this matter were substantially justified. The Department could have sought the information it wanted by pursuing available discovery. Counsel for Conval-Care even remained the Department of the availability of discovery. The Department, however, rather than pursuing the information which it indicated it needed, elected to pursue a punitive action against Conval-Care rather than obtaining the information through discovery. The Department's reason for pursuing punitive actions against Conval-Care was not convincing to Hearing Officer Benton. Despite this fact, the Department entered a Final Order upholding its actions and imposing a fine of $5,000.00 for refusing to provide it with information which it could have obtained through other means. The First District Court reversed the Department's Final Order opining that the Department "lacked a legitimate investigatory purpose for demanding the records" which gave rise to its action against Conval-Care. Finally, the entire record in this case failed to indicate that there was any basis in law or fact to substantially justify the actions of the Department.
Findings Of Fact The Communication Workers of America (CWA) is an employee organization and the St. Petersburg Junior College is a public employer. In June, 1976, CWA was attempting to organize various employees at SPJC. To facilitate getting their message to the employees and the group for which representation was sought, CWA inquired of SPJC about renting a classroom. Initially CWA was advised that no bar to renting the room was foreseen; however, the following day CWA was advised by SPJC that they would not rent the use of a classroom to CWA. Thereafter on June 14, 1976 CWA submitted a written request (Exhibit 3) to SPJC requesting rental of a room any weekday between July 19 and July 30. No written response to this request was made but upon oral inquiry CWA was advised that they would not be able to rent the room. In April, 1975 the President of SPJC issued a memorandum (Exhibit 6) to managerial employees advising that union activities were being conducted on the campus and that they should be on the lookout for various signs of union activities. Examples of what to look for were given. A union organizer at SPJC, Ms. Marcia Warden, was the principal complaining witness in these proceedings. She testified she was being followed by "supervisory" personnel each time she came on SPJC campus and was thereby prevented from having access to the employees. There were only two employees in the unit solicited by CWA that were excluded from union participation by reason of their managerial status. Another witness, an employee of SPJC, never saw either of these two employees in the vicinity of Ms. Warden the 10 or so times she observed Ms. Warden on the campus. At the beginning of the organization drive notices of union organizational meetings were removed from campus bulletin boards. However, after October the union was allowed to post on these bulletin boards notices of union meetings. This authorization was memorialized in a letter to Ms. Warden dated October 18, 1976 (Exhibit 9). Thereafter on October 31, 1976, Ms. Warden advised PERC that as a result of this change in SPJC's policy, no further amendments would be made to their unfair labor practice charge (Exhibit 7). Prior to the end of 1976 a settlement agreement was executed between SPJC and CWA (Exhibit 8). During the organization drive SPJC did not cooperate with the CWA to facilitate their task. A list of employees was not given to CWA until after a law suit was brought by CWA. A full list of employees was provided CWA 7 days prior to the election. Ms. Warden also testified that by refusing to rent the union a room SPJC removed CWA from access to the employees other than at the parking lot where she was being watched by supervisors. An employee of SPJC in the proposed unit testified that she received numerous notices in the mail at her home address and that Ms. Warden had visited her at her home on organizational business. SPJC's policy regarding renting classrooms to non-profit organizations is contained in Exhibit 5. Most such organizations that apply to lease meeting space from the college are successful in doing so. The only exceptions noted at the hearing were a karate group that had previously done some property damage, a gay liberation group, and the CWA. Meetings had been held between SPJC and a previous group attempting to represent the college employees called the Career Services Employment Council. No meetings were held with that organization subsequent to July, 1976 and no evidence was presented that the group was ever allowed to rent college space for Organizational meetings. No evidence was presented that union representatives were barred from SPJC campus, that reasonable diligence on the part of union organizers would have been unsuccessful in Obtaining the names and addresses of employees in the proposed unit, or that the employer actively interfered with CWA Communicating with its employees during non-working hours. On the other hand SPJC did not cooperate with CWA so as to facilitate the Organizational efforts of the CWA. CWA requested the use of a room at SPJC during working hours, i.e. from 1 to 4 P.M. and meetings held during those times could have interfered with the program of the college. However the union proposed these hours in order to have access to the largest shift of employees in the proposed bargaining unit who normally reported for duty at 2:50 P.M. Subsequent to 3:00 P.M. CWA proposed to meet with the shift that came off duty at 2:50 P.M. All proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent are treated in the findings herein submitted or were considered immaterial to the issues to be resolved.
The Issue The two major issues in this case are as follows: Was the failure of Datamaxx to submit resumes of training and maintenance personnel as required by Performance Mandatory No. 10 of the Invitation to Bid a material deviation from the Invitation to Bid such as to render Datamaxx a nonresponsive bidder? If Datamaxx was a nonresponsive bidder, must the contract be awarded to Burroughs, or must DHRS, pursuant to Section 13A-1.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, have the contract rebid, or seek single source procurement or negotiation approval from the Division of Purchasing?
Findings Of Fact Based on the admissions of the parties, on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact: For at least the past 10 years, the DHRS Data Communications Network has been maintained by Burroughs on a sole source basis. At the end of the previous Burroughs Terminal Maintenance contract with Burroughs, the Department of General Services (DOS) asked DHRS to bid the contract in lieu of sole source procurement, it being the belief of DOS that there was competition in this area. On or about September 19, 1986, DHRS published an Invitation to Bid which advised prospective bidders that sealed bids would be opened on October 20, 1986, for a contract, known as "Burroughs Terminal Maintenance" [Bid No. 86 ATM] regarding maintenance of the terminals of the DHRS Data Communications Network. The Special Conditions of the Invitation to Bid contained, among others, the following provisions: The State has established certain require- ments with respect to bids to be submitted by bidders. The use of "shall," "must" or "will" (except to indicate simple futurity) in this Invitation to Bid indicates a requirement or condition from which a material deviation may not be waived by the State. A deviation is material if, in the State's sole discretion, the deficient response is not in substantial accord with this Invitation to Bid requirements, provides an advantage to one bidder over other bidders, has a potentially significant effect on the quantity or quality of items bid, or on the cost to the State. Material deviations cannot be waived. (at p. 1) No negotiations, decision, or actions shall be initiated or executed by the bidder as a result of any discussions with any State employee. Only those communications which are in writing from the Department's Purchasing office may be considered as a duly authorized expression on behalf of the State. Also, only communications from bidders which are signed and in writing will be recognized by the State as duly authorized expressions on behalf of the bidder. (at p. 2) All personnel performing maintenance must be trained to service the equipment covered by this contract. Training shall be completed before the individual is assigned to service the equipment covered by this contract. Training shall be provided to whatever level is necessary to ensure the individual has the required qualifications to perform satisfactory maintenance service on Burroughs equipment listed in Attachment A of this Invitation to Bid. Bidder shall submit with their bid a summary of their Burroughs training program and resumes of personnel who will be performing this training and the resumes of personnel who will be per- forming the maintenance. (at p. 8) Bidder shall certify to the State, at the time the bid is submitted, that bidder has existing established service centers staffed with personnel trained to service the equipment covered by this contract . . . In lieu of this requirement, if bidder does not have existing established service centers, liaison office, and trained personnel, and bidder submits a plan for compliance, the required certification must be given the State no later than two (2) weeks prior to the anticipated starting date of the contract as indicated in the paragraph of this document entitled Calendar of Events. Failure to comply with this requirement shall result in rejection of the bid and award of the bid to the next lowest responsive bidder. The Invitation to Bid was drafted by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The only bidders on the contract (other than no- bids) were Burroughs and Datamaxx. DHRS found Burroughs and Datamaxx both to be responsive bidders and posted their bids making them public in the recognized manner of publicizing the bidder to be awarded a bid. Both bids were found to be responsive by DHRS at the time they were made public. The Datamaxx bid was the lowest bid and the Burroughs bid was the next to lowest bid. DHRS staff recommended the contract be awarded to Datamaxx. The Datamaxx bid was approximately $784,000 less than the Burroughs bid. In its bid Datamaxx indicated that it understood and agreed to all provisions of the Invitation to Bid, specifically including those dealing with Mandatory Requirements, Verbal Instruction Procedure, Rejection of Bids, Bid Evaluation, Performance Mandatories, and Certification. Datamaxx submitted the Certification required under the terms of the Invitation to Bid and did not submit a plan for compliance with its bid. Datamaxx never requested in writing that the requirement for resumes be waived, and DHRS never advised Datamaxx in writing that it did not have to submit the resumes. Datamaxx did not submit with its bid the resumes of training and maintenance personnel required under Performance Mandatory 10 of the Invitation to Bid. Performance Mandatory No. 10 required the submission of resumes with the bid, and did not concern an event that would take place after the bid had been let. DHRS considered the requirement for resumes to be a mandatory requirement. The qualifications of the persons who would be performing the maintenance under the contract would have a potentially significant effect on the quality of the maintenance provided. Nothing could be more material to the contract than the ability of the personnel to perform that contract. The difference in the dollar amount of the bids of Burroughs and Datamaxx influenced the decision of DHRS in finding Datamaxx to be a responsive bidder. This was a major reason Datamaxx was found to be a responsive bidder. In evaluating the Datamaxx bid, DHRS went outside the material provided in the Datamaxx bid. Subsequent to the posting of bids, DHRS met with Datamaxx and advised Datamaxx that its initial submission was deficient for not including resumes with the bid, that DHRS had waived the resumes, but that in order for DHRS to continue its recommendation that the bid be awarded to Datamaxx, DHRS had to have the resumes prior to the awarding of the bid. DHRS considered it an error and a deficiency in the bid that the resumes were not furnished. Datamaxx, on November 6, 1986, advised DHRS in a letter to Charles Ray that it would submit a plan which would address, among other things, service personnel resumes by November 17, 1986. DHRS could not have considered Datamaxx's letter of November 6, 1986, in evaluating whether Datamaxx was a responsive bidder, because that letter was not received until after DHRS had already found Datamaxx to be a responsive bidder and recommended that the contract be awarded to Datamaxx. Had Datamaxx not submitted the resumes prior to November 17, 1986, DHRS staff would have recommended that the award of the contract be withdrawn. The performance the State would receive under the contract would directly depend on the qualifications of the persons performing the service and the maintenance, and the resumes would be the only source of information regarding the qualifications of the personnel.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that a final order be entered to the following effect: Concluding that the bid submitted by Datamaxx USA Corporation on Bid No. 86 ATM should be rejected on the grounds that it is not responsive, Concluding that the bid submitted by Burroughs Corporation should be rejected on the basis of Rule 13A-1.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, and, Providing for the agency to issue a second invitation to bid/request for proposals or take other action provided by Rule 13A-1.002(3), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-4460B1D The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by both parties: Findings proposed by Petitioner Paragraphs 1 through 19 are accepted with a few minor editorial modifications. The first two lines of paragraph 20 are rejected as redundant. The remainder of paragraph 20 is accepted. Findings proposed by Respondent Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted in substance. Paragraph 3 is rejected as constituting unnecessary details. Paragraphs 4 through 7 are accepted. Paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 are rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 11 is rejected in part as irrelevant and in part as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 12 is accepted. Paragraph 13 is rejected as constituting irrelevant and unnecessary details. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Powell Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Edgar Lee Elzie, Jr., Esquire MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly 804 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue This proceeding concerns the Respondent's rejection of all bids for construction of its new middle school "FF". Petitioner has challenged that intended action, arguing that it was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the law. The parties disagree as to the basis for the intended action. Initially the School Board considered rejecting all bids for failure to meet MBE/WBE goals, and Petitioner protested. Later, the Respondent determined that significant revisions to the construction documents were required, and the bids were all rejected on that basis. Petitioner protested again, but contends that the original basis for intended action is still at issue. For reasons set forth in the following recommended order, the MBE/WBE goal issue is moot. The central issue for determination, therefore, is whether Respondent properly rejected all bids based on its determination that substantial changes are required, and Petitioner's motion to consolidate its two protests is DENIED.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mark C. Arnold Construction Co., (Arnold), is a commercial general contracting firm located in Orange County, Florida, but well-experienced in building public facilities throughout the state. Arnold currently is engaged in constructing school "EE" for Respondent, Orange County School Board (School Board, or Board). In January 1992, the school board promulgated an advertisement for bid soliciting bids for the construction of a new school project known as Middle School "FF". The advertisement for bid was published five (5) times in the Orlando Sentinel on January 7, 14 and 28 and on February 4 and 1, 1992. The board also compiled a project manual which among other things contained a copy of the advertisement for bid and instructions to bidders which governed the bidding process. The advertisement for bid reserved the school board's "right to reject any or all bids and to waive any informality or irregularity in any bid received". (Joint Exhibits 1 and 2) The instructions to bidders also reserved the school board's "right to reject any and all bids when such rejection is in the interest of the school board of Orange County, Florida...". (Joint Exhibit 5) The project manual also contained a bid form to be used by bidders. In it the bidder agrees "that the Owner reserves the right to reject this bid, or to waive informalities in any bid,...". Such language was contained in the bid submitted by Arnold. (Joint Exhibits 7 and 9) By addendum dated February 5, 1992 the school board amended and replaced Section A-12 of its project manual and instructions to bidders. Such amendment, among other things, established goals for minority/womens business enterprise (MBE/WBE) subcontractor and supplier participation in the project, and it required any bidder who failed to attain the goals to demonstrate a good faith effort to do so; otherwise, the bid of such bidder would be rejected. (Joint Exhibit 8) Arnold's bid showed that Arnold had no MBE/WBE subcontractor or supplier participation. (Joint Exhibit 9) Arnold's bid was the lowest of eleven bids received by the school board. Arnold's bid was in the amount of $10,977,000.00. The next lowest bid was in the amount of $11,075,000.00. After bids were opened, Arnold promptly contacted the MBE/WBE manager of the school board, and was advised by her to try to obtain MBE/WBE participation to meet the goals; within several days after bid opening Arnold was able to get a total of about 13.5% MBE/WBE subcontractor/supplier participation. Contrary to the MBE/WBE manager's instruction, the addendum to the project manual and bid instructions proscribed any effort after bid opening to attain the MBE/WBE goals and to thereby make a bid responsive. In spite of Arnold's attempt to demonstrate to the MBE/WBE manager that it had made a good faith effort to attain the goals prior to bid opening, the MBE/WBE Manager determined that no sufficient good faith effort was shown by Arnold. On March 5, 1992 the school board furnished to Arnold a written notice of its intended decision to reject all bids because of the failure of all contractors (bidders) to attain the MBE/WBE goals and/or to show compliance with the good faith effort requirement of the contract documents. (Joint Exhibit 11) On March 10, 1992 Arnold and its attorney attended a meeting of the school board for the purpose of appealing the MBE/WBE manager's decision that Arnold had not demonstrated a good faith effort to meet the goals. Mark C. Arnold spoke at length to the school board itemizing actions which Arnold contended showed its requisite good faith effort to solicit MBE/WBE participation. Arnold's attorney also made a presentation at the meeting. By a 6 to 1 vote, the board initially sustained the findings of the MBE/WBE manager that a good faith effort was not shown by Arnold, and rejected all bids because of the failure of all contractors (bidders) to meet the minority participation goal and/or to show compliance with the good faith effort requirements of the contract documents. (Joint Exhibits 12 and 15) Following a work session after its initial meeting on March 10, the board convened again in regular session on March 10, at which time it unanimously voted to reconsider its earlier action of rejecting all bids, and it voted to postpone action of the award of a contract for the construction of Middle School "FF". The effect of that action was to rescind its earlier action rejecting all bids and determining that Arnold had not shown a good faith effort to solicit MBE/WBE participation; and also to postpone action on the entire matter to a future time. (Joint Exhibit 13). On March 20, Arnold filed Formal Protest directed to the board's March 5th Notice of Intended Decision and directed to the March 10 action rejecting Arnold's bid. During or about the first week in April, engineers for the school board met with the school board's attorney, William M. Rowland, Jr., to inform him that significant revisions needed to be made in the site work and sewer plant plans for the Middle School "FF" project. The engineers recommended that because of the need to make such revisions all bids for the project should be rejected and the project should be rebid after the plans were revised. As a result of the early April meeting with the engineers, the board's attorney prepared and delivered a memorandum dated April 7th advising the school board of its engineers' recommendations. The attorney also submitted a resolution which, if adopted, would serve to reject all bids and require a rebidding of the project. (Joint Exhibit 16) On April 10th the school board furnished to Arnold an amended notice of intended decision, which by its express terms replaced, amended and superseded its prior notice of intended decision dated March 5th, and notified Arnold of its intent to reject all bids on the project because of the need to make significant revisions in the construction documents. (Joint Exhibit 17) Said amended notice rendered moot the March 20 formal protest filed by Arnold. At its meeting held on April 14th, the board considered the April 7th memorandum from its attorney. At that meeting, the board heard from its staff engineer, Chuck Greif, who pointed out the revisions needed to the site plans for the Project. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 59-62, 77-78) Mark Arnold also spoke, contending that the site revisions could be handled by change orders if Arnold's bid were accepted. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 76-77) Bob Gallardo, the school board Director of Facilities and Planning, advised of problems encountered in the site work and of the need to make significant revisions in the site plans. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 87-92) As the geotechnical engineer on the job, Charles Cunningham stressed the significance of the site plan changes. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 96-97) Derek Burke, engineer on the project, confirmed that major redesign needs to be done. (Joint Exhibit 20, page 64) Attorney Rowland advised that the prior intended decision to reject all bids because of failure of all bidders to comply with the MBE/WBE requirements of the bid documents, was moot and no longer before the board for action, and that the only resolution before the board for action was the resolution to reject all bids because of the need to make significant site plan revisions for the project. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 72-76) The school board unanimously adopted that resolution. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 97-99; Joint Exhibit 18) On April 23rd Arnold timely filed the written formal protest which is the subject of these proceedings. At the time of the meeting held by on April 14th, there was a need to make significant changes in the site work and sewer plant for the Middle School "FF" project. Such changes formed a valid and legitimate reason for the board to reject all bids. Even at the time of this administrative hearing, some details regarding the site work still needed to be worked out. For example, an outfall is needed for the percolation pond underdrain but it was not included in the project design. The site work and sewer plant changes and revisions could have been handled by change orders between Arnold and the school board, had the board accepted Arnold's bid, since any changes in a project can be accomplished by change orders; however, revising the nature and quantity of construction work by change orders involves the potential for excessive cost to the project owner and change orders always require agreement between the parties. Prudence dictates that when it is known that changes must be made, the bid advertisement should include those changes up front to remove the uncertainty of costs and to put all bidders on equal footing. There has been no showing of any illegality, fraud, oppression or misconduct in the actions of the school board in rejecting all bids on the Middle School "FF" Project and in opting to seek new bids for the project. There has been no showing in these proceedings that the school board's rejection of all bids had the purpose or effect of defeating the object and integrity of competitive bidding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the bid protests by Petitioner. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Evans Davis, Esquire 170 East Washington Street Orlando, FL 32801 MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1992. William M. Rowland, Jr., Esquire 1786 North Mills Avenue Orlando, FL 32803 Dr. James L. Schott, Superintendent Orange County School Board P.O. Box 271 Orlando, FL 32802
Findings Of Fact Union Trucking is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of trucking. Its net worth is less than $2,000,000.00 In DOAH Case NO. 87-4007, the Department sent Petitioner a letter dated August 6, 1987, denying Petitioner's request for certification as a minority business enterprise pursuant to the Department's Rule 14-78.005, Florida Administrative Code. The reason stated in the letter was that Petitioner was not actually under the control of a minority person. On August 25, 1987, Petitioner timely requested a hearing and the case was sent to the Division Of Administrative Hearings on September 11, 1987. By Notice of Hearing dated September 23, 1987, hearing was scheduled for November 16, 1987 and later continued until February 10, 1988. Rule 14-78.002, Florida Administrative Code, was amended on September 21, 1987. The amendment effectively removed DOT's reason-for denial of Petitioner's certification. However, on February 11, 1988, well after the rule change came into effect, DOT formally decided to certify Petitioner. Petitioner was therefore forced to proceed for several months in preparation for an action which Respondent admits it had no basis for after the rule change took effect. Respondent's initial decision occurred on August 6, 1987, when Respondent notified Petitioner of its denial of minority business status. At some point in time, Respondent had filed its proposed rule change. Petitioner failed to demonstrate the time of the proposed change. Depending on the facts surrounding the rule change as to its likelihood of adoption at the time Respondent initiated this action, no findings regarding substantial justification can be made at the time of the agency's initial action on August Most certainly after September 21, 1987, the date the MBE rule was amended, Respondent lacked any substantial justification to continue to litigate this matter. The Final Order of the Department recognized the earlier certification of Petitioner and dismissed the action. However, the Final Order of Respondent did not dispose of the attorney's fees issue which had also been raised during the principal action. The order, therefore, did not dispose of substantially all the issues raised in the principal action. Additionally, there was no settlement of this case since a written settlement agreement was drafted and signed by Petitioner, but refused by Respondent. Respondent's unilateral certification is not enough to force a settlement on Petitioner, especially since Respondent elected to enter a Final Order in this case. Petitioner, therefore, became a prevailing party when Respondent entered its Final Order on April 18, 1988. Section 57.111(4)(b)(2) , Florida Statutes. The application and affidavit which initiated this action were filed on May 23, 1988. The application substantially meets the requirements of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, in that it fairly put Respondent on notice of Petitioner's claim. The application and affidavit were timely, having been filed within 60 days after the date on which Petitioner became a prevailing small business party. According to the affidavit of Frank M. Gafford, Petitioner incurred legal fees of $3,572.86. These fees and costs are found to be reasonable. The Department does not dispute the reasonableness of the fees in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Hayward Trucking, Inc. for certification as a minority business enterprise be GRANTED. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1982.
