The Issue The ultimate issue in this proceeding is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-21 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Mebane, North Carolina. Sometime in April 2003, Petitioner requested the Board to release certain information that is public information within the meaning of Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (2003). Sometime in October 2003, the Board provided some of the information requested by Petitioner. The information included "scores, converted and raw and seat numbers of test applicants." Respondent did not include the "listed areas as agreed." The Board charged Petitioner $90.00 for providing "what they felt Petitioner should have," and the Board was "quite insulting about it." On a date not identified in the Petition, Petitioner asked a representative of the Board if the Board "currently" had an advertisement in the Florida Administrative Weekly concerning a "rule challenge that dealt with raw scores or scores in general." The representative stated there was no proposed rule change pertaining to scores. Petitioner asked for any and all data pertaining to scores as a rule change. The representative for the Board stated there was no such information to provide. At some time not identified in the Petition, Petitioner requested a copy of any records that "had been submitted" to the [B]oard pertaining to scores as part of a rule change. The representative of the Board repeated that nothing had gone before the Board pertaining to applicants sitting for the "Intern Test or the PE Exam." The Florida Administrative Weekly dated October 10, 2003, contains a proposed change to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-21 that is directly related to Petitioner's "public information request." Petitioner believes that the Board had to approve the rule change before the Board advertised it on October 10, 2003, and that the previous denials by the Board's representative constituted "unethical" conduct. Petitioner requested a public hearing pursuant to the advertisement in the Florida Administrative Weekly on October 10, 2003, but doubts if the Board will comply with the "Florida Administrative Laws" based on what Petitioner believes to be the Board's "previous unethical behavior." The Board may be "in violation of The Florida Sunshine Law and the Florida Administrative Laws." The behavior of the Board's representative "in trying to deceive" Petitioner on this issue is "certainly a red flag" and indicates a necessity to notify all previous testing applicants to make sure they are aware of the proposed rule change before adoption. The Florida Administrative Weekly alone is not "a well read media for the general [sic] affected masses." Florida law states that any substantially affected person may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule by filing with DOAH a petition seeking such a determination within 21 days after the date of publication of the notice required by Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner timely filed a petition challenging the proposed change to an existing rule. Petitioner believes the term "substantial" denotes "having a reasonable basis in law and fact" and that the term "reasonable" denotes "that which is fair, proper or moderate under the circumstances." Petitioner believes it is Respondent's "negligence in complying with FS 120, FS 119 that gives Petitioner standing in this case." Petitioner made a "public information request" sometime in July 2003. Respondent did not provide the information in the months of August and September 2003. In September 2003, Respondent requested Petitioner to pay $90.00 for release of part of the information requested by Petitioner. The information Respondent agreed to release included: statistical data broken down by race and sex identifying each applicant by assigned number and a list of the "number of applicants" who sat for the past five professional engineer exams; the number of times "testees" took the test; raw and converted scores; the "city of the testees"; and the race and sex of the "testees." When Respondent requested the payment of $90.00, Respondent failed to disclose that Respondent would not release all of the requested information. Respondent did not release the "testees' candidate numbers." There may be no statutory exemption for "testees' candidate numbers." Petitioner believes Respondent violated Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (2003), by exceeding the statutory time limit for releasing public records and by not releasing all of the information that Petitioner requested. Petitioner believes that Petitioner is entitled to all of the information she requested, asserts that it is a misdemeanor to violate Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (2003), and alleges that such a violation is grounds for removal or impeachment. Petitioner believes Respondent failed to grant Petitioner a public hearing in violation of applicable rulemaking procedures. During a conversation with a representative for Respondent concerning Petitioner's request for information, the representative failed to advise Petitioner of the proposed rule change advertised in the Florida Administrative Weekly on October 10, 2003. If the proposed rule change were adopted, "without credibly addressing the remaining issues of Petitioner's public records request," there may be no further opportunity to retrieve the data now in the possession of Respondent. Respondent accepted payment for the requested data, cashed Petitioner's check, and "arrogantly" released what information Respondent felt Petitioner should have. Counsel for Respondent advised Petitioner that Respondent would not cash Petitioner's check, but would return the check to Petitioner. Counsel for Respondent also threatened in a telephone conversation to advise Respondent not to grant the request and to require Petitioner to come to Florida and "go through the records" herself. Petitioner requested counsel for Respondent to put the requested information in "chart form." Counsel stated he would not advise Respondent to place the information in any particular format. Counsel was "extremely hostile and arrogant" and "later apologized for his behavior." However, Petitioner believes counsel for Respondent is "extremely hot tempered with certain people." Counsel for Respondent stated to Petitioner that Respondent would release the information "just as it is" in Respondent's database, and Petitioner could then put the information in any format she desired. That is "exactly what Respondent did. The information was extremely fragmented and difficult to read." Respondent had "no credible basis" for denying Petitioner the requested information. Petitioner believes that Respondent's action, "at best was deceptive and nonresponsive to Petitioner's inquiry." The trier of fact cannot summarize the next assumptive finding from Petitioner's response to the Motion to Dismiss, but must quote from the response. On October 16, 2003, Petitioner asked [Respondent's representative] via e-mail for the immediate release of all data whether electronic or written or telephonic messaging; and any and all communications between staff, and any other entity, person, corporation, business, governmental agency relative to the proposed change of scores, etc. Identify the date of origination of the proposed rule change and the reason for the proposed change. Please indicate any Board action on this issue and the date of Board action. Please include any supportive reports or data submitted to the Board to support or necessitate the need for a change in policy. Lastly, will the legislature need to act on your proposed rule change? As the e-mails will illustrate [the representative] continued to deny that any rule change existed pertaining to the very same public records request by Petitioner. The actions of [the representative] breached the public trust [and] eroded the fiber of 'ethics' in government. When Petitioner found the proposed rule change in the October 10, 2003, issue of the Administrative Weekly, [the representative] was listed as the contact person. Petitioner believes Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2003), creates a two-pronged right to participation in the rulemaking process, i.e., "those [at] whom the intended action is directed and those who may just be affected by the new rule." Rulemaking procedures require notice to all persons named in the rule and to all persons who have timely requested notice. Respondent conducted its "rule change meeting in a closed meeting not open to the public." The records of that meeting are not available to the public. The Florida Administrative Weekly is not a well read publication for the "affected parties, directly affected parties, or the intended target parties." Therefore, Petitioner believes "in the spirit of open government, Respondents [sic] failed to meet the standard."
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Dawn Jenkins (“Jenkins”) failed to meet the Deferred Retirement Option Program (“DROP”) termination requirements set forth in chapter 121, Florida Statutes; and, if so, whether Petitioner, Town of Miami Lakes (“Miami Lakes,” the “Town,” or “Petitioner”), is required to reimburse Respondent, Department of Management Services (“DMS”), Division of Retirement (“DOR” or “Respondent”), for the overpayment of retirement benefits paid to Jenkins.
Findings Of Fact DMS is the state agency delegated to administer FRS. The Florida Legislature created DOR to manage the retirement plans and programs under FRS within DMS. FRS is a retirement program for state and local government employees administered pursuant to chapter 121. All state agencies participate in FRS. Local governments have the option of joining the plan if they meet certain requirements set out in statute and rule. Participating employers agree to follow chapter 121 and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 60S when they join FRS. Petitioner is the Town, a State of Florida municipal government located within Miami-Dade County and duly charted on December 5, 2000. In January 2004, the Town joined FRS as a participating employer. Jenkins was a member of FRS through her employment with Miami- Dade County Public Schools. Jenkins entered DROP and received two one- year extensions (totaling seven years) until her retirement, effective June 8, 2018. Before entering DROP, Jenkins signed a DP-Term form on May 7, 2018. The DROP termination notification form specified that Jenkins had to “terminate all employment relationships with all participating FRS employers for the first 6 calendar months after [her] DROP termination date.” Clary Garcia Ramos (“Clary”) is a Town employee. In her regularly established position, Clary teaches yoga part time at a community center for the Town and is paid $25.00 per hour per class. She has worked for Miami Lakes for approximately 15 years and is covered under the FRS. In the fall of 2018, Clary was having bilateral knee replacement surgery and asked her longtime friend Jenkins to help her out and cover her yoga classes with the Town while she was out after her surgery. Clary and Jenkins have known each other for approximately 15 years and obtained their yoga education together. Jenkins, a certified yoga instructor, agreed to help Clary out with her classes for September and October 2018. Miami Lakes did not post a position opening nor conduct interviews for a back-up, part-time yoga instructor. Before Jenkins started filling in for Clary, Jenkins was instructed to fill out paperwork to start the position. She first filled out an employment application dated August 22, 2015, and then a second one with the corrected date of August 22, 2018, for the position of yoga instructor. On the completed application, Jenkins informed the Town that she had retired from Miami-Dade County Public Schools with “40 years of service” on June 8, 2018. The last detachable page of the application allowed the Town to perform Jenkins’ required background screening since she would be teaching yoga with seniors, a vulnerable population. Only the last page of the application pertains to a background check. On or about August 31, 2018, Jenkins received an offer of employment letter signed by Town Manager Alex Rey (“Rey”) regarding the position she was filling in for Clary. The letter stated: SUBJECT: EMPLOYMENT LETTER Dear Ms. Jenkins: On behalf of the Town of Miami Lakes, I would like to offer you the position of Back up-Part-Time Instructor, Yoga. Instructors work under the supervision of the Leisure Services Manager and are required to select, plan, and teach cultural classes for youth and adults. Your supervisor will determine your schedule for yoga classes. This position start date is September [12], 2018 and the rate of pay will be $26.00 per hour. Each time you are scheduled to work, you will be required to submit a time sheet to your supervisor. This position qualifies for participation under the Florida Retirement System (FRS), and 3% employee contribution is mandatory. This employment offer is contingent upon satisfactory results of the following pre-employment requirements: Criminal Background check and Drug Screening Proof of required education, certifications and/or licenses This is an exciting step for the Town of Miami Lakes, and we look forward to you joining our team. Should this offer be considered acceptable, please sign below and return [i]t to the attention of Cynthia Alejo, Human Resources Specialist, to complete your pre-employment process. Jenkins signed the employment offer letter and accepted the FRS position from Miami Lakes on September 4, 2018. Rey was the town manager for Miami Lakes during all times material to this case. He was the chief executive of the Town and oversaw human resources. Cynthia Alejo (“Alejo”) was the Town’s part-time human resources specialist, who served as the assistant to Rey in the Human Resources Department. Alejo used Clary’s offer letter as a template when she drafted the employment offer letter that Jenkins signed. Ismael Diaz (“Diaz”), the Town’s comptroller and chief financial officer, was off work during October 2018 on vacation. While Clary was out recuperating, Jenkins performed yoga instruction to the seniors for the Town in her place. Jenkins was paid a rate of pay of $26.00 per hour per class. However, while in Clary’s position, Jenkins did not receive the benefits available for employees or receive orientation or training for new employees. Jenkins taught 16 one-hour yoga classes to senior citizens from September 13, 2018, until October 11, 2018. Jenkins was paid and received, as agreed in the terms of her employment offer letter, a total of $442.00 for the yoga classes she taught for the Town. The Town erroneously reported Jenkins to FRS. The Town’s monthly reports specifically included Jenkins under a preretirement code, which alerted DOR internally that a person who had retired was being reported within the first 12 months after retirement. Each month that Jenkins worked, the Town reported her wages to DOR and made retirement contributions to DOR with the payroll reports. During the period when the Town reported Jenkins to DOR as an employee for three consecutive months on its retirement reports, the wrong codes registered errors. DOR notified the Town that Jenkins should not be reported in that way. The Town could have corrected the errors. However, the Town never provided a correction report to change Jenkins’ status. Instead, by the Town continuously reporting Jenkins as an employee, a DOR review of Jenkins’ retirement status was triggered. Eventually, Jenkins found out that she was being reported as an employee to DOR by the Town and her DROP retirement funds were in jeopardy. On or about December 3, 2018, Jenkins complained to DMS, Office of Inspector General, regarding her potential violation of FRS rules. Jenkins was informed in writing that her complaint was being referred to DOR for review. Jenkins also telephoned DMS several times, including December 3, 10, and 11, 2018, and February 8, 2019, requesting a review of her reemployment status and possible voiding of DROP. Jenkins requested to speak with an FRS specialist regarding her FRS retirement issue by email on December 10, 2018. At one point, Jenkins spoke to Kathy Gould, DOR bureau chief of calculations, and informed her that the reporting of her as an employee was a mistake and she was just covering for a friend who was out after having surgery. Because of the variety of Jenkins’ requests to review her retirement issue, which included the inspector general complaint and the multiple payroll report errors reported for Jenkins, DOR investigated Jenkins’ retirement status. June Moore (“Moore”), from the retirement calculations section at DOR, handled Jenkins’ review for DOR. On or about December 13, 2018, Moore started looking into the Jenkins’ retirement issue and contacted the Town’s comptroller, Diaz, by email requesting Jenkins’ personnel action form when she was hired and informing the Town that Jenkins was reemployed with Miami Lakes and “in violation of [her] termination date.” That same day, Diaz emailed Alejo, copying Moore, to update Alejo that he had spoken with Moore and told her the Town had also issued Jenkins an offer letter. In the email, Diaz asked Alejo to provide Moore’s requested information and suggested that the situation be mitigated so that Jenkins did not suffer any financial loss. Diaz also suggested that Jenkins could perhaps return the $400.00 earned. Moore responded 30 minutes later by email, “We are still reviewing this account. Once we receive the documents from your agency we will let you know what the outcome is.” The next day, Alejo sent Moore Jenkins’ two personnel action forms dated September 25, 2018, and October 12, 2018, and the August 31, 2018, offer letter that had been executed by Jenkins. Alejo stated in the email that: [Jenkins] was also under the impression that as a temporary employee, this would not affect her retirement. As Mr. Diaz mentions, Ms. Jenkins is willing to return all funds back to the Town and instead be considered a volunteer. While we don’t know if that’s a possibility, we are willing to help in any way so that Ms. Jenkins does not suffer a financial loss. Both personnel action forms dated September 25, 2018, and October 12, 2018, listed Jenkins as a temporary part-time, hourly wage, non- exempt employee. Each form had FRS checked under the benefits section. Additionally, the September form had “temporary coverage for Clary” written on it and the October form had checked resigned with notice and “temp position” written on it. Jenkins also received an Internal Revenue Service W-2 wage and tax statement from Miami Lakes for her services of working as a yoga instructor at the Town in Clary’s place. On or about February 12, 2019, Alejo sent a memorandum to Diaz that was contrary to all the previous employment records the Town had regarding Jenkins’ employment. The memorandum changed Jenkins’ status to a volunteer and referenced her $26 per hour payments as a stipend. The memorandum stated: After a review of our records, it has come to my attention that Ms. Dawn Jenkins, who assisted the Town of Miami Lakes (the “Town”) as a senior fitness class volunteer during September 19, 2018 thru October 11, 2018 and was inadvertently classified as a Town of Miami Lakes employee. Additionally, a review of our records reveals that Ms. Jenkins did not receive a salary for her services. The only monetary contribution from the Town was in the form of a $26.00 daily stipend. Ms. Jenkins became a volunteer following her friend’s knee incident which required surgery. The Town required Ms. Jenkins to complete an application and consent to a criminal background search, which is standard policy for any volunteer that engages with vulnerable children or adults. Upon receipt of Ms. Jenkins application, the Town in error, reported Ms. Jenkins wages to the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”). The error was discovered within a month or so, and by that time, Ms. Jenkins had already stopped volunteering and was thereby removed from our payroll system. As a follow-up, the Town will need the assistance of the FRS administration to correct the error reported. FRS is under the impression that Ms. Jenkins abused the system by seeking re- employment after retirement. As detailed in this memorandum, this is not the case. Ms. Jenkins, at no time during the period of September 19 thru October 11, 2018 served the Town as a salaried employee. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. On February 19, 2019, DOR issued a final agency action letter, notifying Jenkins that she was “subject to the termination requirement found in [section] 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes,” and that she was required to “repay all retirement benefits previously paid to [her], as provided in Rule 60S-4.012, Florida Administrative Code,” in the amount of $445,013.04. Jenkins petitioned for, and received, a section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing in response to the notice of intended agency action that would have required her to repay her DROP payout and the retirement benefits she had received. The DOAH case number assigned to that proceeding is 19-1692. Case No. 19-1692 was litigated through the final hearing. At that final hearing, the parties presented evidence and testimony of the same witnesses in this proceeding. After the administrative hearing on December 20, 2019, DMS and Jenkins entered into a Settlement Agreement to resolve the issues related to her termination of DROP and retirement benefits. As part of the Settlement Agreement, Jenkins’ benefit amount was recalculated based on the additional service credit she earned for the years she participated in DROP. The Settlement Agreement also deducted $464.86 monthly from Jenkins’ retirement benefits for a lifetime to repay $445,013.04, the overpayment amount in DROP benefits. In addition, a part of the Settlement Agreement obligated DMS to seek reimbursement for the entire debt, $445,013.04, from Miami Lakes. After settling the case with DMS, Jenkins voluntarily dismissed Case No. 19-1692 with prejudice. On October 2, 2020, DMS then issued its Notice of Intended Agency Action against the Town, informing Miami Lakes that due to hiring Jenkins on September 12, 2018, her FRS termination requirement of ceasing all employment with an FRS employer for six calendar months was never satisfied and, as a result, whenever a participating employer employs a retired FRS member in violation of the termination requirements, both the employee and the participating employer are liable for repayment of the money to the FRS Trust Fund in accordance with section 121.091(9)(c)3. The notice included an invoice demanding payment from the Town of the full amount of the “overpayment of benefits” to Jenkins. The Town timely filed a Petition for Formal Hearing contesting the agency action letter. Ultimate Findings of Fact Upon careful consideration of the entire record, it is determined that DMS has demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence that Jenkins was an employee of Miami Lakes instructing yoga from September 2018 to October 2018, while Clary was out recuperating. It is interesting to note that, even though Jenkins testified at hearing, she did not believe providing services to the Town to help a friend who was having knee surgery was violating the DROP agreement, and she did not realize that Miami Lakes was a participating employer with FRS when she substituted for Clary while she was out recuperating. Jenkins did admit that she understood the DP-Term form she signed, which specified that she could not work for any FRS entities. Jenkins was also honest and forthright and admitted at hearing that she did not read the September 4, 2018, employment offer letter that she signed when she accepted the FRS position. Had she read the employment letter, she would have been put on notice that the position she was taking was “under the Florida Retirement System, and 3% employee contribution is mandatory.” At hearing, Alejo testified that it was her first time processing an employee covering for another employee. Notwithstanding her lack of experience, the evidence establishes Jenkins was employed with Miami Lakes. In this matter, Miami Lakes was notified of Jenkins’ retirement on June 8, 2018, from Miami-Dade County Public Schools on her employment application before she started the position. Also, the Town offered Jenkins employment through Rey, the Town’s human resources chief executive. The employment offer letter informed Jenkins who her supervisor was and specified participation in FRS, which both Rey and Jenkins signed. Additionally, the Town checked FRS twice under Jenkins’ benefit sections on both her personnel action forms. Likewise, the September personnel action form had “temporary coverage for Clary” written on it and the other form had “temp position” written on it. The evidence also demonstrates that the Town reported Jenkins’ wages as an employee three months in a row and made retirement contributions to DOR on three consecutive payroll reports. At hearing, Dr. Joyce Morgan credibly testified that even after DOR notified Miami Lakes that there was an error in reporting Jenkins, they continued to report her in November and December 2018, and the Town never attempted to correct the error or contact DOR to get help in correcting any errors.1 In addition, the Town properly issued Jenkins a W-2 tax statement as an employee for instructing yoga for Miami Lakes not a 1099 statement. At hearing, the record not only shows Miami Lakes hired Jenkins as an employee, but was fully aware of her employee status with the Town. The evidence demonstrates that Diaz, the comptroller, confirmed by his December 13, 2018, email that Jenkins’ status was a Town employee when he informed Moore that Jenkins had executed an employment offer letter and Diaz attempted to assist mitigate Jenkins’ financial loss with DOR by suggesting her pay be returned to the Town. Additionally, Alejo further established Miami Lakes’ full knowledge of Jenkins’ status as an employee with the Town in her email of December 14, 2018, when she admitted she did not know if it were possible, but offered to help Jenkins not suffer a financial loss by suggesting to Moore to change Jenkins’ title so Jenkins could be considered a volunteer and return the money paid. The record also demonstrates that it was not until almost two months later in February 2019, that the Town’s Human Resource Department actually reclassified Jenkins’ title to a senior fitness volunteer and renamed her “rate of pay” that had formally been $26.00 per hour in the employment offer letter to a “$26.00 daily stipend” in an internal memorandum2 that Alejo sent to Diaz. 1 The undersigned is not persuaded that the Town’s reporting error was caused because Comptroller Diaz was out on vacation during October 2018, because the errors were not corrected after Diaz returned and have not been corrected as of the date of the hearing. Additionally, the Town’s errors are not determinative of Jenkins’ employment status. Any contention that correcting the error in the payroll report would have an impact on changing Jenkins’ employee status is misplaced. To that end, the payroll report does not determine Jenkins’ employment status. 2 The undersigned rejects the memorandum as reliable evidence to help determine Jenkins’ employment status since the record demonstrates that Alejo had been working on Jenkins’ behalf to help her from receiving a financial loss for approximately two months. An internal title change by the Town did not change Jenkins’ status as a temporary yoga employee for Miami Lakes. Additionally, the record shows that the Town did not process Jenkins as it did for other volunteers. At hearing, Rey testified that there were categories of volunteers: resident volunteers that served on different committees and volunteers through agreements. Rey explained that volunteers with the Town are non- paid persons and the Town only reimburses volunteers for supplies by providing the funds or obtaining a receipt for reimbursement, neither of which occurred with Jenkins. Rey also testified that upon learning there was an issue with Jenkins’ employment, he explained to Jenkins that she had been hired by Miami Lakes as a “temporary employee to cover for a limited period of time.” Rey also testified that Jenkins was never considered a volunteer for the Town. Therefore, the greater weight of the evidence in this cause establishes that Miami Lakes employed Jenkins as a temporary yoga instructor. Hence, Jenkins was reemployed by an FRS employer, Miami Lakes.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Onier Llopiz, Esquire Joan Carlos Wizel, Esquire Lydecker Diaz 1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Gayla Grant, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order that: Finds that Jenkins’ reemployment with Miami Lakes, an FRS municipality, failed to meet the DROP termination requirements; Upholds DMS’s October 2, 2020, notice of intended agency action that the Town of Miami Lakes is jointly and severally liable for repayment; Requires the Town of Miami Lakes to pay back the total overpayment of Jenkins’ benefits in the amount of $445.013.04; and Allows the Town of Miami Lakes to repay the overpayment in installments over a three- to five-year period. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2021. Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Gayla Grant, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Onier Llopiz, Esquire Lydecker LLP 1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 Joan Carlos Wizel, Esquire Lydecker LLP 1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 Kristen Larson, Interim General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Trey D. Evans, Esquire Lydecker LLP 1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor Miami, Florida 33131
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the party resides. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
