The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an act of discrimination in employment based on age, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born on December 11, 1951. She was employed by Respondent from 1977 until December 27, 1999, at which time Respondent terminated her. During the entire term of her employment, Petitioner has served as an outside sales representative. As an outside sales representative, Petitioner was typically assigned a territory within which she was to serve existing advertisers and develop new advertisers. Petitioner often helped customers prepare their advertisements and plan and budget their advertising campaigns. While employed with Respondent, Petitioner helped train Mr. Fine, who has been employed with Respondent for nearly 13 years. Mr. Fine is currently the National Advertising Director, but, during the time in question, served as the Broward Advertising Sales Manager, and, as such, he supervised Petitioner. He served as the Broward Advertising Sales Manager from September 1998 through February or March 2000. While Broward Advertising Sales Manager, Mr. Fine supervised eight sales representatives. Mr. Fine found that Petitioner was strong in persuasiveness, but weak at times when she displayed a negative attitude and sense of entitlement to her job and her way of doing her job. She also treated customers inconsistently. In February 1999, Mr. Fine disciplined Petitioner for her handling of an internal fax that the Broward office received from an employee of Respondent in another office. The fax was addressed to a member of management and contained salary information about five persons in the office. Petitioner happened to find the fax and revealed its contents to her coworkers before delivering it to the addressee. When Mr. Fine reprimanded Petitioner for her actions, she denied any wrongdoing. Next, Mr. Fine began receiving complaints from various of Petitioner's customers, mostly over a relatively short period of time. A marketing person at the Swap Shop complained that Petitioner was brusque in dealing with her. Another customer representative mentioned that Petitioner had criticized one of her coworkers in suggesting that the customer place all of its business with Petitioner. A similar situation arose with another customer, to whom Petitioner claimed that its outside sales representative handled only smaller accounts. A representative of the Florida Philharmonic Orchestra requested that Mr. Fine assign it a new outside sales representative because Petitioner raised her voice and talked down to its young, inexperienced marketing person. On June 29, 1999, Mr. Fine sent a memorandum to his supervisor, Donna Sasser, who was then Advertising Director. The memorandum describes Petitioner as "dynamite" and expresses concern as to when she "will blow and who she will hurt." At the time, Mr. Fine was concerned that Petitioner's actions might undermine morale among the other staff for whom he was responsible. Ms. Sasser advised Mr. Fine to communicate to Petitioner specific expectations in terms of job performance and customer interaction in particular. Mr. Fine met with Petitioner and detailed his problems with her job performance and his expectations for improvement. By memorandum dated July 30, 1999, Mr. Fine memorialized the meeting, including specific customer complaints, and warned that Petitioner's job "will end, even within the next few weeks, if you are unable to achieve the following: no additional customer complaints, monthly goals [met] on a consistent basis; positive, collaborative attitude with co-workers, customers, and managers; [and] acceptance of responsibility for what goes well and what does not go well." Petitioner resisted Mr. Fine's criticism. By memorandum dated August 22, 1999, she defended her actions by pointing to shortcomings elsewhere within Respondent. Significantly, the memorandum does not address the complaints about brusque, discourteous treatment of employees of customers. At this point, Mr. Fine, who was a young manager, was legitimately concerned about whether Petitioner's attitude would undermine his ability to do his job. Mr. Fine resolved to assess over the next three to six months whether Petitioner met the goals that he stated in the July 30 memorandum. In late October 1999, a representative of the Cleveland Clinic complained about Petitioner's handling of its account. The complaints included Petitioner's "flip attitude" and "lack of professionalism." Two months later, Mr. Fine received a more serious complaint because it involved a loss of revenue to Respondent and the advertiser. Due to some miscommunication, Respondent published the wrong advertisement for a customer. When the customer's representative telephoned Petitioner and complained, she blamed someone at the Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel, who had supplied her the wrong advertisement for publication. When she did not call him back on the day that she had promised, the customer representative called Respondent, complained about the poor handling of the account, noted the reduction in advertising from his company over the past year as compared to the prior year, and requested a different outside sales representative. Mr. Fine consulted with Ms. Sasser and Janet Stone, the Human Relations specialist assigned to advertising. The three agreed that Respondent should terminate Petitioner. Their decision was submitted through four levels of management--up to the level of Publisher--and each level approved the decision before it was implemented. On December 27, 1999--six days after the receipt of the last complaint--Mr. Fine and Ms. Stone met with Petitioner and told her that she had been terminated. At the hearing, Petitioner presented evidence of a contemporaneous complaint about age discrimination that she had made to a Human Relations specialist who had since left the employment of Respondent. Respondent contested this assertion, but Petitioner's August 22 memorandum states that, as a "female over 40 I feel the harassment and stress that you have been putting on me is totally unnecessary." Although not a formal complaint concerning age discrimination, this memorandum is an early mention of Petitioner's age within the context of harassment. Based on the testimony of coworkers, Mr. Fine was a high-pressure manager, given to yelling, but he did not make age-related comments to Petitioner. Even if Petitioner had timely made comprehensive complaints about age discrimination, the record in this case does not support her claim that her termination was due to age discrimination. Mr. Fine hired two outside sales representatives over 40 years old, and the only other outside sales representative whom he fired was under 40 years old. More importantly, he treated employees the same without regard to age. Most importantly, Petitioner's job performance provided Mr. Fine with ample reason to fire her. Without regard to the quality of the support that Petitioner received, customer satisfaction is paramount in advertising. In a competitive environment, Mr. Fine justifiably sought satisfaction of all customers, not just favored customers. Mr. Fine could not reasonably allow Petitioner to continue to treat discourteously representatives of advertisers, regardless of the merits of her claims of inadequate support. Past evaluations suggest that interpersonal relations was never Petitioner's strength. Despite an obvious talent at advertising sales and considerable experience, Petitioner's frustrations with the perceived incompetence of her coworkers and customers' employees weakened her interpersonal skills beyond a critical point, so that her other strengths no longer offset this important deficit.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jan Hall-Szugye 3834 Panther Creek Road Clyde, North Carolina 28721 Ellen M. Leibovitch Adorno & Yoss, P.A. 700 South Federal Highway, Suite 200 Boca Raton, Florida 33432
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device in any business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for issuing real estate sales associate licenses and monitoring compliance with all statutes, rules, and regulations governing such licenses. Respondent was at all times relevant to this proceeding a licensed real estate sales associate in the State of Florida and held License No. 3115665. In March 2006, Respondent was introduced to Willie Belle Lewis (Lewis) by a mutual acquaintance. Lewis was interested in selling her house, and Respondent agreed to work for Lewis in that regard. On March 13, 2006, Lewis and Respondent entered into an Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Agreement (the "Agreement"). Under the Agreement, Respondent was to act as Lewis' sales agent for sale of the house. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Agreement, Respondent was to receive a commission of six percent of the purchase price. Respondent initially requested a seven percent commission which was the ordinary and customary amount at that time, but agreed to six percent in deference to Lewis' request (and due to the fact that Lewis had recently lost her grandmother and Respondent empathized with her, having just lost her mother). In one version of the Agreement admitted into evidence, there is a notation that any cooperating real estate agent (presumably a buyer's agent) would receive a commission equal to three percent of the purchase price, i.e., one-half of Respondent's six percent commission. Another version of the Agreement admitted into evidence did not address sharing the commission with a cooperating agent. At some point in time (which was not clearly defined during testimony at final hearing) Lewis and Respondent re-negotiated the amount of Respondent's commission.2 Lewis maintains that the re-negotiated commission was three percent; Respondent says the re-negotiated commission was four percent. Respondent's testimony was more credible on this point. The amount of the new commission was not reduced to writing or indicated on either version of the Agreement. There is no indication, for example, what Respondent's commission would have been if a cooperating agent had been involved. It is highly unlikely that Respondent or any other agent would agree to a two percent commission, i.e., one-half of four percent (or 1.5 percent, one-half of three percent). Once the Agreement was signed, Respondent immediately began efforts to sell the Lewis house. Respondent invited Lewis to her (Respondent's) house and offered Lewis plants and flowers from Respondent's yard. Respondent and Lewis dug up various plants and transferred them to Lewis' yard to generate some "curb appeal," i.e., to dress it up for potential buyers. Within days, a potential buyer was found. A Contract for Sale and Purchase (the "Contract") was entered into between Lewis and Mrs. Bibi Khan. Respondent was listed as the seller's agent; no agent was indicated for the buyer. In fact, Respondent agreed to act as buyer's agent as well, performing services as both an agent and a broker. Again, there were two versions of the sales Contract admitted into evidence. On one version, Respondent's signature included only her first name; on the other it included her first and last name. On one version of the Contract, there appears to be "white-out" on Respondent's signature line. Contained and legible under the whited-out portion of the signature is the phrase "3%." Respondent admits she whited out the three percent figure, but that it was done after the closing occurred. The three percent figure appearing at that place in the Contract is confusing. It only makes sense if that was meant to represent Respondent's portion of a six percent commission split between a buyer's agent and a seller's agent. Respondent explained that she whited out the figure because it was not written in both places it was supposed to be. Rather than going through the process of re-doing the entire Contract and re-distributing it to all pertinent parties, she whited it out in one place. The explanation is plausible. However, it seems an unnecessary action inasmuch as the closing had already occurred. When the parties arrived at closing on April 17, 2006, the closing documents--including the HUD Settlement Statement-- indicated a six percent commission for Respondent (as originally stated on the Agreement). Lewis vehemently objected to the commission, saying that it should be three percent as verbally agreed to by her and Respondent.3 Respondent acquiesced at closing and, in front of witnesses, said the commission should be three percent. She asked that a letter be drafted by the closing agent reflecting a three percent commission. In effect, Respondent re-negotiated her commission at that time. She rues having done so and says she was confused, but she did so nonetheless. The closing was only the third closing Respondent had taken part in since becoming licensed. She was not very experienced with the process and seemed to be thinking she was getting a four percent commission, even when three percent was being discussed.4 It is clear, however, that Respondent did verbally agree to a three percent commission during the closing. The closing agent told Lewis to return on Monday and she would re-calculate the commission and provide Lewis with a final check in the appropriate amount. Meanwhile, Respondent attempted to contact Lewis over the weekend to discuss the discrepancy. Respondent wanted to remind Lewis they had agreed on four percent despite what she said at the closing. All attempts at communication with Lewis over the weekend were futile. When Lewis returned to the closing office on the following Monday, she found the check to still be in error as it reflected a four percent commission instead of a three percent commission. Apparently when Respondent advised the closing agent about her mistake regarding the amount of the commission, Respondent still maintained that the verbal agreement was for four percent. This was contrary to her statements during the closing and is not substantiated by any written documentation. Respondent directed the closing agent to issue a check reflecting a four percent commission, instead of the six percent commission reflected on the Agreement. Lewis ultimately, under protest, accepted her $74,264.92 check reflecting a four percent commission to Respondent. The check contained a shortage of $1,600, if a three percent commission had been applied. Lewis continued to seek repayment of the $1,600 she believed she was entitled to receive. Subsequently, Respondent discussed the entire dispute with her sales team and decided that the disputed amount ($1,600) was not worth fighting about. A check was then sent to Lewis in that amount.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, imposing a fine of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) against Respondent, Marian Lemon Coaxum. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Lee County School District (District) Invitation to Bid #4908 (ITB) was provided to the vendors on December 9, 1992. The ITB sought bids for 61 hardware and tool items to be used in the District Supply Department. The District maintains an inventory of hundreds of miscellaneous hardware items. Quantities of available materials are monitored through a computerized system which is used to generate a list of items which need to be replenished. The District has historically utilized ITB's to acquire hardware items in order to maintain appropriate inventory levels. Eight sealed bids were opened on January 6, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. Bids were submitted by Parker-Mahn Ace Hardware, W.W. Grainger, Action Bolt & Tool, Biscayne Electric & Hardware Distributors, Bob Dean Supply, Scotty's, Shadbolt & Boyd, and the Petitioner. The ITB states that the School District of Lee County: reserves the right to waive minor variations to specifications, informalities, irregularities and technicalities in any bids; to reject any and all bids in whole or in part with or without cause, and/or to accept bids that in its judgement will be in the best interest of the District. The District further reserves the right to make awards on a multiple, lump sum, or individual item basis or combination as shall best serve the interest of the District unless otherwise stated. Three of the vendors bid on all 61 items. The remaining vendors bid on some but not all of the items. The bids were tabulated by personnel in the Purchasing Department. The information in the bids is set forth in tabulation sheets which facilitate comparison of buds. On January 7, 1993, the Petitioner sent a letter to the Respondent stating that there were only "two authentic submissions: Ace Hardware and S.W. Supply, Inc." The tabulation sheets and additional materials included in the bid responses were forwarded to the Supply Department where supply personnel reviewed the submissions and made recommendations to the Purchasing Department as to which vendors should receive awards. As part of the evaluation of the bid proposals, the District determined that the cost of the total bid award would be lower if the awards were made on an individual item basis. The District considered prompt payment discounts in making this determination. The total amount of the proposed awards to the eight vendors is $7,104.55. Were the Petitioner to receive awards for all items, the total amount of the award would be $7,965.00, accounting for the Petitioner's proposed prompt payment discount. The Purchasing Department posted a Notice of Intention to Award on January 15, 1993. The proposed awards were made on an individual item basis. All eight vendors received awards. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner timely filed a notice of protest. Subsequent to the January 15 posting, the Petitioner discovered several errors in determining the proposed awards. In the Petitioner's formal protest, four awards are identified as incorrect. Despite the Petitioner protest, the first item identified was correctly awarded because the Petitioner failed to account for the prompt payment discount offered by the winning vendor. A second item protest was based on clerical error and was withdrawn by the Petitioner. The two remaining items were resolved and were addressed in a corrected Notice of Intention to Award posted February 16, 1993. There is no evidence that the errors were other than mistakes made in calculation or transcription of bid data from the vendor's documents to the bid tabulation form. No further specifically challenged items were identified by the Petitioner prior to the hearing. General condition 1.d. of the ITB states as follows: For purposes of evaluation, the bidder must indicate any variances from specifications, terms and/or conditions regardless of how slight. If variations are not stated in the proposal, it will be assumed that the product or service fully complies with the specifications, terms and conditions herein. (emphasis supplied) General condition 6 of the ITB states as follows: Use of brand names, trade names, make, model, manufacturer, or vendor Catalog Number in the specifications is for the purpose of establishing a grade or quality of material only. It is not the District's intent to rule out other competition; therefore, the phrase OR APPROVED EQUAL is added. However, if a product other that specified is bid, it is the vendor's responsibility to submit with the bid brochures, samples and/or detailed specifications on item(s) bid. The District shall be the sole judge concerning the merits of bids submitted. If a bidder does not indicate what he is offering in the proper blank and if the bidder is successful in being awarded the item(s) then the bidder shall be obligated to furnish the specified item(s). If packing is different from that specified, the bidder must note manner and amounts in which packing is to be made. (emphasis supplied) Only one vendor, Parker-Mahn Ace Hardware, proposed to supply all items exactly as specified in the ITB. The remaining vendor proposals included at least some items which varied in some respects from the items identified in the ITB. Where a vendor fails to identify that a product bid is "not as specified", the proposal is evaluated as if all specifications have been met, in which event, price is the determining factor in determining the award. Where a vendor identifies a variance related to a specified item, the proposal is evaluated as if all specifications other than the identified variance are met. If the product is determined by the Supply Department to be the equivalent of the product identified in the ITB, price is again the determining factor in determining the award. Where the ITB specifies a brand name followed by the word "ONLY", the vendor may not bid another brand. Where the ITB does not qualify the brand name as "only", the vendor may propose an equivalent product. Where a vendor does not identify the brand name of the item to be supplied, the vendor presumed to be bidding an item which will meet the specifications. If the vendor delivers goods which are not as specified, the District rejects delivery and cancels the order. The evidence establishes that, where bid items were not as specified in the ITB, the District had access to sufficient information to permit a determination of equivalency and an award of bids. The evidence fails to establish that, except as stated herein, the Petitioner should have received an award other that as set forth in the February 16, 1993, Notice of Intent to Award. General condition 5 of the ITB states as follows: Cash discount for prompt payment of invoices will be considered in making awards. The District prefers cash discount items which allow at least twenty (20) days for approval and payment of invoices. Four vendors included proposals for prompt payment discounts in the responses. One vendor offered a 2 percent discount for payment within 20 days, one offered a 1 percent discount for payment within 15 days and one offered a 1 percent discount for payment within 10 days. The Petitioner offered a 12 per cent discount for payment within five days, but only if the Petitioner received the award for all items bid. The District preference for a 20 day payment period reflects the time needed to accept delivery, process invoices and make payment for goods received. The District has accepted a five day prompt payment discount when the purchase was for a single item and the delivery date was specified. Such payment is otherwise difficult and results in other vendor payments being delayed. There is no evidence that based on the costs of goods involved in this bid, the savings are of such event as to warrant such extraordinary treatment of deliveries and invoices. General condition 16 of the ITB states as follows: Any and all special conditions that may vary from these General Conditions shall have precedence. Special condition 1 of the ITB states as follows: A SAMPLE OR COMPLETE SPECIFICATION SHEET MUST ACCOMPANY EACH BID ITEM THAT IS NOT "AS SPECIFIED." IF AN ITEM CANNOT BE EVALUATED, IT WILL BE DISQUALIFIED. Parker-Mahn Ace Hardware submitted product brochures or other materials related to items bid. The Petitioner submitted an extensive selection of photocopies pages from a hardware product catalog. W.W. Grainger submitted an index of part numbers and identified where such parts could be located in the Grainger catalog, which was on file with the District. Action Bolt and Tool included product information by brand name and model number in the ITB response. The remaining four vendors (Biscayne Electric & Hardware Distributors, Bob Dean Supply, Scotty's, and Shadbolt & Boyd) attached no specification sheets or other descriptive materials for items bid. As stated previously, the ITB directed vendors to submit specification sheets for "not as specified" items. The request for such information was intended to facilitate the review of the bids by eliminating the need for District personnel to consult vendor product catalogs already in the District files. The ITB also provided for disqualification where an item could not be evaluated. The Petitioner asserts that the failure to submit such product information materials with the bids is a material defect which cannot be waived and which renders the bids nonresponsive. The evidence fails to support the assertion. Of the four vendors which included no specification sheets, all four had product catalogs on file in the Purchasing and/or Supply Departments of the Lee County School Board. The District had sufficient information to evaluate the bids submitted by the vendors with catalogs on file. The Petitioner asserts that it was disadvantaged by the District's decision to waive the failure to attach specification sheets where catalogs were on file, because it was allegedly not possible to compare his bid to those submitted by the other vendors. The evidence does not support the assertion. The relevant catalogs are on file in the Purchasing and Supply Departments of the District and are available for public inspection. There is no evidence that the Petitioner sought at any time to reference the materials on file. The fact that the omitted specification sheets made such a comparison less convenient than it would have been had such sheets been attached to the bids does not render the bid proposals nonresponsive. At hearing, the Petitioner challenged many of the individual intended awards announced by the District. Prior to the hearing, the Petitioner had not asserted that such items were inappropriately awarded. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would be entitled to an award of any of the additional items challenged at hearing. In the case of individual items, a bidder other than the Petitioner would be entitled to the award if the Petitioner's challenge succeeded. None of the other bidders challenged the proposed bid awards. No vendors intervened in this proceeding. Accordingly the Petitioner is not affected by such individual awards and is without standing to challenge the items first identified at hearing. The Petitioner asserted that if the low bidder for each identified product is disqualified, and the next lowest bid included in the total bid calculation, the Petitioner's total bid, including the prompt payment discount, would be lower than the total of individual bids, and that accordingly, he would be entitled to an award of all items. The evidence fails to support the assertion. The Petitioner identified one item at hearing for which the Petitioner should have received the award. The ITB sought bids to supply 24 galvanized one quart metal funnels, item #58115. One of the vendors proposed to supply a plastic funnel at a cost of .56 each. The next lowest bidder was the Petitioner which proposed to supply the metal funnel requested at a cost of $1.44 each. On a previous bid, a plastic funnel was proposed by a vendor and rejected by the District as not meeting the specifications. Although in the instant case, purchasing personnel were informed by supply personnel that a plastic funnel would serve the same purpose and was acceptable, the vendors were not provided the opportunity to bid on the provision of the plastic funnels. General condition 9.c. of the ITB states as follows: If the material and/or services supplied to the District is found to be defective or does not conform to specifications, the District reserves the right to cancel the order upon written notice to the seller and return the product to the seller at the seller's expense. In other words, the District has the right to reject delivery and cancel orders for items which are not as specified in the ITB and for which no variance was identified by the successful vendor. A vendor delivering goods which are not as specified in the vendor's proposal will not be invited to participate in the ITB process for an indeterminate period of time. At hearing, the Petitioner asserted that item #58800 (a plastic sheet of twelve garden hose washers) was mistakenly awarded to a vendor whose proposal was for individual washers rather than the sheet. The Respondent acknowledged that accordingly the proposed vendor's bid was not the lowest. The next two lowest bids (one of which is an "as specified" bid) were received from vendors other than the Petitioner. The Petitioner therefore would not receive this award. The Petitioner asserts that some bidders did not complete "drug-free workplace" forms. Although correct, the assertion is irrelevant. Such forms are used to determine award winners where there are identical bids ("ties"). There were no tie bids related to this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: The School Board of Lee County enter a Final Order directing that the District Purchasing Department refrain from purchasing item #58115 pending the next invitation to vendors to submit bids for miscellaneous hardware supplies and otherwise DISMISSING the Petitioner's Notice of Bid Protest. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 93-1260BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 7. Rejected, irrelevant. Item #58038 does not require that ONLY an Ace Hardware item may be bid. Based on the ITB, it is clear that the item bid by Action Bolt & Tool meets the specifications set forth in the proposal. 11-12. Rejected, irrelevant. 14. Rejected, irrelevant. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner attempted to obtain the materials used by District personnel to evaluate the bids. 16-17. Rejected, irrelevant. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 9. Rejected, immaterial. 23. Rejected, irrelevant. 28. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. James A. Adams Superintendent School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901-3988 Garey F. Butler, Esquire Humphrey & Knott 1625 Hendry Street Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Marianne Kantor, Esquire School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901-3988
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of a handicap.
Findings Of Fact Sometime in July 2002, Petitioner was hired by Respondent as a Store Clerk (now known as a Sales Associate) at Store No. 3727 in Panama City, Florida. On March 1, 2003, Petitioner was promoted to Lead Sales Associate. Sometime around December 2005, Petitioner was diagnosed with absolute glaucoma and cataracts. As a result of her deteriorating eyesight, Petitioner asked the Store’s Manager, Michaelene Mellor, to be reassigned to her earlier Sales Associate position. Although there was some conflict in the evidence on whether Petitioner was reassigned as a “store stocker,” the better evidence demonstrated that Dollar General did not have a formal position known as a “store stocker.” Dollar General did have a position known as a “Sales Associate.” The Sales Associate position consisted of a variety of duties. Essential to the position were the following: assist in setting and maintaining planograms and programs; build merchandise displays; operate a cash register; itemize and total a customer’s purchase; collect payment from a customer and make change; operate a handheld scanner; and assist with ordering merchandise and maintaining inventory in the store. Planograms are shelving strips that contain shelf tags. They are the method that employees use to place merchandise in the store and on the shelves. They also help in inventory control. Petitioner was reassigned by Ms. Mellor. Her primary duties were to stock the store by using the planograms and shelf tags. Ms. Mellor advised the District Manager about the reassignment. However, she did not inform the District Manager that Petitioner would primarily be limited to stocking the store. Under Ms. Mellor’s tenure as Store Manager, Store 3727 was not properly managed. The store was dirty, had incorrect or out-of-date signage, incomplete or nonexistent planograms, merchandise on the floor and blocking the aisles, and a high incidence of inventory loss. Because of these problems, Ms. Mellor was terminated in October 2006. That same month, Thomas Rector became the Store Manager. His goal was to bring the store into compliance with Dollar General’s operation policies and to reduce the store’s inventory loss. At the time Mr. Rector took over Store 3727, the store had 4 positions and 7 employees allotted to it. The positions were Store Manager, Assistant Store Manager, Lead Sales Associate and Sales Associate. Each store was allotted a specific number of labor hours, excluding the hours worked by the manager, to cover the hours the store is open for business. Because Store 3727 had only 7 employees, only two or three employees worked during any given shift. With so few employees to cover each shift, it was essential that all employees be able to perform all the duties of the position that they filled. In this case, it was essential that Petitioner be able to read a scanner, run the cash register, make change, read a planogram, read a shelf tag, locate merchandise and stock merchandise. For the next several months, Mr. Rector observed that Petitioner could not clock herself in or out of work. More importantly, he observed that Petitioner had difficulties in stocking merchandise in the proper place. He observed that other employees had to sometimes help Petitioner with stocking. Improperly stocked items caused inventory control problems, increased the labor hours used by the store because time was required to correctly place store items and could result in lost revenue due to improper pricing. He also observed that she had trouble reading the scanner, the planograms and shelf tags. Based on his observations, Mr. Rector concluded that Petitioner could not fulfill the duties of a Sales Associate. He contacted the District Manager, Joe Peebles, and advised him that Petitioner could not perform the duties of a Sales Associate. On June 6, 2007, Mr. Peebles met with Petitioner. He read her the list of duties that a Sales Associate must perform and asked her if she felt she could perform those duties. Those duties are outlined above. Petitioner admitted she had difficulty with reading a planogram and operating a cash register. Likewise at the hearing, Petitioner admitted and demonstrated that she could not accurately read a planogram or shelf tag. She admitted she could not build a merchandise display, could not operate a cash register and could not make change for a customer. The evidence was clear that Petitioner could not perform the essential functions of a Sales Associate. Eventually, Petitioner was placed on leave and was told that, if her vision did not improve, she would be terminated. At no time did Petitioner ask for or identify any reasonable accommodation that could be made by Respondent to enable her to perform her duties as a Sales Associate and the evidence did not reveal that any such accommodations existed or were available. Ultimately, Petitioner was terminated because she could not perform the duties of a Sales Associate. The evidence did not demonstrate that her termination was discriminatory or the reasons given for her termination were pretextual. Finally, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner’s vision impairment could be reasonably accommodated. Given these facts, Petitioner’s Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jean Marie Downing, Esquire 221 Thomas Drive Panama City Beach, Florida 32408 Alva L. Cross, Esquire 2300 SunTrust Financial Centre 401 East Jackson Street Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue The issue presented for determination is whether Respondent, Dillard’s, discriminated against Petitioner, Tanya Chun, based on her age, in violation of section 760.101, Florida Statutes (2012),1/ when it did not hire her for a sales associate position.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Chun was born April 4, 1957. Ms. Chun applied for a position as a sales associate at Dillard’s Department Store No. 209 in Lakeland, Florida, on June 7, 2012. At the time, she was 55 years old. Ms. Chun completed the employment application at a kiosk in the store linked to Dillard’s personnel system. Ms. Chun’s application disclosed only two periods of employment. The most recent was with Golf Plus, Inc., as a bookkeeper handling accounts receivable and accounts payable from January 1998 to May 2012. The other was employment at Macy’s in New York City from April 1993 to October 1994 in clothing sales and customer services as a retail sales associate. At the time, the Lakeland Dillard’s store had five openings--two in cosmetics, two in ladies’ shoes, and one in men’s shoes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Walter Soto was operation sales manager at the store with authority to hire people to fill the openings. Mr. Soto interviewed Ms. Chun and seven other applicants for the five positions. During the interview and hiring process, Mr. Soto relied upon the information the applicants provided in their applications and the interviews. Mr. Soto hired five of the applicants. He did not hire Ms. Chun. During Ms. Chun’s interview, Mr. Soto asked her a number of questions about Macy’s sales procedures and common sales procedures and practices. Ms. Chun was not familiar with common concepts, such as sales per hour and items per transaction. These are concepts with which someone with retail experience and knowledge should be familiar. The five people Mr. Soto hired are Emil Pancorbo, Angelique Schoenmakers, Taylor Swallow, Ashley Thirion, and David Tilton. All were younger than Ms. Chun, although Ms. Schoenmakers was only three years younger. The information available to Mr. Soto about Emil Pancorbo, which he relied upon, indicated that Mr. Pancorbo had recent retail experience at large retailers, JCPenney from October 2008 to April 2011, and Guitar Center from April 2011 to September 2011. Mr. Soto considered this experience in deciding to hire Mr. Pancorbo, instead of Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about Angelique Schoenmakers, which he relied upon, indicated that she had recent retail experience as a counter manager for Elizabeth Arden and that she worked for Macy’s from October 2010 to April 2012. Ms. Schoenmakers was recruited to work for Dillard’s. Mr. Soto considered Ms. Schoenmakers’ employment history in deciding to hire Ms. Schoenmakers, instead of Ms. Chun. Ms. Schoenmakers was born January 15, 1960, making her only three years younger than Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about Taylor Swallow, which he relied upon, indicated she had recent retail experience, working for Kohl’s from August 2011 to June 2012. Ms. Swallow also had cosmetic experience. She had applied makeup on clients. Mr. Soto considered Ms. Swallow’s employment history in deciding to hire Ms. Swallow, instead of Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about Ashley Thirion, which he relied upon, indicated she had recent retail experience working at a Clinique cosmetics counter at Macy’s from June 2011 to November 2011. Clinique is a cosmetics line that Dillard’s also carries. Mr. Soto considered Ms. Thirion’s employment history in deciding to hire Ms. Thirion, instead of Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about David Tilton, which he relied upon, indicated that Mr. Tilton had recent retail experience at a large retailer, Bealls from May 2010 to May 2012. Mr. Tilton worked in the shoe department for Bealls. Mr. Soto considered Mr. Tilton’s employment history in deciding to hire Mr. Tilton, instead of Ms. Chun. Based on the information from the applications and interviews available to him, Mr. Soto made a fair and rational decision to hire applicants other than Ms. Chun. In particular, the fact that the retail experience of each of the applicants was more recent than that of Ms. Chun supports Mr. Soto’s decision. All of the applicants, except Ms. Swallow and Ms. Thirion, also had more retail experience than Ms. Chun. Ms. Swallow and Ms. Thirion both had cosmetics experience, and two of the positions that Mr. Soto was filling were for the cosmetics department. The Dillard’s employment procedure includes preparing an applicant summary for each individual interviewed. For the hiring cycle involved here, eight of the applicant summaries, including Ms. Chun’s, indicate the person was hired. In order for the Dillard’s system to permit obtaining a background check, Mr. Soto had to change an applicant’s status on the applicant summaries to “hired.” At the time, Mr. Soto was not following the Dillard’s procedure of only conducting a background check for an employee after the employee was hired. He did not think the procedure was fair to the applicants, who may be hired and then “un-hired” after the background check. Mr. Soto chose to conduct background checks before extending job offers. The status on Ms. Chun’s applicant summary states “hired.” But she was not hired, just as Ricky Davis and William Guadalupe, whose summaries state “hired,” were not hired. The status for all the applicants said “hired,” only because Mr. Soto changed the status in order to run a background check. If Dillard’s hires an employee, a Basic Employee Information sheet is prepared. There is no Basic Employee Sheet for Tanya Chun because she was not hired. There are Basic Employee Information sheets for Emil Pancorbo, Angelique Schoenmakers, Taylor Swallow, Ashley Thirion, and David Tilton. If an employee is hired, Mr. Soto conducts reference checks. He did not conduct a reference check for Ms. Chun because she was not hired. Ms. Chun maintains that Mr. Soto told her at the interview’s conclusion that she was hired and that they agreed to a start date and compensation of $10.00 per hour with full medical and dental insurance. She also maintains that Mr. Soto told her she would undergo a routine background check and requested that she sign a consent form and provide her identification card for the background check. Ms. Chun says that Mr. Soto stated that she did not “look that old” after he looked at her identification. She also claims he then said he had to talk to someone else and left the room for about five minutes. Mr. Soto denies Ms. Chun’s descriptions of the conversation. Ms. Chun, according to her own testimony, called for Mr. Soto a few times in the days following the interview to check on her employment status. She was correctly told that he had been transferred. On June 18, 2012, Ms. Chun sent a letter with the following text to Mr. Soto: I am writing to inquire the status of my employment application and I would like to receive your written response. Early last week, I applied for employment at Human Resources. The next day I was called in for an interview by you and when we met, before you offered a position you stated that I seemed to be a good candidate, and requested my identification and social security card, made photocopies, then stated that you will do a background check. As you reviewed my identification papers, your tenor changed and you stated that you will get back to me. I am writing to ask the status. I would like to request a copy of the documents I completed, as I do not have them for myself--both the application and the background disclosure form. And I would like to know why my identification with date of birth was requested before I was offered a position, and why my identification became the basis of your change of discussion. Thank you for your prompt attention. She did not receive a response. On February 28, 2013, Ms. Chun sent another letter, this one to the Dillard’s Human Resource Department. It states: I wrote the attached letter [June 18, 2012, letter] to your company more than six months ago, and I have received no response. My discussion with Walter at the interview, before being requested to provide my ID showing my age, was that I was going to be hired. Then, when my ID revealed my age I was told “we will get back to you” and I have requested an explanation and copies of the documents pertaining to my application, but you have totally disregarded my letter. I am writing to reiterate my request, and I request that you respond within five business days. Neither letter, both of which are specific and articulate, includes the claim Ms. Chun now makes that Mr. Soto said she did not “look that old” after seeing her identification. Dillard’s did not respond until March 11, 2013. A woman named “Arlie” called that day and told Ms. Chun it was Dillard’s policy to obtain identification and again advised that Mr. Soto had been transferred to another location. The weight of the credible, persuasive evidence does not establish Ms. Chun’s version of the events. The factors resulting in this determination include the fact that she testified that Mr. Soto told her she was hired and that they agreed upon a start date. Yet, she also testified that she called several times to check on the status of her application. Calling to check on the application’s status is inconsistent with having accepted a job and having agreed to a start date. If Ms. Chun had been offered and accepted a job, she would have reported for work, not called to check on the status of her application. In addition, Mr. Soto’s testimony about the process and the events is consistent with the documents for the applicants he interviewed. Finally, Ms. Chun did not make her very specific claim about what Mr. Soto said, “you don’t look that old,” in either of her letters or her initial Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Commission. From April to November of 2013, Mr. Soto hired at least ten individuals born in 1957, like Ms. Chun, or born earlier. This is persuasive evidence corroborating Mr. Soto’s testimony that he does not weigh an applicant’s age against the applicant when making his hiring decisions. Mr. Soto hired five applicants other than Ms. Chun because he found their qualifications superior for the open positions. Ms. Chun’s age was not a factor in Mr. Soto’s decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations deny Ms. Chun’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2014.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Mickey Rosado violated Subsection 112.313(8), Florida Statutes (2005),1 and, if so, what recommendation should be made for discipline.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Rosado served as member of the Cape Coral City Council (City Council) from April 2003 until he was suspended from office in January 2007. In addition to being on the City Council, Mr. Rosado owned a marketing business named Mickey Rosado Management, LLC. He and his wife also operated a small café and catering business. During the latter part of 2005, the City of Cape Coral (City) was involved in looking for property to expand the City’s office space. On December 5, 2005, the City Council met, and one of the items on the consent agenda was the request for authorization to offer $2,000,000 and negotiate a contract for the purchase of property located at 924 Del Prado Boulevard, Cape Coral, Florida. For purposes of this Recommended Order, this property will be referred to as the Motor City Property. Mr. Rosado voted against authorizing the negotiation of the purchase of the Motor City Property. In the discussion at the City Council meeting, Mr. Rosado stated that he felt the location had traffic problems. The motion to negotiate a contract for the Motor City Property passed on a seven-to-one vote. After the City Council meeting concluded, Mr. Rosado asked Terry Stewart (Mr. Stewart), who was the city manager, to look into purchasing some other property for the needed office space. The property was owned by Steve Westphal’s Used Car Factory, Inc., which is a car dealership owned by Steven L. Westphal (Mr. Westphal) and his children. The property to which Mr. Rosado was referring (Westphal Property) was located on Del Prado Boulevard, in Cape Coral, Florida. Mr. Stewart told Mr. Rosado that he would look into the Westphal Property. There are two versions of how Mr. Rosado came to know that Mr. Westphal would be willing to sell the Westphal Property to the City. According to Mr. Westphal, while visiting in Tennessee, he was watching the December 5, 2005, City Council meeting on television and listened to the discussion concerning the purchase of the Motor City Property. Mr. Westphal stated that he called Mr. Rosado to talk to Mr. Rosado in his capacity as a member of the City Council and advised Mr. Rosado that he would be willing to consider selling the Westphal Property to the City. Mr. Westphal stated that he also called A.J. Boyd, who was a member of the City Council, and told him of the possibility of selling the Westphal Property to the City. Mr. Rosado’s version is contained in a letter to the Ethics Commission staff dated February 12, 2009,2 in which Mr. Rosado responded to the question of how he learned about the availability of the Westphal Property as follows: Mr. Malone’s question was: “How did I find out about the property?” I replied that through a conversation with Mr. Westphal, when I called him about a property located in Cape Coral, called Motor City. I asked him about the property in question and he replied that the property didn’t deserve to be a location for a customer service center for the City of Cape Coral. I told him your property would be much better since it was located by City property,[3] and he agreed. Furthermore, he said, tell Mr. Stuart [sic] I will sell the city the Del Prado property, and I did so immediately after the meeting that evening. Whether Mr. Westphal’s version or Mr. Rosado’s version is correct, the undisputed fact remains that Mr. Westphal advised Mr. Rosado, in Mr. Rosado’s capacity as a member of the City Council, that he was willing to sell the Westphal Property to the City and that Mr. Westphal wanted Mr. Rosado to convey to the City that the property was for sale. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Westphal was advising Mr. Rosado in Mr. Rosado’s private capacity that he was in the market to sell the Westphal Property to anyone other than the City. As Mr. Westphal put it, “I’m not going to call a guy that delivers sandwiches to my dealership about selling a large piece of property.” It is clear that Mr. Westphal was talking to Mr. Rosado in Mr. Rosado’s capacity as a member of the City Council. It is also clear that the information that Mr. Westphal was willing to sell his property to the City was not information that was available to the general public. The evidence establishes that, before Mr. Westphal and Mr. Rosado talked in December 2005 about selling the Westphal Property to the City, Mr. Westphal had not had the Westphal Property on the market. As requested by Mr. Rosado, Mr. Stewart began looking into the Westphal Property to determine whether the property would be appropriate for the City’s needs. Mr. Stewart contacted Mr. Westphal and was given permission to visit the Westphal Property along with two other pieces of property owned by Steve Westphal’s Used Car Factory, Inc. Sometime between December 5, 2005, and December 12, 2005, Mr. Rosado contacted an employee of Top Two Development, Inc., and advised that the Westphal Property was available for sale. Mr. Rosado, in turn, advised Mr. Westphal that Top Two Development, Inc., was interested in purchasing the Westphal Property. A meeting was arranged at which Mr. Rosado introduced Mrs. Giraldo to Mr. Westphal to discuss the purchase of the Westphal Property and other properties owned by Steve Westphal’s Used Car Factory, Inc., as well as the car dealership. Mrs. Giraldo spoke Spanish but not English, and Mr. Westphal spoke English but not Spanish. Mr. Rosado and Mrs. Giraldo’s daughter, who was also at the meeting, were bi- lingual and translated for Mr. Westphal and Mrs. Giraldo. Mr. Westphal, as representative of Steve Westphal’s Used Car Factory, Inc., and Mrs. Giraldo, as representative of Top Two Development, Inc., came to an understanding to negotiate for the purchase of the properties and the stock of the dealership. Mr. Rosado drafted the Letter of Interest/Understanding for Negotiation Purposes which Mrs. Giraldo and Mr. Westphal signed on December 12, 2005. After the meeting, Mr. Rosado approached Mr. Westphal and wanted to know if there would be anything in the deal for him. Mr. Westphal agreed to pay Mr. Rosado a finder’s fee of $261,000 if the sale of the stock of the dealership between Mr. Westphal and Mrs. Giraldo was completed. Mr. Rosado also asked Mr. Westphal if he would include a new car for Mr. Rosado’s wife, but Mr. Westphal balked at that suggestion. A couple of weeks after the December 5, 2005, City Council meeting, Mr. Stewart advised Mr. Rosado of his efforts regarding the Westphal Property, and Mr. Rosado told Mr. Stewart that the property was under contract. Mr. Rosado did not divulge his participation in the introduction of Mrs. Giraldo and Mr. Westphal. By Invoice 50313, dated January 12, 2006, Mickey Rosado Management, LLC, billed Top Two Development, Inc., $10,000 for the following services: Consulting services for Business opportunity with Steve Westphal’s Properties and Business Purchase. Developed Letter of Intent for business agreement, deliver negotiations agreement and notarized terms of agreement. When the transaction is final Top Two Development will also as part of the agreement with MRM will provide a vihicle [sic] of choice. By check dated January 16, 2006, Top Two Development, Inc., paid Mickey Rosado Management, LLC, $10,000 for the services invoiced on January 12, 2006. On March 12, 2006, Mickey Rosado Management, LLC, invoiced Top Two Development, Inc., $10,000 for the following services: Provide interpreting services, at all meetings pertaining Steve Westphal’s stock purchase agreement. In person, phone conferences, meetings, and all pertaining needed area’s [sic] requested January, February, March 2006. These services include all dates, hours, minutes, phone calls, meetings, arrangements, appointments, travel, transportation, etc. This invoice is an extension agreement of January Invoice 50313 as agreed by Mrs. Giraldo, payment is due 3/1/06 to continue services. By check dated March 21, 2006, Top Two Development, Inc., paid Mickey Rosado $10,000 for services rendered. In 2007, Mr. Rosado was arrested for his involvement in the attempted sale of the Westphal Property for operating as a broker without a license in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes. On January 30, 2007, Governor Charlie Crist entered an executive order suspending Mr. Rosado from his position as a member of the City Council. Mr. Rosado was not re-elected to the City Council in September 2007. On July 27, 2008, Mr. Rosado entered a guilty plea to one count of brokering without a license and one count of misuse of confidential information. The plea agreement provided that Mr. Rosado was to make restitution of $10,000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Mr. Rosado guilty of violating Subsection 112.313(8), Florida Statutes, and recommending the imposition of a public reprimand and censure and a civil penalty of $7,500. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th of January, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents are guilty of misrepresentation or breach of trust and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact In October 1993, Respondent Sylvester (Respondent) took his daughter, whose last name was Rodriguez by marriage, to a real estate sales office that was selling units of a new condominium building. Respondent's daughter was 42 years old at the time. Speaking to the qualifying broker for the selling broker, Respondent advised her that he was a real estate salesperson for Respondent Lyric Realty Group, Inc. and wanted to show a unit to his daughter. Respondent referred to his daughter by name, rather than as his daughter, and did not mention to the broker that his customer was his daughter. Respondent gave the qualifying broker his card and signed his name in a log to protect his interest in the cooperating broker's sales commission. After touring a model unit, Mrs. Rodriguez expressed sufficient interest that Respondent obtained a form contract from the qualifying broker before leaving the premises. Respondent completed the contract, but left negotiations to Respondent Mitulinsky because Respondent was going out of town. Respondent Mitulinsky is the qualifying broker for Respondent Lyric Realty Group, Inc. Her involvement with the transaction was limited to contact with the listing broker, transmitting prices between Mrs. Rodriguez and the seller. Respondent Mitulinsky did not disclose that Mrs. Rodriguez was Respondent's daughter. But the evidence fails to suggest that Respondent Mitulinsky was in any way aware that the seller's broker was ignorant of the relationship between Respondent and Mrs. Rodriguez. The evidence also fails to suggest that the nature and extent of the conversations between Respondent Mitulinsky and the qualifying broker were such as to support an inference of concealment of the relationship by Respondent Mitulinsky. Prior to agreeing upon a final price, the seller's qualifying broker agreed to increase the commission to be paid Respondent Lyric Group Realty, Inc. by one percentage point to three percent. The listing price for the unit was $285,000. Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez submitted the contract with a price of $240,000. Following verbal negotiations, the seller returned the same contract with a price of $268,000, which the buyers accepted on October 29, 1993. A salesperson employed by the listing broker admits that she knew of the relationship between Respondent and his daughter prior to closing. After the contract was signed but prior to closing, Respondent, Mrs. Rodriguez, a home inspector, and the salesperson visited the unit. As the inspector worked, Mrs. Rodriguez and her father spoke freely, as they had in past visits, with Mrs. Rodriguez referring to Respondent as "dad" and he referring to her by her first name. The salesperson immediately informed her broker, who immediately reported the information to the seller. However, the seller elected to do nothing with the information because he was satisfied with the sales price and net proceeds. Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez were purchasing the first unit to be sold at the seller's project. This makes the first transaction especially risky for both the seller and the buyers. The purchase price represented the fair market value for the unit. The unit appraised at $271,000 at the time of the sale to Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez. On January 6, 1994, the parties closed on the unit pursuant to the provisions of the contract. The $16,080 sales commission was split evenly between the listing broker and Respondent Lyric Realty Group, Inc.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Real Estate enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint against all respondents ENTERED on September 30, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this September 30, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Daniel Villazon, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Peter Hobson, Esquire 606 East Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue Whether Respondent violated certain provisions within chapter 520, Florida Statutes (2010),1/ as alleged in Petitioner’s Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Sam’s Car is a motor vehicle retail installment seller based in Pensacola, Florida, and is governed by chapter 520. Mirza Ahmad is the president and 50-percent owner of Sam’s Car. Between January 7, 2009, and December 31, 2010, Sam’s Car held license number MV0902721 enabling it to conduct business as a motor vehicle retail installment seller. In other words, Sam’s Car could offer financing so that its customers could purchase vehicles through installment payments. At some point in 2010, Mr. Ahmad decided to convert the sole proprietorship named Mirza Aftab Ahmad, d/b/a Sam’s Car, into a corporation named Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. If a sole proprietorship licensed as a motor vehicle retail installment seller wishes to convert to a corporation, the new corporation must file a new application to be licensed as a motor vehicle retail installment seller. Accordingly, Mr. Ahmad filed an application in December of 2010 for a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s license on behalf of Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. Mr. Ahmad did not renew license number MV0902721, and the license went into inactive status on December 31, 2010. Sam’s Car could not enter into retail installment contracts with an inactive license. OFR ultimately issued license number MV9905731 to Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car, and that license became effective on March 16, 2011. Sam’s Car never moved to re-activate license number MV0902721, and OFR deemed that license to have retroactively expired on December 31, 2010. Sam’s Car was not licensed to enter retail installment sales contracts between January 1, 2011, and March 15, 2011. OFR licenses motor vehicle retail installment sellers such as Sam’s Car and is responsible for ensuring that licensees comply with chapter 520. OFR may conduct examinations and investigations to determine whether any provision of chapter 520 has been violated. In March of 2014, OFR contacted Mr. Ahmad and notified him that OFR would soon be conducting an on-site examination of Sam’s Car. During an on-site examination, OFR examiners visit a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s office, identify themselves, and examine various records in order to verify that the licensee complied with chapter 520 during the time period in question. OFR examiners arrived at Sam’s Car on March 19, 2014, and spent approximately six hours examining and scanning particular records of Sam’s Car. The examiners began by requesting that the office manager of Sam’s Car provide them with all the motor vehicle installment contracts that Sam’s Car had entered into in 2011 and 2012 (“the examination period”). Some of the requested records were at Mr. Ahmad’s home rather than at Sam’s Car. Accordingly, one of the examiners returned to Sam’s Car on April 9, 2014, to scan those documents after they had been retrieved from Mr. Ahmad’s home. The examiners reviewed 20 to 25 records from Sam’s Car and determined that several of the sales contracts utilized by Sam’s Car were not the form contract that had been approved as an industry standard by the Florida Independent Auto Dealer Association. There was a period of time during the examination period when Sam’s Car was utilizing a sales contract that it had essentially created from scratch. The examiners determined that the sales contracts in question did not have several of the items required by chapter 520. On September 5, 2015, OFR issued an Administrative Complaint alleging that Sam’s Car violated four provisions within chapter 520. In Count I, OFR alleged that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07, Florida Statutes, by failing to ensure that all motor vehicle retail installment contracts executed by Sam’s Car during the examination period satisfied all of the requirements of section 520.07. The contracts reviewed by OFR allegedly failed to contain the “Notice to Buyer,” the “total amount of payments,” and a specific statement that liability coverage is not included. OFR further alleged in Count I that several of the contracts failed to ensure that the contract had been signed by the buyer and the seller. Finally, OFR also alleged in Count I that there were two instances in which Sam’s Car failed to ensure that the contract was completed before it was signed. OFR alleged in Count II that several of the reviewed contracts violated section 520.07(6) by enabling Sam’s Car to collect delinquency/collection charges or late fees in excess of five percent of the installment payment due. In Count III, OFR alleged that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07(3), and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69V- 50.001 and 69V-50.002 because there were instances in which Sam’s Car had failed to document that it refunded or credited title charges collected from the buyer that exceeded the actual charges. Finally, OFR alleged in Count IV that Sam’s Car violated section 520.03(1) by selling motor vehicles on installment payments between January 1, 2011, and March 16, 2011, without an active license. The following findings are based on the documentary evidence and testimony received at the final hearing conducted on March 11, 2016. OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not have the notice to buyer required by section 520.07(1)(b). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not have the specific statement about liability insurance coverage required by section 520.07(1)(b). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not set forth the “total of payments” as required by section 520.07(2)(c). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 6 through 8, 11, and 14 through 18 were not signed by the seller as required by section 520.07(1)(a). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 18 and 20 were not complete prior to being signed as required by section 520.07(1)(a). In sum, OFR proved all of the allegations in Count I of its Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. With regard to Count II, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 6, 7, and 21 that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07(6) by collecting a delinquency/collection charge in excess of five percent of each installment. As for Count III, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 1 and 14 that there were two occasions during the examination period when Sam’s Car did not refund the overcharges on the estimated title, tag, and registration fees. Accordingly, OFR proved that Sam’s Car violated rule 69V-50. With regard to Count IV, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 22, through 25 that Sam’s Car violated section 520.03(1), by entering into retail installment contracts with four separate buyers during the period when Sam’s Car did not have a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s license (i.e., January 1, 2011, through March 15, 2011). Even though OFR proved the allegations in its Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence, there was no indication that those responsible for Sam’s Car’s operations intentionally committed the aforementioned violations. Instead, the testimony presented at the final hearing demonstrated that the violations resulted from inadvertence and/or an incomplete understanding of chapter 520’s requirements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order imposing a $1,000 administrative fine on Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2016.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Lawrence P. Weiner, was a registered Florida real estate salesman employed by Continental Marketing Services, Inc. Continental Marketing Services, Inc. solicited real property listings from property owners in the State of Florida by means of postal cards inquiring of those property owners whether they would like to sell their Florida real property. Interested owners were requested to fill out a card with their address and telephone number, and to forward that card to Continental Marketing Services, Inc. which would then contact the property openers by telephone, Respondent, as a real estate salesman in the employ of Continental Marketing Services, Inc., would then contact responding property owners from a list furnished him by his employer. Respondent would obtain information by telephone from property owners such as initial purchase price, size and location of the property. Both Respondent and his employer represented to property owners that, should they list their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., the property would be advertised in foreign countries where investors existed who were interested in purchasing Florida real estate. In order to list their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., property owners were required to pay an "advance fee" for these listings, usually $350, which amount they were told would be used to defray the cost of initial preparation of a directory listing those properties in Florida which were for sale. After obtaining initial background information, Respondent would submit the information to his employer, which, though unclear from the record, would analyze these facts and return to Respondent for transmission to the property owner a suggested sales price. This suggested sales price was usually several times the initial purchase price for the property. For example, one witness at the hearing testified that a lot purchased on April 27, 1967 for $2,640 was ultimately listed with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. at Respondent's suggestion, at a sales price of $7,600. Testimony at the hearing indicated that comparable lots in the same area are presently selling for $4,700. Another witness testified that two lots purchased in 1965 for $2,390, were discussed in 1977 with Respondent who suggested that they be listed at a suggested sales price of $16,600. Finally, still another witness testified that he listed property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. as a result of his contacts with the Respondent at a purchase price of $5,000 per acre in 1976 for property that he had purchased for $500 an acre in 1964. Those property owners testifying at the hearing who listed their property for sale with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., indicated that they had no further contact with either Respondent or Continental Marketing Services, Inc. after having paid their $350 listing fee. None of these property owners received any offers to purchase their property as a result of its listing with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., and, as of the date of the final hearing in this cause, the property remained unsold. The Respondent testified that his only responsibilities with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. involved contacting those persons on the lists furnished to him, and obtaining their agreement to listing their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. Suggested sale prices for particular pieces of property were furnished to Respondent by other employees of Continental Marketing Service, Inc. Respondent further testified that placing of advertisements for properties listed with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. was accomplished by other employees of the company. Respondent testified that he "understood" that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. had sold properties and that some of these sales were to foreign investors, although he did not know the identity of the foreign investors, or the number of parcels sold by the company. Respondent denied that he had represented to property owners that the sale of their property would be accomplished in sixty to ninety days. This contention is borne out by the testimony of two of the property owners testifying in this proceeding, one of whom testified that Respondent indicated that her property could "probably be sold within sixty to ninety days", and another property owner testified that Respondent made no representation to him concerning the length of time necessary to effect a sale of his property. There is no evidence in the record to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. failed to advertise property listed for sale as promised in the Listing Brokerage Agreement with those property owners testifying in this proceeding. There is no evidence in the record in this proceeding to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc., in fact, knew of no foreign investors interested in purchasing property in the United States. Further, there is no testimony in the record in this proceeding to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. had never sold property for other property owners in either the United states or the State of Florida. Finally, although property belonging to three of the witnesses testifying in this proceeding was listed at several times its initial purchase price, there is no indication in the record that Respondent played any part in setting the suggested listing prices.
