The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 475.025(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what the appropriate penalty is.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, O. Dane Streets was licensed by the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker having been issued License No. 0085710-1 for an address in Lakeland, Florida. In the Spring or early Summer of 1991, Nathan Price, a minister in Orlando, Florida, contacted Respondent to solicit Respondent's participation in representing Price's daughter, Melissa Howard, in purchasing real estate in Orlando. Price and Respondent have been business and social acquaintances for more than 10 years, and Price was helping his daughter and son-in-law in purchasing a home. The Howard's found a house they liked, Respondent obtained the listing information from the listing broker and prepared a contract for sale and purchase (Exhibit 1). As modified and accepted by all parties, this contract provided for a $1000 earnest money deposit to be held in escrow by Respondent's real estate company. In lieu of obtaining the deposit from Price or Howard, Respondent told Howard to give the earnest money deposit to the selling broker as all of the transactions were to be conducted in Orlando. The $1000 earnest money deposit was given to neither Respondent nor the listing broker, ReMax Southwest in Orlando. The failure of Respondent to follow up to insure that the earnest money deposit had been given to the listing broker in this transaction does not reach the status of fraud or dishonest dealing as Respondent had no such intent. Shortly before the August 21, 1991 closing date, Price advised Respondent that the mortgage lender was asking about the earnest money deposit. Respondent immediately obtained a cashier's check dated August 8, 1991 (Exhibit 2) in the amount of $1000 which Price presented at the closing on August 21, 1991. In his testimony, Respondent acknowledged that he erred in not obtaining the earnest money deposit or failing to check to be sure the deposit had been made with the listing broker. Since Respondent is located in Lakeland and the property being purchased is in Orlando when the closing was held, Respondent thought everything would be simplified if the deposit was held by the listing broker. When the listing broker learned that the deposit of $1000 had never been received by Respondent and placed in escrow, a complaint was made to the Florida Real Estate Commission, and these proceedings followed. Respondent has held licenses from the Florida Real Estate Commission for some 20 years, and this is the first time any charges have been brought against his license.
Recommendation It is Recommended that a Final Order be entered finding O. Dane Streets not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged. ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1992. Copies furnished to: Steven N. Johnson, Esquire Darlene F. Keller Division of Real Estate Division Director 400 W. Robinson Street Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801-1900 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801-1900 O. Dane Streets Post Office Box 6852 Jack McRay, Esquire Lakeland, FL 33807 Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto John Young was registered as a real estate salesman by the Florida Real Estate Commission. On October 2, 1985 Respondent and William Kelly, D.O. entered into a contract to jointly purchase a condominium from Concord Developers Inc. (Exhibit 1). The contract provided for a down payment of $2,000 with an additional earnest money deposit of $3690 to be paid on or before November 4, 1985. Respondent and Kelly each gave the seller a check for $1000 at the signing of the contract and this $2000 was deposited in escrow with the escrow agent. Kelly met Respondent through Respondent's wife who worked in Kelly's office. At the time Kelly was looking for income tax shelters and this purchase appeared to qualify for that purpose. On November 9, 1985, Kelly made out a check payable to John Young in the amount of $1845 which represented Kelly's half of the additional $3690 earnest money deposit. This check was either cashed by Young or deposited in Young's bank account (Exhibit 2). The additional earnest money deposit was not made to the seller, as required by the contract, Exhibit 1. Young notified Bayside Federal Savings and Loan Association, who was to finance the sale, that the loan application was withdrawn, the transaction was cancelled, and two checks in the amount of $1000 each were returned to the seller by the escrow agent (Exhibit 6). The customary practice of the seller in such a situation was to return the down payment to the buyer by check drawn on the seller's account. While no witness could recall this specific transaction, the usual practice would be to return the deposit to the buyer. In this case, the deposit would normally have been returned to Young. Young acknowledged that he received the return of his $1000 deposit but not the $1000 that represented Kelley's portion of the down payment. When Kelley gave Young the check for $1845 he inquired if it was necessary for him (Kelley) to attend the closing and Young advised him it was not. When Kelley subsequently learned that the transaction did not close, he demanded the return of his money. To date he has received none of the monies he deposited to purchase this property. Evidence was presented that in December 1985, Young closed on a condominium he and his wife had contracted to purchase in this same development, and subsequently moved into this unit. While this indicates Young had the opportunity to convert Kelley's contribution to the purchase of the condominium by Young and his wife, no credible evidence was presented that he did so. The evidence that was presented regarding this transaction was that Young was able to move into that unit with a total cash outlay of less than $500. Young accounted for the $1845 check from Kelley as payment of a bet between him and Kelley on one football game. In rebuttal Kelley testified that not only did he not bet with Young on any matter, but also he has never gambled on a football game in his life. Young's testimony that a $1845 bet was made on a football game is so unbelievable that it taints all of his testimony.
Recommendation That the Real Estate license of John Young be revoked. Entered this 2nd day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert H. Dillinger, Esquire 5511 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Bruce D. Lamb General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729
Findings Of Fact At all times material here to, Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker under the laws of the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0044295. On or about June 4, 1981, Respondent, representing himself to Doris Colon as the duly appointed, qualified and acting broker for Alvin Katz if, and representing that Alvin Katzif was the owner of certain real property located at 636-638 Southwest Eighth Avenue, Miami, Florida, accepted from Colon a written offer to purchase said property. Colon's offer was accompanied by a deposit of $5,000, receipt of which was acknowledged by Respondent on or about June 6, 1981. That deposit was delivered to the Respondent, as broker, to be held by him in escrow under the terms of the Deposit Receipt. The vendor named in the Deposit Receipt Agreement Alvin Katzif, was unable to sell the property in accordance with the terms expressed in that Deposit Receipt Agreement. Therefore, the sale was never consummated. Approximately one month after signing the Deposit Receipt Agreement, Alvin Katzif advised Respondent that he did not hold title to the property and that there were numerous and diverse claims to the property. Respondent never placed Colon's $5,000 deposit in an escrow account but rather placed the deposit in a personal account. Colon, through counsel, made a demand for the $5,000 earnest money deposit. Respondent failed to provide Colon with an accounting or delivery of her deposit until such time as she obtained a civil judgment against him. At no time did Respondent request an escrow disbursement order or submit the matter to arbitration or seek interpleader. Respondent converted Colon's $5,000 earnest money deposit to his own use. On or about the same day that Colon gave Respondent her $5,000 deposit made payable to him, Respondent gave Colon a check for $10,000 made payable to her. The $10,000 paid to Colon was not a loan to her and had no relation to the Katzif/Colon transaction. Rather, the $10,000 was a deposit toward the purchase of a duplex owned by Colon in which Respondent was then living as a tenant and which he desired to purchase from Colon. That transaction was completed, and the closing took place on August 12, 1981. The closing statement reflects credit given to Respondent of $10,000 toward the purchase price of the duplex he bought from Colon. The duplex Colon sold to Respondent is located at 2931-41 Southwest Sixth Street, Miami, Florida. When Respondent gave Colon his $10,000 deposit toward the purchase price of the duplex which he bought from her, he took her to friends of his at Intercontinental Bank, where she opened an account. She then wrote the $5,000 check out of that account, which check was the deposit which accompanied her offer on the property she wished to purchase from Katzif. In other words, the only relationship between the $10,000 check given to Colon by Respondent and the $5,000 check given to Respondent by Colon is that the fact that Respondent gave Colon a $10,000 down payment on the duplex he was purchasing from her gave Colon the opportunity to make an offer on the Katzif property using $5,000 of the $10,000 as a deposit on the offer to Katzif.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and revoking his real estate broker license number 0044295. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Martin I. Carlin, Esquire 3000 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 402 Miami, Florida 33137 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Is Respondent, Victoria D. Wiedle, guilty of failure to account for and deliver funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent Wiedle was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number BK-0646846, and was principal broker of Escarosa Realty. Respondent's license is still active. Janice Marlene Christian is a realtor associate. She was an independent contractor with Escarosa Realty from December 1998 until April 1999. Accordingly, Respondent Wiedle was Ms. Christian's registered broker during this time. Ms. Beverly Lewis is the mother-in-law of Ms. Christian's brother. Ms. Lewis came to Ms. Christian in February 1999 because she was interested in looking for and purchasing a house. On February 16, 1999, Ms. Christian facilitated an Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement (the Agreement) on behalf of Escarosa Realty with Ms. Lewis. The Agreement was on a form created by Formulator, a software company. "Florida Association of Realtors" appears on the face of the document. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement reads in pertinent part: RETAINER: Upon final execution of this agreement, Buyer will pay to Broker a non- refundable retainer fee of $0 for Broker's services ("Retainer"). Accordingly, Respondent was not entitled to any money as a retainer fee for broker services pursuant to this agreement. The agreement was signed by Ms. Lewis, Ms. Christian, and Ms. Wiedle and became effective on February 16, 1999. The specified termination date of the agreement was August 17, 1999. On or about February 27, 1999, Ms. Christian tendered an offer to sellers on behalf of Ms. Lewis, for property located at 107 Poi Avenue in Santa Rosa County (subject property). Pursuant to this offer, Ms. Lewis gave a $500.00 check dated February 27, 1999, to Ms. Christian as earnest money. The check is made out as follows: "Escarosa Realty Inc. Escrow". Ms. Lewis wrote in the memo section of the check that the check was escrow money for 107 Poi Terrace. The $500.00 check was deposited in Escarosa Realty's escrow account on March 1, 1999. Respondent accounted for the $500.00 check on the March 1999 monthly reconciliation statement for Escarosa Realty. The seller of the subject property made a counter- offer for a higher price which Ms. Lewis rejected. The testimony differs as to what happened next. According to Ms. Christian, Ms. Christian spoke to Respondent sometime after Ms. Lewis rejected the counter-offer about refunding the escrow money to Ms. Lewis. According to Ms. Christian, Respondent informed her that she did not have to give the escrow money back to Ms. Lewis yet because she had the buyer broker agreement. Ms. Christian further asserts that she filled out a written request on March 16, 1999, on a form entitled "EMD Request," which means earnest money deposit request, and gave it to Respondent who again asserted that the $500.00 did not need to be returned at that time because of the buyer brokerage agreement. Ms. Christian's testimony is consistent with Ms. Lewis's. According to Ms. Lewis, she talked to Ms. Christian about getting a refund of the $500.00 shortly after she rejected the counter-offer. She and Ms. Christian discussed the EMD form. She initially agreed that Respondent could temporarily maintain the escrow funds. However, when Ms. Lewis discovered that the financing she was seeking through the rural development program would take several months, she decided she wanted the money returned. Ms. Christian ended her contract with Escarosa Realty effective April 14, 1999. Because Ms. Christian was no longer at Escarosa, Ms. Lewis contacted Respondent by telephone on or about April 21, 1999. Ms. Lewis informed Respondent about the purchase offer and rejection of the counter-offer for the subject property. According to Ms. Lewis, Respondent initially told her she would return the money to her in the mail. When she did not receive it, Ms. Lewis again called Respondent and was told that the $500.00 would not be returned because of the buyer brokerage agreement was still in place. Ms. Lewis asserts that Respondent never told her any request for a refund of the $500.00 had to be in writing. Ms. Lewis then went to the Escarosa Realty office. Ms. Weidle was not there but Elnora Alexander was there. Ms. Alexander was also a realtor associate who was an independent contractor with Escarosa Realty. Ms. Lewis explained to Ms. Alexander about the circumstances of the subject property and that she wanted her earnest money back. Ms. Alexander gave a copy of the buyer broker agreement to Ms. Lewis. After going to Escarosa Realty, Ms. Lewis had numerous other telephone conversations with Respondent about the money. Respondent denies any knowledge of the Poi Terrace failed transaction until she spoke to Ms. Lewis on the phone. She also denied ever receiving the EMD request from Ms. Christian. Respondent asserts that she repeatedly told Ms. Lewis that she would return the $500.00 if Ms. Lewis would only make a request in writing, but that Ms. Lewis refused. This assertion is not credible. It is inconceivable that after all of the efforts made by Ms. Lewis to get her $500.00 returned to her, that she would refuse to make a written request for the money. In any event, there is no dispute that Ms. Lewis made verbal requests to Respondent for the return of the escrow monies. Respondent Wiedle admits that Ms. Lewis requested the money over the telephone. Further, in an April 2, 2001 letter from Respondent to the Division of Real Estate, Respondent acknowledged that Ms. Lewis asked for a refund of the money in the beginning of May and again in early June of 1999. Clearly, if Respondent Wiedle had not previously been aware of the failed Poi Terrace transaction, she was made aware of it during the telephone conversations with Ms. Lewis. Notwithstanding Respondent's assertion that the reason she did not refund the $500.00 to Ms. Lewis was that the request was not in writing, it is clear from Respondent's testimony and from a letter she wrote to Mr. Clanton, Petitioner's investigator, that she believed the $500.00 was connected to the buyer brokerage agreement, not to any offer for purchase of property. In an undated letter from Respondent Wiedle to Mr. Clanton, Respondent wrote: Dear Mr. Clanton, This is in response to your letter dated August 17th, 1999. First Beverly A. Lewis was refunded her money on August 20, 1999 check #111. Second I would like to respond to her complaint. Beverly A. Lewis signed a Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement with EscaRosa Realty, Inc. on February 16th, 1999 with it to terminate on August 17th 1999. Beverly A. Lewis knew that her deposit was a refundable deposit after the agreement is expired not before. As the Broker of this company I had no contact with Beverly Lewis until the agent Marlene Christian was asked to leave the company. If there ever was a contract for her to purchase a house then her agent Marlene Christian never informed me of nor did she ever provide any such contract. The deposit was given to me with the Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement only. Nor did her agent Marlene ever fill out the EMD refund request form requesting a refund to be given to Beverly A. Lewis. However, The result would have been the same. I asked Beverly Lewis If she had changed her mind on purchasing a house she said no she was still going to buy a house but that she knew if she didn't buy her house through Marlene at her new company that Marlene would make life very hard on her. I told her I was sorry but that is the whole purpose in the contract was to secure your buyers from just going all over the place. . . .(emphasis supplied) Respondent refunded the $500.00 to Ms. Lewis on August 10, 1999. At hearing, Respondent volunteered that there was a previous complaint against her for failing to return money she held under a buyer brokerage agreement with a former client. In that instance, the Probable Cause Panel of the Florida Real Estate Commission found no probable cause but issued a letter of guidance to Respondent.1
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, the evidence of record and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission finding the Respondent, Victoria D. Wiedle, guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, in that she failed to deliver escrow money upon demand, imposing a fine of $1,000.00, and placing Respondent Wiedle on probation for a period of two years. As conditions of probation, Respondent should be required to attend a continuing education course which addresses appropriate handling of escrow funds and be subject to periodic inspections and interviews by a Department of Business and Professional Regulation investigator. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002.
The Issue The issues posed for decision herein are whether or not the Respondent, Loretta Woloszyk, failed to account for or deliver a security deposit received by her, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and whether or not Respondent derivatively violated Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in that she is guilty of a breach of trust in a business transaction and, therefore, violated Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the following relevant facts are found. Loretta Woloszyk, Respondent herein, is presently registered with the Board of Real Estate as a broker/salesperson. On or about April 15, 1977, Respondent Woloszyk entered into a deposit receipt contract executed with John F. and Jeannine M. Chrest as purchasers of a house owned by Respondent Woloszyk located at 210 North G Street, Lake Worth, Florida. Pursuant to the terms of said deposit receipt contract, John E. Knowles signed as broker for receipt of a $300 cash deposit from the Chrests as purchasers. On or about April 22, 1977, the $300 deposit was placed in the escrow account of Sunshine Estates, Inc., the corporate broker by which the Respondent was employed. The deposit receipt contract was contingent upon the buyer qualifying for a Veterans Administration (VA) mortgage loan in the amount of $26,900. The relevant portion of the contract provided as follows: VA Appraisal: It is expressly agreed that, notwithstanding any other provisions of this contract, the purchaser shall not incur any penalty by forfeiture of earnest money or otherwise be obligated to complete the purchase of the property described herein, if the contract price or cost exceeds the reasonable value of the property established by the Veterans Administration. The purchaser shall, however, have the privilege and option of proceeding with the consummation of this contract without regard to the amount of the reasonable value established by the Veterans Administration. By letter dated May 25, 1977, the Chrests were notified that the subject property was appraised at $18,750, and thus was not acceptable under the minimum property appraisal standards of the Veterans Administration. With this notification, John Chrest went to the offices of Sunshine Estates, Inc., and demanded a return of his $300 earnest money deposit. John E. Knowles, as broker in receipt of the Chrests' $300 deposit, returned the $300 deposit check to Respondent Woloszyk, who deducted $200 from the Chrests' $300 deposit based on a separate rental transaction with the Chrests on the same subject property. During the hearing, John Chrest testified that he contacted Respondent for purchase of her residence situated in Lake Worth Farms. Mr. Chrest agreed during cross-examination that he initially contacted Respondent to "buy or rent Respondent's residence". He also testified that upon receipt of the VA appraisal at an amount below the agreed upon purchase price of $26,900, he agreed to pay to Respondent rent in the amount of $150 plus a $50 security deposit, which amount was deducted from the Chrests' security deposit. The FHA-VA deposit receipt contract contains a special condition entered by and between the parties (Woloszyk and the Chrests) indicating that "Buyer will pay rental of $225 per month until closing, beginning on or before May 1, 1977. Buyer will honor rental agreement for Kenneth Johnson, tenant, from April 1, 1977, to March 31, 1978, or $80 per month rent." Based thereon, and on John F. Chrest' s admission that be agreed to the rental fee which was deducted from his deposit received by Respondent Woloszyk, the administrative charges alleged are without basis. I shall so recommend.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMEND: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED in its entirety. RECOMMEND this 6th day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 1979 COPIES FURNISHED: John Namey, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ms. Loretta Woloszyk 733 Husiingbird Way, Apt. #3 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Robert Marriott has been a licensed real estate broker/salesman under the laws of the State of Florida, trading as Marriott Realty. In February of 1980, in his capacity as a real estate broker/salesman, Respondent obtained an offer to purchase commercial property in Miami from Orlando Villacis, a resident of Ecuador, as purchaser, for a total purchase price of $500,000. In conjunction with the offer, Villacis paid a $20,000 earnest money deposit to be held by Marriott Realty in escrow under the terms of the offer. Villacis' deposit check in the amount of $20,000 was deposited into the Marriott Realty escrow account on February 22, 1980. By March 11, 1980, Villacis' $20,000 had been withdrawn, leaving an escrow account balance of $40. This fact was never reported to Villacis. Having heard nothing definite from Respondent with regard to the offer, and because he spent most of his time out of the country, Villacis engaged the services of attorney Rafael Penalver. Prior to July 1980, Penalver contacted the Respondent and inquired as to the status of the offer. Each time, Respondent told him that the seller was still considering the offer. In July of 1980, Respondent told Penalver that the $500,000 offer had been rejected by the seller and recommended that Villacis present an offer for $570,000. Penalver prepared the offer in the amount of $570,000, again calling for a $20,000 earnest money deposit, which Penalver and Villacis assumed was still in the Marriott Realty escrow account. Receiving no response from Respondent on the second offer, Penalver attempted to contact Respondent by telephone on numerous occasions. When Penalver was successful, Respondent told him that the seller was reviewing the offer. In early September 1980, Respondent advised Penalver that the $570,000 offer had been rejected by the seller. By letter dated September 11, 1980, Penalver raised the offer to $600,000, set a deadline of September 19 for the acceptance of the offer, and directed Respondent to return the $20,000 immediately should the offer not be accepted. After September 19, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Penalver called him, at which time Respondent advised that the offer was being considered by the seller. Penalver then wrote a letter dated October 7, 1980, to Respondent demanding that Respondent deposit the $20,000 into Villacis' account. Again hearing nothing from Respondent, Penalver on numerous occasions attempted to contact him by telephone in order to again demand the immediate return of the $20,000 deposit. Being unsuccessful, Penalver wrote the Respondent on November 20, 1980, and January 22, 1981, both times demanding the return of the $20,000 earnest money deposit. After the letter of January 22, 1981, Respondent agreed to meet with Penalver in Penalver's office. On February 2, 1981, the Respondent and his wife met with Penalver. During that meeting, Respondent advised Penalver that the $20,000 was no longer available and that he and his wife had used the money to make mortgage payments and cosmetic improvements on their personal residence. Respondent challenged Penalver to sue him to get the money back. After discussing Respondent's position with Villacis, Penalver filed a civil action for return of the $20,000. In his Answer to the Complaint filed in that litigation, Respondent admitted that he had used the $20,000 deposit for mortgage payments and other personal household expenses and for payment of his IRS tax deficiency. Villacis obtained a Final Judgment in the civil action in the amount of $20,000 plus interest and costs on October 6, 1982. Respondent testified that he did not return the $20,000 earnest money deposit because, in approximately October 1980, Villacis verbally agreed to loan the $20,000 to Respondent. Villacis strongly denied making any offer of a loan to Respondent. The purported loan agreement would have occurred after Penalver had twice written Respondent regarding immediate return of the $20,000 and seven months after the $20,000 had disappeared from the escrow account. Further, after Penalver sent his November demand letter, Respondent wrote Villacis in December of 1980 asking that Villacis consider loaning Respondent the $20,000 in exchange for an unrecorded mortgage on Respondent's personal residence. Clearly, Respondent's testimony is not credible. As of the date of the formal hearing in this cause, the Final Judgment in favor of Villacis and against Respondent remained unpaid and Respondent had still not returned to Villacis the $20,000 earnest money deposit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his license as a real estate broker/salesman. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 David I. Schlosberg, Esquire 525 North 27th Avenue, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33125 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the posthearing memorandum and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact: Respondent, Alfred Rifflard, Jr., during times material herein, was a licensed real estate broker-salesman and is the holder of license number 0338064. Respondent, Thomas L. Narog, during times material herein, was a licensed real estate salesman and is the holder of license number 0309097. On approximately May 24, 1982, Respondent Narog represented to John F. Wodalski that Respondent Rifflard, as an investor, was interested in purchasing certain real property owned by Wodalski. Based on discussions with seller Wodalski, Wodalski and Respondent Alfred Rifflard entered into a deposit receipt and contract for sale and purchase of the Wodalski property. The purchaser is listed on the deposit receipt contract as Alfred Rifflard and/or assigns." (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) The negotiations for the sale of the subject property were conducted at the bar of a country club where both Respondent Naroq and seller Wodalski were employed. Respondent Rifflard was aware that the subject property had been on the market for approximately eighteen months. Seller Wodalski expressed (to Respondent Narog) disenchantment that he was unable to move the property as he had planned to purchase other properties with the proceeds received from the sale of the subject property. Respondent Narog attempted to sell the Wodalski property to enable him (Wodalski) to purchase the other property. During the negotiations for the sale of the subject property, Respondent Wodalski tendered a copy of his business card to seller Wodalski. That business card reflected that Respondent Rifflard was a licensed real estate salesman. Following the execution of the deposit receipt contract by Respondent Rifflard, Respondent Rifflard showed the property to approximately three prospective purchasers in an effort to sell the property prior to the purported closing date. Federal Land Title Corporation of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida was commissioned to handle the closing of the property from seller Wodalski to Respondent Rifflard and/or his assigns. This is confirmed by a letter dated August 19, 1982 to seller Wodalski wherein loan processor Kathy Bradley advised the seller that she expected to expedite the closing of the Wodalski property. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) Upon receiving the above-referred letter from Federal Land Title Corporation, seller Wodalski demanded a tender of the $1,000 earnest money deposit which is referred to in the deposit receipt contract executed by Respondent Rifflard. At that time, Respondent Narog was told that no monies could be disbursed to him prior to closing. Seller Wodalski called off the closing based on his claim that another broker advised him that it was illegal for an undisclosed licensed real estate salesman to purchase property in his name. Based on the testimony of Respondents Rifflard and Narog including the testimony of the Petitioner's investigator, Anthony Nicola, who investigated the subject complaint, it is specifically found herein that the Respondents disclosed the fact that Rifflard was a licensed real estate salesman at the time the deposit receipt contract was executed herein. In making this finding, consideration was given to seller Wodalski's testimony to the effect that he was busy 2/ at the time that he entered the deposit receipt contract and that it was indeed possible that Respondent Rifflard tendered a business card to him at the time he entered the subject contract. Paragraph two of the deposit receipt contract reveals that the method of payment includes a $1,000 deposit, in the form of a note, which would be returned to the buyer at closing. It is undisputed by the Respondents that no earnest money deposit note in the amount of $1,000 was given the buyer's attorney to be held in trust until the closing was completed. The Respondents acknowledged that it was an error on their part to fail to execute the earnest money deposit as Respondent Rifflard agreed in the subject deposit receipt contract. Further, Respondent Rifflard urges that his failure to execute a note was an oversight on his part.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents, Alfred Rifflard, Jr. and Thomas L. Narog, be privately reprimanded by the Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, based on their failure to place in deposit, to be held in trust, a $1,000 earnest money deposit in connection with the transaction surrounding the deposit receipt and contract for sale and purchase entered into by Alfred Rifflard, Jr., as purchaser of certain real property owned by John Wodalski. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1984.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents violated Subsection 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes (1999), by failing to maintain an escrow deposit in a trust account until properly authorized; whether Respondents violated Subsection 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, by failing to account for or deliver funds; whether Respondents violated Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by committing a breach of trust or culpable negligence in a business transaction; and, if so, whether the proposed penalty is reasonable.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of real estate licensees in the state. Simons is licensed in the state as a real estate broker/officer of Respondent, Home Hunters USA, Inc. (Home Hunters), pursuant to license number BK-0159866. Home Hunters is a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker pursuant to license number CQ-0146369. On March 21, 1996, Respondents entered into a property management contract (amended contract) with Max and Mary Newman (Newmans). The amended contract authorized Respondents to lease and manage real property owned by the Newmans and located at 1555 Whiskey Creek Drive, Ft. Myers, Florida 33919 (the property). The original contract that Respondents proposed to the Newmans was dated March 11, 1996. The original contract contained a clause that would have obligated the Newmans to pay a sales commission to Respondents in the event Respondents sold the property to a tenant or certain other purchasers. The Newmans deleted that language from the original contract, initialed the deletion, dated the deletion "3/21/96," signed the amended contract on March 21, 1996, and returned the amended contract to Respondents. The deleted language in the amended contract signed by the Newmans provided: Owner agrees to pay Agent a sales commission for the sale of said property to the tenant, or any other the tenant relates or refers. Agent will perform any services normally performed to consummate the sale to the tenant in a professional and diligent manner. Owner shall notify Agent at earliest possible time so that Agent may perform services (prequalify, arrange financing, closing, repairs, etc.). It is the owners [sic] responsibility to pay said fee to Agent upon closing of sale. Petitioner's Exhibit 5 (P-5) at 19 (the second unnumbered page of the exhibit). On or about February 1, 1999, Respondents brokered a lease of the property from the Newmans to Ms. Lilly Gilson (Gilson). Mr. Newman signed the lease agreement on February 14, 1999, and Gilson signed it on February 23, 1999. The lease agreement, in relevant part, obligated the Newmans to pay Respondents a "fee" in the event the "tenant should enter into a lease purchase, lease option, or purchase through their tenancy." The lease agreement states that the fee is for Respondents "serving the sale as a broker" but does not specify the amount of the fee, does not express the fee as a percentage of the purchase price, and does not otherwise specify how the fee is to be determined. Neither of the Respondents is a signatory to the lease agreement. At the time Gilson entered into the lease agreement, Gilson paid a deposit of $650 to Respondents as a security deposit in accordance with the lease agreement. Respondents placed this deposit into a trust account. At some point prior to December 1999, the Newmans entered into a purchase and sale contract to sell the property to Mr. Gary Newman (Buyer). The Buyer is unrelated to the Newmans, but is a relative of Gilson. The Newmans closed on the sale to the Buyer on December 28, 1999. The parties to the sale used other brokers in the transaction over Respondents' objections, and neither of the Respondents served the sale as a broker. The closing statement shows that the Buyer was obligated to pay the $635 security deposit to the Newmans. Subsequent to the closing, Respondents transferred the security deposit from their trust account to their operating account. Simons believed he was entitled to a commission on the sale from the Newmans to Buyer. Respondents had actual knowledge that the Newmans claimed entitlement to the security deposit and disputed Respondents' entitlement to the security deposit. Simons was aware as early as December 11, 1999, that the Newmans did not knowingly consent to pay Respondents a commission on the sale transaction. Respondents failed to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) of the dispute concerning entitlement to the security deposit. Respondents did not institute the settlement procedures prescribed in Subsection 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes (1999).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that Respondents violated Subsections 475.25(1)(b), (d), and (k), Florida Statutes (1999), by committing the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint; imposing a fine of $1,000 against each licensee; and suspending Respondents' licenses concurrently for 30 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801-N Orlando, Florida 32801 Larry A. Simons Home Hunters USA, Inc. 1415 Colonial Boulevard, Suite 3 Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Nancy P. Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Nancy P. Campiglia, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802-N Orlando, Florida 32801-1772
Findings Of Fact Respondent met Sibley Dennis Carpenter, Jr. (Carpenter) in 1974 or 1975, in connection with a land sale that is not otherwise relevant to this matter. In the summer of 1975, Carpenter asked respondent for assistance in obtaining financing for another, separate land transaction. On that occasion, Carpenter furnished respondent an unaudited, personal financial statement, prepared by an accounting firm, which put the net worth of Carpenter and his wife at slightly less than a half million dollars. On November 19, 1975, respondent became affiliated with Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., as a real estate salesman. Because he had other irons in the fire, he only appeared at the office of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., once every month or two. Not until the spring of the following year, after he had been licensed as a real estate broker, did respondent have access to the company's books. In November of 1975, respondent met one Charles W. Van Cura, a hog farmer from Minnesota who expressed an interest in buying land in Florida, and referred Mr. Van Cura to Carpenter. Carpenter, possibly in the company of respondent, showed Mr. Van Cura certain real property belonging to Harvey H. Westphal and Margaret Westphal. Mr. Van Cura made an offer of one hundred fifteen thousand dollars ($115,000.00) for the property and deposited seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) with Carpenter towards the purchase price, as evidenced by a binder receipt and deposit, dated December 31, 1975, and signed by Carpenter. Respondent's exhibit No. 1. Carpenter presented the offer to the Westphals, who refused Mr. Van Cura's offer but made a counteroffer of one hundred thirty-five thousand dollars ($135,000.00), by crossing out Mr. Van Cura's figures, substituting their own and signing their names. Both the offer and the counteroffer were "subject to receiving Federal Land Bank Loan of 70 percent of purchase price . . ." Van Cura told Carpenter he was unwilling to accept the Westphals' counteroffer. Carpenter persuaded respondent to buy the property himself, and, on January 6, 1976, Carpenter, respondent and Van Cura met in respondent's office. After some discussion, respondent drew two checks aggregating seventy- five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) to Van Cura's order. Petitioner's composite exhibit No. 6. Van Cura executed a receipt, respondent's exhibit No. 2, reciting that he had received seventy-five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) from respondent. At the time of this transaction, Carpenter could not have refunded Van Cura's deposit from the escrow account of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., because there were insufficient funds in the account. Unbeknownst to respondent, Carpenter had never deposited Van Cura's money in the escrow account. On January 30, 1976, Carpenter drew up a written offer on behalf of respondent to purchase the Westphal property for one hundred thirty-five thousand dollars ($135,000.00). Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. The binder receipt and deposit recited that respondent "and or assigns" had deposited seventy-five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) with Carpenter in earnest money. Although the Westphals accepted this offer, the transaction never closed, for reasons which were not developed in the evidence. The Westphals never made demand for the seventy-five hundred dollar ($7,500.00) deposit, and respondent never got the money back from Carpenter. Respondent has since decided to "treat it . . . as a loan, or write it off." (R119) At no time did respondent relate to the Westphals the history of the earnest money deposit. In May of 1976, respondent was licensed as a real estate broker, and became secretary-treasurer of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc. Respondent and Carpenter agreed between themselves that the corporation should open an escrow account on which each could draw individually. This is reflected by a corporate resolution, dated May 4, 1976. Respondent's exhibit No. 7. Such an account was opened. When the first bank statement revealed to respondent that Carpenter had drawn improper checks against the escrow account, however, a second corporate resolution was drafted, dated July 23, 1976, respondent's exhibit No. 9, which authorized respondent, but not Carpenter, to draw against the escrow account.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mr. W. O. Birchfield, Esquire 3000 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue Whether respondent's license as a real estate salesman should be revoked or otherwise disciplined on the ground that she is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, culpable negligence, and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1) (b), Florida Statutes (1979).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the charges, respondent Margaret Perry was a licensed Florida real estate salesman holding license No. 0147966. Her business address is Key Place Realty, 513 West Vine Street, Kissimmee, Florida. (Stipulation of Parties.) I. The Offer On December 12 and 13, 1980, Perry W. Ripple, Jr., and Carol C. Ripple, his wife, signed a contract to purchase a 5-acre tract, with residence, located on Hickory Tree Road, Osceola County, Florida. The contract was prepared by respondent, who had previously shown the property to the Ripples. (Testimony of Perry, P. Ripple, C. Ripple; Joint Exhibit No. 1.) On Saturday, December 13, 1980, the contract constituted only a written offer to purchase the property since Novie P. Cleveland and Pamela A. Cleveland- -the owners of the property--had not yet accepted the offer by signing the contract. Pursuant to the contract, the offer was accompanied by a $1,000 earnest money deposit and an assignment of a certificate of deposit. (Testimony of P. Ripple, Perry.) On Saturday, December 13, 1980, when respondent received the signed offer, with earnest money deposit and certificate of deposit assignment, she mailed a copy to the American Title Insurance Company and ordered title insurance. Before mailing the contract offer to the title insurance company, she typed two dates above the contract signature lines: "December 13, 1980" as the date it was signed by the buyers; 3/ and "December 15, 1980" as the date it would be signed by the sellers (the sellers had not yet signed the contract; she inserted December 15, 1980, in anticipation of their signing on that date). She used December 15, 1980, because, under the terms of the contract, that was the last day the offer could be accepted by the sellers. (Testimony of Perry, Carlyon; P-1.) II. The Acceptance At approximately 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, December 14, 1980, respondent telephoned the sellers, Novie P. and Pamela A. Cleveland, and arranged for them to meet her at Mr. Cleveland's office and accept the offer by signing the contract. Respondent expedited the signing of the contract because the Ripples were in a hurry to close the transaction. (Testimony of N. Cleveland, P. Cleveland, Perry.) A few minutes later, the Clevelands met respondent at the designated place and signed the contract. Although they signed the contract on December 14, 1980, respondent inadvertently failed to correct the December 15, 1980, date which she had earlier placed in the contract as the date of execution by the sellers. (Testimony of Perry, N. Cleveland, P. Cleveland; Joint Exhibit No. 1.) III. Buyers' Attempt to Withdraw Offer Later on that evening--between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on December 14, 1980--Mr. Ripple telephoned respondent at her home. He questioned her about the boundaries and size of the property and, for reasons not material here, told her that he no longer wanted to buy the property, that he wanted the earnest money deposit returned. The conversation was abrupt and heated; both parties became upset with each other. The subject of whether the contract had been accepted and signed by the sellers was not mentioned. (Testimony of Perry, C. Ripple, P. Ripple.) The critical dispute in this case is the time of Mr. Ripple's telephone call to respondent. The Ripples testified it was between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m.; respondent testified it was between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. If the Ripples' testimony is accepted, then respondent presented an offer to the sellers for acceptance after the buyers had told her they wanted to withdraw the offer and not proceed with the contract; this is the essence of respondent's alleged misconduct. If respondent's testimony is accepted, the buyers did not notify her that they wanted to withdraw their offer until after the offer was accepted by the sellers; under such circumstances, her conduct was clearly proper. Respondent's testimony on the timing of the Ripples' telephone call is accepted as persuasive; (see paragraph 7 above) the Ripples' testimony concerning the time of the call is rejected. In earlier testimony, Mr. Ripple's memory of the events in question was shown to be unreliable: [Respondent's Counsel] Q: You say you signed the contract on December the 13th, on a Saturday. [Mr. Ripple] A: Yes. Q: Isn't it true that you signed the contract at the Sun Bank in St. Cloud on Friday, December 12th, on the hood of your car or Marge's car? That's possible, yes. Q: So you were mistaken when you said you signed it on Saturday. A: Yes, I was. I probably was. (Tr. 23.) More importantly, if the Ripples' testimony is correct, respondent deliberately presented an offer for acceptance which the purchasers no longer wished to make. Assuming such conduct occurred, it is inconceivable that she would inadvertently fail to correct the date on the contract to indicate that the sellers signed on December 14, 1980 (the same day the Ripples attempted to withdraw), not December 15, 1980. The events occurred close together and timing was critical. By not changing the date, she allowed the contract to incorrectly reflect that the sellers signed the contract a day later than they actually did: the time between the buyers' attempt to withdraw and the sellers' acceptance becomes greater than it was and even more difficult for her to explain. In short, her failure to correct the date of the sellers' signing of the contract is not a mistake she would have made if, as the Department alleges, she knowingly presented an offer and completed a contract against the expressed wishes of the buyers. IV. No Damage to Parties Involved On Monday, December 15, 1980, the Ripples stopped payment on their earnest money deposit check. The sellers did not pursue any legal rights or remedies they may have had against the Ripples. Eventually, the property in question was sold to another party. There is no evidence that the Ripples or Clevelands were financially harmed as a result of the events in question. (Testimony of Perry, C. Ripple, P. Ripple, N. Cleveland.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department's administrative complaint dated October 20, 1981, be dismissed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1982.
