The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Clay County School Board (“School Board”), may terminate Respondent's employment as an non-instructional employee based upon the conduct alleged in the document titled “Charges and Recommended Action” (the “Charge”) issued by the Superintendent of Schools, Addison Davis, to Respondent dated April 17, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Article IX, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, establishes that each county constitutes a school district. The School Board is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the public schools for Clay County. § 1001.42, Fla. Stat. A Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the School Board and CESPA governs the relationship between the School Board and its educational support employees. Respondent Carrie Williams was hired by the School Board in 1998. At all material times, Ms. Williams worked for the School Board as a non-instructional Exceptional Student Education (“ESE”) assistant at Bannerman Learning Center, an elementary school within the Clay County school district. Ms. Williams was an “educational support employee” as that term is defined by section 1012.40(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2018). Educational support employees working for the School Board are covered by the CBA. Ms. Williams remained employed by the School Board from 1998 until May 3, 2018, when the School Board terminated her employment for just cause after she tested positive for cocaine and marijuana metabolites on a random drug test. Ms. Williams had been subject to no prior discipline as a School Board employee. As an ESE assistant, Ms. Williams had job responsibilities that included transporting exceptional students in vehicles owned by the School Board. Ms. Williams was required by the School Board to have a valid Florida driver’s license and a safe driving record while employed. Because of her student transportation job duties and driving-related job qualifications, Ms. Williams was subject to random drug testing under the School Board’s Alcohol and Substance Abuse Policy (“Substance Abuse Policy”), rule 6GX-10- 2.17B. Language in Article XII(B) of the CBA reflects the Substance Abuse Policy’s random drug testing requirements. The Substance Abuse Policy, in conjunction with the CBA, establishes standards for the School Board’s drug testing of support employees. For employees who operate commercial motor vehicles (“CMV”) and, as such, perform “safety sensitive functions,” as defined by Federal regulations, the Substance Abuse Policy and CBA require random drug testing that complies with the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 (“OTETA”). The Federal Department of Transportation (“DOT”) requirements for this testing regime are codified at 49 C.F.R. Part 40. The tests are colloquially referred to as “DOT tests.” School Board employees such as Ms. Williams, who are not covered by OTETA, but whose job descriptions require a valid driver’s license other than a CMV license, are also subject to random drug testing under the Substance Abuse Policy and the CBA. The Substance Abuse Policy states, at 6GX-10-2.17 B.10.a.(2), that the procedures used for testing and review of test results for these non-OTETA employees “shall be the same as those established for CMV operators as specified in [Substance Abuse Policy] 2.17 B.9,d.,e.” The cited Substance Abuse Policy specifications provide as follows: Drug Testing Procedures: With respect to drug testing procedures OTETA requires the use of a “split sample” approach, which provides employees an option for a second screening test following positive findings on the primary sample.[1/] All testing for controlled substances shall be performed on urine specimens and be accomplished by means of an initial screen (Enzyme Immunoassay or EIA), followed by a confirmation of any positive findings by Gas Chromotography/Mass Spectrometry or GC/MS. All controlled substances testing will be carried out at a laboratory certified by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Urine spectrometry shall be screened for amphetamines, cannabinoids, cocaine, phencyclidine, and opiates. Review of Controlled Substance/Alcohol Test Results: All laboratory results generated by the District’s drug testing program shall be reviewed by a medical review officer (MRO). The MRO is a licensed physician (medical doctor or doctor of osteopathy) having knowledge of substance abuse disorders and having appropriate medical training to interpret and evaluate an individual’s confirmed positive test result, together with his/her medical history and any other relevant biomedical information. Prior to verifying a “positive” result, the MRO shall make every reasonable effort to contact the employee (confidentially), and afford him/her the opportunity to discuss the test result. If, after making all reasonable efforts and documenting them, the MRO shall contact the District’s key contact, who shall direct the employee to contact the MRO as soon as possible (within 24 hours).[2/] Under split-sample collection procedures, the employee has seventy-two (72) hours following notification of a positive result to request the secondary sample be analyzed. Analysis of the split-sample specimen shall be at the employee’s expense and shall be paid in advance with a money order or certified check.[3/] Article XII(B)(2) of the CBA likewise provides that non-OTETA employees who hold a position for which a driver’s license is required “shall be subject to random drug testing.” It goes on to provide: “The method used to generate the list of randomly selected employees and all other aspect of the drug testing for this group of employees shall be the same as for OTETA covered employees. Specifically, this shall require that Federal standards be met with regard to specimen collection and handling, testing procedures, the use of a Medical Review Officer (MRO) to review all test results, and reporting procedures.” At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Williams was aware of the School Board’s Substance Abuse Policy and that she could be subjected to random drug testing. She also understood that the School Board could take disciplinary action up to and including termination of her employment as a consequence of a failed drug test. In spite of the clear language of the Substance Abuse Policy providing that non-OTETA employees, such as Ms. Williams, shall be subjected to the same testing procedures as OTETA employees, i.e., the DOT test, the School Board conceded at hearing that its long established practice has been to provide a “non-DOT” drug test to employees in Ms. Williams’s position. David Broskie, assistant superintendent for Human Resources, testified that for as long as he could remember the School Board’s practice has been to require employees with commercial driver’s licenses (“CDLs”) to take the DOT test, and to require employees with regular driver’s licenses to take the non-DOT test. Mr. Broskie stated that neither CESPA nor any individual employee has ever filed a grievance or otherwise challenged the School Board’s practice. Both the DOT and non-DOT tests are subjected to the same five-panel drug screen set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 40.85, i.e., marijuana metabolites, cocaine metabolites, amphetamines, opiate metabolites, and phencyclidine (“PCP”). Both tests employ the same standardized cutoff levels for the presence of drugs in the urine. Evidence provided at the hearing established that the chief difference is that the DOT test employs the split specimen technique, whereby the urine sample is divided into two specimens at the point of collection. In the non-DOT test, a single urine specimen is sent to the lab, which may then retain a portion of the specimen for potential retesting. On the morning of November 28, 2017, School Board personnel alerted Ms. Williams that she had been selected for a random drug test. She went to the School Board’s administrative office and completed the School Board’s consent form for a non- DOT drug test. The consent form required her to submit to a random drug screen at ClayMed of North Florida (“ClayMed”), the School Board’s drug screening service provider, no later than 8:30 a.m. ClayMed’s facility is less than two minutes from the School Board’s administrative office. Ms. Williams arrived there at 8:15 a.m., and recorded her name and arrival time on the patient sign-in sheet. Amanda Johns has been employed by ClayMed as a collector, phlebotomist, and a breath alcohol technician for four years, and has 19 years’ experience in the drug screening collection industry. Ms. Johns was on duty at ClayMed on the morning of November 28, 2017. She witnessed Ms. Williams sign in and then assisted her in the sample collection process. Ms. Johns testified, consistent with the sign-in sheet, that Ms. Williams was the first patient to sign in that morning, and that the next patient did not arrive until 8:45 a.m. After Ms. Williams signed in, Ms. Johns took her back to a desk and chair approximately five feet from a bathroom in the rear of ClayMed’s office where urine samples are given. Ms. Williams provided Ms. Johns with the School Board’s consent form. Ms. Johns verified Ms. Williams’s identification and the accuracy of her paperwork, made appropriate notations on it, had Ms. Williams empty her pockets, gave her a cup for the urine sample collection, and sent her to the nearby bathroom to provide the specimen. Ms. Johns remained at the collection desk directly facing the bathroom for the entire time Ms. Williams was in the bathroom. Ms. Johns was at the desk when Ms. Williams exited with her urine sample. At the hearing, Ms. Williams testified that after she exited the ClayMed bathroom, and was standing with her urine sample at the collection desk, she received a telephone call concerning her mother’s medical condition. Ms. Williams testified that she told Ms. Johns that she had an emergency and needed to leave. She testified that she set her urine sample on the corner of the collection desk and left ClayMed before the collection process was completed. She stated that there were other urine samples on the desk at the time she placed her sample there. Ms. Williams’s testimony on this point is contradicted by Ms. Johns and by the documentary evidence. Ms. Johns testified that Ms. Williams did not receive a call and did not leave ClayMed before completing the collection process. Ms. Williams turned over her urine sample to Ms. Johns at 8:23 a.m., as indicated on the non-DOT Custody and Control Form that Ms. Johns completed at the time of collection. The Custody and Control Form identified Ms. Williams as the donor, and connected her to the sample container via matching specimen numbers. After Ms. Williams placed her urine sample on the collection desk, Ms. Johns removed one of the two tamper seal labels from the bottom of the Custody and Control Form, affixed it over the top of the sample bottle, dated the label, and provided it to Ms. Williams for her initials. In fact, Ms. Johns had to go through this process twice in Ms. Williams’s presence because she inadvertently dated the first label “11/27.” Ms. Johns removed the first label, put on the second of two tamper seal labels from the Custody and Control Form, dated it correctly, and had Ms. Williams initial the sample a second time. Ms. Williams signed the Custody and Control Form, certifying (a) that she provided her urine specimen to the collector, (b) that Ms. Williams had not altered her urine sample in any way, (c) that the specimen bottle used was sealed with a tamper-evident seal in her presence, and (d) that the information provided on the Custody and Control Form and on the corollary label affixed to the specimen bottle was correct. Ms. Johns testified that Ms. Williams left ClayMed immediately after completing the collection process. Ms. Williams departed ClayMed before the next patient arrived and signed in at 8:45 a.m. As to her claim that other urine samples were sitting on the collection desk when she left her sample, Ms. Williams could offer no specific description as to how many there were or whether they were labeled. Ms. Johns unequivocally stated that there were no other urine samples on the collection desk when she took Ms. Williams’s sample. Ms. Johns’ testimony is supported by the fact that Ms. Williams was the first patient of the day, making it highly unlikely that other samples would be on the desk. Ms. Johns testified that there was no chance that Ms. Williams’s urine sample was switched with someone else’s. Ms. Johns’ version of events on the morning of November 28, 2017, is credited. Chain of custody over Ms. Williams’s urine sample was appropriate at all material times. Ms. Williams’s urine sample was sent to Laboratory Corporation of America (“LabCorp”) in Southaven, Mississippi, for testing. LabCorp received the urine sample on November 29, 2017, with no material deficiencies noted. The lab specifically noted on the Custody and Control Form that the primary specimen bottle seal for Ms. Williams’s urine sample was intact on November 29, 2017. On November 30, 2017, LabCorp conducted an initial immunoassay test on Ms. Williams’s urine sample that yielded a presumptive result positive for marijuana and cocaine metabolites. LabCorp then performed a confirmation test using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (“GC/MS”), which resulted in Ms. Williams’s urine sample being confirmed positive for marijuana metabolite and cocaine metabolite. A laboratory report was issued that same day. The positive results were forwarded to First Source Solutions, the School Board’s MRO service provider, and were reviewed there by MRO Philip A. Lopez, M.D. On December 1, 2017, Dr. Lopez called Ms. Williams twice, once at 9:28 a.m. and again at 12:57 p.m.,4/ to discuss the positive results of the tests, but was unable to reach her. At 3:26 p.m. on the same day,5/ Dr. Lopez’s office contacted Jacqueline Cory, the School Board’s director of Support Personnel and Human Resources, advising that Dr. Lopez had been unable to reach Ms. Williams. Dr. Lopez’s office asked Ms. Cory to call Ms. Williams and give her Dr. Lopez’s contact information. Ms. Cory spoke with Ms. Williams on the afternoon of December 1 and told her that she needed to contact Dr. Lopez that day. Ms. Williams did not call Dr. Lopez that day. On December 3, 2017, Dr. Lopez determined that Ms. Williams’s drug screen was positive for cocaine and marijuana. On December 4, 2017, at 8:19 a.m., First Source Solutions contacted Ms. Cory to inform her that they were releasing Ms. Williams’s drug test results to the School Board as “no contact, positive for marijuana and cocaine.” Shortly thereafter, Ms. Cory accessed the MRO’s report with a final verification of positive for cocaine and marijuana and took it to Mr. Broskie. Mr. Broskie instructed Ms. Cory to call Ms. Williams and set up an appointment for them to meet with her the following day. When Ms. Cory called Ms. Williams, she told her that the School Board had received a positive report from her random drug screen and that Mr. Broskie wanted to meet with her about it the following day. Ms. Williams agreed to meet, but stated to Ms. Cory that she could not understand the test result. Also on December 4, 2017, at 2:38 p.m., Ms. Williams phoned Dr. Lopez. Ms. Williams denied that she had used marijuana or cocaine, but admitted to what Dr. Lopez characterized as “passive exposure.” Dr. Lopez asked her a series of questions designed to probe whether there was an alternative, medically reasonable explanation for the presence of marijuana and cocaine in Ms. Williams’s drug screen. However, Ms. Williams’s answers provided no such explanation. Consequently, Dr. Lopez advised Ms. Williams that her drug test result would be set as positive for cocaine and marijuana. A meeting between Ms. Williams, CESPA union representative Betsy Reagor, Ms. Cory, and Mr. Broskie was held on December 5, 2017. Mr. Broskie explained to Ms. Williams that the School Board had received a drug test report positive for cocaine and marijuana and that, consistent with School Board practice, Ms. Williams was being suspended with pay, pending an investigation. Ms. Williams denied drug use and stated that she did not think it was her urine that was tested. She offered to give another urine sample. Mr. Broskie advised Ms. Williams that School Board policy provided her 72 hours from the time she was notified of the test result to request that the urine sample she gave on November 28, 2017, be retested.6/ Mr. Broskie further informed Ms. Williams that she would be responsible for the cost of retesting.7/ On December 6, 2017, Ms. Williams spoke again with Dr. Lopez by telephone. She again denied drug use, but provided Dr. Lopez with no new medical information to justify a change in her positive drug test. Ms. Williams did not contact Dr. Lopez and First Source Solutions to request a retest of her urine sample until the morning of December 8, 2017. This was more than 72 hours after she received notice of her positive drug test result from Ms. Cory and Dr. Lopez on December 4, 2017. A timeline of events provided to the School Board in January 2018 by First Source Solutions indicates that problems with a money order and later a check submitted by Ms. Williams to pay for the retest prevented it from being done. Ms. Williams first attempted payment in mid-December 2017 and finally gave up on January 4, 2018. In January 2018, the School Board transitioned Ms. Williams from “suspended with pay” to “suspended without pay.” Mr. Broskie testified that the School Board normally would move immediately for termination of an employee with a positive drug result. However, the School Board wished to give Ms. Williams the benefit of the doubt because she had denied drug use and had spoken of asking for a retest. The School Board decided to proceed cautiously while it investigated the matter. In mid-January 2018, Ms. Cory communicated with First Source Solutions about obtaining the above-referenced timeline of events. Ms. Cory also confirmed with First Source Solutions that Ms. Williams’s urine sample had been available for retesting, as well as the length of time the specimen would remain available and whether the company could conduct a DNA test on Ms. Williams’s urine. After receiving the timeline from First Source Solutions, Ms. Cory passed it on to Mr. Broskie as part of the investigatory process. They took special note of the timeline entry in which Dr. Lopez wrote that Ms. Williams had admitted “passive exposure.” Ms. Cory testified that she took this to mean that Ms. Williams acknowledged she had been around marijuana and cocaine. Ms. Cory also obtained information from ClayMed concerning Ms. Williams’s drug screen. This included, among other things, obtaining a copy of the non-DOT Custody and Control Form signed by Ms. Williams on November 28, 2017, and ClayMed’s Patient Sign-In sheet for that day. On February 7, 2018, Ms. Williams independently submitted to a hair follicle drug test. A single hair was collected from Ms. Williams’s head at that time and sent to United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc.’s (“USDTL”) for testing. USDTL performed a five-panel drug screen on Ms. Williams’s hair specimen on February 13, 2018, and reported negative test results for cocaine and cannabinoids. Ms. Williams offered the hair follicle test results to the School Board as evidence that the November 2017 drug screen was erroneous. Both parties presented expert evidence on the efficacy of hair follicle testing generally, and on the particular question of whether a negative hair follicle test on February 7, 2018, could call into question the result of the urine drug test of November 28, 2017. Ms. Williams introduced the deposition testimony of Donald E. Palm, III, Ph.D., an expert in pharmacology with a professional focus in neuropharmacology. Dr. Palm opined that the hair follicle test was a valid indicator of whether cocaine and marijuana were present in Ms. Williams’s system on November 28, 2017. Dr. Palm stated that, because hair is a stable matrix to preserve a drug, samples of drugs can be detected in hair “up to three to even six months” after ingestion. A urine screen is capable of detecting cocaine metabolites for three or four days after ingestion and cannabinoids for perhaps six days. Dr. Palm cited research indicating that an African American’s hair is thicker and richer in melanin, factors that provide a “perfect matrix” for preserving drugs in the system. Ms. Williams is African American. The School Board offered testimony and a written expert opinion at the final hearing from Raymond M. Pomm, M.D., a board-certified physician specializing in addiction psychiatry; a certified MRO; and chief medical officer for Gateway Community Services, an addiction treatment facility in Jacksonville. Dr. Pomm has been involved in hair follicle testing and assessing drug screens involving hair follicle specimens for many years. He developed the protocols standardizing the utility of hair follicle testing for the State of Florida’s impaired professionals program. Dr. Pomm testified that hair follicle testing has been around for a long time but has limitations. A hair test might or might not show a positive for three months or longer, depending on circumstances. Excessive washing, hair treatments, or hair straightening can disrupt the bonds of hair follicles and invalidate test results. Dr. Pomm testified that marijuana is not easily taken up into the hair follicle, especially in hair with high melanin content. He agreed with Dr. Palm that African American hair may be optimal for a cocaine test, but noted research indicating that the rate for positive cocaine tests is only 40 percent after a couple of months. Dr. Pomm described urinalysis testing at the GC/MS level as the “gold standard” in the industry. It tests at the molecular level. If the molecule is there, the test detects it. The GC/MS test does not detect something that is not there. Cocaine and marijuana metabolites are detected in a urinalysis only when the drugs have been ingested; “passive exposure” is not enough to generate a positive GC/MS result. Dr. Pomm opined that he could not medically conclude from Ms. Williams’s negative hair follicle test that her November 2017 urinalysis was erroneous. In his words, “a negative hair follicle testing has absolutely no relevance to the original test through urinalysis that was positive.” In the “Frequently Asked Questions” portion of its public webpage, USDTL has published the following questions and answers: Q. Can a hair test be manipulated by the donor? A. Yes. Bleaching, perming, dyeing and straightening can affect the outcome of a hair test. Commercially treated hair should not be collected. Q. Can a hair test be used to prove that a previously taken urine test was inaccurate? A. No. The results of any second collected specimen have absolutely no bearing on the validity of the results of the first collected specimen. Furthermore, each matrix has its own advantages, disadvantages and limits of interpretation. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that Ms. Williams’s hair follicle test of February 7, 2018, does not invalidate the results of the random urine drug test that Ms. Williams took on November 28, 2017. Dr. Pomm further opined that nothing in this case suggests that the School Board’s deviation from DOT protocols in collecting Ms. Williams’s November 2017 urine sample adversely affected the reliability of the test result: “The urine is the urine. Whether it’s split or not, it’s still the urine.” Whether the specimen is split at the collection site or later at the lab makes no clinical difference. The same five-panel drug screen, with the same standard cutoff levels, is used in both DOT and non-DOT drug tests. In a document titled “Fact Finding Memorandum,” dated April 16, 2018, Mr. Broskie wrote as follows: The recommendation to terminate Carrie Williams’s employment with the Clay County School District is based on her having submitted to a urinalysis test which came back positive for marijuana and cocaine use. As an ESE Assistant, one of the essential functions of Ms. Williams’s job was to transport students in a motor vehicle, and as a result of that, she is considered to be in a safety sensitive position subjecting her to random drug testing under the School Board’s Alcohol and Substance Abuse policy. She was randomly selected for such testing on November 28, 2017, and the district received positive test results for her marijuana and cocaine use on or about December 4, 2017 (copy attached). She was placed on unpaid suspension on January 8, 2018. Under the School Board’s Alcohol and Substance Abuse policy, Ms. Williams could have elected within 72 hours to have her split sample retested at her expense,[8/] but she chose not to exercise that right though she delayed for weeks in making a decision. Rather, through her attorney, she has contended that when she gave her urine sample in November 2017, several other patients were at the collection facility and that multiple samples were setting out on a counter unmarked so hers must have been mixed up with someone else’s sample. Then, in early February 2018, approximately two and a half months after she was tested, she provided a urine and hair sample for testing at a laboratory she selected, and the results came back negative. Her attorney contends that while the urinalysis test would only detect the presence of illegal drugs recently ingested, the hair sample provides a record of drug use going back 90 days, thus proving the sample taken in November 2017 was not Ms. Williams’s. The union and her attorney have also claimed that Ms. Williams does not fit the profile of a drug user and that she has consistently maintained she never ingested any illegal drugs. I investigated the above and have determined that Ms. Williams’s defense to the positive drug test to be insufficient based on the following: Two certified medical review officers (“MRO’s”), one of whom is a certified addiction psychiatrist retained to advise the School District on drug testing, have given the District an opinion that a single episode of illegal drug use will not result in a positive hair sample drug test, particularly one more than 60 days after the illicit drug use. The collection site and testing laboratory have confirmed they properly followed specimen collection and chain of custody protocols, including properly marking and sealing Ms. Williams’s sample. Also, the sign-in sheet at the collection site (copy attached) documents that Ms. Williams was the first to give a sample on November 28, 2017 and that the next patient did not even sign in until more than 20 minutes after she already had donated her sample, directly contradicting her claim that others were there at the same time and that multiple samples were setting on the counter. The contemporaneous notes of the MRO who certified the initial drug test result document that Ms. Williams admitted to passive exposure, contrary to her later denial of any ingestion of illegal drugs (see attached). The certified addition psychiatrist/MRO disputes that drug use can be determined by profiling individuals. Given that students’ safety is of utmost concern to the District and Superintendent, and the risk of a negligent retention claims of employing someone who tested positive to drive children, employment termination is recommended. The Substance Abuse Policy prohibits a School Board employee from reporting to work with illegal drugs in his or her system. The Substance Abuse Policy further prohibits School Board employees’ use of illegal drugs off duty and off School Board property because such use “may adversely affect on-the-job performance and the confidence of the public in the School district’s ability to meet its responsibilities.” Employees who violate the Substance Abuse Policy are subject to discipline, up to and including termination. The School Board’s Discipline Policy (“Discipline Policy”), 6GX-10-2.17 and Article X of the CBA provide that the School Board may dismiss any employee for just cause. The Discipline Policy establishes that “[j]ust cause shall include, but is not limited to” a variety of violations, among them “misconduct in office” and “non-compliance with regulations and policies of the School Board, State Board of Education, or the laws of Florida.” The Discipline Policy and the Substance Abuse Policy are communicated to School Board employees through the School Board’s Employee Handbook. It is undisputed that Ms. Williams was aware of the School Board’s drug testing policy and that she was subject to random drug testing during her employment. The Substance Abuse Policy and CBA do not provide for mandatory termination for employees who fail drug tests, but the School Board’s established practice is to terminate employees testing positive for illegal drugs. Superintendent Davis testified that the rationale for the School Board’s practice is safety-based. He stated that student safety is the School Board’s greatest priority. Employees who transport students and test positive for cocaine and marijuana will face termination “100 percent of the time.” Prior to this case, Mr. Broskie had been involved in disciplining five or six other School Board employees who tested positive for illegal drugs. Each case resulted in either termination of employment by the School Board or the employee’s voluntary resignation in lieu of termination. When questioned as to why the School Board did not employ progressive discipline in light of Ms. Williams’s prior spotless record, Superintendent Davis responded that the School Board’s “progressive discipline menu” was in fact consulted and that the appropriate consequence for the circumstance was selected. On April 17, 2018, Superintendent Davis provided Ms. Williams with written notice of his recommendation that the School Board terminate her employment based on her misconduct in office and violations of School Board policies. On May 3, 2018, the School Board accepted the Superintendent’s recommendation and terminated Ms. Williams’s employment for just cause effective May 17, 2018. Ms. Williams had the remaining portion of her November 28, 2017, urine sample retested by a Quest Diagnostics Incorporated laboratory between May 10 and May 13, 2018. The retest reconfirmed the presence of cocaine and marijuana metabolites in Ms. Williams’s urine sample. On May 15, 2018, Dr. Lopez reviewed the retest of Ms. Williams’s urine sample and reconfirmed that it was positive for cocaine and marijuana. Mr. Broskie testified that his opinion that Ms. Williams’s employment should be terminated is unchanged by the fact that she was given a non-DOT drug test. Echoing Dr. Pomm, Mr. Broskie stated that the lack of split sampling at the point of collection had no effect on the ultimate test result because the same five-panel drug screen is administered in both DOT and non-DOT drug tests. Ms. Williams counters that the Federal DOT's rules are explicit and detailed, providing for security measures at the test site, procedures for the taking of the urine samples, chain of custody for urine samples, and guarantees of privacy for employees. 49 C.F.R. pt. 40. For example, urine collectors are required to do all of the following before each collection: Secure any water sources or otherwise make them unavailable to employees (e.g., turn off water inlet, tape handles to prevent opening faucets); Ensure that the water in the toilet is blue; Ensure that no soap, disinfectants, cleaning agents, or other possible adulterants are present; Inspect the site to ensure that no foreign or unauthorized substances are present; Tape or otherwise secure shut any movable toilet tank top, or put bluing in the tank; Ensure that undetected access (e.g., through a door not in your view) is not possible; Secure areas and items (e.g., ledges, trash receptacles, paper towel holders, under-sink areas) that appear suitable for concealing contaminants; and Recheck items in paragraphs (b)(1) through (7) of this section following each collection to ensure the site’s continued integrity. 49 C.F.R. § 40.43(b). The evidence produced at the hearing did not establish that these exemplar procedures or the other collector procedures prescribed by 49 C.F.R. Part 40, Subparts D & E were followed by ClayMed. Obviously, the many provisions specific to split specimen testing were not followed due to the School Board’s initial instruction that Ms. Williams be given a non-DOT test. The DOT rules provide that in undertaking the verification process, an MRO must not consider any evidence from tests of urine samples or other body fluids (e.g., blood or hair samples) that are not collected or tested “in accordance with this part.” 49 C.F.R. § 40.151(a). The MRO is required to make reasonable efforts to reach the employee to notify him or her of positive test results. “Reasonable efforts include, at a minimum, three attempts, spaced reasonably over a 24-hour period, to reach the employee” at the numbers the employee has provided. These efforts must be documented, including dates and times, before the MRO may contact the Designated Employer Representative (“DER”) and direct that person to contact the employee. 49 C.F.R. § 40.131(c). If the DER becomes the first point of contact, the DER must attempt to contact the employee immediately and inform the employee of the consequences of failing to contact the MRO within the next 72 hours, which are that the MRO may verify the test as positive. 49 C.F.R. § 40.131(d). After verifying a drug test as positive, the MRO is required to inform the employee of his or her right to have the split specimen tested, as follows: You must inform the employee that he or she has 72 hours from the time you provide this notification to him or her to request a test of the split specimen. You must tell the employee how to contact you to make this request. You must provide telephone numbers or other information that will allow the employee to make this request. As the MRO, you must have the ability to receive the employee’s calls at all times during the 72 hour period (e.g., by use of an answering machine with a “time stamp” feature when there is no one in your office to answer the phone). You must tell the employee that if he or she makes this request within 72 hours, the employer must ensure that the test takes place, and that the employee is not required to pay for the test from his or her own funds before the test takes place. You must also tell the employee that the employer may seek reimbursement for the cost of the test (see § 40.173). You must tell the employee that additional tests of the specimen (e.g., DNA tests) are not authorized. 49 C.F.R. § 40.153. The evidence produced at hearing established multiple failures by the School Board and its MRO to comply with the DOT testing requirements. In even considering the non-DOT test, Dr. Lopez, the MRO, acted in contravention of the DOT requirement that he consider only evidence from tests of urine samples collected in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 40. Dr. Lopez made only two attempts in a three-hour period to contact Ms. Williams on December 1, 2017, the first at 9:28 a.m., the second at 12:57 p.m. At 3:26 p.m., Dr. Lopez phoned Ms. Cory (the presumptive DER) to ask her to call Ms. Williams and give her his contact information. Ms. Cory spoke with Ms. Williams that afternoon and told her she needed to contact Dr. Lopez that day. The record is silent as to whether Ms. Cory informed Ms. Williams of the significance of the following 72-hour period. In any event, Dr. Lopez reported the test “no contact, positive for marijuana and cocaine” at 8:19 a.m., on December 4, 2017. This was slightly sooner than 72 hours after Dr. Lopez’s first, unsuccessful attempt to phone Ms. Williams and much sooner than 72 hours after Ms. Cory actually contacted Ms. Williams on the afternoon of December 1, 2017. Ms. Williams phoned Dr. Lopez on December 4, 2017, at 2:38 p.m. Dr. Lopez testified as to what he and Ms. Williams discussed but did not state whether he gave her the information required by 49 C.F.R. § 40.153, particularly the notification that she was not required to pay for any retest from her own funds before the test took place. In urging that its failure to follow the DOT testing procedure mandated by its own policy was harmless error, the School Board narrowly focuses on the laboratory test result without considering the myriad procedural and substantive protections denied to Ms. Williams by the failure of the School Board to use the DOT test protocols. In addition to the initial, fatal flaw of failing to require a split sample, the School Board’s MRO failed to make reasonable efforts to contact Ms. Williams about her test result. The MRO also denied Ms. Williams the proper 72-hour notice before her test was verified as “positive, no contact.” The School Board denied Ms. Williams a retest because of her inability to pay for it, despite a clear DOT requirement that the School Board pay for the test if she could not. There is every reason to believe that Ms. Williams would have promptly requested a retest had she been told that she was not required to come up with the money immediately. Mr. Broskie’s testimony and his “Fact Finding Memorandum” make clear that Ms. Williams’s failure to request a retest within 72 hours and her subsequent failure to pay for a retest played a significant role in the recommendation to terminate her employment. Thus, the School Board’s errors were not merely procedural. The School Board denied Ms. Williams the substantive right to a timely retest of a split sample specimen, then used the lack of a retest as evidence against her. It is axiomatic that an agency must follow its own rules. The fact that the agency has disregarded a specific provision of its rules for as long as its employees can remember is irrelevant once the illicit practice is challenged. The School Board’s prior failures should not be visited upon Ms. Williams. There is no way of knowing how events would have played out if the School Board had followed its own adopted policy and sent Ms. Williams for a DOT drug test. The School Board’s failure to comply with its own Substance Abuse Policy 6GX-10-2.17B.10 and Article XII of the CBA renders the non-DOT drug test administered to Ms. Williams invalid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Clay County School Board enter a final order: Dismissing the “Charges and Recommended Action” issued by the Superintendent of Schools Addison Davis to Respondent dated April 17, 2018; and Reimbursing Respondent for any pay or benefits that she did not receive as a result of the School Board’s actions in this case, plus interest from the date that any such pay or benefit was withheld, as appropriate under applicable law. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2019.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d), by testing positive for marijuana; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed against Respondent's Law Enforcement Certificate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating persons certified in Florida as law enforcement officers. On June 29, 2000, Petitioner certified Respondent as a law enforcement officer pursuant to Law Enforcement Certificate number 192064. Petitioner had previously certified Respondent as an auxiliary law enforcement officer on November 3, 1998, pursuant to Law Enforcement Certificate number 183207. Respondent has worked continuously as an auxiliary law enforcement officer and as a law enforcement officer for the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) from November 3, 1998. Respondent performed her jobs well and had no disciplinary action prior to this proceeding. On January 30, 2002, a licensed practical nurse (LPN) for the Sheriff's Office collected a urine specimen from Respondent in a random procedure conducted pursuant to the Drug Free Workplace testing program. The LPN sealed the specimen in the presence of Respondent and stored the specimen in a refrigerator regularly used for that and other purposes. Staff for the Sheriff's Office forwarded the specimen to LabCorp at approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same day that the LPN collected the specimen. The specimen arrived at LabCorp with the seals in tact. LabCorp would not have tested the specimen if the seals were broken. LabCorp staff observed two deficiencies in the chain of custody documents that accompanied the specimen. The collector signed as the collector but did not sign as the person who released the specimen. Nor did the chain of custody documents indicate the mode of shipment. LabCorp began testing the specimen and sent an affidavit to the LPN for her to sign. The LPN signed the affidavit, without understanding the content or purpose of the affidavit, and returned it to LabCorp. LabCorp would not have completed testing if the LPN had not returned the affidavit properly completed. LabCorp conducted an immunoassay. The specimen tested positive for propoxyphene. The reading for propoxyphene metabolite exceeded the minimum 300 required for a positive result. The specimen also tested positive for cannabinoids (marijuana). The reading for marijuana metabolite exceeded the minimum of 50 required for a positive result. LabCorp conducted a gas chromatography mass spectrometry (GCMS) to rule out a false-positive reading in the immunoassay. The specimen exceeded the minimums of 300 for propoxyphene and 15 nanograms per milliliter for marijuana. The specimen reading for marijuana was 32 nanograms per milliliter. LabCorp referred the test results to Dr. John Eustace, a certified medical review officer under contract with the Sheriff's Office to ensure the validity of test results for controlled substances. Dr. Eustace confirmed the test results and contacted Respondent. Respondent had a prescription for Darvocet. Darvocet contains propoxyphene. The Administrative Complaint does not charge Respondent with any violation based on propoxyphene. Respondent stated to Dr. Eustace that she was on other non-prescription pain medications. None of the pain medications would have caused a false-positive reading in the testing conducted by LabCorp. After concluding her conversation with Dr. Eustace, Respondent immediately submitted a second specimen for independent testing that was completed on February 14, 2002. The specimen did not test positive for any controlled substance. The independent test was conducted approximately 14 days after Respondent provided the original specimen. Tests may detect marijuana in chronic users for up to 14 days but generally cannot detect the drug in recreational users after three to five days. Respondent denies using marijuana and denies any willful or intentional ingestion of marijuana. The test conducted on the original specimen would have detected marijuana in Respondent's system if Respondent were to have ingested the drug unknowingly through food that she consumed or through second hand smoke. Respondent does not recall being around anyone smoking marijuana and has no knowledge of consuming food that contained marijuana. Respondent's only explanation for the positive test results is that someone tampered with the specimen tested by LabCorp. The refrigerator used to store the specimen is located in an area of the building that is not secure. Staff members of the Sheriff's Office as well as some inmates in the adjacent jail have access to the area where the refrigerator is located. Assuming arguendo that someone had access to the specimen, Respondent elicited no testimony from Petitioner's experts, and called no expert in her case, to show how those with access to the refrigerator could have added a substance to the specimen to cause it to test positive for marijuana. Nor did Respondent submit any evidence of how such tampering could have been accomplished without breaking the seal on the specimen tested by LabCorp.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4), and issuing a written reprimand in accordance with Subsection 943.1395(7)(e), Florida Statutes (2001). DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Pine Scott Price, Esquire Bank of America Building 126 East Olympia Avenue Suite 405 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue This is a proceeding in which the Petitioner seeks to suspend the license of a medical doctor on the basis of allegations set forth in an Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint charges that the medical doctor is in violation of Section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, "by being unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness or use of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, chemicals, or any other type of material or as a result of any mental or physical condition."
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is, and has been at all times material to this proceeding, licensed as a physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0077594. Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled substance with a high potential for abuse, whose use may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. When a person ingests cocaine, the human body metabolizes some of the cocaine into a substance called benoylecgonine. Benoylecgonine is commonly referred to as cocaine metabolite or metabolite of cocaine. In the normal course of events, cocaine metabolite is found in the human body only following the ingestion of cocaine. On February 17, 1998, the Respondent submitted a urine sample for drug screening as part of the application process for employment at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida. The results of that test came back positive for metabolite of cocaine. While positive, the amount of cocaine metabolite recorded by the test equipment was very small, only 61 nanograms of metabolite of cocaine per milliliter. The Respondent was very surprised by the results of the urine drug screen test, and he questioned the accuracy of the test results. When he gave the urine sample on February 17, 1998, the sample was split into two separate samples. He eventually requested a test of the second sample. The second sample was tested on November 24, 1998. The second sample also tested positive, but again the measured amount of cocaine metabolite was very small, only 50.5 nanograms per milliliter. The Respondent is unable to explain why the urine specimen he gave on February 17, 1998 would test positive for metabolites of cocaine. The Respondent denies any voluntary or intentional ingestion of cocaine and is unaware of any manner in which he might have accidentally or unknowingly ingested cocaine. The Respondent believes that the test results of the urine sample he gave on February 17, 1998, are erroneous because there is no logical reason known to him for his urine to have tested positive for metabolites of cocaine, other than test error or sample contamination. Drug test results that indicate only very small amounts of cocaine metabolite in the test sample are regarded as insignificant and are treated essentially the same as negative results. For example, Jackson Memorial Hospital treats test results of less than 50 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter the same as a negative result. And the Department of Transportation treats test results of less than 150 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter the same as a negative result. When the Respondent's urine sample of February 17, 1998, was tested the first time, the materials being tested also included two control samples of known values. One of the control samples contained 150 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter. The test equipment measured that sample as 163 nanograms per milliliter; 13 nanograms high. The other control sample contained 450 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter. The test equipment measured that sample as 482 nanograms per milliliter; 32 nanograms high. On the first test of the Respondent's February 17, 1998, urine sample, the test equipment recorded a measurement of 61 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter. That result was not adjusted to take into account the fact that the test equipment was producing high readings on the known samples. If the test results of the Respondent's urine sample were to be adjusted by the 13 nanogram error in the smallest of the control samples, the result would be 48 nanograms of cocaine metabolite in the Respondent's sample. The Respondent became licensed to practice medicine in Florida on or about March 4, 1999. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent obtained employment with an anesthesia group in Miami, Florida, known as Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc. Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc., had a contract to provide anesthesia services to patients at Coral Gables Hospital. In his capacity as an employee of Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc., the Respondent was assigned to provide anesthesia services to patients at Coral Gables Hospital on a regular basis. Dr. Manuel Torres was the CEO and owner of the Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc. Dr. Torres was the person who made the decision to offer the Respondent employment with the Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc., and was also the person primarily responsible for supervising the Respondent's professional activities. Dr. Manuel Torres has been practicing anesthesiology for approximately 30 years. During that time he has served as Chief of Anesthesiology at several hospitals in the Miami area, including Hialeah Hospital, Golden Glades Hospital, and Coral Gables Hospital. Dr. Manual Torres has also been a professor of medicine at the University of Miami School of Medicine. While the Respondent worked at Coral Gables Hospital as a new anesthesiologist, he was closely supervised by Dr. Torres, both inside and outside of the operating room. During the course of his supervision of the Respondent, it never appeared to Dr. Torres that the Respondent was impaired in any way. On the evening of July 16, 1999, while some atypical events were taking place in the vicinity of the lobby of the Coral Gables Hospital, the Respondent was elsewhere in the hospital providing anesthesia services for two patients.3 Hospital records show that from 7:00 p.m. until about 9:20 p.m. on July 16, 1999, the Respondent was providing anesthesia services to two patients in one of the hospital operating rooms. These medical records include entries made by the Respondent as the anesthesia services were being provided to the patients in the operating room and in the recovery room, with the Respondent documenting the patient's pulse, blood pressure, respiration, and other information in the records every few minutes. Between about 9:20 p.m. and 11:07 p.m., one of the patients being attended to by the Respondent was in the recovery room. During this time, the Respondent remained in or near the recovery room to ensure that the patient fully recovered from the anesthesia before the Respondent left the hospital premises. At 11:07 p.m., the recovery room nurse went to the Respondent to ask him for orders to move the patient from the recovery room to a regular floor. The Respondent gave the requested orders. Very shortly thereafter, the Respondent left the recovery room and also left the hospital. The Respondent was picked up at the hospital by his roommate at approximately 11:30 p.m. On the evening of July 16, 1999, the Respondent was not the person in the men's restroom of the hospital lobby and was not the person who, upon leaving the men's restroom, asked that a taxi be called.4 As of the date of the final hearing in this case, the Respondent had shared a dwelling place with an adult roommate for approximately one and a half years. During that period of time, the Respondent's roommate has never seen the Respondent using drugs, nor has he ever seen the Respondent engage in any conduct that created any suspicion of drug use. After July 16, 1999, and until his license was suspended in December of 1999, the Respondent continued to work for the Anesthesia Group of Miami under the supervision of Dr. Manuel Torres at facilities other than Coral Gables Hospital. Dr. Torres was never notified by anyone at Coral Gables Hospital about the allegations made against the Respondent on July 16, 1999, even though the hospital knew that the Respondent continued to be employed by Dr. Torres and that the Respondent was continuing to provide anesthesiology services to patients at other facilities. Shortly before the Respondent was employed by Dr. Torres, Martha Garcia, the Chief Executive Officer, at Coral Gables Hospital, had notified Dr. Torres that the hospital had decided to terminate its contract with the Anesthesia Group of Miami, and that after midnight on July 16, 1999, another anesthesia group would be providing all anesthesia services at Coral Gables Hospital. The new anesthesia group took over responsibility for all anesthesia services at Coral Gables Hospital beginning at the stroke of midnight on July 16, 1999. The Respondent had wanted to continue to work at Coral Gables Hospital after July 16, 1999. Dr. Torres did not object to the Respondent continuing to work at Coral Gables Hospital after July 16, 1999. Accordingly, Dr. Torres advised the Respondent that the he would release the Respondent from the non-compete clause in the Respondent's employment contract. Dr. Torres also advised the hospital CEO that he was releasing the Respondent from the non-compete clause. The Respondent communicated with the new anesthesia group and made arrangements to work with that group when they began providing anesthesia services at Coral Gables Hospital on July 17, 1999. The Respondent also discussed the matter with Martha Garcia. She initially told the Respondent that she had no objection to him continuing to work at Coral Gables Hospital with the new anesthesia group after July 16, 1999. At some point in time prior to July 16, 1999, Martha Garcia changed her mind. She told the new anesthesia group that she would not allow the Respondent to work at Coral Gables Hospital after July 16, 1999. She also told the Respondent that she had changed her mind. Martha Garcia and the Respondent had at least one heated conversation about her change of mind. Martha Garcia became very angry with the Respondent about the way he spoke to her during their heated conversation. She was still angry with him on July 16, 1999. Martha Garcia's animosity towards the Respondent was still evident during her testimony at the final hearing. On August 3, 1999, about two and a half weeks after the alleged incident on the night of July 16, 1999, Martha Garcia, the Chief Executive Officer of Coral Gables Hospital, called the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN) and told them that a hospital security guard had discovered the Respondent "strapped off" and injecting a substance into himself.5 The PRN monitors health care practitioners who are impaired or potentially impaired by alcohol, drugs, or other mental conditions. Dr. Raymond Pomm, the Medical Director of the PRN, serves as the impaired practitioner's consultant to the Board of Medicine. In response to the information provided by Martha Garcia, the PRN contacted the Respondent on August 10, 1999. The PRN requested that the Respondent obtain an evaluation for possible impairment and provided the Respondent with several options for such an evaluation. The Respondent agreed to see Dr. Richard Seely for the evaluation. On August 20, 1999, the Respondent presented to Richard Seely, M.D., who is a board certified addiction psychiatrist, for evaluation. At that time, Dr. Seely observed Respondent to be anxious, tremulous, and in an agitated state. Additionally, Dr. Seely noticed that the Respondent's nose was running and that the Respondent frequently rubbed his nose. During Respondent's visit with Dr. Seely, Dr. Seely requested that the Respondent provide an immediate urine sample for a urine drug screen. Such a urine drug screen is a routine part of an evaluation of impairment or possible impairment. The Respondent refused to provide an immediate urine sample. The Respondent was presented with two options for submitting to an immediate urine drug screen. The Respondent could either call his attorney from Dr. Seely's office, or he could immediately provide the urine sample, which Dr. Seely agreed to hold until such time as the Respondent could speak with his attorney. The Respondent rejected these options, and he did not provide a urine sample on August 20, 1999. The Respondent also refused to sign the consent forms and refused to pay for the evaluation. The Respondent contacted his attorney to discuss whether he should sign the forms provided to him by Dr. Seely and whether he should provide the urine sample requested by Dr. Seely. Following review of the forms, the attorney advised the Respondent that he should sign the forms and that he should provide the requested urine sample. On August 24, 1999, the Respondent returned to Dr. Seely's office, signed the consent forms, and provided a urine sample. Testing of that urine sample was negative for any of the drugs tested for. However, because the Respondent had waited four days to provide the urine sample, on August 24, 2000, Dr. Seely also asked the Respondent to provide a hair sample. The Respondent contacted his attorney to ask whether he should comply with the request for a hair sample. The Respondent's attorney advised him not to provide a hair sample for testing. Consistent with that advice, the Respondent refused to provide a hair sample on August 24, 2000. Dr. Seely could not complete an evaluation of Respondent or make a recommendation to PRN without the Respondent's undergoing some form of reliable drug screening, either by immediate urine screening or by hair drug toxicology screening. Dr. Seely reported to the PRN that an evaluation of the Respondent could not be completed because the Respondent refused to cooperate with the evaluation. On October 4, 1999, Dr. Raymond Pomm, the Medical Director at PRN and a board certified addiction psychiatrist, wrote to the Respondent. Dr. Pomm's letter to the Respondent included the following: This correspondence serves as written documentation that your case is being referred to the Agency for Health Care Administration for appropriate action. This referral is the result of serious allegations brought forth and your unwillingness to fully cooperate with the evaluation process to resolve same. On October 4, 1999, Dr. Raymond Pomm also wrote to the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). Dr. Pomm's letter to the AHCA summarized the information he had received regarding the allegations against the Respondent, summarized efforts to have the Respondent submit to an evaluation, summarized the Respondent's failures to cooperate, and concluded with the opinion that the Respondent was "unsafe to practice his profession with reasonable skill and safety." As of March 24, 2000 (the last day of the final hearing in this case), the Respondent had not completed a psychological evaluation or a chemical dependency evaluation. However, during March of 2000, the Respondent voluntarily submitted several urine samples for drug screen testing. These more recent urine samples were tested by the same lab that performed the drug screen test on February 17, 1998. The more recent samples were submitted on each of the following dates: March 7, 10, 13, 17, and 20, 2000. All five of the urine samples submitted by the Respondent during March of 2000 were negative for cocaine metabolite. They were also negative for all of the other drugs for which the tests screened. Under Section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner has "the authority to issue an order to compel a licensee to submit to a mental or physical examination by physicians designated by the department." No such order was issued to compel the Respondent to submit to such a examination.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case concluding that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the Respondent is unable to practice with skill and safety, dismissing the Administrative Complaint in its entirety, and vacating the previously issued Emergency Suspension Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 2000.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated sections 458.331(1)(t), 458.331(1)(m), and 458.331(1)(n), Florida Statutes (2004), and section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2006), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state department charged with regulating the practice of medicine in Florida pursuant to section 20.43, Florida Statutes (2010), and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes (2010). At all material times to the Administrative Complaints, Dr. Rubinstein was licensed as a medical doctor within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME37720. He is an otorhinolaryngologist, meaning he is a specialist in ears, nose and throat, and facial plastic and reconstructive surgery. He also treats allergies. On November 7, 2003, Dr. Rubinstein and the Department entered into a Consent Agreement, related to the following Administrative Complaints filed against Dr. Rubinstein: Case No. 2001-07091, Case No. 1999-5773, and Case No. 2000-02195. Based on the Consent Agreement, a Final Order, DOH-04-0020-S-MQ, was filed by the Board on January 7, 2004, imposing a fine of $25,000; imposing 60 hours of community service; requiring Dr. Rubinstein to submit to a two-day evaluation at the Institute for Physician Education (IPE); requiring Dr. Rubinstein to comply with the recommendations resulting from the evaluation at IPE; and placing Dr. Rubinstein on probation for five years. On August 6, 1993, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DPR) and Dr. Rubinstein entered into a Consent Agreement to resolve DPR Case Nos. 90-06221, 91-06043, 91-08800, 91-12051, 92-00308, 92-11650, 92-11763. The Consent Agreement provided a stipulated disposition of a $10,000 fine and probation for five years. The Consent Agreement was adopted by a Final Order of the Board filed August 23, 2009. On May 11, 1993, DPR and Dr. Rubinstein entered into a Consent Agreement relating to DPR Case No. 92-13503. The Consent Agreement provided a stipulated disposition of a $5,000 fine, a reprimand, and requirement that Dr. Rubinstein review section 458.331, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 21M. The Consent Agreement was adopted as a Final Order by the Board on June 8, 1993. On August 24, 1992, the Board entered a Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 0081610, 8906844, 8903225, 109405, and 8907280 finding Dr. Rubinstein guilty of violations of subsections 458.331(1)(d), (k), (m), (n), (t), and (x), Florida Statutes; imposing a $15,000 fine; reprimanding Dr. Rubinstein; prohibiting Dr. Rubinstein from initiating contact with patients or their families for the purpose of persuading them to agree to his treatment recommendations; and placing Dr. Rubinstein on probation for one year. On June 8, 2005, a Determination and Order was entered by the State of New York, Department of Health, State Board for Professional Medical Conduct, BPMC No. 05-115, revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license to practice medicine in New York, based on the disciplinary actions by the Board in the Final Order in Case DOH-04-0020-S-MQ. Facts Relating to DOAH Case No. 09-5267PL At all times material to this Administrative Complaint, Dr. Rubinstein did not hold hospital staff privileges for any hospital in the Sarasota, Florida, area. On January 11, 2005, J.D. presented to Dr. Rubinstein's office, seeking the following medical procedures: a breast lift or augmentation; possible liposuction on her hips; and a tummy tuck. J.D. completed a form during the office visit. Dr. Rubinstein recommended that J.D. have a breast augmentation; liposuction of hips, outer and inner thighs, and knees; and an abdominoplasty (tummy tuck). During the January 11, 2005, visit, Dr. Rubinstein told J.D. that he could help her with the dark circles under her eyes with some allergy testing. J.D. had not gone to Dr. Rubinstein for diagnosis, help, or treatment for any other conditions other than her request for cosmetic surgery. On January 11, 2005, J.D. was provided with a cost estimate for the surgical procedures of $29,550. These costs included a tummy tuck at $8,900; liposuction of the abdomen at $3,800; liposuction of the hips at $2,800; liposuction of the waist at $2,400; liposuction of the lateral thighs at $3,400; liposuction of the medial thighs at $1,800; liposuction of the knees at $800; operating room for $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; anesthesia at $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; and lab work for $250. The cost estimate did not include the breast augmentation. The surgical cost estimate stated: "It is estimated that your operating and recovery time will be 9 hours." J.D. took the cost estimate and discussed them with her husband, who felt that the costs were too much. J.D. called Dr. Rubinstein's office and advised that the cost was too high, and she could not have the surgeries for that price. Dr. Rubinstein revised his surgical cost estimate as follows: abdominoplasty $8,900; breast augmentation $4,200; implants $1,400; liposuction of the abdomen $0; liposuction of the hips $2,800; liposuction of the waist $0; liposuction of the lateral thighs $3,400; liposuction of the medial thighs $0; operating room at $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; anesthesia at $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; and pre-op lab work $250. There was no mention of liposuction of the knees in the revised cost estimate. The revised cost estimate stated: "It is estimated that your operating and recovery time will be 9 hours." The revised cost estimate was signed by J.D. on January 14, 2005. Both the original and revised cost estimates contained the following: "The Anesthesia and operating room charges are based on operating and recovery time. Consequently, if a surgical procedure turns out to be more or less lengthy than was expected, both fees will be correspondingly increased or decreased." J.D. went to Dr. Rubinstein's office on January 14, 2005, for a pre-operative visit. A history was taken, and a physical examination was done. Frank Steig, M.D. (Dr. Steig), who is board certified in otolaryngology, head and neck surgery, and plastic and reconstructive surgery, testified as an expert on behalf of the Department. He was of the opinion that the history and physical met the basic criteria. His opinion was based on a review of the medical records. Some of the forms used by Dr. Rubinstein in recording the information concerning J.D. were forms that are more suitable for an otolaryngology physician's use. However, no evidence was presented that the information listed on the forms did not meet the basic criteria for medical records or that the use of a certain form fell below the standard of care. Although J.D. was seeing Dr. Rubinstein for cosmetic surgery, she was asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning allergies. On or about January 14, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein gave Patient, J.D., a cost estimate for allergy testing totaling $3,565.00. On or about January 14, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein directed J.D. to go to Lab Corp for pre-operative testing, which included a CBC with Differential/Platelet, Complete Metabolic Panel, Urinalysis, Prothrombin Time, and Partial Thromboplastin Time. On or about January 19, 2005, J.D. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for the decided cosmetic procedures. Based on Dr. Rubinstein's operative report, he performed the following procedures on J.D. on January 19, 2005: abdominoplasty; liposuction of lower lateral abdomen, hips, waist, lateral thighs, medial thighs, and knees; and augmentation of breasts. Based on the surgical and anesthesia notes, the anesthesia began at 9:15 a.m. and ended at 11:55 p.m. There was some difficulty in finding a vein on J.D. that would be suitable to deliver the anesthesia. Eventually the anesthesia was administered through the jugular vein. Surgery was begun at 11:45 a.m. and was completed at 11:20 p.m. The breast augmentation took three hours and 35 minutes. The liposuction took one hour and 55 minutes. The abdominoplasty took six hours and five minutes. At the final hearing, Dr. Rubinstein testified that he would have predicted that the breast augmentation would have taken approximately two to two-and-a-half hours. He would have estimated that the liposuction would have taken one hour and 55 minutes. He would have estimated that the abdominoplasty would have taken three to four hours. Given these estimates, the planned surgery time at a maximum would have been eight hours and 25 minutes. Dr. Rubinstein's testimony contradicts his estimate of the surgical time as reflected on the surgical cost estimates, which were done prior to the surgery. The first cost estimate did not include the breast augmentation; therefore, the planned surgery for liposuction and the abdominoplasty was eight hours as reflected on the cost estimate. In the revised cost estimate, he added the breast augmentation, which he estimated to be between two and two-and-one-half hours. Thus, the planned time for the three surgical procedures would have been between ten and ten-and-one-half hours. No explanation was given by Dr. Rubinstein why there was no adjustment between the planned time for surgery as reflected in the cost estimates. On or about January 19, 2005, J.D. was taken to the recovery room at 11:55 p.m. and released to return home at 1:00 a.m. on January 20, 2005. Based on the anesthesiologist's assessment, J.D. met the discharge criteria of Dr. Rubinstein's surgical facility, which was accredited as a Level III surgical facility. J.D.'s husband, Mr. J.D., was called to Dr. Rubinstein's office to take J.D. home. He testified that after he arrived at the facility, he was told that there would be an additional fee of $4,900; however, he stated that the discharge of J.D. was not conditioned on the payment of the additional fee. The evidence is conflicting concerning when Mr. J.D. actually paid the additional $4,900 by credit card. Mr. J.D. testified that he paid by credit at the time of J.D.'s discharge on January 20, 2005. The computer credit card receipt, which was signed by Mr. J.D., shows that the payment by credit card was made at 1:01 p.m. on January 20, 2005. The evidence shows that the credit card payment was made in the afternoon of January 20, 2005. Dr. Rubinstein's operative report did not include the amount of tissue that was removed during the abdominoplasty or the tightening of J.D.'s abdominal wall. Dr. Steig, the Department's expert, did not testify that the standard of care required that such information be included in the operative report. He said that generally such information is included. Douglas Dedo, M.D. (Dr. Dedo), expert witness for Dr. Rubinstein, opined that the standard of care did not require Dr. Rubinstein to document the amount of tissue removed during the abdominoplasty or to document the tightening of the abdominal wall. Dr. Dedo's testimony is credited. Dr. Rubinstein belongs to the International Trade Exchange (ITEX), which is a corporation that serves as a network for businesses to do business with each other using an alternative currency system called trade dollars. In other words, businesses can barter with one another. Dr. Rubinstein suggested to J.D. that she might want to become a member of ITEX, and it could be a way of paying for procedures. J.D. and her husband own a tour guide service. One of Dr. Rubinstein's employees, Judy Trapani (Ms. Trapani), was interested in bartering a trip to Italy for procedures performed by Dr. Rubinstein. Based on the testimony of Mr. J.D., it appears that conversations concerning bartering a trip to Italy for surgical procedures occurred between Ms. Trapani and Mr. J.D. The evidence is not clear and convincing that Dr. Rubinstein was trying to barter the surgical procedures for a trip for Ms. Trapani. Facts Relating to DOAH Case No. 09-5269PL On March 22, 2005, B.L. first presented to Dr. Rubinstein, accompanied by her mother, C.L., for complaints of severe acne. C.L. filled out a general patient questionnaire and was also asked to fill out a form concerning allergies. It is not clear why a form relating to allergies would need to be completed prior to the initial examination when B.L. was being seen for severe acne. On the general questionnaire, C.L. indicated that B.L. had had asthma or other respiratory problems, chronic bronchitis, and ear infections. The allergy questionnaire was to determine the cause of the patient's allergy symptoms. However, B.L. was not seeing Dr. Rubinstein for allergy symptoms, and C.L., understandably, thought that the allergy questionnaire related to past symptoms. On the allergy questionnaire, C.L. indicated that B.L. had had trouble with her skin; hives; trouble with ears popping and itching, hearing loss; frequent sore throats with drainage; itching eyes; thick/colored discharge from her nose; sniffles, and sneezing. Other than trouble with her skin, B.L. did not have any of these symptoms when she presented to Dr. Rubinstein. On examination, Dr. Rubinstein noted that B.L.'s turbinates were engorged and pale and that she had hypoplastic lymphoid tissue. Dr. Rubinstein diagnosed B.L. with cystic acne. Cystic acne occurs when an obstruction of the hair follicle inflames the sebaceous gland and the inflammation rises to the surface. Allergies do not cause cystic acne. However, Dr. Rubinstein told C.L. and B.L. that food allergies could affect the inflammatory component of B.L.'s cystic acne. On one of the questionnaires, C.L. had indicated that B.L. had problems with sugars and carbohydrates. From this information, Dr. Rubinstein deduced that B.L. must have a problem with yeast and put her on a yeast-free diet. It is not understood why B.L. was put on a diet eliminating yeast, since sugar and carbohydrates also occur in foods other than foods containing yeast. Dr. Rubinstein put B.L. on a yeast-free diet before any testing was done to determine whether she had an allergy to yeast. Dr. Rubinstein also recommended blue-light therapy for the inflammation. He recommended allergy testing and the Obagi Nu-Derm System (Obagi) products. The Obagi program consists of topical products that are applied to the problem area. A prescription is required for the Obagi products. He prescribed an antibiotic, Minocycline. He also prescribed Nystatin for B.L. During the initial office visit on or about March 22, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein administered 1000mg of Erythromycin to B.L. by mouth prior to performing a deep pore facial cleansing on her. B.L. was also given a facial mask. B.L. suffered severe stomach pains and diarrhea from the Erythromycin. C.L. called Dr. Rubinstein and told him about the stomach problems, and he told C.L. that was a normal reaction. On or about March 28, 2005, B.L. and C.L. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a follow-up appointment. Dr. Rubinstein documented in the medical records that B.L.'s complexion appeared improved. He continued B.L. on Nystatin and Minocycline. Dr. Rubinstein continued to recommend the allergy tests and the Obagi program. C.L. purchased the Obagi program products for $1,200. B.L. and her mother returned to Dr. Rubinstein's office on April 4, 2005, for a follow-up visit. Dr. Rubinstein continued the Minocycline and reviewed the progress in the Obagi program. C.L. authorized the allergy tests. The charge for the allergy tests was $2,821. One of the allergy tests which Dr. Rubinstein had performed was IgG testing. Such testing is not done by mainstream allergists, and it is below the standard of care to use such testing. On the evening of April 11, 2005, B.L. ate a piece of cake at her grandmother's birthday party. On the morning of April 12, 2005, B.L. went to school at 7:30 a.m., and, by 8:20 a.m., she was experiencing hives, swollen joints, problems catching her breath, and problems moving her fingers, bending her knees, and bending her feet. B.L.'s joints were visibly swollen. C.L. took B.L. to see Dr. Rubinstein on April 12, 2005. Dr. Rubinstein noted in his records on April 12, 2005, that B.L. had hives, but he did not mention that B.L.'s joints were swollen. He opined that the hives were caused by eating cake. B.L. had eaten cake at times before the ingestion of cake on April 11, 2005, and had not experienced the symptoms that she had on April 12, 2005. B.L. has eaten cake since the ingestion of the cake on April 11, 2005, and has not experienced the symptoms that she had on April 12, 2005. Dr. Rubinstein had the results of the allergy tests to foods on April 12, 2005. None of the tests showed that B.L. was allergic to baker's yeast or gluten. One of the tests showed that B.L. might be allergic to candida albicans, which is a yeast that is usually found in babies with thrush and people whose immunity system is compromised. An allergy to candida albicans is not the same as an allergy to baker's yeast. However, Dr. Rubinstein continued the yeast-free diet. During the office visit on April 12, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein administered a 6mg dose of Decadron to B.L. for an acute allergic reaction. Decadron is a steroid used to treat conditions such as arthritis, blood/hormone/immune system disorders, allergic reactions, certain skin and eye conditions, breathing problems, certain bowel disorders, and certain cancers. B.L. had an adverse reaction to the Decadron, resulting in vomiting, stomach pains, and diarrhea. Dr. Rubinstein placed B.L. on another round of Minocycline. He suggested to C.L. that he might want to have B.L. switch to tetracycline because it may be more effective and cheaper than the Minocycline. C.L. told Dr. Rubinstein the price that she was paying for the Minocycline, and he told C.L. that if she could get the Minocycline for the price she stated that B.L. could stay on the Minocycline. During the office visit on April 12, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein lanced and drained four extremely inflamed cysts located on B.L.'s forehead and cheek. On April 12, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein suggested that B.L. go on a Rotation Elimination Diet to eliminate positive allergic foods. B.L. was to continue abstaining from eating yeast. The cost of the diet was $100. On April 12, 2005, after the office visit with Dr. Rubinstein, C.L. called Dr. Rubinstein and advised that B.L. was still not improving. Dr. Rubinstein made a note of C.L.'s telephone call. He continued to opine that the rash was caused by the ingestion of cake. He noted that the allergic reaction may be caused by the medication, but he still did not discontinue the medication. Although, Dr. Rubinstein had just examined B.L. that day, he requested that B.L. be seen again for re-evaluation. On or about April 14, 2005, C.L. went to see Dr. Rubinstein without B.L. to obtain the results of B.L.'s allergy tests. C.L. indicated that B.L.'s hives were worse. Dr. Rubinstein suggested that B.L. present to him again, after having seen B.L. two days prior, and that she may need antihistamines and medrol dose packs. He did not tell C.L. to discontinue the Minocycline. C.L. no longer trusted Dr. Rubinstein. On April 15, 2005, B.L.'s symptoms had not improved, and C.L. took B.L. to see B.L.'s pediatrician. The pediatrician referred B.L., to Hugh H. Windom, M.D. (Dr. Windom), a board-certified allergist. Dr. Windom saw B.L. on April 15, 2005, for hives, joint pain, and some swelling of her hands and lower arms. On examination, Dr. Windom found that B.L. had cystic acne, raised blanching, a red rash on her lower arm, mild nasal mucosal edema, and swelling in the joints on both hands and that B.L. was dermatographic. B.L. told Dr. Windom that she had been prescribed Minocycline by Dr. Rubinstein and had been taking it since sometime in March 2005. B.L. advised Dr. Windom that she did not take the Minocycline on April 14, 2005, and that her symptoms had improved some. Dr. Windom suspected that the hives, joint pain, and swelling were allergic reactions to drugs. He discontinued B.L.'s use of Minocycline and Nystatin. Within 24 hours after her visit with Dr. Windom, B.L.'s symptoms were gone. Dr. Windom referred B.L. to a dermatologist for her acne. Michael Pacin, M.D. (Dr. Pacin), is a board-certified allergist and testified as an expert for the Department. Dr. Pacin was of the opinion that there is no connection between allergies and acne. Acne is not an allergy symptom. He is also of the opinion that the prescription of a yeast-free diet when the physician does not know if the patient has an allergy to yeast is below the standard of care. Dr. Pacin's testimony is credited. C.L. paid Dr. Rubinstein $100 for the Rotation Diet, and $2,821 for allergy testing. Facts Relating to DOAH Case No. 09-5270PL On July 17, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein with complaints that he had a rash on his face and that it was itching. R.A. thought that he might have an allergy, which is why he sought out an allergy specialist. R.A. had not gone to see Dr. Rubinstein for any nasal problems. R.A. felt that, when he mentioned that he thought he might have allergies, "it just locked in with [Dr. Rubinstein] that he had nasal problems." R.A. filled out a questionnaire on the first visit concerning his current problem. He advised Dr. Rubinstein that he had prostate cancer in 1999, and his prostate had been removed. He also stated that he had had nasal problems and had gone to the Silverstein Institute1/ in October 2005. In December 2005, he had surgery at the Silverstein Institute. Part of the surgery had been for the removal of polyps. R.A. had been going to the Silverstein Institute for follow-up visits and felt that his nasal and sinus issues were clearing up. Dr. Rubinstein recommended that R.A. have a CT scan done. Dr. Rubinstein asked R.A. to get his medical records from the Silverstein Institute. R.A. requested his medical records, including a CT scan of his sinuses, from the Silverstein Institute, and those records were provided to Dr. Rubinstein. On July 18, 2006, a CT scan was performed on R.A. The physician who interpreted the CT scan had the following impression of the CT scan results: Surgical alteration includes bilateral superior and middle turbinate removal. Opacificaton of the anterior ethmoidal air cells present bilaterally extends into the frontal sinuses where there is mild mucoperiosteal thickening. The right sphenoid sinus is completely opacified. There is mention in the history of a possible nasal bone fracture however, fractures are not identified. The CT Scan did not show a deviated septum to the extent that surgery would be needed. The physician who prepared the report on the CT stated: "Nasal septum is not significantly deviated." The medical records from the Silverstein Institute showed that in 2005 that R.A.'s septum was intact in midline. The CT scan report stated: "Mucoperiosteal thickening exists in the left maxillary sinus in a relatively mild fashion with probable polyp formation of the anterior ethmoidal air cells." The CT scan did not conclusively state that polyps were present. Dr. Steig, the Department's expert, reviewed the CT scan image and opined that the CT scan did not show nasal polyps, but instead showed polypoid changes which may or may not have been associated with the presence of polyps. Polypoid changes can be caused by mucosal irritation or suctioning. The polypoid changes in the CT scan were on the mucosa on the lateral wall. Dr. Steig's testimony is credited. On or about July 19, 2006, Dr. Rubinstein called R.A. to discuss the CT scan results and told R.A. that the CT scan results were abnormal. Dr. Rubinstein diagnosed R.A. with chronic allergic rhinitis, chronic sinusitis, nasal septal deviation with moderate obstruction, recurrence of nasal polyps, loud snoring, and dry mouth secondary to mouth breathing. Dr. Rubinstein felt the redness on R.A.'s face was a form of rosacea. Dr. Rubinstein's treatment plan consisted of reviewing the CT results, providing R.A. with supplements, in vitro allergy testing, and providing allergy medication if needed. On July 24, 2006, R.A. underwent in vitro allergy testing, using IgE blood testing for inhalants and IgG blood testing for food. On or about July 27, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a follow-up appointment, complaining of a number of symptoms bothering him since his previous appointment the week before. R.A. complained of symptoms on his skin, a stuffy nose, sore throat, body ache, and watery eyes. On July 27, 2006, Dr. Rubinstein performed an endoscopy on R.A. Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that the polyps that had been removed at the Silverstein Institute had grown back. He further told R.A. that his septum was crooked and that the physician at the Silverstein Institute had not done a good job and needed to be reported. Dr. Rubinstein advised R.A. of the results of the allergy testing. The allergy test, which Dr. Rubinstein requested for food allergies, showed that R.A. was allergic to all foods tested except for sunflower seeds. The food allergies were tested by Commonwealth Medical Labs in Warrenton, Virginia. The test used was called an IgG test. The laboratory report stated: "This test is For Investigational Use Only. Its performance characteristics have not been cleared or approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration." Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that the allergies could be treated with homeopathic vitamins, supplements, acupuncture, and a Rotation Elimination Diet. Dr. Rubinstein sold R.A. a lot of homeopathic vitamins and supplements from Dr. Rubinstein's office. Dr. Rubinstein also recommended that R.A. get some treatments from an acupuncturist, who worked out of Dr. Rubinstein's office on a case-by-case basis. Some of the treatments included injection of some homeopathic medications. The acupuncturist was supposed to help with the rash on R.A.'s face and the allergies. On July 27, 2006, Dr. Rubinstein ordered a sleep apnea test for R.A. The method of testing was a home test, which R.A. rented from Dr. Rubinstein. R.A. often woke during the night to urinate since he had his prostate removed. The results of the test showed that R.A. had significant snoring and mild obstructive sleep apnea. Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that he suffered from sleep apnea that was very serious and that R.A. had almost died three to four times during the test. Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that he needed surgery immediately to treat the sleep apnea. The sleep apnea test did not show severe sleep apnea. The sleep could and should have been treated using positive pressure ventilation via a mask. Dr. Rubinstein's testimony that he suggested the use of a mask and R.A. rejected the idea is not credited. It is clear from R.A.'s testimony that he was led to believe by Dr. Rubinstein that his sleep apnea was life- threatening and that he needed immediate surgery. On or about July 29, 2006, R.A. returned to Dr. Rubinstein's office. Dr. Rubinstein discussed the Rotation Elimination Diet with R.A. On or about August 1, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a follow-up appointment with complaints of a stuffy nose and dry mouth. Dr. Rubinstein noted that a culture from R.A. was positive for staph aureus and prescribed the antibiotics, Septra and Gentamicin nasal spray. On or about August 4, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein with complaints of inability to breathe through his nose at night. Dr. Rubinstein reviewed the progress of the Rotation Elimination Diet with R.A. On August 8, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein complaining of bilateral congestion. Dr. Rubinstein prescribed Allegra-D, an antihistamine decongestant, and Nasonex, a cortical steroid. Dr. Rubinstein presented R.A. with a surgical plan that included: endoscopic sphenoidoscopy and debridement; septoplasty; radiofrequency inferior turbinates; radiofrequency soft palate; radiofrequency base of tongue; and bilateral intranasal endoscopic ethmoidectomy revision. Dr. Steig, the Department's expert, is of the opinion that the recommended surgeries were unnecessary and that Dr. Rubinstein should have tried medical treatment before resorting to surgery. Dr. Steig's opinion is credited. On or about August 11, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a pre-operative appointment to take a history and physical examination. Dr. Rubinstein discussed EKG results with R.A., stating that the results were borderline and that Dr. Rubinstein would ask another physician to review the results. On August 14, 2006, R.A. called Dr. Rubinstein's office and left a message that he was cancelling the surgery. R.A. went to see Howard B. Fuchs, M.D. (Dr. Fuchs), on August 14, 2006, to get a second opinion. Dr. Fuchs is board- certified in pediatrics and allergies. On August 14, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Fuchs with chronic rhinitis, which is a chronic inflammation of the nasal tissues. He wanted to find out whether he had allergies. R.A. told Dr. Fuchs that he had been tested for allergies when he was Dr. Rubinstein's patient. R.A. did not bring any of the allergy test results with him to the office visit. Dr. Fuchs told R.A. to stop taking antihistamines and scheduled R.A. for skin testing ten days later. On August 24, 2006, Dr. Fuchs performed allergy skin tests, and the results were negative. R.A. did not have any allergies. Dr. Fuchs changed the Allegra-D to doses twice a day and continued R.A. on Nasonex. The Allegra-D was for congestion and to shrink the tissues in R.A.'s nose. Dr. Fuchs diagnosed R.A. with vasomotor rhinitis, which is non-allergic. Vasomotor rhinitis is triggered by things like smoke and chemical fumes. Dr. Fuchs saw R.A. again on September 14, 2006. R.A. said that he was better, but the medication made him jittery. Dr. Fuchs changed the medication. The last time that Dr. Fuchs saw R.A. was on October 13, 2006, and R.A. said that he was doing well. On August 16, 2006, Jack J. Wazen, M.D. (Dr. Wazen), who is board certified in otolaryngology, head and neck surgery, saw R.A. for the first time. Dr. Wazen is employed at the Silverstein Institute, but had not treated R.A. when R.A. had been a patient at Silverstein Institute before August 16, 2006. R.A. was seeking a second opinion concerning Dr. Rubinstein's plan for nasal surgery. Dr. Wazen did a physical examination of R.A., including an endoscopic nasal examination, which revealed the septum to be in the midline with no obstructive deviation. There were no polyps, and the sites on which R.A. had had surgery looked well-healed. Dr. Wazen also reviewed a CT scan, which R.A. had provided. Based on his examination and evaluation, Dr. Wazen told R.A. that he did not have polyps and that there was no clinical benefit to be derived from surgery. R.A. presented with complaints of nasal congestion, stuffy nose, and hives. Dr. Wazen diagnosed R.A. with allergic rhinitis. Dr. Steig was of the opinion that surgery should not have been recommended for the sleep apnea or the chronic allergic rhinitis or chronic sinusitis without first trying other medical treatments such as a mask for the sleep apnea. He opined that the rhinitis and sinusitis could have been treated by the avoidance of a known cause of the rhinitis or sinusitis and continuation of nasal steroids and antihistamines. Dr. Steig's testimony is credited. Dr. Steig was of the opinion that the recommended surgery was not justified by the medical records. There were no polyps present and the septum was not deviated to the extent that surgery was necessary. The sleep apnea was moderate and did not warrant surgical intervention. Dr. Steig's testimony is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered as follows: DOAH Case No. 09-5267PL Finding that Dr. Rubinstein violated section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2004); Finding that Dr. Rubinstein did not violate sections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(n); Revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license; and Imposing a $10,000 administrative fine; DOAH Case No. 09-5269PL Finding that Dr. Rubinstein violated sections 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(n), and 458.331(1)(t); Requiring Dr. Rubinstein to pay C.L. $2,921 for the allergy testing and the Rotation Diet; Revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license; and e. Imposing an administrative fine of $10,000. DOAH Case No. 09-5270PL Finding that Dr. Rubinstein violated section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2006); Revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license; and Imposing a $10,000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2011.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed medical doctor, holding license number 44726. At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a physician holding board certifications in internal medicine, hematology, and oncology. Patient 1 was a patient of another hematologist, Dr. Thomas Katta. On March 17, 2003, Dr. Katta had Patient 1 admitted via the patient's internist (Dr. Frank Leiva) to Sand Lake Hospital in Orlando. The patient was anemic and thrombocytopenic and had been previously diagnosed with autoimmune hemolytic anemia, the treatment for which was transfusion. Failure to transfuse a person suffering from autoimmune hemolytic anemia can lead to death, and such a transfusion had been ordered for the patient. Dr. Katta apparently had personal obligations for the evening of March 17, 2003, and for the following day, and, in the late afternoon of March 17, 2003, he asked the Respondent to "cover" his hospitalized patients. The Respondent agreed to do so. Dr. Katta's office transmitted a list of the patients by fax to the Respondent's office. The list contained the full names and locations of Dr. Katta's other hospitalized patients, but identified Patient 1 only by last name and diagnosis ("AIHA"). The fax did not indicate the patient's first name or gender and did not specifically identify the patient's location. The Respondent made no attempt to obtain additional information from Dr. Katta or his staff. The lab work performed upon admission to the hospital indicated that the patient was severely anemic and had a critically low platelet count. At approximately 6:30 p.m. on March 17, 2003, the Respondent received a telephone call through her answering service from a hospital nurse who reported that the patient was severely anemic and that there were problems obtaining a proper blood match for the transfusion. The Respondent advised the nurse to call the blood bank and tell them to find the least incompatible blood and get the transfusion done. The Respondent did not inquire as to the patient's name or location. At about 10:19 p.m. on March 17, 2003, the Respondent was again contacted by a hospital nurse, who advised that the patient was short of breath and had tachycardia at 133 beats per minute. The nurse also advised that the blood bank had been unable to find an appropriate match for the previously ordered transfusion and that the transfusion remained uncompleted. The Respondent directed the nurse to contact the patient's primary care physician or the cardiologist on call, but did not ask the identity of either practitioner. The nursing notes indicate that the Respondent stated that she did not provide treatment for tachycardia and did not believe that Dr. Katta did either. The Respondent also advised the nurse to call the blood bank and direct them to find the least incompatible blood and perform the transfusion. The Respondent did not inquire as to the patient's name or location and provided no other direction to the reporting nurse. On the next day, March 18, 2003, at about 6:15 a.m., the Respondent was contacted by a hospital nurse, who advised that the transfusion had still not taken place. The Respondent took no action and provided no direction to the reporting nurse. The Respondent did not inquire as to the patient's name or location. Later during the morning of March 18, 2003, the Respondent attempted to locate the patient while making her rounds but was unsuccessful. In attempting to locate the patient, the Respondent talked with various hospital personnel, but had no information other than the patient's last name and diagnosis. Based on her inability to obtain any additional information, the Respondent assumed that the patient had been transfused and discharged. The patient had not been discharged, but had been transferred to an intensive care unit in the hospital. The transfusion had not yet occurred. Patient 1 died on March 20, 2003. The Respondent was unaware of the patient's death until she saw Dr. Katta at the hospital, at which time he questioned her about the patient and informed her that the patient was dead. The Petitioner presented the testimony of Dr. Howard Abel, M.D., regarding whether the Respondent met the standard of care in her treatment of the patient. Dr. Abel's testimony regarding the standard of care issues is credited and is accepted. As to the issue of the uncompleted transfusion, the evidence establishes that the transfusion did not occur while the Respondent provided hematological care for Patient 1. The Respondent should have personally contacted the blood bank to identify the cause of the inability to provide blood for the transfusion and determine whether another option was available. The Respondent should have responded to the 10:19 p.m. call on March 17 by personally examining the patient and reviewing the history and lab test results. While the Respondent's directive to contact a cardiologist was not inappropriate, breathing difficulties and tachycardia are symptomatic of severe anemia for which hematological care was required. If the Respondent determined that the symptoms were cardiac-related, the Respondent should have personally made the cardiology referral and provided the information to the cardiologist. The Respondent did not do so and was unaware of the cardiologist's identity. A review of additional lab test results including observation and evaluation of blood smears would have provided useful information as to whether the patient's condition was deteriorating and to whether the patient was developing thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura ("TTP"), a serious condition which, left untreated, is fatal in not less than 90 percent of cases. The blood smears had been performed by the time of the phone call, but the Respondent reviewed no lab test results and made no inquiries related to the results. The failure to review lab test results may have delayed a diagnosis of TTP. While there was some disagreement between testifying witnesses as to whether or not the patient had TTP, Dr. Katta ordered that the patient be treated for TTP immediately upon his return on March 19, 2003, and there is no evidence that Dr. Katta treated the patient for TTP without reasonable cause to do so. The evidence clearly establishes that the Respondent failed to review the patient's test results that could have provided timely and useful information regarding the patient's condition. As to the Respondent's failure to locate the patient on March 18, 2003, the Respondent testified that the patient's last name was common, but the Respondent had not called Dr. Katta at the time she received the faxed list of his hospitalized patients to obtain additional identifying information. The Respondent did not request the information from the nursing staff during any of the telephone calls and made no effort to obtain the information prior to arriving at the hospital to make her rounds. The Respondent would have become aware of the patient's location had she attended to the patient's breathing difficulties and tachycardia on the night of March 17. She would have also likely reviewed the medical records and would have become aware of the admitting physician as well as other information regarding the patient's condition. The Respondent consulted with hospital personnel on March 18, 2003, in attempting to identify those patients admitted by Dr. Katta. There were approximately ten to 12 other hospitalized patients with the same last name, none of which had been admitted by Dr. Katta. The Respondent was unaware that the patient had been admitted under Dr. Leiva's name. The Respondent did not visit the ten to 12 patients with the same last name to locate the one for which she was responsible. The Respondent did not contact the blood bank, which had been having difficulty providing transfusion blood to the patient. It is reasonable to assume that the blood bank, charged with the responsibility to provide the appropriate blood supplies to the patient, would have been aware of the patient's location, and could have provided it to the Respondent. The Respondent made no effort to identify patients located in the hospital's intensive care units, despite the critical nature of the patient's condition at last report. Had she done so, she would have located the patient. The Respondent presented testimony that it was not uncommon for a physician, unable to locate a hospitalized patient, to routinely assume that the patient has been appropriately treated and has been discharged, or is deceased. However, the Respondent testified that it was unusual for her not to be able to identify and locate a patient. Even assuming that such practice is routine, it is unlikely that such an assumption could reasonably be made in the case at issue here, where the Respondent did not know the patient's name, had never seen the patient, had personally reviewed no medical records, was unable to find anyone in the hospital who could provide her with any information, and at last communication with the nursing staff had been told that a critically-needed transfusion had not occurred. The testimony is not credited and is rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order finding Vasundhara Iyengar, M.D., in violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), and imposing a penalty as follows: a three-year period of probation; a fine of $10,000; and such additional community service and continuing education requirements as the Department of Health determines necessary. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Forshey, Esquire Dorys H. Penton, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 H. Gregory McNeill, Esquire Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster Kantor & Reed, P.A. Post Office Box 2809 Orlando, Florida 32802-2809 H. Roger Lutz, Esquire Lutz, Bobo & Telfair, P.A. 2 North Tamiami Trail, Suite 500 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a Florida-licensed registered nurse, holding license number RN 2061632. At all times material to this case, the Respondent resided with her daughter in an unidentified city in Massachusetts. In February 2001, the Respondent sought employment at the Pleasant Manor Health and Rehabilitation Center ("Pleasant Manor"), a facility located in Attleboro, Massachusetts. As part of the employment application process, the Respondent was required to submit a urine sample to a Pleasant Manor employee. The evidence fails to establish that the procedure utilized by the Pleasant Manor employee in collecting the urine specimen was sufficient to preclude contamination of the specimen. Prior to the urine collection procedure, the Pleasant Manor employee did not require that the Respondent wash her hands. The Respondent was taken into a restroom to provide the specimen. The Pleasant Manor employee waited outside the restroom while the Respondent collected the urine sample. The water in the toilet bowl was clear. Hot and cold running water was available in the restroom sink. After the sample was taken, the Respondent remained with the Pleasant Manor employee while the sample was sealed and packaged for transportation to the testing lab. The urine specimen was submitted to a LabCorp testing facility in North Carolina for analysis. The initial LabCorp test on the Respondent's urine specimen produced results indicating the presence of cannabinoids and opiates. The Respondent's urine specimen was subjected to confirmation testing and returned a test result of 31 ng/mL for cannabinoids and 920 ng/mL for opiates/codeine. The evidence establishes that the LabCorp tests were performed according to appropriate standards and practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Nursing, enter a Final Order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent Deborah Ketz. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Alexis J. DeCaprio, Esquire Division of Medical Quality Assurance Bureau of Health Care Practitioner Regulation Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Suzanne H. Suarez, Esquire 447 3rd Avenue, North Suite 404 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dan Coble, R.N., Ph.D., C.N.A.A. C, B.C. Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3252 Reginald D. Dixon, Esquire Division of Medical Quality Assurance Bureau of Health Care Practitioner Regulation Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice medicine, No. ME 0046170, based upon the alleged violations of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes, set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated April 6, 1989, (the "First Administrative Complaint") which has been assigned DOAH Case No. 89-3723 and/or the Administrative Complaint dated August 16, 1990, (the "Second Administrative Complaint") which has been assigned DOAH Case No. 91-3864.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the hearings on October 3, 1990, and March 10, 1992, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician, having been issued license number ME 0046170 by the State of Florida. Respondent was initially licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida in approximately April of 1985. No evidence was presented of any prior disciplinary action against Respondent. Respondent's last known address is 10611 N.E. 11th Avenue, Miami Shores, Florida 33138. Sometime around 1986, Respondent became affiliated with EMSA which is an emergency room provider. EMSA contracts with hospitals to staff emergency rooms. Thus, Respondent has been working as an emergency room physician since 1986. The evidence did not establish the extent of Respondent's obligations with EMSA since 1986. As discussed in more detail below, since 1986, Respondent has also been affiliated with at least two other entities, the Institute of Specialized Medicine and the Immunology Allergy Institute, Inc. Facts Regarding the First Administrative Complaint Respondent was employed as a salaried employee of the Institute of Specialized Medicine (the "Institute") for at least several months during the year 1987. Although the evidence regarding Respondent's affiliation with EMSA was not entirely clear, it appears that he retained his affiliation with that company during the time that he worked at the Institute. In June of 1987, Respondent was associated with the Institute. In June of 1987, J.P. was a 36 year old female who saw an advertisement in a newspaper for the Institute of Specialized Medicine. That advertisement suggested that weight loss could be accomplished through adjusting a person's metabolism. J.P. called the Institute and scheduled an appointment for June 30, 1987. J.P. had been seriously overweight all of her adult life and had previously tried almost every possible method of weight loss. Shortly before her visit to the Institute, J.P. had been able to lose 80 pounds by diet and exercise alone. On June 30, 1987, J.P. visited the Institute and was told that she needed to provide certain information to determine her eligibility for the Institute's program. J.P. was advised that the Institute charged a $925 fee for testing and consultation. That fee included her first two visits, after which she was to be charged $40 per visit. The Institute's staff told J.P. that she had to pay $285 and that the rest would be billed to her insurance company. J.P. paid $285 on this first visit. On her first visit, J.P. filled out various questionnaires regarding her health, background and other general information. She was given a "blood test," a spirometric test, an EKG, and she provided a urine sample. J.P. did not see a physician or dietician during this visit. On July 6, 1987, J.P. returned to the Institute and was seen for about ten minutes by Respondent, who listened to her heart and lungs. Her height, weight, blood pressure, and pulse rate were noted, but no other physical examination was performed and Respondent did not inquire regarding any of the matters disclosed in the questionnaire filled out by J.P. during her first visit. During the July 6, 1987 visit, Respondent informed J.P. of his interpretation of her test results. He told J.P. that her tests showed she had an irregular thyroid, that her metabolism was below normal range, and that her body retained fluid. In his records of J.P.'s July 6, 1987 visit, Respondent diagnosed J.P. as having "Euthyroid Sick Syndrome." Euthyroid Sick Syndrome is a condition which may arise in a patient seriously ill from another cause. In such a situation, there are abnormal findings in blood tests for thyroid function, but these findings do not indicate the true thyroid status which is normal. The evidence established that this was an incorrect diagnosis for J.P. based upon the test results and history provided. Respondent did not provide a cogent explanation for his written diagnosis of Euthyroid Sick Syndrome nor did he explain the verbal diagnosis given to J.P. Respondent's records do not include the results of the spirometric test or the EKG. In addition, the urinalysis was incomplete and, while the doctor's notes and billing records reflect a chest x-ray was taken, there is no evidence of such an x-ray in the records. The results of J.P.'s blood tests reflect all normal values with the exception of a slightly low "total iron." At the conclusion of the July 6, 1987 visit, Respondent prescribed Cytomel, 25 micrograms BID, and Maxzide for J.P. No directions were given regarding the administration of Maxzide. Cytomel is a prescription drug containing the active ingredient of the secretions of the thyroid gland. Cytomel is used to replace the hormone in cases of thyroid underactivity (hypothyroidism). There is no indication from the medical records that J.P. was suffering from Euthyroid Sick Syndrome, that her thyroid was malfunctioning, that her metabolism was below normal, or that she required any hormonal replacement therapy. Respondent now admits that the test results indicate J.P. was not hypothyroid. Respondent claims that if he had actually believed that the patient had been hypothyroid, the dosage prescribed would have been approximately three times greater. He contends that he prescribed Cytomel to increase oxygen consumption. To justify his prescription of Cytomel, Respondent cited to two medical texts which he claims were in wide circulation in 1987. He says those texts support his prescription of Thyroid hormone to encourage weight reduction. Only one of the two cited references even marginally supports Respondent's contention. In any event, the more persuasive evidence established that, before the advent of thyroid testing (approximately twenty years ago), Cytomel was occasionally used in an attempt to encourage weight loss in patients. However, the prescription of Cytomel for weight loss in 1987 was below the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent physician under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent also attempted to justify his prescription of Cytomel by claiming that J.P. had advised him that she had previously been taking a thyroid supplement. Respondent contends that some patients who stop taking thyroid supplements have a "rebound effect where their metabolic rate decreases." During her testimony, J.P. denied having ever been on thyroid medication. The questionnaires filled out by J.P. during her first visit to the Institute do not reflect that she had ever taken thyroid medication in the past. Furthermore, there is no notation in the medical records indicating that J.P. had been on thyroid medication in the past. Respondent's testimony that J.P. advised him that she had previously been on thyroid supplements but was no longer taking them is not credited. Maxzide is a prescription drug, a diuretic appropriate for patients with high blood pressure. Maxzide should not be used as initial therapy for fluid retention. Maxzide can have deleterious effects on a patient and should not be used in a weight reduction program unless other reasons indicating its use are present. Respondent's medical records do not justify the prescription of Maxzide to J.P. There is no indication that the patient had high blood pressure. Furthermore, J.P. denied having any previous problems with fluid retention and no such problems are noted on the medical history that she filled out. While Respondent noted "++edema" as part of his examination on July 6, 1987, the notation is not consistent with Respondent's other notes of his exam or J.P.'s testimony regarding her condition. Moreover, J.P.'s weight loss of only three pounds between July 6 and July 30, 1987, indicates that she had no edema on July 6, 1987. During the July 6, 1987 visit, J.P. saw the Dietitian at the Institute of Specialized Medicine for about 20 minutes. The only thing the Dietitian did was to give J.P. a 1,000 calorie per day diet which she was told to follow. On July 30, 1987, J.P. returned to the Institute to see Respondent because she thought she was suffering nausea from the effects of the medications Cytomel and Maxzide. Respondent did not document in his notes any treatment for her nausea. J.P.'s health insurance claim form, submitted under Respondent's signature, reflects a diagnosis of "Euthyroidism" and a corresponding insurance code number of 244.9. Euthyroidism means normal thyroid function. An insurance company will not pay for a diagnosis of a normal condition. Insurance code number 244.9 indicates a condition of hypothyroidism or thyroid insufficiency which Patient J.P. did not have. The health insurance claim form submitted under Respondent's signature reflects overlapping billings for a hemogram and WBC, includes charges for an x- ray and spirometry of which there is no record, and contains a coded diagnosis of Hypothyroidism which conflicts with the results of the tests performed on J.P. and also conflicts with the Respondent's recorded diagnosis of Euthyroid Sick Syndrome. The insurance claim form also includes charges for a complete history and physical. After J.P. filed a complaint with Petitioner, Respondent attempted to justify this billing by telling Petitioner's investigator that he gave J.P. a complete physical examination and a "full workup". However, the evidence established that Respondent did not perform a complete physical examination of J.P. Respondent did not examine J.P.'s breasts, recommend a mammogram, perform or refer J.P. for a gynecological examination, examine her throat, eyes, ears, or abdomen; address her familial history of diabetes, kidney disease, hypertension or obesity; question her about her listed allergies, past anemia, abnormal stomach x-rays, or changing moles; consider her serious depressions and emotional problems; interpret her EKG; or address the basic causes of her obesity. Respondent contends that he did not handle the billing for the Institute and did not himself submit any diagnosis to the insurance carrier. In addition, he claims that he has subsequently learned that the Institute forged his name on some insurance documents. These contentions do not provide a defense to the charges in this case. It is clear that the billings to the insurance company were submitted under Respondent's signature. There is no evidence that the health claim form in this case was forged. The insurance company directed an inquiry to Respondent regarding his diagnosis of J.P. and Respondent did little or nothing to clarify the situation. Furthermore, when J.P. complained to Respondent about the treatment and costs, there is no indication that Respondent took any steps to investigate the situation or correct the problems. In the original billings submitted to J.P.'s insurance company, the Institute sought payment of $925 for the treatment and tests rendered to J.P., even though the patient had already paid $285 of that agreed upon fee. Respondent's records reflect that ultimately the insurance company paid $670 for the services rendered to J.P. Respondent's treatment of J.P. failed to meet that level of care, skill and treatment expected of a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar conditions and circumstances because Respondent inappropriately prescribed Cytomel and Maxzide to J.P. when the need for those drugs was not indicated by the results of the tests performed and because his final diagnosis of "Euthyroid Sick Syndrome" was incorrect and unsupported by any tests or physical findings. Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying his course of treatment of J.P. because the records (1) do not justify his diagnosis of Euthyroid Sick Syndrome, (2) do not justify his prescription of Cytomel for the patient who had no evidence or history of hypothyroidism, (3) do not justify his prescription of Maxzide for the patient who had no fluid retention and who presented with normal findings other than her obesity, (4) do not justify the extensive and inappropriate tests performed, (5) do not appropriately reflect J.P.'s EKG, do not report on results of her x-ray (if it was made) or spirometry, and (6) do not indicate that Respondent either advised or treated J.P. on July 30, 1987, when she complained that the medications were making her nauseous. By prescribing medications for J.P. which were medically unnecessary, by filing conflicting diagnoses, by charging for a complete physical examination when one was not performed, and by signing off on duplicative billing on J.P.'s health insurance claim form, Respondent has made deceptive, untrue and/or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine. Facts Regarding the Second Administrative Complaint Respondent quit working at the Institute in approximately November of 1987. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Respondent was indicted in October of 1988 in connection with his affiliation with the Institute of Specialized Medicine. While the circumstances and facts surrounding that indictment were not fully explained at the hearing in this cause, it appears that Respondent was indicted with several other individuals for allegedly participating in a scheme to defraud insurance companies by billing for tests and treatments that were unnecessary or unrelated to patients' true conditions. The indictment was pending through out the time of the incidents alleged in the Second Administrative Complaint. Respondent ultimately entered into a pretrial diversion program as a result of those charges. Sometime in 1988, Respondent became associated with the Immunology Allergy Institute, Inc., (the "Allergy Clinic"). Respondent claims that he was seeking to establish a private family practice and associated with the Allergy Clinic as part of an office sharing arrangement. The Allergy Clinic was owned by Frank Seedarnee and his ex-wife. Respondent contends that in return for office space, he was to serve as the "medical director" for the office and would be responsible for examining and diagnosing all medical problems and prescribing necessary controlled substances. Respondent contends that he never discussed cases with Seedarnee and did not rely on any recommendations from him because Seedarnee was not a doctor. Respondent further contends that Seedarnee's only function was to recommend diet changes, vitamins, or other products to help patients keep their homes free from allergies. However, the evidence presented in this case established that the Allergy Clinic did not always function in this manner, at least with respect to the patient S.L. and her son A.L. In March of 1989, S.L. was experiencing sinus problems and had a cough. In addition her son, age 10 months at the time, had been coughing for a few months. S.L. had previously been diagnosed as having allergies. S.L. was told of the Allergy Clinic by a friend who recommended "Dr. Seedarnee" as a allergist. She assumed from this conversation that Dr. Seedarnee was a medical doctor. She made an appointment at the Allergy Clinic for herself and her son for March 30, 1989. On March 30, 1989, S.L. arrived at the Allergy Clinic with her son as scheduled. She did not see a sign at the Allergy Clinic or any indication as to who the doctors were. During her initial visit, S.L. filled out an extensive health questionnaire form on herself and her son, A.L. S.L. and her son were escorted by a woman who appeared to be a nurse into an office. The nurse stated "Dr. Seedarnee will see you now." This nurse also mentioned that Respondent was not in because he was out on an emergency. The office contained a large microscope and a TV-like screen. A man in a white coat introduced himself as Dr. Seedarnee. Seedarnee reviewed S.L.'s health history forms and discussed with her the reasons why she wished to see an allergist. He told S.L. that he had developed an immune booster to help immune systems, that he would be taking blood from S.L. and A.L. so he could diagnose their problems, and that he had invented a microscope capable of evaluating the blood that same day. Seedarnee did not physically examine S.L. or A.L. or inquire if anyone else in the office had examined them. Seedarnee ordered a nurse to draw blood from S.L. and A.L. The blood was drawn as requested without question or surprise by the nurse. S.L. also provided a urine sample at the nurse's request. After the samples were obtained, S.L. and A.L. returned to Seedarnee's office where an enlarged picture of two slides of blood were shown to S.L. on the TV-like screen. Seedarnee took photographs of the blood slides and gave them to S.L. Those photographs were introduced as Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 3. Seedarnee told S.L. that the white cell in the middle of her blood slide was an "allergy cell" and the other figures in the picture were iron- deficient cells. He also told her that she had a "low immune system." Seedarnee told S.L. that A.L.'s blood slide had clumped-together cells because he had a sluggish immune system. Seedarnee indicated that his conclusions were based on the blood pictures. He recommended that S.L. receive one of his "immune boosters" once a month for the next few months and one yearly thereafter. He also indicated that A.L. needed an immune booster and should get one yearly thereafter. Seedarnee specifically used the words "diagnosis" and "treatment" and stated that he was going to run further tests in order to make his final diagnosis. Seedarnee's statements to S.L. on March 30 constituted a diagnosis and the practice of medicine. The evidence presented at the hearing established that the diagnosis made by Seedarnee on March 30 could not validly be made on the basis of the blood slides. Moreover, the pictures of S.L.'s and A.L.'s blood appear normal. The "allergy cell" was simply a white blood cell and the clumping of A.L.'s blood was due to an artifact. S.L. did not see Respondent or any other person she thought was a physician on the March 30 visit. At this point, she still believed Seedarnee to be a physician. S.L. was told that she was required to pay 20% of the "total cost" for the treatment and her insurance company was to pay the remaining 80%. At the conclusion of the March 30, 1989 visit, S.L. wrote a check to the Allergy Clinic for $371.20. On April 4, 1989, S.L. returned without her son to the Allergy Clinic. She did not bring her son because her husband was skeptical that a proper diagnosis could be made from the blood slide picture. On April 4, S.L. was taken directly to Seedarnee's office where Seedarnee reviewed with her the results from her blood test and urinalysis, told her that she was allergic to dust and had a sensitivity to milk and yeast, and suggested to her that she needed his immune booster and B-12 injections. Seedarnee also reviewed with S.L. her son's test results. He told S.L. that A.L. had no allergy problems, but, because A.L. had a low immune system, he recommended an immune booster. During the April 4 visit, S.L. asked Seedarnee where he went to school. He told her India and England and said he had a Ph.D. and worked under a physician. Until this time, S.L. believed him to be a medical doctor. The office staff at the Allergy Clinic all referred to Seedarnee as "doctor." The medical records from the Allergy Clinic for S.L. and A.L. are captioned as follows: Patient: L, S. Physician: Seedarnee/Kunen and Patient: L, A. Physician: Seedarnee/Kunen After S.L. met with Seedarnee in his office on April 4, she was given two injections by a nurse. The medical records indicate the injections were (1) B-12 and Folic Acid and (2) "URT." There was no doctor's order for these injections. At the hearing, neither Seedarnee nor Respondent could, or would, identify "URT." Seedarnee's interpretation of tests, diagnosis of allergies and development of a treatment plan for S.L. on April 4 by ordering two injections for her which were given before S.L. ever saw a physician constitute the practice of medicine. After the injections, the nurse took S.L. to an examining room. Shortly thereafter, Respondent entered and introduced himself as Dr. Kunen. He asked S.L. what Dr. Seedarnee had recommended. Thus, it is clear that Respondent was aware that the patient had already seen Seedarnee and that he knew Seedarnee had at least developed some recommendations for her treatment. It is not clear whether Respondent knew that S.L. had already been given two injections. S.L. told Respondent that Seedarnee had diagnosed her allergies and told her that she needed B-complex, an immune booster and yearly immune boosters thereafter. Respondent's only response was something to the effect of "good, fine." He said nothing more about her treatment. S.L. was with Respondent for only about five minutes. Respondent briefly examined her. He listened to her heart and lungs and checked the glands in her neck. She was fully clothed during the exam. Respondent did not review with S.L. any of the items on her health form questionnaire. He did not inquire as to any of the items noted on the form such as the antibiotics she was taking, her sensitivity to perfume, her symptoms of fatigue and/or lethargy, her complaints of pressure in her head, muscle weakness and heart palpitations, or her notations of mucus in her stool or problems with urinary frequency. Her blood pressure was never taken. She was not asked about her history of rheumatic fever. Respondent did not discuss with S.L. her allergy symptoms, what she was allergic to, her test results or why she needed an immune booster and B-complex. Respondent did not ask about A.L. and S.L. did not tell Respondent that she wanted A.L. to be tested. Respondent's medical records regarding S.L. contain one undated page of notes indicating that Respondent requested allergy testing for S.L. and that S.L. wanted her son to be tested. S.L. denies telling Respondent that she wanted her son tested. Indeed, the evidence established that S.L. and her son had already been tested the week before by Seedarnee and that S.L. told Respondent of Seedarnee's diagnosis and treatment plan. Respondent's medical records for A.L. contain the boy's birth date rather than a current date. The notation in Respondent's handwriting states "patient here for testing, will return next week." Respondent claims that he saw the son otherwise he would not have filled out this medical note on the child. S.L. claims that her son was not with her on the April 4, 1989 visit and, therefore, Respondent never saw him. S.L.'s testimony is credited. In sum, it is concluded that Respondent's notes in the medical records for S.L. and A.L. do not accurately reflect the events that occurred and were an apparent attempt to justify after the fact Seedarnee's actions and treatment. It is also concluded that Respondent never saw A.L. as a patient and that Respondent "recommended" a treatment plan for S.L. which had already been carried out. At the conclusion of her April 4 visit, S.L. wrote a check to the Allergy Clinic for $162 to cover the cost of her visit and the purchase of a product which Seedarnee had recommended and supposedly developed called Allergex. This product was supposed to be put in the laundry and used to wipe down tables, etc. to eliminate household dust. After her visit on April 4, S.L.'s suspicions were aroused. She inquired of authorities about the licensure of the Allergy Clinic (it had none) and of Respondent and Seedarnee (he had no license). Following the April 4 visit to the Allergy Clinic, S.L. went to see a Board certified allergist who questioned the treatment she received at the Institute. The allergist advised S.L. that she was allergic to items other than those Seedarnee had claimed. On May 23, 1989, S.L. wrote to Respondent elaborating on what Seedarnee had done, complaining that she was mislead to believe that Seedarnee was a physician and that Respondent had done nothing but rubber stamp Seedarnee's findings and treatment. Respondent was on notice at least from this time that Seedarnee was practicing medicine without a license. S.L. filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation on June 9, 1989. During the ensuing investigation, Respondent told the Department's investigator on January 23, 1990 that Seedarnee only worked under his supervision and that Seedarnee never made recommendations to patients. These statements were made even though S.L. had told Respondent during her April 4th visit and in her letter of May 23, 1989 about Seedarnee's actions. At the hearing, Respondent disclaimed any knowledge of the "diagnosis" made by Seedarnee and/or the administration of injections to S.L. pursuant to Seedarnee's instructions. He suggests that if any such actions took place, they were contrary to the specific understandings that he had as to the procedures of the Allergy Clinic. Even if Respondent thought that he was supposed to make all diagnoses and develop all treatment plans at the Clinic, it is clear that these procedures were not followed with respect to S.L. and A.L. Moreover, it is clear that Respondent was aware of Seedarnee's activities by at least April 4, 1989. It is the physician's responsibility to formulate a treatment plan and treat a patient. Professional responsibility should be delegated only to individuals who have training and degrees to perform those tasks and non-medical personnel should not be allowed to assume functions that are to be performed by physicians. It is the physician's obligation, if he knows an unlicensed, untrained individual with whom he is working is following practices which constitute the practice of medicine, to stop that activity if possible and report it to the Department of Professional Regulation. Respondent was aware that Seedarnee was not a licensed medical doctor and was not qualified to make a diagnosis or to treat patients. Respondent never reported Seedarnee's unlicensed activity to any authority. Respondent's actions on April 4 with respect to S.L. constitute an acquiescence to Seedarnee's recommendations and treatment. Respondent contends that even if S.L. was administered the two injections discussed above, there is no evidence that those injections were controlled substances. Thus, Respondent argues there is no evidence that Seedarnee engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine. This contention is rejected. As noted above, neither Seedarnee nor Respondent could explain what the immune booster or "URT" was. They both suggest that anything not prescribed should be considered part of a therapy program not medicine. However, the administration of an injection, particularly if not indicated by medical testing, always runs the risk of causing a reaction in a patient. The Respondent's interpretation of the practice of medicine is unduly narrow and is rejected. As discussed above, it is clear that the Clinic operations led at least one person, S.L., to believe that Seedarnee was a physician and it is clear that, with respect to at least this patient, Seedarnee interpreted test results, developed a diagnosis and directed a treatment plan. Moreover, it is clear that Respondent was made aware of these activities by at least April 4, 1989 and that he took no steps to halt or correct the situation and, indeed, that he acquiesced to it. The Allergy Clinic has been owned by Seedarnee for approximately 12 years. Seedarnee refers to the entity as a "research institute" rather than a laboratory or medical clinic. Seedarnee formulated the internal rules and procedures for the Allergy Clinic. Seedarnee's testimony on these procedures and other issues at the hearing was evasive, ambiguous and inconsistent. Seedarnee recognized that he needed a licensed physician to "approve prescribed substances and supervise techniques." However, it is clear that, at least during the time in question, the Allergy Clinic was operated in a manner that permitted him to diagnose and order vitamins and booster injections. Respondent was Medical Director of the Allergy Clinic from 1988 until at least mid-1990. Other than the matters raised in the Second Administrative Complaint and discussed above, no evidence was presented as to any other situations where Respondent acquiesced in the practice of medicine by Seedarnee. Respondent's testimony regarding his relationship with the Allergy Clinic was vague, conveniently selective and sometimes inconsistent. Respondent admits that he was hired to be Medical Director and was given office space. However, he claims that he had no obligation to Seedarnee, was not salaried (although he admits he was "loaned" money by Seedarnee, only some of which he paid back) and that he had no duties as Medical Director except "to be a good physician and see patients and to build a practice." He says he never had the need to discuss a case from a medical standpoint with Seedarnee or with other physicians there. He also says there were no staff meetings. Seedarnee's version of the relationship was quite different. Seedarnee testified that Respondent was paid a salary for his duties at the Allergy Clinic. At one point, Seedarnee claimed that the Medical Director made decisions for testing of patients on the basis of the patient's medical questionnaire. Because the allegations of the Second Administrative Complaint are limited to the treatment rendered to S.L. and her son, it is not necessary to fully explore and/or resolve the nature of Respondent's affiliation with the Allergy Clinic. That evidence established that, at least with respect to S.L. and her son, Respondent's role differed greatly from his description of the Clinic's operations. Respondent failed to report what was clearly the unauthorized practice of medicine by Seedarnee. Furthermore, by acquiescing in Seedarnee's diagnosis and treatment, Respondent unlawfully delegated professional responsibility to a person he knew to be unlicensed. Finally, Respondent's participation in the treatment of S.L. and her son constitutes the employment of a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(k), (m) and (t), Florida Statutes as alleged in the First Administrative Complaint and finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 458.331(e), (k) and (w), Florida Statutes as alleged in the Second Administrative Complaint. As punishment therefore, Respondent should be (1) reprimanded, (2) fined $15,000, (3) suspended from the practice of medicine for five years, two years of which should be suspended if Respondent successfully completes Board approved continuing medical education courses, and (4) thereafter, Respondent should be placed on probation for a period of three years, the terms and conditions of which should be set by the Board of Medicine. It is recommended that one condition of probation should be a limitation on Respondent's establishment or participation in a private office practice. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of September, 1992. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Case Numbers 89-3723 and 91-3864 Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Submittal with Respect to the October 3, 1990 Hearing Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. 4. Adopted and 8. in substance in Findings of Fact 7 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. 6. Adopted 10. in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted 14. in substance in Findings of Fact The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 31. The Petitioner's Supplemental Proposals regarding the First Administrative Complaint Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 11. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings regarding the Second Administrative Complaint Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36 and 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 41. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 42. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 43. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 45. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 46. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 50. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 52. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 53. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 53. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 53. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 56. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 54. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 55. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 57. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 58. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 58. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 58. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59 and 61. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 62. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 63. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 64. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66 and 67. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 68. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 57. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 76. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 74. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 71. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 72. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 76. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 77. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76 and 77. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 79 and 80. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact regarding the Second Administrative Complaint Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as unnecessary. The first and the third sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 33-35, 70, 75 and 79-80. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 34. Rejected as unnecessary. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 38. 6.-10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35, 70, 75, 77, 79 and 80. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 40, 58 and 59. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 58 and 59. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 59. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 37. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 41 Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 45. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 42. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 46 and 47. 28.-29. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 70. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 50. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 52 and 53. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 54. The first two sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 55 and 57. The remainder is subordinate to Findings of Fact 70, 79 and 80. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 35, 70, 75, 79 and 80. 36.-37. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 70, 75, 77, 79 and 80. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 70. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76, 77 and 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 75. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 75, 79 and 80. Rejected as vague, ambiguous and unnecessary. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 56. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 64. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 70. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 70. Rejected as unnecessary. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 34 and 77. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 57 and 70. Rejected as unnecessary. The evidence established that Respondent continued working at the Allergy Clinic for a year or more after S.L. alerted him to Seedarnee's actions. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact regarding the First Administrative Complaint Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and subordinate to Findings of Fact 18 and 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and subordinate to Findings of Fact 18 and 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary and as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 28. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Rejected as constituting argument. The issues raised by Respondent go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. The issues raised by Respondent regarding Dr. Lindbergh's qualifications go to the weight to be given to his testimony rather than its admissibility. Rejected as constituting argument. See #31 above. Rejected as speculative, constituting argument rather than a finding of fact and unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Addressed in Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary B. Radkins, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Northwood Centre, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Neil F. Garfield, Esquire Suite 333 3500 North State Road 7 Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33319 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation/Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Northwood Centre, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Northwood Centre, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
