Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: The Respondent, Boley Manor, Incorporated, is licensed to operate Boley Manor Group Home #1, 214 Fourth Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida, as an Adult Congregate Living Facility in compliance with Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. On August 13, 1984, Mr. Mike Morris, a Fire Protection Specialist from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Office of Licensure and Certification, conducted a survey of Boley Manor Group #1. During the survey, Mr. Norris observed that the facility was using an area below the stairway as a storage space for several items, including linens, boxes and a metal trunk. An exit conference was conducted by Mr. Morris with two representatives of the facility, Ms. Moulton and Ms. Murphy. Mr. Morris told Ms. Murphy and Ms. Moulton that the combustible items under the stairway had to removed. A deadline of October 1, 1984, was established in conjunction with the facility by which time the space under the stairway would no longer be used for storage of combustible items. The representatives of the facility were told that the metal trunk was not a combustible item and could remain under the stairway. Subsequent to the initial survey and exit conference, the Respondent was mailed a list of the deficiencies noted during the survey and suggested action required for correction. The list contained other deficiencies not related to the fire safety aspect of the survey. In regard to the deficiency concerning stairway storage, the document read as follows: "A. Space under stairway used for storage. (Action to correct: Remove storage from under stairway)." On March 14, 1985, Mr. Bernard Dunagan, Fire Protection Specialist with the office of Licensure and Certification, conducted a follow-up survey of Boley Manor Group #1 and observed that the metal trunk was still stored under the stairway. Thereafter, the Respondent was cited with the alleged deficiency set forth in the Administrative Complaint. When the nature of the deficiency was clarified in March of 1985, the Respondent removed the trunk from under the stairway. All of the other deficiencies, not related to the fire safety aspect of the survey, had been corrected or were being corrected by Respondent. Mr. Mike Morris is no longer employed as a Fire Protection Specialist with the office of Licensure and Certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of April, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Carol Wind, Esquire HRS District V Asst. Legal Counsel 2255 East Bay Drive Clearwater, Florida 33546 Donna Varnadoe Residential Program Boley, Inc. 1236 Ninth Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 William "Pete" Page, Jr. Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Huss, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Addressed in Conclusions of Law Section of R.O. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 5. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Salutatory remarks and not a finding of fact. Adopted in findings of fact 2-8. Addressed in Recommendations Section of R.O.
The Issue The two issues raised in this proceeding are: (1) whether the basis and reason Respondent, Vestcor Companies, d/b/a Madalyn Landings (Vestcor), terminated Petitioner, Carlos Gomez's (Petitioner), employment on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for Petitioner's protected conduct during his normal course of employment; and (2) whether Vestcor committed unlawful housing practice by permitting Vestcor employees without families to reside on its property, Madalyn Landing Apartments, without paying rent, while requiring Vestcor employees with families to pay rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, and Chapter 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the respective position of the parties received in evidence, stipulations of the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2002), and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: Petitioner filed charges of housing discrimination against Vestcor with the Commission on August 30, 2002. Petitioner alleged that Vestcor discriminated against him based on his familial status and his June 28, 2002, termination was in retaliation for filing the charge of discrimination. Vestcor denied the allegations and contended that Petitioner's termination was for cause. Additionally, Vestcor maintained Petitioner relinquished his claim of retaliation before the final hearing; and under oath during his deposition, asserted he would not pursue a claim for retaliation. Petitioner was permitted to proffer evidence of retaliation because Vestcor terminated his employment. The Commission's Notice was issued on January 7, 2005. The parties agree that Petitioner was hired by Vestcor on June 25, 2001, as a leasing consultant agent for Madalyn Landing Apartments located in Palm Bay, Florida. Petitioner's job responsibilities as a leasing consultant agent included showing the property, leasing the property (apartment units), and assisting with tenant relations by responding to concerns and questions, and preparing and following up on maintenance orders. Petitioner had access to keys to all apartments on site. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was, as was all of Vestcor employees, given a copy of Vestcor's Employee Handbook. This handbook is required reading for each employee for personal information and familiarity with company policies and procedures, to include the company requirement that each employee personally telephone and speak with his/her supervisor when the employee, for whatever reason, could not appear at work as scheduled, which is a basis and cause for termination. The parties agree that Vestcor's handbook, among other things, contains company policies regarding equal employment; prohibition against unlawful conduct and appropriate workplace conduct; procedures for handling employee problems and complaints associated with their employment; and procedures for reporting illness or absences from work, which include personal notification to supervisors, and not messages left on the answering service. Failure to comply with employment reporting polices may result in progressive disciplinary action. The parties agree that employee benefits were also contained in the handbook. One such employee benefit, at issue in this proceeding, is the live-on-site benefit. The live-on- site benefit first requires eligible employees to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, and be a full-time employee. The eligible employee must pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the live-on-site unit. Rent-free, live-on-site benefits are available only to employees who occupy the positions of (1) site community managers, (2) maintenance supervisors, and (3) courtesy officers. These individuals received a free two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment at the apartment complex in which they work as part of their employment compensation package. The rent-free, live-on-site benefit is not available for Vestcor's leasing consultant agent employees, such as Petitioner. On or about July 3, 2001, Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with Vestcor to move into Apartment No. 202-24 located at Madalyn Landing Apartments. The lease agreement ended on January 31, 2002. The lease agreement set forth terms that Petitioner was to receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, which became effective on September 3, 2001. Although he was eligible for the 25-percent monthly rental concession, to have given Petitioner the full 25 percent of his monthly rental cost would have over-qualified Petitioner based upon Madalyn Landing Apartment's tax credit property status. Petitioner and Vestcor agreed he would receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, thereby qualifying him as a resident on the property. Petitioner understood and accepted the fact that he did not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. Petitioner understood and accepted Vestcor's $50.00 monthly rental concession because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. The rental concession meant Petitioner's regular monthly rental would be reduced by $50.00 each month. On September 1, 2001, Henry Oliver was hired by Vestcor as a maintenance technician. Maintenance technicians do not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Oliver did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Oliver was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 13, 2001, Michael Gomez, the brother of Petitioner (Mr. Gomez), commenced his employment with Vestcor as a groundskeeper. Groundskeepers did not meet the qualifications for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Gomez did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Gomez was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 21, 2001, 81 days after his hire, Mr. Oliver commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 203-44 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Mr. Oliver's leasing consultant agent was Petitioner in this cause. Like other eligible Vestcor employees and as a part of the lease application process, Mr. Oliver completed all required paperwork, which included, but not limited to, completing a credit check, employment verification, and income test to ensure that he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Fifteen days later, on November 28, 2001, Mr. Gomez commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. As part of the leasing process, Mr. Gomez, as other eligible Vestcor employees who intend to reside on Vestcor property, completed all necessary paperwork including, but not limited to, a credit check and employment verification and income test to ensure he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Included in the paperwork was a list of rental criteria requiring Mr. Gomez to execute a lease agreement to obligate himself to pay the required rent payment, consent to a credit check, pay an application fee and required security deposit, and agree not to take possession of an apartment until all supporting paperwork was completed and approved. Mr. Gomez's leasing consultant was Petitioner. On December 28, 2001, Petitioner signed a Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 206-24, effective February 1, 2002. The Notice to Vacate was placed in Vestcor's office files. Petitioner's reasons for vacating his apartment stated he "needed a yard, garage, more space, a big family room, and some privacy." Thirty-four days later, February 1, 2002, Mr. Gomez moved into Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments without the approval or knowledge of Vestcor management. On January 9, 2002, a "Corrective Action Notice" was placed in Petitioner's employee file by his supervisor, Genea Closs. The notice cited two violations of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Specifically, his supervisor noted Petitioner did not collect administration fees from two unidentified rental units, and he had taken an unidentified resident's rental check home with him, rather than directly to the office as required by policy. As a direct result of those policy violations, Ms. Closs placed Petitioner on 180 days' probation and instructed him to re-read all Vestcor employees' handbook and manuals. Petitioner acknowledged receiving and understanding the warning. At the time she took the above action against Petitioner, there is no evidence that Ms. Closs had knowledge of Petitioner's past or present efforts to gather statements and other information from Mr. Gomez and/or Mr. Oliver in anticipation and preparation for his subsequent filing of claims of discrimination against Vestcor. Also, on January 9, 2002, Petitioner was notified that his brother, Mr. Gomez, did not qualify to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments because of insufficient credit. Further, Petitioner was advised that should Mr. Gomez wish to continue with the application process, he would need a co-signer on his lease agreement or pay an additional security deposit. Mr. Gomez produced an unidentified co-signer, who also completed a lease application. On January 30, 2002, the lease application submitted by Mr. Gomez's co-signor was denied. As a result of the denial of Mr. Gomez's co-signor lease application, Vestcor did not approve Mr. Gomez's lease application. When he was made aware that his co-signor's application was denied and of management's request for him to pay an additional security deposit, as was previously agreed, Mr. Gomez refused to pay the additional security deposit. As a direct result of his refusal, his lease application was never approved, and he was not authorized by Vestcor to move into any Madalyn Landing's rental apartment units. At some unspecified time thereafter, Vestcor's management became aware that Mr. Gomez had moved into Apartment No. 206-24, even though he was never approved or authorized to move into an on site apartment. Vestcor's management ordered Mr. Gomez to remove his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24. Subsequent to the removal order, Mr. Gomez moved his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24 into Apartment No. 103-20. Mr. Gomez's move into Apartment No. 103-20, as was his move into Apartment No. 206-04, was without approval and/or authorization from Vestcor's management. Upon learning that his belonging had been placed in Apartment No. 103-20, Mr. Gomez was again instructed by management to remove his belongings. After he failed and refused to move his belongings from Apartment No. 103-20, Vestcor's management entered the apartment and gathered and discarded Mr. Gomez's belongings. As a leasing contract agent, Petitioner had access to keys to all vacant apartments. His brother, Mr. Gomez, who was a groundskeeper, did not have access to keys to any apartment, save the one he occupied. Any apartment occupied by Ms. Gomez after his Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 103-20 was without the knowledge or approval of Vestcor and in violation of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Therefore, any period of apartment occupancy by Mr. Gomez was not discriminatory against Petitioner (rent-free and/or reduced rent), but was a direct violation of Vestcor's policies. On February 10, 2002, Mr. Oliver signed a one-year lease agreement with Vestcor. Mr. Oliver's lease agreement reflected a 25-percent employee rental concession. Throughout Mr. Oliver's occupancy of Apartment No. 203-64 and pursuant to his lease agreement duration, Mr. Oliver's rental history reflected his monthly payment of $413.00. There is no evidence that Mr. Oliver lived on site without paying rent or that Vestcor authorized or permitted Mr. Oliver to live on site without paying rent, as alleged by Petitioner. On June 2, 2002, Ms. Closs completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal report. Performance ratings range from a one -- below expectations, to a four -- exceeds expectations. Petitioner received ratings in the categories appraised as follows: Leasing skills -- 4; Administrative skills -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork, computer updating, and policy adherence; Marketing skills -- 4, with comments that Petitioner had a flair for finding the right markets; Community awareness -- 3, with no comment; Professionalism -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork reporting; Dependability -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in attendance; Interpersonal skills -- 3, with no comments; Judgment/Decision-making -- 3, with no comments; Quality of Work -- 2, with comments that work lacked accuracy; Initiative -- 4, with no comment; Customer service -- 3, with no comments; Team work -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in the area of resident confidence; Company loyalty -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in adherence to company policy and procedures; and Training and development -- 3, with no comments. Petitioner's Overall rating was 2.5, with comments that there was "room for improvement." On June 27, 2002, while on 180 days' probation that began on January 9, 2002, Petitioner failed to report to work and failed to report his absence to his supervisor, Ms. Closs, by a person-to-person telephone call. This conduct constituted a violation of Vestcor's policy requiring all its employees to personally contact their supervisor when late and/or absent from work and prohibited leaving messages on the community answering service machine. On June 28, 2002, Petitioner reported to work. Ms. Closs, his supervisor, informed Petitioner of his termination of employment with Vestcor for failure to report to work (i.e. job abandonment) and for probation violation, as he had been warned on January 9, 2002, what would happen should a policy violation re-occur. It was after his June 28, 2002, termination that Petitioner began his personal investigation and gathering of information (i.e., interviews and statements from other Vestcor employees) in preparation to file this complaint. Considering the findings favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Vestcor, when they terminated his employment on June 28, 2002. Considering the findings of record favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of housing and/or rental adjustment discrimination by Vestcor, based upon familial status of himself or any other employer. Petitioner failed to prove Vestcor knowingly and/or intentionally permitted, approved, or allowed either Mr. Gomez or Mr. Oliver to live on site without a completed and approved application followed by appropriate rent adjustments according to their employment status and keeping within the tax credit requirement, while requiring Vestcor employees with families (or different employment status) to pay a different monthly rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Petitioner failed to prove his termination on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for his actions and conduct other than his personal violation, while on probation, of Vestcor's policies and procedures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Rights enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief alleging discrimination filed by Petitioner, Carlos Gomez. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.
The Issue Whether deceased retiree's prior selection of Option One retirement benefit pay-out and his receipt and negotiation of retirement several checks should now be set aside, due to his wife's alleged forgery of her signature on the Spousal Acknowledgement (Form FR-11).
Findings Of Fact 1. Irvin M. Carpenter was born November 16, 1934, and died of cancer on November 18, 1997. Mr. Carpenter was employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer on September 10, 1984, and attained the rank of police sergeant at the time of his retirement. Mr. Carpenter was a member of the Florida Retirement System. 2. On January 20, 1991, Irvin M. Carpenter and Susan Ann Prescott were married. Susan Ann Carpenter is now, and has been at all time pertinent to these proceeding, employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer. Susan Carpenter is a member of the Florida Retirement System. 3. In October of 1996, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Carpenter separated and continued to live separately. Dissolution of marriage proceedings were initiated but was not finalized at the time of Irvin Carpenter's death in November 1997. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Ann Carpenter were husband and wife. 4. On July 8, 1997, Irvin Carpenter executed a Florida Retirement System form styled "Application for Service Retirement" (Form FR-11). This form provides the retiree with information pertaining to the four options by which his retirement benefits can be paid. One full page of the form provides an explanation of each option. By use of this form, Irvin Carpenter selected Option One retirement benefit payout plan. The explanation of Option One on Form FR-11 is as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. 5. The FR-11 also contained the following information in bold lettering: THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2 MARRIED YES[ ] NO [ ] IF YES, YOUR SPOUSE MUST SIGN BELOW: SPOUSAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : I, (Signature) Susan A. Carpenter,’ being the spouse of the above named member, acknowledges that the member has elected either Option 1 or 2. (Signature Irvin Carpenter 11-27-96 Signature of Spouse Date If your spouse does not sign, you must attach a signed statement explaining why your spouse did not acknowledge your selection. 6. The "yes" or "no" blocks requesting marriage status were blank on the FR-11 submitted by the retiree to the Agency. The Spousal Acknowledgement block contained the signature of "Susan Ann Carpenter." Susan Carpenter alleged this signature to be a forgery. 7. The form FPR-11 also contained the following statement in capital letters: I UNDERSTAND I MUST TERMINATE ALL EMPLOYMENT WITH FRS EMPLOYERS TO RECEIVE A RETIREMENT BENEFIT UNDER CHAPTER 121, FLORIDA STATUTES. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, OR CHANGE MY TYPE OF RETIREMENT (REGULAR, DISABILITY AND EARLY) ONCE MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL. MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED. 8. Between the date of his retirement and the date of his death, Irvin Carpenter received, cashed, or deposited a minimum of three retirement checks from the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to his selection of Option One benefit payout plan. 9. After the death of Mr. Carpenter, the Agency, by letter dated November 24, 1997, addressed to: FAMILY OF IRVIN M. CARPENTER, 3602 W. Tampa Circle, Tampa, Florida 33629, informed the family of the retirement benefit due beneficiaries for November and the income tax deduction therefrom. 10. By letter to the Agency dated July 13, 2000, Susan Carpenter stated: My Husband, Irvin M. Carpenter, DOB 11/16/34, SSN 263-42-0146, retired from the Tampa International Airport Police Department on 07/31/1997. At the time of his retirement, we were separated but still Married. He passed away less than three months later in November 1997. I inquired as to any benefits and informed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, the parent organization of the Tampa International Airport Police Department, that he had changed his beneficiary to his daughter, Anita Carpenter. Just recently, I became aware of the Florida Retirement System provisions concerning retirement options. I ama police officer with the Tampa International Airport Police Department and these matters were covered in a pre-retirement briefing conducted by Human Resources. It is my understanding that if you are married and select option 1 or 2, the spouse must acknowledge that selection in writing. Since I had not signed any such acknowledgement, it occurred to me that my deceased husband's remaining options both provide for the joint annuitant. I posed this question to the HCAA Human Resources and was informed that my deceased husband did not retire. The Department announced his retirement, his name was added to the plaque listing retired officers and Department personnel files indicate a retirement date of 07/31/1999. I questioned my police captain and Chief of Police and both of them were emphatic that my husband retired on 07/31/1999. With my superiors providing information contrary to Human Resources, I have some doubt as to the status of my deceased husband with regards to the Florida Retirement System. Please confirm the status of Irvin M. Carpenter. Did he retire from FRS? If not, what was his status at the time he passed away? I am sure you understand the significance of my determining the correct status. Thank you for any assistance you can provide. 11. The Agency denied Susan Carpenter's request to void Irvin Carpenter's selection of Option One retirement pay-out. The Agency's letter of November 15, 2000, asserted the position that the selection cannot be changed since the retirement checks were cashed or deposited and cited the following portions of Section 121.091(6) (a), Florida Statutes: "The spouse of any member who elects to receive the benefit provided under subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2. shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." The law does not require the spouse to agree with the members' retirement option selection. The Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement, submitted by Irvin Carpenter included Susan Carpenter's signature acknowledging that she was aware of the Option 1 selection. We receive numerous applications monthly and we do not investigate to determine if each signature is authentic. Although Mrs. Carpenter contends that her signature was forged, once a member cashes or deposits a check the option selection cannot be changed. The statutes do not require the spouse to agree with the members option selection, only to be made aware. Your request to void the Option 1 selection is denied. 12. Susan Carpenter denies having signed the Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement submitted by Irvin Carpenter. Susan Carpenter alleges that the signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," appearing on the Form FR-11 is a forgery. 13. During the final hearing and in the presence of the undersigned, Susan Carpenter signed "Susan A. Carpenter" three times, Petitioner's Exhibit F. At the request of the undersigned Susan Carpenter signed "Susan Ann Carpenter" once. A review of the four signature samples provided by Susan Carpenter, the sample signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," proved to the satisfaction of the undersigned evidence of the genuineness of the written signature in dispute. Accordingly, and as a finding of fact, the Form FR-11 signature "Susan Ann Carpenter" is not a forgery. 14. Susan Carpenter's assertion that the Agency is under legal obligation to contact each spouse or otherwise verify the signature of each spouse on the Form FR-11ls received in the Agency's normal course of business is without foundation in law and in fact. 15. Only the circuit court has jurisdiction and authority in dissolution of marriage cases to enter final orders determining property rights of marital assets. Petitioner proffered no such order as evidence. Accordingly, all testimony and evidence based on alleged spousal rights and entitlements pursuant to Chapter 61, Florida Statutes, are not considered
Conclusions For Petitioner: Scott W. Fitzpatrick, Esquire Southeast Building, Suite 1500 St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building Cc 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact an Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Susan Carpenter's request to change the retirement option 13 selected by Mr. Irvin Carpenter, including benefits due, and denying all such other relief. lo& DONE AND ENTERED this = day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division _of Administrative Hearings this J2% day of July, 2001.
The Issue The sole issue in this cause is whether or not the payments received from Gadsden County by Petitioner, as set forth on pages 4 through 8 of her Amended Petition, for services rendered as Official Court Reporter pursuant to Chapter 29, Florida Statutes, constitute "compensation" within the meaning of that term in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 27 and May 1, 1992, respectively, the Respondent and the Petitioner submitted to the Hearing Officer their Proposed Recommended Orders including proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix to Recommended Order, the Hearing Officer submitted recommended rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's and Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, are hereby accepted and adopted in that they track the stipulated facts contained in the PREHEARING STIPULATION dated and filed March 30, 1992. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, are hereby rejected in that they are conclusions of law and were not contained within the stipulated facts contained within the PREHEARING STIPULATION, and are, therefore, not based upon competent substantial evidence. The actual employment position held by the Petitioner as an employee of the judicial branch of the State of Florida is clearly identified on Florida Retirement System Form FR-11, which was executed by the Petitioner on January 24, 1990, and certified by the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit (Exhibit 6 attached to the PREHEARING STIPULATION), whereon the "Title of Position held" is stated to have been "Official Court Reporter, Second Judicial Circuit of Florida assigned to Gadsden County." The supplemental salary that was paid to the Petitioner by the County required paper work identifying her as a county employee for payroll purposes only; but, as a matter of law, she held her State position as an official court reporter solely at the pleasure of the Judges of the Second Judicial Circuit pursuant to Section 29.01, Florida Statutes. In the Conclusions of Law in this Final Order, this issue shall be fully analyzed. RULINGS ON HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 1 is hereby accepted as a proper statement of applicable law. Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 2 is hereby accepted as a correct statement of applicable law. Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 3 is hereby rejected in that it erroneously concludes that the Petitioner's salary and fees were authorized and set by statute, when, they had to have been authorized and set pursuant to Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The conclusion of the Hearing Officer is incorrect because under Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, the compensation of, and the fees in question to be charged by, court reporters are authorized and set by such judicial rule. Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, adopted generally by reference the annual salary for court reporters set forth in Section 29.04, Florida Statutes, for a 60-hour work month. That judicial rule then goes on to provide for overtime at the rate of $10.00 per hour. That Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, also provides that the fees in question (for transcripts and depositions) to be charged by court reporters should be set in each circuit by administrative order, and, in the absence of such order, as provided by law. Such court reporters' fees, therefore, are set pursuant to said judicial Rule 2.070, which authorizes the charging of such fees in accordance with a circuit administrative order, and, in its absence, as provided by law. The setting of such fees and the authorization to charge same arise from said judicial Rule 2.070, and not from Chapter 29, Florida Statutes. The fee schedule set forth in Chapter 29, Florida Statutes, derives its legal efficacy not from its legislative enactment alone, but from its judicial approval in said Rule 2.070 in the event that a local circuit administrative order setting such fees has not been entered. In such instance, the fees are not set by statute, but by judicial approval of a statutory fee schedule. The judicial branch has set such fees, not the legislative. Thus, any such fees were not set by statute. The citations by the Hearing Officer in recommended Conclusion of Law No. 4 of Rules 22B-1.004(4)(b)1., and 22B-6.001(49), Florida Administrative Code, are rejected as being inapplicable to the proceeding at bar inasmuch as the Petitioner as an Official Court Reporter appointed pursuant to Section 29.01, Florida Statutes, was an employee of the State of Florida and was not an employee of Gadsden County. Under said Section 29.01 all official court reporters are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Chief Judge and a majority of the Judges of the Court in which the reporter is serving. Provision is made in Section 29.04, Florida Statutes, for the respective counties to provide funds necessary to pay the cost of reporting in criminal cases as necessary to provide competent reporters in such proceedings, but any such monies paid to such official court reporters would be paid to state employees. The judicial branch of government in Florida is a State court system. Official Court Reporters are hired and retained by the State Judges in a Circuit, and their employment is not determined or continued to any extent whatsoever by any Board of County Commissioners. Under Section 29.04(3), Florida Statutes, provision is made for the counties to supplement the funds necessary to pay the cost of reporting in criminal cases as necessary to provide competent reporters in such proceedings. The counties are a source of funding, and are not employers of the Official Court Reporters. In the case of Matter of Compensation of Hunter, 635 P.2d 1371 (Or. App. 1981), the Court of Appeals of Oregon held that where court reporters are appointed and hold their offices at the pleasure of the Judges, and are officers of the Court subject to the direction and control of the Judges, those court reporters are employees of the State of Oregon and not of the counties. At page 1373 of 635 P.2d the Court held: "The right to control is also important from a policy standpoint. The judges of the State of Oregon benefit directly from the services of the court reporters. They not only perform reporting duties in court, but are also the judges' official secretaries. See ORS 8.330. The State benefits most directly from court reporters' services, and it should be responsible for providing their workers' compensation insurance." Recommended Conclusion of Law of No. 5 is hereby rejected as a conclusion of law in that is a recitation of the relative positions of the parties and is not of any recommended holding or ruling by the Hearing Officer. Upon the reasoning and authorities set forth in Paragraph No. (3), above, recommended Conclusion of Law No. 6 is hereby rejected in that the fees in question were not authorized or set by legislative statute but were, in fact, authorized and set pursuant to judicial Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The first three sentences of recommended Conclusion of Law No. 7 are hereby rejected in that they misconstrue the first sentence of Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, that states: "`Compensation', means the monthly salary paid a member, including overtime payments paid from a salary fund, as reported by the employer on the wage and tax statement (Internal Revenue Service form W-2) or any similar form." [Emphasis supplied] A form 1099 is not a form on which an employer reports salary paid from a salary fund to an employee, but, rather is a form utilized to report payments of income to an independent contractor. The "similar form" in that statute refers to an employer's wage and tax statement, which may be a form W-2, which is not the equivalent to a form 1099. As hereinafter discussed in Conclusions of Law Nos. (11), (12), and (13) of this Final Order, Official Court Reporters are "professional persons" within the meaning of that term in Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes. The recommended Conclusion of Law of the Hearing Officer that the transcribing of criminal proceedings do not constitute "special or particular services" does not comport with either judicial Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, or a 1957 Opinion of the Attorney General of Florida. Under said judicial Rule 2.070 the basic salary for a court reporter is set in subsection (g) together with provision for the payment of overtime for hours in excess of 60 worked per month. In subsection (e) of Rule 2.070, provision is made for fees for what would constitute special or particular services by a court reporter, and the fees that may be charged for same. In a 1957 Opinion of the Attorney General of Florida (1957 0p. Att'y. Gen. Fla. 057- 109 (April 26, 1957)), the Attorney General of Florida analyzed Section 122.02, Florida Statutes, the predecessor to Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, as to what constituted compensation under the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). The opinion of the Attorney General was that hourly wages plus overtime would be included within the monthly compensation. But, at the end of that opinion the Attorney General concluded: "We conclude that in the case mentioned in the question the employing authority has prescribed the formula for fixing the monthly compensation or salary. It may vary depending upon the hours employed in discharging the routine work of the employment but the formula is fixed and applicable mathematically. This is not a situation where fees are paid for special or particular services. It is a regular retainer made depending upon the actual hours engaged in performing the month by month routine duties as School Board Attorney. It has no reference to fees for handing special items such as bond validation or other litigation." Under Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, official court reporters are paid their basic salary and overtime for their court appearances in reporting the proceedings. But, if they are to furnish transcripts of proceedings or depositions, which work would be done after their regular working hours, then the fees for such special or particular services are to be set by local circuit administrative order, or in the absence of same, as provided by law. These special or particular services that the court reporters are performing for such additional fees are not performed during their regular working hours, which by said Rule 2.070, is limited to 60 hours per month. And the last sentence of Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 7 that the Petitioner was a county employee is hereby rejected upon the grounds and reasoning set forth in Paragraph No. (4) above. The Hearing Officer's Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 8 (misnumbered as "7") is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reasons set forth in Paragraph Nos. (3) through (7) set forth above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order approving petitioner's request for additional retirement benefits by including in the calculation of average final compensation those fees received by petitioner between January 1973 and February 1990 as set forth on pages 4 through 8 of her amended petition. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-3168 Petitioner: Accepted in finding of fact 1. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 3-4. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 5-6. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 7. Accepted in finding of fact 5. 8-11. Accepted in finding of fact 3. Respondent: Accepted in finding of fact 1. Covered in preliminary statement and in finding of fact 2. 3-4. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 5-6. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 7. Accepted in finding of fact 5. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1500 Edgar Lee Elzie, Esquire P. O. Box 82 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Burton M. Michaels, Esquire Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2630 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this matter, Respondent was licensed to operate an assisted living facility at 817 Eleventh Street, West Palm Beach, Florida. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating, and assuring compliance with state laws governing, assisted living facilities. Joseph Narkier, a human services surveyor employed by AHCA, was assigned to perform an appraisal of the Respondent's facility in September, 1995. He visited the facility on September 27, 1995, along with Polly Weaver, chief of field operations. In accordance with his instructions, Mr. Narkier did not perform a full survey but only looked at certain items, "tags," which had historically been out of compliance at the facility. Based upon his review, Mr. Narkier found the following deficiencies at the Aries Retirement Living facility: Respondent failed to display its current license inside the facility as required by state standard A 003. This deficiency had been cited on an earlier survey, March 14, 1995. Fiscal records were not on the premises, thus Respondent could not identify income and expenses as required by state standard A 100. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. Since fiscal records were not on the premises, it could not be determined that the facility was administered on a sound financial basis as required by state standard A 101. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. The Respondent did not produce an accurate written admission and discharge record as required by state standard A 201. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. The Respondent did not produce an executed contract for each resident dated at the time of admission as required by state standard A 300. There were three residents for whom no evidence of a contract, executed at admission, could be produced. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. State standard A 301, which relates to the content of the resident contract, was also deficient. Since there were no contracts for three residents, the contract content did not exist. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. The Respondent did not have medical records or other support documentation to show that one resident had had a medical examination either within sixty days prior to admission or within thirty days after admission to the facility. Such exams are required to verify the residents are free of signs and symptoms of any communicable disease which is likely to be transmitted to other residents and is required by state standard A 406. The Respondent also could not produce documentation regarding admissions criteria as required by state standard A 408. According to records for one resident, medications were to be administered by a licensed professional. Since records did not verify the medications were administered according to the physician's orders, state standard A 601 was not met. Electrical outlets in the kitchen were not maintained in a safe condition in violation of state standard A 901. Hot and cold water faucets were not identified by use of the "H" and "C" initials as required by state standard A 1023. The records needed to verify the facility was in compliance with the state standards were not made available to the surveyors prior to their departure from the facility. Moreover, fiscal records were not made available to Mr. Narkier at the follow-up review on November 21, 1995. The fiscal records were not available until a third survey date, February 13, 1996, the second follow-up date. Based upon the foregoing, at the time of the survey Respondent had at least six class III deficiencies. None of the excuses suggested by Respondent to explain the survey findings has been deemed credible. This Respondent has a history of deficient performance. Two prior contested administrative complaints resulted in findings of numerous violations. Those violations were fully addressed in DOAH Case Nos. 94-5078 and 94-6908. On April 5, 1995, a recommended order was entered in DOAH Case Nos. 94-5078 and 94-6908. That order was adopted and incorporated by reference in the final order entered by AHCA on May 15, 1995. The final order entered in DOAH Case Nos. 94-5078 and 94-6908 imposed an administrative fine in the amount of $8,000.00 which Respondent has not paid. In addition to this outstanding administrative fine, Respondent has a history of two other administrative actions which also resulted in administrative fines. In DOAH Case No. 92-2415, the parties entered into a stipulation wherein Respondent agreed to pay a fine in the amount of $1,125.00. The Respondent did not timely remit that administrative fine. The second administrative action also resulted in an administrative fine. That case was not referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The final order (AHCA Exhibit 4), entered on August 8, 1991, imposed an administrative fine in the amount of $750.00. Respondent eventually paid this fine on April 22, 1992. Respondent has consistently failed to honor the state standards set for this type facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing Case No. 95-0128 since the applicant has withdrawn the request to increase capacity of the ALF; denying the renewal of licensure sought in Case No. 95-0129; and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,200.00 in Case No. 95-5678. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, and 14 are accepted. With regard to paragraphs 2, and 4 through 10, such paragraphs reiterate findings of fact made in DOAH Case Nos. 94-5078 and 94-6908 which have been adopted by final order and are not at issue in this proceeding. As a matter of law, unless set aside such findings remain in effect. Paragraph 15 is rejected as hearsay. Notwithstanding that Respondent's proposed findings of fact failed to comply with Rule 60Q-2.031(3), Florida Administrative Code, and contained multiple facts per paragraph (some of which could not be accepted while others could), to the extent possible, the following rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent are made: The first sentence of paragraph 1 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as irrelevant or inaccurate. An administrative proceeding related to two complaints against this Respondent which found numerous violations resulted in a final order being entered by the Department. With regard to paragraph 2, the last sentence is accepted; the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant or inaccurate or procedural issues unrelated to this matter. Further, as to the unannounced survey conducted by Mr. Narkier, notice of an intended survey is not required as a matter of law. With regard to paragraph 3, it is accepted a current license was not displayed. Otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 4 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The violation stems from the failure to display the current license. Paragraph 5 is rejected as mischaracterization of the testimony or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraphs 6 through 8 are rejected as no record cited supported the findings or irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence in its entirety. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Linda L. Parkinson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Division of Health Quality Assurance 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-309 Orlando, Florida 32801 Esther A. Zaretsky, Esquire 1655 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Forum III, Suite 900 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for retirement pursuant to Section 112.05, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a public health nurse supervisor who has been employed by the Hardee County Health Department since October 1, 1947. On October 22, 1971, while on annual leave in Texas, Petitioner telephoned her supervisor requesting that she be placed on leave of absence without pay until December 1, 1971. She requested this type of leave because she was experiencing difficulties with her back and did not desire to request sick leave since she was out of state. Her annual leave was almost exhausted at that time. Her supervisor authorized the requested leave and she was informed that she must keep up her health insurance premium payments while on leave of absence. She did so. The period of leave without pay extended from October 22 to December 3, 1971. (Testimony of Petitioner, Trussell, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-2) At the time the leave without pay was authorized, the personnel records clerk of the Hardee County Health Department requested and received information from the personnel department of the then State Board of Health of Jacksonville, Florida, that a leave without pay would not jeopardize Petitioner's retirement status. Similar information had been provided Petitioner and the clerk during a visit to that agency in 1970. (Testimony of Petitioner, Trussell) When Petitioner returned to duty from her leave without pay in December, 1971, the only personnel action taken by her employer was to prepare a personnel action form showing such return. At the time the leave without pay was taken by Petitioner, she had over 400 hours of accrued sick leave to her credit. (Testimony of Trussell, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2) During her employment, Petitioner was a member of the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (Chapter 122, F.S.) and paid contributions toward retirement under that system. As of January, 1978, she had contributed $11,195.37 into the retirement fund. She also was under the noncontributory plan for state employees (Section 112.05, F.S.) and was provided an estimated computation of retirement benefits under both retirement systems by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on May 14, 1971. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2) On March 22, 1977, Petitioner filed application for service retirement under the provisions of Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, with a designated retirement date of January 5, 1978. By letter of April 21, 1977, Respondent advised that applications were not accepted earlier than sixty to ninety days prior to the date of retirement. Petitioner resubmitted the application in September, 1977. By letter of October 7, 1977, Respondent advised the Petitioner that inasmuch as she had been granted a leave of absence without pay in November, 1971, a break in service occurred and therefore she was a compulsory member of the Florida Retirement System upon returning to employment in December of 1971, pursuant to Rule 22B-1.04(4), (sic) F.A.C. In this letter, she was also advised that Social Security contributions were payable on her account from December, 1971, but since her previous retirement contributions offset this indebtedness to some extent, she would owe for Social Security coverage retroactive to the calendar year, 1973. Thereafter, by an invoice dated January 30, 1978, the Division of Health, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, was billed a total of $6,523.74 for Petitioner's Social Security contributions, of which half or $3,261.87 was owed by the employee. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2, Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1) In a letter dated November 9, 1977, the State Retirement Director advised Petitioner that she became a mandatory member of the Florida Retirement System in December, 1971, because she was off the payroll for a month and thereby had a break in service. He further advised that this fact alone did not interfere with her eligibility to be considered for retirement under Section 112.05, but since she had been off the state payroll for more than a month, she was not eligible to retire under that provision. Another letter of the State Retirement Director, dated February 23, 1978, stated that he had reconsidered his position, but adhered to the decision that Petitioner was a compulsory member of the Florida Retirement System pursuant to Rule 22B-1.04(1)4 and did not qualify for retirement under Section 112.05. Petitioner was advised of her right to a hearing in the matter and she thereafter requested the same on March 3, 1978, wherein she requests a determination of her eligibility to retire under Section 112.05.
Recommendation That Petitioner's request for retirement under the provisions of Section 112.05, Florida Statutes, be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony N. Deluccia, Jr., Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Post Office Box 2258 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Building 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Daniel Maddox, a deceased retiree in the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, selected Option 1 (maximum retiree’s monthly benefit without any spousal benefit after death of the retiree) or Option 2 (a reduced retiree’s monthly benefit with continued spousal benefit after death of the retiree, if within a period of ten years after retirement for the balance of the ten-year period).
Findings Of Fact Daniel Maddox was an employee of Pinellas County and a vested member of FRS. Petitioner is Mr. Maddox’s wife. Mr. Maddox retired under the early retirement provisions of FRS in June 2015, and received benefits until his death in December 2016. When Mr. Maddox applied to retire, he submitted an application that included an unexecuted option selection form that had a mark by Option 2. After being notified of the deficiency on two occasions by Respondent, Mr. Maddox submitted an executed option selection form on July 30, 2015, on which he selected Option 1. Option 1 provides the maximum benefit for the life of the member of FRS with no continuing benefit after the member’s death. Option 2 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetime of the member of FRS, but should the member die before 120 payments have been made, the remainder of the first 120 payments will be made to the member’s designated beneficiary. Petitioner signed a Spousal Acknowledgement Form acknowledging that Mr. Maddox selected either Option 1 or 2, rather than an Option 3 benefit, which would have provided a lifetime reduced benefit for her. Mr. Maddox’s signature on the Option Selection for FRS Members form selecting Option 1 was properly notarized. The purpose of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form is to inform the spouse that he/she will not be receiving a lifetime benefit. It does not give control over which option the FRS member selects. That decision is the sole choice of the member. Petitioner testified that she and her husband completed the forms together, with Mr. Maddox selecting Option 2 since he was disabled at the time and on medication. Mr. Maddox took the forms to their bank to have them notarized, but returned without the Option Selection for FRS Members form notarized. While Mr. Maddox was taking his forms to the bank for execution, Petitioner executed the Spousal Acknowledgement Form in the presence of a notary and submitted it to Respondent. She believed her husband had executed the required forms and selected Option 2. Her testimony concerning this sequence of events is credible. Mr. Maddox received a letter entitled “Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application” from Respondent dated May 15, 2014. That letter confirmed that Option 2 had been selected and included an Estimate of Retirement Benefits spreadsheet. Based upon this letter, Petitioner believed that her husband had selected Option 2 and that the selection was in force. The Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application, stating that Option 2 had been selected, required two additional pieces of information from Mr. Maddox: verification of his birthdate; and a notarized Option Selection for FRS Members form, since the one that was submitted (selecting Option 2) had not been executed. When Mr. Maddox submitted the notarized Option Selection form, he had selected Option 1. Respondent relied upon the executed selection in making its determination that Option 1, not Option 2, had been selected by Mr. Maddox. Respondent did not provide an additional Spousal Acknowledgement Form to Petitioner when it received the notarized form selecting Option 1 since its processing people deemed the file complete once all the required forms for retirement had been received. Petitioner testified that she believed she should have been provided a new Spousal Acknowledgement Form when Mr. Maddox selected Option 1 since her acknowledgement signed previously had been executed under the impression her husband had selected Option 2 in her presence and was taking that election to the bank to be notarized. She believes that a Spousal Acknowledgement Form signed several months before and based upon her husband’s election of Option 2 should have been re-sent to her since a different selection was made by Mr. Maddox. She further testified that her husband was disabled and on heavy medication and may have gotten confused when he went to the bank a second time to sign the selection form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for Option 2 retirement benefits on behalf of Daniel Maddox. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Anne L. Maddox 1579 Jeffords Street Clearwater, Florida 33756-4408 (eServed) Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Elizabeth Stevens, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) J. Andrew Atkinson, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Josephine K. Saunders, the designated beneficiary, is entitled to the benefits payable on the teacher's retirement account of William E. Saunders, deceased, or whether she contractually waived her right to such benefits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter a final order denying the relief requested by petitioner and distributing the Teachers' Retirement System benefits of William E. Saunders to Josephine K. Saunders, the designated beneficiary. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1981.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Fred E. Hild (Colonel Hild), a deceased member of the Florida Retirement System, was incapacitated at the time he selected his retirement option and through the time that his first benefits check was cashed and, if so, whether his retirement option should be amended retroactively to provide benefits for Petitioner, Lois Hild, his spouse.
Findings Of Fact Colonel Fred Hild, late husband of Lois Hild, served in the Air Force for 25 years before retiring from that service. After retirement from the Air Force and after Valencia Community College opened in Orlando, Florida, Colonel Hild joined the college staff, first as a teacher and then as an administrator. At the time of his retirement from the college, he was assistant to the provost. He worked at the college from 1978 until 1996. His employment at the college was covered by the Florida Retirement System (FRS). With the exception of a year's employment in her family's business, Mrs. Hild never worked outside of her home. She and Colonel Hild were married over 50 years and had a full, active life together. Colonel Hild provided the financial support for the family and, except for routine household expenses when he was away in the Air Force, he handled all of the family's financial affairs. Colonel Hild's family and co-workers acknowledge that he was a remarkable man in many ways, physically vigorous and mentally sharp. His work was always an important aspect of his life; he was well-respected and well-known on the college campus and, because of his long tenure, was very knowledgeable about the history and functioning of the college. As he aged, Colonel Hild slowed down a bit; he had days at work when he was sleepy or grumpy. Most days, though, he was quite normal and sharp. He knew all of the regulations for the college and always went by the rules. On October 12, 1995, at the age of 81 years, Colonel Hild suffered a major cerebrovascular accident (stroke) while at home. The stroke left lasting side effects. For a time after the stroke he lost all short-term memory and could neither read nor write. He became passive and frail. He underwent rehabilitation and improved quite a bit, according to Mrs. Hild, but he was never again the same man. Colonel Hild's son, David, who lived in California, sold his car and possessions and moved in with his parents to help Mrs. Hild provide the care Colonel Hild then required. This care included driving and assistance ambulating in the home neighborhood, where he would sometimes get lost. Colonel Hild was never again able to drive, as he lost part of his peripheral vision and would forget where he was going. He was unable at times to recognize friends or family members. He slept a lot and needed supervision in showering and dressing. He never again was able to assume responsibility for the financial affairs of the family. The Hild's son, Steve, an accountant in Miami, Florida, helped Mrs. Hild with financial planning and paperwork. Before his stroke Colonel Hild had made some plans for retirement. He spoke to co-workers of investments in stocks and bonds, and when the Air Force brought in a survivor's benefit program, he took advantage of that so that his wife would have some benefits when he died. He also spoke to Mrs. Hild of their having retirement benefits from Valencia for ten years. Still, before the stroke Colonel Hild worried about having enough for retirement and his worries increased after the stroke. He insisted on returning to work at the college after his rehabilitation and some recovery. Although they were worried about how he could function, Colonel Hild's wife and sons were reluctant to oppose him when he was so insistent. Dr. Collins, his personal physician for over 20 years, provided certificates authorizing Colonel Hild to return to the college part-time on April 8, 1996, and full time on June 1, 1996. Dr. Collins believed that the duties would be light and that the family and college staff would look out for Colonel Hild. Colonel Hild's son, David, drove him to and from work and made sure Colonel Hild got in the building. The first time they made the drive, Colonel Hild directed his son to the wrong campus of the college. Already thoroughly trained in the paperwork, the secretaries picked up much of the work that Colonel Hild had been doing. For example, they listened to students' problems and tried to work them out with the department chairpersons. For final decisions, the staff referred the problems to the provost, Dr. Kinzer. Colonel Hild's duties on his return to work were light. Because Colonel Hild was very organized and knew so much about the college, he was able to function with the help of his staff. He could review documents prepared for him and would initial or sign the documents, as appropriate, sometimes changing something if it had not been prepared correctly. Some days were better than others; he slept more than he did before his stroke and would sometimes get lost on campus. Because he was so well- known, someone would always help him back to his office. One of the annual responsibilities of Colonel Hild was organizing the graduation processions, making a list of the order of the march and placing posters or signs in the corridors for guidance. He performed this function without complaint in early May 1996. He refused assistance of his staff and, except for a couple of posters on the opposite wall, he managed to get everything done. At the actual graduation night, however, Colonel's Hild's, son, David, had to help him find his way at the end of the ceremony and recessional march. Colonel Hild retired from Valencia Community College on July 31, 1996. In preparation for that retirement he had several contacts with staff in the college's human resources office. Initially, Colonel Hild signed a form on May 30, 1996, applying for retirement and leaving blank the benefit option selection since he had not yet received an estimate of the amounts he would receive under each option. Vicki Nelson, a staff person in the human resources office, had approximately 4 or 5 contacts with Colonel Hild, face-to-face or over the telephone, while preparing paperwork for his retirement. At one point she was concerned that she was having to explain things over again and she suggested to Colonel Hild and to his secretary that maybe he should bring Mrs. Hild in with him. The issue she was trying to explain had something to do with the need to obtain Mrs. Hild's birth certificate if he selected either option 3 or 4. The suggestion was never followed up and ultimately Mrs. Hild's birth certificate was unnecessary. Michael Break is assistant vice-president of human resources at Valencia Community College. In his capacity as director of human resources Dr. Break was involved in preparing Colonel Hild's retirement documents. On June 19, 1996, Dr. Break, Vicki Nelson, and Colonel Hild met to discuss the benefit options and the monthly estimates of each amount. The FRS provides four benefit options to its retirees. Option 1 yields the maximum monthly benefit, but when the retiree dies there is no survivor benefit. Option 2 yields a reduced monthly benefit for 10 years. If the retiree dies before the end of 10 years, the benefit is paid to the survivor for the balance of the 10 years. Option 3 provides a reduced benefit for the joint lifetimes of the member and beneficiary; Option 4 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetimes of the retiree and beneficiary, which benefit is reduced by 33 1/3% upon the death of either. As explained to Colonel Hild, his monthly benefit under option 1 was $2,569.64; under option 2, his benefit was $1,692.72; under option 3 the benefit was $1,546.92; and under option 4, the benefit was $1,856.41, reduced to $1,237.61 upon the death of Colonel or Mrs. Hild. In his discussion with Colonel Hild, Dr. Break pointed out the implications of the various options, including the need to consider such factors as one's health and financial arrangements for a dependent spouse. In response, Colonel Hild mentioned that he had other financial means and this was not the only retirement that he depended on. Although Dr. Break was aware that some people were concerned about Colonel Hild's effectiveness after his return to work, nothing in Colonel Hild's responses to the discussion in the meeting raised red flags to alert Dr. Break that Colonel Hild did not understand. Colonel Hild expressed his opinion that the difference between benefits under option 1 and the remaining options was excessive. In Dr. Break's experience, and as he counsels pre- retirees, sometimes the selection of option 1, with the additional purchase of an annuity or life insurance policy, inures to the greater benefit of an individual's dependents than the other reduced-benefit options under the FRS. When a retiree selects option 1 or 2, there is a section on the option selection form for the spouse to sign in acknowledgment of the option. Colonel Hild brought the form home and gave it to Mrs. Hild to sign one morning before he left for work. When she signed it the form was blank. All she knew was what he told her, that the form was something she had to sign for his retirement. She did not question her husband or even read enough of the form to know that there were 4 options. Mary Ann Swenson has been employed at Valencia Community College for thirteen years, 8 of which have been in the human resources department. Ms. Swenson notarized Colonel Hild's signature on the benefits option form on June 24, 1996, and remembers the occasion. Colonel Hild came to the human resources office to meet with Vicki Nelson, who called Ms. Swenson. At the time that Colonel Hild signed the form, Mrs. Hild's signature was already on it, but her signature did not require a notary. Likewise, option 1 had been checked on the form and, in response to a question by Colonel Hild, Vicki Nelson showed him that he marked option 1 and said, "Yes, you have marked option 1." Colonel Hild signed the form and then Ms. Swenson notarized it. On June 24, 1996, during the approximately 10 minutes that Ms. Swenson spent with Colonel Hild and Vicki Nelson, she had no reason to believe that he was not in complete control of his mental facilities or that he failed to understand and recognize what he was signing. Colonel Hild retired, as planned, the end of July 1996, and his first retirement check arrived approximately August 30, 1996. Mrs. Hild saw the check and had her husband endorse it. She then cashed the check. She understood that by doing so, she was accepting the amount of the check. She saw no problem with this because she assumed that Colonel Hild had opted for what he and she had discussed as the "ten year" provision. Mrs. Hild assumed that the check reflected the number of years he was employed and the amount of money that he was making. The Hild's son, Steve, made the same assumption, as he and Colonel Hild had discussed retirement sometime in the early 1990's and Steve understood that his father would take the 10- year plan with Valencia. Neither Steve nor Mrs. Hild had requested any information from the college or Division of Retirement about the option selected by Colonel Hild or the amount of benefits he would receive once he retired. Colonel Hild died on September 28, 1997. He had received a total of approximately $37,000, or 14 months of benefits under FRS option 1 during his lifetime. Mrs. Hild and Colonel Hild's sons learned of the option 1 selection when the checks stopped coming after Colonel Hild's death and when Mrs. Hild called the college human resources office. It is necessary to glean Colonel Hild's mental capacity and state of mind from the circumstances described by the witnesses in this case, all of whom were candid and credible. From those circumstances it is impossible to find that Colonel Hild was incompetent to make the decision to chose option 1 for his FRS benefits. That decision was entirely consistent with his concern, described by his family and staff at the college, that there be enough money coming in when he retired. Although he plainly was concerned for making financial arrangements for his spouse, he had made some arrangements already with his Air Force retirement and with other assets or investments. Described as strong-willed, disciplined and well- organized, Colonel Hild, in spite of his diminished capacity after his stroke, convinced his family, the college and his long time physician that he should return to work. And he did function in that work prior to retirement, performing by habit those tasks that he had mastered in his long tenure. No one suggests that Colonel Hild was coerced, pressured or hurried into the decision he made. The various staff who met with him on several occasions regarding his retirement believed that he was capable of making his own decision and that he exercised the very option that he intended.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: THAT the Florida Division of Retirement issue its final order denying the relief sought by Petitioner, Lois Hild. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold Lewis, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Julia Smith, Esquire Amundsen and Moore 502 East Park Avenue Post Office Box 1759 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief Legal Counsel Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue In Case No. 99-2748, should Elvira Demdam, d/b/a San Juan Retirement Home, be administratively fined for operating an unlicensed facility, and if so, in what amount? In Case No. 99-2755, should Elvira Demdam, d/b/a Ingleside Retirement Home, be administratively fined for exceeding the home's licensed capacity, and if so, in what amount?
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulation of ALFs in Florida. Respondent, Elvira Demdam, operates both Ingleside Retirement Home and San Juan Retirement Home in Jacksonville, Florida. Gloria Wolfe is employed by AHCA to inspect ALFs for compliance with state and federal regulations for such facilities. Elvira Demdam is the licensee for Ingleside Retirement Home. The effective date of the license for Ingleside was October 27, 1997. Its expiration date was October 26, 1999. On April 26, 1999, Ms. Wolfe surveyed a facility doing business as San Juan Retirement Home due to a complaint that San Juan was operating as an unlicensed ALF. During Ms. Wolfe's inspection, San Juan Retirement Home had four residents, all of whom were being provided personal services by the home, including assistance with meals, administration of medications, and assistance with other essential activities of daily living. Therefore, the San Juan facility was being operated as an ALF on April 26, 1999. In a letter dated April 27, 1999, AHCA imposed a moratorium on admissions, effective April 26, 1999, on Ingleside Retirement Home, because Ms. Demdam had an interest in Ingleside Retirement Home and an interest in San Juan Retirement Home, which was operating without a license. The moratorium for Ingleside was to remain in force until the unlicensed facility (San Juan) ceased operation, and no residents could be readmitted without approval of AHCA. On April 27, 1999, Ms. Wolfe's superior, Mr. Robert Dickson, recommended a $1,000.00 sanction, based on Ms. Wolfe's report and because he believed that previous sanctions had been recommended against the Ingleside Retirement Home within the licensure period for the same type of deficiency. However, at hearing, he did not specify any previous sanctions against Ingleside, similar or otherwise. Elvira Demdam is the licensed administrator of Ingleside Retirement Home and should have known of the legal requirement that San Juan Retirement Home be licensed. Indeed, by her own admission, Ms. Demdam had been a nursing home administrator for four years, knew of the licensure requirement, and had been attempting to license the San Juan facility since at least 60 days before the property was transferred to her. San Juan was licensed to another person at the time Ms. Demdam took it over. That prior license had expired in December 1998, and Ms. Demdam did not get San Juan Retirement Home licensed in her name until July 1999. Ms. Demdam's exhibits support her testimony that much of her license application paperwork for San Juan Retirement Home was lost in the mail or within AHCA and that ACHA repeatedly required that she re-submit the same documents. However, she did not establish that the Agency failed to grant or deny her application within 90 days of submission of all necessary application items. The fact remains that on April 26, 1999, Ms. Demdam was operating San Juan Retirement Home without a valid ALF license. Although Ms. Demdam asserted that one or more of the San Juan residents were non-blood relatives who had lived with her as family members since 1995, she offered no corroborative evidence on this issue, and this assertion is not found to be credible. Ms. Wolfe also participated in a May 4, 1999, monitoring visit and survey of Ingleside Retirement Home. At that time, she found Ingleside to be operating in excess of its licensed capacity. Ingleside Retirement Home is licensed for 18 residents, but in fact, had 19 residents on that date. Ms. Wolfe personally reviewed residents, room by room, and made a census of Ingleside Retirement Home on May 4, 1999. Her census shows that a nineteenth resident, S.W., had been admitted to Ingleside in March 1999. Ms. Wolfe's investigation revealed that this resident was not noted in Ingleside's admissions/discharge log. Despite arguments that this deficiency constituted a Class III violation, an A-004 "not classified" deficiency was actually issued. (See ACHA Exhibit 4, page 3) Ms. Demdam's explanation for the extra resident in Ingleside Retirement Home was that she had taken in S.W. at the request of a case worker for the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) as an emergency placement on a weekend for a projected stay of only two to four weeks but that due to unforeseen circumstances, DCF had not removed S.W. timely. It is unclear from this record whether the patient, S.W., put the census of Ingleside over 18 patients in March, the time that she was first taken in. It is also unclear exactly how long S.W. caused Ingleside's census to exceed the 18 patients provided for on its license, but as of May 1999, Ms. Demdam was providing care for S.W. and another Ingleside resident, J.J., without pay. Mr. Dickson testified that he recommended a $1000.00 fine as a sanction for having the one extra resident in Ingleside Retirement Home on May 4, 1999, because of prior sanctions recommended within the licensure period for the same type of deficiency. However, the only similar deficiency or sanction he noted during his testimony was the Ingleside moratorium which had been based upon the lack of licensure of the San Juan facility. By a letter dated May 7, 1999, AHCA notified the Respondent of the findings supporting the imposition of a moratorium at Ingleside. Ms. Demdam testified credibly that she moved S.W. out of Ingleside Retirement Home as soon as she was notified and that she cleared-out the four residents of San Juan Retirement Home as soon as possible. Mr. Dickson views both ALF citations very seriously because operating an ALF without a license can be prosecuted by the State Attorney as a third-degree felony (see Section 400.408(1)(b)-(c), Florida Statues, (Supp. 1998) and because he views Ms. Demdam's long practice and licensure in the ALF field to demonstrate her knowing and willful disregard of the law.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of operating an unlicensed facility and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000 in DOAH Case No. 99-2748; and That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of exceeding her licensed capacity at Ingleside Retirement Home, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 99-2755. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael O. Mathis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3408D Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Elvira Demdam, Administrator San Juan Retirement Home Un-Licensed 6561 San Juan Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Elvira Demdam, Administrator Ingelside Retirement Home 732 Camp Milton Lane Jacksonville, Florida 32220 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
