The Issue Whether Respondent, C & J Fruit and Melons, Inc. (C & J Fruit), a citrus fruit dealer and registered packer, owes Petitioner, John Stephens, Inc., a citrus dealer, a sum of money for grapefruit and oranges sold and delivered to C & J Fruit's citrus fruit-packing house for processing.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, John Stephens, Inc., is a Florida-licensed citrus fruit dealer operating within the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services' regulatory jurisdiction. Respondent, C & J Fruit & Melons, Inc., was a Florida- licensed citrus fruit dealer and operated a registered packing house in Frostproof, Florida, during the 2001-2002 citrus shipping season. Respondent, Auto Owners Insurance, was the surety for C & J Fruit's citrus fruit dealer's license in the amount of $14,000.00, for the 2001-2002 season. At the beginning of the 2001-2002 season, Petitioner and C & J Fruit entered into a verbal contract under which Petitioner agreed to contract with various grove owners and grove harvesters in the Polk County, Florida, area. The understanding was that Petitioner would obtain various varieties of grapefruit, oranges, and tangerines from the growers and harvesters and deliver the fruit to C & J Fruit's packing house. Petitioner was responsible for payment to the grove owners and harvesters. C & J Fruit would process the fruit, supply the citrus fruit to retail and wholesale suppliers, and account and pay for the fruit received from Petitioner. Petitioner and C & J Fruit had conducted business in this fashion for many years prior to this season. On October 23, 2001, C & J Fruit sought protection from creditors under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Case No. 01-19821-8W1. Following the filing of bankruptcy, no other supplier would provide C & J Fruit with citrus fruit. With Petitioner's consent, C & J Fruit filed an emergency motion to authorize a secured interest to Petitioner, if it would continue to supply C & J Fruit's packing house with fruit. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, and in November 2001, Petitioner began supplying C & J Fruit's packing house with fresh citrus fruit. The preponderance of evidence proves that Petitioner delivered to C & J Fruit's packing house during November 2001 pursuant to the contract: 540 boxes of grapefruit at $3.00 per box for a total of $1,620.00; 3,044 boxes of oranges at $4.00 per box for a total of $12,176.00; 330 boxes of tangerines at $3.50 per box for a total of $1,155.00; and 1,953 boxes of navel oranges at $2.00 per box for a total of $3,906.00. C & J Fruit was billed for this amount. Accordingly, C & J Fruit was obligated to pay Petitioner the total sum of $18,857.00 for the fruit. When payment was not received in a timely matter, shipment of citrus fruit to the packing house was discontinued. Petitioner performed all of its duties under the contract, and C & J Fruit failed to pay or account for the citrus fruit delivered to its packing house under the terms of the contract. C & J Fruit is, therefore, indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $18,857.00
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered requiring Respondent, C & J Fruit and Melons, Inc., to pay to Petitioner, John Stephens, Inc., the sum of $18,857.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Clemon Browne, President C & J Fruit & Melons, Inc. Post Office Box 130 Lake Hamilton, Florida 33851-0130 John A. Stephens John Stephens, Inc. Post Office Box 1098 Fort Meade, Florida 33841 Jason Lowe, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. Post Office Box 3 Lakeland, Florida 33802
The Issue Whether Respondent, a citrus dealer, owes Petitioner, a citrus producer/grower, compensation for breach of a contract to buy, pick, haul, and sell fruit from Petitioner’s grove. If so, what is the reasonable amount of compensation.
Findings Of Fact Mecca includes a thirty-six acre Murcott tangerine grove in Lakeworth, Florida, purchased by Leonard Mecca in 2003. Murcott tangerines are primarily sold as fresh fruit. Through its owner, Mr. Mecca, Petitioner entered into a contract, on January 3, 2006, Emerald to pick fruit from the grove by April 10, 2006. Old Republic Surety Company is surety on the contract performance bond for $59,000.00, the maximum amount of compensation that can be recovered, if any. On behalf of Emerald, Keith Emmett, a fruit buyer with 25 years of experience, personally visited the Mecca grove and, on January 3, 2006, estimated the number of boxes of fruit at 5,000 boxes and sales price at $14.00 a box. Mr. Emmett’s estimate was the basis for the terms of the contract that was accepted by Mr. Mecca. Mr. Mecca also testified that he contracted with another organization, River Citrus, to be the caretaker of the grove. Mr. Mecca’s contract with Emerald included the statement that “[g]rower agrees to keep said fruit clean and to protect said fruit against fire, and to dust, spray and fertilize the same in such a manner that will not cause injury to said fruit or groves.” Emerald was, under the terms of the contract, required to pay for all “merchantable” fruit at picking time. At sometime in February or March, Mr. Mecca (not his caretaker) discovered that the irrigation system at the grove was not working. Mr. Mecca testified that he had the system repaired within two days. Weed control at the grove was to be done by the use of herbicides and mowing. Mr. Mecca testified that he had a conversation about the condition of the grove with Mr. Emmett, but only about water. Mr. Emmett visited the Mecca grove in late February or early March to see if the fruit was ready to pick to fill pending orders. He described the condition of the grove as having a “hard wilt,” meaning leaves curled, with soft, spongy green fruit. The weeds indicated to him an absence of mowing and herbicides. Mr. Emmett returned to the grove in April and described the fruit as still soft to the touch with a green cast. He also testified that he notified Mr. Mecca, in conversations through the month of March, that the grove needed watering and that the fruit was soft and needed more time. Mr. Mecca testified that he contacted Mr. Emmett several times in March and April to find out when the fruit would be picked because he believed it was getting overripe. Mr. Mecca testified that Mr. Emmett was waiting to pick the fruit late in the season when market prices rose enough to justify the $14.00 a box contract price. Mr. Mecca also testified regarding when he decided to stop negotiating with Emerald and to use another packing house, as follows: It had to be the day that Keith Emmett had his man, Bill Turner, call me to tell me that he was not going to be able to use the fruit unless I wanted -- to wait another two weeks. So -- which would have been around the 20th of April. Q. So that would have been the -- on or about the time that the -- you were informed that the fruit couldn’t be used as fresh fruit; is that correct? By Emerald? A. I was informed -- I was informed by Emerald that they didn’t want to pick any more fruit unless I wanted to wait two more weeks and try again, which was the story I heard every two weeks. Bill Turner, who was in charge of harvesting the fruit for Ridge Harvesting, previously had visited and inspected the Mecca grove in February, after Emerald received a report that the well was broken. He testified that he found wilted trees and lots of weeds. By the time he talked to Mr. Mecca about the condition of the grove, he recalled that the well had already been fixed. One load of 500 boxes of Mecca fruit was picked by Ridge Harvesting for Emerald on April 19, 2006, but failed to pass state inspection. Emerald, nevertheless, paid Mecca $14.00 a box for the 500 boxes, or $7,000.00, and on April 20, 2006, sent a letter to Mecca releasing the fruit back to Mecca and, in effect, terminating the January contract based on the poor condition of the fruit. The letter specified that the fruit was “. . . spongy, soft and indented from the weight of the fruit in the box.” Mr. Emmett testified that he suggested that Mr. Mecca agree to sell the fruit at lower prices for juice, rather than as fresh fruit. He testified that Mr. Mecca declined the offer and notified Mr. Emmett that he was going to use a different packing house. Donald Owens, a field buyer for Rio Citrus (Rio) had driven by the Mecca grove some time in April, and noticed that the fruit had not been picked. He was familiar with the grove, having picked it in prior years before it changed ownership. Mr. Owens searched out the new grower and called Mr. Mecca about picking the fruit, but was told that the fruit was under contract with another picker. On or about April 20, 2006, after Emerald’s representative notified him that they were not going to use the fruit, Mr. Mecca called Donald Owens back, met him at the grove and entered into a verbal contract for Rio to pick the fruit in what Mr. Mecca and Mr. Owens described as a “salvage operation.” When Donald Owens saw the grove, on or about April 20, 2006, he testified that the grass was high, the fruit was small but, he believed, within the criteria that you can pack as fresh fruit and otherwise merchantable. He testified that he told Mr. Mecca that, before he did anything, the grass had to be mowed. Mr. Owen’s company picked a total of 2,106 boxes of tangerines on April 24, April 25, May 1, and May 4, 2006, based on the dates on the trip tickets. Of those, according to Donald Owens and his settlement statements, 69 percent passed inspection and were packed to sell as fresh fruit, but 31 percent were so-called “eliminations” and had to be taken to a canning processing plant to be juiced. Mr. Owens testified that his company, Rio, stopped picking fruit because the canning processing plant stopped taking Murcotts. If Rio had continued, then he estimated that from 25 to 30 percent of the fruit would have ended up in cow pastures at a significant financial loss, considering the expense of picking, loading, hauling, separating, and hauling fruit by grade to a cow pasture. Rio paid Mecca approximately $12,000 for the fruit it picked and sold. The remaining fruit in the grove fell to the ground. In 2004, Emerald picked 9,000 boxes of fruit from the Mecca grove. Donald Owens, whose Rio company picked 2,106 boxes from a part of one of the three divisions of the grove, estimates that each of the three sections could have provided about 3,000 boxes each, or an approximate total of 9,000 boxes of fruit from the Mecca grove, of which approximately 6,000 remained after Rio stopped picking the fruit. In 2005, Mecca produced only 600 boxes of fruit due to hurricane damage and also because Murcott tangerines produce in large volumes every other year. In the Mecca contract with Emerald in 2006, Mr. Emmett estimated the number of boxes at 5,000 merchantable boxes for the 2006 growing season. Although Emerald picked 9,000 boxes in 2004, it is reasonable to believe that the yield would be lower after some trees were damaged during the hurricanes of 2005. The estimate and agreement made prior to this contractual dispute, 5,000 boxes, is accepted as the most reasonable estimate for the 2006 growing season. Stuart Arost, the owner of Emerald, testified that he had contracts to sell elimination Murcott tangerines through April and into the first part of May to canning plants in Umatilla and Haines City. One of those plants, he testified, is cooperative-owned and will take Murcotts as long as the owners are still harvesting the fruit, even into June. Emerald, more likely than not, could have sold the fruit for juice for $10.00 a box with net proceeds to Mecca of $8.00 a box if allowed to further revise the contract or mitigate damages. Mr. Arost testified that further damages could have been mitigated if Don Owens and Rio had continued to pick fruit and used the available processors for the elimination, but there is no evidence that Mr. Owens was aware of the alternative. The evidence, based on the testimony of all of the witnesses who entered the grove, supports a conclusion that some of the fruit in the grove was damaged due to lack of proper care, and that, more likely than not, resulted in the initial failure to pass inspection and the subsequent rate of eliminations. Although 500 boxes taken by Emerald failed USDA inspection, the fact that 2,106 boxes subsequently passed inspection indicates that Emerald correctly advised Mr. Mecca to wait another two weeks until about the time that Rio harvested the fruit rather than insisting that Emerald resume harvesting before the fruit was firm. While Mr. Mecca had agreed to the two-week extensions in the past, his refusal to agree on or about April 20, 2006, resulted in Emerald’s termination of the contract and his decision to use a different packing house.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying any recovery by Petitioner Mecca Farms from Respondents Emerald Packing Company, Inc. and Old Republic Surety Company, as Surety. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher E. Green Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, M-38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Franklin T. Walden, Esquire Law Offices of Franklin T. Walden 1936 Lee Road, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Eric Severson, Esquire Alley, Maass, Rogers & Lindsay, P.A. 340 Royal Poinciana Way, Suite 321 Palm Beach, Florida 33480-0431 Old Republic Surety Company Post Office Box 1635 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents John and Shelby Mahon (the "Mahons"), d/b/a John's Citrus Trees, committed any or all of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated March 12, 2010, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency statutorily charged with protecting the State of Florida from invasive and destructive plant pests and diseases. See § 581.031, Florida Statutes (2010).1/ John's Citrus Trees is a wholly owned business of the Mahons, and holds nursery registration number 47218720. Citrus canker Citrus canker (Xanthomonas axonopodis pv. citri) is a bacterial disease of citrus. It affects all types of citrus. The bacteria requires water to enter the plant tissue and is easily spread by wind driven rain, by movement of infected trees, and by contact with contaminated tools or people. Citrus canker in plants cannot be cured. The only treatment is the destruction of infected and exposed plants. If the infected plants were in the ground, then the ground must be dried out and treated with chemicals, because the bacteria can remain in the ground water after the plant has been removed. The scientific consensus is that 95 percent of new infections occur within 1900 feet of infected trees, when the trees are outdoors. Thus, trees within 1900 feet of an infected tree are considered to have been "exposed" to citrus canker. Within an enclosed structure, citrus canker infection can be spread by worker contact or by overhead irrigation systems. For many years, Florida has followed a program aimed at citrus canker eradication. Several hurricanes swept through the state in 2004 and 2005, resulting in widespread citrus canker. Since the most recent outbreak, the Department has tracked and sought to eradicate citrus canker through the Citrus Health Response Program ("CHRP") developed by the Department in coordination with the United States Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("USDA/APHIS"). See Fla. Admin. Code R. 5B-63.001. In the two years preceding the hearing in this matter, the Department found citrus canker in three commercial nurseries, out of 56 commercial nurseries that grow citrus in Florida. One of the three nurseries, in Polk County, has been released from quarantine and is now free of citrus canker. In that case, the owners destroyed the entire bench on which the infected plants were found. Depending on the size of the propagation house, one bench may contain from 10,000 to 40,000 plants. When a follow-up inspection found canker, the nursery destroyed all infected and exposed plants. Subsequent inspections found no further infection. The second location, in Desoto County, was still under quarantine at the time of the hearing. Citrus canker remained in one of the three growing structures at the nursery even after the destruction of 1,200 trees. The Department intended to release the nursery from quarantine if the follow-up destruction entirely eliminated the infection. The process of inspection, quarantine, destruction and, if necessary, repeat, as followed in the cases of the Polk and Desoto County nurseries, is the standard industry practice for the control of citrus canker in nurseries. The third commercial nursery with a citrus canker infestation was John's Citrus Trees in Clermont. As of the date of the hearing, there was still a citrus canker infection in all parts of the nursery, and the quarantine remained in effect at both the Clermont and Fruitland Park locations of John's Citrus Trees. Movement of citrus trees from quarantined locations The Mahons operate a citrus nursery at 7401 Laws Road in Clermont and a retail operation in Fruitland Park at the front of the North Lake Flea Market on U.S. 441. At the Clermont location, the Mahons have a propagation house, a screened enclosure and an outdoor retail area. The nursery is classified as a propagation nursery because the operators grow citrus from budwood that is grafted onto rootstock and then matured for sale. A propagation house is an enclosed structure that is entered through a decontamination station to prevent the introduction of pests and diseases into the propagation area. Commercial citrus propagation houses are also required to have a double entryway with positive airflow, so that when inspectors or workers enter, air is pushing out against them, to blow away any pests. A screen house is an additional structure in which plants are stored prior to sale. The screening prevents insects from infecting the plants and provides some protection from windblown infection by bacterial diseases such as citrus canker. On June 1, 2009, inspectors from the Department's Division of Plant Industry ("DPI") conducted a routine inspection of the Clermont nursery. The inspectors found structural deficiencies in the propagation house itself, as well as plants outside the screen house that they suspected of having citrus canker. The inspectors collected samples and sent them to the DPI pathology laboratory in Gainesville. The pathology report confirmed citrus canker on the leaves of the plant samples taken from outside the Clermont nursery's screen house. On June 3, 2009, a total of 1281 screen house and outside plants at the Clermont nursery were quarantined until follow-up sampling showed no signs of citrus canker. The inspection report notes that 36 plants at the nursery showed positive signs of citrus canker. The Clermont nursery was re-inspected on June 29, 2009. Following the re-inspection, the quarantine was extended to the 27,400 plants in the propagation house due to the presence of citrus canker there. Re-inspections were conducted on July 31, September 3, October 12, November 12, and December 14, 2009, and on January 15, 2010. Samples were taken at each re-inspection, and pathology testing revealed a continuing infection of plants with citrus canker at the Clermont nursery. During each inspection, the inspectors made a count of the plants in each area of the nursery. On two of the dates, June 29, 2009 and July 31, 2009, the inspection report shows only a total for the outside and screen house areas combined. The other reports give a separate number for the outside and screen houseplants. The counts for the outside location were as follows: 2009 June 3 471 plants September 3 402 plants October 12 439 plants November 12 391 plants December 14 400 plants 2010 January 15 524 plants On July 1, 2009, DPI inspectors conducted an inspection at the Fruitland Park retail location of John's Citrus Trees. The inspectors took samples from plants that displayed the visual symptoms of citrus canker. The samples were sent to the DPI laboratory in Gainesville for analysis. The Fruitland Park location was placed under temporary quarantine pending the results of the laboratory analysis. A DPI pathology report dated July 2, 2009, confirmed that the plants were infected with citrus canker. On July 7, 2009, the quarantine was extended for an additional 30 days to allow time to confirm that the Fruitland Park location was free of citrus canker. On July 6, 2009, the Department's inspectors witnessed the destruction of 21 citrus trees at the Fruitland Park location. Four of these trees had been confirmed with citrus canker, and the other 17 were suspected of having citrus canker. On July 10, 2009, a Department representative witnessed the destruction of another nine trees at the Fruitland Park location. On August 26, 2009, DPI inspectors conducted a re- inspection at the Fruitland Park location, taking additional samples from plants showing signs of citrus canker. In a pathology report completed on the same date, the samples were confirmed to be infected with citrus canker. Subsequent inspections on October 19 and December 15, 2009, and on January 20, February 23, March 29, April 19, and May 24, 2010, each resulted in additional samples of suspected citrus canker being taken for analysis. Pathology reports dated October 21 and December 15, 2009, and January 27, February 25, April 1, April 23, and May 26, 2010, confirmed the continuing infection of the Fruitland Park location with citrus canker. At each of the inspections at the Fruitland Park location, the inspectors made a count of the plants at the nursery. On December 15, 2009, a DPI inspector discovered that the Mahons had between 50 and 100 citrus trees (later determined to be 76 plants) in a spot at the North Lake Flea Market, near a recreational vehicle approximately 200 feet behind the retail location at the front of the flea market. The inspector, James Holm, a supervisor in DPI's Tavares office, gave the Mahons notice that that these plants were under quarantine because of their proximity to the infected plants already under quarantine. The Mahons received written notice of the quarantine on December 18, 2009. The Department considered the additional plants to be at John's Citrus Trees' registered location at Fruitland Park. The alternative would have been to consider the additional trees to be placed at an unregistered location, which would have constituted a different violation than that alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The plant counts, based on the inspection reports and taking into account the plant destruction witnessed by Department inspectors, were as follows: 2009 July 1 470 plants July 6 449 plants, accounting for 21 destroyed July 10 440 plants, accounting for 9 destroyed August 26 449 plants September 10 444 plants, accounting for 5 destroyed October 19 437 plants December 15 452 plants in front area and 50-100 new plants in rear December 18 528 total plants (76 plants counted in rear plus 452 plants in front) 2010 January 20 529 total plants and 22 (424 plants in front area, 76 in rear and 29 plants farther to the rear) Even when the destroyed plants are accounted for, the plant counts appear to show movement of trees exposed to or infected with citrus canker into and out of the Fruitland Park location while it was under quarantine for citrus canker and the owners had knowledge of the continuing infection. The tree count rose from 440 plants on July 10, 2009 to 449 plants on August 26, 2009. The Mahons had no explanation for this change, which they attributed to counting error by the Department. The tree count dropped from 444 plants on September 10, 2009 to 437 plants on October 19, 2009. The Mahons had no evidentiary explanation for this change. They speculated that the seven trees in question were stolen, noting that they were kept in an unlocked, unprotected area of the flea market directly off U.S. 441. As to the additional trees discovered by the Department in the rear area of the flea market on December 15, 2009, the Mahons testified that their conversations with Mr. Holm led them to believe that the Department would approve of their bringing in plants from other locations and selling them in the rear area. The Mahons testified that the plants in the rear area actually belonged to their son, Danny Mahon. The Mahons produced invoices for trees purchased by Danny Mahon from Pokey's Lake Gem Citrus Nursery. (Gary "Pokey" Mahon is the brother of Respondent John Mahon.) The plants named on the invoices could not be definitely matched with the 76 trees in the rear area of the flea market, though the dates on the receipts leave open the possibility that the 76 trees were the property of Danny Mahon. See Findings of Fact 80 and 81, infra, for detailed findings as to the invoices. Even if the Mahons testimony as to the provenance and ownership of the trees is credited, Mr. Holm denied giving the Mahons permission to sell trees from the rear area of the flea market while maintaining a quarantine on the location at the front of the flea market. Mr. Holm acknowledged having a discussion with Mr. Mahon along those lines, but also stated that he told Mr. Mahon that DPI headquarters in Gainesville would have to approve such a plan. The Mahons would have had to register the rear area as a separate retail location. As noted above, on December 15, 2009, Mr. Holm gave the Mahons telephonic notice that the both the front and rear sites at the flea market were under quarantine. The new plants in the rear area were quarantined due to their proximity to the known infected plants in the front of the flea market. Mr. Holm provided the Mahons with written notice of the quarantine on December 18, 2009. Danny Mahon did not have a registered nursery at the Fruitland Park location. The Department therefore attributed ownership of all of the trees, in the front and the back areas of the flea market location, to the only registered location at the North Lake Flea Market on U.S. 441 in Fruitland Park: John's Citrus Trees. On January 22, 2010, inspectors found another 29 plants at a third site, behind the recreational vehicle near which the 76 plants were found on December 15, 2009. The Mahons did not clarify whether these were new plants or plants that had been moved from one of the other two flea market locations. It is noted that the number of plants in the front area was 452 on December 15, 2009, and 424 on January 20, 2010, a difference of 28 plants, very nearly the number of plants found at the third site. The total count of trees at the Fruitland Park location changed from 528 on December 18, 2009, to 529 on January 20, 2010. The Mahons plausibly attributed these small discrepancies to a counting error. The sale of trees to Fred Thomas In 2009, Fred Thomas contacted John's Citrus Trees regarding the availability of 720 Minneola tangelo, or "honeybell," citrus trees. Mr. Thomas, an experienced grove caretaker, had been hired by Victor Roye, the owner of an abandoned grove, to remove the existing trees and replant the grove with honeybell citrus. Mr. Thomas testified that honeybells are "packing house fruit," and that Mr. Roye's intention was to sell the honeybells as edible fruit. The value of such market fruit is much greater than the value of fruit sold for juice. Citrus infected with citrus canker can be sold for juice, but is not salable as market fruit. On the telephone, Mr. Mahon assured Mr. Thomas that he could supply the requested trees. On March 3, 2009, Mr. Mahon and Mr. Thomas met in a McDonald's parking lot and signed a contract for the purchase of 720 honeybell citrus trees. Mr. Thomas gave Mr. Mahon a 25 percent deposit of $1620.00 towards the purchase price of $6,480.00 (720 trees x $9.00 per tree). At the time the contract was entered, the Mahons' propagation location in Clermont was not under quarantine. Under the terms of the contract, the trees were to be delivered by June 10, 2009. When the appointed date passed and he had not received the trees, Mr. Thomas contacted Mr. Mahon, who stated that the trees hadn't grown as they should. Mr. Mahon asked for an additional 30 days to deliver the trees. Mr. Thomas agreed to the extension only because he already had a contract with Mr. Mahon. Mr. Thomas thought it would likely take longer to find a new seller and negotiate a contract than the 30 days requested by Mr. Mahon. Mr. Mahon knew that Mr. Thomas was upset, and asked him to come to the Clermont nursery and see what he had. Mr. Thomas and his wife subsequently met with Mr. Mahon at the Clermont location. Mr. Mahon took the Thomases into the propagation house and showed them some trees in the ground that he identified as their honeybells. Mr. Thomas agreed that the trees were too small and reiterated his agreement to the 30-day extension. Mr. Mahon stated that he might obtain half of the 720 trees from his brother Pokey, and promised full delivery in July. Mr. Thomas testified that when he visited another nursery's propagation house, there was a pan of disinfectant outside the first door, and he was required to step into the disinfectant before proceeding. When the first door was opened, he was hit with a gust of air from a fan. As Mr. Thomas stated, "You walk into the second door, you're clean." Mr. Thomas noted that the Mahons' propagation house had none of those protections from infection. Mr. Thomas further noted that the propagation house itself was in poor condition, with gaps and openings in the enclosure. On about July 10, 2009, Ms. Mahon and one of her sons delivered about half of the promised 720 trees, then delivered the remaining trees two or three days later. Mr. Thomas testified that the trees were delivered "bare root," not in pots. Mr. Thomas paid the remainder of the purchase price to Ms. Mahon as the trees were delivered. Mr. Thomas testified that the trees did not look good when he planted them. "I didn't like the looks of them from the word 'go,' 'cause they were so small, and I seen stuff on them." In August, Mr. Thomas went to Triangle Chemical Company in Mascotte to seek the advice of Richard Hoffman, a salesman who was familiar with citrus pests. Mr. Hoffman was not available, but another Triangle Chemical employee accompanied Mr. Thomas to the grove. This man told Mr. Thomas, "Your trees are eat up with citrus canker." Mr. Thomas was incredulous and chose not to believe the man, though Mr. Thomas acknowledged his expertise. Mr. Thomas simply could not believe that the trees he had just planted were infested with canker, and decided to "try to take care of them." Later, Mr. Hoffman came out to the grove, because it still did not look right. Mr. Hoffman agreed with the earlier Triangle Chemical employee's assessment that the trees were "eat up with canker," in Mr. Thomas' words. Justin Nipaver, a CHRP inspector, is charged with ensuring that all citrus groves can be tracked in the Department's database. During the summer, Mr. Nipaver had noted that an old grove on the Roye property had been pulled out and destroyed. On November 22, 2009, Mr. Nipaver stopped in to inspect the newly planted grove, in order to obtain the information necessary to add the grove to the Department's database. During this inspection, Mr. Nipaver noted visible symptoms of citrus canker on the plants. He collected samples for laboratory analysis. He spoke with Mrs. Thomas, who told him that she and her husband had planted the grove for Mr. Roye and were acting as caretakers. Mrs. Thomas told Mr. Nipaver that the plants had been purchased from John's Citrus Trees. Mr. Nipaver did not tell Mrs. Thomas that he suspected a citrus canker infestation, preferring to wait for laboratory confirmation. Mr. Nipaver returned to the grove on November 30, 2009, accompanied by Mr. Holm, Detective Daniel Shaw of OALE, and two other Department employees. The team surveyed part of the grove and determined that 65 to 70 percent of the trees were suspected of having citrus canker. Mr. Nipaver testified that there was no need to survey the entire grove because of the severity of the infestation in the sample portion. Detective Shaw attempted to contact the Thomases but was unable to reach them. In a report dated December 2, 2009, the DPI pathology laboratory confirmed that the samples taken from the grove on November 30 were infected with citrus canker. The grove was placed under quarantine. Mr. Thomas testified that he told Mr. Mahon about the situation and that Mr. Mahon assured him that he could sell the fruit for juice. Mr. Thomas found this an inadequate response because his entire purpose in planting honeybells was to produce packing house fruit. He asked Mr. Mahon for a refund, but Mr. Mahon claimed that the Department had him "broke and tied up." Mr. Thomas subsequently pulled all of the trees and burned them under the supervision of Department employees. Mr. Nipaver testified that there were no groves with citrus canker near the Roye grove. The Mahons Clermont nursery was released from quarantine on April 1, 2009. Mr. Mahon testified that he feared that the Department would impose another quarantine on his nursery, not necessarily for good reason but just because "they were gunning for me." He therefore potted the 720 honeybell trees promised to Mr. Thomas and moved them, along with many other trees, to his son Paul Mahon's nursery in Groveland. Mr. Mahon testified that the plants were kept in a screen house at Paul's nursery until they were delivered to Mr. Thomas in July. Mr. Mahon's testimony conflicts with Mr. Thomas' testimony regarding his visit to the Mahon's nursery in June. Mr. Mahon had shown him plants in the propagation house that Mr. Mahon stated were the plants to be delivered to Mr. Thomas. Mr. Mahon had also stated that, in the alternative, he might obtain half of the plants from his brother Pokey. This June meeting was well after the April time period during which Mr. Mahon claimed to have moved the plants to Paul's nursery. Mr. Mahon's testimony that the plants being held for Mr. Thomas at Paul's nursery were potted is contradicted by Mr. Thomas' testimony that the plants were delivered bare root. Mr. Holm testified that Paul Mahon's nursery in Groveland was a propagation nursery and as such was inspected every thirty days. Mr. Holm testified that between April 2009 and early July 2009, the period during which Mr. Mahon claimed to be holding Mr. Thomas' plants in pots at Paul Mahon's nursery, there were no such potted plants on the nursery grounds. Mr. Holm testified that in April 2009, Paul Mahon's screen house was overgrown with grass and had "an issue" with tropical spiderwort, an aggressive, difficult to control weed. Part of the screen house structure was collapsed and the entryways were open. Mr. Holm described it as in a "deteriorating condition," and testified that this condition remained unchanged through October 2009. Mr. Mahon testified that Paul Mahon was very ill and awaiting a liver transplant during the period in question. Paul Mahon's illness accounts for the abandoned appearance of his nursery but not for the absence of the 720 plants that Mr. Mahon testified were stored there. Mr. Thomas' testimony was consistent and credible, and was supported by the testimony of Mr. Holm as regards the provenance of the 720 honeybell plants. Based on all the evidence, it is found that the plants delivered to Mr. Thomas in July 2009 came directly from the Mahons' propagation house at the Clermont nursery, and that they had not been stored at Paul Mahon's nursery between April and July 2009. Mr. Mahon knew that these plants were under quarantine and had a substantial probability of being infected with citrus canker. Sale of infected plants to a homeowner On October 20, 2009, DPI fruitfly inspection trapper Wayne Nichols drove past the John's Citrus Trees location at Fruitland Park and noticed plants being unloaded from a Budget rental truck. Mr. Nichols, who had prior experience as a citrus canker inspector with the Department, knew that the Fruitland Park Flea Market location was under quarantine for citrus canker. He therefore phoned his supervisor, Mr. Holm, to inform him of the activity. Mr. Nichols parked his car at the north entrance of the flea market and watched the activity while waiting for instructions from Mr. Holm. He saw a hatchback car leaving the flea market with two citrus trees hanging out of the back window. Mr. Nichols recognized driver of the car as a man he had just seen in the canopy tent from which John's Citrus Trees conducted business at the flea market. Mr. Nichols followed the car until it reached a gated portion of The Villages community. He could not follow further. The next day, Mr. Nichols and Mr. Holm returned to the gated neighborhood in The Villages. They located recently planted citrus trees in a homeowner's yard. Further inspection revealed that at least one of the trees had a citrus nursery identification tag with the registration number of John's Citrus Trees. Trees are tagged in this fashion by the original producer to allow the regulatory authorities to trace the origin of diseased plants. Mr. Nichols and Mr. Holm called the OALE and were met at The Villages location by Detective Shaw, who took over the investigation and photographed the trees and their location. The photographs were entered into evidence at the hearing. Mr. Mahon testified that during the periods when the Fruitland Park location was under quarantine, he would nonetheless take "special orders." He would purchase trees from other certified nurseries to satisfy the customers making these special orders. Mr. Mahon testified that this particular sale was to have been performed "truck to truck," with the plants never touching the ground at the flea market before being loaded into the customer's car. Mr. Mahon stated that if one of the trees had a tag indicating that its place of origin was John's Citrus Trees, then one of his employees must have mistakenly tagged the tree. Mr. Mahon testified that these special order plants were purchased from Pokey's, and were brought to the flea market via pickup truck. The plants in the pickup were covered and kept away from the other plants at the flea market, and they never touched the ground. This testimony is inconsistent with Mr. Nichols' credible testimony that he saw plants being unloaded from a Budget rental truck at the flea market. Mr. Mahon's testimony as to the origin and handling of "special order" trees is not credible. If the plants were kept covered in the back of a pickup truck until the customer took them away, and they never touched the ground at the flea market, it is difficult to see when an employee would have had the opportunity to "mistakenly" affix a John's Citrus Trees identification tag to one of the plants. Even if Mr. Mahon's testimony were credited, the act of bringing the "special order" trees into a quarantined nursery and selling them from that location would itself violate the quarantine. Purchase by undercover officers On December 18, 2009, officers from OALE went to the Fruitland Park location of John's Citrus Trees to purchase citrus trees as part of an undercover investigation. The attendant, Charles Harris, identified himself as an employee of John's Citrus Trees. He told the officers that he could not sell trees from the front portion of the flea market, but that there were trees further back near a recreational vehicle that he could sell. Mr. Harris told the officers that the trees in the back belonged to John's Citrus Trees. The officers purchased four citrus trees from Mr. Harris at the location near the recreational vehicle. As described at Finding of Fact 31, supra, the rear location near the recreational vehicle was within 200 feet of the quarantined location that held trees known to have citrus canker. Trees within this range are considered to have been exposed to citrus canker. See Finding of Fact 5, supra. As set forth at Findings of Fact 37 through 41, the rear location was not separately registered either to the Mahons or to their son Danny. Therefore, the rear location was either a part of the quarantined John's Citrus Trees facility at Fruitland Park, or it was an unregistered location. In either event, sale of trees from that location was unlawful. As noted at Finding of Fact 40, supra, Mr. Holm had given the Mahons telephonic notice that the both the front and rear sites at the flea market were under quarantine, and then provided the Mahons with written notice of the quarantine on December 18, 2009. The Mahons claimed that the trees had been purchased from Pokey's nursery by their son Danny Mahon. They submitted into evidence several invoices ranging in date from April 27, 2009, to November 27, 2009. The Mahons contended that the invoices proved that the trees in the rear location on December 18, 2009, belonged to Danny Mahon, not to John's Citrus Trees. However, the six invoices merely show that on four occasions Danny Mahon purchased citrus trees from Pokey's Lake Gem Citrus Nursery, and on two occasions John's Citrus Trees purchased citrus trees from Pokey's. In total, the invoices show that 254 plants were purchased from Pokey's. John's Citrus Trees is listed as the customer for 110 of the plants, and Danny Mahon is listed as the customer for 114 of the plants. The Mahons offered no details as to the numbers in the invoices, the timing of the deliveries, or how or where the deliveries were made. The invoices establish no necessary connection between the trees purchased by Danny Mahon and the trees found in the rear location of the flea market in December 2009. As stated in Finding of Fact 41, supra, the Department reasonably attributed ownership of all of the trees at the flea market location to the only registered location at the North Lake Flea Market on U.S. 441 in Fruitland Park: John's Citrus Trees. The Budget rental truck On October 8, 2009, a Budget rental truck containing a large number of potted citrus trees was intercepted at the Department's interdiction station on U.S. 90 in White Springs. The driver and passenger of the truck were asked for the bills of lading. The driver of the truck was Bruce Turner, who told Detective Shaw that he was an employee of Danny Mahon. The passenger was Gary Mahon, the youngest son of John and Shelby Mahon. They produced invoices indicating that the trees were to be delivered to eight different nurseries in Madison, Perry, Tallahassee, Marianna, and Kinard. The inspectors found that the invoices lacked the nursery certification that is required to accompany citrus plants transported in the state for commercial purposes. The invoices purported to come from "Danny Mahon Citrus." The invoices carried no street address. They listed an address of P.O. Box 120399, Clermont, which is the mailing address of John's Citrus Trees. Gary Mahon told the interdiction officers that the Danny Mahon nursery was located at 12603 Phillips Road in Groveland. The officers checked the Department's database and found no registered nursery at that address. They also failed to find any registration under the name "Danny Mahon Citrus." They did find a registration for "Danny's Citrus Trees" at the same address as the Mahons' registered location at Laws Road in Clermont. Additional DPI personnel were summoned to the interdiction station. Upon inspection, some of the citrus plants in the truck showed visible symptoms of citrus canker infection. Samples of the plants were sent to the DPI pathology laboratory in Gainesville. Subsequent test results confirmed the presence of citrus canker. Because he suspected citrus canker, the interdiction officer issued a "refusal of transport" form, sealed the lock on the truck with a metal Department seal, and ordered the truck to return to its initial location. Gary Mahon indicated that the initial location was 12603 Phillips Road in Groveland. Mr. Holm and Detective Shaw arranged to meet the truck when it returned that day. Detective Shaw drove to the Phillips Road address and found an empty field and no Budget truck. Mr. Holm arrived a short time later with Mr. Nichols. Mr. Holm made a phone call to Shelby Mahon, who directed him to drive to the Mahons' registered location at 7401 Laws Road in Clermont. Mr. Holm, Mr. Nichols, and Detective Shaw drove to the Clermont location, where they found a Budget rental truck carrying the Department's metal seal on its lock, inside the gates of John's Citrus Trees. Shelby Mahon insisted that the truck be taken to the Phillips Road location, which she stated was the origination point of the plants. On the morning of October 9, 2009, the truck was driven to the Phillips Road location. Detective Shaw followed the truck from Clermont to Phillips Road. Also present at Phillips Road were Mr. Holm, DPI regional administrator Christine Zamora, and DPI canker inspector Mike Hatcher. The Phillips Road property gave the appearance of a derelict orange grove. There was no disturbance on the ground to indicate that the plants had been stored at that location prior to being loaded onto the truck, either in individual pots or on pallets. There was no nursery infrastructure such as sheds or equipment. There was no irrigation system, though Shelby Mahon told Ms. Zamora that there was a well and pump on the property. OALE officers broke the seal on the truck. Shelby Mahon supervised the unloading, which was done by Mr. Turner and other employees of the Mahons. The plants were set out in blocks of 50 to make it easier for the Department's personnel to count them. There were 517 potted citrus plants on the truck, ranging in size from three gallon to 30-gallon pots. The plants in the three and five-gallon pots looked very young. Ms. Zamora noted that the trees fell out of the pots easily. The plants' root systems were very undeveloped and did not conform to the circular shape of the pots, indicating that they had only recently been placed in the pots. The DPI personnel agreed it was unlikely that the plants had been in the pots for more than a week. Many of the trees bore handwritten tags with the registration number of Paul Mahon's nursery. Many of the plants were double-tagged, bearing tags from Pokey's nursery as well as those from Paul Mahon's. None of the plants bore tags from John's Citrus Trees. Many of the plants had visible symptoms of citrus canker. Samples were taken and sent to the DPI pathology laboratory, and subsequent results confirmed that the plants were infected with citrus canker. Shelby Mahon told the Department's inspectors and investigators that the smaller plants had been stored at the Phillips Road location since February 2009. She stated that the smaller plants belonged to Danny Mahon, who had purchased them from his brother Paul Mahon. At the hearing, Ms. Mahon testified that her son Danny was the source of her knowledge as to where the plants had been since February 2009. Ms. Mahon stated that the larger plants in the 15 and 30-gallon pots were from Pokey's nursery, and that her son Gary had brokered the sales to the nurseries named on the invoices on behalf of Pokey and Danny Mahon. At the hearing, Ms. Mahon admitted that she prepared the invoices. Detective Shaw testified that Ms. Mahon told him that she drew up the invoices because Danny Mahon had never sold citrus before. Ms. Mahon recalled at least one customer calling her after obtaining the number of John's Citrus Trees on the internet. Ms. Mahon testified that she took the order on behalf of her son Danny because her own nursery was still under quarantine. She stated that orders were taken for the exact number and type of plants that had been stored at Danny Mahon's nursery since February 2009. The invoices indicated that the trees in the shipment consisted of 449 three-gallon, 15 five-gallon, and 33 ten-gallon plants, for a total of 497 plants. On October 5, 2009, three days before the Budget truck was interdicted at the White Springs station, the Mahons refused access to DPI inspectors at their Clermont nursery. John Mahon claimed that this denial was based on the agreement of DPI's bureau chief, Tyson Emery, to give the Mahons a little more time to clean up the nursery after cutting down and trimming seedling trees. According to Mr. Mahon, the inspector who turned up at the nursery was unaware of Mr. Emery's agreement and demanded access to the nursery. An argument ensued and the Mahons refused to allow the inspector on their property. Mr. Emery was not called as a witness in this proceeding. The inspector named by Mr. Mahon, Bryan Benson, was called as a witness by both sides, and testified a third time in rebuttal. However, the Mahons failed to question him regarding the events of October 5, 2009. The Mahons had previously refused to allow DPI inspectors to conduct an inspection on September 28, 2009.2/ At the hearing, John Mahon stated that access was refused on this date because he had a previous commitment and because he believed that DPI was attempting to schedule the inspection too soon after the previous one. Evidence at the hearing established that the Budget rental truck had been parked at the Laws Road location in Clermont overnight on October 7, 2009, prior to embarking on its intended deliveries to the nurseries listed on the invoices early on the morning of October 8. The Budget rental truck agreement indicated that the truck was rented on October 7 by Rebecca Mahon, the wife of Danny Mahon. At the hearing, John Mahon stated that the truck was parked overnight at the Laws Road location because Danny Mahon feared leaving it unprotected at the Phillips Road location. The Laws Road property is fenced, whereas the Phillips Road property is unfenced. The Mahons steadfastly denied that the trees on the Budget truck came from their Clermont nursery. There was no evidence presented that directly tied the trees to the Mahons' nursery, though the circumstances clearly indicate that Shelby Mahon was involved in arranging the sale of the trees, that there was no indication the plants had been kept at Danny Mahon's Phillips Road property, and that the Budget truck was parked at the Mahons' nursery the night before it set out to deliver the plants. The nearly contemporaneous refusal to allow the Department to inspect their nursery also directs some suspicion at the Mahons. The Department contends that one further piece of circumstantial evidence makes its case convincing: the presence of citrus canker in the plants on the Budget truck. As noted at Findings of Fact 8 through 12, supra, John's Citrus Trees was the only nursery in the state under quarantine for citrus canker at the time of the hearing, with the exception of one in DeSoto County that had destroyed all infected and exposed plants. Because the Mahons asserted that the trees on the Budget truck came from either Pokey's nursery or Paul Mahon's nursery, DPI inspectors sampled citrus trees at both nurseries after the truck was unloaded. Neither nursery showed any sign of citrus canker. The location where Danny Mahon was said to have stored approximately 500 citrus trees between February and October 2009 showed no signs of potted plants having been stored at that location. Nowhere did the ground show matting from having been under pots or pallets. On October 9, 2009, Shelby Mahon pointed the inspectors to a large oak tree, freshly trimmed, on the Phillips Road property. She stated that all of the plants had been stored under that tree, and that she could prove it because Sumter Electric and its tree service had forced her to move the potted plants in order to trim the tree. Detective Shaw contacted Sumter Electric and its contractor, Nelson's Tree Service. Their employees recalled trimming the tree on the Phillips Road property, but had no recollection of potted plants under the tree or anywhere in the vicinity of the tree. Ralph Bowman, the Nelson's Tree Service employee who oversaw the Sumter Electric contract trimming work at Phillips Road, testified at the hearing. He stated that when his team worked on the property during the first two weeks of September 2009, there were no potted plants on the property. An equipment problem forced Mr. Bowman to stop work in September. When he returned during the second week of October, there were potted plants on the property. Mr. Bowman described them as dry, with spots on the leaves. Failure to produce records On June 3, 2009, Tyson Emery, chief of the Bureau of Plant Inspection, sent a letter to the Mahons requesting records of their inventory since January 1, 2009. As of the date of the hearing, the Mahons had not responded to this request. The Mahons contended that the Department already had all of their records. However, the records referenced by the Mahons in their response pertained to transactions that occurred in 2008, not 2009. Further, even if the Mahons contention were correct, such would not justify their complete failure to respond to Mr. Emery's letter. Failure to maintain quarantine tape During a routine inspection of the Fruitland Park location on January 20, 2010, the Department discovered that yellow agriculture hold tape with the statement "Do Not Move" that had been wrapped around citrus trees at the quarantined location at the Fruitland Park flea market location was missing. The Mahons testified that they did not know how the tape went missing. They noted that the flea market is on a highway, that the trees were not secured, and that the presence of quarantine tape was not popular with their fellow vendors at the flea market. I. Ultimate findings As to the allegations that the Mahons moved citrus trees infected with citrus canker from quarantined locations, the evidence was clear and convincing that they moved plants into and out of the quarantined nursery in Clermont. The wide variations in the plant count between June 2009 and January 2010 is otherwise inexplicable. With one exception, the evidence was clear and convincing that the Mahons moved citrus trees into and out of their Fruitland Park location on numerous occasions while it was under quarantine. Regardless of their source, trees offered for sale at that location were under quarantine and could not lawfully be sold. The exception was the change in the count from 528 plants on December 18, 2009, to 529 plants on January 20, 2010, which could reasonably be attributed to a counting error. As to the allegations regarding the sale of trees to Fred Thomas, the evidence was clear and convincing that the Mahons sold and delivered citrus trees to Mr. Thomas directly from the propagation house of their Clermont nursery, and that Mr. Mahon knew that the plants were under quarantine and had a substantial probability of being infected with citrus canker. As to the allegations regarding the sale of two citrus trees from the Fruitland Park location to a purchaser who subsequently planted the trees at his home in The Villages, the evidence was clear and convincing that the Mahons knowingly sold citrus plants to the homeowner while their location was under quarantine for citrus canker. Mr. Mahon's explanation regarding the treatment of "special orders" was not credible. As to the allegations regarding the undercover purchase of citrus trees from the Mahon's quarantined location at Fruitland Park, the evidence was clear and convincing that the Mahons sold trees from a quarantined location to OALE officers on December 18, 2009. As to the allegations regarding the interdiction of the Budget rental truck, the evidence was not clear and convincing that the trees on the truck were taken from the Mahons' registered location in Clermont. While the presence of citrus canker in the interdicted fruit strongly suggested that the plants came from the Mahons' nursery, and other circumstantial evidence pointed toward the Clermont nursery as the origination point of the plants, nothing directly tied the plants to John and Shelby Mahon. All of the tags on the plants were from either Paul or Pokey Mahon's nursery. Mr. Turner identified himself as an employee of Danny Mahon. Shelby Mahon's testimony that her son Gary was brokering the plants for Danny and Pokey Mahon was not implausible in light of all the evidence. Though a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the Mahons' Clermont nursery was the most likely origination point of the trees on the Budget rental truck, the undersigned cannot find that the Department's proof on this point met the standard of clear and convincing evidence. As to the allegation regarding the failure to produce records, the evidence was clear and convincing that the Mahons failed to comply with the Department's letter of June 3, 2009, requesting the production of their inventory records since January 1, 2009. As to the allegation regarding the removal of the quarantine tape, the evidence was not clear and convincing that the Mahons were responsible for the missing quarantine tape at the Fruitland Park location.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order revoking the nursery registration of John L. and Shelby Mahon, d/b/a John's Citrus Trees, imposing an administrative fine of $18,500 on John L. and Shelby Mahon, and ordering the destruction of the citrus trees at both of the registered locations of John's Citrus Trees. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Donnie Selph, d/b/a The Citrus Store and D & D Citrus (Donnie Selph), failed to pay amounts owning to Petitioner for citrus fruit harvested from Petitioner's groves, as set forth in the Complaint dated October 13, 2003, and, if so, the amount Petitioner is entitled to recover.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; stipulations by the parties; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: At all times material to this proceeding Russ Putnal was a "producer of citrus fruit" and owner of Putnal Groves located at 10755 Russ Road, Myakka City, Florida. A producer of citrus is one that grows citrus in this state for market. At all times material to this proceeding, Donnie Selph was a "Florida-licensed [License Number 756] citrus fruit dealer" operating within the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. Donnie Selph admitted that he is owner of and does business under the names of The Citrus Store and D & D Citrus. On October 13, 2002, Donnie Selph entered into a written contract with Russ Putnal under which Donnie Selph agreed to harvest 10,000 boxes of mid-season oranges on or before June 1, 2003. Donnie Selph agreed to pay $4.35 per box for the mid-season oranges and agreed to pay $6.35 per box for the late-season (grove production) Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves. The form contract, dated January 29, 2003, entered into by Donnie Selph and Russ Putnal contained the following terms and conditions: [T]he Grower, for and in consideration of the payment this date received and to be received as herein provided, has agreed and do by these presents agree to sell to the Buyer all citrus fruits, of merchantable quality at the time of picking, from the grove or groves hereinafter mentioned. The price to be paid to the Grower by the Buyer for said fruit per standard field crate by volume or weight ["weight" was circled] at election of buyer on the trees, for all fruit of merchantable quality at the time of picking, shall be as follows: Oranges, mids, 10,000 boxes (or production), $4.35 [per] box Valencia Oranges, 40,000 boxes (or production), $6.35 [per] box The term "merchantable" as used herein shall be defined as that standard of quality required by the United States Department of Agriculture for interstate shipment in fresh/juiced ["juiced" was circled] fruit form. . . . * * * It is agreed that the advance payment hereby receipted for is to be deducted from said payment as follows: As fruit is harvested, $12,000.00, ck# 6318 * * * Note: Less all state taxes owned by Grower. Mutual YES[?] NO[ ] A bond or certificate of deposit posted with the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services does not necessarily ensure full payment of claims for any nonperformance under this contract. . . . (emphasis added) The undisputed evidence established that Donnie Selph harvested mid-season oranges from Russ Putnal's groves and paid Russ Putnal for those mid-season oranges harvested per the terms of the written contract. According to Russ Putnal, the contract was for mid-season oranges "which are basically a pineapple variety." "Mid-season juice oranges and Valencia oranges are late--late-season oranges. The mids were all paid for--the balance is on the Valencia oranges." The undisputed evidence also established that in the contract hereinabove Donnie Selph also agreed to harvest 40,000 boxes (or production) of late-season Valencia oranges and agreed to pay $6.35 per box for the Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves. The undisputed evidence likewise established that Donnie Selph harvested 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges pursuant to terms of the written contract with Russ Putnal. During the harvesting of the Valencia oranges, Donnie Selph raised no objection or complaints with Russ Putnal regarding the quality or quantity of late-season Valencia oranges that were harvested. The parties recalled discussing one load that was "light," meaning the average weight per box was less than the average weight per box of the other loads of Valencia oranges picked from the same grove. According to the evidence presented, it is not uncommon in the citrus business to have a few "light" loads when picking 11,251 boxes of fruit. Donnie Selph is obligated to pay Russ Putnal for the 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves and sold for processing. The net payment due and owning Russ Putnal Groves is computed as follows: Total Purchase Price [Valencia oranges]: $71,443.85 Less Harvesting, Mutual, Taxes, etc.: $2,373.57 Less Amount Received [on September 30, 2003]: $5,000.00[2] Net Amount or Claim [Balance Due]: $64,070.28 Donnie Selph did not pay Russ Putnal for the 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves. Russ Putnal made repeated demands upon Donnie Selph for the past due amount of $64,070.28, and Donnie Selph refused and failed to pay Russ Putnal the past due amount of $64,070.28. This debt of $64,070.28 was due and owing on October 1, 2003, the date Donnie Selph made his last payment of $5,000 to Russ Putnal. Regarding this contractual transaction, Russ Putnal testified: I regret that we all have to be here for this, and I've put it off as long as I could and tried every way I knew to avoid coming to this, but basically -- or in simple terms Donnie Selph, Donnie Selph Fruit Company and I had a contract, a written contract for mid-season and late-season oranges for last year (2002/2003). Basically, it hadn't been paid and it's my understanding the bond is for situations of this nature. And I realize the bond is less than half of what's owed, but I think if Donnie had the money he'd pay me. We're all in -- the citrus industry is in some serious throws so I'm just trying to get what I can to try and keep my bills paid. Donnie Selph admitted entering into a written contract with Russ Putnal. Both men acknowledged their experience in the business of selling and buying citrus fruit and doing business with each other over the years. Russ Putnal is a seasoned producer of fruit and well versed in the business of selling his fruit to citrus dealers. Donnie Selph is a seasoned purchaser and dealer of citrus fruit, having been in the business for over 20 years, and well versed in the business of buying fruit from citrus fruit producers and selling fruit to plants and other outlets. Donnie Selph set the stage of this transaction by first testifying that he is in the business of "buying and selling [fruit], by contract, to the concentration plants." Regarding the sale of Russ Putnal's Valencia oranges, he testified that "based on $1.10 a pound what I got out of [the sale of] Putnal's fruit and taking out the costs I forwarded [to Russ Putnal] what was left up to the point of where we're at now [i.e. $64,070.28]." Donnie Selph's refusal to pay Russ Putnal for the Valencia oranges, "because I received only $1.10 per pound," does not relieve him of his contractual obligations to pay $6.35 per box for the Valencia oranges harvested. At the conclusion of the hearing and in lieu of submitting a proposed recommended order, Russ Putnal elected to make the following summation of his case that has been considered: We have a simple contract and a simple problem where fruit was contracted for, harvested, marketed and not paid for by the specifics of the contract. We have a bond in place to cover these discrepancies. The bond is only $30,000; the amount owed is some $64,000 plus. The defense has pretty much put up a smokescreen off the subject of the contract. The focusing in on pound solids and there's nothing in the contract about pound solids. The contract is simply in weight boxes. Donnie Selph's first defense, to the debt claimed in the Complaint, was oral modification of the written contract. Donnie Selph's evidence to support his oral modification defense consisted solely of his recollection, "Mr. Putnal agreed with me that the contract price to be paid would be based on pound solid [unknown at the time of entering the contract]." Donnie Selph testified that he and Russ Putnal discussed, and agreed, that the encircled word "juiced" on the written contract meant that he would pay Russ Putnal at the price Donnie Selph received when he sold the Valencia oranges "as juiced." Russ Putnal emphatically denied making the alleged oral modification of the written contract of $6.35 per box for his Valencia oranges. Russ Putnal insisted that throughout this entire episode with Donnie Selph the written contract called for "weight boxes." In his post-hearing Memorandum of Law, Donnie Selph admitted entering into a written contract with Russ Putnal, but raised as a defense to payment of the debt Russ Putnal "is going against the bond of The Citrus Store." Donnie Selph argued that Russ Putnal offered no evidence of entering into a written contract with The Citrus Store or personally with Donnie Selph. Donnie Selph's argument is without a foundation in fact and law in this proceeding and is, therefore, rejected. Donnie Selph's second defense, a claim of "detrimental reliance on fraudulent statements made by Russ Putnal," is without foundation in fact. Russ Putnal adamantly denied making a verbal agreement with Donnie Selph that he would accept as payment for his Valencia oranges some amount Donnie Selph may receive when, and if, he sold the Valencia oranges to processing plants as "juiced" rather than by "pound per box." This defense to the contractual debt obligation is without foundation in fact or law in this proceeding and is likewise rejected. The documentary evidence presented by Russ Putnal in support of his demand for payment is uncontroverted. The majority of the documents submitted by Russ Putnal reflected that the fruit described therein was harvested from Russ Putnal's groves in Manatee County. Likewise, the documents from the processing plants reflected that the fruit from Russ Putnal's Manatee County groves averaged a "pound solids per box weight of 6.03676 pound[s] per box." The undisputed evidence established that Donnie Selph picked 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges from Russ Putnal's grove. The agreed contract price for each box of Valencia oranges picked was $6.35 per box. Likewise, the undisputed evidence established Donnie Selph entered into a written contract with Russ Putnal to purchase a specific citrus fruit (Valencia oranges) at a specific price ($6.35) per box. The evidence established that Donnie Selph picked Russ Putnal's Valencia oranges, sold those Valencia oranges, and failed and refused to pay Russ Putnal the agreed contracted price of $6.35 per box for his Valencia oranges. The evidence of record demonstrated clearly that Donnie Selph is indebted to Russ Putnal for the net sum of $64,070.28 due and owing as of October 1, 2003. This outstanding debt is computed from the gross sum of $71,443.85, less: harvesting, mutual, and taxes for a subtotal of $2,373.57, and less $5,000.00 money paid and received from Donnie Selph. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Donnie Selph was, at the times material to this proceeding, a Florida- licensed and bonded citrus fruit dealer and that, as of October 1, 2003, Donnie Selph harvested 11,521 boxes of Valencia oranges from Putnal Groves. Russ Putnal timely filed a complaint alleging that Donnie Selph failed to promptly pay its indebtedness to Russ Putnal for the Valencia oranges harvested pursuant the contract. Russ Putnal is, therefore, entitled to payment of the principal amount of $64,070.28 plus pre-judgment interest. Based on the date of the last payment made by Donnie Selph to Russ Putnal, pre-hearing interest would run from October 1, 2003.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Respondent, Donnie Selph, d/b/a The Citrus Store and d/b/a D & D Citrus, to pay to Petitioner, Russ Putnal, d/b/a Putnal Groves, the sum of $64,070.28, together with pre-judgment interest calculated by the Department pursuant to Section 55.03, Florida Statutes, from October 1, 2003, until paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2004.
The Issue The issues presented are whether Respondent, George Mason Citrus, Inc. (Mason), owes Petitioner $10,000 for citrus fruit that Mason purchased from Petitioner and, if so, whether the surety is liable for any deficiency in payment from Mason.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as a “citrus fruit dealer,” within the meaning of Subsection 601.03(8), Florida Statutes (2005) (dealer).1 The business address for Petitioner is 1103 Southeast Lakeview Drive, Sebring, Florida 33870. Mason is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as a citrus fruit dealer. The business address for Mason is 140 Holmes Avenue, Lake Placid, Florida 33852. Western is the surety for Mason pursuant to bond number 42292005 issued in the amount of $100,000 (the bond). The term of the bond is August 1, 2004, through July 31, 2005. Petitioner conducts business in Highlands County, Florida, as a dealer and as a “broker” defined in Subsection 601.03(3). In relevant part, Petitioner purchases white grapefruit (grapefruit) for resale to others, including Mason. Mason conducts business in Highlands County as either an “agent,” “broker,” or “handler” defined in Subsections 601.03(2), (3), and (23). On January 31, 2003, Mason contracted with Petitioner to purchase grapefruit from Petitioner pursuant to Fruit Contract number 03-307 (the contract). Mason drafted the contract. The terms of the contract require Petitioner to sell grapefruit to Mason for the 2003, 2004, and 2005 “crop years.” The 2003 crop year began in the fall of 2002 and ended at the conclusion of the spring harvest in 2003. The 2004 and 2005 crop years began in the fall of 2003 and 2004 and ended in the spring of 2004 and 2005, respectively. Only the 2005 crop year is at issue in this proceeding. The contract required Petitioner to deliver grapefruit to a person designated by Mason. Mason designated Peace River Citrus Products, Inc. (Peace River), in Arcadia, Florida, for delivery of the grapefruit at issue. Mason was required by the terms of a Participation Agreement with Peace River to deliver 30,000 boxes of grapefruit to Peace River during the 2005 crop year. In an effort to satisfy its obligation to Peace River, Mason entered into the contract with Petitioner for an amount of grapefruit described in the contract as an “Approximate Number of Boxes” that ranged between 12,000 and 14,000. Petitioner delivered only 2,128 boxes of grapefruit to Peace River. The production of grapefruit was significantly decreased by three hurricanes that impacted the area during the 2005 crop year. The parties agree that Mason owed Petitioner $19,070.03 for the delivered boxes of grapefruit. The amount due included a portion of the rise in value over the base purchase price in the contract caused by increases due to market conditions and participation pay out after the parties executed the contract (the rise).2 On or about October 26, 2005, Mason mailed Petitioner a check for $9,070.03. The transmittal letter for the check explained the difference between the payment of $9,070.03 and the amount due of $19,070.03. Mason deducted $10,000 from the $19,070.03 due Petitioner, in part, to cover the cost of grapefruit Mason purchased from other dealers or growers to make up the deficiency in grapefruit delivered by Petitioner (cover). The $10,000 sum also includes interest Mason claims for the cost of cover and Mason's claim for lost profits. Petitioner claims that Mason is not entitled to deduct lost profits and interest from the amount due Petitioner. If Mason were entitled to deduct interest, Petitioner alleges that Mason calculated the interest incorrectly. The larger issue between the parties is whether Mason is entitled to deduct cover charges from the amount due Petitioner. If Mason were not entitled to cover the deficiency in delivered boxes of grapefruit, Mason would not be entitled to interest on the cost of cover and lost profits attributable to the deficiency. The parties agree that resolution of the issue of whether Mason is entitled to cover the deficiency in delivered boxes of grapefruit turns on a determination of whether the contract was a box contract or a production contract. A box contract generally requires a selling dealer such as Petitioner to deliver a specific number of boxes, regardless of the source of grapefruit, and industry practice permits the purchasing dealer to cover any deficiency. A production contract generally requires the selling dealer to deliver an amount of grapefruit produced by a specific source, and industry practice does not permit the purchasing dealer to cover any deficiency. The contract is an ambiguous written agreement. The contract expressly provides that it is a "Fruit Purchase Contract" and a "delivered in" contract but contains no provision that it is either a box or production contract. The contract is silent with respect to the right to cover. Relevant terms in the contract evidence both a box contract and a production contract. Like the typical box contract, the contract between Mason and Petitioner prescribes a number of boxes, specifically no less than 12,000, that are to be delivered pursuant to the contract. However, the typical box contract does not identify the number of boxes to be delivered as "Approximate No. of Boxes" that ranges between 12,000 and 14,000 boxes. Unlike a production contract, the contract does not identify a specific grove as the source of the required grapefruit. Best practice in the industry calls for a production contract to designate the grove by name as well as the number of acres and blocks. However, industry practice does not require a production contract to identify a specific grove as the source of grapefruit. In practice, Mason treated another contract that Mason drafted with a party other than Petitioner as a production contract even though the contract did not identify a specific grove as the source of grapefruit. The absence of a force majure clause in the contract may evidence either type of contract.3 A box contract typically requires the selling dealer to deliver the agreed boxes of grapefruit regardless of weather events, unless stated otherwise in the contract. However, the absence of such a clause may also be consistent with a production contract because "acts of God" are inherent in a production contract. Such acts, including hurricanes, necessarily limit grapefruit production, and a production contract obligates the selling dealer to deliver only the amount of grapefruit produced. The contract between Petitioner and Mason did not contain a penalty provision for failure to deliver the prescribed boxes of grapefruit (box penalty). The absence of a box penalty in the contract evidences a production contract. The contract identifies Petitioner as the "Grower." A grower typically enters into a production contract. A box contract does not limit the source of grapefruit to be delivered, and the selling dealer in a box contract may obtain grapefruit from anywhere in the state. The contract between Petitioner and Mason limits the source of grapefruit to grapefruit grown in Highlands County, Florida. Mason knew that Petitioner sold only grapefruit from groves in Highlands County, Florida, identified in the record as the Clagget Taylor groves. During the 2003 and 2004 crop years, Petitioner sold only grapefruit from the Clagget Taylor groves. Mason received trip tickets and other documentation related to the delivery of no less than 24,000 boxes of grapefruit, all from the Clagget Taylor groves. The boxes of grapefruit delivered during the 2005 crop year came only from the Clagget Taylor groves. Mason received documentation showing the grapefruit came from the Clagget Taylor groves. Ambiguous written agreements are required by judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law to be construed against the person who drafted the agreement. Mason drafted an ambiguous agreement with Petitioner. The agreement must be construed against Mason as a production contract. Mason owes Petitioner $10,000 for the delivered grapefruit during the 2005 crop year. The terms of the bond make Western liable for any deficiency in payment from Mason.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Mason to pay $10,000 to Petitioner, and, in accordance with Subsections 601.61 and 601.65, requiring Western to pay over to the Department any deficiency in payment by Mason. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Deerfield Groves Company (Deerfield), is a licensed citrus fruit dealer under Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 20-34, Florida Administrative Code. As a licensee, Deerfield is subject to administrative and criminal prosecution for violation of the statutes and rules governing licensed citrus fruit dealers and was under administrative prosecution for alleged violations of Section 601.33, Florida Statutes, and Rule 20-34.11, Florida Administrative Code, at the time of the final hearing. Deerfield has legal standing as a party petitioner in this case. Respondent, Department Of Citrus (DOC), promulgated Rule 20-34.11, Florida Administrative Code, under the authority of Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. Rule 20-34.11 is designed to implement Section 601.33, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Department Of Agriculture And Consumer Services, (DACS), is the agency charged with the duty to enforce Section 601.33, Florida Statutes, and Rule 20- 34.11, Florida Administrative Code. Personnel of DACS' Division Of Fruit And Vegetable Inspection also are responsible for testing fresh citrus for maturity under Chapter 20-34, Florida Administrative Code. Licensees such as Deerfield furnish a testing room for DACS inspectors to perform maturity tests and certify fresh citrus, as required for marketing fresh fruit. DACS leases an extractor, used for squeezing juice from fruit samples, and subleases the extractor to the licensee. Under the sublease, the extractor is kept in the testing room for use by DACS inspectors and, when not being used by DACS inspectors, for use by the licensee in performing its own tests. Typically, the licensee furnishes the testing room with a table for two and a chair or two. When DACS inspectors perform maturity tests at the beginning of the early harvest, they bring most of the things they need for testing. The licensee provides the bins in which the fruit samples are carried into the testing room. The inspectors bring either a DACS slicing knife or their own. The licensee provides buckets it owns for use by the inspector during the test to collect juice extracted from fruit samples. The DACS inspectors also bring: a sizer to measure the fruit samples; a 2000 c.c. graduated cylinder to measure juice quantities; a 500 c.c. graduated cylinder to hold juice being tested for solids content and for temperature; aluminum pans to hold the graduated cylinders; a combination hydrometer for measuring juice solids content and temperature; a 25 m.1. pipet for transferring a measured amount of juice into a flask; the flask; a bottle of phenothaline with eyedropper top used for adding measured amounts of phenothaline to the flask of measured juice; a bottle of alkaline solution; and a burette for adding a measured amount of the alkaline solution to the flask of measured juice. During the harvest season, DACS leaves its equipment, instruments and solutions referred to in the preceding paragraph in the testing room. They are kept separate from the licensee's property and are not supposed to be used by the licensee. However, DACS allows the licensee to use its own bins and buckets and the extractor to conduct its own tests in the testing room when DACS inspectors are not using it. 1/ Some DACS inspectors request or allow licensees to assist during testing or to handle the fruit samples. 2/ Some allow licensees to attempt to influence the inspector's judgment by questioning the validity of the test or the accuracy of the inspector's observations or by comparing the inspector's results with the results of its own tests. Sometimes, this results in correction of an error the inspector otherwise would have made. It was not proved, however that there is an agency policy of requesting or allowing licensees to conduct themselves in those ways during testing. DACS has a policy to allow only one licensee representative in the testing room with the DACS inspector during testing. Violation of this policy is viewed as a violation of Section 601.33, Florida Statutes (1983). However, not all DACS inspectors strictly enforce this policy. Some allow more than one licensee representative in the testing room.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 64-4.002 (the “Proposed Rule”) is an invalid exercise of the legislative authority delegated to the Department of Health (the “Department”).
Findings Of Fact In order to better contextualize the facts presented at final hearing and discussed below, the following excerpts from the Proposed Rule and the underlying statutory provision are provided: Section 381.986, Florida Statutes (8) Medical Marijuana Treatment Centers.- (a) The department shall license medical marijuana treatment centers to ensure reasonable statewide accessibility and availability as necessary for qualified patients registered in the medical marijuana use registry and who are issued a physician certification under this section. * * * The department shall license as medical marijuana treatment centers 10 applicants that meet the requirements of this section, under the following parameters: [Previously denied applicants meeting certain requirements not relevant to the instant action.] [One applicant from a specific class pursuant to a federal lawsuit.] As soon as practicable, but not later than October 3, 2017, the Department shall license applicants that meet the requirements of this section in sufficient numbers to result in 10 total licenses issued under this subparagraph, while accounting for the number of licenses issued under sub-subparagraphs a. and b. For up to two of the licenses issued under subparagraph 2., the department shall give preference to applicants thatdemonstrate in their applications that they own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses and will use or convert the facility or facilities for the processing of marijuana. (Emphasis added). Florida Administrative Code Rule 64-4.002 (Proposed) (1)(f) For applicants seeking preference for registration as a medical marijuana treatment center pursuant to ss. 381.986(8)(a)3., F.S., the applicant must provide evidence that: The property at issue currently is or was previously used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses. In order to demonstrate the property meets this criteria, the applicant may provide documentation that the applicant currently holds or has held a registration certificate pursuant to section 601.40, F.S. A letter from the Department of Citrus certifying that the property currently is or was previously used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses will be accepted as sufficient evidence. The applicant as an individual holds, in his or her name, or the applicant as an entity holds, in the legal name of the entity, the deed to property meeting the criteria set forth in subparagraph 1. above; and A brief explanation of how the property will be used for purposes of growing, processing, or dispensing medical marijuana if the applicant is selected for registration. * * * Subject matter experts will substantively and comparatively review, evaluate, and score applications using [the Scorecard incorporated by reference]. * * * (a)7.(b) Scores for each section of the application will be combined to create an applicant’s total score. The department will generate a final ranking of the applicants in order of highest to lowest scores . . . . (c) In accordance with ss. 391.986(8)(a)3., F.S., the two highest scoring applicants that own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses and will use or convert the facility or facilities for the processing of medical marijuana will receive an additional35 points to their respective total score. Licenses will be awarded, subject to availability as set forth in ss. 381.986(8)(a)2. and 381.986(8)(a)4., F.S., based on the highest total score in the following manner: The highest scoring applicant that is a recognized member of the Pigford or [the Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation] will receive a license. The remaining highest scoring applicants, after the addition of the preference points for applicants pursuant to paragraph (7)(c) above, will receive licenses up to the statutory cap set forth in ss. 381.986(8)(a)2., F.S. The remaining highest scoring applications, after removing any preference points received under paragraph (7)(c), will receive licenses up to the statutory cap . . . . (Emphasis added). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering and enforcing laws related to the general health of the people of the state. § 381.0011(2), Fla. Stat. As part of this duty, the Department is charged with implementing the Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act of 2014. See § 381.986, Fla. Stat. Favero is a Florida corporation in good standing since its incorporation in 1974, primarily engaged in the business of growing orchids. Favero aspires to file an application for licensure as a medical marijuana treatment center (“MMTC”). Following the passage of Senate Bill 8A by the 2017 Florida Legislature, which substantially rewrote section 318.986, Florida Statutes, Favero decided to seek the citrus preference described in section 381.986(3)(a)3. (hereinafter referred to as the “Preference Statute”). To that end, Favero purchased a citrus processing business in Safety Harbor, Florida, for approximately $775,000, including the business’s real property and all facilities located thereon. The purchase took place prior to publication of the Proposed Rule. The purchase of the Safety Harbor property reduced Favero’s financial liquidity but, presumably, not its net worth as the value of the property would replace the cash expenditure made for the purchase. It is Favero’s intent to convert the citrus processing facility located on the property into a medical marijuana processing facility if Favero receives the requisite license as a MMTC. Favero contends, as stated in the following paragraphs of its Petition Challenging the Invalidity of Proposed Rule 64-4.002: The Proposed Rule grants a preference to an applicant who owns “property” that was once used for citrus processing. The statute, however, clearly grants the preference only to applicants who “own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing ” By using the broader word “property” rather than “facility,” the Department is granting the citrus preference to a broader group of applicants than the statute permits, such as owners of packinghouses and other properties that fail to meet the definition of “processor” or were not used for “canning” or “concentrating.” The statute is clear and unambiguous. The use of the word “property” rather than the statutory term “facilities” renders the rule invalid because the use of that term exceeds the Department’s rulemaking authority, enlarges and modifies and contravenes the requirements of Section 381.986(8)(a)3., is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, vests unbridled discretion in the agency and is arbitrary and capricious. See § 120.52(8)., Fla. Stat. * * * The Proposed Rule allows for a preference to only some applicants that own a citrus processing facility. Under the scoring system, applicants demonstrating that they own a citrus processing facility may receive an additional 35 points. However, the Proposed Rule does not guarantee that any applicant owning a citrus processing facility will actually receive those points or get a license. The Proposed Rule merely grants an additional 35 points to two applicants. The Department of Citrus has indicated that more than a dozen companies will qualify for the citrus preference. Under the Proposed Rule, most of those applicants would receive no additional points despite qualifying for the statutory preference. Additionally, the Proposed Rule provides no assurance that any applicant qualifying for the citrus preference will actually receive a license. The Form adopted by the Proposed Rule allows Department evaluators to award a maximum of 1,150 points in several categories. The additional 35 points available under the Proposed Rule amount to an addition of just a 3% bonus. If those extra 35 points are not enough to exceed the scores of other applicants, then no citrus-preference qualifying applicant will receive a license. Favero contends that reduction of its liquid assets could have a negative impact on its overall financial condition when considered by the Department as it reviews Favero’s MMTC application. Favero is concerned that this negative impact may not be completely offset by the citrus preference it is seeking. Mecca is a Florida corporation located at 7965 Lantana Road, Lantana, Florida. It has existed since November 15, 1973, has operated in Florida since the early 1970s, and began citrus farming on approximately 2,000 acres in 1983. Mecca has been and is currently licensed as a citrus dealer and a regulated citrus processing plant and citrus packinghouse. The “processing” done by Mecca does not involve canning or concentrating citrus. Mecca “processes” citrus in its “fresh fruit form” (discussed more fully below). Mecca intends to convert its property and facilities for the purpose of growing, processing or dispensing medical marijuana if its application for an MMTC license is approved. Mecca contends the citrus preference in the Proposed Rule needs further clarification. Mecca also asserts the evaluation and scoring system with respect to the citrus preference constitutes an invalid exercise of the Department’s delegated legislative authority. The Scoring System The MMTC application has 16 separate sections. An applicant may be awarded up to 50 points on some sections, up to 100 points on other sections. The total number of points any application might receive is 1150, presuming a perfect score on each section. Each of the individual sections, whether for 50 or 100 points, is graded in accordance with an evaluation rubric. The rubric contains five categories of scores which are used by reviewers, allowing for a range of points in each section. The five categories each have a range depending on whether the section allows 50 or 100 points. The rubric directs that a category 5 response could be awarded between 40 and 50 points in the 50-point sections, or between 80 and 100 points in a 100-point section. A category 4 response could get between 30 and 39 points (or 60 to 79 points); a category 3 could award 20 to 29 points (or 40 to 59 points); a category 2 could be worth 10 to 19 points (or 20 to 39 points); and a category 1 might award 0 to 9 points (or 0 to 19 points). Thus, an applicant may be awarded points anywhere within the range in each category for each section of the application. By way of example, category 5 under the rubric (wherein a reviewer may give an application 40 to 50 or 80 to 100 points) directs the reviewer as follows: Applicant addressed all items. When necessary, each item has multiple, specific examples of experience and knowledge. Experience and knowledge are connected to specific, identifiable people in the application. Plans are clear, detailed, well documented, and thorough. All charts, photographs, maps, sketches, and other supplemental information are clear and legible. When necessary, applicant provides full documentation for representations of future performance. Responses related to financial reflect robust financial resources and clear lines of authority within the organizations. By comparison, under Category 3, which could award 20 to 29 or 40 to 59 points, the rubric directs the reviewer to consider: Either: Applicant responded to all items. Applicant responds to items addressing experience and knowledge, though answers tend to lack specificity. Plans are provided, but are lacking in clarity, documentation, or thoroughness. When necessary, some supplemental information is provided. Responses related to financials do not reflect robust financial resources, but do not raise doubts of applicant’s financial viability, or the organization has unclear lines of authority, or; Most responses are sufficient to be considered Category 4 or 5 Responses, but applicant fails to address some items. Favero asserts that allowing a reviewer to award points from an allowable range gives unbridled discretion to the Department. The argument misses the point that the ranges in each category direct the reviewer on how to score, while allowing some leeway in determining which applications are slightly better or worse than their competitors. Depending on the strength or weakness of one applicant’s response vis-à-vis another applicant, it is reasonable to assign more or fewer points in a comparative review. The rubric is quite descriptive and allows for a nuanced review of responses by the Department reviewers. The Preference The Preference Statute asserts a preference “for up to two of the licenses issued,” i.e., past tense. There are no licenses “issued” during the application review process, so the preference is actually assigned before licensure. The Preference Statute is somewhat confusing in this regard. The Proposed Rule attempts to reconcile this discrepancy by assigning preference points as a part of the application review process, while still approving the most qualified applicants. That approach is reasonable and has merit; it allows the preference to be assigned but does not attempt to insert it into the actual licensure process. The Proposed Rule assigns the preference points at the end of the review, i.e., after an application receives its “total score.” Thus, an applicant could conceivably be awarded 1185 points on the 0 to 1150 point scale. Regardless of how the points are assigned, Favero contends that the 35 preference points are too insignificant as compared to a possible (perfect) score of 1150 during application review. That number of points (35) would be only about three percent of a perfect score. The lower the average scores of all applications, however, the more the 35 points might come into play. If all applicants received an average score of 575 total points, the preference points would be twice as important as compared to perfect 1150 scores. The assignment of the preference points only after totaling the scores is a legitimate and acceptable method. Taking the 16 sections of the application separately, 35 points assigned in any one section could be quite significant. In fact, the Department arrived at the 35 points by taking the average number of possible points per section, i.e., 72, and assigning approximately half of that amount to reach the 35- point preference. The preference points are not just an arbitrary number assigned by the Department. Favero also objects that the Proposed Rule only assigns the 35 preference points to the two highest scoring, eligible applicants, i.e., those who will convert a citrus facility to process medical marijuana. If those two eligible applicants were more than 35 points below other, non-eligible applicants’ scores, assignment of the preference points would not result in the approval of any eligible applicants. The plain language in the Preference Statute and the Proposed Rule allows for a preference of “up to two” applicants. There is, therefore, no mandate that any applicants must receive the preference. While the Legislature can be presumed to have wanted preference points to be awarded (else why would the Preference Statute exist?), the language of the statute merely limits the number of entities which could get such a preference. The Department, interpreting a statute it is charged with implementing, interprets section 381.986(8)(a)3. to mean the issuance of available licenses to as many as two entities which are eligible for the preference. The Proposed Rule allows the Department to assess an applicant’s entitlement to the preference, to assign the preference, and to meet its statutory obligation. Property versus Facility The Legislature clearly intended to give a preference to applicants who “own . . . facilities that are, or were, used for canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus . . . and will use or convert the . . . facilities for the processing of medical marijuana.” The Legislature failed, however, to provide guidance by way of definitions. While the Legislature chose the words “facility or facilities” in the Preference Statute, the Department complicated the issue by using the word “property” for the most part, but also using the words “facility” and “facilities” at times. Favero contends that a property is much broader in scope than a facility, and the Department therefore exceeded its delegated legislative authority. The Department argues that facilities used to process citrus must be located on some property, obviously. But, facilities located on a property might be leased, so that the fee simple owner of the property is different from the leaseholder of that facility. Thus, if an applicant for a medical marijuana treatment center license wants to avail itself of the preference, it would need to own the facility. Whether that means the applicant must own the property on which the facility is located is not clear in the Preference Statute or in the Proposed Rule. The Department argues that the way to show ownership of a facility is by way of a deed to the property on which the facility is located. In fact, Favero will use a warranty deed to prove ownership of the facilities it purchased in order to obtain the preference. But if Favero purchased land on which citrus had been grown but not processed, i.e., if there had been no facilities on the land to can, concentrate or otherwise process the fruit, except in fresh fruit form, the preference would not apply. And if an applicant obtained a leasehold interest in a facility, it would not be able to “show ownership” by way of a deed to the property. The Preference Statute requires the applicant to convert the facility in order to gain the preference. It is unclear how a piece of unimproved property can be “converted” to another use; land is land. This begs the question of whether growing citrus on a piece of property, and then removing all the citrus trees in order to grow medical marijuana, is a “conversion” of a facility as contemplated by the Legislature. Neither the Preference Statute nor the Proposed Rule contain any definitional assistance to answer that question. An important question to be answered is whether the growing of citrus constitutes “processing” as alluded to by the Legislature. The Preference Statute provides no definition of the word. The Citrus Code (chapter 601, Florida Statutes) also does not define “processing,” but does describe a “processor” of citrus as: ‘[A]ny person engaged within this state in the business of canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing citrus fruit for market other than for shipment in fresh fruit form.” § 601.03(32), Fla. Stat. (Emphasis added). Processing must therefore mean something other than merely growing citrus and packing it up for shipment. That being the case, a property where citrus is grown that is “converted” to a property growing marijuana would not afford an applicant a preference. There must be some “facility” that is or has been used to process citrus, i.e., doing something more with the raw product, in order to constitute “processing.” Therefore, a “packinghouse,” i.e., “[a]ny building, structure, or place where citrus fruit is packed or otherwise prepared for market or shipment in fresh fruit form,” would not be engaged in “processing” citrus. See § 601.03(29), Fla. Stat. Mecca, which owns property where citrus was grown, picked, graded, sorted, polished, cleaned and packaged for transfer “in fresh fruit form,” would not be a processor, either. Mecca owns a packinghouse only, not a processing facility as that term seems to be used by the Legislature. Its operations were not part of the “canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing citrus fruit other than for shipment in fresh fruit form.”
The Issue Whether Respondent A & J Pak Ship, Inc., owes Petitioner $551.16 for "gift fruit,” as alleged in Petitioner's Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner and A & J have been licensed by the Department of Citrus as "citrus fruit dealers." As part of its operations, A & J sells "gift fruit" to retail customers. The "gift fruit" consists of oranges or grapefruits, or both, that are packaged and sent to third parties identified by the customers. In November and December of 1999, A & J took orders for "gift fruit" from retail customers that it contracted with Petitioner (doing business as Fresh Fruit Express) to fill. Under the agreement between A & J and Petitioner (which was not reduced to writing), it was Petitioner's obligation to make sure that the "gift fruit" specified in each order was delivered, in an appropriate package, to the person or business identified in the order as the intended recipient at the particular address indicated in the order. Among the intended recipients identified in the orders that Petitioner agreed to fill were: the Uthe family, the Weckbachs, Mr. and Mrs. T. Martin, Angelo's, Susan Booth, Mr. and Mrs. E. Coello, Mr. and Mrs. Dalbey, Carol Baker and family, the Tarvin family, Shelly and Mark Koontz, Pamela McGuffey, Jerome Melrose, Russell Oberer, Mrs. Josephine Scelfo, Curt and Becky Tarvin, Heidi Wiseman, Kay and Artie Witt, and the William Woodard family, who collectively will be referred to hereinafter as the "Intended Recipients in Question." A & J agreed to pay Petitioner a total of $438.18 to provide "gift fruit" to the Intended Recipients in Question, broken down as follows: $21.70 for the Uthe family order, $21.70 for the Weckbachs order, $22.82 for the Mr. and Mrs. T. Martin order, $27.09 for the Angelo's order, $21.70 for the Susan Booth order, $31.67 for the Mr. and Mrs. E. Coello order, $17.50 for the Mr. and Mrs. Dalbey order, $21.70 for the Carol Baker and family order, $27.09 for the Tarvin family order, $21.70 for the Shelly and Mark Koontz order, $21.70 for the Pamela McGuffey order, $32.44 for the Jerome Melrose order, $21.70 for the Russell Oberer order, $17.60 for the Mrs. Josephine Scelfo order, $21.70 for the Curt and Becky Tarvin order, $17.50 for the Heidi Wiseman order, $17.50 for the Kay and Artie Witt order, and $31.67 for the William Woodard family order. All of these orders, which will be referred to hereinafter as the "Intended Recipients in Question 'gift fruit' orders," were to be delivered, under the agreement between A & J and Petitioner, by Christmas day, 1999. On Sunday night, December 12, 1999, fire destroyed Petitioner's packing house and did considerable damage to Petitioner's offices. With the help of others in the community, Petitioner was able to obtain other space to house its offices and packing house operations. By around noon on Tuesday, December 14, 1999, Petitioner again had telephone service, and by Friday, December 17, 1999, it resumed shipping fruit. Scott Wiley, A & J's President, who had learned of the fire and had been unsuccessful in his previous attempts to contact Petitioner, was finally able to reach Petitioner by telephone on Monday, December 20, 1999. After asking about the status of the Intended Recipients in Question “gift fruit” orders and being told by the employee with whom he was speaking that she was unable to tell him whether or not these orders had been shipped, Mr. Wiley advised the employee that A & J was "cancelling" all "gift fruit" orders that had not been shipped prior to the fire. Mr. Wiley followed up this telephone conversation by sending, that same day, the following facsimile transmission to Petitioner: As per our conversation on 12-20-99, please cancel all orders sent to you from A & J Pak-Ship (Fresh Fruit Express). After trying to contact your company numerous times on December 13, I called the Davie Police Department, who [sic] informed me that you had experienced a major fire. I tried to contact you daily the entire week with no luck. Since I had no way to contact you, it was your responsibility to contact me with information about your business status. Without that contact, I had to assume that you were unable to continue doing business. With Christmas fast approaching and with no contact from anyone on your end, I had no choice but to begin to issue refunds. While I understand the fire was devastating for you, understand that my fruit business is ruined, and will take years to reestablish. Please note that I will not pay for any orders shipped past the date of your fire, 12-13-99, as I have already issued refunds, and I will need proof of delivery for all those orders delivered before the fire. Again, cancel all orders including the remainder of multi-month packages, and honeybell orders. Your lack of communication has put me in a very bad situation with my customers. One short phone call to me could have avoided all this difficulty. Had I not tried your phone on 12-20, I would still have no information from you. Petitioner did not contact Mr. Wiley and tell him about the fire because it did not think that the fire would hamper its ability to fulfill its obligations under its agreement with A & J. By the time Mr. Wiley made telephone contact with Petitioner on Monday, December 20, 1999, Petitioner had already shipped (that is, placed in the possession of a carrier and made arrangements for the delivery of) all of the Intended Recipients in Question "gift fruit" orders (although it had not notified A & J it had done so). Petitioner did not ship any A & J "gift fruit" orders after receiving Mr. Wiley's December 20, 1999, telephone call. On or about February 18, 2000, Petitioner sent A & J an invoice requesting payment for "gift fruit" orders it had shipped for A & J. Among the orders on the invoice for which Petitioner was seeking payment were the Intended Recipients in Question "gift fruit" orders (for which Petitioner was seeking $438.18). The invoice erroneously reflected that all of these orders had been shipped on December 25, 1999. They, in fact, had been shipped on December 18, 1999, or earlier. 1/ Mr. Wiley, acting on behalf of A & J, wrote a check in the amount of $858.26, covering all of the invoiced orders except the Intended Recipients in Question "gift fruit" orders, and sent it to Petitioner, along with the following letter dated February 22, 1999: As per my conversation on 12/20/90 at 11:20 a.m. with Yvette we cancelled all orders shipped after the fire, and also followed up with a certified letter. We had to reorder all of those orders and also refunded a lot of orders as they were not there in time for Xmas as all orders are required to arrive before Xmas. As I said in my certified letter to you it was a[n] unfortunate fire but all you had to do was to inform me what was going on and we could have worked something out. Our fruit business has been ruined by this incident, and quite possibly our entire company. It is unbelievable that more than sixty days after the fire we still have had no correspondence from you whatsoever. We have deducted those orders that were cancelled and arrived well after Xmas and remitted the remainder. A & J has not yet paid Petitioner the $438.18 for the Intended Recipients in Question "gift fruit" orders.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 2001.
The Issue The issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE is whether Emergency Rules 20ER02-01, 20ER02-02, and 20ER02-03 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP is whether Proposed Rules 20-15.001, 20- 15.002, and 20-15.003, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Citrus Commission was established in 1935 to organize and promote the growing and sale of various citrus products, fresh and processed, in the State of Florida. The purpose of the Citrus Commission is today reflected in Section 601.02, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Florida Citrus Commission ("the Commission") and the Department, are set forth in full in Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Department include the power to tax and raise other revenue to achieve the purposes of the Department. In particular, Section 601.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, state: The Department of Citrus shall have and shall exercise such general and specific powers as are delegated to it by this chapter and other statutes of the state, which powers shall include, but shall not be confined to, the following: To adopt and, from time to time, alter, rescind, modify, or amend all proper and necessary rules, regulations, and orders for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties under this chapter and other statutes of the state, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law when not inconsistent therewith. To act as the general supervisory authority over the administration and enforcement of this chapter and to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be imposed upon it by other laws of the state. The Department is authorized to set standards by Section 601.11, Florida Statutes, as follows: The Department of Citrus shall have full and plenary power to, and may, establish state grades and minimum maturity and quality standards not inconsistent with existing laws for citrus fruits and food products thereof containing 20 percent or more citrus or citrus juice, whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, including standards for frozen concentrate for manufacturing purposes, and for containers therefor, and shall prescribe rules or regulations governing the marking, branding, labeling, tagging, or stamping of citrus fruit, or products thereof whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, and upon containers therefor for the purpose of showing the name and address of the person marketing such citrus fruit or products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed; the grade, quality, variety, type, or size of citrus fruit, the grade, quality, variety, type, and amount of the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, and the quality, type, size, dimensions, and shape of containers therefor, and to regulate or prohibit the use of containers which have been previously used for the sale, transportation, or shipment of citrus fruit or the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or any other commodity; provided, however, that the use of secondhand containers for sale and delivery of citrus fruit for retail consumption within the state shall not be prohibited; provided, however, that no standard, regulation, rule, or order under this section which is repugnant to any requirement made mandatory under federal law or regulations shall apply to citrus fruit, or the products thereof, whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or to containers therefor, which are being shipped from this state in interstate commerce. All citrus fruit and the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed sold, or offered for sale, or offered for shipment within or without the state shall be graded and marked as required by this section and the regulations, rules, and orders adopted and made under authority of this section, which regulations, rules, and orders shall, when not inconsistent with state or federal law, have the force and effect of law. The Department is authorized to conduct citrus research by Section 601.13, Florida Statutes. To help pay for these duties of the Department, the Legislature first enacted the "box tax" in 1949. The box tax is now codified as Section 601.15(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: There is hereby levied and imposed upon each standard-packed box of citrus fruit grown and placed into the primary channel of trade in this state an excise tax at annual rates for each citrus season as determined from the tables in this paragraph and based upon the previous season's actual statewide production as reported in the United States Department of Agriculture Citrus Crop Production Forecast as of June 1. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, goes on to set forth specific rates for fresh grapefruit, processed grapefruit, fresh oranges, processed oranges, and fresh or processed tangerines and citrus hybrids. Section 601.15(1), Florida Statutes, sets forth the Department's authority to administer the box tax, as follows: The administration of this section shall be vested in the Department of Citrus, which shall prescribe suitable and reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement hereof, and the Department of Citrus shall administer the taxes levied and imposed hereby. All funds collected under this section and the interest accrued on such funds are consideration for a social contract between the state and the citrus growers of the state whereby the state must hold such funds in trust and inviolate and use them only for the purposes prescribed in this chapter. The Department of Citrus shall have power to cause its duly authorized agent or representative to enter upon the premises of any handler of citrus fruits and to examine or cause to be examined any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing on the amount of taxes payable and to secure other information directly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement hereof. Any person who is required to pay the taxes levied and imposed and who by any practice or evasion makes it difficult to enforce the provisions hereof by inspection, or any person who, after demand by the Department of Citrus or any agent or representative designated by it for that purpose, refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or any part thereof or any books, records, documents, or other instruments in any manner relating to the liability of the taxpayer for the tax imposed or hinders or in anywise delays or prevents such inspection, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The box tax was challenged in 1936 and the Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in 1937 upholding the validity of the box tax. C.V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937). In 1970, the Legislature enacted the "equalization tax," codified as Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. The statute mirrored Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, but added certain processors who were mixing foreign citrus products with Florida products. The purpose of the equalization tax was to have all Florida processors of citrus products help pay for the costs of the Department, rather than have the burden fall entirely on the Florida growers subject to the box tax. Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: The first person who exercises in this state the privilege of processing, reprocessing, blending, or mixing processed orange products or processed grapefruit products or the privilege of packaging or repackaging processed orange products or processed grapefruit products into retail or institutional size containers or, except as provided in subsection (9) or except if a tax is levied and collected on the exercise of one of the foregoing privileges, the first person having title to or possession of any processed orange product or any processed grapefruit product who exercises the privilege in this state of storing such product or removing any portion of such product from the original container in which it arrived in this state for purposes other than official inspection or direct consumption by the consumer and not for resale shall be assessed and shall pay an excise tax upon the exercise of such privilege at the rate described in subsection (2). Upon the exercise of any privilege described in subsection (1), the excise tax levied by this section shall be at the same rate per box of oranges or grapefruit utilized in the initial production of the processed citrus products so handled as that imposed, at the time of exercise of the taxable privilege, by s. 601.15 per box of oranges. In order to administer the tax, the Legislature provided the following relevant provisions in Section 601.155, Florida Statutes: Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall keep a complete and accurate record of the receipt, storage, handling, exercise of any taxable privilege under this section, and shipment of all products subject to the tax imposed by this section. Such record shall be preserved for a period of 1 year and shall be offered for inspection upon oral or written request by the Department of Citrus or its duly authorized agent. Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall, at such times and in such manner as the Department of Citrus may by rule require, file with the Department of Citrus a return, certified as true and correct, on forms to be prescribed and furnished by the Department of Citrus, stating, in addition to other information reasonably required by the Department of Citrus, the number of units of processed orange or grapefruit products subject to this section upon which any taxable privilege under this section was exercised during the period of time covered by the return. Full payment of excise taxes due for the period reported shall accompany each return. All taxes levied and imposed by this section shall be due and payable within 61 days after the first of the taxable privileges is exercised in this state. Periodic payment of the excise taxes imposed by this section by the person first exercising the taxable privileges and liable for such payment shall be permitted only in accordance with Department of Citrus rules, and the payment thereof shall be guaranteed by the posting of an appropriate certificate of deposit, approved surety bond, or cash deposit in an amount and manner as prescribed by the Department of Citrus. * * * (11) This section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes set forth and as additional and supplemental powers vested in the Department of Citrus under the police power of this state. In March 2000, certain citrus businesses challenged Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, as being unconstitutional. At the time of the suit, Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, read as follows: All products subject to the taxable privileges under this section, which products are produced in whole or in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, are exempt from the tax imposed by this section to the extent that the products are derived from oranges or grapefruit grown within the United States. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. The citrus businesses claimed the exemption in Section 601.155(5) rendered the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, in that processors who imported juice from foreign countries to be blended with Florida juice were subject to the equalization tax, whereas processors who imported juice from places such as California, Arizona and Texas enjoyed an exemption from the tax. The case, Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated), was brought in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Polk County. Judge Dennis P. Maloney of that court continues to preside over that case. In a partial final declaratory judgment effective March 15, 2002, Judge Maloney found Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution due to its discriminatory effect in favor of non-Florida United States juice. In an order dated April 15, 2002, Judge Maloney severed the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, from the remainder of the statute. The court's decision necessitated the formulation of a remedy for the injured plaintiffs. While the parties were briefing the issue before the court, the Florida Legislature met and passed Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, to read as follows: Products made in whole or in part from citrus fruit on which an equivalent tax is levied pursuant to s. 601.15 are exempt from the tax imposed by this section. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit exempt from the tax imposed by this section, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, was given an effective date of July 1, 2002. By order dated August 8, 2002, Judge Maloney set forth his decision as to the remedy for the plaintiffs injured by the discriminatory effect of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Judge Maloney expressly relied on the rationale set forth in Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991)("McKesson II"). In its initial McKesson decision, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment ruling that Florida's alcoholic beverage tax scheme, which gave tax preferences and exemptions to certain alcoholic beverages made from Florida crops, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed that portion of the summary judgment giving the ruling prospective effect, thus denying the plaintiff a refund of taxes paid pursuant to the unconstitutional scheme. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision as to the prospective effect of its decision. The United States Supreme Court held that: The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. 496 U.S. at 31 (footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court set forth the following options by which the state could meet its obligation to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief:" [T]he State may cure the invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to petitioner the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same rate reductions that its competitors actually received. . . . Alternatively, to the extent consistent with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner's competitors who benefited from the rate reductions during the contested tax period, calibrating the retroactive assessment to create in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme. . . . Finally, a combination of a partial refund to petitioner and a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on favored competitors, so long as the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce, would render petitioner's resultant deprivation lawful and therefore satisfy the Due Process Clause's requirement of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. 496 U.S. at 40-41 (citations and footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court expressly provided that the state has the option of choosing the form of relief it will grant. In keeping with the United States Supreme Court opinion, the Florida Supreme Court granted the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division") leave to advise the Court as to the form of relief the state wished to provide. The Division proposed to retroactively assess and collect taxes from those of McKesson's competitors who had benefited from the discriminatory tax scheme. McKesson contended that a refund of the taxes it had paid was the only clear and certain remedy, because retroactive taxation of its competitors would violate their due process rights. McKesson II, 574 So. 2d at 115. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on McKesson's refund claim, with the following instructions: While McKesson may not necessarily be entitled to a refund, it is entitled to a "clear and certain remedy," as outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion. Because nonparties, such as amici, will be directly affected by the retroactive tax scheme proposed by the state, all affected by the proposed emergency rule must be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in this action. Therefore, on remand, the trial court not only must determine whether the state's proposal meets "the minimum federal requirements" outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion, it also must determine whether the proposal comports with federal and state protections afforded those against whom the proposed tax will be assessed. We emphasize that the state has the option of choosing the manner in which it will reformulate the alcoholic beverage tax during the contested period so that the resultant tax actually assessed during that period reflects a scheme which does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Therefore, if the trial court should rule that the state's proposal to retroactively assess and collect taxes from McKesson's competitors does not meet constitutional muster and such ruling is upheld on appeal, the state may offer an alternative remedy for the trial court's review. However, any such proposal likewise must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court as well as be consistent with other constitutional restrictions. 574 So. 2d at 116. In the instant case, Judge Maloney assessed the options prescribed by the series of McKesson cases and concluded that the only fair remedy was to assess and collect back assessments from those who benefited from the unconstitutional equalization tax exemption. His August 8, 2002 order directed the Department to "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." On September 18, 2002, the Department promulgated the Emergency Rules at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE. The Emergency Rules were filed with the Department of State on September 24, 2002, and took effect on that date. They were published in the October 4, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 40, pp. 4271-4272). The full text of the Emergency Rules is: EQUALIZATION TAX ON NON-FLORIDA UNITED STATES JUICE 20ER02-1 Intent. The Court in Tampa Juice Service, et al v. Florida Department of Citrus in Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718 (Circuit Court in and for Polk County, Florida) severed the exemption contained in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, that provided an exemption for persons who exercised one of the enumerated Equalization Tax privileges on non-Florida, United States juice. The Court had previously determined that the stricken provisions operated in a manner that violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. On August 8, 2002, the Court ordered that the Florida Department of Citrus "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." It is the Florida Department of Citrus' intent by promulgating the following remedial Rule 20ER02-01 and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., to implement a non-discriminatory tax scheme, which does not impose a significant tax burden that is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress constitutional limitations. These rules shall be applicable to those previously favored persons who received favorable tax treatment under the statutory sections cited above. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New 9-24-02. 20ER02-2 Definitions. "Previously favored persons" shall be defined as any person who exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege as defined by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, but who was exempt from payment of the Equalization Tax due to the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice set forth in the statutory provision, which was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional and severed from Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. The "tax period" during which the severed provisions of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, were in effect shall be defined as commencing on October 6, 1997, and ending on March 14, 2002. "Tax liability" shall be defined as the total amount of taxes due to the Florida Department of Citrus during the "tax period," at the following rates per box for each respective fiscal year: Fiscal Year Processed Rate Orange Grapefruit 1997-1998 .175 .30 1998-1999 .17 .30 1999-2000 .18 .325 2000-2001 .175 .30 2001-2002 .165 .18 Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New 9-24-02. 20ER02-3 Collection. The Florida Department of Citrus shall calculate the tax liability for each person or entity that exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege outlined in section 601.155, Florida Statutes, upon non-Florida, United States juice based upon inspection records maintained by Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the United States Department of Agriculture. Additionally, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide notice of the calculation to the previously favored persons by certified mail. The notice of the calculation shall contain a statement including the following categories: (a) Tax liability; (b) Gallons; Brix; Type of product; (e) Total solids; (f) Conversion rate; (g) Total boxes; (h) Delineation of non-Florida, United States juice. (2)(a) Contained within the notice will be the various legal options available to those who previously enjoyed the exemption, set forth in proposed Rule 20- 15.003(2), F.A.C. (b) Persons who previously enjoyed the exemption may petition to intervene in the case of Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al, Consolidated Case No. GCG-003718, presently pending before the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County. A hearing to consider arguments made by any intervenor, the Plaintiffs and the Florida Department of Citrus is currently scheduled to be heard by the Honorable Dennis Maloney on November 12, 2002, in Bartow, Florida. (3) The Florida Department of Citrus will not oppose the timely intervention of persons who previously enjoyed the subject exemption that wish to present a claim to the Court in the Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus. However, the Florida Department of Citrus does not waive any argument regarding the validity of the calculation of the tax liability or that imposition of this tax is constitutional. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New 9-24-02. The Department's "Specific Reasons for Finding an Immediate Danger to the Public Health, Safety or Welfare" were set forth as follows: On March 18, 2002, the Court in the Tenth Judicial Circuit, State of Florida, in and for Polk County, entered a Partial Final Declaratory Judgment in the case of Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus, Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718. In this order the Court ruled that the exemption in Section 601.155, F.S., for non-Florida, United States juice was unconstitutional. On or about April 15, 2002, the Court severed the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice from section 601.155(5), F.S. On August 8, 2002, the Court held that the Florida Department of Citrus was required to cure the invalidity of the equalization taxing scheme. To cure this invalidity, the Florida Department of Citrus promulgates Rule 20ER02-1, F.A.C., which will serve to implement the Court's order for a nondiscriminatory tax scheme and provide due process protections for the previously favored taxpayers. These rules are being promulgated on an emergency basis to meet time constraints associated with litigation and to establish guidelines which protect the public's and state's interest for the orderly and efficient collection and payment of the tax liability. Without these guidelines, the welfare of the citizens and the state would be adversely affected because of the immediate and widespread impact of the failure of previously favored persons to properly remit the tax. The Department's "Reason for Concluding that the Procedure is Fair Under the Circumstances" was set forth as follows: Promulgation of these guidelines using the emergency rule procedures is the only available mechanism which adequately protects the public interests under the circumstances which require collection and payment of the tax liability. This procedure is fair to the public and to the previously favored persons. It permits promulgation of the necessary guidelines within a time frame which allows the industry to be adequately informed of their duties, responsibilities and rights with respect to the tax liability. In the November 15, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 46, pp. 4996-4998), the Department published the Proposed Rules at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP. The text of Proposed Rule 20-15.001, Florida Administrative Code, is identical to that of Emergency Rule 20ER02-1, set forth above. The text of Proposed Rule 20-15.002, Florida Administrative Code, is identical to that of Emergency Rule 20ER02-2, set forth above. The text of Proposed Rule 20- 15.003(1)&(3), Florida Administrative Code, is identical to that of Emergency Rule 20ER02-3(1)&(3), set forth above. The text of Proposed Rule 15.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, varies from the text of Emergency Rule 20ER02-3(2), and reads as follows: 20-15.003 Collection. Subsequent to adoption of this rule, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide to the previously favored persons by certified mail a Notice of Tax Liability which shall contain a demand for payment consistent with the above-referenced itemized statement. The Department will deem late payment of Equalization Taxes owed by previously favored persons to constitute good cause, and shall waive the 5 percent penalty authorized by Section 601.155(10), F.S., as compliance with either of the following is established by Department [sic]: Lump sum payment of the tax liability remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability; or Equal installment payments remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection subsection [sic] 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., over a 60-month period, the first payment being due within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability pursuant to subsection 20-15.003(2), F.A.C.; or The Good Cause provisions of 601.155(10), F.S., shall not apply to persons who do not comply with paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(a), F.A.C., or paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(b), F.A.C. Failure to pay the taxes or penalties due under 601.155, F.S. and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., shall constitute grounds for revocation or suspension of a previously favored person's citrus fruit dealer's license pursuant to 601.56(4), F.S., 601.64(6), F.S., 601.64(7), F.S., and/or 601.67(1), F.S. Peace River is a Florida corporation and licensed citrus fruit dealer regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, Peace River is subject to the rules of the Department. Peace River buys, sells, and manufactures bulk citrus juices. By correspondence dated October 2, 2002, Peace River was notified by the Department that Peace River would be liable for payment of $86,242.41 in Equalization taxes for the tax period of October 6, 1997 through March 14, 2002 (the "tax period"), pursuant to the terms of the Emergency Rules. Fresh Juice is a Florida corporation and licensed citrus fruit dealer regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, Fresh Juice is subject to the rules of the Department. Fresh Juice buys, sells, and manufactures citrus juices. By correspondence dated October 2, 2002, Fresh Juice was notified by the Department that Fresh Juice would be liable for payment of $45,052.19 in Equalization taxes for the tax period, pursuant to the terms of the Emergency Rules. Sun Orchard is a Florida corporation and licensed citrus fruit dealer regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, Sun Orchard is subject to the rules of the Department. Sun Orchard buys, sells, and manufactures citrus juices. By correspondence dated October 2, 2002, Sun Orchard was notified by the Department that Sun Orchard would be liable for payment of $45,052.19 in Equalization taxes for the tax period, pursuant to the terms of the Emergency Rules. During the tax period, Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard imported, stored and blended non-Florida, United States citrus juices. Neither Peace River, Fresh Juice, nor Sun Orchard is a party to the lawsuit styled Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated). Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard contend that they relied on the tax exemption in making business decisions and had no notice that their activities regarding non-Florida, United States juice would be taxable upon the court's striking of the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard contend that, during the tax period, they had no opportunity to conform their conduct to avoid the tax or position themselves to claim a refund allowed by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard contend that they have not been obligated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, to keep specific records on their use of non-Florida United States citrus juices for the tax period, but admit they keep business records required by law, which may include some business records related to non-Florida United States juice during the tax period. Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard shipped products made with non-Florida, United States juice during the tax period without payment of the Equalization Tax.
