The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer License should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact On or about January 4, 1994, the Petitioner filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. On April 20, 1994, the Respondent sent a letter to the Petitioner advising him of its intention to deny his application. The sole stated ground for denial was described as "[f]ailure to qualify under Section 493.6118(1)(j). You committed an act of violence or used force on another person which was not for the lawful protection of yourself or another." The denial letter also made specific reference to the date of February 21, 1993, and specifically referred to criminal charges allegedly brought against the Petitioner on that date for battery and aggravated battery. With regard to the Respondent's basis for denial, the proof demonstrates that during the early afternoon of February 21, 1993, the Petitioner became involved in an argument with Jessica Favata, an adult female with whom he was acquainted. The intensity of the argument escalated and at one point the Petitioner physically pushed Ms. Favata. At that point a male friend of Ms. Favata, one Bradley Watson, injected himself into the argument. As the intensity of the argument between the Petitioner and Mr. Watson continued to increase, the Petitioner retrieved an aluminum baseball bat from his motor vehicle and began swinging the bat in the general direction of Mr. Watson. During the course of one of the swings of the bat, the Petitioner struck Ms. Favata on the hand with the bat. As a result of being struck by the bat, Ms. Favata's hand was visibly injured. During the course of the events described in the preceding paragraph neither Ms. Favata nor Mr. Watson were armed with any type of weapon. Similarly, neither Ms. Favata nor Mr. Watson were causing or attempting to cause physical harm to the Petitioner.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case denying the Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer License. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1994, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1994.
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are true, and, if so, what disciplinary penalty, if any, should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was certified by the Petitioner as a law enforcement officer, holding certificate 267907. At all times material to this case, the City of Sarasota, Florida, employed the Respondent as a law enforcement officer. On the night of January 4, 2010, the Respondent was on duty, riding in a patrol car driven by her work partner, Officer Coppinger. The patrol car contained a laptop computer that was connected to the Florida Driver and Vehicle identification Database (DAVID), a law enforcement database. The DAVID system is not accessible to the public. At the time of logging into the DAVID system, users are advised by a warning screen that the system is restricted to authorized personnel for appropriate law enforcement purposes. Usage of the system for personal purposes is specifically prohibited. An officer accessing the DAVID system must affirmatively acknowledge an understanding of the usage policy prior to initiating research. On the night of January 4, 2010, Officer Coppinger was logged into the DAVID system. The laptop computer is available to both officers in the patrol car. While on duty, the Respondent received a telephone call from her cousin, "Whizz," who told the Respondent of an alleged threat of arson against the Respondent's family by a man identified as "Terrance Bryant." The Respondent did not report the threat to Officer Coppinger or to any other law enforcement officer or agency. Instead, the Respondent immediately accessed the DAVID system in an effort to identify Terrance Bryant's residential address. The Respondent was sufficiently familiar with Terrance Bryant to use a variety of family names and spellings in the search. The Respondent also used information about Terrance Bryant's girlfriend, with whom the Respondent was also familiar, to the extent that the girlfriend had listed the Respondent as a reference on her own application for employment with the Sarasota Police Department. After extensive research in the DAVID system on January 4, 2010, the Respondent obtained the residential address for Terrance Bryant. The Respondent and Whizz met on January 5, 2010, at the Respondent's home to handle some household errands. The Petitioner asserts that the Respondent provided Terrance Bryant's residential address to Whizz at that time. The evidence is insufficient to clearly establish how Whizz obtained the address, but, by the time Whizz left the Respondent's home on that date, he possessed Terrance Bryant's residential address.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order suspending the Respondent's correctional certificate for two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2012.
The Issue Whether on or about November 28, 1993, Petitioner committed an act of violence or used force on another person which was not for the lawful protection of himself or another and was sufficient grounds for denial of Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer and Class "G" Statewide Firearm Licenses, pursuant to Sections 493.6118(1)(j) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact By application dated February 10, 1994, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a Class "D" Security Officer license and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm license. The applications prepared by Petitioner were complete, and included the required photos and copy of a certificate evidencing successful completion of security officer training as required by statute. On November 28, 1993, the Petitioner met his estranged spouse in the Lakeland police station lobby to exchange custody of their baby daughter. This transfer of custody was videotaped, allegedly by the Petitioner's mother-in-law. As the transfer was ending, the Petitioner became agitated at the person holding the camera. Petitioner picked up the baby car seat and moved towards the camera. The Petitioner swung the baby car seat, while the baby was in it, in the direction of the camera. No competent evidence was produced which proved that the car seat, while being swung by Petitioner, struck another person or an object held by another person.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officers license and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm license as provided for in Section 493.6118, Florida Statutes (1993). DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX Petitioner is eligible for licensure under either stand Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Respondent proposed finding of fact: Accepted in substance: paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (in part). Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of competent (non-hearsay) evidence: paragraphs 6 (in part), 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Angel E. Figueroa 5331 David Street Lakeland, Florida 33813 Richard R. Whidden, Jr., Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent misused her position as an Orlando city commissioner by attempting, on May 6, 2006, to influence how the Orlando Police Department (the police department) handled a routine traffic stop involving her son in violation of Subsection 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2005).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating compliance with the Code of Ethics applicable to public officers and employees pursuant to Chapter 112, Part III. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent has been a public officer, a commissioner of the City of Orlando, Florida. Respondent is African-American, as are her two sons Mr. Sean Lynum and Mr. Juan Lynum. At 12:50 a.m., on May 6, 2006, Officer Matthew Ochiuzzo was on duty for the police department patrolling the Paramore neighborhood in Orlando less than a mile from Rock Lake Drive. Officer Ochiuzzo stopped Mr. Juan Lynum because of an inoperable headlight on the vehicle Mr. Lynum was driving.2 Mr. Lynum was driving Respondent’s vehicle home from a fraternity party to Respondent’s residence on Rock Lake Drive in Orlando, Florida. Mr. Lynum shared the residence with Respondent at the time. Neither Respondent nor Mr. Lynum were aware that a headlight on the vehicle was not working. Mr. Lynum telephoned Respondent from his cellular telephone. He informed Respondent that he was being stopped by a Caucasian police officer and expressed his concern that he was the victim of racial profiling. Respondent telephoned then Chief Michael McCoy of the police department at his home and expressed her concern that Mr. Lynum was the victim of racial profiling. Chief McCoy said he would telephone the watch commander on duty and have him deal with the allegation of racial profiling. Respondent then telephoned Officer Roderick Johnson, the police liaison officer assigned to Respondent and an officer first class in the police department. Officer Johnson was engaged in approved off-duty employment to provide security at a local night club. Respondent had time to disclose the general location of the traffic stop and her concern that her son was being racially profiled when she terminated the conversation to take a return telephone call from Chief McCoy. Respondent clearly intended to influence how the police department handled the traffic stop. Respondent did not expressly request intervention in the traffic stop by Chief McCoy or Officer Johnson, but Respondent admits that the purpose of her action was to alert both men to possible racial profiling and to monitor the traffic stop. Respondent used her official position to influence the traffic stop of her son. Both Chief McCoy and Officer Johnson interpreted a telephone call from a city commissioner at approximately 1:00 a.m. in the morning to be a request for action in her official duty as a commissioner.3 The testimony of Chief McCoy is illustrative. Q. Chief, when you received that call from Commissioner Lynum, did you feel you needed to act based on the phone call? A. She’s a Commissioner, yes. Act then, yes. . . . Q. . . . When you answered that she was a Commissioner, what did you mean by that? How did that impact you? A. I used to make the analogy that our Commissioners were our board of directors, because I spent some time in the private sector, and you know, they drive the direction of the city, police department being part of that. So they’re a Commissioner. They’re elected by the people, so, yeah, pay attention to a Commissioner call, as I would a Mayor call. Q. So when you responded to her, were you responding as a friend or as a commissioner? A. As a commissioner. Transcript (TR) at 258-259 and 277. Officer Johnson took it upon himself to call Officer Ochiuzzo, by radio and then by cell phone, during the traffic stop. A call from a city commissioner at approximately 1:00 a.m. motivated Officer Johnson to take action. Officer Ochiuzzo terminated the traffic stop after discussing the matter with Officer Johnson and never spoke to the watch commander on duty during the traffic stop. Officer Ochiuzzo had intended to issue a traffic summons to Mr. Lynum for an inoperable headlight, no registration, and no proof of car insurance. The benefit sought by Respondent in her attempt to influence how the police department handled the traffic stop involving her son was not to prevent her son from receiving a traffic citation. When Mr. Lynum arrived at Respondent’s home after the traffic stop, Respondent discovered that the headlight on her vehicle was inoperable. She telephoned Officer Johnson and asked him to ensure that a traffic citation was forwarded to her. The benefit sought by Respondent was to prevent racial profiling during an ongoing traffic stop by complaining directly to the chief. That was a special benefit or privilege available to Respondent that was not available to a member of the public through the police department’s bias free policing policy. The police department’s bias free policing policy was drafted by legal counsel for the department and was adopted in June 15, 2004. The policy required a member of the public who alleged racial profiling to file a written complaint on a form provided by the department and required the department to investigate the alleged profiling. Respondent was personally familiar with the police department’s bias free policing policy. Respondent was very active in the community, supported the bias free policing policy, and assisted her constituents in processing profiling complaints. Mr. Lynum later filed a complaint of racial profiling pursuant to the bias free policing policy. The police department investigation exonerated Officer Ochiuzzo. Exoneration means the department found Officer Ochiuzzo to be innocent of the charges in the complaint. Exoneration differs from “not sustained” in that the latter means only that the proof is insufficient to support a finding of guilt. When Respondent telephoned Chief McCoy and her liaison officer at approximately 1:00 a.m. on the morning of May 6, 2006, Respondent acted with wrongful intent for the purpose of benefiting another person from an act or omission during an active traffic stop. Respondent acted in a manner that was inconsistent with her public duties. Respondent testified that she called Chief McCoy and Officer Johnson, not in her capacity as commissioner, but as a mother fearful for the safety of her son. Mr. Lynum testified that he sought his mother’s help out concern for his safety at the hands of a Caucasian police officer. The fact-finder finds the testimony of both witnesses to be less than credible and persuasive. Mr. Lynum was on his cell phone when Officer Ochiuzzo approached the vehicle driven by Mr. Lynum. Mr. Lynum virtually ignored Officer Ochiuzzo. The actions of Mr. Lynum in ignoring an investigating officer risked antagonizing the officer and are inconsistent with a person in fear of physical harm. The testimony of Officer Ochiuzzo is illustrative. Q. So what did you do next? A. I exited my patrol vehicle and I approached Mr. Lynum’s car. . . . Q. Okay. What happened next? A. He was on his cell phone when I approached the window and the window was up, and I told him I was conducting a traffic stop and that I needed his license and registration, proof of insurance, and he didn’t respond. Q. So at the initial approach of the vehicle, did you make any other gestures to get the driver’s attention or did you solely use voice commands? A. Voice commands combined with my patrol car lights and chirping of the siren. Q. So when you made these initial voice commands, did the driver respond? A. No. Q. So what did you do next to get his attention? A. . . . I took my flashlight and I tapped the window to get the driver’s attention and instructed him again that I was conducting a traffic stop and I needed a license, registration, proof of insurance. Q. And at that point did Mr. Lynum engage in the traffic stop? A. No. Q. What did he do? A. He ignored it once again. He was on the cell phone. And so I pulled the door open and I told him that I was conducting a traffic stop. I needed his license, registration, proof of insurance. TR at 35-36. Officer Ochiuzzo returned to his patrol vehicle and began writing a uniform traffic citation when he was interrupted by the radio inquiry, which concluded by cell phone, from the liaison officer for Respondent. Officer Johnson informed Officer Ochiuzzo that Officer Johnson was Commissioner Lynum’s liaison officer and that Officer Ochiuzzo had stopped the commissioner’s son. After the conversation, Officer Ochiuzzo terminated the traffic stop. When Officer Ochiuzzo pointed patrol vehicle lights into the rearview mirror of the vehicle of Mr. Lynum, shined a flashlight beam into the vehicle, and kept his free hand on top of his holstered pistol, it was not a threat to Mr. Lynum. It was standard procedure for traffic stops at that hour. When Officer Ochiuzzo was yelling at Mr. Lynum, it was because Mr. Lynum had ignored the officer’s earlier attempts to redirect Mr. Lynum from the cell phone conversation and had failed to lower the window so the officer would not have been required to yell to be heard. Mr. Lynum is an attorney who is familiar with police procedures during traffic stops through instructions from his father who was a law enforcement officer from 1969 through 1987 and ended his career as the chief of the Wildwood Police Department in Wildwood, Florida. Sean Lynum, Mr. Lynum’s brother, is a former officer in the same police department as Officer Ochiuzzo. Respondent is very active in the community and familiar with police procedure. A common safety precaution for a person who suspects he or she is a victim of racial profiling during a traffic stop is to ensure the site of the stop is well lighted and that the person is in contact by cell phone with a person who can be a witness. Mr. Lynum followed both precautions. He stopped in a well-lit area, and he was on his cell phone. Complaints of racial profiling in the area had declined from 23 the year before Chief McCoy became the chief of the department to a consistent annual range of six to eight. Racial profiling was not an issue in the area until after Mr. Lynum made his complaint. The testimony of Chief McCoy is illustrative. This, after the fact, became quite a community event or issue, which sparked a lot of accusations of racial profiling. Our policy had been in effect as long as it’s been in effect. The year before I was Chief, there was like 23 total racial profiling complaints made. The year I became Chief that dropped to like six or eight and that was-–that number was pretty consistent. Even after we had this community event issue, they still never got over 10, total. The key is that if you have a complaint, you need to follow up on it. If people feel like they were stopped simply because they were-–of their race, then you need to do the form and do it right and the officers know that-–or knew that. Q. So, really, it did not become a community issue until after Commissioner Lynum’s son was stopped, racial profiling? A. That would definitely be my perspective . . . . it was not an issue. TR at 278-279.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order and public report finding that Respondent violated Subsection 112.313(6) and publicly censuring and reprimanding Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd of February, 2009.
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are: Whether The Buxton Group, Incorporated, and Kavin P. Buxton (hereinafter jointly referred to as "Buxton") committed fraud, deceit, negligence, or misconduct, and, if so, whether the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (the "Department") may deny the issuance of or revoke various licenses held by Buxton--DOAH Case No. 10-2197; and Whether administrative denial of Buxton's existing Class "G" license is warranted--DOAH Case No. 10-2198.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, the issuance and monitoring of various licenses related to the field of private security. It is the Department's responsibility to take disciplinary action against any licensee who violates statutes or rules relating to the licenses issued by the Department. Buxton has held, now holds, or has applied for the following licenses which are issued by the Department: D9414758: A security officer's license which has an expiration date of August 30, 2010; DI9900012: An instructor's license for which Buxton applied for, but was denied renewal; B9400126: A license to operate a security agency. Buxton's license has expired and there is an administrative action pending against it; G9402513: A statewide firearms license. Buxton's license has expired, and his request for renewal has been denied by the Department; A9700094: A private investigative agency license, effective May 19, 2008; and MB9500099: A license to manage a security agency. Buxton's license has expired, and there is an administrative action pending. The basis of the Department's disciplinary actions against Buxton's licenses (and the reason the Department has denied applications for renewals) is an incident occurring on March 27, 2008, in Pinellas Park, Florida. Buxton was on that date working as a security guard for Dew Cadillac, a new and used car dealership. At approximately 5:05 a.m., Buxton was returning to the dealership after taking a coffee break off-site. He was driving his personal automobile down an unpaved track of land on the east side of the dealership. He turned unto an unpaved area at the northern end of the lot at which time he noticed movement around an employee's pick-up truck which was parked in the car lot. It appeared a window of the truck had been broken, and there was glass lying around the outside of the vehicle. Buxton approached the vehicle and found a person (later identified as Mark Lobban) "rummaging around" in the cab of the truck. Buxton noted that two windows had been smashed, and there was a dent in the passenger side door. Buxton ordered Lobban to exit the vehicle. When Lobban came out of the truck, his eyes indicated a drugged or intoxicated state, and he reached his hand into his shirt along the front waistline of his pants. When Buxton saw that movement, he drew his weapon, a Springfield Armory XP 9mm semi-automatic handgun, for which he held a current permit to carry. Lobban took his hand out of his shirt and stated that he was looking for his cousin. Buxton ordered Lobban to the ground and began to dial 9-1-1 as he kept an eye on Lobban. Just as Buxton finished dialing 9-1-1, Lobban allegedly lunged at Buxton, then took off running. Lobban ran behind some Hummer vehicles parked nearby. Buxton says that as Lobban ran, he again reached his hand into his shirt near his waistline. That placed Buxton in fear that Lobban may have a gun, so Buxton ran to another row of Hummers for protection and began firing shots toward Lobban from his own handgun. Lobban then ran past the row of Hummers and appeared to be exiting the premises. Buxton followed Lobban and later recounted in his Firearms Incident Report, that he ran toward Lobban "to insure that the suspect was actually exiting the property. At this point, I felt he was possibly running away. I followed further in an attempt to maintain sight of the suspect." Lobban approached a hedgerow located at the west side of the dealership, attempted to jump over it, but caught his leg and fell over the hedges. By this time, Buxton had cleared the last line of parked vehicles and, thus, had no more cover. When Lobban stood up on the other side of the hedgerow, he turned to face Buxton. Buxton wrote in his report, "Fearing he had drawn a weapon behind the hedge, I fired another round, at which time the suspect turned and fled east, through the wooded area adjacent to the property." Lobban did not at any time display or fire a weapon at Buxton. Buxton returned to his cell phone which he had dropped when first apprehending Lobban. The 911 operator was just calling him back at that moment. Buxton was put through to PPPD and, within minutes, the first officer, Scott Martin, arrived at the dealership. Martin had ensured that a police perimeter was established around the dealership concurrent with his arrival. When Scott got to the dealership, he found Buxton and was briefed as to what had transpired. A brief search of the premises was commenced pending arrival of the PPPD K-9 unit. While awaiting their arrival, Buxton spotted Lobban hiding under a vehicle in the dealership's service area. Lobban was apprehended by Scott and placed in a police cruiser. Scott determined that Lobban was impaired, probably by alcohol, and was essentially incoherent. Scott did an "article search" of the premises to see if any items belonging to Lobban could be found. A cell phone and wallet were recovered, but there was no sign of a firearm. The search did not concentrate on a firearm specifically, but the search was intended to find any item that Lobban had handled. The K-9 unit was able to trace Lobban's scent through the Hummers, across the hedgerow and back to the service area. The search concentrated on the areas where Lobban had been known to have crossed. No search was done of the wooded area behind the hedge, because the tracking dogs did not point to that area as having been traveled by Lobban. Scott reported in to his headquarters after hearing Buxton's explanation of the events that transpired. The discharge of a weapon in that scenario seemed unwarranted to Scott, so he reported it to his supervisor. Within minutes, Detective Doswell arrived at the dealership to further investigate the situation. Doswell arrived to find Lobban already in custody and Buxton standing in the parking lot with another security guard. Buxton told Scott he had fired four shots at Lobban initially and then two more shots after Lobban jumped the hedge. However, there were five shell casings found in the first location and only one near the hedgerow. The events concerned Doswell enough that he asked Buxton to come into headquarters and make a statement about what had occurred. Buxton initially agreed to do so. After a few minutes, however, he handed his cell phone to Doswell so that Doswell could talk to Buxton's attorney. Doswell and the attorney set up a meeting for later that same day, a Thursday. The attorney later called Doswell and said he and Buxton could not come in until the next day (Friday), so the meeting was rescheduled for that day. On Friday, March 28, 2010, Buxton and his attorney arrived at the PPPD headquarters. Doswell informed Buxton that he was investigating the event as a probable illegal discharge of a firearm and that criminal charges could be filed. Buxton was not read his Miranda rights at that time however, in that no charges had yet been filed. At some point, Doswell determined that Buxton had been involved in another incident relating to the discharge of his firearm while on duty. In that case, Buxton was working at a bowling alley when a group of kids attempted to "jump him." One kid spit on Buxton and during the brief confrontation, Buxton pulled his firearm. Buxton discharged his gun, firing into the ceiling of the establishment (because, said Buxton, someone hit his arm just as he was shooting. Buxton did not say what he was aiming at when he fired.). After interviewing Buxton and his attorney, Doswell revisited Dew Cadillac and did some further investigation. Fragments of bullets from Buxton's firearm had been recovered from the tires of two Hummers on the car lot. In order to obtain licenses which allow a person to use a firearm in conducting their authorized activities, a person must undergo a background check and certain training and education. The Class "D" license held by Buxton required 40 hours of training (which can be dispensed with if the applicant has prior corrections or law enforcement experience). The training necessarily included instruction from the Firearm Instructor's Training Manual (the "Manual"). The Manual specifically warns against the unauthorized use of deadly force, i.e., discharging a firearm at an individual. The Manual stresses the need to retreat and disengage, rather than entering into a situation that might require using the firearm. Several examples are set out in the Manual to provide applicants guidance about how to avoid using deadly force. Two of those examples follow: Situation #1: You are guarding a liquor store and are advised by a customer that there is an armed robbery in progress. You look around the corner and see a man rushing out the front door with a firearm in his hand. Instructor Discussion: Instead of immediately looking around the corner, call the police first. The suspect could turn around and see you as you look around the corner, thus, increasing the probability of armed conflict. The man is running away from you, and there is no threat of death or great bodily injury. Don't shoot. Situation #2: You have been advised that a burglary has occurred at a warehouse you are guarding. The suspects were observed leaving the scene in a blue, 1972 Dodge. Later that night, while patrolling the grounds in a well-marked security vehicle, you observe the suspects' vehicle traveling through the parking lot at a high rate of speed with the headlights off. You see a flash come from the driver's side of the suspect's vehicle and, almost simultaneously, the front windshield of your patrol car cracks. The suspect vehicle continues through the parking lot at a high rate of speed. Instructor Discussion: Don't shoot. Record the license number and description of the vehicle and suspects if it is possible to do so from a covered position. Pursuit could result in serious injury to you or to innocent bystanders who may get in the way. Call for police as soon as possible. According to the expert testimony at final hearing (which was not rebutted or contradicted by Buxton), each of the above-described situations is more egregious than the one Buxton encountered at Dew Cadillac. It is clear that discharge of a firearm in Buxton's situation would be contrary to the guidance provided in the training materials. Each of the facts stated herein are based upon the testimony of live witnesses and written statements from police and investigative reports. Each of the witnesses appeared knowledgeable about his area of testimony, and each was credible. Buxton provided no evidence to contest or rebut any of the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services denying Buxton's licensure application for License No. G9402513 and taking such action as the Department deems appropriate as to each of Buxton's other licenses issued by the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Christopher E. Green, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Division of Marketing Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Mail Stop 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Tracy Sumner, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Post Office Box 3168 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-3168 Kavin P. Buxton Post Office Box 13644 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1984, Trooper Kevin Dennis Roy of the Florida Highway Patrol stopped an automobile occupied by Petitioner on the Florida Turnpike in Palm Beach County. After obtaining consent to search the vehicle, Trooper Roy discovered in the trunk approximately 100 pounds of marijuana and a white plastic bag containing $8644 in small bills wrapped in rubberbands. Petitioner made no claim to the cash found in the trunk. He was arrested. A search revealed no significant sum of money on Petitioner's person. The State Attorney's office dropped a subsequent criminal proceeding for possession of marijuana because Respondent denied knowledge of the drugs and money in the trunk.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's claim of ownership of the monies in question. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-0103 Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance. 3-10. Rejected as recitation of testimony. 11&13. Adopted in substance. 12. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted except as to the amount of money in the bag. Rejected as irrelevant. 16-17. Rejected as recitation of testimony, irrelevant, and subordinate. 18. Rejected as not finding of fact. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 2, 13, 27, 28. Adopted in substance. 16. Adopted. Remainder rejected as recitation of testimony, subordinate, and irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew M. Johnson, Esquire 524 East Livingston Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Elise M. Greenbaum, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of Comptroller 400 West Robinson Street Suite 501 Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroler State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Plaza Level, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed misconduct in the practice of regulated activities by falsely reporting that he was on duty at his assigned security post, in violation of Section 493.6118 (1)(f), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has held a Class "D" Security Officer license, bearing number D90-17908, which is effective from November 21, 1996, through November 13, 1998. On January 17, 1997, while employed as a security guard by Employer Security Company, Respondent was scheduled to work the 8:00 pm to 6:00 am shift at a car dealership in Bradenton. Later in the evening, Respondent's supervisor discovered that Respondent was absent from his post without leave. A day or two later, the supervisor asked Respondent to explain, and Respondent replied that, while he was driving to work that evening, two Mexicans had jumped in his car and carjacked him. Respondent's fanciful story was untrue, although Respondent had picked up some youths in the middle of the night along the highway, when Respondent should have been at the car dealership, and one or two of these persons roughed up Respondent and took his car. However, Petitioner has not charged Respondent with the misconduct of leaving his post without leave or lying to a supervisor. In the course of spinning his tale of a Mexican abduction, Respondent acknowledged that he had not been at the car dealership when he had first called in to headquarters to report that he had started his shift. Instead, he had called in from home. As Respondent knew, the purpose of the telephone call is to confirm that the security guard has assumed his duties. As Respondent knew, it makes no sense to make the call from home because the security guard cannot assume his duties until he reaches his post. Thus, Respondent's testimony that he believed his practice of calling in from home was acceptable is discredited. When Respondent called in from home, he was violating his employer's policy and fraudulently reporting that he had assumed his duties.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of State enter a final order imposing an administrative fine of $1000, suspension for six months, and probation for two years following the conclusion of the term of the suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Michele Guy Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Joseph J. Wheaton 904 70th Street Sarasota, Florida 34243 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 John M. Russi, Director Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
