The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondent, Judy K. Beardslee, violated state election laws by certifying the correctness of a campaign treasurer's report that was incorrect, false, or incomplete, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a member of the City Council of Edgewood, Florida. She ran successfully for this political office in 2004 and 2006. The alleged offense took place during the 2004 election campaign. The City of Edgewood has approximately 1,200 registered voters, and Respondent's 2004 campaign was very modest by any measure. She received only three direct campaign contributions, totaling $415, and $50 of this sum was from her personal funds. Respondent appointed her mother, Linda Boggs, as her deputy treasurer. Three treasurer's reports were filed for Respondent's 2004 campaign. Ms. Boggs relied on Respondent for the information about contributions and expenditures that appears in the three reports. The reports disclosed $415 in campaign contributions and $415 in campaign expenditures. The treasurer's reports were signed by Ms. Boggs and by Respondent. Respondent's signatures were placed under the following statement that appears on the official campaign treasurer's report form: "I certify that I have examined this report and it is true, correct and complete." It is undisputed that on March 2, 2004, Respondent's husband, Ronald Beardslee, paid $148.56 for the production of 25 yard signs that included the words "Elect Judy Beardslee." Mr. Beardslee paid for the yard signs using a check from a joint personal bank account he owned with Respondent. The yard signs were distributed and displayed before the vote for city council members held on March 9, 2004. Mr. Beardslee's purchase of the yard signs was not reported in Respondent's campaign treasurer's report that covered the period from February 14, 2004, to March 3, 2004, and the purchase was not shown in any subsequent report. In January 2005, the Commission received a confidential complaint, alleging that Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports did not disclose all contributions made to her 2004 campaign. Following the Commission's investigation of the complaint, it issued the December 2, 2005, Order of Probable Cause that is the subject of this case. In its Order of Probable Cause, the Commission charged Respondent with violating Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, "by certifying the correctness of her [campaign treasurer's report] covering the period from February 14, 2004 to March 3, 2004, when Respondent failed to report an in-kind contribution from her husband, Ron Beardslee, of $148.56 for yard signs." Respondent testified at the hearing that at the time she certified the accuracy of the treasurer's reports, she did not know her husband had purchased the yard signs. She claims she did not know her husband purchased the signs until more than a year after the election. Respondent's husband testified that he did not consult with, coordinate with, or otherwise inform Respondent that he had purchased the yard signs until long after the 2004 election. Respondent first saw the yard signs "a couple of days before election day." Respondent also saw her husband with the yard signs before the election, and she saw the city clerk talking to her husband about the signs on election day. Nevertheless, these events did not cause her to think her husband had paid for the signs. Respondent said she thought the signs had been procured by a homeowners association that supported her candidacy. Respondent made no inquiries to determine who had paid for the yard signs. The Commission argued that Respondent's testimony at the hearing was inconsistent with her testimony in a deposition taken two weeks earlier during which she said that she found out her husband had paid for the signs on "either election day or the night before." Respondent said she was confused by the deposition question and did not mean to say she knew before the election that her husband had paid for the signs. The transcript of the deposition supports Respondent. The question put to Respondent at her deposition about when she found out who paid for the signs followed questions about when she first noticed the signs. When Respondent answered "either election day or the night before," she apparently thought she had been asked again when she found out about the signs. That is indicated by her answer to the follow-up question about how she found out, which was, "I saw them." Seeing the signs is how Respondent could first notice them, not how she could find out her husband paid for them. See Petitioner's Exhibit 15, pp. 54-58. In addition to ordering and paying for the yard signs, Mr. Beardslee distributed the yard signs. When advised to do so by the city clerk, Mr. Beardslee prepared and attached a disclaimer label to the yard signs. He also did some door-to- door campaigning for Respondent. Mr. Beardslee's door-to-door campaigning was primarily for the benefit of another candidate, but Mr. Beardslee used the opportunity to urge people to vote for Respondent. On one or two occasions, Mr. Beardslee hand- delivered Respondent's campaign treasurer's report to the city clerk. When the yard signs were made, they did not identify who paid for them. On the day of the election, the city clerk, Faye Craig, told Mr. Beardslee that the yard signs did not comply with the election laws because they had no disclaimer statement. Mr. Beardslee immediately went home and made labels that contained a disclaimer statement and then attached the labels to the yard signs. It was established that the labels included the words "Paid Political Advertisement" (possibly in another form, such as "Pd. Political Ad"), but Mr. Beardslee testified he was not sure whether the label indicated that the advertisement was paid "for Judy Beardslee" or "by Judy Beardslee." On cross-examination, Mr. Beardslee stated that the disclaimer on the yard signs might have said "by Judy Beardslee." As set forth in the Conclusions of Law that follow, the election laws require a political advertisement to disclose who paid for the advertisement. The elections laws do not require an advertisement to disclose who the advertisement is for, since that would usually be obvious. Because Ms. Craig was very familiar with the election laws, a reasonable inference can be made that she advised Mr. Beardslee to add a disclaimer to the yard signs to indicate who paid for them. It is not credible that after being told to by the city clerk to put a disclaimer statement on the yard signs, and then making the labels himself, Mr. Beardslee would not remember what the labels said in this regard. The photograph of one of the yard signs in the record (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) is not large enough to show the wording of the label clearly. However, by use of a magnifying glass, it appears to the undersigned that the second line of the disclaimer reads "by Judy Beardslee." It is reasonably clear that the first word of the second line is a two-letter word and the second letter of the word is "y."3 Considering the record evidence and the demeanor of Mr. Beardslee during his testimony, it is found that the disclaimer label indicated that the yard signs were paid for "by Judy Beardslee." The labels did not include Mr. Beardslee's name and address or indicate that the signs were paid for by him, independently of Respondent. After the election, the yard signs were put in Respondent's garage where they remained for months.4 When Respondent submitted her qualifying papers for her candidacy for the City Council, she was provided copies of the 2004 Candidate and Campaign Treasurer Handbook (Handbook) and the Florida Election Law Book. Chapter 9 of the Handbook explains the meaning of "contribution" and "independent expenditure" and the reporting requirements associated with each. Respondent admitted that she did not read the Handbook because she was exhausted from campaigning and other responsibilities. Respondent understood that the Handbook was important, because "[she] had to sign for it." Respondent never asked the city clerk about any of her duties under the election laws. Even at the time of her deposition for this case in March 2006, when asked whether she had received a copy of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, Respondent said she did not know what Chapter 106 was because "[she] was not a lawyer." Mr. Beardslee did not file a report with the Commission to disclose that he had made an independent expenditure during the 2004 Edgewood City Council election campaign. In a letter to a Commission investigator dated May 23, 2005, counsel for Respondent stated that "even including the yard sign expenditure, the total campaign expenses were under $500.00," and suggested that the omission of the yard signs from the treasurer's report was due to inadvertence, rather than because it did not have to be reported.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, Judy K. Beardslee, willfully violated Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2006.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of using or attempting to use his position as mayor of the City of South Pasadena for his benefit or the benefit of candidates that he supported in the 2014 city commission election, in violation of section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact In March 2014, the Respondent was the mayor of the City of South Pasadena, having been elected the year before. City commission elections were scheduled for Tuesday, March 11. There were two contested slots. The incumbents were Max Elson and Arthur Penny. The challengers were Harris Blair and Robert Small. The Respondent supported the challengers and donated to their campaigns to unseat the incumbents, who had been voting against the Respondent's positions since his election as mayor. Of the two elections, the Respondent was more interested in unseating Penny, who regularly opposed the mayor. Pasadena Liquors is a retail business operating in the City of South Pasadena. It was operated by Jimmy Valenty, whose family trust owned the business. Although not a resident and not eligible to vote in the city commission elections, Valenty supported Elson, who was a personal friend. A few weeks before the election, Elson mentioned to Valenty that the campaign signs Valenty allowed him to place outside Pasadena Liquors kept disappearing. Elson asked if Valenty would let him use the marquee inside the front window. Valenty agreed. Elson then asked if Valenty also would let Penny use it. Valenty had no personal interest in Penny's campaign but agreed to his friend's request. Valenty arranged the letters on the marquee to read: "VOTE ELSON AND PENNY CITY COMMISSIONER." During the week before the election, the Respondent received telephone calls regarding the marquee from several constituents who were supporting Blair and Small. They did not recall the marquee being used to solicit votes for city commission elections in the past and questioned whether it was legal. The Respondent was not aware of the sign before receiving the telephone calls and told his constituents that he would look into it. On Friday, March 7, the Respondent went to Pasadena Liquors to talk to Valenty and tell him about the telephone calls he had received. Valenty asked if the Respondent was there as mayor, and the Respondent said, no, he was there as a concerned customer or concerned citizen. During the discussion about the propriety and legality of the sign, Valenty asked to see the city's sign ordinance. The Respondent offered to get a copy of it for Valenty. Normally, the mayor would not be involved in enforcement of the city's sign ordinance. The city's government is run by the mayor and five commissioners, all elected positions. The city has five departments. The mayor oversees the administration department. Each commissioner oversees one of the other four departments. Code enforcement, which includes enforcement of the sign ordinance, is part of the community improvement department (CID). Code violations usually would come to the attention of the city through either a code enforcement inspection or a citizen complaint, which would be referred to code enforcement for investigation. It was the CID director's job to interpret, as necessary, the ordinances being enforced. His interpretation would stand unless the city commission overruled him. In March 2014, Commissioner Elson was in charge of and oversaw the CID. The CID's director, Neal Schwartz, reported directly to Commissioner Elson. After talking to Valenty, the Respondent went to Schwartz's office, told him about his conversation with Valenty, and asked for a copy of the sign ordinance pertaining to the Pasadena Liquors marquee. Schwartz copied the sign ordinance, which was long and convoluted, and highlighted the pertinent provisions. It was the CID director's opinion that the sign was legal, in part because the marquee was a "reader board" with changeable letters. The CID director offered to check with the county election supervisor to verify his opinion and was told that the city clerk, who directed the administration department overseen by the Respondent, was in charge of city elections. It was not clear from the evidence whether the Respondent was still present in the office of the CID director when he telephoned the county elections supervisor. It was clear that the Respondent had left the CID director's office before the CID director talked to the city clerk. When the clerk was asked, she was of the opinion that the sign was legal because it was not paid political advertising. She was prepared to tell the Respondent her opinion if he contacted her. The Respondent did not contact the city clerk for her opinion. After meeting with the CID director, the Respondent returned to Pasadena Liquors to show Valenty the sign ordinance. Valenty saw nothing in the highlighted portions of the sign ordinance that made it clear to him that the sign was illegal, but there appeared to him to be a size limitation. Valenty got a tape measure and concluded that the sign exceeded the size requirements. Valenty asked if the Respondent was requiring him to remove the signage from the marquee. The Respondent said no, it was up to Valenty to decide what to do with the sign. Valenty was planning to remove the sign the next day anyway to replace it with advertising for St. Patrick's Day, so he decided to go ahead and switch the signage on the marquee that day. At the election on March 11, the incumbents won. After information was reported to him about the Respondent's actions regarding the Pasadena Liquors marquee, Commissioner Penny swore out an Ethics Commission complaint alleging that the Respondent went to Pasadena Liquors and demanded that the owner remove the "vote-for-the-incumbents" sign by falsely telling him that he was in violation of the political advertisement laws, after insisting that the CID director call the supervisor of elections and not waiting for the opinion of the city clerk as to the sign's legality. After receiving and reading the ethics complaint, the Respondent brought a copy to Valenty because his name was mentioned, and the Respondent thought he should know about it. Valenty read it and said there was nothing negative in it about him, so he was not concerned about it. The Respondent did not try to influence Valenty's reaction to the complaint, and there was no evidence that there was anything else to this encounter. A few months later, the Respondent asked the city clerk to begin the process of recognizing the lounge at Pasadena Liquors for being open for 25 years and to be sure to say that it was at his request. When the city clerk broached the subject with Valenty, he declined the honor because the timing suggested to him that the recognition was to "make up for" any hard feelings that arose from the issue regarding the business's election sign. In fact, the timing was a coincidence. The city had recognized Pasadena Liquors for the 10th anniversary of its lounge being open, and other businesses in the city were recognized similarly when they reached landmark anniversaries. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken for the purpose of influencing the election, and it is unlikely that they had any influence on the election. In part for these reasons, it was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken for the purpose of securing a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself or the unsuccessful candidates. It also was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken with corrupt intent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Ethics Commission enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Melody A. Hadley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A. Building B, Suite 431 2454 McMullen Booth Road Clearwater, Florida 33759-1339 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Freda Sherman Stevens (Respondent), a candidate in the 2008 primary for a seat in the Florida House of Representatives, willfully violated section 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (2008), by certifying that six of her campaign reports were true, correct, and complete when they were not. Whether Respondent willfully violated section 106.19(1)(c), Florida by falsely reporting, or deliberately failing to report information required to be reported by chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2008).1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent was a candidate for the House of Representatives, District 100, in the August 26, 2008, primary election. As a candidate for the Florida Legislature, the Division of Elections of the Florida Department of State (the Division), was Respondent's filing office, and Respondent was required to file all her reports electronically. On October 30, 2007, Respondent filed with the Division her Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository form listing herself as treasurer for her 2008 campaign. On November 1, 2007, Ms. Bronson sent Respondent a letter acknowledging that Respondent had been placed on the 2008 active candidate list. The letter advised Respondent that all candidates filing reports with the Division were required to use the electronic filing system (EFS) and provided Respondent with a personal identification number (PIN) and initial password to grant access to the EFS. The user was expected to change the initial password after logging on for the first time. Ms. Bronson's letter included the following information: You, your campaign treasurer, and deputy treasurers are responsible for protecting these passwords from disclosure and are responsible for all filings using these credentials, unless the Division is notified that your credentials have been compromised. * * * Each campaign treasurer's report filed by means of the EFS is considered to be under oath by the candidate and campaign treasurer and such persons are subject to the provisions of Section 106.075(5), Florida Statutes. * * * An online guide is available to you on the EFS to assist with navigation, data entry, and submission of reports. The Division of Elections will also provide assistance to all users by contacting the EFS Help Desk at (850) 245-6240. All of the Division's publications and reporting forms are available on the Division of Election's web site at http://election.dos.state.fl.us. It is your responsibility to read, understand, and follow the requirements of Florida's election laws. Therefore, please print a copy of the following documents: Chapters 104 and 106, Florida Statutes; Candidate and Campaign Treasurer Handbook (September 2007 edition); 2007-2008 Calendar of Reporting Dates; and Rule 1S-2.017, Florida Administrative Code. When a campaign report is submitted electronically through the EFS, both the candidate and treasurer's PINs must be entered into the website. Though it is possible for either the candidate or the treasurer to give their PINs to another individual to enter the report on their behalf, the candidate remains responsible for the PINs and the filed reports. Respondent did little to educate herself as to her responsibilities as a candidate and as the treasurer for her campaign. She could not even remember whether she read Ms. Bronson's letter, and she did not remember whether she had read the handbook referred to by Ms. Bronson. Respondent did not attend any candidate trainings offered by the Broward County Supervisor of Elections Office. On November 21, 2007, Respondent resigned as treasurer and appointed her mother, Clementine Sherman, as her new treasurer. On December 5, 2007, Ms. Bronson sent a letter to Ms. Sherman, with a copy to Respondent, acknowledging Ms. Sherman's appointment as treasurer and providing the same information contained in Ms. Bronson's letter to Respondent dated November 1, 2007 (and discussed above). On January 29, 2008, the Division accepted Respondent's appointment of herself as her deputy treasurer. Respondent did not have a system for keeping track of campaign contributions or expenditures. Pursuant to section 106.07, Florida Statutes (2008), Respondent was required to file periodic reports listing "all contributions received, and all expenditures made, by or on behalf of her candidacy." At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been the owner of Prodigal S & D Corporation, which does business as Green Apple Association of Christian Schools (Green Apple). Respondent was authorized to issue and sign checks on the bank account owned by Green Apple. In August 2008, shortly before the primary election, Respondent placed an order with WPLG-TV for airtime to disseminate political advertisement for her campaign. The script used in the advertisement aired on WPLG included the following: "Please vote Freda Stevens for State Representative District 100 on August 26. Thank you."2/ On August 6, 2008, Respondent signed two checks made payable to WPLG. Both checks were drawn on the same bank account owned by Green Apple. Check 1050 was in the amount of $13,812.50. Check 1051 was in the amount of $680.00. Both checks were made payable to WPLG in payment for political advertising that Respondent had purchased from WPLG. When Respondent signed those checks to WPLG, she knew, or should have known, that there were insufficient funds in both the Green Apple account and her campaign account to cover the checks. On August 15, 2008, Respondent signed check number 1053 payable to WPLG that was drawn on the same bank account owned by Green Apple as checks 1050 and 1051. Check number 1053 was in the amount of $7,161.25 and was used to pay for political advertising that Respondent bought from WPLG prior to the primary election. When Respondent signed check numbered 1053 to WPLG, she knew, or should have known, that there were insufficient funds in both the Green Apple account and her campaign account to cover the check. Check numbered 1050 and 1051 were returned to WPLG for non-sufficient funds. WPLG did not deposit check numbered 1053. Respondent filed an original and five amended 2008 F3 Reports. Respondent certified that each report was true, correct, and complete. All reports were filed electronically utilizing the PIN number given to Respondent by Ms. Bronson. On August 22, 2008, Respondent filed her "Original Report." That report listed no campaign contribution from Green Apple, and it failed to list campaign expenditures to WPLG or other media. Because of those omissions, the report was not accurate, and it was not complete. On August 23, 2008, Respondent filed a first "Amended Report." That report listed five in-kind contributions from Respondent with the descriptor "media" under each contribution. The amounts of the in-kind contributions were $13,812.50; $680.00; $3,185.85; $7,161.25; and $3,187.00. That report was inaccurate because the in-kind contributor for three of the in- kind contributions ($13,812.50; $680.00; and $7,161.25) was Green Apple, not the Respondent.3/ Respondent lost the primary election. After the election, on August 30, 2008, Respondent filed a second "Amended Report." The five in-kind contributions from Respondent with the descriptor "media" that had been on the first "Amended Report" were deleted from the report and were replaced with the following four in-kind contributions with the reported date of the contribution in parentheses: $13,812.50 (August 6); $3,187.50 (August 20); $3,128.85 (August 18); and $680.00 (August 6). That report was inaccurate because the in-kind contributor was Green Apple, not the Respondent. That report also failed to report the check in the amount of $7,161.25 that Green Apple had issued to WPLG on August 15. On November 24, 2008, Respondent filed a third "Amended Report", a fourth "Amended Report", and a fifth "Amended Report." The third "Amended Report" deleted the in- kind contribution from Respondent dated August 6, in the amount of $13,812.50, and with the descriptor "media." The fourth "Amended Report" and the fifth "Amended Report" reflected no contributions, only expenditures, none of which was for media. These "Amended Reports" were incomplete and inaccurate. WPLG attempted to collect the monies owed by Respondent's campaign. Clementine Sherman remitted a payment (by cashier's check) in the amount of $6,000.00 on August 27, 2008.4/ Respondent remitted three money orders that were deposited September 28, October 15, and December 22, 2009, respectively. These money orders were in the amounts of $200.00, $200.00, and $680.00. These payments were not reflected on any report filed by Respondent.
The Issue Whether Petitioner willfully violated Section 106.021(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits a candidate from making an expenditure except through the campaign treasurer on 66 separate occasions, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony, documentary evidence, entire record of the proceedings, and facts admitted to in the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Alan Schreiber, was the incumbent candidate for Public Defender, 17th Judicial Circuit, in the 2000 election. Petitioner was unopposed for reelection when qualifying ended on July 21, 2000. Petitioner is an experienced politician serving his seventh term as Public Defender. During the 2000 campaign qualifying period, Petitioner made sixty-six expenditures for which he submitted receipts and received reimbursement from his campaign account. The expenditures for which Petitioner was reimbursed are as follows: Date Merchant Amount 05-01-00 Andrew's Tallahassee $261.00 04-04-00 Andrew's Tallahassee $225.61 12-13-99 Bar Amici/ Cathode Ray $50.40 10-29-99 Bar at Embassy Suite $51.41 06-30-00 Big Louie's $265.01 06-20-00 Big Louie's $145.72 06-27-00 Bimini Boatyard $64.82 05-31-00 Bimini Boatyard $316.49 05-21-00 Bimini Boatyard $70.08 05-18-00 Bimini Boatyard $43.26 12-08-99 Bimini Boatyard $71.66 10-20-99 Bimini Boatyard $47.92 05-04-00 Bravo Italiano $63.86 02-24-00 Bravo Italiano $232.43 02-15-00 Bravo Italiano $52.79 01-31-00 Bravo Italiano $62.86 01-27-00 Bravo Italiano $86.83 06-19-00 Café de Paris $113.34 05-24-00 Café de Paris $70.04 05-16-00 Café de Paris $154.99 05-12-00 Café de Paris $160.94 05-06-00 Café de Paris $136.11 04-13-00 Café de Paris $146.65 03-18-00 Café de Paris $113.09 03-04-00 Café de Paris $144.47 02-23-00 Café de Paris $280.10 02-07-00 Café de Paris $73.27 01-17-00 Café de Paris $193.51 12-27-99 Café de Paris $66.47 11-29-99 Café de Paris $145.60 11-26-99 Café de Paris $230.51 11-24-99 Café de Paris $133.57 11-15-99 Café de Paris $183.97 10-31-99 Café de Paris $105.68 10-22-99 Café de Paris $99.43 10-19-99 Café de Paris $130.76 03-31-00 Café de Paris $182.64 03-15-00 Costco Wholesale $140.96 12-14-99 Costco Wholesale $267.61 10-27-99 Costco Wholesale $231.02 Costco Wholesale $256.87 05-23-00 French Quarter $499.24 11-09-99 French Quarter $81.25 11-09-99 French Quarter $85.02 06-08-00 Georgio's Food and Spirits $193.14 05-11-00 Greek Islands $89.73 06-03-00 Greek Islands $75.25 01-04-00 Greek Islands $70.49 10-29-99 Heavenly Ham $349.66 03-22-00 Houston's $75.54 10-28-99 Mayhue's Liquors $70.02 06-14-00 Mezzanot $102.02 12-01-99 Padrino's Restaurant $61.21 03-17-00 Publix $235.32 12-16-99 Publix $235.32 10-29-99 Publix $212.00 Publix $149.41 05-07-00 Restaurante Botin $146.39 01-04-00 Sage $79.85 12-28-99 Sage $107.89 10-29-99 Salute-Embassy Suites $211.26 03-01-00 TGI Fridays $47.08 05-25-00 Things Remembered $79.49 05-24-00 Things Remembered $296.69 05-21-00 Things Remembered $386.22 01-03-00 Wolfgang Puck Café $138.87 While Petitioner's personal decision to "wine and dine potential donors, supporters and campaign volunteers" at upscale restaurants may have been the genesis of the complaint that caused the Commission's investigation, no evidence was offered that suggested this to be an inappropriate expenditure of campaign funds. Sixteen checks were written by the campaign treasurer from the campaign account to Petitioner to reimburse him for the above expenditures. The campaign treasurer acknowledged that he had misdated one of the sixteen checks. Each check was written on the campaign accounts, was dated, was made payable to Petitioner, and each check listed that the purpose of the expenditure was to reimburse for non- specific campaign expense(s) as follows: Date Check No. Purpose Amount 10-29-99 1003 Reimb.-Campaign party expenses 11-02-99 1004 Reimb.-misc. campaign lunches 11-16-99 1005 Reimb.-misc. campaign lunches $968.38 $536.68 $350.24 11-30-99 1006 Reimb.-misc. campaign dinners 01-06-00 1008 Reimb.-camp. party expenses $509.68 $502.93 01-07-00 1009 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $496.50 03-03-00 1015 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $566.81 04-04-00 1019 Reimb.-camp. meeting expenses $565.32 04-11-00 1020 Reimb.-camp. party exp. $376.28 04-27-00 1021 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $799.23 5-16-00 1023 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $679.69 5-18-00 1024 Reimb.- misc. camp. lunches $462.58 5-22-00 1025 Reimb.-novelty items $368.22 5-24-00 1051 Reimb.-misc. camp. lunches $612.58 5-26-16 1054 Reimb.-camp. novelty items $376.16 06-09-00 1055 Reimb.-camp. meals/lunches $386.53 Each of the above-noted reimbursements to Petitioner was listed as an expenditure on Petitioner's campaign treasurer's reports filed with the Division of Elections as follows: Date Name and Address of Purpose Amount Person Receiving Reimbursement 10-29-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $968.38 11-02-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $536.68 11-16-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $320.24 11-30-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $509.68 01-06-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $502.93 01-07-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $496.50 03-03-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $566.81 04-04-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement campaign meeting expenses $565.32 04-11-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $376.28 04-27-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $799.23 05-16-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $697.69 05-18-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $462.58 05-22-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement campaign novelty items $386.22 05-24-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $612.58 05-26-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign novelty dinners $376.16 06-09-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $386.53 While the campaign treasurer's report accurately reports reimbursements to Petitioner, because the reimbursements are non-specific and aggregated, it is impossible to determine the actual expense for which reimbursement is made. Stephen Michaelson served as the campaign treasurer for Petitioner's 2000 reelection campaign and had served as deputy treasurer of Petitioner's 1996 campaign. Mr. Michaelson has served a number of candidates in a similar fashion. Prior to filing papers to open the 2000 reelection campaign account, Mr. Michaelson and Petitioner discussed whether it was permissible under Florida law for a candidate to be reimbursed from his campaign account for legitimate, campaign-related expenditures made by him personally in the course of the campaign. Petitioner had experienced difficulty writing campaign checks at restaurants during the 1996 campaign. After the 1996 campaign, Mr. Michaelson had researched the issue and informed Petitioner that he had discovered a "reimbursement statute." Mr. Michaelson also found a 1994 Division of Elections opinion that he believed "to be right on all fours," i.e., the opinion dealt specifically with the issue. The 1994 Division of Elections opinion [DE 94-07] referred to by Mr. Michaelson provides, in pertinent part, as follows: It is also permissible for a candidate to make a purchase with his own personal check or currency if the candidate intends to seek reimbursement from his campaign. However, the purchase does not become a campaign expenditure until such time as the reimbursement is made by campaign check or petty cash through the candidate's campaign treasurer. In 1999, prior to opening his campaign account, Petitioner and Mr. Michaelson again discussed the "reimbursement issue." Mr. Michaelson checked Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, that had been in effect when the 1994 Division of Elections opinion [DE 94-07] had been issued and noted no changes in the statute. In addition, he did a computer search on Florida Statutes Annotated of District and Supreme Court cases and found nothing dealing with the subject that, in his opinion, would warrant a change in the Division of Elections opinion. He checked the Division of Elections website to see if the 1994 opinion was still there and concluded that it was. He did a computer check to see if there were any subsequent Division of Elections opinions that referred to expenditures; finding none, he concluded that the 1994 opinion was still in effect. Based on his review, he advised Petitioner that Petitioner could seek reimbursement from the campaign account for legitimate campaign expenditures that he paid with personal funds. Mr. Michaelson has been a campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer on seven occasions, has, himself, been a candidate, is a lawyer who has practiced criminal defense law for 23 years, and, during his testimony at this formal hearing, demonstrated competency and understanding of the Florida election law/campaign financing law. He gave Petitioner advice on Florida election law/campaign financing law knowing that Petitioner would rely on his advice. Petitioner's reliance on Mr. Micahelson's advice was warranted. In the same general time period during which he opened his reelection campaign account, Petitioner spoke to David Bogenschutz, an attorney in Fort Lauderdale, and asked whether a candidate could incur campaign expenses and then seek reimbursement from his campaign account. Mr. Bogenschutz is a lawyer who has known Petitioner since 1971, whose practice is devoted largely to criminal defense, who had previously advised and represented candidates and public officials in proceedings related to the Florida's election law/campaign financing law, had himself been a candidate, and was believed by Petitioner to be knowledgeable regarding Florida election law/campaign financing law. While Mr. Bogenschutz was reluctant to acknowledge that he was an "expert" in Florida election law, his testimony at this formal hearing demonstrated a satisfactory working knowledge of Florida election law/campaign financing law; it was appropriate for Petitioner to seek his counsel and to be guided by his advice. Mr. Boganschutz advised Petitioner that he saw nothing wrong with his reimbursing himself from his campaign treasury for authorized campaign expenses. He further advised that he would research the matter and advise if he saw anything wrong. Mr. Boganschutz reviewed Section 106.021(3) and Subsection 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes, and Florida Statutes Annotated. He concluded that Subsection 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes, permitted a candidate to be reimbursed for authorized campaign expenditures from the campaign account and so advised Petitioner. In giving his advise, he did not review Division of Elections Opinion DE 94-07 or a later opinion, DE 97-06, because, while other Division of Elections opinions are found in Florida Statutes Annotated, neither of the referenced opinions is listed in Florida Statutes Annotated. In addition, he felt that the statute regarding reimbursement was so clear that there was no need to do further research. In addition to his discussions with Mr. Michaelson and Mr Bogenschutz, Petitioner conducted his own research and concluded that it was appropriate to pay vendors personally for campaign-related expenses and then be reimbursed from his campaign account for those campaign-related expenses. The qualifying period ended on July 21, 2000, with Petitioner having drawn no opposition. At about the same time, a local newspaper article questioned Petitioner's campaign spending habits and quoted a Division of Elections official saying Petitioner should have been using campaign checks. After reading the newspaper article, Mr. Michaelson called the local Supervisor of Elections who advised him that Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded by Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06. This caused Mr. Michaelson obvious concern; the qualifying period had ended and, for Petitioner, the election was over. It appeared that he had incorrectly advised Petitioner regarding the propriety of paying campaign-related expenses personally and then seeking reimbursement. Mr. Michaelson then checked his research in an effort to understand how he had missed the rescission of Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 and discovered that the Division of Elections website did not indicate that opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded. The Division of Elections, Department of State, maintains a website which includes "Formal Opinions of the Division of Elections." This website lists all opinions from 1987-2000. Intermittently throughout the list of opinions is the notation "rescinded" in highlighted type, indicating that the particular opinion has been rescinded. No such notation appeared in reference to opinion DE 94-07. The 1997 Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06 indicates "Rescinding DE 76-16, 78-2, 88-32, 90-16, and 94-7." This is presented in the same type as the rest of the text and is not highlighted. Mr. Michaelson then used his web browser to search the Division of Elections website that lists these advisory opinions for the words "expenditure" or "reimbursement," the website did not direct him to the 1997 opinion DE 97-06. Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06, which, in part, rescinds Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07, provides in pertinent part, as follows: We held that candidates could make unlimited purchases by personal check as long as they intended for such expenditures to be reported as in-kind contributions. The opinion also stated that the "candidate cannot make such purchases as a campaign expenditure except by means of a campaign check . . . made through the candidate's campaign treasurer." This reasoning has resulted in some confusion as to when and under what circumstances a campaign expenditure or in-kind contribution occurs. Therefore, we rescind DE 94-07. Except for petty cash expenditures allowed under section 106.12, Florida statutes (1995), the only way that a candidate may make a campaign expenditure is by means of bank check drawn on the primary campaign depository, pursuant to section 106.11(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Having said this, we recognize the applicability of section 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes (1995), which requires that candidates report any reimbursements of authorized expenses from the campaign accounts to themselves. We believe that the purpose of this provision is to cover rare occurrences where the campaign must make an expenditure, but the campaign check book is not available. Such a situation could occur when a bill must be paid and the campaign has not received its first order of checks from the bank, or where, during the course of campaign travel, tolls or other miscellaneous expenses must be paid in cash and the candidate has failed to take the money out of his petty cash fund for such purposes. During the 2000 campaign, Mr. Michaelson maintained possession of the campaign checkbook which was usually kept at his home. On occasion, he would have one or two campaign checks on his person. If Petitioner asked for a campaign check, and Mr. Michaelson had one on his person, he would give it to Petitioner. On occasion, Petitioner would return a campaign check to Mr. Michaelson, indicating that the check was not accepted by a particular vendor. Most of the reimbursements at issue are a result of Petitioner's not having a campaign check with him at the time of a transaction or the vendor's unwillingness to accept a check or campaign check. In most instances the transaction involved purchases by Petitioner at restaurants. TGI Friday's located in Plantation, Florida, does not accept checks. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at TGI Friday's for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Bimini Boatyard does not generally permit patrons to pay with checks, although exceptions have been made. Petitioner made six campaign related-purchases at Bimini Boatyard for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. During his 1996 campaign, Petitioner wrote 15 checks directly to Bimini Boatyard for campaign expenditures from the campaign account. Café de Paris and French Quarter have a policy of not accepting checks except when personally approved by the owner or for a special party. The owner indicated he would not accept a campaign check. Petitioner made 20 campaign related-purchases at Café de Paris and three campaign-related purchases at French Quarter for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. The Sage Restaurant accepts only cash, MasterCard and Visa from restaurant patrons; checks are accepted for catering. The owner opined that had Petitioner called ahead and advised that campaign laws required him to pay by campaign check, she would accept that form of payment. Petitioner made two campaign-related purchases at Sage Restaurant for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Bar Amici and Cathode Ray do not accept checks; however, if a candidate advised that the law required payment by campaign check, a check would be reluctantly accepted. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at Bar Amici and Cathode Ray for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Greek Island Taverna does not accept checks. Petitioner sought reimbursement for three campaign-related expenditures at Greek Island Taverna for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Padrino's Restaurant does not accept checks. The owner, who is seldom at the restaurant, indicated that he would accept Petitioner's check. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at the Padrino's Restaurant for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Andrew's, a Tallahassee restaurant, does not accept checks from restaurant patrons. The manager opined that, if prior arrangements were made, a campaign check might possibly be accepted, but an out-of-town campaign check made it more problematic. Petitioner made two campaign-related expenditures at Andrew's for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Connie Evans, Chief, Bureau of Election Records, Division of Elections, Department of State, who has been employed by Division of Elections for 22 years and a bureau chief for five years, was qualified as an expert witness "in the area of Chapter 106 of Florida Statutes," without objection. She opined that Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, requires full disclosure of all contributions and expenditures for the public benefit. Ms. Evans further opined that Division of Elections advisory opinions are only binding on the candidate or organization who sought the opinion. Ms. Evans further opined that the Division of Elections, in applying Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06, considers that it is appropriate for a candidate to seek reimbursement for personal payment of a campaign-related expense at a restaurant when the restaurant refuses to take a check, but that the candidate should not return to the same restaurant knowing that the restaurant will not accept a campaign check in payment. She acknowledged that there is no statutory authority in Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, for this opinion. Ms. Evans further acknowledged that Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06 refers to Subsection 106.07(4)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (which allows reimbursement for campaign- related expenses), and that both DE 97-06 and DE 94-07 advise that it is permissible for candidate to reimburse himself for campaign-related expenses. Ms. Evans opined that the Division of Elections website should have indicated that Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded in bold type, as is done with the other rescinded opinions. Ms. Evans further opined that, if a candidate were to reimburse himself or another person for authorized campaign- related expenses, it is the position of the Division of Elections that the reimbursement must be made by a campaign check, must be reported on the campaign treasurer's report as an expenditure, and the amount, date, and the purpose of the expenditure must be reported.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Alan Schreiber, did not violate the Florida Campaign Financing Law as alleged and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Herron, Esquire Mark Herron, P.A. Post Office Box 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1701 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, Brian Pitts, treasurer for Justice-2-Jesus, a political committee, willfully violated Section 106.07(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to file a Campaign Treasurer's Report for the first quarter of 2008 (referred to herein as the 2008 Q1 CTR).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is the treasurer for Justice-2-Jesus, a political committee that registered with the Division of Elections (Division) on December 12, 2007. Justice-2-Jesus registered by filing an "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committees and Electioneering Communication Organizations" form, or Form DS-DE-6. Justice-2-Jesus designated Respondent, Brian Pitts, as its treasurer. Respondent signed the document, giving as his address 1119 Newton Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida. Also on December 12, 2007, Justice-2-Jesus filed a "Registered Agent Statement of Appointment," Form DS-DE 41, naming Calvester Benjamin-Anderson as its registered agent. Respondent signed the document and gave 1119 Newton Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida as the address of the registered agent. The Division sent a letter, dated December 14, 2007, to Respondent acknowledging receipt of the Form DS-DE-6 and providing information about the Division's electronic filing system for CTRs. The letter informed Respondent that all political committees that file reports with the Division are required to do so by means of the electronic filing system. The Division's letter concluded with the following paragraph, set out in bold type: All of the Division's publications and reporting forms are available on the Division of Elections' web site at http://election.dos.state.fl.us. It is your responsibility to read, understand, and follow the requirements of Florida's election laws. Therefore, please print a copy of the following documents: Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, 2006 Committee and Campaign Treasurer Handbook, 2007-2008 Calendar of Reporting Dates, and Rule 1S- 2.017, Florida Administrative Code. The Division's letter also enclosed a sealed envelope containing PIN numbers to allow Respondent secure access to the Division's electronic filing system in order to submit CTRs for Justice-2-Jesus. A CTR lists all contributions received and expenditures made during a given reporting period. The 2008 Q1 CTR is the report that a campaign treasurer should have filed on behalf of his committee at the close of the first quarter of 2008. Respondent's 2008 Q1 CTR was due to be filed on or before April 10, 2008. Candidates and political committees have been required to file their CTRs electronically since 2004. § 106.0705(2), Fla. Stat. The CTR data may be uploaded using any of several proprietary programs that have been approved by the Division. These programs carry a fee for their use. As an alternative, the treasurer may enter the CTR information directly into the Division's electronic filing system at no cost. The Division has published an online "Electronic Filing System (EFS) User's Guide" (the Guide) to explain the use of the electronic filing system. The Guide contains help menus to assist the user in completing the data entry for a CTR. The Guide is available in a PDF format that can be read online or downloaded to the user's computer at no cost. A user may also make a public records request to the Division for a hard copy of the Guide. The Division will provide the hard copy at a cost of $0.20 per double-sided page, or approximately $4.80 for the 47-page Guide. On or about April 11, 2008, the Division sent Respondent a letter informing him that it had not received the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus, which had been due on April 10, 2008. On or about April 25, 2008, the Division sent Respondent a second letter informing him that it had not received the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus. Both letters were sent to 1119 Newton Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida, the address provided by Respondent on the Form DS-DE-6 for Justice-2-Jesus. Neither letter was returned to the Division as undeliverable or unclaimed. At the hearing, Respondent did not deny receiving these letters in April 2008. On or about July 10, 2008, the Division sent to Calvester Benjamin-Anderson, the registered agent for Justice-2- Jesus, a final notice that Respondent had failed to file the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus. The letter was sent certified mail, return receipt requested. Ms. Benjamin-Anderson signed for the letter on or about July 14, 2008. Respondent testified that he attempted to hand-deliver a paper copy of the 2008 Q1 CTR to the Division, but that a Division employee told him that he was required to file all reports for his committee electronically. The Division's records indicate that Respondent had filed Justice-2-Jesus' 2007 Q4 CTR and its 2007 SR2 report2/ electronically, prior to the due date for the 2008 Q1 CTR. Erin NeSmith, a supervisor in the Bureau of Election Records, testified that Respondent came into the Division's offices on November 20, 2008. Respondent asked Ms. NeSmith questions about the 2008 Q1 CTR. She told him that the matter had already been referred to the Commission because Respondent had not filed the report despite repeated notices, but that Respondent still needed to file the 2008 Q1 CTR. Respondent explained to Ms. NeSmith that he had not filed the report because he had been busy and had a lot of items to pull together for the report. As of August 10, 2009, Respondent had yet to file the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus. At the hearing, Respondent testified that he had at least 50 contributions and 80 to 100 expenditures to report for the first quarter of 2008. Respondent testified that the due date for the 2008 Q1 CTR fell during the legislative session, when Respondent was extremely busy at the Florida Capitol. The Division's offices are open only during normal business hours, when Respondent was unavailable, and thus Respondent was unable to phone the Division for assistance in preparing the reports. Respondent defended his subsequent failure to file the report as something in the nature of a protest against the Division's electronic filing requirement and its alleged refusal to provide him with a paper copy of the Guide to facilitate his preparation of the report. Respondent complained that the vendors who provide Division-approved data uploading programs charge prohibitively expensive fees. He further complained that the alternative means of filing, direct entry of the data onto the Division's electronic filing system, is difficult and confusing without a paper copy of the Guide for assistance. Respondent acknowledged the availability of the Guide in printable PDF format, but asserted that purchasing printer cartridges and paper sufficient to print the Guide and other necessary Division handbooks would cost between $80.00 and $120.00. Respondent did not acknowledge the Division's willingness to print the Guide for $0.20 per double-sided page pursuant to a public records request. Respondent testified that he has assisted several other persons in preparing and filing their electronic reports to the Division. On behalf of Justice-2-Jesus, Respondent has electronically filed several reports to the Division subsequent to the due date for 2008 Q1 CTR. Willfulness is a question of fact. § 106.25(3), Fla. Stat. See Beardslee v. Fla. Elections Comm'n, 962 So. 2d 390, 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); McGann v. Fla. Elections Comm'n, 803 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 provides: For purposes of imposing a civil penalty for violating Chapter 104 or 106, F.S, the following definitions shall apply: A person acts "willful" or "willfully" when he or she knew that, or showed reckless disregard for whether his or her conduct was prohibited or required by Chapter 104 or 106, F.S. "Knew" means that the person was aware of a provision of Chapter 104 or 106, F.S., understood the meaning of the provision, and then performed an act prohibited by the provision or failed to perform an act required by the provision. "Reckless disregard" means that the person disregarded the requirements of Chapter 104 or 106, F.S., or was plainly indifferent to its requirements, by failing to make any reasonable effort to determine whether his or her acts were prohibited by Chapter 104 or 106, F.S., or whether he or she failed to perform an act required by Chapter 104 or 106, F.S. The evidence established that Respondent was well aware of the requirement to file the 2008 Q1 CTR on behalf of Justice-2-Jesus. Shortly after Respondent filed the committee's initial paperwork, the Division sent him an acknowledgement letter directing him to the Division's website for information about the electronic filing of campaign treasurer's reports. Respondent could have downloaded the Guide or any other Division publication. At the hearing, Respondent claimed no lack of knowledge of the filing requirements. After he failed to file the 2008 Q1 CTR, Respondent received two letters from the Division notifying him of the failure. Despite these notices, Respondent never filed the report. The evidence established that Respondent electronically filed two reports with the Division prior to the due date of the 2008 Q1 CTR, and filed several electronic reports after the due date of the 2008 Q1 CTR. These facts demonstrate Respondent's knowledge of the filing requirements and ability to prepare an electronic report. Respondent has acted willfully in his failure to file the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus. At the hearing, Respondent asserted that Justice-2- Jesus was indigent, but offered no financial data to support the assertion.
The Issue Whether S & A's bid on Job No. 18130-3426 should be disqualified? If so, whether Fairchild is entitled to the contract for Job No. 18130-3426?
Findings Of Fact On February 27, 1986, DOT issued a notice to contractors, "Advertisement No. 2," which announced that Sealed bids will be received in the Auditorium of the State of Florida, Department of Transportation Building, Tallahassee, Florida at 10:30 a.m. (Tallahassee Local Time) on Wednesday, the 26th day of March, . . . Joint Exhibit 2, No. 5 for, among other projects, Job No. 18130-3426, involving work on various bridges south of Wildwood in Sumter County. Joint Exhibit No. 5. DOT's standard specifications, those which apply to this and all other DOT bid lettings, include: 2-8 Delivery of Proposals. All bids shall be submitted in sealed envelopes bearing on the outside the name of the bidder, his address and the number of the project for which the bid is submitted. If submitted by mail the sealed envelope containing the proposal, marked as directed above, shall be enclosed in an outer envelope addressed to the Department, at the place designated in the Notice to Contractors. Mailed proposals should be sent by certified mail. If a proposal is not sent by mail, it shall be delivered to the Contracts Office of the Department, or to the place of the bid opening as designated in the Notice to Contractors. Proposals received after the time set for opening bids will be returned to the bidder unopened. . . . 2-10 Opening of Proposals. Proposals will be opened and read publicly, at the time and place indicated in the Notice to Contractors. Bidders, the authorized agents and other interested parties are invited to be present. Joint Exhibit No. 6 Opened and read publicly on March 26, 1986, were three bids for Job No. 18130- 3426, including Fairchild's, which was the apparent low bid, at $179,530. Joint Exhibit No. 2. At half past ten on March 26, 1986, as usually happened on bid-letting days, John Ted Barefield, chief of DOT's contracts bureau, had called time and stopped accepting bids. Bids already delivered to the auditorium that morning were all put on a table. Before opening and reading the bids on the table, Mr. Barefield waited a few minutes for the assistant contracts officer to arrive from the contracts office to learn if any other bids had been received in time. He finished reading the last bid for the last job just before noon. Another Bid When he returned to his office, Mr. Barefield found six packages delivered by Federal Express, including an unopened envelope containing a bid from S & A for Job No. 18130-3426, stamped in at 10:45. Joint Exhibit No. 3. The unopened envelope had arrived in the contracts office inside a Federal Express envelope addressed to DOT's contracts office, which Ms. Waller did open. After Ms. Waller told him the packages had reached his office at about 11:00 o'clock, he asked her to return them to the senders without opening the bids. Ms. Waller placed S & A's unopened bid in a larger envelope, Joint Exhibit No. 4, and sent it back to S & A by United Parcel Service (UPS). Later the same day, after conversations with Mr. Wilson, somebody in Mr. Barefield's office telephoned a DOT office in Deland, asking that the bid returned to S & A be intercepted. DOT's Edwin L. Fleming, Jr. arranged to accept delivery of (and sign for) the parcel from UPS in Orange City. Inside the envelope, which looked to be unopened, was S & A's bid for $117,230. Joint Exhibit No. 2. Eventually, DOT proposed to award Job No. 18130-3426 to S & A rather than to Fairchild. Filling In Robert Lee Wilson has worked for DOT in the motor pool since 1971, washing cars mostly. DOT's motor pool service facility is on Springhill Road in Tallahassee, but the motor pool also does some record keeping in a corner of the mail room, on the ground floor of the Burns Building. By mid-morning on March 26, 1986, the only people on duty in the mailroom were an unnamed woman who is deaf and dumb, and Mr. Wilson, who had been asked to help out. While the volume of mail at DOT has increased two or threefold, the mail room has lost a full-time position. During the same period, DOT personnel have scattered into leased space around Tallahassee so that mail room employees spend more time delivering the mail. When the courier from Federal Express reached the mailroom on March 26, 1986, he set 22 packages on a counter and began going through them checking the last four digits of the airbill on each against a list he had, and removing certain forms. After counting the packages and determining that none was C.O.D., Mr. Wilson signed for them and returned to sorting envelopes. Mike Schafenacker, one of 17 employees of DOT's contracts bureau, went to DOT's mail room about ten o'clock on the morning of March 26, 1986. Somebody there told him the Federal Express deliveryman had not arrived. At 10:25 a.m., according to the wall clock he glanced at, Mr. Schafenacker telephoned the mailroom from elsewhere in the building. Robert Wilson told him the Federal Express deliveryman had still not arrived. Three times that morning Mary Sue Waller spoke to Mr. Wilson in the mailroom: 9:30, 10:00 and 10:26, according to her clock. Each time she asked if any special delivery packages had arrived. By special delivery she meant not only mail, but also deliveries by Federal Express, Airborne and Emery, but she always asked about "special delivery." Each time she asked, Mr. Wilson said no special delivery packages had arrived. In Mr. Wilson's view, there is a difference between special delivery and Federal Express. The courier arrived that morning at 10:22, according to his watch, which was three minutes slower than the clock on the wall of the mailroom. He wrote 10:22 in his log. Joint Exhibit No. 1. The receipts Mr. Wilson signed indicated a 10:22 delivery. All 22 packages were "Priority 1," meaning the senders would be entitled to refunds if the packages were not delivered before 10:30, which would reflect adversely on the courier, Kenneth D. Brown, who was taking that route for the week because the regular courier was sick. In response to Mr. Barefield's questions on the afternoon of March 26, Mr. Wilson first said the packages had arrived after 10:30 at the time he stamped them in; then said 10:22; then said 10:27 or 10:28; then said between 10:25 and 10:30. At hearing, Mr. Wilson testified that the packages, including S & A's bid, arrived at 10:22 on the morning of March 26, 1986, the time indicated on the log sheet. Past Practice At every letting since 1980, those in charge have waited until after 10:30 to open the bids, to be sure of including all bids that reach DOT's contracts office before 10:30. A DOT employee leaves the contracts office for the auditorium shortly after 10:30, after checking with the mailroom. The contracts office is a suite of offices on a different floor of the Burns Building than the mailroom. During this period, DOT has consistently treated Federal Express deliveries in the same fasliion in which it has dealt with mail. For DOT's convenience, Federal Express made deliveries to the mailroom and not elsewhere in the building. It is DOT "policy for the mailroom to be the receiving and shipping point for the central office, because we can't have people. . . delivering to . . . individual offices within buildings . . . for several reasons." (T.77) DOT has never accepted a bid not read aloud at the bid letting. The evidence did not show to what extent S & A was aware of DOT's past practice; and did not establish specific reliance by S & A on DOT's past practice.
The Issue Whether Petitioners violated provisions of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order of Probable Cause filed August 23, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Chapters 97 through 106, Florida Statutes, comprise the Florida Election Code (Code). Pursuant to the Code, the Commission is empowered specifically to enforce the provisions of Chapters 104 and 106, Florida Statutes. Mary McCarty was elected to the City Commission of Delray Beach, Florida in 1987. She was elected to the Palm Beach County Commission in 1990. She has been returned to that office in each subsequent election and she is currently a member of the Palm Beach County Commission. In November of 2002, she was elected to her fourth term as Chairman of the Palm Beach County Republican Executive Committee. The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary was an unincorporated entity. It was a de facto committee, which, for reasons addressed herein, did not ever become a "political committee" as defined in Section 106.011(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. McCarty has run for public office six times and was successful on each occasion. Prior to each election she received from the Florida Secretary of State a handbook addressing campaign financing. She is familiar with the statutes and rules with regard to financing an individual campaign. Sometime before the Thanksgiving Holiday in 2000, Ms. McCarty received a telephone call from Roger Stone of Washington, D.C. Ms. McCarty knew Mr. Stone, who at various times had been a campaign operative for Senator Arlen Specter, had been involved in opposing the sugar tax amendment in Florida, and had been a consultant to Donald Trump, during his short-lived presidential campaign. Ms. McCarty was aware that Mr. Stone and Craig Snyder were principals of IKON Public Affairs, a business entity with offices in Washington, D.C., and Miami Beach, Florida. Roger Stone informed Ms. McCarty that he was forming a committee to raise funds for the purpose of taking action against the Florida Supreme Court. Mr. Stone stated that he had formed The Committee and that he wished for her to be the chairperson. She did not initially commit to undertake this responsibility. A few days after the conversation with Mr. Stone, Ms. McCarty received a facsimile draft of a fundraising letter that The Committee proposed to post. The facsimile was sent by Roger Stone from Washington. She made some suggested changes and returned it to the address in Washington from whence it came. Subsequently, she had a telephone conversation with Lora Lynn Jones of Unique Graphics and Design in Alexandria, Virginia. Ms. Jones was in the business of making mass mailings. Ms. McCarty told Ms. Jones that her name could be used on the fundraising letter although Ms. McCarty did not sign the fundraising letter. Nevertheless, the document was mailed to a large number of people and it bore the printed name, "Mary McCarty, Palm Beach County Commissioner." The first time Ms. McCarty saw The Committee's finished product it was in the form of a "Telepost, high priority communication." She first saw the "Telepost" when it arrived in her mailbox in early December 2000. The wording of the letter was different from the draft Ms. McCarty had seen earlier. Unlike the draft, it targeted specific justices on the Florida Supreme Court. It cannot be determined from the evidence the date the December "Telepost" was posted, but it was posted before Ms. McCarty determined that she had become Chairperson of The Committee. The "Telepost," dated December 2000, solicited funds so that The Committee could, ". . . send a clear message to the Florida Supreme Court that we will not tolerate their efforts to highjack the Presidential election for Al Gore." Later in December 2000, Mr. Stone called Ms. McCarthy and told her that she should be the chairman of The Committee. She agreed. Ms. McCarty signed a "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," which was dated December 19, 2000. This is a form provided by the Division of Elections, which, if properly completed and filed, officially establishes a political committee. She also signed a form entitled "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee." Mr. Stone, or his operatives, provided these forms to Ms. McCarty. She signed them and mailed them to Mr. Stone's address in Washington, D.C., which was the headquarters of the IKON Public Affairs Group. The "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," dated December 19, 2000, was received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. It listed Amber McWhorter as Treasurer. Inez Williams, who works in the document section of the Division of Elections, processed the form. When Ms. Williams received it, she recognized that the form was incomplete because on the face of it the reader could not determine if the committee was an "issue" committee, or a "candidate" committee. Ms. Williams noted that the mailing address on the form dated December 19, 2000, was "c/o VisionMedia," 1680 Michigan Avenue, Suite 900, Miami Beach, Florida. Ms. Williams found a telephone number for that business and dialed it, on December 27, 2000. No one answered so she left a message on VisionMedia's answering machine. In addition to the telephone call, Ms. Williams prepared a letter with the address of, "Mary McCarty, Chairperson, The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary, 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, Miami Beach, Florida." This letter was dated December 27, 2000, and was signed by Connie A. Evans, Chief, Bureau of Election Records. This is the address found on the "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee," which had also been received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. The letter signed by Ms. Evans on December 27, 2001, informed Ms. McCarty that items 3 and 7 needed to be "rephrased." It further informed Ms. McCarty, that upon receipt of the requested information the committee would be included on the "active" list. The message recorded on The Committee answering machine on December 27, 2001, generated a response from a person who identified himself as Mr. Snyder, on January 2, 2002. Mr. Snyder engaged in a telephone conversation with Ms. Williams. Ms. Williams explained to Mr. Snyder that items 3, 5, 7, and 8, would have to be completed properly as a condition of The Committee's being recognized. A letter dated January 4, 2001, bearing the letterhead of "The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary," and signed by Amber Allman McWhorter, was faxed to the Division of Elections on January 4, 2001, and received that date. This letter referenced the telephone call between Ms. Williams and Craig Snyder, who was further identified as The Committee's attorney. The letter stated that a corrected Statement of Organization of Political Committee, and a designation of treasurer, would be forwarded to the Division of Elections within the next 72 hours. On January 8, 2001, a filing was received by the Division of Elections that was deemed by the Division to be complete. Subsequently, in a letter dated January 10, 2001, and signed by Connie Evans, informed Ms. McCarty and The Committee that the Statement of Organization and the Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for The Committee complied with the Division of Elections' requirements. The Committee was provided with Identification No. 34261. Posted with the letter was a copy of the "2000 Handbook for Committees," which is published by the Division of Elections. The letter and the handbook were sent to The Committee operation in Miami, not Ms. McCarty, and no one in the Miami Beach operation ever forwarded it to her. Connie Evans, Bureau Chief of Election Records, the entity that supervises the filing of the forms mentioned above, believes that due to a court ruling in Florida Right to Life v. Mortham, Case No. 98-770-Civ-Orl-19A, the language in Section 106.011, Florida Statutes, which defines a "political committee," has been found to be unconstitutional. She believes that a political committee is not required to register with the Division of Elections but that if a committee does register, it must abide by the statutes regulating political committees. Ms. Evans has informed numerous entities of this interpretation of the law in letters. The efficacy of that case, and Ms. Evans' interpretation of it, will be discussed further in the Conclusions of Law, below. Ms. McCarty signed a "Campaign Treasurer's Report Summary"(CTR-Q1) which was filed with the Division of Elections on April 10, 2001. This addressed the period January 1, 2001 until March 31, 2001. Under the certification section of the CTR-Q1 are the words, "It is a first degree misdemeanor for any person to falsify a public record (ss. 839.13, F.S.)." Immediately above her signature are the words, "I certify that I have examined this report and it is true, correct, and complete." The box found immediately above and to the right of her signature, was checked to signify that Ms. McCarty was the chairperson of The Committee. According to Ms. Evans, The Division of Elections regulates several kinds of committees. There are "issues" committees, "candidate" committees," "party executive" committees, and "committees of continuing existence." Depending on the nature of the committee, different rules apply. The Committee was a "candidate" committee so the contribution regulations of a political candidate applied to the committee. That meant that the maximum contribution per person was $500. The CTR-Q1 indicated in the "Itemized Contributions Section" that seven people contributed $1,000 and one person contributed $2,000. Walter Hunter, Neda Korich, Arthur Allen, William Shutze, Caroline Ireland, Henry Allen, and Honore Wansler, contributed $1,000, each. Robert Morgan contributed $2,000. The amounts in excess of $500 were eventually returned to the $1,000 contributors, except that in the case of Henry Allen, the refund was made to Allen Investment corporation. The sum of $1,500 was returned to Robert Morgan, the $2,000 contributor, but the CTR-Q1 listed only a $500 repayment. Therefore, the CTR-Q1 in its expenditures section was incorrect with regard to Mr. Morgan. The CTR-Q1 also listed in the "Itemized Contributions Section" the receipt, on January 2, 2001, of $150,000 for "LOA/INK extension of credit for direct mail services." These words may be interpreted to mean that a loan in the form of an "in kind" service had been provided. This was reported under the name of Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The Committee had a bank account at CityBank of Miami, Florida. The sole authorized signatory on the account was Diane Thorne. The Account No. was 3200015694. There was no entry in the bank account of the receipt of $150,000. This indicates that the item was not processed through the bank and it would not have been processed through the bank if it were really an "in kind" contribution. Because the beginning balance was zero on February 8, 2001, it is concluded that the inception date of Account No. 3200015694 was February 8, 2001. Lora Lynn Jones, is the principal of Unique Graphics and Design, which is located in Suite 253, at an address in Alexandria, Virginia, which is not further identified in the evidence of record. Ms. Jones prepared and posted the fundraising letter of December 2000, at the direction of Mr. Stone. Ms. Jones talked on the telephone with Ms. McCarty prior to mailing the fundraising letter and determined that the language in the letter was agreeable to Ms. McCarty. At the direction of Mr. Stone, Ms. Jones requested payment and received payment for her work, but from whom she cannot remember, except that she is sure that Creative Marketing did not pay it. The money for this production was paid in advance by wire transfer. There is no evidence in the record that this was paid from the account of The Committee. In fact, because the payment was made sometime in early December 2000, it could not have been paid from the account because it had not been opened. Ms. Jones is aware of an entity by the name of Creative Marketing Company and she believes it may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. It is found by clear and convincing evidence that the fundraising letter was not paid for by Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The bank records of The Committee reflect a $50,000 expenditure made to Unique Graphics and Design, paid with a check dated May 9, 2001. This represents a payment for something other than the fundraising letter dated December 2000. The $50,000 item was reported as an expenditure on the CTR-Q1 that was reported to have been made on March 12, 2001. It was reported as having been made to Creative Marketing as payee. The only check in the amount of $50,000, reflected in The Committee checking account for the period February 8, 2001, to June 30, 2001, was payable to Unique Graphics and Design and was dated May 9, 2001. Therefore, it is found that the CTR-Q1 is incorrect when it was reported as having been made on March 12, 2001, to Creative Marketing. Ms. Jones believes there is a company by the name of Creative Marketing Company, which she believes may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. Contributions remitted in response to the fundraising letter were forwarded to one of Mr. Stone's two addresses. Because the address of 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, in Miami Beach, Florida, is the address listed on the fundraising letter, it is likely that contributions in response to the fundraising letter went to Mr. Stone's Miami Beach operation. In any event, it is found as a fact that Ms. McCarty did not personally receive or have any contact with any of the contributions remitted to The Committee. The people handling the receipt of funds and the deposits were Roger Stone and people paid by his organization, including Diane Thorne, the secretary; Amber McWhorter, the treasurer; and Craig Snyder. Just as Ms. McCarty was not involved in the receipt of income to The Committee, she was also not involved in the disbursement of funds. The CTR-Q1 was completed by The Committee's staff in either Miami Beach or Washington, D.C., but Ms. McCarty had no input into its preparation. When Ms. McCarty signed the CTR-Q1 she was without knowledge as to whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. It is further found that she made no effort to ascertain whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. She believed it to be true and correct because she trusted Mr. Stone's operatives to accurately prepare the report. Ms. McCarty, excepting the current litigation, has never been the subject of a Commission action. Ms. McCarty has an income of approximately $80,000. She owns a residence jointly with her husband which is valued at approximately $300,000 and which is subject to a mortgage of approximately $200,000. She owns a vacation home in Maine jointly with her husband that is valued at approximately $25,000. She and her husband own three automobiles. She owns stocks, annuities, mutual funds or certificates of deposit of an indeterminate value.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Orders of Probable Cause entered in the case of both Mary McCarty and The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kendall Coffey, Esquire Coffey & Wright, LLP 2665 South Bayshore Drive Grand Bay Plaza, Penthouse 2B Miami, Florida 33133 J. Reeve Bright, Esquire Bright & Chimera 135 Southeast 5th Avenue, Suite 2 Delray Beach, Florida 33483-5256 Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Ruching, Clerk Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue for consideration is whether the Respondent's signs, bearing permits numbers AX762 and AX782, respectively, located adjacent to U.S. Highway 41 in Manatee County, Florida, be removed for the reasons set forth in the Department's Notices of Violation dated March 15, 1999.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Transportation (Department) was the state agency responsible for the licensing and regulation of advertising along the highways of this state. Respondent, National Advertising Company, is a private company engaged in the outdoor advertising business in Florida. It owns numerous advertising signs placed at various locations adjacent to the roads in the Federal Highway System as well as state roads in this state. On March 11, 1998, Eugene Casey, an outdoor advertising inspector with the Department's Bartow, Florida, office, drove past a sign owned by Respondent and located on U.S. Highway 41 approximately 950 feet south of 73rd Street East in Palmetto, Manatee County, Florida. His examination of the sign in question revealed that it had no advertising copy on it, and it bore the permit tag with number AX782, which was issued to the Respondent. He also noted that the sign was closer than permitted to an adjacent sign, being only 408 feet away. This adjacent sign bore the permit tag number AX780, also issued to Respondent. The distance between the signs in question was measured by both Mr. Lowry and Mr. Casey. Mr. Lowry measured the distance utilizing a device in his vehicle which, he contends, was accurate to 2 feet in every 1,000 feet. Mr. Casey also used a similar device, but also utilized a walking wheel which he calibrated daily, and which he claims was exactly correct with no error. Even if the vehicle device with its 2-in-1,000 error ration were the only measurement taken, the degree of error is far less than that necessary to make any real difference in the spacing between 782 and 780, a distance of 408 feet. The Department rules require signs to be at least 1,000 feet apart. Mr. Casey also went past the sign in question approximately every two weeks during the succeeding 12 months and on no occasion did the sign display any advertising message. He took a photograph on March 11, September 15, and November 30, 1998, and also on March 24 and July 8, 1999. On none of these occasions had any advertising copy or a message of any nature been placed on the billboard. On the last occasion, he noticed that the face of the signboard had been painted to cover the apparent deterioration of the sign face. This deterioration, described as mildew and mold stains in both green and black was definitely not, as counsel for Respondent suggested, the remnants of an advertising message. On March 1, 1998, Mr. Casey also visited the sign bearing permit tag AX762, which was located on US Highway 41 approximately 590 feet north of Palmview Road in Manatee County. This sign was located on property zoned by the county as residential property. Under the rules of the Department, advertising signs may be erected only on property zoned commercial or industrial. As was the case with the previously mentioned billboard, AX782, Mr. Casey visited the site approximately every two weeks during the succeeding year and saw no message painted thereon. He took a photograph of the signboard on March 1, 1998, again on March 11, September 15, and November 30, 1998, and also on March 24, 1999. On none of those occasions did the signboard bear any advertising copy. Mr. Casey had no doubt at all that no message offering goods or services, or a public service announcement - in fact, no message of any kind was displayed on either sign. Respondent presented no evidence to indicate an advertising message had been displayed on either billboard during the period in question. Though not a matter properly in issue in this case, the Department established that both signs in question were nonconforming signs. The first, AX782, was nonconforming because it did not meet the applicable spacing requirements contained in the agreement between the state and the federal Departments of Transportation. The other, AX 762, was nonconforming because it was not located in an area designated primarily for commercial or industrial use under the county’s comprehensive plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order revoking permits AX782 and AX762 and ordering their removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary ATTN: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
