The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. (“Holiday Endowment”) is eligible for a consumer certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, the Holiday Endowment, is an organization incorporated in the State of Florida as a not-for-profit corporation under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes. It was formed in October 1996 by the Holiday Rotary Club of Holiday, Florida, as a vehicle for accruing funds to contribute to the various charities supported by the Holiday Rotary Club. The Holiday Endowment is exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3), having obtained an exemption letter from the Internal Revenue Service on May 30, 1997. Larry Schalles, Treasurer of the Holiday Endowment, testified that annual fundraising achieves variable results, and that the membership of the Holiday Rotary Club seeks to attain stability in its philanthropic endeavors by placing a portion of its funds into the Holiday Endowment each year. Once the endowment is built up, the interest can be used to pay for scholarships each year, leaving the principal intact. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the sole active function of the Holiday Endowment has been to raise moneys to establish the endowment fund. All moneys raised by the Holiday Endowment are invested in the fund to provide scholarships in the future. All of the Holiday Endowment’s fund raising activities are conducted by unpaid volunteers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Holiday Endowment has made no expenditures of any kind. The Department denied the Holiday Endowment’s application for a certificate of exemption on the ground that the Holiday Endowment did not qualify as a charitable institution under the seven criteria set forth in Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. In particular, the Department found that the Holiday Endowment does not expend in excess of 50% of its operational expenditures toward qualified charitable services, meaning that the provision of a charitable service is not the organization’s sole or primary function. As set forth above, the Holiday Endowment has in fact made no expenditures of any kind. The Department also found that the Holiday Endowment does not provide a reasonable percentage of services free of charge or at a substantially reduced cost to persons unable to pay for such service. The Holiday Endowment’s response is that the exemption should nonetheless be granted, because any expenditures it makes in the future will be for charitable purposes.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying the certificate of exemption sought by the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry C. Schalles, C.P.A. Treasurer, Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. 5728 Main Street New Port Richey, Florida 34652 William B. Nickell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street, Suite 304 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the AAI, Florida Chapter, is an affiliate member of the International Association of Arson Investigators, Inc. AAI, Florida Chapter, is a nonprofit corporation exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code, and is located at 2302 North Wallen Drive, Lake Park, Florida. The governing body for AAI, Florida Chapter, the International Association of Arson Investigators, is a world-wide organization dedicated to the suppression of arson and related criminal activities. The mission of the International Association of Arson Investigators is to provide education, training, and public awareness to combat these crimes. To this end, the International Association of Arson Investigators provides training through regional programs, seminars, and publications. The AAI, Florida Chapter, exists pursuant to a grant of authority from the International Association of Arson Investigators. However, the AAI, Florida Chapter, is a separate and distinct legal entity from the International Association of Arson Investigators. The membership of the AAI, Florida Chapter, is comprised of individuals involved in some professional aspect of arson suppression. Members are typically employed by fire departments, law enforcement agencies, and fire marshals' offices. Petitioner's membership also includes representatives from the Statewide Prosecutor's Office, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the various state attorneys' offices, and sheriffs' offices. Petitioner provides training for state agencies and educational organizations, including the Florida Fire College, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National Fire Academy, and school districts, community colleges and public universities in Florida. Petitioner provides the personnel, supplies, equipment and materials for the training programs which it conducts. Some of the training seminars conducted by Petitioner receive law enforcement matching funds, and are approved for continuing education units for law enforcement personnel and for recertification contact hours for fire service personnel. The educational training and programs provided by AAI, Florida Chapter, are offered to various entities on a contractual basis. Notwithstanding Petitioner's contractual relationships with several educational entities, it has no authority or control over those entities. Petitioner is not accredited by nor is it a member of Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, the Florida Council of Independent Schools, or any other organization responsible for accrediting educational entities. Petitioner applied for a consumer certificate of exemption as an educational institution, and contends that the basis for such exemption is that it is an administrative office whose function is to assist or regulate the customary activities of its members.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying a consumer certificate of tax exemption to Petitioner, the International Association of Arson Investigators, Florida Chapter. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CARLOYN S. HOLIFIELD, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5668 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. 1-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. 1-18. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Ruth Ann Smith, Esquire Tracy L. Allen, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Guy E. Burnette, Jr., Esquire William R. Lewis, Esquire Butler, Burnette & Pappas Bayport Plaza, Suite 1100 6200 Courtney Campbell Causeway Tampa, Florida 33607-1458 Larry Ruchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tel-World Ministries (petitioner), is a private, non-profit association formed on January 24, 1996. According to its articles of association, petitioner was formed "to operate for the advancement of religion, religious education and charitable purposes, by the distribution of its funds for such purposes, and in particularly to promote understanding and truth and save soul's in Christ Jesus." Its president is Frederick J. Hoffman, a resident of Holly Hill, Florida. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is charged with the responsibility of administering and implementing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. It has the specific task of collecting sales taxes and enforcing the State Tax Code and rules. By law, certain transactions are exempt from the state sales and use tax. Among these are sales or lease transactions by qualified "charitable" or "religious" institutions. In order for an organization to be entitled to an exemption, it must make application with DOR for a consumer's certificate of exemption and demonstrate that it is a qualified religious or charitble organization within the meaning of the law. Once the application is approved, the certificate entitles the holder to make tax-exempt purchases that are otherwise taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Claiming that it was entitled to a certificate of exemption as either a religious or charitable organization, petitioner filed an application with DOR on an undisclosed date in early 1996. The application itself has not been offered into evidence. After requesting additional information, on April 26, 1996, DOR preliminarily disapproved the application on the grounds petitioner did not qualify under the statutory definition of a religious institution, and it did not have as its primary purpose one of seven defined charitable purposes set forth in the law. Thereafter, petitioner filed a request for hearing to contest this decision. In its request for hearing, petitioner contended, among other things, that DOR had failed to consider the legislative intent of the law, failed to consider an amendment to the application, and failed to properly interpret its own rules and the general law. Petitioner agrees it is not a church but rather is a ministry. It has no building or established physical location from which it provides charitable or religious services. As described by its president at hearing, its president, and perhaps two other officers, go to other churches, primarily the Seventh Day Adventist Church, and they "assist" the pastors of those churches by giving "input" at mass, prayer, and Bible study classes. The association also disseminates religious materials, including brochures and the like. Under Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes, a charitable institution is generally defined as an entity which holds a current exemption from the federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The entity must also have as its "sole or primary function" the provision of, or raising funds for organizations which provide, one of seven defined charitable services, if a reasonable percentage of such services is provided free of charge, or at a substantially reduced cost, to persons who are unable to pay for such services. The parties agree that petitioner has a current exemption from the federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) and, in this respect, it meets the statutory requirements. Petitioner contends that its sole or primary function is to provide services of the type that fall within the charitable purpose defined in subparagraph (IV) of the statute. That purpose is defined as being "(s)ocial welfare services including adoption placement, child care, community care for the elderly, and other social welfare services which clearly and substantially benefit a client population which is disadvantaged or suffers a hardship." According to petitioner, it does God's work at other churches by assisting those churches' pastors in saving souls, and thus these services fall within the broad definition of "social welfare services." However, within the narrow context of the statutory exemption, and when the term "social welfare services" is given its plain and ordinary meaning, religious or spiritual activities do not qualify as "charitable" services. In general terms, to qualify as a religious institution, an entity must be (a) a church, synagogue, or established physical place for worship at which nonprofit religious services and activities are regularly conducted and carried on, (b) a nonprofit corporation the sole purpose of which is to provide free transportation services to church members and attendees, (c) a "state, district or other governing or administrative office whose function is to assist or regulate the customary activities of religious organizations or members within the state or district organization," or (d) a corporation qualified as nonprofit under section 501(c)(3) that owns or operates a Florida television station. Petitioner has no "established physical place for worship," its sole purpose is not to provide free transportation services to church members and attendees, and it does not operate a television station. Thus, it cannot qualify under the first, second and fourth parts of the definition. Petitioner's president contends, however, that he represents the "state office" of Tel-World Ministries, and therefore the association meets that part of the test. It is noted that the only "office" within the entity is that found in Holly Hill and it is not a part of a larger organization. Under DOR policy, in order to pass muster as a state, district or administrative office, petitioner must be a part of a larger organization and, within the hierarchy of that larger organization, assist or regulate the activities of those beneath it in the organizational hierarchy. This interpretation of the law is found in prior agency orders and is deemed to be reasonable. Because petitioner does not comport with this policy, it cannot qualify as a "state administrative office" within the meaning of the law. In summary, while petitioner submitted evidence to show that it is engaged in laudable religious efforts, the entity itself does not qualify as a religious or charitable institution for tax purposes, and thus it is not entitled to a consumer certificate of exemption.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a Final Order denying petitioner's application for a consumer certificate of exemption as a religious or charitable institution. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent: Respondent's proposed findings, while substantially altered, have been adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Frederick J. Hoffman 1728 Derbyshire Road Holly Hill, Florida 32117 William B. Nickell, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to an exemption from sales and use tax as a religious or charitable organization.
Findings Of Fact By Application for Consumer Certificate of Exemption dated March 17, 1992, Petitioner requested a sales tax exemption as a religious organization. The application indicates that Petitioner was incorporated on February 18, 1992. At all times, the president of Petitioner has been Reverend Robert M. Rinaldi. By letter dated April 16, 1992, Respondent requested that Petitioner supply information concerning its primary purpose, including a list of all activities or services and to whom they are generally offered. The letter also requested, among other things, statements of receipts and expenditures and a copy of the letter determining that Petitioner is exempt from federal income tax. Petitioner submitted to Respondent evidence of 12 expenditures during the quarter ending March 31, 1992. The expenditures and their descriptions are as follows: Morrisons-- dinner business; Holiday Inn in Tampa--lodging for quarterly convention; Maas Brother in Naples--attire; Marshalls-- personal; Martha's Health Food Shop--personal; Things Remembered--card case/business cards; RJ Cafe Tropical--lunch interview; Beach Works Marco Island--attire; annual membership fee for vice president's American Express card; Las Vegas Discount golf and tennis in Naples--personal; Eckerd's Vision Works--medical eyeglasses; Quality Inn Golf Country Club in Naples--lodging during business travel; Avon Fashions/Hampton-- personal; Del Wright in Sarasota--automobile expenses and travel; JC Penney--personal; Amador's Restaurant in Naples-- dinner/lunch; Avon Fashions/Hampton--personal; annual membership fee for treasurer's American Express card; and Mobil Oil--business travel. Petitioner produced other evidence of similar types of expenditures, such as for fitness center fees, car insurance, car service, car payments, utilities, and rent. Nothing in the record links these expenditures to religious or charitable activities. There were expenditures for printing religious tracts and self- improvement educational materials, but they do not appear to be a substantial part of the total expenditures of Petitioner during the time in question. After receiving these materials, a representative of Respondent telephoned Reverend Rinaldi and stated that Petitioner would have to submit additional documentation of its income and expenses and formal affiliation with prison chapels where Petitioner reportedly conducted outreach programs. Respondent's representative also asked for evidence of Reverend Rinaldi's counselling credentials. Petitioner next submitted a copy of a letter from the Department of Treasury determining that Petitioner was exempt from federal income tax. Petitioner also submitted a budget for the year ending 1992 and a proposed budget for the year ending 1993. However, the budgets did not document a charitable purpose. The budget reveals that the largest disbursement was $4200, which was rent for an office and living quarters. The largest single receipt was $1764.27, which was a contribution from the incorporator, who was Rev. Rinaldi. There were no charitable receipts, such as from contributions from members, the public, or anonymous sources. On November 10, 1992, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner requesting additional information, including statements of the primary purpose of the organization and of receipts and expenditures. The request asked for a description or explanation for each charity-related program expenditure. On November 18, 1992, Petitioner submitted a second Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. The information was essentially unchanged from the first application. Rev. Rinaldi also sent Respondent a religious flyer. On February 10, 1993, Petitioner submitted a third Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. The material was essentially unchanged from the preceding two applications. On March 30, 1993, one of Respondent's representatives sent a letter to Petitioner stating that Petitioner does not meet the criteria for exemption from sales tax. In response, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent received April 8, 1993, requesting reconsideration of the denial. On May 4, 1993, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter stating that, as indicated during an earlier telephone conversation, Respondent had not yet received sufficient documentation to justify a sales tax exemption. Following up on Rev. Rinaldi's opinion that Petitioner qualified as a charitable organization, the letter suggests that he submit materials describing each charitable service or activity, the types of persons receiving such services, the frequency that the services are offered, the demonstrated benefit provided by Petitioner to disadvantaged persons, the fees charged by Petitioner, and the availability of Petitioner's services at the same or less cost elsewhere. The letter also asks for a statement of income and expenses. In response, Petitioner filed a fourth Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption on November 10, 1993. Rev. Rinaldi explained Petitioner's activities as informing people of the truth and the second coming of Jesus Christ and stopping addictions to drugs and alcohol. The enclosed materials included a church telephone number. The materials state that services are available 24 hours a day for no fees and are provided solely for the spiritual preparation of humanity. The materials also indicate several addresses at which religious activities are conducted. Upon investigation, Respondent learned that Petitioner's telephone number had been disconnected, the street address is Rev. Rinaldi's apartment, and the addresses at which religious activities are conducted are locations of Alcoholic Anonymous, from which Rev. Rinaldi and his church had been barred as public disturbances. Checking with the post office, the investigator learned that all mail for Rev. Rinaldi and Petitioner is being forwarded to an address in New York. Respondent asked for more information, and Petitioner supplied information no different than that previously supplied. By letter dated April 26, 1994, Respondent informed Petitioner that its application was denied. Following another exchange of correspondence, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny dated June 17, 1994. The Notice of Intent to Deny states that Respondent determined that: [Petitioner] travels from church to church and does not assemble regularly at a particular established location. [Petitioner] conducts services for short periods of time at numerous temporary locations. [Respondent] has reviewed your application and supporting documents and has determined that the primary purpose of your organization fails to meet the qualifications for sales tax exemption authorized by Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. By letter dated June 24, 1994, Petitioner requested a formal hearing on its application for sales tax exemption. Petitioner does not regularly conduct services. Petitioner does not engage in other religious activities nor does Petitioner provide services typically associated with a church. Petitioner has no established physical place for worship. Petitioner has generalized plans to construct one or more places for worship. However, these plans are post-apocalyptic in nature and thus do not assure the commencement of construction in the immediate future.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption certificate from sales and use tax. ENTERED on December 20, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 20, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Rev. Robert Rinaldi P.O. Box 1081 167 N. Collier Blvd. J-3 Marco Island, FL 33937-1081 Attorney Lisa M. Raleigh Office of the Attorney General The Capitol--Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
The Issue Whether the proposed amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-2.0020(4) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because of conflict with section 1008.34(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), or because the rule will be arbitrary and capricious in its application and administration.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Florida Association of Independent Charter Schools is a Florida non-profit corporation. The association is substantially affected by the proposed amended rule. Petitioner Aspira Raul Arnaldo Martinez Charter School is a charter school in Miami-Dade County and is currently serving 573 students. Its school grades over the past two consecutive years are: “D” for 2014-2015 and “D” for 2015-2016. If the proposed amended rule becomes effective and the school receives a school grade lower than “C” for 2016-2017, the school will not be eligible for the 2017-2018 Capital Outlay Appropriation. The school is substantially affected by the proposed amended rule. Petitioner Miami Community Charter Middle School is a charter middle school in Miami-Dade County currently serving 283 students. It is a Title I school serving 99 percent Free and Reduced Lunch. Its school grades over the past two consecutive years are: “D” for 2014-2015 and “D” for 2015-2016. If the proposed amended rule becomes effective and the school receives a school grade lower than “C” for 2016-2017, the school will not be eligible for the 2017-2018 Capital Outlay Appropriation. The school is substantially affected by the proposed amended rule. Respondent State of Florida Board of Education is “the chief implementing and coordinating body of public education in Florida . . . [with] the authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement the provisions of law conferring duties upon it for the improvement of the state system of K-20 public education . . . .” § 1001.02(1), Fla. Stat. Respondent Florida Department of Education “act[s] as an administrative and supervisory agency under the implementation direction of the State Board of Education.” § 1001.20(1), Fla. Stat. “The Commissioner of Education is the chief educational officer of the state . . . , and is responsible for giving full assistance to the State Board of Education in enforcing compliance with the mission and goals of the K-20 education system except for the State University System.” § 1001.10(1), Fla. Stat. Charter school capital outlay funding is the state’s contribution to capital funding for charter schools. A charter school’s governing body may use such funds for the following purposes: purchase of real property, construction of school facilities, purchase or lease of permanent or relocatable school facilities, purchase of vehicles, renovation, repair, maintenance of school facilities, and insurance for school facilities. § 1013.62(3), Fla. Stat. The charter school statute, section 1002.33, Florida Statutes, specifically authorizes the State Board of Education to adopt rules which address charter school eligibility for capital outlay funds. “The Department of Education, after consultation with school districts and charter school directors, shall recommend that the State Board of Education adopt rules to implement specific subsections of this section.” § 1002.33(28), Fla. Stat. One of the specific subsections of section 1002.33 is subsection (19), entitled “CAPITAL OULAY FUNDING.” Subsection (19) provides, in pertinent part: “Charter schools are eligible for capital outlay funds pursuant to s. 1013.62.” Each year, the Commissioner of Education is required to allocate charter school capital outlay funds, if any are appropriated by the Legislature, to eligible charter schools.1/ One of the eligibility criteria, which is at the center of the parties’ dispute, is set forth in section 1013.62(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes: “Have satisfactory student achievement based on state accountability standards applicable to the charter school.” The 2016 Florida Legislature amended section 1013.62, but it did not amend the statute regarding satisfactory student achievement. With regard to satisfactory student achievement, presently effective rule 6A-2.0020 provides: (2) The eligibility requirement for satisfactory student achievement under Section 1013.62, F.S., shall be determined in accordance with the language in the charter contract and the charter school’s current school improvement plan if the school has a current school improvement plan. A charter school receiving an “F” grade designation through the state accountability system, as defined in Section 1008.34, F.S., shall not be eligible for capital outlay funding for the school year immediately following the designation. On February 28, 2017, Respondents published a Notice of Proposed Rule, which proposed to amend rule 6A-2.0020. On March 22, 2017, the State Board of Education approved the proposed amendments to rule 6A-2.0020. As approved, the portion of the proposed rule which addresses satisfactory student achievement provides: (4) Satisfactory student achievement under Section 1013.62(1)(a)3., F.S., shall be determined by the school’s most recent grade designation or school improvement rating from the state accountability system as defined in Sections 1008.34 and 1008.341, F.S. Satisfactory student achievement for a school that does not receive a school grade or a school improvement rating, including a school that has not been in operation for at least one school year, shall be based on the student performance metrics in the charter school’s charter agreement. Allocations shall not be distributed until such time as school grade designations are known. For the 2016-2017 school year, a charter school that receives a grade designation of “F” shall not be eligible for capital outlay funding. Beginning in the 2017-2018 school year, a charter school that receives a grade designation of “F” or two (2) consecutive grades lower than a “C” shall not be eligible for capital outlay funding. Beginning in the 2017-2018 school year, a charter school that receives a school improvement rating of “Unsatisfactory” shall not be eligible for capital outlay funding. Proposed amended rule 6A-2.0020(4), if adopted, will provide the standard for what constitutes failure to meet satisfactory student achievement for purposes of receiving capital outlay funding. A school with a grade of “F” or two (2) consecutive grades lower than a “C” will be ineligible for funding. Proposed amended rule 6A-2.0020(4), if adopted, will allow a charter school with a single “D” grade to continue receiving capital outlay funds for the next fiscal year. On April 5, 2017, Respondents published a Notice of Change for a technical change for rule 6A-2.0020, referencing the following rulemaking authority for the rule: sections 1001.02(1), (2)(n); 1002.33(19), (28); 1013.02(2)(a); and 1013.62(5).
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a consumer’s certificate of exemption from sales and use tax.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. At all material times, Petitioner has qualified as a Section 501(c)(3) organization under the Internal Revenue Code. Since March 1992, Petitioner has also held the sales and use tax exemption that it seeks in this case. Pursuant to a change in law requiring all exempt organizations to reapply, Petitioner submitted an Application for Consumer’s Certificate of Exemption dated February 1, 1997. By stipulation, the parties agree that, for the purpose of this case, the sole legal basis for the application is Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes, and, if Petitioner fails to prevail in this case, it may immediately file an application seeking the same exemption under another statute, such as Section 212.08(7)(n). Petitioner was incorporated in 1989. It was first incorporated in 1975, but its corporate status lapsed. Petitioner has been in operation for 40 years. In broadest terms, Petitioner’s purpose is to assist social-studies education in Florida. Petitioner’s major activities involve training teachers of social studies. The most important annual activity of Petitioner is to sponsor a statewide conference that gives social-studies teachers a chance to receive inservice training. This inservice training satisfies, in whole or in part, each teacher’s requirement to obtain inservice training credits in order to maintain her teaching certificate. Petitioner conducts the conference in October during inservice days on which public-school teachers statewide are generally relieved from classroom duties. Between 600 and 1200 teachers participate in this annual conference. The conference runs two days, but Petitioner offers preconference institutes for a day or two prior to the start of the conference. These institutes, which are held at the same location as the conference, provide social-studies teachers with more specialized training in social studies. Petitioner also assists four regional affiliates in conducting inservice training to social-studies teachers. These affiliates are the Southwest Florida Coalition for the Social Studies, Big Bend Council for the Social Studies, Central Florida Coalition for the Social Studies, and Northeast Florida Council for the Social Studies. Petitioner works with various organizations, including the Florida Department of Education, ensuring that these organizations are aware of the interests of social- studies teachers and that the teachers are aware of the activities of these organizations. Petitioner quarterly publishes Trends in Social Studies, which provides useful, current information to social- studies teachers. Petitioner sells advertising space in the journal, mostly to educational publishers. Petitioner provides free space to the Florida Department of Education, state universities, state community colleges, the Holocaust Center, and African-American educational centers. Partly through the use of an endowment fund, Petitioner also provides additional funding for the development of social-studies teachers and the promotion of social-studies education. Petitioner provides awards, including small monetary sums, for exceptional social-studies teachers in Florida, and recognizes, at the annual conference, the outstanding social-studies teacher from each of Florida’s 67 districts. Petitioner’s major sources of income are membership fees and conference registration fees. Individual teachers pay membership fees. Conference registration fees are paid by checks from individual attendees, school districts, archdioceses, and the State of Florida. Educational vendors pay Petitioner fees for the privilege of showing their products and services at the conference. Vendors’ fees typically make up the margin by which Petitioner’s revenues exceed expenses for the conference. Petitioner does not have any paid employees. Dr. Theron Trimble, who started teaching social studies in Florida in 1966, is the executive director of Petitioner and has been associated with Petitioner for 30 years. Dr. Trimble’s full-time employment is in the Collier County School District, where he is director of Fulltime Equivalents and Resource Allocations. All persons working for Petitioner are, like Dr. Trimble, volunteers with full-time educational employment throughout Florida. Petitioner pays small sums to instructors or presenters at the annual conference and pre- conference institutes, but these payments are strictly for their services in conducting their seminars. Petitioner intends to continue helping social- studies teachers meet students’ changing needs in social- studies education. For example, Petitioner recently sponsored an inservice program designed to help teachers incorporate computers in social-studies education. At a time of reduced state involvement, Petitioner has tried to fill the gaps in funding and curriculum control. Petitioner’s funding efforts are directed toward schools and teachers, rather than school districts. Three years ago, Petitioner started an endowment fund to establish a long-term mini-grant program for social- studies teachers. According to the Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, the first definition of “office” is “a special duty, charge, or position conferred by an exercise of governmental authority and for a public purpose: a position of authority to exercise a public function and to receive whatever emoluments may belong to it <hold public ~> [and] a position of responsibility or some degree of executive authority.” The fourth definition is “something that one ought to do or must do: an assigned or assumed duty, task, or role [and] the proper or customary action of something: FUNCTION.” The fifth definition includes: “a place in which the functions (as consulting, record keeping, clerical work) of a public officer are performed [and] the directing headquarters of an enterprise or organization.” The last definition is “a major administrative unit in some governments <British Foreign Office [and] a subdivision of some government departments <Patent Offices>.” According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, the second and third definitions of “office” are “[a] duty or function assigned to or assumed by someone: “the maternal office was supplied by my aunt (Gibbon) [and] “[a] position of authority, duty, or trust given to a person, as in a government, corporation, or other organization: the office of vice president.” However, the fourth definition is: “[a]ny of the branches of the Federal government of the United States ranking just below the departments [and a] major executive division of the British national government, often headed by a cabinet minister.” And the fifth and seventh definitions are “[a] public position: seek office" [and] [o]ften plural[; a]n Act performed for another, usually beneficial: a favor: 'The projected duel . . . was halted by the offices of friends on both sides.' (Katherine Anne Porter).” Webster’s second and third definitions of “administration” are “performance of executive duties: MANAGEMENT [and] the execution of public affairs as distinguished from policymaking.” The fourth definition includes “a governmental agency or board.” American Heritage’s first definition of “administration” is “[t]he management of affairs.” However, the second definition is “[t]he activity of a sovereign state in the exercise of its powers or duties.” The fourth definition is “[t]he management of any institution, public or private.”
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order granting Petitioner’s application for a consumer’s certificate of exemption from sales and use tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Theron Trimble 3710 Estey Avenue Naples, Florida 34104 Kevin J. O’Donnell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent took "agency action" when it certified the Okaloosa-Walton College Foundation, Inc. as its direct support organization and endorsed the Foundation's decision to sell the Mattie Kelly property; and whether Petitioners have standing to request an administrative hearing on those issues.
Findings Of Fact The Foundation was incorporated and first certified as a direct support organization in 1988. The Mattie Kelly property is approximately 13 acres of waterfront property on Choctawhatchee Bay in Destin, Okaloosa County, Florida. It includes the former residence of Mattie Kelly and the real property surrounding the residence. Destin, Okaloosa County, Florida, is a municipality, bounded on the north and west by Choctawhatchee Bay, on the south by the Gulf of Mexico, and on the east by Walton County, Florida. On August 17, 1992, Mattie Kelly executed her Last Will and Testament (will). Article VIII of the will states as follows: I give, devise and bequeath my personal residence located a 1200 Indian Trail Road, Destin, Florida 32541, including all real property surrounding the residence and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000,000) to Okaloosa-Walton Community College for the establishment of the "Mattie Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute of Okaloosa-Walton Community College." The purpose of the "Mattie M. Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute of Okaloosa-Walton Community College" shall be: To provide a meeting place for literary societies, fine arts groups, and small performing groups. To provide a location for conferences and seminars offered through Okaloosa-Walton Community College. To provide a location for biology studies and marine science studies associated with Choctawhatchee Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. To provide a location for displaying the coastal heritage of Northwest Florida. The Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000,000) endowment which forms part of this gift shall be used only for maintenance and operating costs in furtherance of the above purposes, including the perpetual care, maintenance and upkeep of my mausoleum. A Personal Representative's Warranty Deed dated March 6, 1997, conveyed the property to the Foundation. At some point in time, the Foundation decided to sell the property to a real estate developer and entered into a contract to do so. On March 15, 2004, Petitioner Hammet filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with the Board. The petition questioned whether the Board should support, endorse, and/or not oppose the sale of the property for private real estate development purposes, accept the college president's recommendation about the sale, and certify the Foundation to be operating in the best interest of the state. The Board's March 16, 2004, minutes state as follows in relevant part: ACTION AGENDA DSO Certification/IRS 990 The District Board of Trustees certified that requirements of Direct Support Organization under FS 1004.70 have been met and that the OWCC Foundation is in compliance with the procedures as herein described and accepts Form IRS 990 as submitted. Further, the District Board of Trustees supports and endorses the Foundation Board of Directors in its endeavor to sell the Mattie Kelly Property (Motion: Henderson; Second Rainer. Vote: 6 yes; 2 no (Smith, Wells). Motion carried. On April 22, 2004, the Board referred Petitioner Hammet's petition to DOAH, together with the Board's Motion to Dismiss. DOAH assigned this case DOAH Case No. 04-2049. On June 15, 2004, the Board referred the following to DOAH: (a) Petitioner Coastkeepers' Petition for Administrative Hearing; (b) Petitioner's Motion and Suggestion for Disqualification of Joseph Henderson and James R. Richburg; and the Board's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Administrative Hearing. DOAH assigned the case DOAH Case No. 04-2141. On July 8, 2004, some of Ms. Kelly's relatives filed a suit against the Foundation in Circuit Court. In Count I of the complaint, the relatives sought a declaratory judgment that the Foundation's proposed sale violates Ms. Kelly's will and that the relatives had reversionary rights to the property. In Count II of the complaint, the relatives sought injunctive relief to restrain the Foundation from selling the property to a third party in accordance with a written contract of sale. On April 20, 2005, the Florida Attorney General issued an Advisory Legal Opinion, stating that the Foundation is subject to Florida's Sunshine Law. On May 5, 2005, the Foundation voted to ratify the contract to sell the property and to confirm the prior decision to sell the property. On June 3, 2005, the First Circuit Court entered a "Final Judgment for Defendant" in L. Bernarr Kelly, Carol Kelly and Lowell B. Kelly v. The Okaloosa-Walton Community College Foundation, Inc., No. 2004-CA-405 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. June 3, 2005), which states as follows in pertinent part: . . . The Court is convinced by the nature of the Will, and the testimony and evidence that Mattie Kelly had legal advice in her estate planning, that if Mattie Kelly intended for the subject property to be placed in a trust, and if she desired to put restrictions on the subject property to prevent Defendant Foundation from selling it, that she knew how to accomplish this, and that she chose not to do so. The Court finds . . . that Mattie Kelly did not intend to limit or restrict the sale of the subject property in the future to fulfill her desires for the creation of a cultural and environmental institute. . . . The Court finds that the deed dated March 6, 1997, . . . does not contain a reverter clause or language creating any right of reversion. . . . The Court finds that the deed conveyed a fee simple title to the OWCC Foundation with no right of reversion. The Court further finds that this deed was in accordance with the intent of Mattie Kelly at the time she executed her will. The Court finds that Article VIII of the Will which devised the subject property contains no language of trust and no language of reverter, and did not create a charitable trust . . . . The Court further finds that Defendant's proposed sale of the subject property does not include the "mausoleum property." . . . Since the mausoleum property is not being conveyed, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs no longer have standing as to the remaining property, and would deny Plaintiffs relief on this basis, in addition to the foregoing reasons. Therefore, the Court finds for the Defendant, The Okaloosa-Walton Community College Foundation, Inc. and against the Plaintiffs, and ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows: Defendant Foundation's proposed sale of the subject property is not in derogation of Article VIII of the Last Will and Testament of Mattie Kelly, or the deed which conveyed the subject property to Defendant Foundation. Therefore, Defendant Foundation is not prohibited from selling the subject property, excluding the mausoleum property as described in Addendum #4 to the Contract for Sale and Purchase, in order to fulfill the intent of Mattie Kelly in creating the "Mattie M. Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute;" however, all monies received from the sale of the subject property, including any matching funds, are to be used in the establishment and operation of the Mattie M. Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute. [Emphasis added.] On June 8, 2005, Petitioners filed a Joint First Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing, stating as follows regarding standing: Petitioner Hammet's substantial interests will be affected by Respondent's determination because she and her family live within close proximity to the Mattie Kelly property and have often used and enjoyed the property for viewing the coastal heritage of Northwest Florida, and she wishes to continue to use and enjoy the property in the future. The Mattie Kelly property is a special place for Hammet and her family, where they have many pleasant memories and regularly have benefited from this public property being in their neighborhood. Hammet and her family will no longer be able to use and enjoy this accessible public resource if it is sold for private development. Petitioner Coastkeepers' substantial interest will be affected by Respondent's determination because it is a Florida non-profit corporation dedicated to protection of the environment in an area of the Gulf of Mexico Coast that includes Okaloosa and Walton Counties and Choctawhatchee Bay. Preservation of environmentally sensitive lands such as the Mattie Kelly property, and having the Mattie Kelly property as a location for biological studies, marine science studies, and studies of the coastal heritage of Northwest Florida, are vitally important to protecting Choctawhatchee Bay and the interest of Petitioner and its members, who include a substantial number of members who reside in Okaloosa and Walton Counties and have the present intention to use, visit, enjoy, and study biological, marine science and cultural heritage issues associated with Choctawhatchee Bay, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Mattie Kelly property at the Mattie Kelly property. The Mattie Kelly property is ideally suited to provide waterfront environmental education in an otherwise highly urbanized environment, including education of local residents, which is vital to controlling urban runoff, and for highlighting, encouraging, and educating the public of the need to protect Choctawhatchee Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. The Mattie Kelly property would no longer be available for such intended pursuits were the proposed sale of the Mattie Kelly property to private development interest go forward. Moreover, the proposed development of the very property set aside by Mattie Kelly would itself directly contribute to the urban runoff known to be causing problems in Choctawhatchee Bay. Choctawhatchee Bay has many examples of waterfront subdivision development and very little opportunity for environmental protection education in a local setting near where waterfront residential owners already live. These purposes will not be as well-served by educational efforts at OWC's main campus in Niceville, which is not waterfront and miles away from Choctawhatchee Bay. If properly managed, the Mattie Kelly property should be the field trip every school-age child in Okaloosa and Walton County takes, which would be a lasting legacy to Mattie Kelly that would truly be consistent with her express purposes. This opportunity will be forever destroyed if the property is developed as proposed. On June 24, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Joint First Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing. On July 5, 2005, Petitioners filed a Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Joint First Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing. Neither of the Petitioners holds any title interest in the property.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a final order dismissing the Petitions for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Richburg, President Okaloosa-Walton Community College 100 College Boulevard Niceville, Florida 32578-1295 Joseph D. Lorenz, Esquire 1270 North Elgin Parkway, Suite C-12 Shalimar, Florida 32579 Steven A. Medina, Esquire Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Echsner & Proctor, P.A. 316 South Baylen Street Post Office Box 12308 Pensacola, Florida 32581
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Spiritual Kingdom of God the Creator of All Universes, should receive a consumer's certificate of exemption.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the administration of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. On or about February 4, 1999, the Petitioner submitted an application for consumer’s certificate of exemption. Such application sought exemption as a religious organization. On February 17, 1999, the Department issued a letter to the Petitioner acknowledging receipt of the application and requesting additional information about the Petitioner in order to complete the application review. On March 15, 1999, the Department issued a second notice to the Petitioner that mirrored the prior request for additional information. On April 26, 1999, the Department issued a third letter that advised Petitioner that it had failed to demonstrate that it meets the criteria as a religious institution as defined by Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. This letter outlined the criteria that would support the approval of the certification sought by the Petitioner. On June 11, 1999, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the Petitioner’s application for a consumer’s certificate of exemption. Thereafter the Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to contest the agency’s decision.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying the Petitioner’s application for a consumer’s certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Wendell Phillips Spiritual Kingdom of God the Creator Post Office Box 331228 Coconut Grove, Florida 33233-1228 George C. Hamm, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Petitioner, who is employed as an occupational therapist by a local school board, is considered a “teacher” eligible for the 2015 State of Florida Best and Brightest Scholarship Program.
Findings Of Fact The 2015 Florida Legislature Appropriations Act created the Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program, chapter 2015- 232, p. 27, Item 99A. The eligibility pre-requisites for applying to and being awarded the Scholarship (up to $10,000) were established in the Scholarship. The Scholarship provides as follows: Funds in Specific Appropriation 99A are provided to implement Florida's Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. The funds shall be used to award a maximum of 4,402 teachers with a $10,000 scholarship based on high academic achievement on the SAT or ACT. To be eligible for a scholarship, a teacher must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment and have been evaluated as highly effective pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, or if the teacher is a first-year teacher who has not been evaluated pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. In order to demonstrate eligibility for an award, an eligible teacher must submit to the school district, no later than October 1, 2015, an official record of his or her SAT or ACT score demonstrating that the teacher scored at or above the 80th percentile based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. By December 1, 2015, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall submit to the department the number of eligible teachers who qualify for the scholarship. By February 1, 2016, the department shall disburse scholarship funds to each school district for each eligible teacher to receive a scholarship. By April 1, 2016, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall provide payment of the scholarship to each eligible teacher. If the number of eligible teachers exceeds the total the department shall prorate the per teacher scholarship amount. The Scholarship does not define the word “teacher.” Petitioner, who timely filed an application for the Scholarship, contends that she is a “teacher” and is therefore eligible for the award. Respondent and Intervenor contend that Petitioner is an occupational therapist, and, as such, she is not considered a “classroom teacher,” which is the target group that the Legislature intended for the teacher scholarship program to cover. Petitioner contends that even if the Scholarship is limited to “classroom teachers,” she meets the statutory definition of a “classroom teacher” and is therefore eligible to receive the Scholarship. It is undisputed that the 2015 Scholarship language is vague as to whether the Scholarship is limited to classroom teachers. In 2016, the Legislature made it clear that the award is intended to only cover “classroom teachers.” Legislation enacted in subsequent legislative sessions may be examined to ascertain legislative intent. See Crews v. Fla. Pub. Emp’rs Council 79, AFSCME, 113 So. 3d 1063, 1073 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)(citing Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d 1216, 1230 (Fla. 2006)). Recently, the Governor signed chapter 2016-62, Laws of Florida. Section 25 of chapter 2016-62 enacts section 1012.731, Florida Statutes, the Florida Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program.1/ Section 1012.731(2) provides that the “scholarship program shall provide categorical funding for scholarships to be awarded to classroom teachers, as defined in s. 1012.01(2)(a), who have demonstrated a high level of academic success.” The Legislature's amendment of the language, just a year after the first appropriation, confirms that the Legislature intended the award to go to "classroom teachers," as defined in chapter 1012. Petitioner was hired by Respondent as an occupational therapist. She has worked as an occupational therapist for Respondent for approximately 17 years. Petitioner does not hold a Florida teaching certificate and her position as an occupational therapist does not require a Florida teaching certificate. Instead, Petitioner is licensed by the Florida Department of Health, which has jurisdiction over ethical violations committed by occupational therapists licensed in Florida. In her position as an occupational therapist, Petitioner reports to Respondent’s director of Pupil Support Services, who supervises all therapists within Sarasota County Public Schools. Petitioner’s stated job goal is “[t]o facilitate the handicapped student’s independent functioning in the school setting.” Petitioner’s performance responsibilities, as set forth in her job description, are to: Conduct appropriate evaluation of students referred for possible exceptional student education needs and prepare reports of the evaluation and findings. Plan intervention and service delivery programs to meet student’s individual needs. Implement and direct interventions essential to meeting targeted students’ needs. Provide information and consultative services to appropriate personnel in support of students with disabilities. * * * Establish schedules for meeting with students, conferencing with parents and assisting in rehabilitation techniques. Provide resources to all stakeholders involved in the evaluation, identification of student needs and rehabilitation of students. Petitioner delivers therapeutic services individually or in a small group setting, in a room assigned to her, or in a classroom, usually at the same time a teacher is delivering instruction to the entire class. Petitioner completes “lesson plans,” which are referred to in the therapy setting as “plans of care.” Plans of care differ in substance from lesson plans prepared by teachers because lesson plans set out a teaching plan for the entire class, whereas plans of care set out therapeutic goals and activities directed to one student that complies with the goals set forth in a student's Individualized Education Plan (IEP). As an occupational therapist, Petitioner is responsible for maintaining a “class roster,” which is referred to in the therapy setting as a “caseload.” Occupational therapists maintain a caseload for student accountability purposes and for Medicaid billing purposes. Petitioner’s therapy sessions are assigned a “700” course code, which correlates in the Florida Department of Education's course directory to “related services.” Joint Exhibit O is an example of courses offered to students by Respondent. The course list includes math, language arts, physical education, science, social studies, art, Chinese, music, and occupational therapy. Petitioner is listed as the “teacher” for the occupational therapy course. Unlike the other listed “teachers,” Petitioner is not instructing students in a subject area; she is delivering a service. See § 468.203(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). Succinctly stated, the difference, in this context, between “occupational therapy” and the other listed “courses,” is that occupational therapy is not a subject area that a student learns about; it is a service that a student receives to help them to achieve independent functioning. Although listed as “course” by Respondent, occupational therapy, as compared to the other listed “courses,” is not a “course” within the meaning of section 1012.01(2)(a).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Sarasota County enter a final order finding Petitioner ineligible for the Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 2016.
