The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Environmental Protection (Department), Division of Recreation and Parks' (Division) existing Rule 62D-2.014(18), Florida Administrative Code (Rule), is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Specifically, the issues are whether the Division has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority and whether the Rule is vague, fails to establish standards for Division decisions, and vests unbridled discretion in the Division.
Findings Of Fact Frandsen Frandsen is a citizen of the state of Florida who is interested in free speech activities in state parks that advance the cause of naturist activities, including recreation. Frandsen is a physicist and works for the United States Air Force, essentially as a defense scientist. Frandsen's original challenge in this proceeding was directed, in part, to the Division's application of the Rule and the validity of agency statements as rules and as applied to him. Frandsen has deleted these from his challenge. This Final Order does not decide whether the Division has properly applied the Rule to Frandsen nor whether any agency statements are invalid, nor whether the Rule is constitutionally infirm either on its face or as applied. Frandsen's cause, with respect to the state park system, is to see limited, designated areas within state parks open to "clothing optional recreation, particularly beachfront recreation, where someone can sunbathe," "socialize," and "swim nude in the ocean and on the beaches as the human race has for eternity." Frandsen is aware of the anti-nudity rule, Rule 62D- 2.014(7)(b), but is challenging the right to be able to advocate changing the rule which prohibits nudity. For Frandsen, "[t]he issue [here] is [his] ability to exercise free speech to communicate with the public to advocate for [his] cause," in a state park. Conversely, "[t]his action does not deal with the issue of whether [Frandsen has] a constitutional right to incorporate nudity into a communication." His main concern is the absence of standards in Rule 62D-2.014(18) to channel the Division's exercise of discretion relating to time, place, and manner restrictions placed on free speech activities and also the threat of arrest if the restrictions are not complied with. The Department stipulated that Frandsen has standing to challenge Rule 62D-2.014(18) as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Department and Division The Department is an agency of the state of Florida, which manages and operates state parks under its jurisdiction, pursuant to Chapter 258, Part I, Florida Statutes, through its Division of Recreation and Parks. The Division has the duty "to supervise, administer, regulate, and control the operation of all public parks " Section 258.004(1), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the Division "shall preserve, manage, regulate, and protect all parks and recreational areas held by the state . . .." Section 258.004(2), Florida Statutes. It is the policy of the Division "[t]o promote the state park system for the use, enjoyment, and benefit of the people of Florida and visitors . . . administer the development, use and maintenance of these lands and render such public service in so doing, in such a manner as to enable the people of Florida and visitors to enjoy these values without depleting them . . .." Section 258.037, Florida Statutes. "The division has authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement provisions of law conferring duties on it, and the violation of any rule authorized by this section shall be a misdemeanor and punishable accordingly." Section 258.007(2), Florida Statutes. State Parks The Division manages 155 state parks, which comprise over a half a million acres. The term "state parks" is generic and includes historic sites, beach areas, river parks, parks with swimming pools, geological sites, archeological sites, and recreation areas. The parks are very diverse and offer different opportunities for visitors. The parks can range in size from just a few acres to over 25,000 acres. Florida's state park system is the fourth largest in the nation. Over 16 million people visited the parks last year, which was an increase of 13 1/2 percent from the previous year. The state park system is divided into five districts, each of which includes 20 to 30 parks. The Division employs over 1,000 full-time employees and approximately 300 to 500 part-time, OPS help. Each district is under the supervision of a district bureau chief who is responsible for that district's employees, visitors, volunteers, and parks. Individual parks or groups of parks are under the direct supervision of a park manager. Honeymoon Island State Park, which is located on the west coast of Florida in Pinellas County, is one of six main parks all managed by the same park manager. It is part of a GEO (Geographically Efficient Operation) park, which includes 15 properties, both submerged lands and uplands, and extends through 3 counties. Not every park is staffed with Division personnel at all times. For example, District 4 has approximately 25 parks with 17 park managers. In parks which are not staffed, the telephone numbers of the park manager and assistant manager are posted within the park at various locations including near the restrooms, pay phones, concessions, or camp grounds. Various activities are enjoyed in state parks including: swimming, camping, hiking, boating, biking, horseback riding, wildlife viewing, snorkeling, guided tours, and picnicking. Each park offers a different number and combination of these activities. The Division's primary mission is to enable the public to enjoy outdoor-based resource recreation. Through its rules, the Division regulates many activities in state parks to ensure the safety of visitors and to protect park resources, including the speed of vehicles, parking, boating, fishing, the consumption of alcoholic beverages, bathing and swimming, domestic animals, hunting, merchandising, aircraft, and commercial photography. See Rule 62D-2.014(4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (12), (13), (14), (15), and (17), Florida Administrative Code. The Rule Rule 62D-2.014(18), Florida Administrative Code, provides: Free Speech Activities. Free speech activities include, but are not limited to, public speaking, performances, distribution of printed material, displays, and signs. Free speech activities do not include activities for commercial purposes. Any persons engaging in such activities can determine what restrictions as to time, place, and manner may apply, in any particular situation, by contacting the park manager. Free speech activities shall not create a safety hazard or interfere with any other park visitor's enjoyment of the park's natural or cultural experience. The park manager will determine the suitability of place and manner based on park visitor use patterns and other visitor activities occurring at the time of the free speech activity. Rule 62D-2.014 pertains to "activities and recreation." Section 258.007(2), Florida Statutes, is cited as the specific authority for Rule 62D-2.014, including Subsection (18). Rule 62D-2.014, including Subsection (18), implements Sections 258.004, 258.007(1)-(3), 258.014, 258.016, 258.017, and 258.037, Florida Statutes. The Rule was adopted in 1996 to inform the public that free speech activities are welcome in state parks. It sets broad guidelines and standards for park managers to ensure that the public's First Amendment rights are respected and not infringed. The Division felt the need for a rule "to put park staff on notice that [First Amendment activity] is okay and it is allowable and it is acceptable." No permits have been issued for free speech activities since the mid-1990's as a result of a federal court order. See The Naturist Society, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 858 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. 1994). The Rule was not intended to be all encompassing because of the diversity of the parks. Most activities in the parks include some form of free speech activity. The term "include, but are not limited to" means anything that is covered by the First Amendment, whether it be oral, written, or symbolic conduct. The Rule applies to even a single individual wishing to engage in free speech activities as defined by the Rule, including, but not limited to the activity of "displays" and "signs." The Rule states that free speech activities shall not interfere with any other park visitor's enjoyment of the park's natural or cultural experience. This means that people are free to conduct any activity they choose so long as the manner in which they do it does not infringe on other park visitors' purpose for coming to the park. For example, if an area of a particular park were known for bird watching, it would be inappropriate for someone to walk through that area playing loud music or shouting. The Rule contemplates that the Division will be diligent in protecting visitor enjoyment and safety. The Rule states that free speech activities shall not create a "safety hazard." Safety hazards vary depending on the activity, area, and park involved. They can range from the dangers inherent to a large assembly of people, which would be the same in any park, to the dangers of holding a particular activity in a specific area of a specific park. The types of safety hazards a manager must consider will vary significantly with the type of activity and the park in which it takes place. Park managers also consider "visitor use patterns" when determining the suitability of the time, place, and manner of a particular activity. Visitor use patterns are the different activities, which typically occur in a particular park. They vary by time of the day and the season and are therefore different day-by-day and park-by-park. For example, a visitor may tour the Gamble Plantation as a historic site, but not swim. At Honeymoon Park, people use the beach and swim. Moreover, during the summer, the use patterns at Wakulla Springs State Park for swimming are heavy, whereas the pattern for swimming decreases rapidly during the winter. Different safety concerns arise given the nature and use(s) of each park. A person or group wishing to engage in free speech activities are not always able to access a park manager to determine applicable time, place, and manner restrictions because the park manager may not be on duty during all hours and days when the park is open. The Division does not decide in advance and publicly post or otherwise publicly provide generic time, place, and manner restrictions. Beyond the Rule, there are no written documents, handbooks, guidelines, and policies of general application to provide guidance to the Division park managers to determine what time, place, and manner restrictions may be applied. Each determination of time, place, and manner restrictions by the Division, including the resources, which may be needed to be expended to accommodate a free speech activity, is made on a case-by-case basis based upon the criteria in the Rule. Because of the number of parks, their diversity, staffing issues, and the varying attendance on particular days or in particular seasons, it would be impracticable to develop a set of standard time, place, and manner restrictions for every possible activity, which may occur in every park. The Rule contemplates that a park manager may consult with other personnel with the Department and the Division regarding the application of the Rule. Park managers have consulted with legal counsel prior to responding to a request or, in some cases, request legal counsel to respond directly to the requesting person. This procedure is the norm regarding requests for "clothing optional demonstration[s]." The Department's "Office of General Counsel is consulted on all nudity issues that may involve free speech to ensure compliance with all current laws" and responses are given on a case-by-case basis in light of counsel's interpretation of the Rule, reached in conjunction with First Amendment case law. The Rule does not require contact with a park manager prior to engaging in a free speech activity. The Rule contemplates that the public may contact a park manager to ensure that a planned activity will not create a safety hazard or conflict with other planned activities. For example, weddings are welcomed in the state parks, although prior notification is not required. But, notification can be helpful to the park manager to determine the number of people involved and the time of day to ensure, for example, that parking is available. Although the Rule does not state a time in which park managers must respond to a request for any applicable time, place, and manner restrictions, the Rule contemplates that these decisions will be made within a reasonable time. The Division expects their park managers to respond in an expeditious manner. The Division's typical practice is to respond within a 2 or 3 week period. There have been exceptions to this expectation. The level of complexity of the inquiry may lengthen the time to respond. Generally, any person dissatisfied with a response from the park manager may contact various levels of responsibility throughout the Division and Department. This process is not referred to as "an official administrative appeal." Nevertheless, any decision regarding an interpretation of a park rule or a response to an inquiry results in the formulation of agency action. Any person substantially affected by the agency action should be given a point of entry to challenge the agency action pursuant to and consistent with the procedural requirements of the APA. See Department's Proposed Final Order, page 10, paragraph 46.
The Issue Whether Respondent should be terminated from her employment with the Seminole County School Board.
Findings Of Fact Mack has been employed by the School Board for six years. During the 2001-2002 school year, Mack was a school lunch assistant assigned to Seminole High School. Her immediate supervisor was John Caldwell (Caldwell). Mack received satisfactory evaluations of her work for Petitioner until April 2002, when she received an evaluation from Caldwell criticizing her in several areas. On April 12, 2002, a Friday, Mack was upset about her evaluation, showed her evaluation to fellow workers and loudly complained about her evaluation. She was becoming disruptive to the cafeteria operations. Caldwell called Mack into his office to discuss her behavior. She became loud, and Caldwell had to call the Assistant Principal. Mack was sent home. Caldwell did not tell her not to come back, and, at that time, did not tell her that he was going to recommend that she be terminated. On Monday, April 15, 2002, Mack called her workplace and said that she was sick and was going to the emergency room. On April 16, 2002, Mack called in and spoke to Janelle Harris (Harris), who was Caldwell's assistant. Mack told Harris that she had the flu and would not be coming to work. The policy for a food service worker at Seminole High School who was going to be absent from work because of sickness was that the worker was to call either Caldwell or Harris and notify them of the absence. The telephone in Caldwell's office has voice mail capabilities; thus, if Caldwell or Harris were not in the office, the sick employee was to leave a message on the voice mail. Caldwell and Harris were the only two persons who had access to the code to retrieve messages from the voice mail. On April 17, 2002, Mack was absent from work, but did not call in and give an explanation for her absence. Mack continued to be absent from work without calling in. On April 26, 2002, Mack came to the school office and picked up her paycheck. She did not go to the cafeteria and tell Caldwell or Harris why she had not been at work. Learning that Mack had gone to the school to pick up her check, Caldwell called Mack at her home. Mack told Caldwell that she had called in and left a voice mail. No messages were left on the voice mail by Mack between April 17 and April 26. Caldwell explained to Mack that she was required to call in unless she was in the hospital or could not talk. Daniel Andrews (Andrews), the Director of Food Services, prepared a letter to be sent to Mack under Caldwell's signature. The letter, dated May 2, 2002, advised Mack that she had continued to be absent without calling in to notify Caldwell of her absence and to provide a reason for the absence. The letter further advised her that three days of absence without leave required a penalty of termination. Mack was requested to contact Caldwell by noon on May 7, 2002, or the case would be referred to Andrews. Mack did not receive the letter until May 8, 2002; however, she never contacted Caldwell concerning the letter. By letter dated May 10, 2002, Andrews advised Mack that because of her continued absences without leave and her failure to provide justification for her absences that he would be requesting that her termination be recommended to the School Board. Mack received this letter on May 18, 2002. By letter dated May 20, 2002, Paul Hagerty, Superintendent of Public Schools for the School District of Seminole County, Florida, advised Mack that he would be appearing before the School Board on May 28, 2002, and recommending that she be suspended without pay. He further advised her that at the June 11, 2002, School Board meeting he would file a recommendation that her employment be terminated effective June 12, 2002. Mack contacted Andrews by telephone and left a voice mail. On May 21, 2002, Andrews returned her call, and Mack told him that she had gotten the voice mail when she tried to call Caldwell but did not leave any messages. Andrews would have accepted a reasonable explanation from Mack for her absences when she talked to him on May 21, but she did not provide any plausible reason for not notifying Caldwell of her absences nor did she ever provide any documentation from a doctor that she had been ill during her absences. Mack told Andrews that she did not care if her employment was terminated. By letter dated May 25, 2002, Mack requested a hearing on the decision to terminate her employment. Mack did not request a hearing concerning the recommendation for her suspension. On May 28, 2002, the School Board suspended Mack, effective May 29, 2002. Mack had a job at a local barbeque restaurant during the evening hours. While she was absent from her job at Seminole High School, she continued to work at the barbeque restaurant. The Non-Instructional Personnel of Seminole County Board of Public Instruction, Inc., and the School Board have entered into a collective bargaining agreement, effective July 1, 1997, through June 30, 2002, covering the wages, hours, and the terms and conditions of employment of the public employees within the bargaining unit. The collective bargaining agreement applies to Mack's employment with the School Board. Article VII, Sections 5, 11, and 15 of the collective bargaining agreement provide: Section 5. Regular employees who have been hired for a minimum of three (3) continuous years (without a break in service) shall not be disciplined (which shall include reprimands), suspended or terminated except for just cause. * * * C. An employee may be suspended without pay or discharged for reasons including, but not limited to, the following providing just cause is present: * * * 10. Improper use of sick leave. Section 11. Absence Without Leave Employees will be considered absent without leave if they fail to notify their principal, appropriate director or supervisor that they will be absent from duty and the reason for such absence. Absence without leave is a breach of contract and may be grounds for immediate dismissal. Section 15 Employees shall report absences and the reason for such absences prior to the start of their duty day in accordance with practices established at each cost center. An employee who has been determined to have been AWOL shall be subject to the following progressive discipline procedures: 1st Offense--Written reprimand and one day suspension. 2nd Offense--Five day suspension without pay. 3rd Offense--Recommend for termination. The School Board interprets the collective bargaining agreement to mean that each day an employee is absent without leave is a separate offense. At no time did the School Board issue Mack a written reprimand, one-day suspension, or a five- day suspension prior to her termination, as set forth in Section 15 of the collective bargaining agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Dorothy Mack was absent without leave, suspending her for one day, and issuing a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas L. Johnson, Esquire Chamblee, Johnson & Haynes, P.A. 215 West Verne Street, Suite D Tampa, Florida 33606 Sandra J. Pomerantz, Esquire Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Paul J. Hagerty, Superintendent Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Honorable Jim Horne Commissioner of Education Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street Turlington Building, Suite 1514 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a patient transporter. On December 27, 2018, Petitioner sustained a back injury while on the job. Petitioner reported the injury to Lora Vitali, Director of Colleague Health, Respondent’s employee healthcare department. Ms. Vitali instructed Petitioner to take the rest of the day off work and treat the injury with ice and ibuprofen. On December 28, 2018, Petitioner returned to Colleague Health and reported that she was still in pain. Colleague Health nurse, Monica Hubmann, arranged massage therapy and pain medication for Petitioner and instructed her to report back to Colleague Health on Monday, December 31, 2018, for further evaluation. Petitioner presented to Colleague Health on December 31, 2018, and reported that she was still in pain. Nurse Hubmann referred Petitioner to Dr. Spencer Stoetzel, who evaluates and treats Respondent’s employees who are injured on the job. Dr. Stoetzel is employed by North Florida Sports Medicine & Orthopaedic Center, not Respondent. At Dr. Stoetzel’s direction, Petitioner received regular treatment, including both physical and occupational therapy, until March 25, 2019. Petitioner was on workers’ compensation leave from work during her treatment. On March 25, 2019, Dr. Stoetzel cleared Petitioner to return to work with no restrictions and a 0% impairment rating. Based on Dr. Stoetzel’s conclusion, Ms. Vitali released Petitioner to return to work effective March 26, 2019. Ms. Vitali informed Petitioner of her release to work on March 25, 2019. Petitioner’s supervisor placed Petitioner on the work schedule after she was released to return to work, but Petitioner did not return to work as scheduled, and did not return any one of several telephone calls from her supervisor. Therefore, Respondent discharged Petitioner for job abandonment. Petitioner disputes her dismissal for job abandonment because she maintains that she was unable to work due to continuing pain. Petitioner disputes Dr. Stoetzel’s conclusion that she could return to work beginning March 26, 2019. Petitioner testified that Dr. Stoetzel told her that, based on the results of magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”), she had a lumbar tear in the L4-L5 region, yet the discharge summary excluded the results of the MRI. The discharge summary refers only to a “[l]umbar sprain or strain with discrepant pain as well as radicular symptoms [pain radiating down the leg].” In the discharge summary, Dr. Stoetzel concludes, “There is really nothing further I have to offer.” Petitioner testified that her pain is continuous, has increased in severity, and prevents her from wearing shoes, driving, doing household chores, and caring for her children. Ms. Pride testified that her daughter is in constant pain and that Ms. Pride has assumed care of her grandchildren during the day when Petitioner’s husband is at work. Petitioner maintains that she has been unable to work due to her injury from December 27, 2018, through the date of the final hearing. Petitioner did not introduce any evidence of discrimination on the basis of her race, sex, or in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. With regard to age discrimination, Petitioner testified that Dr. Stoetzel once commented that her back pain was due to her age. Petitioner’s PRO includes no references to discrimination based on her age, sex, race, or in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that Tallahassee Memorial HealthCare, Inc., did not discriminate or retaliate against Petitioner, and dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief in Case No. 2019-18837. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2020. Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Elaine Williams 411 Earline Hobbs Road Quincy, Florida 32351 Gerald D. Bryant, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. 2nd Floor 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Stephanie Clark, Esquire Pennington, P.A. Suite 200 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding Respondent, Frederick Alexander, was a student at Seminole Community College. As such, Respondent was subject to the disciplinary rules and regulations of Seminole Community College as set forth in the College's general catalog, Volume 16, April 1981. In particular, Petitioner's Rule 6HX25-4.06 provides as follows: Seminole Community College expects its students to be mature and responsible citizens at all times and places. Any student whose conduct or dress, whether on or off campus, at any time, is in violation of law, is a public nuisance, or deemed improper and detrimental to the College, may be subject to disciplinary action including probation, suspension, dismissal or denial of re-enrollment . . . . While enrolled at Seminole Community College, on or about September 25, 1981, Respondent entered Room J-110 at the College and, while in the presence of Claudette Gover, a secretarial employee of the College, exposed his genitals, and remarked to Ms. Gover, "Do you want some of this black stuff, Baby?" Ms. Gover appeared as a witness at the final hearing in this cause, and positively identified the Respondent from a photograph of the Seminole Community College basketball team. Subsequently, on or about October 26, 1981, Respondent was observed in the ladies shower room in the health building on the campus of Seminole Community College. That shower room is a non-coeducational facility, intended solely for use of female college students and faculty and staff members, and is clearly marked as such. Respondent was observed in the shower room by a female student who had just emerged from the shower and was clad only in her underclothing. Although Respondent made no overt advances to the female student, he remained in the locker room adjacent to the shower room, which also was used only by female students and faculty, until the female student dressed and left the room. Later, when questioned by college officials concerning his entry of the ladies shower room, the Respondent neither admitted nor denied his conduct. The Respondent was, however, positively identified as the individual in the shower room by the female student.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Board of Trustees of Seminole Community College dismissing Respondent as a student at the College. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 1982, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Clayton D. Simmons, Esquire Stenstrom, McIntosh, Julian, Colbert & Whigham, P.A. Post Office Box 1330 Sanford, Florida 32771 Frederick Alexander 1619 West 16th Street Sanford, Florida 32771
The Issue Whether Petitioner meets the qualifications prescribed by Chapter 475, Florida Statutes for licensure as a real estate salesman?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a 1986 graduate of Florida State University. He has a degree in urban politics and real estate. In November, 1989, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in Palm Beach County Circuit Court to two counts of burglary of a dwelling, one count of petty larceny, and one count of dealing in stolen property. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Petitioner was placed on five years probation, which, the court specified, was not subject to "early termination." In addition, Petitioner was ordered to pay $360.00 in restitution and $265.00 in court costs. These crimes were all committed in June, 1989, after Petitioner had returned to Palm Beach County from a two or three-month vacation in Colorado. The two counts of burglary involved the same dwelling: the townhouse that Petitioner had lived in, with others, prior to his Colorado vacation. The lease to the townhouse, which was in the name of one of his roommates, had expired before his return from vacation. Contrary to the instructions of the landlord, Petitioner entered the dwelling on at least two separate occasions after coming back from Colorado in order to retrieve personal belongings that remained in the townhouse. The stolen property involved in the dealing in stolen property charge was a stereo that belonged to Petitioner's friend. Petitioner tried to pawn the stereo for $45.00. The petty theft charge involved the taking of ten CD's that were on top of a CD player located in a bar in the vicinity of the townhouse. Since these incidents, Petitioner has not run afoul of the law. Petitioner presently owns and operates the South Florida Adventure Club, a business which plans and organizes social activities for single professionals. In his spare time, he serves as an advisor to two youth groups. Petitioner is still on probation. He has paid in full the restitution ordered by the court. His court costs, however, have not yet been paid in full. He still owes $50.00.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not qualified for licensure as a real estate salesman because of his criminal record and denying his application for licensure based upon such a finding, without prejudice to Petitioner filing a subsequent application supported by a showing that, "because of the lapse of time and subsequent good conduct and reputation, or other reason deemed sufficient, it appears . . . that the interest of the public and investors will not likely be endangered by granting" the application. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of September, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Respondent: 1. Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. 2-4. Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 5. First sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Remaining sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. 6-10. Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony than findings of fact based upon such testimony. 11. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a statement of the case than a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg Allen Hinds 2016 Broward Avenue # 3 West Palm Beach, Florida 33407-6112 Joselyn M. Price, Esquire Assistant Attorney General 400 West Robinson Street Suite 107, South Orlando, Florida 32801 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
