Findings Of Fact On November 24, 1976, petitioner purchased an airplane (the Corsair) in Florida from R. D. Whittington Aircraft Sales, Inc., for which he paid eighty thousand dollars ($80,000.00). Sales tax has never been paid on account of this transaction. Before the purchase, petitioner asked George W. Sullivan, an airplane mechanic and test pilot, to evaluate the Corsair as an investment for resale. After petitioner acquired the Corsair, he caused three new cylinders to be installed and had the carburetor, the magneto and the propeller overhauled. Within three or four months of petitioner's acquisition, several prospective purchasers had inspected the Corsair. In the spring of 1977, petitioner began displaying the Corsair. At various times, petitioner engaged other pilots to ferry the Corsair to aircraft shows at Cherry Point, North Carolina, Greenville- Spartanburg, South Carolina, and elsewhere. At the time of the hearing, the Corsair had been flown approximately 43 hours since petitioner had acquired it, ten to twelve hours of which petitioner flew himself, in the course of displaying the Corsair and checking out repairs. Petitioner has traded in airplanes for the last several years and has been recognized as a dealer in aircraft by the Internal Revenue Service. Petitioner, who moved to Florida from California, applied to respondent for a dealer's certificate promptly upon learning that he was required to do so. On November 24, 1976, however, petitioner was not registered as an aircraft dealer with respondent. After an unsuccessful attempt to register effective retroactively to July 1, 1972, petitioner registered as a dealer with respondent, effective October 1, 1977. According to respondent's records, R. D. Whittington Aircraft Sales, Inc., was not registered as a dealer with respondent on November 24, 1976, and has not registered since. Petitioner obtained an address for R. D. Whittington Aircraft Sales, Inc., from respondent and, on or about, December 20, 1977, sent by certified mail a blanket resale and exemption certificate to the address respondent had furnished. A return receipt indicated that the certificate was delivered as addressed. In the past, respondent has treated sales to dealers as exempt from sales tax where the purchaser furnished the seller a resale and exemption certificate at the time of the sale and even when the certificate has been furnished afterwards, where the purchaser was registered as a dealer with respondent at the time of the transaction. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's proposed assessment be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of August, 1978 in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675
Findings Of Fact The stipulated facts are as follows: The petitioner is GJPR Two Corporation, formerly Employers Insurance Management Corporation, a Florida Corporation, and its address is c/o W. L. Adams, Esquire, Pyszka, Kessler, Adams and Solomon, 2699 South Bayshore Drive, Miami, Florida 33133. Said petitioner has a substantial interest in these proceedings and has proper standing herein. The agencies affected are the Department of Revenue, Tallahassee, Florida, and the Office of the Comptroller of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida; no other agencies are affected. These proceedings have been properly initiated and are now properly before the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Administration of the State of Florida. The parties are not in dispute as to any issues of fact, and agree to the following findings of fact: On or about June 1, 1977, petitioner sold all of its assets of every kind and type in a single transaction to Arthur J. Gallagher and Company. The assets sold included two aircraft. When the registration documents of such aircraft were presented to the State of Florida for transfer, payment of sales tax was required in the sum of $4,056.00. Said sum was paid under protest on or about June 10, 1977. Until the sale of its assets, the business of petitioner had always been the sale of insurance and the administration of self-insurance programs for insureds and self-insureds throughout Florida and other states. The aircraft had been used in the business of petitioner, but petitioner had never engaged in the sale or leasing of aircraft as all or any part of its business. Since the sale of its assets, petitioner has not been engaged in business and petitioner has adopted and filed with the Internal Revenue Service of the United States a Resolution requiring that petitioner conduct no further business and that petitioner be liquidated. The sale of the two aircraft upon which the tax in question was paid under protest is an occasional or isolated sale. Petitioner filed a Claim for Refund upon the ground that the sale was an isolated sale. The Claim for Refund was denied by letter of August 11, 1977 from the Office of the Comptroller of the State of Florida, a copy of which is appended hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A."
Recommendation That the denial of tax refund to the petitioner by the State Comptroller be affirmed. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Horwich, Esquire Suite 302 University Federal Building 2222 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Cecil Davis, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner owes State of Florida use tax and local government infrastructure tax on the alleged use of three airplanes.
Findings Of Fact Charles and Dorothy Tolbert own and operate American Aircraft International, Inc. (American). American is in the business primarily of selling and brokering aircraft sales. Most of American's business involves brokering in which American earns a commission or fee for putting together a seller and buyer and bringing the transaction to a conclusion. On a much less frequent basis, American will purchase an airplane for resale. American advertises the availability of its airplanes, both brokered and American-owned, for either sale or lease. However, American has not had occasion to lease one of its own aircraft except as part of a lease-purchase agreement. American does not make any other use of airplanes it offers for sale or lease, except as necessary for maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers or lessees. Such use would be cost-prohibitive. Fuel, crew, and insurance costs would be well in excess of the cost of a ticket on a commercial airline. American's insurance policy only covers the use of the planes for demonstration and maintenance purposes. On February 6, 1990, American traded for a King Air 200, N56GR, serial number 059, at an acquisition value of $650,000. The King Air 200 was delivered to American from Carlisle, Kentucky, and held by American for resale purposes only and was flown only for purposes of maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers. When it was sold in 1991 to an English company, BC Aviation, Ltd., American had flown the aircraft only 7 hours. The aircraft was delivered out-of- state in May 1991. In July 1991, American bought a kit for a home-built aircraft called the Renegade, serial number 445. The kit was manufactured and sold by a company in British Columbia, Canada. American's intent in purchasing the kit was to build the airplane and decide whether to become a dealer. It took a year and a half to build, and by the time it was completed, American decided not to pursue the dealership. In September of 1991, American sold the Renegage to the Tolberts. The Tolberts registered the Renegade in September 1994, under N493CT. At first, the Tolberts did not pay sales tax on their purchase of the Renegade. They thought that, since they owned American, no sales tax was due. When the Department audited American and pointed out that sales tax was due, the Tolberts paid the tax in December 1994. In 1991, American also purchased a King Air B90, N988SL, serial number LJ438, for $175,000. The King Air B90 was held by American for resale purposes only and was flown only for purposes of maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers. In July 1991, American sold the aircraft to Deal Aviation of Chicago, Illinois. However, Deal could not qualify for its own financing, so American agreed to lease-sell the aircraft to Deal. Under the lease-purchase agreement entered into on July 21, 1991, the purchase price was $269,000, payable $4,747.85 a month until paid in full. (The agreement actually said payments would be made for 84 months, but that would amount to total payments well in excess of the purchase price; the evidence did not explain this discrepancy.) American continued to hold title to the aircraft and continued to make payments due to the bank on American's financing for the aircraft. The lease- purchase agreement must have been modified, or payments accelerated, because American transferred title to the aircraft in April 1993. The Department asserted that a Dolphin Aviation ramp rental invoice on the King Air B90 issued in August for the month of September 1991 reflected that the aircraft was parked at the Sarasota-Bradenton Airport at the time of the invoice, which would have been inconsistent with American's testimony and evidence. But the invoice contained the handwritten notation of Dorothy Tolbert that the airplane was "gone," and her testimony was uncontradicted that she telephoned Dolphin when she got the invoice and to inform Dolphin that the invoice was in error since the plane had not been at the ramp since Deal removed it to Illinois on July 21, 1991. As a result, no ramp rent was paid after July 1991. Indeed, the Department's own audit schedules reflect that no ramp rent was paid on the King Air B90 after July 1991. The Department also presented an invoice dated September 16, 1991, in the amount of $3400 for engine repairs done on the King Air B90 by Hangar One Aviation in Tampa, Florida. The invoice reflects that the repairs were done for American and that they were paid in full on September 19, 1991, including Florida sales tax. The Department contended that the invoice was inconsistent with American's testimony and evidence. But although American paid for these repairs, together with Florida sales tax, Mrs. Tolbert explained that the repairs were made under warranty after the lease-purchase of the airplane by Deal. A minor engine problem arose soon after Deal removed the airplane to Illinois. Deal agreed to fly the plane to Hangar One for the repairs, and American agreed to pay for the repairs. After the repairs were made, Hangar One telephoned Mrs. Tolbert with the total, and she gave Hangar One American's credit card number in payment. She did not receive American's copy of the invoice until later. She does not recall if she: noticed the Florida sales tax and did not think to question it; noticed it and decided it was not enough money ($179) to be worth disputing; or just did not notice the Florida sales tax. When American's certified public accountant (CPA), Allan Shaw, prepared American's federal income tax return for 1990, he included the King Air 200 as a fixed capital asset on the company's book depreciation schedule and booked $26,146 of depreciation on the aircraft for 1990 on a cost basis of $650,000. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the aircraft ($92,857) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. The next year, 1991, Shaw included the both the King Air B90 and the Renegade as fixed capital assets on the company's book depreciation schedule. He booked $9,378 of depreciation on the B90 on a cost basis of $175,000 and $1,872 on the Renegade on a cost basis of $25,922 for part of the year 1991. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the B90 ($12,507) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. This depreciation was subtracted from the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the return in the amount of $22,796, which represented the payments from Deal under the lease-purchase agreement. The Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. The next year, 1992, Shaw again included the both the King Air B90 and the Renegade as fixed capital assets on the company's book depreciation schedule. He booked $35,613 of depreciation on the B90 and $5,555 on the Renegade. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the B90 ($25,014) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. This depreciation was subtracted from the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the return in the amount of $51,737, which again represented the payments from Deal under the lease-purchase agreement. The Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. It is not clear from the evidence why American's CPA decided American was entitled to claim depreciation on the three aircraft in question. (Shaw also depreciated another airplane in 1989 which was before the period covered by the Department's audit.) Shaw's final hearing and deposition testimony was confusing as to whether he recalled discussing the question with the Tolberts. He may have; if he did, he probably discussed it with Mrs. Tolbert. Meanwhile, Mrs. Tolbert does not recall ever discussing the question of depreciation with Shaw. In all likelihood, Shaw probably made his own decision that American could depreciate the airplanes to minimize income taxes by claiming that they were fixed capital assets used in the business and not just inventory items being held for resale. For the King Air B90, there were lease payments Shaw could use to justify his decision; but there were no lease payments for the King Air 200 or the Renegade. The evidence was not clear whether there were lease payments for the airplane Shaw depreciated in 1989. For the next year, 1993, Shaw included the Renegade as a fixed capital asset on the company's book depreciation schedule and booked $7,712 of depreciation on the Renegade. For federal tax purposes, the Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. When the Department audited American starting in July 1994, tax auditor William Berger saw the depreciation schedules and tax returns, both of which indicated to him that the three airplanes in question were used by the company, but no sales or use tax was paid on them. (He also pointed out the Tolberts' failure to pay sales tax on the purchase of the Renegade from American, and the Tolberts later paid the tax, as previously mentioned.) As a result, on July 26, 1995, the Department issued two notices of intent. One was to make sales and use tax audit changes which sought to assess American $56,097.77 in use taxes, together with delinquent penalties of $14,657.36 and interest through July 26, 1995, in the amount of $31,752.61, for a total of $102,507.74, with subsequent interest accruing at the rate of $18.44 per day. The second was to make local government infrastructure surtax audit changes which sought to assess American $609.99 in the surtax, together with delinquent penalties of $163.14 and interest through July 26, 1995, in the amount of $256.33, for a total of $1,029.46, with subsequent interest accruing at the rate of $.20 per day. It is not clear from the record how the Department arrived at the use tax and surtax figures. The alleged use tax assessment should have been calculated as $51,061.32 (six percent of the acquisition costs of the airplanes), and the alleged surtax assessment should have been calculated at the statutory maximum of $50 per item, for a total of $150. On August 28, 1995, American made a partial payment of $5,496.44 on the Department's use tax and surtax audit change assessments, intending to leave a disputed assessed amount of $51,061.32 in use tax and $150 in surtax. It is not clear from the record what American intended the $5,496.44 to apply towards. American filed an Informal Protest of the use tax and surtax audit change assessments on February 26, 1996. The Informal Protest contended that the use tax and surtax were not due and that the federal income tax depreciation schedules were "not determinative." On October 6, 1996, the Department issued a Notice of Decision denying American's protest primarily on the ground that the depreciation of the aircraft for federal income tax purposes constituted using them for use tax purposes. After receiving the Notice of Decision, on November 4, 1996, American filed amended tax returns to remove the depreciation of the airplanes (together with the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the 1991 return). (Although CPA Shaw refused to admit it, it is clear that American's federal income tax returns were amended in order to improve its defense against the Department's use tax and surtax assessments.) As a result of the amended returns, American had to pay an additional $15,878 in federal income tax on the 1990 return; there was no change in the tax owed on any of the other returns. On November 6, 1996, American filed a Petition for Reconsideration on the ground that the returns had been amended and the additional federal income tax paid. On January 10, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration denying American's Petition for Reconsideration on the ground that "subsequent modifications made to the federal income tax returns will have no affect [sic] upon" the use tax and surtax assessments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order withdrawing the assessment of use tax and local government infrastructure surtax, delinquent penalties, and interest against American. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Albert J. Wollermann, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Respondent Gene Lawrence (Lawrence) is president of Respondent Home Owner's Equity Fund, Inc. (Homeowners) and has been for six years. He is not licensed as a real estate broker or salesperson in Florida and has not been so since 1987 or 1988. He has never worked actively in the real estate business. At no time has Homeowners ever employed a licensed real estate broker, nor was it itself licensed to engage in real estate brokerage activities. Homeowners was formed in 1986 or 1988. Lawrence is the sole owner of Homeowners. From December 1986 through December 1993, Homeowners engaged in business involving the purchase and sale of single-family homes, employing from 1-3 employees in its principal place of business in Ft. Myers. In general, Homeowners purchased homes and sold them to buyers, receiving installment payments for the purchase price. In most cases, Homeowners used contracts for deed or sometimes a lease-purchase arrangement. Homeowners located buyers through newspaper advertising. The advertisements stated that a person could own his own home instead of paying rent for about the same monthly payment. Advertisements, mostly in a shopper- type newspaper, ran almost continuously. One of Homeowner's ads, under the "For Sale by Owner" category, states: HAVE YOU HAD TROUBLE GETTING A MORTGAGE? CAN YOU AFFORD $500 OR MORE PER MONTH? WE CAN PUT YOU IN A HOME OF YOUR CHOICE! INVESTORS WILL BUY THE HOME & HOLD THE MORTGAGE. NO QUALIFYING. 332-0043 Another Homeowner ad, under rental properties, states: WOULD YOU RATHER OWN THAN RENT? FOR THE SAME MONTHLY PAYMENTS AND DEPOSIT YOU CAN PURCHASE YOUR OWN HOME! VARIOUS PRICES - SIZES - AREAS. NO BANKS, NO CREDIT CHECKS, NO HASSLES. CALL 332-0053 TODAY!! After meeting a customer in the office, Lawrence or another employee of Homeowners would determine if the customer's desires were reasonable. If so, the customer's profile, including needs and ability to pay, would be filed. If the customer was interested in obtaining the services of Homeowners, the customer had to pay a fee at the initial meeting. The fee was usually $125. The service provided by Homeowners was to offer to sell to the customer homes that it already owned or, more often, homes that it was willing to purchase. If the customer became interested in a house that Homeowners was unwilling to purchase, Homeowners would not assist the customer in any way. Following the initial visit, Homeowners would give the customer a list of homes that Homeowners was considering buying. At the same time, Homeowners did a credit check on the customer. The fee paid by the customer entitled him to these services from Homeowners for 120 days. Homeowners typically purchased homes with seller- provided financing, usually with a low down payment. The homes were of a price that Respondents' customers could afford, given their modest means. The price range was typically $50,000 to $60,000. In Lee County, where Respondents focused their efforts, a house in that range might have two or three bedrooms. If the customer purchased a home from Homeowners, it would credit his fee against his first month's payment. Otherwise, the fee was nonrefundable. When Homeowners purchased a home, Lawrence typically handled the negotiations with the listing agent. Lawrence or one of Homeowners' employees then negotiated the sale to the customer. On November 15, 1991, Curtis McRee gave Lawrence a $750 down payment on a mobile home and lot in N. Ft. Myers. At the same time, he and his wife, Lynda L. McRee entered into a contract for deed with Homeowners under which Homeowners would convey "by a good and sufficient deed" fee simple title, clear of all encumbrances, if the McRees paid an additional $24,250 with interest at an annual rate of 10.5 percent through monthly payments of $386. At this rate, 92 monthly payments would be required to satisfy the obligation. The contract for deed involves a mobile home lot, but omits any mention of a mobile home. On the same date, Respondents acquired the same property from a third party. The purchase money mortgage note was for $19,750, bearing interest at the annual rate of 10 percent, and payable by 84 monthly payments of $327.87. When the McRees missed some payments, Respondents failed to make payments to their mortgagee, which foreclosed on the mortgage and retook title to the property. On May 18, 1992, Homeowners acquired three lots from a third party for $30,319.80. On the same date, Homeowners entered into a contract for deed with Delfino and Candelaria Lopez under which Homeowners would convey fee simple title to the three lots, free of all encumbrances, by a "good and sufficient deed," if they paid $39,950 at 10.5 percent annually by monthly payments of between $375 and $396. On May 25, 1992, Laura A. Ortiz paid Homeowners a fee of $120. The receipt form states that Ms. Ortiz acknowledges that the fee "is collected in advance from clients interested in purchasing residential property, owned, or to be owned by [Homeowners]." The form adds that, during the next 120 days, Homeowners will offer Ms. Ortiz homes with monthly payments of less than $500 and Homeowners will offer owner financing at 10.5 percent annually. The form concludes by noting that the fee is nonrefundable, but will be credited toward the first monthly payment. On June 25, 1990, Homeowners acknowledged receipt from Ms. Ortiz of $500 as an "escrow deposit" for property located at 15779 Treasure Island. It is unclear whether Homeowners had a contract with the owner of 15779 Treasure Island when Homeowners accepted Ms. Ortiz's $500 escrow deposit. However, a dispute developed between Homeowners and the owner over liability to repair a roof, and Homeowners could not offer the property to Ms. Ortiz, who instead rented another property owned by Homeowners at a monthly rental of $500. Based on Lawrence's affidavit, Ms. Ortiz paid Homeowners a deposit of $4000, of which only $3500 was refunded when the deal fell through. The $500 withheld was to pay rent that Ms. Ortiz owed. On April 19, 1993, Rosa Saez paid Homeowners the $125 fee and entered into a receipt form of the type described above. Ms. Saez found a house that she liked and paid Homeowners a deposit of $1000. When some problem arose preventing Homeowners from purchasing the property that she wanted, Lawrence returned the $1000 deposit by giving Ms. Saez a personal check dated July 8, 1993. There is no evidence connecting Humberto Zabala or Sandra Aparicio to Homeowners or Lawrence. In December 1993, Homeowners stopped operating due to the pending disciplinary investigation and poor health of Lawrence. In March 1994, Lawrence began operating a similar type of business in his own name. He claims that he is not a broker and does not need to be licensed because he does not put buyers and sellers together nor does he charge a commission. Lawrence claims to sell only the homes that he owns and does so as a "social service for people," which he has continued to offer, despite doing no better than breaking even, due to a "dogged determination, a perseverance, perseverance and tenacity."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts IX and X of the Administrative Complaint, finding each Respondent guilty of four counts of engaging in real estate brokerage activities without a license, and imposing an administrative fine of $5000 against Gene Lawrence and $5000 against Home Owners Equity Fund, Inc. ENTERED on August 24, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 24, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-12: adopted or adopted in substance. 13: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 14-15: adopted or adopted in substance. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3: adopted or adopted in substance. 4: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Typically, Homeowners did not acquire the real property until a customer had expressed interest in the property. 5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6-8: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 9-11: adopted or adopted in substance. 12: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 13-14: adopted or adopted in substance. 15: rejected as irrelevant. 16-18: adopted or adopted in substance. 19: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 20-21: rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Theodore R. Gay Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 NW 2nd Ave. Suite N-607 Miami, FL 33128 Harry Blair Blair & Blair 2138-40 Hoople St. Ft. Myers, FL 33901 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900
The Issue There are several issues that were under consideration in these cases. The first issue concerns the taxability of sales of used rental cars by Chestnut Fleet Rentals, Inc., referred to subsequently as Chestnut (DOAH Case No. 81- 1227); second, the taxability of short-term sub-leasing of rental cars by American International Rent-A-Car of Florida, Inc., subsequently referred to as American, to individual sub-leases (DOAH Case No. 81-1228); and finally, the taxability of car rentals (sub-leasing) from American to employees of the federal government when those employees used their personal credit cards or paid cash for the car rental. (DOAH Case No. 81-1228).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Chestnut is a foreign corporation with authorization to do business in the state of Florida. Petitioner American is a Florida corporation doing business at various places in Florida. The corporate address of both Petitioners is 3000 Admiral Wilson Boulevard, Pennsauken, New Jersey. On October 25, 1976, Patrick Treacy, an auditor with the State of Florida, Department of Revenue, made a tax audit of the books and records of the two petitioning corporations. This audit was made in the offices of the two corporations. The audit was concluded on December 24, 1976, and was followed by an initial Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Each company was notified of an intention to assess tax. A copy of the initial Notices of Proposed Assessment may be found as Respondent's Exhibits A and B which date from February 17, 1977. Exhibit A is American and Exhibit B is Chestnut. In arriving at these statements of proposed assessments, against American, Treacy had examined, among other things, the sales tax returns, general ledgers, rental agreements, daily branch reports, purchase invoices, and source journals. Reference American, it had been discovered that automobiles which had been rented in accordance with a contract between American and the United States General Services Administration, rentals pertaining to government employees, in Florida, under special rates, were transactions in which no tax was being collected for the benefit of the State of Florida. On occasions where the federal government was billed directly, for the rental, no tax was sought; however, the Notice of Proposed Assessment called for the remittance of tax on those rentals in which the employee paid cash or used a personal credit card in the transaction. Moreover, the initial assessment related to American called for collection of tax on transactions not involving federal employees or the General Services Administration contract in which tax was not collected on certain rentals in Florida. The cars which were the subject of both the General Services Administration rentals and non-government rentals, and for which Florida sought the collection of tax, had initially been leased to American International of Florida, Inc., from Chestnut Fleet Rentals and American International of Atlanta, Georgia, through a primary lease agreement, with the cars to be sublet to the general public. That lease agreement was one in which tax was paid to the State of Florida and credit afforded for that agreement. It is the further sub-lease from American International of Florida to the ultimate consumer that is the subject of the two categories of tax collection for the rental. The period involved is from February 1, 1973 through October 31, 1976. In the Chestnut Fleet Rentals circumstance of the February 17, 1977 assessment, tax collection was sought on the sale of long-term fleet rental cars, in Florida, to the lessees or other consumers, in which the State of Florida believed that sales tax was not collected. On this occasion, a pro-rata assessment was made in view of the fact that Chestnut did not have source documents representing the sales prior to November, 1974. Consequently, the pro-rata estimate was made of the pre- November 1974 sales based upon subsequent sales where records had been kept. At the final hearing Chestnut did not refute the prorata adjustment by contrary proof. The overall circumstance with Chestnut Fleet related to the audit period of February 1, 1973 through October 31, 1976. In all instances related to American and Chestnut, the State of Florida sought and continues to seek a delinquent penalty and interest. In those several categories American and Chestnut were responsible for the collection and remission of any tax which the State of Florida was certified to collect and to keen any needed records to aid in that endeavor. In the American circumstances at issue the incidence of tax fell upon the lessees. In the Chestnut sales the incidence of tax fell upon the purchasers. By correspondence of February 11, 1980 from counsel for the Petitioners, the proposed assessments were challenged. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit C. In referring to the sale of used cars by Chestnut, its counsel did not state opposition as such, it was merely indicated that counsel wished to check with its client to be sure that the client agreed with the figures set forth in the proposed assessment. This was also the circumstance in the situation related to leases to customers other than federal government employees. In effect, counsel for the Petitioner American was asking for the opportunity to verify the tax owed based upon the circumstance that existed after credit was given for taxes that had already been paid. The General Services Administration rentals from American to federal employees were protested in their totality. On June 11, 1980, the protest was responded to by the State of Florida in its Notice of Decision. On that occasion, it was indicated that the position of the State related to the lease of American cars to non-federal employees would remain the same. The lease of American cars to federal employees was upheld in the area of rentals where federal employees paid in cash or through the use of their own credit cards. On that occasion of the notice, reference was made to Rule 12A-1.01(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code, as a basis for sustaining the State's position. That provision states, "When hotel accommodations are paid for directly by church officials from church funds, an exemption certificate may be used to exempt such transactions from tax. If hotel bills are paid by guests and reimbursement is made from church funds as expense accounts of individuals, the tax shall be paid by such individuals. This provision was offered by way of analogy, in the mind of the State of Florida. In the decision, no mention was made of the sale of rental cars by Chestnut. There followed an informal conference between the taxpayers' former attorney who had authored Respondent's Exhibit C, and officials within the Department. At that time, American, through its former counsel, sought to have the State of Florida abandon its request for penalty in the rental circumstance involving non-federal renters, and to have the State possibly consider a stipulated payment schedule for the tax due. It continued to oppose the idea of the assessment of tax on the American rentals through the General Services Administration contract. In the Chestnut Fleet sales of lease cars to consumers, counsel sought the State's acquiescence in the removal of penalties on that tax claim. This informal conference was memorialized in correspondence of former counsel for the Petitioners, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit On February 26, 1981, the State of Florida issued its Notice of Reconsideration. A copy of this is found as Respondent's Exhibit F. In this notice, the State continues to assert its right to collect the tax in the several categories that are at issue, denies the opportunity for stipulated payments pending proof of qualification for that payment plan and refuses to consider the question of penalty reduction until the matters have been settled. At that point in time, the agency was proceeding under what, in effect, was a fourth revised notice of assessment as to American and a third revision as to Chestnut. These notices of assessment date from June 25, 1980. The assessment pertaining to the American International rentals per agreement with the General Services Administration are found as Exhibit G by the Respondent, a copy. The assessments pertaining to American International's rentals to persons other than through the General Services Administration contract are found as Respondent's Exhibit H, a copy. Finally, the assessments pertaining to the Chestnut Fleet rental sales to consumers of their off-lease automobiles may be found as Respondent's Exhibit I, a copy. In each circumstance, the state of Florida continues to request the imposition of a delinquent penalty and accrued interest. Following the receipt of the February 26, 1981 Notice of Reconsideration, the Petitioners filed a Request for Relief pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, related to the issues as set forth in the Recommended Order. Those petitions as amended have been considered through the hearing process.
Findings Of Fact Arrowhead Country Club (Arrowhead) is a business entity owned by Can Am Company, Ltd., a limited partnership, which held at all times pertinent to this case a beverage license issued by the Division of Beverage. Can Am Company, Ltd. entered into a lease with EST Corporation (EST) to lease the restaurant and lounge at Arrowhead to EST. Subsequently, RST applied for its corporate charter but was unable to use the name RST. It amended its corporate name to Wilval Corporation (Wilval). RST/Wilval continued to operate the restaurant and lounge under the terms of its lease. EST/Wilval obtained a sales tax number, collected tax, and remitted taxes for several months, May through October, 1978. Thereafter, RST/Wilval failed to remit sales taxes to the Department of Revenue. RST/Wilval also began to fall behind on its payments to Arrowhead under its lease. This resulted in Arrowhead taking certain charges in payment for monies due under the lease and collecting them from club members. Arrowhead remitted the four percent lease tax but not the sales tax on these collections. Testimony was submitted by the Department's auditor that there was no evidence of collusion between RST/ Wilval and Arrowhead or indication that they did not deal at arm's length with one another. The Department audited RST/Wilval and determined that, although the first few months of records were complete, its total records were incomplete. An estimate of sales taxes due was based upon estimates of the sales based upon the records of Arrowhead on the restaurant and lounge operations for the preceding year adjusted for price increases. These estimates, when compared against the records which were maintained by RST/Wilval in its first months of operation, show a close correlation. Based upon these estimates, the sales taxes assessed against RST/Wilval were $7,965.14. This assessment was presented to Ralph Williams, the manager of the RST/Wilval operation. Williams, an officer of the corporation, advised that RST/Wilval was unable to pay the taxes. The Department of Revenue then filed a warrant for collection of delinquent taxes, and the Sheriff of Broward County attempted to levy on the warrant. Williams tendered to Arrowhead a Notice of Termination of the Lease and vacated the premises on March 26, 1979. When the Sheriff attempted to levy the warrant, he found that Williams had left the location and the property on the premises belonged to Arrowhead. On Nay 18, 1979, the Department presented a jeopardy assessment to Arrowhead, which led to the instant controversy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the sales taxes due not be assessed against Arrowhead Country Club. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Linda C. Procta, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis J. Pleeter, Esquire 6200 Stirling Road, Davie Post Office Box 8549 Hollywood, Florida 33024
Findings Of Fact Petitioner purchased the facilities of a bankrupt chemical recovery plant and on May 13, 1987, was issued a temporary tax exemption (Exhibit 1) for sales taxes on equipment purchased for the production or processing of tangible personal property for resale. Petitioner essentially operates a distillation plant where products are distilled and certain chemicals are produced. The plant also operates as a servicing facility in removing impurities from products submitted for distillation. Because the materials received at the plant were not as clean as originally anticipated, there was less product for resale and more servicing provided than originally intended. The items on which sales tax refunds are requested were used to ,repair and/or refurbish the distillation plant, and the business qualifies as new business under Section 212.08(5)(b)(1), Florida Statutes. In 1987, Petitioner had receivables totaling $824,819 of which only $63,474 (7.7%) was in the account for sale of tangible personal property (Exhibit 3). Petitioner's witness testified that the other receivable accounts (Exhibit 3) are not service accounts. Petitioner now has an inventory of tangible personal property for sale in excess of $100,000 which was produced through the distillation plant. Although Respondent's auditor initially contended that Petitioner had failed to produce all invoices and bills to justify the exemptions claimed, on cross-examination he acknowledged that the refund for sale taxes paid on the equipment purchased was denied solely on the basis that the equipment and plant was not used principally for the production of tangible personal property for sale. The Notice of Intent (Exhibit 6) denied Petitioner's application for a sales tax refund in the amount of $12,592.75 for the reason that: Business is primarily a service organiza- tion and tangible personal property is only a minute show (sic) of the operation. Records were incomplete. The witness who signed the Notice of Intent understands the denial of the refund of sales taxes was because the sale of tangible personal property produced by Petitioner was not the primary or a substantial part of the revenues generated by the plant.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is liable for tax, interest, and penalty, as claimed in the proposed assessment.
Findings Of Fact Gary J. Bell (Mr. Bell) and his father Sidney Bell formed Petitioner in 1992. Until Mr. Sidney Bell left the company in his son's sole control in 2001, they were the sole shareholders and officers of the company, which had two other employees. Mr. Bell and his father estimated and checked jobs. Not fabricating fences itself, Petitioner obtained finished fences from suppliers and installed them, primarily at private residences. The audit period in this case extends from May 1, 1995, through November 30, 1999 (Audit Period). By 1995, Petitioner had four employees: one in the office and three laborers. The nature of Petitioner's business had changed from entirely residential to about half commercial, mostly consisting of sales to the State of Florida. The size and nature of Petitioner's business did not change significantly during the remainder of the audit period, although the percentage of sales to the State of Florida increased somewhat. Without referring to any records, Mr. Bell estimates that Petitioner's gross sales during the 55-month audit period totaled $1.2 to $1.4 million. Jose Rouco, a tax auditor of Respondent, sent a notice in May 2000 to Mr. Bell informing him of Respondent's intention to examine Petitioner's records. Due to a change of address, Mr. Rouco sent the form a second time. When he received no response to the form, in September 2000, Mr. Rouco visited the address that he had found for the company. Speaking to someone at a nearby business, Mr. Rouco learned that the fencing business had recently moved from the second address. On November 22, 2000, Mr. Rouco spoke to Mr. Bell on the telephone and learned that the records required for the audit were at Petitioner's present business address. Mr. Rouco directed Mr. Bell to send him copies of these records. When Mr. Bell failed to do so, Mr. Rouco sent a demand letter on December 12, 2000, warning that the failure to provide the requested records by December 27 would result in the issuance of a Formal Notice of Demand to Produce Certain Records. On December 28, 2000, after Mr. Bell had failed to respond by the deadline stated in the December 12 letter, Mr. Rouco issued a Formal Notice of Demand to Produce Certain Records for the Audit Period by 10:00 a.m. on January 9, 2001. The form warns: "Failure to produce [the records] may result in the immediate issuance of a distress warrant or a jeopardy assessment in the amount of an estimated assessment of all taxes, interest, and penalties due and payable to the State of Florida." When Mr. Bell failed to produce the records by January 9, 2001, Mr. Rouco proceeded to estimate taxes that Petitioner owed. A couple of weeks later, he received as unclaimed the December 12 letter and December 28 notice, which he had sent certified mail, return receipt requested, to Petitioner's correct address. The record does not disclose why Mr. Bell never took delivery of this mail. Based on Mr. Rouco's work, Respondent issued on April 30, 2001, a Notice of Proposed Assessment, which claimed, for the Audit Period, taxes of $227,610, a penalty of $113,805, and interest of $98,583.19 through April 30, 2001, and $74.83 daily after April 30, for a total of $439,998.19. The notice warns that the proposed assessment would become a final assessment if Petitioner did not file an informal protest by June 29, 2001, and that Petitioner must commence a judicial action or administrative proceeding by August 28, 2001. By letter dated August 10, 2001, Willie Barnett, a certified public accountant, informed Respondent that he was Petitioner's accountant, and he was responding to Respondent's tax notice dated July 25, 2001. The record does not contain any documents from Respondent dated July 25, 2001. However, Mr. Barnett's letter states that Petitioner "is in the business of installing fences, not retail sale. In those instances where the company purchases the fencing materials, the sales taxes are paid at the point of purchase." The letter concludes that Petitioner is therefore not liable for sales taxes. Mr. Bell asserts that Petitioner has paid all taxes lawfully due, but that Petitioner is not required to collect any tax on its sales to consumers because these are sales pursuant to real property contracts. Respondent's file already contained the information that Mr. Barnett supplied. By Audit Assignment Request received January 11, 1999, by Respondent's Case Selection Division, L. David Mills, evidently an employee of Respondent, wrote: "Taxpayer sells and installs real property. Potential for recovery on purchases and fabrication labor and overhead. Taxpayer does not appear to be registered." By a file memorandum dated October 25, 2000, Joan C. Rietze, also evidently an employee of Respondent, wrote: "Talked to Gary Bell. . . . He also stated that he pays tax on all of the purchases he makes. He requested that his tax number be cancelled in December of last year. The sales tax number was cancelled in October, 2000." In estimating Petitioner's tax liability in January 2001, Mr. Rouco identified four areas: taxable sales, taxable purchases, taxable acquisition of fixed assets, and taxable rent. Mr. Rouco's estimates were $207,900 for uncollected taxes on sales, $6270 for unpaid taxes on purchases of items other than fixed assets, $6840 for unpaid taxes on fixed assets, and $6600 for unpaid taxes on warehouse rent. Without much explanation, Mr. Rouco selected a "small construction company" as the source of gross monthly sales of $63,000, as well as other relevant business activity. However, this choice produces $3.465 million of gross sales during the Audit Period, which is almost three times Mr. Bell's estimate. Factually, the record offers scant support for Mr. Rouco's selection of the "small construction company" as a comparable to Petitioner's business. Petitioner's business was not construction; it purchased already-fabricated fences and installed them. Coupled with the problem with the comparable, the record does not support Mr. Rouco's estimate of Petitioner's tax due on purchase amounts of fixed assets, and Petitioner has proved that it does not owe additional taxes on such purchases. Petitioner's labor-intensive services, coupled with its itinerant nature during the Audit Period, suggest strongly few, if any, such purchases. Coupled with the problem with the comparable, the record does not support Mr. Rouco's estimate of Petitioner's tax due on warehouse rent, and Petitioner has proved that it does not owe additional taxes on such rent payments. The estimate concerning unpaid warehouse rent sales tax requires the presumption that Petitioner's several lessor's found some reason not to collect and remit sales tax based on the lease payments. Any dealer-like activities by Petitioner involving sales for resales would not impact its liability to pay this tax, so misuse of a dealer registration is unlikely here. Nor has Respondent suggested such widespread noncompliance with this component of the sales tax as to justify a presumption of noncompliance among Petitioner's lessors, even assuming that Mr. Rouco generated a gross rent that is factually supported by the record. Notwithstanding the problem with the comparable, the factual record supports Mr. Rouco's estimate of Petitioner's tax due on purchases of items other than fixed assets, and Petitioner has failed to prove that it does not owe additional taxes on such purchases. For much, if not all, of the Audit Period, Petitioner appears to have been a registered dealer. Mr. Bell's unprofessional handling of this matter while Mr. Rouco attempted to perform a routine audit inspires little confidence that Mr. Bell would not misuse a dealer registration and resale certificate. Thus, although the use of the "small construction company" as a comparable is questionable, there is factual support for the assessment of $6270 in unpaid taxes on these purchases over the Audit Period. As noted below, the main problem with Mr. Rouco's estimate of Petitioner's tax due on sales to consumers is legal, not factual. As for the main factual aspect of this issue, the record offers no support that Petitioner sold to consumers using a retail sale plus installation contract, as opposed to a simple lump sum contract. Nothing in Petitioner's operation, as reflected on this record, suggests that it would be more inclined to use the more sophisticated contract.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Department enter a final order adjusting the assessment against Petitioner to reflect unpaid sales tax of $6270, a penalty of $3135, and interest at the lawful rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Bruce Hoffman, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Gary J. Bell, Qualified Representative Bell & Son Fence Company, Inc. 6600 Northwest 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33147 John Mica, Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, the Respondent entered a sales tax assessment in the amount of one thousand four hundred sixty-one and eighty-two one hundredths dollars ($1,461.82) against the Petitioner. In support thereof, Respondent takes the position that payments of $300.00 per charter hour of flying time by the Petitioner to owners of aircraft in order that Petitioner may use said aircraft to provide charter services to third parties are payments for the rental of tangible personal property and therefore subject to a sales tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Petitioner on the other hand, takes the position that it is the agent of the owners of the aircraft and as such, provides services which are exempt from taxation pursuant to Department of Revenue Rule 12A-1.71(8), Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Robert Capen, President of the Petitioner, testified that Petitioner has verbal arrangements to utilize the services of two jet aircraft to further its charter services. As a charter service, Petitioner transports third persons to a certain destination and provides the fuel and crew in return for an amount ranging from $300.00 to $750.00 per charter hour, depending on the length of the flight. The amount for services paid by third persons are made payable by check or other credit memos to Petitioner and said amounts are reported as income to the Internal Revenue Service. Pursuant to the verbal agreement with the aircraft owners, Petitioner guarantees that the aircraft will be chartered to third persons three hundred (300) hours annually. In return therefor, Petitioner pays the aircraft owners $300.00 per charter hour on a monthly basis. In addition thereto, Petitioner provides crews, maintains, schedules and operates the aircraft for the owners and is responsible for the proper licensing and certification of the aircraft for charter flights. For these services, Petitioner received a management fee in the total amount of $7,500.00 per month from the two owners of the aircraft. Based on the $300.00 per charter hour fee which is paid by Petitioner to the owners, Respondent entered its assessment claiming that the services provided by Petitioner constitute a "lease or rental" as provided in Section 212.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Respondent also points out that the legislative intent as enunciated by the state is that every person is exercising a taxable privilege when leasing or renting tangible property within Florida as set forth in Chapter 212.05, Florida Statutes, and that a tax therefore must be imposed on the gross proceeds of all rentals or leases of tangible personal Property, citing Section 212.11(3), Florida Statutes and Department of Revenue Rule 12A-1.71(1), Florida Administrative Code. Based on the facts adduced at the hearing including the testimony of Messrs. Capen, Nelson Brown and James Santimaw, President, Secretary and Treasurer respectively, it appears that this case is governed by the statutory authority contained in Section 212, Florida Statutes, as implemented by Respondent's Rule 12A-1.71, Florida Administrative Code. Although Petitioner urges that its services amount to the creation of an agency relationship between the aircraft owners, the relevant facts tend to show otherwise. For example, Petitioner provides fuel and crew while third persons did not take possession of nor exert any control over the aircraft. As stated, Petitioner charges and receives an amount ranging from $500.00 to $750.00 per charter hour directly from third persons who have no dealings whatsoever with the aircraft owners. In the absence of any evidence tending to show that any type of agency relationship existed other than the statements advanced by Mr. Robert Brown during the course of the hearing, I hereby conclude that the Petitioner's contention that the services which it renders to third parties amount to a rental of tangible property and is therefore a taxable service within the meaning of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's final argument that its charter service amounts to a brokerage arrangement was also considered however this argument must also fall as there was no credible evidence tending to establish that the Petitioner was in any manner acting as broker for anyone other than itself.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law as recited above, it is recommended that the assessment referred to herein he upheld as a valid assessment. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia S. Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Rod Tennyson, Esquire Ombres, Powell & Tennyson, P.A. Suite 600, Clematis Building 208 Clematis Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Robert L. Shevin Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a real estate broker. After 18 years in the business in Michigan, Petitioner moved to Florida in August, 1988. After about one and one- half years working in residential real estate, Petitioner devoted his efforts exclusively to the sale of mobile homes. He soon began to specialize in the resale of mobile homes. In June 1990, Petitioner became self-employed and registered, or was required to register, as a dealer. He engaged in two types of mobile home sales: mobile homes with land and mobile homes without land. This case involves solely the sale of mobile homes without land. From June 20, 1990, through April 26, 1991, Petitioner was involved in the sale of 11 mobile homes without land, and these sales are the subject of the present case. In each transaction, Petitioner never took title or possession of the mobile homes; they remained on a rented lot in a mobile home park. In each transaction, Petitioner stated, on a notarized bill of sale, the sales price of the mobile home and the sales price of associated tangible personal property, such as sheds, carports, and furniture. The associated tangible personal property is typically referred to as "appurtenances." In most transactions, Petitioner listed the mobile home and found the buyer. At these closings, he collected a $2000 commission. In one transaction, which closed March 18, 1991, Petitioner did not secure the buyer, nor did he have the listing. The buyer and seller approached Petitioner and asked him to prepare the closing papers. In this case, Petitioner charged only $250. The sales price of this transaction was $18,900 with $7560 allocated to the appurtenances. The resulting additional tax liability was $453.60. In another transaction, Petitioner did not secure the buyer so he charged a reduced commission. In a third transaction, which closed April 5, 1991, Petitioner was not the listing agent, but agreed to prepare the closing documents because the listing broker was under sales tax audit and evidently did not wish to increase his potential liability. Only one more transaction followed the April 5 closing. The total sales price allocated to appurtenances in the 11 transactions is $145,280. The sales tax arising from these 11 transactions is $8716.80. On January 15, 1992, Respondent mailed to Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes. The notice sought to impose additional sales taxes of $8716.80, penalties of $2179.20, interest through said date of $1034.94, and per diem interest thereafter of $2.87. Respondent maintained this position through subsequent informal conferences. Petitioner acted in the capacity of a dealer in all transactions except the one on March 18, 1991, when he closed the transaction as an accommodation and charged a nominal fee. After deducting the sales tax on the appurtenances from the March 18 transaction, the remaining sales tax liability is $8263.20. There is no doubt that at all material times the Lee County Tax Collector's Office misinformed Petitioner and other dealers that they were not required to collect the sales tax on the casual sale of appurtenances in connection with the casual sale of a mobile home on a rented lot. However, there is no evidence that the Lee County Tax Collector's Office is an agent of Respondent. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent misinformed him as to his liability as a dealer to collect the tax on the sale of the mobile home and appurtenances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order assessing Respondent for $8263.20 in sales tax, plus interest, but waiving all penalties. ENTERED on October 18, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 18, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3: rejected as subordinate. 4: adopted or adopted in substance. 5: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 6: adopted or adopted in substance. 7: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence and irrelevant. 8: adopted or adopted in substance. 9: rejected as subordinate. 10: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. 11-13: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3-4: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. 5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6-16: rejected as subordinate. 17: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 18: rejected as subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 James G. Decker Decker and Smith, P.A. P.O. Box 9208 Ft. Myers, FL 33902-9208 Lealand L. McCharen Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol--Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
